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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

B. B. EDWARDS AND E. A. PARK,

Professors at Andover,

WITH THE SPECIAL CO-OPERATION OF

DR. ROBINSON AND PROF. STUART.

VOL. VI.



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THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XXI.

FEBRUARY, 1849.

ARTICLE I.

DEMOSTHENES AND MASSILLON.

Condensed and translated from the work of Dr. Theremin, entitled: "Demosthenes and Massillon.—A Contribution to the History of Eloquence." Berlin, 1845. By J. E. Lyman, M. A.

[LUDWIG Friedrich Franz Theremin was born in 1783 at Gramsow, in the northern part of Prussia, where his father was preacher in the French church. It may be well to state that, of the 800,000 protestants who fled from France at the time of the revocation of the edict of Nantes, some took refuge in the electorate of Brandenburg, where they enjoyed extensive civil privileges. At Prenzlow, a few miles from the native place of the author, most of the inhabitants are said to be their descendants. Hence we conclude, that of these, the congregation to which the elder Theremin preached, was composed; as also that in Berlin, to which Dr. Theremin himself was afterwards called to preach, might in part have been. He studied with his father and at the French gymnasium in Berlin, afterwards at the university in Halle, under the instructions of Dr. Knapp and the philologist and Homeric critic F. A. Wolf. He afterwards spent a year in Geneva, in preparation for the office of the ministry in the French church, and was ordained there in 1808. In 1810 he was called to the Werner church in Berlin, in place of the French preacher von Ancillon, descendant of one of the French protestants, and who had been appointed to the post of instructor of the present king, and was afterwards minister of State. In 1816 he was appointed preacher in the court

church and cathedral, where he accomplished his wish to preach in the German language. In 1824 he was appointed counsellor of the high consistory, and received a situation in the educational department of the ministry of ecclesiastical and medical affairs. And in 1840 he was appointed ordinary professor of theology in Berlin, in the department of Homiletics. He died in 1846.

"Theremin," says the *Conversations-Lexicon der Gegenwart* of 1841, "is one of the most distinguished living preachers, and is so much the greater, the more he possesses this character according to the homiletic principles which he has himself established. For him 'eloquence' is 'a virtue;' an expression which he has adopted as the main title of his work upon the 'fundamental principles of systematic rhetoric,' 2d ed. Berlin, 1837." In this work the author seeks to establish his principle, that 'eloquence is a virtue,' from the consideration of the aim which it pursues; that it has a purpose without itself; that it aims to produce a change in the dispositions or the actions of men, in the various relations of social life. Hence eloquence, as, for example, in an oration of Demosthenes, is interwoven with and cannot be separated from the circumstances of the times.

When an ancient orator arose to address an audience his eloquence was an action, and merited the name none the less and was none the less powerful for making use of speech instead of weapons. But as all activity of man in his relations must be guided by moral principles, the exercise of eloquence, which is no other than such an activity, can be subjected to no other than moral laws. The object of inquiry then is, what are the laws, according to which a free being may influence other free beings? A question which can be answered only from an ethical point of view. Considered in this light eloquence would belong to one of the highest qualities in man. Not that a certain degree of moral perfection suffices for the production of eloquence and renders all else superfluous, which it is accustomed to appropriate to itself from art, learning and science; but that it is reserved for the ethical law to arrange and determine that, which eloquence derives from these various departments. This is precisely what is demanded of a fundamental principle; and it is the ethical law, that determines where, how and in what measure each of the various means necessary to the orator are to be applied. So that eloquence, in all its various forms, is nothing more than the development of the moral impulse; and applied to pulpit oratory, the author remarks in another place, that the inner life of faith is the only source of sacred eloquence.

"As, in this work, the author derives all skill in following the essential laws of rhetoric, and hence all sure results of eloquence, from

the character, morally good, of the orator; so in his own preaching, and in his address, which satisfies, warms, and carries away the hearer, but without awakening *indefinite* emotions, we feel that it is his own participation in such effects, that it is love in the preacher, which constitutes the living fountain of his preaching, a love founded upon the gospel and personal experience of its power. The fresh effusions of his feeling and his zeal, without losing their power, are ruled by a delicate tact, formed after modern and ancient models, and by a *circumspection*, which, combined with a genuine desire to produce a result in the minds of his hearers, becomes an effort of love. These qualities appear not only in his sermons,¹ but also in various other forms, as in his 'Evening Hours,'² a collection of poems, dialogues and theological treatises; but especially in his treatise, full of heart and spirit, entitled 'Adelbert's Confessions.'³ His work, published in 1823, 'The Doctrine of the Kingdom of God,'⁴ shows what appeared to him the highest idea in his Christian convictions."

In the work before us the author presents two distinguished orators, the one from the ancient, the other from the modern world; the one in political, the other in religious life; but, as the author observes, alike in this, that they both appeared in an age of decline; and both set their faces against the degeneracy of the times.—TR.]

As the father of Demosthenes was an armorer, the son in a sense continued his profession by forging swords of speech. He was born 385 B. C.⁵ Losing his father in his seventh year, his guardians squandering his inheritance, feeble in his bodily structure, absenting himself from the gymnastic exercises of the Athenian youth, stammering in his speech, we may suppose him to have lived, in a great measure, apart from his fellows. A condition not so unfavorable, as it might seem, to the training of an orator; it affords him opportunity to collect the force of his character, which might otherwise be dispersed. And feeling himself separated from society, the desire might be stronger to influence it by the power of his thoughts and words.

¹ His sermons have been published in eight volumes, under various titles, as: *Das Kreuz Christi* (the Cross of Christ), 3 vols. Berlin, 1829; *Zeugnisse von Christo in einer bewegten Zeit* (Testimonies of Christ in an age of agitation). Berlin, 1832.

² *Abendstunden*, 3 vols. Berlin, 1833-39.

³ *Adelbert's Bekenntnisse*. Berlin, 2d ed. 1835.

⁴ *Die Lehre vom Göttlichen Reiche*.

⁵ The accounts are various concerning the year of his birth. We have preferred that which offers the fewest difficulties, in reference to his oratorical development and the events of his after life.

This, in a certain sense, was his position through life ; alone, or supported only by a few, to move the masses of the people according to his own views.

In his eighteenth year, and scarcely enrolled among the citizens of Athens, he gave evidence of his courage by instituting a process against his guardians for their breach of trust ; a process which continued three or four years, but which the young Athenian gained, yet without obtaining his entire inheritance.

Plato is said to have been his teacher in philosophy, Isæus instructed him in rhetoric, and Thucydides was his model in style. At first devoted to eloquence in court, he was afterwards attracted to the arena of political life, especially by an oration of Callistratus. He now ventured to appear before an assembly of the people ; but with all his carefully turned periods, his antitheses and enthymemes, he failed, was hissed and obliged to leave the stage. He spoke with short breath, a bad pronunciation, and with an absence of all the grace of external eloquence. But this only increased his zeal and redoubled his efforts. We see him speaking with pebbles in his mouth, reciting long periods while ascending a hill, declaiming on the shore of the stormy sea, and, in the quiet and stillness of a subterranean apartment, exercising himself in gesture and attitude. A drawn sword hanging from the ceiling must cure the shrug of his shoulders. Nor was the result less incredible than his efforts. He became as renowned for delivery and gesture as for other and more important qualities as an orator. In undertaking the profession of an orator, he undertook also most zealously to strive for all which belongs to that profession. He certainly therefore considered eloquence as something, which must be acquired, and which one may acquire by a will perseveringly directed to that end. A view quite different from that now prevalent, which regards eloquence as a beautiful native gift, which scarcely needs to be cultivated. Which view is correct, may be seen in the fruits which they bear. In Demosthenes, eloquence appears in its highest living power.

In his thirtieth year he appeared in his oration against the law of Leptines, which must be regarded as a finished masterpiece. According to this law none but the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton were to be free from the public burdens ; the people were to confer this privilege upon none in the future ; and whoever should make a proposition to that effect, should be punished. One year had passed, since the reception of the law ; and Demosthenes now appears as counsel for the plaintiffs ; one of whom was Ctesippus, son of Chabrias, whose object was to retain the immunity granted to his father.

Although Demosthenes shows, that the advantage of discontinuing the immunities is not so great as might appear, yet this were not a sufficient reason for abrogating the law. A stronger motive is necessary; and that Demosthenes finds in magnanimity and fidelity towards those who, by their actions, have merited well of the State, as Conon and Chabrias; an honor to the orator; as it was also to the Athenians, that they felt the force of the motive, and, according to historical accounts, abrogated the law of Leptines. On account of this predominance of the moral motives, this oration was especially esteemed by the stoic philosopher Panaetius.

The statute of Leptines was also open to attack, when considered in relation to the Attic law; as it did not stand in the best harmony with other laws. With much acuteness the orator makes use of these judicial reasons; and he himself proposes a law, by which abuse in granting immunities may be prevented without violating honor or fidelity. In objecting further to the law, the orator asks whether, while it allows immunities to the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, it shall not be allowed in future to confer the same upon those who should resemble them? We cannot know what circumstances may arise in the future.

We find in this oration no overflowing fullness, no violent ebullitions, no splendid but disproportionate development of individual thoughts; as might perhaps have been expected from the youth of the orator. The style is intermediate, as is suitable upon a subject which demands quiet reflection, rather than the awakening of violent emotions. It has the neatness and elegance of the best writers of the age of Louis XIV. The periods, although simple, are carefully elaborated and rounded; antecedent and conclusion are commonly used to render prominent the contrast between what is done and what ought to be done. All objects and persons, including his opponent, are treated with Attic delicacy and grace; whence Dionysius calls this the most graceful of all orations, *χαριέστατος ἀπάντων λόγων*. We should scarcely have looked for this quality in a man, who, as appears from his history, had adopted many habits, which then appeared eccentric, and had lived less in social intercourse with his fellow men, than his contemporaries. But this example proves that the charm and gracefulness of speech are not so much formed from without, as flowing from the inner source of a moral disposition.

If any fault is to be found with this oration, it is, perhaps, a certain moderateness, combined with its simple elegance; which becomes especially striking when we compare it with the Olynthian and Philippic orations; and especially with that for the Crown, in which the

orator reaches the summit of his magnificent style; and which also, in point of time, is the last that we have from him. So also in the pictures of Raphael, in his earliest period, there is a certain moderateness and coldness. But in his last work, the Transfiguration, his genius unfolds itself in its greatest fulness and power. With the pulpit orator also the power and fulness of thought and richness of feeling, instead of diminishing, will increase with time; but only, it is true, under the condition that he never suffer the deeper fountain, from which they flow, to dry up within. In his political oration "de Symmoriis," occasioned by a report that Artaxerxes Ochus, king of Persia, intended to wage war against Greece, Demosthenes dissuades the excited Athenians from war. This his political position is grounded upon two very sound reasons. If the Athenians commenced the war, they would have to carry it on alone; but if they should wait until the other States were attacked, these would become their most faithful allies: and, secondly, the requisite money could be better raised, when actual danger threatened. Nevertheless he advises a new and improved arrangement of the *symmories*, and enters very minutely and profoundly into this branch of military administration. These discussions may appear dry to us, but it is an honor to the orator, that he preferred these to an idle splendor.

We here see how Demosthenes despised the glory which he might have reaped from a brilliant declamation, for which a most favorable opportunity was here afforded; how he endeavored solely to gain a right apprehension of the subject, and correctly to judge of its relations; how truth was to him the highest, to which he sacrificed all else. This is found in all his orations. Here lies his greatness and his sterling worth. In this path he has obtained true glory, which can be acquired only by despising false glory. He is a pattern that well merits to be placed before Christian orators. They too, should strive to say, not what is brilliant and gains applause, but what is salutary and useful. They should place their honor in fathoming as deeply as possible the subject which they treat, and then placing it before their hearers as they themselves behold it. They should seek, not the applause of men but their salvation and edification. Thereby they will probably in the end gain honor with men; but if not, they would still have honor with God, the only honor for which the Christian orator should strive.

Before we consider Demosthenes in his struggle against Philip, we must notice an oration relating to a personal affair, that against *Miridas*. Demosthenes had been chosen by his class chorus-leader (*χορευς*) at the festival of Bacchus, that is, he had the duty to clothe

and exercise a chorus for the festival. Midias, a rich and haughty man, had not only placed hindrances in his way, but had struck him in the face, as he appeared with his chorus. Demosthenes here shows the irresistible power of the orator, which hitherto he had not had occasion to exhibit in the same measure.

In this oration, from the personal offence, he constantly rises to the general idea of right and wrong. He represents the crime not only as an offence against the individual, but against the laws in general, as against Bacchus, whose festival was celebrated; and he adduces also many cases of injustice from the life of Midias, thus connecting the idea of virtue with that of right; and thereby showing that Midias had not only violated the laws in a single case, but was, in general, an odious character. The oration was never delivered, but only written; Demosthenes is said to have been induced, by a considerable sum of money from Midias, to keep silent and drop the complaint. But Isidorus of Pelosium maintains, that we must not accuse the magnanimous man of so disgraceful a love of gain.¹

This oration is admirable on account of the unabated emotion which, notwithstanding its length, pervades it from beginning to end; which expresses itself in every sentence, we might say, in every word; a cold and weak passage is not to be found in it. The thoughts are not drawn from without, but from the subject itself, which is fathomed in all its depths.

We have now to regard Demosthenes awake to the dangers that were threatening Greece from the north, from the Macedonian king; and we see him struggling not only against Philip, but against the supineness, the carelessness and the levity of the Athenians, long degenerated from their ancient greatness. But, though zealous against their faults, he ever shows them his confidence, that they will rise to a better disposition, and resolve upon glorious action. His example teaches us, that the confidence which we show to men, is one of the most efficient means of inspiring them for that which is great and noble. The Athenians not only bore the censure of Demosthenes, but, in many respects, at least, fulfilled his expectations. It had indeed been decreed by Providence, which, through Christianity, prepared a reconstruction of society, that Athens should sink from its height; the bloom of heathen States could only be of transient duration. But Athens has to thank Demosthenes that she fell with honor; and that the period which preceded her loss of independence, belonged to the brightest in her history.

¹ Οὐ γὰρ δέχεται τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀσχοκερδείας μεγαλοψυχία τοῦ ῥήτορος.

The consideration of the orations of Demosthenes, in his struggle with Philip, is peculiarly adapted to confirm the view, that eloquence is action, and, in order to be effective, must be subject to the same laws as action, namely to moral laws. The orations of Demosthenes in this period are his acts, and the orator must not be separated from the statesman. What gives their power to his orations, is, to be sure, in part, the political wisdom unfolded in them; but even this, as it was gained through the incitement of his love of country, is to be regarded as a moral quality. The irresistible effect, however, of his orations is to be ascribed to the grandeur of sentiment, which reigns in them, and to the security and confidence, which can spring only from the consciousness of thoroughly upright intentions. Had these qualities been wanting to Demosthenes, all the strenuous efforts of his youth would not have made him a great orator.

In his thirty-third year he delivered the first oration against Philip, which has come down to us, in which he urges the Athenians to form some definite plan against the king, with whom at that time they were in a state neither of peace or war. He was in league with Thessaly against the Phocians, and the Athenians, perceiving the danger that threatened them if he should enter Greece, had sent a fleet to prevent him from passing Thermopylae. Demosthenes demands that the Athenians should send out a fleet to watch the coasts in the possession of Philip, and hinder him in any hostile undertakings. This subject occupies the middle of the oration, which he begins and closes with the most powerful motives, drawn from the ideas of honor and public welfare. He reproaches the Athenians for their supineness, but, in referring to their former history, he would show them also, that nothing need be formidable to them.

It is not probable that this oration led to any definite determination on the part of the people. External, visible effects are not to be looked for from every address which the orator may pronounce. Sufficient, if his whole life leaves a trace behind it. But Demosthenes had, at least, opened the contest, and shown that he had all the requisite qualities in himself for carrying it on with honor: a deep penetration into all the relations of Athens and Greece; courage to say disagreeable truth to his fellow citizens; capacity to treat a subject with power, and at the same time, with the moderation of a man of moral elevation and Attic culture; glowing hatred to the ambition of Philip; and an equal hostility to the degeneracy of his fellow citizens. Thus through this oration, as through worthy Propylaea, we are led to the remaining immortal monuments of his political career.

Some years after this Demosthenes felt himself urged to take a still more decided position against Philip. The king in his plans of conquest, waged war against the city of Olynthus, and the people sent to Athens for assistance. Demosthenes seized this opportunity to summon the people to opposition against Philip. On this subject we have the three Olynthian orations, in which the orator, with far more precision than in the first Philippic, fixes his eye upon his purpose, and with far greater power urges the execution of his proposals. In comparing the three we find in them a remarkable progress, since the orator, from the ideas of outward welfare, penetrates ever more deeply the ideas of integrity and civil virtue. In the first oration he tells them what must be done. In the second everything is transferred to the province of morality; everywhere we meet the thought that Philip is a worthless man; that he owes his power to his faithlessness and his wicked deeds; that the fortune of such a man cannot be of long duration; that ruin must soon overtake him and all his power. "For it is impossible, yes it is impossible, men of Athens," exclaims the orator, "that an unjust, a perjured, and false man should possess a lasting power. Such a power may stand for once and for a short time; it blooms in hope when fortune smiles, but time is lying in wait for it, and it falls to pieces of itself. For, as in a house, a ship and other like things, the lowest must be the strongest, so in actions, the beginning and the foundation must be true and just. But this we do not find in that which Philip has done." Demosthenes paints the worthless life of Philip in the midst of immoral jugglers and buffoons, and then adds: "These things, men of Athens, however unimportant they may seem to many, are to the wise evident signs of his manner of thinking, and of the evil genius which rules him." This view of things which comes here suddenly to light, will astonish every one who reads with attention. It was necessary, to be sure, to hold up some encouragement in opposition to the orators, who disquieted the Athenians by their exaggerations of the power of Philip; but that Demosthenes, instead of untying should cut the knot, by maintaining that the power of the unjust cannot subsist, is worthy of our admiration. Even now every one may not be ripe for such a thought. At the time when Napoleon's power was in its bloom, one might not have found everywhere ready hearers for a doctrine like this; and could an orator among a heathen people, rise to such a moral view of the world?

These observations are made, not so much in praise of the Athenians, as in praise of eloquence. It is wholly of a moral nature; moral ideas are its province, and it cannot be assailed so long as it

remains therein. The boldest thoughts, if they but have a moral foundation, can be pronounced to thousands of assembled men; you may presume upon their assent; you will never be deceived. All feel that the orator must be allowed to address the highest and noblest impulses of human nature; that he must address himself to no other than these. If you wish to persuade a man to a base action, speak to him alone, and turn away your face when you make the base proposition. But he, who should appear before an assembly of thousands, with the advice to renounce honor and freedom, to bear patiently the chains of servitude, among whatever people it might be, would be stoned.

In the third Olynthian oration a new progress may be observed in the development of these moral ideas. The orator, swayed and impelled by them, cannot avoid applying them more fully and powerfully than ever before, against the Athenians themselves; and as he had called Philip a worthless man, and denied him all success for the future, he now lets his own countrymen feel the weight of his patriotic indignation. Leaving Philip and Olynthus in the back ground, he dwells only upon the administration of the State, and the degeneracy of the Athenians produced thereby. With a sadness far too earnest and deep, to relieve itself by derision; to which the melancholy truth itself was sufficient, and which disdained to weaken the impression by rhetorical turns, he draws a comparative picture of the earlier and his own times. This delineation, in which the most important contrasts are placed side by side in definite outlines without amplification, was admired by antiquity.

The Athenians at various times sent help to the Olynthians, yet their city was taken and destroyed, and the Athenians listened to proposals of peace from Philip. After this, Philip threw himself, with his whole power, upon the Phocians, conquered them and destroyed their cities, and thus gained the renown of having put an end to the so-called "holy war." And the Greeks, regarding that as a service, which, in reality, was an important step towards their subjugation, gave him a seat and voice in the Amphictyonic council. When the Athenians were asked concerning their assent to the choice, Demosthenes, in his oration "concerning peace," advises for so trifling a matter, not to commence a war, in which they would have not only Philip but most of the Greeks for their enemies; thus showing again that discretion and correct judgment of relations, which in him, were in so rare union with power and decision.

The greatest political activity of Demosthenes, falls in the period between the peace with Philip and the battle of Chaeronea, where the

freedom of Greece was extinguished. He appears as the chief opponent of the Macedonian party. Philip was extending his conquests and enlarging his power; he had made complaints to the Athenians, concerning the conduct of Diopeithes, whom they had sent to the Chersonesus, at the head of a body of armed colonists. Demosthenes on this occasion, though not wholly justifying Diopeithes, still excusing him, appears against Philip. With the most various turns, now looking to the past, now to the future, he utters or rather thunders forth his thoughts in combination with each other. Through this powerful emotion, swaying the orator, in which the most various conceptions are melted together as to a unity, but at the same time presented with full clearness, one supported by the other, this oration becomes in the highest degree penetrating, and acquires an uncommonly elevated character. Amid the keenest reproaches, escape from his love of country, moving words of recognition; as when he says in the same oration, "And, truly, it is not a like danger, that threatens others and you, for he designs not only to subject the city, but to exterminate it entirely. For he knows too well that ye will not be slaves, nor if you would, would ye know how to be, for ye are accustomed to rule."

In the same year, the forty-third of the orator, we have the third Philippic. Here, in a connected delineation, he shows all the unjust acts of Philip; that he has already violated the peace with the Athenians. Then he turns himself against those who have sold themselves to the king, and demands from the people their punishment. He instructs his fellow citizens upon the great advantages which Philip derived from his changed and more speedy mode of warfare. For their warning he accumulates examples of nations and cities, who had given ear to Philip and his bought flatterers, and who, after the ruin that had come upon them, had painfully, but too late, repented their delusion. In this oration, as it seems to me, Demosthenes has most completely unfolded that stormy, irresistible power, which was peculiar to him. If any one of his orations is the most excellent, it is this or that for the Crown. The latter indeed leaves everything else behind it; but it cannot be denied that its plan is more artificial than one would wish; and that the orator, otherwise animated by the noblest emotions, often descends here to personalities, which one might wish away. The third Philippic, on account of its simple structure, and the ever noble emotion that flows through it, would merit the pre-eminence over it. How great a difference between this oration and that against Leptines, held thirteen years before. Then, he could quietly and gracefully polish his thoughts, as Polykleitas his statues.

But now he had run upon all the cliffs which beset the course of life for every man, especially for him who undertakes to manage great affairs. Here his speech is an angry and thundering stream; in the place of beauty is sublimity; and if gracefulness is no longer compatible with so powerful emotions, yet precisely by these the oration reaches the highest degree of its irresistible power. Where in these orations does Demosthenes pass the limits becoming a noble man? whilst he hurls thunderbolts, he stands there in completely moral dignity. It is so predominant in him, that, correctly speaking, the qualities of his eloquence, which are falsely called art and beauty, must be designated only by names which are borrowed from moral qualities; such as power, boldness, self-sacrifice. The moral faculty here applies all the other powers of the soul, which are likewise in the highest degree active, such as acuteness, reflection and discretion.

Soon however came that great catastrophe in which Athens lost her freedom, Philip was conqueror in the battle of Chaeronea. Though the policy of Demosthenes had not saved his country, yet his fellow citizens honored him; obliged almost daily to answer accumulated accusations in court, he was always acquitted. He was called to pronounce the funeral oration over those who had fallen at Chaeronea. In the same year with that battle, Ctesiphon proposed to the people, that a golden crown should be presented to Demosthenes, in consideration of expenses, which he had defrayed from his own means, for public improvements, as of the services which he had constantly rendered the State. Aeschines, availing himself of the right of protestation, instituted a process against Ctesiphon. Demosthenes appeared as counsel for the defendant, and, on this occasion, delivered his famous oration "for the Crown," in which he enters into a defence of his public life and character. It was in his fifty-fifth year; hence as the oration is the most beautiful, so also is it a late fruit of his eloquence. Aeschines appears as the defender of his own cause, and in his oration, commits, in the outset, the great fault of commencing with the outward question of mere legality, rather than that of worthiness or unworthiness in the life and public administration of Demosthenes. If he had commenced with the latter, and given the other a subordinate situation, his oration, in the commencement, would have acquired that living and powerful elevation which is so necessary to produce strong effect upon the minds of men; but this it must renounce, and, in the outset, lose all its force, so soon as that which is unimportant is made equal to that which is of more consequence. How can we explain his adoption of the plan which he took? Only thereby, it appears to me, that the inner grounds, from the life and administra-

tion of Demosthenes, did not appear to him sufficient; because he himself was not convinced of all the baseness of which his passion led him to accuse Demosthenes; because he despaired of making that perfectly credible to the judges, which he himself did not believe. With a feeling of the dubiousness of his undertaking, the juridical reasons appeared, after all, to afford the greatest assurance; on this account he unfolds these first, without reflecting that from that a deadly coldness must spread itself over the other reasons. In following this unwise plan; in all the faults which sprang from it, and made his defeat inevitable, nothing was in fault, to express it in one word, but his guilty conscience, and the distrust in his own cause, with which it smote him. We may regard it as established, that the forming of the plan of an oration is an act; and it can succeed only by an undivided action of the moral powers. If this is true in the political orator, how much more in the sacred orator! If the latter lives only in outward things, and not in the depth of religious intuitions, he will never grasp his subject at that point, whence a fulness of thought naturally develops itself.

If the faults in the oration of Aeschines arise from a wrong moral sentiment, the excellences of the oration of Demosthenes are, in their deepest foundation, moral excellences. Such a defence as this would have been wholly impossible, with an embarrassment and disquietude arising from inward reproaches; it is only conceivable in a man, who is filled with the consciousness of having willed the best, and of having served his country through a long series of years, with unquestioned self-sacrifice. Indeed, without the fullest confidence in his cause, he never could have formed his plan as he did, in which he avoids the faults of his opponent, and paves the way for the most stirring developments. Only when animated by this confidence could he, in passing over subordinate matters, have dwelt ever upon the main point, and placed first the examination of his life, and made the whole decision dependent upon the result.

From the foregoing representation it follows, that to Demosthenes, even if we cannot free his character from all blemish, is due, in the highest degree, the praise of power, decision, perseverance and devotion to his country; that he has succeeded in impressing the stamp of these virtues upon his eloquence, and that it owes to them its high and admirable excellences.

The first feature in the eloquence of Demosthenes, and which may also perhaps be called the first in the ideal of eloquence, is, that his person, its advantageous appearance, and regard for the applause of his hearers, is always sacrificed to the subject and aim of the oration.

He aims not merely to *gain*, but to move the hearer ; he seeks not his applause, but his assent ; in this especially lies his greatness. That the Athenians not only endured him, but declared him the first of orators, shows that they even in an age of decline, were superior to the most cultivated nations of modern times, by their correct estimation of things. If Demosthenes confined himself to his subject, he also completely fathomed it ; he considered it from all sides and in all relations, and penetrated into all its depths. Of all which he could use, not the least thing escaped him. The treasures which he thus gained, and which he brought out from the object itself, placed him in a condition to despise everything foreign to the subject. We must be astonished at the copiousness of the ideas and means which were at his command. Still greater and more glorious treasures than Demosthenes found in the subjects treated by him, are to be found in those which belong to the province of sacred eloquence ; but to be sure, just as great fidelity of investigation is requisite to bring them out from their depths.

But this wealth of ideas must be wrought into shape ; every thought must receive that position, where it is sustained by that which precedes, and itself, in turn, may sustain that which follows ; where it does not stop, but continue the movement ; where it may not only be heard by the hearer without offence, but may strengthen his conviction and increase his emotion. The thoughts of the orator must be waves, of which the one is driven on by the other. In this quality also which lies so deep, Demosthenes surpasses all other orators. His thoughts form a linked series, of which no part can change its place without injury to the whole. The hearer, at the outset, is seized by a salutary power, to which, without resistance, he surrenders the best powers of his inner being ; and as he is led upon a path, where there is no hindrance or interruption, he follows step by step to the end ; not only because he must, but because he also follows gladly and with joy.

In Demosthenes, this firmly linked chain of thought glows with the most living fire of emotion. In modern times there is an inclination to deny him this excellence ; he is accused of addressing only the understanding and not the heart ; that his whole problem is placed in convincing, by arguments, of the justice of his cause, and the utility of his proposals. Were this the case, he would be deficient in the most essential quality of an orator. But is thought incompatible with feeling ? Is not rather the connection of thought a chain, along which the fire of feeling may the more easily pass ? Is not feeling so much the nobler, and hence so much the more powerful in noble natures,

the more it is sustained by thought? We must not indeed seek the more tender feelings in Demosthenes; for developing these, his struggle with Philip offered little occasion. But if we seek the stronger, manly feelings, love of country, enthusiasm for the glory of noble actions, hatred against everything base, indignation against selfishness and faithlessness, the words of Demosthenes, more than of any other man, are penetrated with the fire of these emotions; and it glows in them still, after so many centuries have passed over them.

To this perfection of material corresponds, in Demosthenes, the finished form. From the critics of antiquity, especially Dionysius, he received the highest praise in this respect. His style, says this critic, is not the rough and hard style of Thucydides, nor the soft and polished of Isocrates, but he has taken a happy middle way between them.

His prose is, in its kind, something quite as finished as metrical composition; he bestowed great attention, for example, upon the sequence of long and short syllables; not to produce a symmetrically recurring metre, but to express the most various emotions of the mind by a suitable and ever changing rhythm. In general, by the study of Demosthenes and the ancient critics, we are introduced to mysteries of prose composition, which must awaken our astonishment. It is the opinion of the modern world, that he, who is full with his thoughts, cannot possibly bestow so much care upon the form. But it may be asked, whether it is not necessary, precisely on account of the substance, in order to present it undimmed to the intuition of the hearer, to bestow attention upon the form. But the example of Demosthenes shows us, that, in cultivating the form, we need not separate it from the substance; a fault to be ascribed not to art but to a want of art, since for true art, the most perfect form is nothing else, than the clearest and most transparent appearance of the substance.

At the close of this representation, I give it for consideration, whether these qualities, praised in Demosthenes, may not be transferred to the field of sacred eloquence, and whether it is not the duty of every pulpit orator, to strive to acquire them.

We pass now from Greece to France;¹ from Athens to Paris; from Demosthenes, the first political orator of all times, to Massillon, who, among the pulpit orators of the Catholic church in the age of

¹ We have occupied so much space with Demosthenes, that we shall be obliged to omit very much in the second part, which occupies over 200 pages, more than half the work; and shall confine ourselves chiefly to those parts which relate to the oratorical character of Massillon.—Tr.

Louis XIV, appears to me to merit the first place. Demosthenes and Massillon both flourished at the close of the age in which they lived. Demosthenes is one of the last from the period of Attic splendor; Massillon stands on the decline of the age of Louis XIV, an age which has been not unjustly praised; and he lived to see the beginning of the following century, and of the new period which began with it. The second half of the seventeenth century was, in many countries, rich in highly gifted and pious men. In the evangelical church in Germany were Gerhard, Spener and Franke; and France possessed such men as Pascal, Fenelon and Bossuet, to the number of whom Massillon may be worthily added. He was born in 1663 at Hyères, and in his youth attended the school in his native town, established and directed by the priests of the *Oratorium*. He afterwards, in his eighteenth year, became a member of that congregation, and was animated by its spirit, and became himself its ornament. This was a religious society, which had its establishments in various parts of France, and sustained a high religious character. Somewhat resembling this was the congregation of Saint Lazare, founded by Vincent de Paul. When we consider these and other institutions in their activity, we may form a favorable picture of the condition of the Catholic church at that time in France. About this time also arose the struggle between the Jesuits and the Port-Royal. Massillon, shortly after entering the *Oratorium*, resolved to leave, and devote himself to the life of the cloister. Accordingly he entered as novice the abbey of Septfons; but by means of a letter, which he wrote for the abbot, he attracted the notice of the bishop, who said, that a talent, like his, must not bury itself in a cloister; Massillon returned to the *Oratorium*.

Demosthenes felt himself, in his earliest years, called to be an orator; in Massillon this consciousness slumbered during his youth; he thought himself fitted for every other work, more than proclaiming the word of God. At the urgent request of his superiors, however, he made some essays in preaching, and immediately gained uncommon applause; which they merited, perhaps, on account of what they promised for the future; but by no means for what he then performed. He seems to have had no presentiment at all of the great resources, which he discovered, indeed, only in the progress of his own inner life, and through which he afterwards succeeded in producing so great effects. But in these first attempts, is not to be mistaken an earnest and strict religious sentiment.

In his thirty-third year he was called to Paris, as superintendent of the seminary of Saint Magloire, which was under the direction of the *Oratorium*, and in this capacity delivered several sermons. In these

he shows himself a mature orator; insight and experience are combined with enthusiasm for his profession, which is never wanting to him. The style freed from the burdensome play of rhetorical forms, with all youthful life and freshness, may be called appropriate, noble, and simple.

Soon after Massillon arrived in Paris, he was asked his opinion concerning the most celebrated pulpit orators of that period. He replied that he acknowledged and esteemed the excellences of each, but did not wish to take any of them as a pattern for himself. This expression seems to show, that Massillon, even at that time, was satisfied as to the direction to be pursued by him in proclaiming the Divine word. Public speaking stands in the closest connection with the entire personality; where this has something decided, it not only rejects conscious imitation, but seeks to break new paths for itself, in order to unfold itself the more fully. The most distinguished orators of France, at that time, were Mascarón, Fléchier, Bossuet and Bourdaloue. Massillon may not have heard them all, as they were advanced in life when he went to Paris. The province of feeling was at that time little appropriated for sacred eloquence; and if Massillon was led to this, almost involuntarily, by his personal endowments, he may also have recognized it as the province in which the sacred orator must be especially at home. By this is not to be understood, that he aimed to call forth idle emotions, that move and affect us uselessly, but serve no higher aim; the French character, indeed, is not inclined to such tones of mind; and, with his high idea of the dignity of the preacher's office, Massillon could not possibly have assigned to it so low a mission. It is his design, to awaken the tenderest and most powerful feelings of the heart, on the side of faith and Christian piety; to draw the whole world of feeling into the struggle for holiness, to convert it from a hostile to an auxiliary power. Connected with this, is the fact, that, at least in his best sermons, he does not aim so much to develop doctrines and exhibit commands, as to contend against the prejudices and passions, which hinder the reception of truth and obedience to commands. All this appears to have hovered, though dimly, before his mind, in that answer which he gave.

If the personality, disposition and the principles of an orator point out to him the direction which he is to take, it is still the surrounding world which furnishes the material of his discourses; and from the position which he takes, in the century in which he lives, will the predominant tone and coloring of his addresses, in many respects, be explained. But the period in which Massillon lived, may be called, in respect to the political, literary, religious, and moral life in France, a

time in which decline was commencing. The unjust and ambitious wars of Louis XIV. had exhausted the resources of the country, and alienated the hearts of his subjects, and the French army had suffered many great defeats in the war of the Spanish succession, although the king attained his purpose. The splendid epoch of French literature, which began about the middle of the seventeenth century, was already approaching its end. Massillon lived at a time when he could make use, for his culture, of all the great works of this period, and in him, as in one of the last representatives of this epoch, that which is excellent in them appears to have united in a last glance of light. But he outlived this period, and witnessed the decline of French literature, that afterwards appeared. Towards the close of this century that man was born, who, in the next, became the most noted instrument of the universal decline,—Voltaire.

Moral life had sunk deeply in France, which must probably, among other reasons, be ascribed to the influence of Louis XIV.; of the spirit, in which, guided by fanatical and intriguing priests and statesmen, he managed the affairs of the church, we have an example in his persecution of the protestants. He also delivered up the Port-Royal to the hatred of the Jesuits; and procured from the pope the condemnation of a religious work of Fenelon. It marks the court of Louis XIV., that a man like Fenelon found no place there, was thrust from it, and must close his days in honorable exile, as archbishop of Cambray. But this incredibly rapid decline of religion and morality in the French people, cannot be explained, unless we add the corrupt influence of an immoral court.

It seemed necessary to refer to this general decline, especially in morals and religion, in the age of Massillon; since his eloquence can appear in its true light, only when seen upon this dark background. In periods of great corruption, men are accustomed to take a twofold position in relation to their age. Some, without exactly participating in the corruption, in its whole extent, yet swim along with the stream, unconcerned where it may take them. Others, perceiving the danger, escape the whirlpool, and with the power of a morally good will, set themselves against the general movement; such was the position of Demosthenes and Massillon; a position, perhaps, not unfavorable to eloquence. By the greatness and general spread of the evil he contends against, the orator feels himself summoned to the most extraordinary efforts. It was such a violent contest as this, that Massillon carried on; and if his sermons, on this account, are less adapted to the edification of the closet, they are so much the more important as examples of exalted eloquence. From this may be explained that coloring of

sadness, which, with all their splendor of style, extends itself over his sermons; and that he sometimes breaks out in certainly blameworthy sighs upon the fruitlessness to be apprehended in his preaching.

After Massillon had preached, with great distinction, in the seminary of Saint Magloire, he resolved to enter upon the great career of Catholic pulpit oratory in France, as Advent and Fast-day preacher. He commenced at Montpellier, and in the following year preached at Paris, where he met with the most extraordinary applause. In the same year, his thirty-sixth, he was called to preach in Versailles before the king and court. He preached the fast-day sermons before the king also in 1701 and 1704. A great effect was produced by a passage in one of these sermons, "upon the small number of the chosen," in which he supposes Christ in the midst of the assembly to judge them, and the various classes of sinners to be separated from the just. The effect of the passage was extraordinary. The king and those around him, the whole assembly were shaken. One will not be able to refrain from rejoicing at this testimony for the power of the Divine word. For it was not the arts of a worldly eloquence, which produced this effect; it was the word of God itself, which smote the heart as with a hammer. To be sure the word of God was here proclaimed to a mighty king, and a splendid court, with a fearlessness and a boldness, which must gain our esteem and veneration for the orator. These advent and fast-day sermons appear to me the best of all his works.

Louis XIV. seems to have entertained great esteem for Massillon, as is evident from the words which he addressed him. "I have heard," says he, "many great preachers in my chapel, and have been very well satisfied with them; but every time that I have heard you, I have been very much dissatisfied with myself." It did not escape the king, that Massillon sought not his own honor, but the welfare of his hearers, their conversion and change of heart. By these words he designated well the spirit of his eloquence; and the praise which he gave him was the best which can be bestowed upon a sacred orator.

He pronounced the funeral oration at the obsequies of the king, a difficult problem for one, who could never have accustomed himself to the tone of flattery; a problem which he solved in a striking and not in the happiest manner, by placing light and shade side by side; bestowing praise, and then destroying it, by the blame immediately added.

It was usual at that time, in France, to reward those, who had delivered a brilliant course of advent and fast-day sermons, with the of-

fice of bishop. This reward Massillon did not receive from Louis XIV; but was afterwards, through the Regent Duke of Orleans, appointed Bishop of Clermont. In the following year he was appointed to preach to Louis XV, then eight years old, and his attendants. In these sermons he commits the great mistake, of undertaking to instruct the young king upon all, which the high office, to which he was destined, demanded; instead of endeavoring to awaken in his mind, for the person of Christ, for his love, his sacrifice and his favors, feelings of adoration, trust and love, and thus plant in the heart of the child the germ of a Christian life. But it may be said in his favor, that the passions of Louis XIV, his ambition and abuse of power, with all their sad consequences, stood in such living and terrifying colors before his eyes, that nothing appeared more necessary and urgent than to warn his successor from such errors; that his principles could not remain without influence upon the young king, if they were laid to heart by those who surrounded him, and were afterwards to guide his steps. And perhaps he flattered himself, if his words should be rescued from oblivion, to leave in them, for the future king, a permanent possession, and a mirror of all kingly virtues.

In 1719, Massillon became member of the French Academy. From this time till his death, in 1742, he remained in his diocese, and devoted himself, with the greatest fidelity, to the administration of his office. His revenues belonged to the poor; and in the ecclesiastical confusion of the times, he appeared as the man of peace.

In giving the description of a pulpit orator, we should aim chiefly to point out the means of religious influence peculiar to him, or which he has applied with particular success. Thereby we receive a clear and definite picture of the preacher himself, and of his work as an orator; we acquire a deeper insight into the nature of eloquence. In attempting to describe Massillon's manner of preaching we shall follow these principles. To this end, in order to point out more definitely the means employed by the preacher, for attaining the end proposed, it will be necessary to divide his sermons into certain classes, according as the most prominent point of view shall be that of *eternal happiness, virtue, duty, or truth*.

In preaching upon *duty*, it is the common procedure to represent the extent of the duty and the motives for fulfilling it. This method has the advantage of developing the thoughts in a connected manner; but it has the disadvantage, that by such considerations, which besides are commonly not unknown to the hearer, the opposition of the heart to the fulfilment of the divine commands is rarely broken. This Mas-

Massillon probably perceived; and although he pursues this method in several sermons of this class, yet in many has chosen an entirely different method. It rests upon the perfectly correct perception, that the hindrance to the fulfilment of duty lies not in the understanding but in the heart; that men allow the obligation to obey the Divine commands, but by various reasons, which the deluded and inventing heart suggests, seek to excuse the transgression of them. The method consists in this, instead of laboring to establish and recommend the duty directly; to refute these specious grounds of excuse, and so break the opposition of the heart. The development of the thoughts suffers indeed by this; for the connection, which binds together the divine doctrines and commands, is not found in the errors which arise from the corruption of man. But, on the other hand, the hearer is led, to such a degree, into his own heart, that he can no longer evade the question, how it stands with himself, nor conceal the wounded spot within. This method may be regarded as a new discovery, which Massillon has made in the field of eloquence; here he shows his peculiarity and his masterly talent. For the application of this method a great knowledge of the human heart is requisite. But to penetrate so deeply into the heart as Massillon has done, to follow with such perseverance, through all their mazes the thoughts, that would justify themselves; this presupposes a fidelity, a zeal, a love, which can be found only in a truly pious heart.

To the class of sermons, in which the prominent idea is that of duty, belong those of our author upon "afflictions," upon "the love of our enemies," on "prayer," on "beneficence," and upon "death," that is, the duty of reflecting upon death.

In speaking of those sermons of Massillon, in which the principal point of view is that of *eternal happiness*, we must recollect that he was a Catholic, and that, according to the doctrines of that church, salvation is not the gift of pure grace to believers, but must be gained by their own efforts and good works; whereas it is the doctrine of the evangelical church, that salvation is a pure gift of grace, imparted upon the sole condition of faith.

Massillon treats the idea of salvation and misery in a twofold way: in the one he describes the conditions belonging to each, this may be called the descriptive method; in the other, he designates the various causes by which we are brought to the one or the other. The description of an object is one of the surest means which eloquence employs to awaken, in reference to that object, the various emotions which determine the will, as inclination and disinclination, desire and fear. But to describe an object is not to portray the various elements

in the conception of that object, but to fill out the general outlines of the conception with elements from the ever new and ever changing life; in characters and relations, to seize and bring to view those points which escape most men, but which every one, as soon as they are pointed out to him, will recognize as true; not to place together these elements in a cold enumeration, but with the glow of emotion, which one wishes to awaken, and which he himself feels, to impress them, as a complete picture, upon the heart of the hearer. That orator alone can give such descriptions, who possesses the gift of observation in a high degree, increased by self-knowledge; and upon whose susceptible and deep feeling these objects produce impressions as quick and lively, as they are constant and enduring. That Massillon possessed these qualities in a high degree may be seen in his descriptions, which by their intuitive truth, their stirring power and life, form one of the most essential excellences of his eloquence.

In the class of those sermons which treat of eternal blessedness, are those upon "the happiness of the pious," "upon the final judgment," the powerful sermon on "the death of the wicked and the pious," in which he paints the misery of the one, and the joy with which the other approaches death. Here belongs also one of his most celebrated sermons, "upon the small number of the chosen," which, as we have mentioned, produced great effect. In one passage of this sermon he declares himself in plain terms against the theatre. Here also belongs the sermon "upon impenitence in death."

The sermons whose prominent idea is that of *virtue*, refer to a permanent form of the spiritual life, to a quality, a disposition, which either belongs to a godly life, and is then encouraged; or is incompatible with that life, and is then combated. To paint the condition of which one speaks; to bring to view the marks, by which it may be shown to be good or sinful; to represent its salutary or corrupting effects; these are commonly the predominant points of view in this class of sermons, and according to these, the sermons of Massillon, in this class, are constructed. To these belong the sermons upon "lukewarmness," "relapse into sin." In these two, and in all of this class, Massillon shows his deep knowledge of the human heart, and his gift in delineating its conditions; and as he always penetrates deeply into the subject, and does not shun theological expositions, there will be no cause to complain of a want of true and important thoughts. Here belong some of his homilies, as those upon "the rich man," "upon the history of Lazarus," and that pearl of his homilies, "upon the lost son."

As examples of sermons according to the idea of *truth*, we will

mention two, the one "upon the immortality of the soul," and that "upon the Divinity of Christ." This last merits the first place among his sermons of this class, and is one of the best of all his sermons; it is excellent in carrying out individual points, and complete as a whole, and is a pattern for the rhetorical treatment of a theological doctrine. The grounds which he adduces are prophecies, miracles, the testimony of Christ, and the character of his teaching. He appeals to the sense of truth and the moral feeling of man for the confirmation of two principles; first, it is inconceivable that God, in the arrangements of his providence, could have had the design to mislead men to error, to idolatry, to the worship of a created being; secondly, it is just as inconceivable, considering the holiness of Christ, which shines forth in his whole life, that he could have rendered himself guilty of deceiving men and robbing God of his honor. The first of these principles he applies to prophecy and miracles, the second to the precepts of Christ and the testimony which he gives of himself; and he shows that a man who makes himself equal with God, and assumes the divine privilege of being loved above all else, has deceived men and robbed God of his glory, unless he himself is true God. In the union of these two principles with these proofs, and in the dialectical movement of the thoughts that arise therefrom; in urging to the dilemma, either to assume that which is inconceivable and awakens abhorrence, or confess the divinity of Christ; in this lies the nerve of the sermon. The sermon is divided into two parts; in the first he seeks to establish the divinity of Christ from the glory of his mission, in the second from the spirit of his mission; the first referring to prophecy and miracles, the second to the doctrines and morals taught by Christ.

Massillon was a believing, pious, and upright man; with this trait, which no true sacred orator must be without, we can begin the delineation of his oratorical character. In the various grades of his ministry he lived only for his calling. His faith was lively and sincere; his moral principles strict, nor does he conceal them; he maintains them in the face of a degenerate age. He chastises the life of courts, and the abuses which had crept into the church, and declares the truth before the king. His intellectual capacities were favorably balanced for the orator; and although he was wanting neither in fancy nor in the gift of deep and connected thought, yet neither of the two is disproportionately prominent, the faculty which appears more prominently than the others in him, is not one of the intellect, but of the heart; it is feeling. And this is awakened in him especially by that, which corresponds to or opposes the moral requisitions. It is awakened by

that which makes men happy or unhappy ; he feels the one, as a joy touching himself, the other, as personal pain. This feeling is not inactive in him, it has a practical nature. Without this easily awakened feeling, Massillon would never have been able to gain that deep knowledge of the human heart and life, which distinguishes him. The cold observer never penetrates very deep ; the selfish man sees that which can bring advantage, all else remains concealed ; to the scorner true forms must appear as caricatures ; only love to men, only zeal for their welfare sharpens the sight in their observation, guards from onesidedness, keeps the eye undimmed, and is able even to supply the perceptions, which are wanting, by a correct presentiment. With these qualities, we might expect that Massillon would have broken through the common forms of pulpit eloquence, and sought to pave a new way for himself in proclaiming the Divine word. How could he have hoped by the representation of a duty, and the general motives for conforming to it, to produce a deep impression ? His knowledge of the human heart betrayed to him the hindrances which oppose the fulfilling of a duty, whose obligation one acknowledges ; he fixes his eye upon these hindrances, and seeks to overcome them ; he struggles with the hearer, and in this bears some resemblance to Demosthenes ; and where is there a noble and fit development of eloquence, that does not remind us of the Demosthenian.

To another form, which he has so often and with so great skill applied, he must almost necessarily have been led by his peculiarity. The human heart and life stood clear before him ; he had looked through all their depths ; he had observed so many men in their most important moments, those of suffering and death ; and with his deep and lively feeling, the most joyful, but oftener still the most painful impressions had remained to him ; he could paint with a pencil dipped in the glow of his own heart.

Not less excellent than in description, does Massillon appear, when he presses upon the wavering hearer, with ever new arguments for repentance and conversion. And for this immediate address, which, as it appears to us, is also one of the most beautiful characteristics of the eloquence of Chrysostom, Massillon was fitted by his deep knowledge of man and his glowing zeal.

It follows from what has been said, that that which is commonly called wealth of thought, that is, a cumulation of such thoughts as address the understanding more than the heart, did not accord at all with the eloquence of Massillon, and with its peculiar character. He chooses and develops only such conceptions as can produce a deep impression upon the feeling and disposition of the hearer ; and he does

not leave them till he has made the fullest use of them in this respect. He cannot possibly, therefore, cumulate the thoughts; if he were to do so, one would limit the other in its development, and neither would effect that for which it is designed. It is so with the eloquence of Demosthenes; he also seeks not to surprise and entertain by a change of ideas; a few principal thoughts lie at the ground of each of his orations; and he shows himself inexhaustible only when he applies them most manifoldly, and uses them in the most various manner to accomplish his ends. But this is something, the taste for which is lost in modern times; even the French, from whose native rhetorical taste we should not expect it, are sometimes unjust towards Massillon in this respect. They admire Bossuet's gifted flashes, Bourdaloue's fulness of thought, and undervalue Massillon in comparison with these. We gain little by such comparisons; and it is better to recognize in every one what he has, than demand of him things which he cannot have, because they are at variance with his nature and its greatest excellences. The end, which alone Massillon proposed to himself, and which alone, considering his whole peculiarity, he could propose to himself, was to move his hearers to concern for their salvation, by awakening now the most joyful, now the most painful feelings. For this, flashes of genius and fulness of thought are not the most appropriate means; hence they are not found in him. We must, however, observe that this susceptible feeling, which seems to us most prominent in Massillon's rhetorical character, by no means expresses itself in him beyond the bounds of propriety and moderation.

The style of Massillon is precisely that, which, with such a personality and such intentions, it must be and alone could be. Massillon would address the heart, and describe what passes in the heart and life of man; but for the one as for the other, a diction is entirely unsuitable, which deviates too much from the common mode of expression; a clear and simple style is requisite, and that we find in him. Nowhere do we meet with rhetorical pomp, plays of wit and fancy, and embellishments, which, without strengthening the thought, are to win and entertain the hearer. One is almost compelled to acknowledge that this Frenchman surpasses many of our German pulpit orators in simplicity. This simple style, however, has the highest vivacity, it pours on unceasingly in the most rapid flow, whilst, at the same time, by the most powerful turns, the uniformity of such a rapid course is broken, the attention kept up, and the impression strengthened. A mind like that of our orator must form for itself such a style as this, and it was also necessary, in order to express the emotion with which he spoke. Over this simple and living style is poured

the grace of a morally beautiful character; and what Dionysius said of the oration against Leptines, that it was the most graceful of all orations, might be said of every sermon of Massillon, if one did not commonly, in the earnestness and power of the orator, forget the gracefulness of his style. Even those who place little value upon such qualities, will not perhaps be so unjust, as to blame it in him, who does not seek it from self-love, but possesses it as the necessary bloom of a beautiful nature. I certainly will not undervalue Bossuet and Bourdaloue, in comparison with Massillon, in respect to style; but I may be allowed perhaps to say, only to designate the peculiarities of these three men, that Bossuet speaks ever from the bishop's throne; that Bourdaloue appears surrounded with the scholastic atmosphere of a Jesuit college; that Massillon alone speaks with his audience the cultivated language of society. He has perhaps too many words, and dwells possibly too long on a thought, but this fault flows from the same source as the excellences of his style, from the warmth and fulness of his heart.

ARTICLE II.

DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

Translated from De Wette's Commentary on the XV. Chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. 2d edition. 1845.*

THE occasion of treating this subject was, that some in Corinth denied the truth of the resurrection of the dead (v. 12); but we do not certainly know, what was the character of these doubts and in what connection they stood. It appears, that these Corinthian Christians did not deny the fact of the resurrection of Christ, because the apostle, in his argument, lays this at the foundation, and indeed expressly certifies it, but does not seek to establish it against objections.¹ This conclusion however is not entirely certain, since the apostle writes for the majority of the Corinthian Christians, who had not yet been possessed by those doubts, although dangerously affected by them, rather than against the authors of those doubts (Flatt). In verse 35, it is

* For some account of De Wette and of his merits as a commentator, see *Bibliotheca Sacra*, No. XVIII. p. 263.

¹ Ziegler, *Theologische Abhandlungen*, II. 93. Knapp, *scripta varii argumenti*, etc. p. 316. Meyer.

true, he seems to have regard to an objection from them; but this is of such a character, that it could be made from various quarters. Meyer concludes, from the anti-materialistic view of the resurrection, which the apostle maintains in verses 35 and following, that the principles of the opponents were *anti-materialistic*; but the opposite conclusion would rather be the true one. See the remarks upon these verses. Jesus, in refuting the Sadducees, Matt. 22: 30, views the subject in the same manner. Hence those in Corinth, who doubted the doctrine, might formerly have been Sadducees,¹ (for, that such persons must be answered with passages from the Pentateuch, rests upon an erroneous view of Matt. 22: 31, 32,) if every intermixture of Sadduceism with Christianity were not so improbable. Since also the derivation of those doubts from Essenism (Mosheim) has little or no probability, we are limited in our conjectures to the circle of Gentile Christians in Corinth. That the doctrine of the resurrection opposed the Grecian mode of thinking, we know from Acts 17: 32. The supposition of Epicurean principles (cf. Acts 17: 18) in those at Corinth, who denied the resurrection, is decidedly rejected by Neander (Apost. Gesch. I. 315), by Meyer and others, because such principles stand in too great opposition to Christianity, and because the apostle, in verse 32, adduces the Epicurean manner of life, not as the source, but as the consequence of the doubts, which he opposes, and indeed as an argument against them. But still he warns them, in verse 33, against "evil communications," which can be no other than the intercourse of those who doubted this doctrine. As sensuality could creep into the church, so also could Epicurean levity. That these were Gentile Christians of philosophic cultivation,² is not very probable, considering the small number of such Christians in Corinth (1 Cor. 1: 26) and the absence in this chapter of all polemic opposition to worldly wisdom. It is a false view to regard them, with Grotius, Usteri, Billroth, and Olshausen, as allegorists like Hymeneus and Philetus (2 Tim. 2: 17, 18), because in the argument of the apostle no trace of an opposition to such a tendency is to be discovered (Meyer).

Vs. 1—11. The apostle sets out from the fact of the resurrection of Christ as a main point of the gospel, and lays that at the foundation of his argument. Vs. 1, 2. *γνωρίζω*] *I make known*. Theophylact, Oecumenius: *τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐπαγγελία*, and so the most; Rückert: *I call attention to*, contrary to the literal sense of the word, cf. 12, 8. 2 Cor. 8: 1. Gal. 1: 11. The apostle begins, as it were, anew with the announcement of the gospel. *τὸ εὐγγ.*] is not to be limited to the

¹ Heumann, Mosheim in part, Michaelis, Storr, Knapp and Flatt.

² Ziegler, Neander, Meyer and others.

proclamation of Christ's death and resurrection (contrary to Rck. and Mey.); these points are only rendered especially prominent by the *ἐν πρώτοις* in vs. 3 seq. *ὁ καὶ παρελάβετε κ. τ. λ.*] The *καὶ* three times used designates in each case something added to the preceding thought (Meyer); and indeed there is a climax in the repetition. *παρελάβετε* denotes the fact of perceiving (intellectually), historical faith, corresponding to the *παραδιδόναι* = *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*, cf. v. 3. Gal. 1: 19. Phil. 4: 9, and often; according to the common explanation, it denotes the believing reception (Jno. 1: 11), *ἰσθῆκατε* the faithful abiding therein (cf. Ro. 5: 2.), *σωθήσεσθε*, *ye are saved* (of the certain future), the salutary effect. *τῖνι—κατέχετε*] contains a condition of the latter, since *τῖνι λόγ. εὐγγ. ὑμῖν*, for the sake of emphasis, is placed first: *if ye hold fast the doctrine as I have announced it to you*. Contrary to Heidenreich, Billroth and others, who unite *τῖνι λόγ. εὐγγ. ὑμῖν* with *ὁ εὐγγ. ὑμῖν*, (see Rückert and Meyer). *λόγος* is here to be taken of the substance (Rückert, Meyer) and not the reason (Estius, Kypke, Wetstein, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Heidenreich), since *παρέδωκα* v. 3, and what actually follows, leads us only to the former, viz. the substance. *ἐκτὸς—ἐπιστεύσατε*] *unless* (14: 5) *ye have in vain* (Gal. 3: 4. 4: 11) *become believers*.

If now this clause, which forms an exception, is connected with *σωθήσεσθε*,¹ this does not suppose "the case (inconceivable to the Christian consciousness) that they, notwithstanding the *κατέχετε*, could still lose the fruit of faith" (Mey.); but it does suppose the truly conceivable case, that they had indeed received and held fast the gospel, but had not made a fruitful application of it to themselves; but with this connection, the more appropriate explanation would be, *without reason, temere*, as in Col. 2: 18.² Thphlet. Oec. Calv. Est. Bllr. connect with *κατέχετε*, so that *εἰκῇ* denotes the *being in vain*, in reference to that; with this view we must indeed make an addition to the sentence: *κατέχετε δὲ πάντως* (Thphlet); and this on account of the position is the more suitable. Accordingly by the *εἰ κατέχ.* the danger is indicated, that they might not have firmly adhered to the Gospel, and this apprehension, by the *ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ κ. τ. λ.* is carried out, as it were with horror, to the worst, scarcely supposable case, that their reception of faith had been entirely in vain.

Vs. 3 and following. *Specification* (not proof, Mey.) *of the τῖνι λόγῳ, in the principal points.* *γάρ*] *namely* (Bllr.). *ἐν πρώτοις*] *in*

¹ Beza, Flt. Olsh. Rck. Mey.; but which would not render necessary any insertion in brackets of the *τῖνι—κατέχετε*, as in Griesbach and Scholz.

² Rückert, but who with Theodoret supposes the reference to verse 14, which seems over-hasty.

primis, as the principal points: *οἰοῦναι γὰρ θεμελιῶς ἔστι πάσης τῆς πίστεως* (Thphlet), not: *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* (Chrys.); not: *among the first*, Masc. (Rek.). *ὁ καὶ παρέλαβον* what I have also received in communication. From whom? see on 11: 28. *ὑπὲρ τ. ἁμαρτ. ἡμῶν*] on account of our sins Gal. 1: 4, namely in order to atone for them, Ro. 3: 25, in other places simply *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* 1: 13. Ro. 5: 8 and often. *κατὰ τ. γραφ.*] cf. Lu. 22: 37. 24: 25 and following, Acts 8: 35. 26: 22, 23.—V. 4. *ἐγγέρεται*] The Perf., and not the Aorist as before and after, because it still continues in its consequences (Mey.). *κατὰ τ. γρ.*] refers as well to *ἐτάφη* (Isa. 53: 9), as to *ἐγγή.* (Isa. 53: 10. Ps. 16: 10. cf. Acts 2: 25. 13: 34, 35).

V. 5. *Κηφᾶ*] Lu. 24: 34, compare explanation of John, p. 212. *τοῖς δώδεκα*] Jno. 20: 19 and following, Lu. 24: 36 and following. *δώδεκα* denotes the apostles as a whole, or as a body, a collegium (like Decemviri, etc.), not according to the exact number; for at that time there were only eleven. Chrys. Thphlet. Oec. include Matthew with those who saw the Lord (namely after the Ascension); but it is a previous appearance that is here spoken of. — V. 6. The specifications which now follow are not made dependent upon *παρέλαβον* by *ὅτι*, but only indeed by a change of construction; for the apostle must also have received these facts. By *ἔπειτα, εἶτα* he unquestionably intends to designate the succession of time, cf. *ἔσχατον* v. 8. *ἐπάνω*] over, more than, out of the grammatical regimen, Win. § 38. 5. *πεντακοσίους ἀδελφοίς*] five hundred brethren, believers. A difficulty arises from the fact, that in Acts 1: 15, only one hundred and twenty disciples are mentioned; all however were not perhaps assembled there, or only so many were known to Luke. The testimony of the apostle decides for the correctness of the fact. *ἐφ' ἅπαξ*] at once, Theodoret: *οὐ καθ' ἓνα, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ πᾶσιν*, Vulgate, *simul*; so most; Bretschneider and Mey.: *once for all*, cf. Ro. 6: 10. Heb. 7: 27. 9: 2. 10: 10; yet, on account of the great number, the former signification is more full of meaning. *οἱ πλείους*] the majority. *μένουσιν*] are living. This appearance of Christ, which the evangelists do not mention, Olsh. Flatt and others connect with that in Matt. 28: 16 seq.; yet this evangelist speaks only of the Eleven.

V. 7. *Ἰακώβῳ*] probably the brother of the Lord, Gal. 1: 19. (Chrys. Thdrt. Thphlet. Oec. and the common opinion.) Grotius compares the account from the Hebrew-Gospel in Jerome, de vir. ill. c. 2. (Einl. ins N. T. p. 71), but there it is the very first appearance of the risen Lord, that is spoken of. *τοῖς—πᾶσιν*] seems to include James, so that if the former supposition is correct, *ἀπόστολοι* is used

in a more extended sense (Chrya. Thdrt. Thphlct. Oec. Calv. Bengel, Mey. and others.)

V. 8. πάντων] this is commonly regarded as Masc., and Meyer limits it to the apostles, because Paul designates himself as the least of them. But must we not connect πάντων as Neut. with ἔσχ. meaning *last of all* (cf. Mark 12: 29. Grb. T.)? So πάντων μάλιστα Plat. Prot. p. 330. A. ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἐκτρώματι] *as it were a child prematurely born, the immature fruit*,¹ a designation (according to Bllr.) of his violent, as it were, not natural call, but according to that which follows, of his unworthiness, since those prematurely born are weakly. The article places the conception in a definite relation to the apostleship, as it were, *a premature birth as an apostle*. Knapp and Rink, following older writers in Wlf., erroneously read τῷ, equivalent to τινι, without any analogy in the N. T. (Mey.). The explanation of Spätling² is contrary to the use of language;³ otherwise it would fitly correspond to the late call of the apostle and also to the predicate ὁ ἐλάχιστος τ. ἀπ. The appearance of Christ, of which the apostle speaks, is unquestionably that mentioned in Acts ix.

Vs. 9, 10. not precisely a parenthesis (Grb. Scho.), but a digression in explanation of the expression "premature birth." ὃς οὐκ εἰμι κ. τ. λ.] *as who, because, ἱκανός*] Matt. 3: 11. 2 Cor. 8: 5. καλεῖσθαι ἀπ.] *to bear the honorable name of apostle. χάριτι—θεοῦ*] *but through the grace of God*, notwithstanding my unworthiness. With the humiliating feeling of personal unworthiness is united the consciousness of the higher power active upon and in it, and this guides thus to the purified self-feeling of one's desert. οὐ κενή] *not in vain*, without result. περισσότερον] Acc. Neutr., governed by ἔκον. ἀντὶν πάντων] *than they altogether, not: than each one of them, as commonly*." (Mey.) Although this explanation can be historically justified, still it is not certain and necessary. ἐκονίασα] *labored* (Gal. 4: 11), not: *suffered* (Chrya. Thphlct.). οὐκ—ἐμοί] to prevent misunderstanding, as if he had said ἐκονίασα in an egotistic, vain-glorious sense. By οὐκ ἐγὼ—ἀλλά (as in Matt. 10: 20. Mark 9: 37. Jno. 12: 44. Acts 5: 4. 1 Thess. 4: 8) merely the subordination of the human activity to the Divine is expressed, not the suspension of the former. Augustin de grat. et lib. arb. c. 3.: Non ego autem, i. e. non solus, sed gratia Dei mecum. Ac per hoc nec gratia Dei sola, nec ipse solus, sed gratia Dei cum illo.

¹ Citations in verification in Wetst., attic ἀμβλωμα, Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 209.

² ὥσπερ ἐν γέννημα, τινις in Thphlct. Hdrch. Schulthess in Tzschirn. Anal. 1. 4. p. 212 seq.

³ Eritzsche de nonn. post. P. ad Cor. ep. locis Diss. I. 60 sq.

(Hdreh.). ἡ σὺν ἡμῶν] here the human activity is united with the Divine.

V. 11. οὕτως] by this the thread of verse 8 is again taken up, although the αἶψα—κρηύσσομεν presupposes the substance of the digression in vs. 9, 10; for only there is the calling and labor of the apostle spoken of. ἑκαῖς] does not refer back to vs. 7, 8 (Mey.), but to vs. 9, 10. οὕτω] as vs. 3 seq., especially v. 4. The structure of the sentence is as in 13: 8. οὕτως] in the same manner, namely, by this, that ye have received this teaching. ἐπιστεύσατε] as v. 2.

Vs. 12—20. Upon the fact of the resurrection of Christ, the apostle now grounds the doctrine of the general resurrection. V. 12. δὲ] places the denial of the resurrection of the dead in contradiction with this truth. πῶς] how is it possible that, etc. Ro. 6: 2, Gal. 4: 9. οὐκ ἔστι] is a non-entity, a chimera, cf. 7: 9. Winer § 59. 5. b, p. 453. — V. 13. By the δὲ a chain of inferences is attached and continued in the following verses. The first conclusion here made does not rest upon the principle: sublato genere tollitur et species (Grotius, Mey.; similar Knpp. p. 316. Rck.), nor upon the similarity of being in Christ and men (Thdr. Blr. cf. Ust. p. 864.)—to be sure a Pauline (v. 21. Heb. 2: 17), but here subordinate conception,—but, according to vs. 20 seq. upon this, that Christ by his resurrection had made a commencement in the resurrection of the dead, and that the latter is a necessary consequence of the former. So Chrys. Thphlet.; similar Calvin. Against the last mode of inference the objection may indeed be made, that from the ἀνάστ. νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν it does not follow, that Jesus is not risen, but simply that [under the supposition made] his resurrection has not fulfilled its end (Mey.); but this objection can be made only when one overlooks, that, according to the apostle, the connection of the resurrection of Christ with the general resurrection is founded in the Divine arrangement of the world, and for him has the validity of an axiom. On the other hand, the first mode of inference is merely logical, and the apt objection may be made to it, that Christ, as sinless, was not subject to death, and that consequently his resurrection could not be the condition of that of sinful men. V. 14. οὐκ ἐγγεγραται] is to be taken in connection with the preceding, as in vs. 16, 17 cf. 7: 9. κερὸν ἄρα καὶ [according to A D E F G 17. all.] ε. κήρ. ἡμῶν] therefore¹ also our (entire apostolical) preaching is vain, empty, without foundation² [if Christ be not risen],

¹ It can hardly be said that ἀρα has in Paul anything surprising (Mey. after Hartung, Part. 1. 432. Kühn. § 757. b.), cf. Ro. 7: 3, 25. 10: 7. 2 Cor. 5: 15. Gal. 3: 29.

² Cf. Eph. 5: 6. Col. 2: 8; according to Knpp. *inutilis*; opposed to this view, A. F. Müller, diss. exeg. de loco Paul. 1 Cor. 15: 12—19. Lips. 1839. p. 8.

and indeed because it is founded upon the resurrection and death of Christ. *κενή δὲ¹ καὶ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν*] *vain also your faith*; this is founded namely upon the *κήρυγμα*.

V. 15. Lchm. Tschdf. Mey. connect this verse with the preceding by a comma, plainly contrary to the true relation of the chain of clauses and inferences; for *εὗρισκ.*—*θεοῦ* has its ground in that which follows, whilst the clauses *κενὸν—ὑμῶν* have their ground in that which precedes. *εὗρισκόμεθα*] *we are found*, prove ourselves. *ψευδομάρτυρες θεοῦ*] *as false witnesses concerning God* (Rck. Mey.) not: *of God*, which God has (Blr.). *False* witnesses according to what follows, because they would have declared that which was false; according to Knpp. *quia auctoritatem Dei eumentuntur*, and Müll. l. c. distinguishes strictly between *ψευδεῖς μάρτ.*, *qui falsum testimonium dicunt*, and *ψευδομάρτ.*, *qui mentuntur se esse testes*, cf. *ψευδοπροφήται* and others; on the contrary, however, *ψευδοδιδάσκαλος*, *ψευδοκατήγορος*. — *κατὰ θεοῦ*] most interpret: *against God* (Matt. 26: 59), because against the truth; according to Meyer, “every consciously false declaration, that God has done anything, is against God.” It is better to interpret it, with Raphel., according to Xenoph. *Cyrop.* 1. p. 6. Plutarch. *praedag.* c. 4. Wlf.: *of God.* *εἴπερ ἄρα*] *if truly peradventure* (Mey.); but the two hardly go together in German [or in English—Tr.]; and *εἰ ἄρα*, *si forte*, is different from *εἴπερ ἄρα*, *if truly therefore, siquidem, ut vos putatis* (Müll.). cf. the examples, where it is used elliptically, in Viger. ed. Herm. p. 514. Passow p. 640. a.

V. 16. Vindication of the *ὅτι οὐκ ἔγγ.* x. τ. λ. by an almost literal repetition of v. 13. — V. 17. Repetition of the inference for the Christian faith, drawn in v. 14, from the preceding proposition, with the modification that this faith is represented as fruitless (*ματαιία*, *vain*, *fruitless*, cf. 3: 20), and indeed in reference to redemption from sin. *ἔτι—ὑμῶν*] *ye are still in your sins*, in the condition of the misery of sin; similar Ro. 8: 9 *ὅτι ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι*. The inference rests upon the inseparability of the resurrection of Christ and his atoning death, and, in general, upon the inseparability of all the parts in the work of salvation.

V. 18. A new (*καί also*) inference from the *εἰ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγ.*, and indeed such an one, as must give pain to many affectionate hearts in Corinth (11: 30). *οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ*] *those who have fallen asleep* (v. 6, and 11: 30) *in Christ* (in communion with him, in faith in him, not meaning: for the sake of Christ, i. e. as martyrs, Chrysa.

¹ *δέ* is to be omitted, according to A B D * F G 17. all. Vulg. all. Patr. with Lachmann, Tischendorf, Rck. Mey.

Thdrt. Thphlet. Oec. Grt.), the departed Christians, at the same time not including the pious, who lived before Christ (Calov. Knpp.). ἀπώ-
 λοντο] *are lost*, i. e. Christians, if there be no resurrection, are sub-
 jected to destruction in Gehenna.

V. 19. A sad application of this inference to the living. The ab-
 sence of a Part. copul. may be explained by the emotion, cf. Ro. 7: 24,
 25. The correct position of the words, according to A B D * E F G
 17. It, Patr. Lchm. Tschdf. is : εἰ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ταύτῃ ἐν Χριστῷ ἡλι-
 κότες ἐσμέν μόνον]. Whether μόνον be connected with ἐν τῇ ζωῇ τ.
 (the common opinion, and for this transposition Ro. 5: 6 may be ad-
 duced) or with the whole clause (Mey. Müll.) is indifferent as regards
 the sense in the main point, if the emphasis be laid upon ἐν τ. ζωῇ τ. :
 "If we are only such, as have hope in Christ *in this life*" (Mey.).
 According to Mey. Müll. ταύτῃ has not the emphasis because it is
 placed after; but this reason is of no force, cf. Eph. 1: 21; nor is τ.
 ζωῇ to be placed in opposition to κοιμηθέντες (Mey.); ἐν τ. ζ. τ. is
 plainly contrasted with the destiny of the departed, indefinitely con-
 ceived, after death, if there be no resurrection. Yet I should rather
 divide the emphasis between ἐν τ. ζ. τ. and ἡλπ. ἐσμέν, and suppose a
 contrast between hope in this life and the fulfilment after death (cf. Ro.
 8: 24). Morus and Rck. connect μόνον with ἐν Χριστῷ; on the con-
 trary, Mey. ἐλπίσειν ἐν Χρ. to place one's hope in Christ, cf. Eph. 1:
 12; the Perf. as in Jno. 5: 45. 2 Cor. 1: 10, and the Partic. with ἐσμέν,
 in order to render more prominent the idea of hope. ἐλπιούτεροι π.
 ἀνθρ.] *more miserable than all men*.

V. 20. Conclusion of the argument, since the fact of the resurrec-
 tion of Jesus is taken as proved (νυνὶ δέ, *but now*, cf. vs. 4 seq.) and
 at the same time the axiom of belief connected with it (on which the
 argument has been hitherto conducted) : ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων]
as first fruits of those who have fallen asleep (is he awaked from the
 dead), so that he has made the commencement in the resurrection of
 the dead. cf. Col. 1: 18: ἀρχὴ πρωτότοκος ἐκ νεκρῶν.

Vs. 21—28. Explanation of this axiom by showing its connection
 with other truths. 1) Vs. 21—24. Christ, as contrast to Adam, is the
 author and effector of the resurrection. Vs. 21, 22. The axiom of
 faith, that the resurrection of the dead has its ground in the resurrec-
 tion of Christ, is connected with what is laid down in Ro. 5: 12 seq.,
 that Christ, as contrast to Adam, is the second head of the human race,
 or the head of the human race restored, as Adam was the head of the
 fallen race of men. Whilst in Romans this parallelism is pointed out
 in the two points of sin and death on the one side, and righteousness
 and life on the other, here only one point is exhibited. (cf. remarks

after v. 50.) We have two corresponding propositions: in the one, v. 21, the parallelism is represented in general terms, under the conception *man*; in the second, v. 22, individually, in Adam and Christ; in the first, in the relation of antecedent and conclusion (*ἐπαιδή*, as *once*); in the second, in the relation of similarity. *δι' ἀνθρώπου ὁ θάνατος*] sc. *ἐστὶ*, cf. Ro. 5: 12. *ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ, ἐν τ. Χρ.*) in connection with *Adam, with Christ*, in so far as the one and the other stands at the head. On account of this parallelism, and what follows, we must not give up the universality of the *πάντες*, maintained by the older writers (Bez. Aretius, Mor. Rsm. Ust. Olsh. Mey.), and limit it to Christians (as Calov. Blondel, Wlf. Msh. Bgl. Lutheran-orthodox opinion, Est. Bilr. Rck.). But, since there is an *ἀνάστασις ζωῆς* and an *ἀνάστ. κρίσεως* (Jno. 5: 29), taking *ζωοποιηθ.* the same as *ἐγερθήσονται*, and finding here both resurrections, shall we with the reformed churches, found also the resurrection of the unjust to judgment upon the merits of Christ, or say, with Olsh., that the wicked also, as *men*, are in Christ (but with this view the meaning of the *ἐν Χρ.* would be changed); — or shall we, with Grotius, contrary to the parallelism, take *ἐν* by means of; or, with Mey., understand it of the ground or reason: “in so far namely as Christ as Messiah must also be the general awakener of the dead, and would not be the former if he were not the latter, Acts 24: 15. Jno. 5: 28?” But with this latter view, the question would only be transferred back to a positive conception. Probably *ζωοποιηθ.* is to be taken in its appropriate signification, and understood simply of the resurrection to life; the universality of it, however, to be conceived of in the sense of the *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων* indicated in what follows. (cf. Weizel in Stud. u. Kr. 1836. 978.)

V. 23. *ἕκαστος*] plainly refers to *πάντες*. — *ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι*] in his own order. *τάγμα* properly *what is placed in order, a body of troops drawn up in military order*; so Mey.: *in his own division*; and such an one would *οἱ τοῦ Χρ.* form. But as a second *τάγμα* is not mentioned, and also Christ himself commences the series, the *succession* (*τάξις*) seems to be denoted by the word, as this idea lies in the words *ἀπαρχή, ἔπειτα, εἰτα*. For this use of the word, proof is not found in Clem. Rom. 1. Ep. ad Cor. c. 37. b. Rck., rather in c. 41; but as *τάξις* also like *τάγμα* designates a *division of an army*, so also the latter may have the former signification of *τάξις* [viz. *succession*]. *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*] *those belonging to Christ*, cf. 1 Thess. 4: 16. Therefore the “*first resurrection*,” Rev. 20: 5. Bibl. Dogm. [of De Wette] § 203.

V. 24. *εἰτα τὸ τέλ.*] sc. *ἐσται*. Then will the end be. Not: of the

resurrection;¹ for although with this view the development of the thought would be in strict progression, yet the expression *τέλος*, which we are scarcely led by the *ἀπαρχή* to refer to *ἀνάστασις*, is against it; not: of the world, or the present order of the world;² for although the objection, that "according to the uniform doctrine of the New Testament, with the second coming of Christ commences the *finis hujus sæculi*" (Mey.), is removed by Rev. 20: 7, 8 (where the Millennium is interposed); and if accordingly, with Olsh., we suppose the apostle to place this temporal kingdom of Christ between the *first resurrection* and the *end*, and the general resurrection at the same time with the *end*, a complete harmony arises between him and the Apocalypse, as also the expression *τέλος* can be justified by the clauses which follow in the context: *ὅταν καταργήσῃ* κ. τ. λ. V. 24, *ἰσχυρὸς ἐχθρὸς* κ. τ. λ. V. 26; still the apostle, by the *ὅταν παραδ.* κ. τ. λ. (which clearly is to explain τὸ τέλος), has pointed out the way to another explanation, I mean not precisely this: the end of the kingdom of Christ (Gr. Bllr.), but of the events included in the "last things," the eschatological events (Ust. p. 373: the consummation). But the second, general resurrection is always to be connected with τὸ τέλος, and also between this and the first, a longer or shorter space of time is to be conceived of, which Rck. and Kl. wrongly deny. In this space of time now is to be placed the temporal kingdom of Christ, and at the same time with that, according to Weizel, as cited above, a process of sanctification or redemption, which extends also to the heathen and wicked persons, (analogous to the process of redemption, which took place from the resurrection of Christ to his reëappearance in the church) and the subjugation of all the enemies of Christ, together with the destruction of death, which takes place last (vs. 25, 26), and which is followed by the general resurrection. *ὅταν παραδῶ*³ κ. βασ. κ. τ. λ.] when he gives up the kingdom to God the Father (Ro. 15: 6). *ὅταν* with the Pres. Conj. expresses elsewhere (Jno. 8: 44. Win. § 43. 5) a recurring action, but also a future action (Matthiæ Greek Gr. § 521. p. 1195). The Aor. is not appropriate, because this surrender is made dependent upon the following *ὅταν καταργήσῃ. ἡ βασιλ.* the kingdom of Christ can scarcely be regarded the same as that which is called the kingdom of Grace, i. e.

¹ As Thdr. Oec. Cajet. Bgl. Jehne interpr. c.15. cp. 1. ad Cor. in Velth. et Kain. Comment. Vol. II. Hdreh. (not Ust.) Mey.

² Chrys. Bez. Bld. Wlf. Msh. Olsh. Kling St. u. Kr. 1839. 504.

³ More correctly Rck. Mey. after A D E all. Verss. Patr. *παράδιδῶ* (Lchm. Tschdf. after B F G *παράδοι*, which Opt. cannot be grammatically justified, cf. Köhn. II. 810. remark), because the following Aor. as well refutes the common reading as explains its origin.

the church (Bld. Calov. Est. Wk. Msh. Rsm. Hdreh. Rck.), since this is before the final advent of Christ (the *παρουσία*), but a kingdom (v. 25) between this and the consummation, similar to the Millennium of the Apocalypse, which indeed is far more perfect, spiritualized, and triumphant than the present earthly one (the church), but still belongs to a finite state, and is subjected to struggle. So Ust. p. 867. Note, Olsh.; whilst Weizel rejects the idea of a Millennium, but assumes, however, an intermediate period. All other expositors hesitate to take up the thought of the apostle. Thphlet.: *τούτοις κατορθοῖς τελειοῖ* — τότε γὰρ τελείως ὁ Χρ. ἡμῶν βασιλεύσει; similar Thdrt. Ambros. Cajet. Storr Opusc. 1. 277. Flatt, so that a sense comes out entirely opposite to the Pauline. Est.: *tradet regnum Deo et patri*, i. e. cum subiectione et gratiarum actione gloriosum illud regnum suum Deo patri suo offeret, profitens universam regni sui gloriam illi auctori se acceptam referre. Hilar. Lib. XI. de trin., Aug. l. I. de trin. c. 8. Hugo Victor: cum perduxerit electos suos ad contemplationem Dei; similar Hesshus. in Calov.; Hdreh.: quando omnes regni messiani cives Deo exhibebit atque offeret vivos, dominio mortis ereptos, redintegratos, restitutos et immortales. — Parallel are Pirke Elies. 11. in Wist. Schttg.: *Nonus rex est Messias, qui reget ab extremitate una mundi ad alteram. Decemus Deus S. B. Tunc redibit regnum ad auctorem suum S. D. ὅτας—δύναμιν*] when he shall have destroyed all dominion and all might and power. All hostile powers are meant, not merely the demons (Chrys. Thdrt. Hdreh. Bllr. Ust. p. 854), nor merely the earthly powers. Against the context, on account of the τοὺς ἐχθρούς in v. 25, is the explanation of Calvin (cf. Cajet.): *potestates legitimas a Deo ordinatas*, and of Olsh.: *all dominion, good as well as evil, and also even that of the Son.* (cf. Mey.)

2) Vs. 25—28. The Apostle in the course of his remarks is led to the thought, not known probably to all, of the *surrender of the kingdom of Christ to God*; of this now, in a digression, he gives an explanation.

V. 25. *δεῖ—βασιλεύειν*] for he must (by virtue of the Divine order or arrangement of the world) reign. This necessarily presupposes a longer duration of the dominion, and indeed a different one from that in the church, during the continuance of which the destruction of the terrestrial powers indeed, but not of the super-terrestrial, takes place. *ἀχρὶς οὐ κ. τ. λ.*) Words adopted from Ps. 110: 1. The subject is not θεός (Bez. Grt. Est. Rsm. Fl. Hdreh. Bllr.), to which neither the connection (which was probably not taken into consideration by the apostle) of the passage in the Psalm, nor v. 27 compels us; but the subject is Christ on account of the connection with v. 26

(Chrys. Rek. Mey.), although *αὐτοῦ*, not *αὐτοῦ*, is to be written (Mey., cf. Win. p. 175-6.

V. 26. *As the last enemy death is destroyed*, not Satan (Ust. p. 373); still death is conceived as a personal, diabolical power, Rev. 20: 14.—V. 27. Proof, that Christ will destroy all hostile powers, also death, from Ps. 8: 6, which passage according to the grammatico-historical sense, is to be understood of the dominion of man over the earth, but by an ideal explanation is applied by Paul to the Messiah: *for he* (God, according to the connection of the Psalm) *hath put all things under his feet*, namely, by his decree, which the Messiah in reality (vs. 24—26) fulfils. The apostle at the same time also, by an analysis of the passage in the Psalm, confirms the above conception of the surrender of the kingdom of Christ to God, and defines it more accurately as a subjection of the Son to the Father. *ὅταν δὲ εἴπῃ* sc. ἡ γῆ (6: 16); according to Mey. *ὁ θεός*, but contrary to the connection here and in the Psalm. *ὅταν quandoquidem*, Jno. 9: 5 (Blhr.); better: *quum dicet* (Bez. Mey.), but this is uncommon, since after *ὅταν* the Aor. has the signification of the Fut. exact, cf. Remarks on Heb. 1: 6. *δῆλον ὅτι*] sc. *πάντα ὑποτ.*, cf. Matthiae, § 624, p. 1494.

V. 28. *τότε—ὑποτ.*] *then will also the Son subject himself*, etc., in a different sense from that in which everything (hostile) will be subjected to him, in this sense namely, that he will no longer reign in God's stead, or God through him mediately, but God will rule without mediation. The explanation, that the subjection is only a hyperbolical expression for the complete harmony of Christ with the Father (Chrys. Thphlct. Oec.); the limitation to the human nature (Thdrt. Aug. Jerom. in Calov., Bld. Est. and others) together with the declarative explanation: "it will be very clear, that Christ also in respect to his dominion, considered according to his humanity, is dependent upon God the Father" (Fl.), together with the addition: "Christ will then according to his divine nature rule with the Father" (Calv.); and furthermore to explain it by the Corpus Christi mysticum, i. e. of the church (Thdrt.),—these all are unmeaning evasions. The limitation to the mediatorial office of Christ (Bld.) is better. *ἵνα ἢ x. τ. λ.*] *in order that* (not: *so that*, Hdreh.) *God may be all* (as we say: *be everything*, in authority, etc.) *in all* (Masc.), cf. Col. 3: 11; differently Eph. 1: 23, and also here *ἐν παντί* can be taken as neuter *for in all modes* (of existence).

Vs. 29—34. *Further arguments for the resurrection.* V. 29. *First argument.* *ἐπεὶ*] *for*, does not introduce a reason for v. 28 (Mey.), but an argument for the resurrection (Oec.). The preceding stands

indeed only in distant connection with it; but since vs. 25—28 are to be considered as a digression (Olsh.), it is not at all unnatural thus to refer back. τί ποιήσουσιν] the Fut. refers to the supposition: if there be (were) no resurrection; *what will (would) then . . . do*; not: quid eos facere apparebit (Blr.). But in this question lies the foolishness of this doing. Cf. Acts 14, 15: τί ταῦτα ποιεῖτε; 21, 13: τί ποιεῖτε κλαίοντες; Grt. Fl. Mey.: *what will they effect?* οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν] *who are baptized for (instead of) the dead*. This only possible sense of the words leads to the explanation, that the apostle supposes the practice afterwards in use among the Cerinthians (Epiph. Haer. XXVIII, 7) and Marcionites (Tert. de Resurr. 48, adv. Marc. V, 10. Chrys. ad h. l.), according to which Christians were baptized for those who had died unbaptized (the article denotes those who thus died), in order thereby to make them partakers of the resurrection and eternal life.¹ It is an argumentum ad hominem, an appeal to the prevailing belief; in which view there is only this difficulty, that the apostle seems to have sanctioned this senseless practice (Mey. and others do not indeed allow this), or at least does not blame it. Luther and others in Calov. translate: *over the dead*, i. e. over their graves; but ὑπὲρ does not appear in the New Testament in the signification of *place*; the custom is not proved, and the argument taken from thence would be weak. Chrys. Thphlet. Oec. Corn. a Lap. Er. Schmid and others, entirely contrary to the use of language, translate: *in faith in the resurrection of the dead*. Epiph. Calv. Est. Flac. and others explain it of the baptism of the catechumens on the death bed, likewise contrary to the sense of the words. Oleric. ad Hamm., *Deyling*. Observ. S. II. 44, *Döderlein* Institutt. II. 409, and *Olsh.* translate: *in the place of the dead*, i. e. who are baptized, although their predecessors are dead,—who take the place of the dead. *Polag. Olivar. Paul.* Memor. II. 153 seq. *Schr.* interpret: with regard to the departed Christ (Plur. of the Category); *Strr.* Opusc. 1. 281. *Fl.* interpret: *on account of Christ and those who have died in him*; *Fl.* proposes also to take βαπτίζ. in the metaphorical sense of the baptism of blood: *to endure sufferings* in respect to the departed Christ and his departed worshippers. *Morus* interprets: why do they incur misery on account of the dead, i. e. on account of those who have been dead a longer or shorter time? (Similar Lghtf.) Many other explanations still, see in Calov. Wlf. Hdrch. εἰ—ἐγγεινεται is joined to the preceding by Luther, Grb. Scho. better (cf. Ro. 8: 6, 7) by Bez. Bgl. Lchm.

¹ Ambros. Anselm. Scalig. Grt. Calixt. and others of the older writers in Calov. Blr. Rck. Mey.

Blr. Rck. Mey. to that which follows, so that it forms the parallel of the conditional clause to be supposed with ἐπεὶ : τί καὶ] *but why* (Ro. 8: 24). Instead of τῶν νεκρ. read αὐτῶν.

Vs. 30—32. *Second argument* : *I should act foolishly to expose myself to death.* This is an argument for immortality; but for such an one as is an object of hope. Cic. Tusc. 1, 15. : Nescio quomodo inhaeret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum — quo quidem demto, quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret? V. 30. καὶ ἡμεῖς] *we also*, the apostles, not till in the following passage does Paul speak of himself alone. V. 31. ἀπεθνήσκω] a strong expression for encountering dangers of death, cf. Wist. Kpk. τῇ τῶν ὑμετέρων καύχῃσιν] *per gloriam* (meam) *de vobis*. τῇ a well known Greek particle of affirmation, used only here in the N. T. ὑμεῖς. is to be taken objectively, as sometimes the Gen., and as ἡ ἀγάπη ἡ ἐμὴ Jno. 15: 9, ἡ χαρὰ ἡ ἐμὴ Jno. 15: 11. according to the explanation of some, ὑμετέρῳ ἐλπίε Ro. 11: 31, φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ Thucyd. 1. 83, cf. Matthiae § 466. 2. Rückert, but he reads ἡμετέρων according to A 2 * * 4. all. Or. Thdr. ἐν Χριστῷ κ. τ. λ.] *in the communion* (as it were in goods) *with Christ*, i. e. as apostles.

V. 32. κατὰ ἄνθρωπον] *after the manner of men*, Bez. : *humano impulsu*, Mey. : *in the interest of ordinary men*; more definitely indeed : *without hope of the resurrection* (Ambros. Oec. Schott). The explanation : *ut hominum more loquar* (Est.), or *exempli causa* (Hdreh. and others) is entirely untenable, since λαλῶ or λέγω is not in the clause. ἐθροισμάχῃσιν] is with Tert.¹ Thphlct. Oec. Pelag. Bez. Grt. Est. Calov. Rsm. Schr. Rck. Olsh. Mey. to be taken in a figurative sense of any great danger encountered. Cf. Ignat. ep. ad Rom. c. 5, ἀπὸ Συρίας μέχρι Ρώμης ἐθροισμαχῶ—ἐνδεδεμένος δέκα λεονάρδαις, ὅ ἐστι στρατιωτικὸν τάγμα. Other examples in Wist. 2 Tim. 4: 17. For against the literal interpretation² may be adduced : 1) the silence of the Acts and of Paul himself, 2 Cor. 11: 23; 2) that Paul as a Roman citizen was not exposed to such a punishment; 3) the improbability of deliverance. But what that danger was we do not know. Thphlct. Pelag. and others refer it perhaps to the commotion excited by Demetrius (Acts 19: 23 seq.), but on the one hand Paul, according to Luke, did not come immediately into danger; again, this event seems to be later than the composition of this Epistle (cf. Acts 20: 1). τί—ὅφ.] *what advantage do I have from it?* The aim and fruit of all

¹ De resurr. c. 48 : depugnavit ad bestias Ephesi, illas sc. bestias Asiaticae pressurae, 2 Cor. 1: 8.

² Adopted by Ambros. Cajet. Erasm. Lth. Calv. Corn. a Lap. Lghtf. Wlf. Msh. Pl. B'lr.

higher effort Paul found in blessedness with Christ, which he thought of as beyond the grave. εἰ—ἐγείρ.] is best connected with what follows (Chrys. Thphlet. Bez. Bgl. Grb. d. N.), because if connected with what precedes (Thdrt. Bld. Grt. Est. Lth.—but he makes two questions), the φάγ. κ. π. seems too much isolated, and the conditional clause εἰ νεκρ. κ. τ. λ. is contained already in the correctly explained κατ. ἄνθρ. φάγ. κ. τ. λ.] words borrowed from Isa. 22: 13, LXX, concisely denoting the Epicurean, pleasure-loving levity, which results from unbelief in a higher life after death. Cf. Book of Wisdom 2: 1 seq. and classical parallel passages in Wtst.

Vs. 33, 34. *Moral Warning.* μὴ πλαν.] 6: 9. φθείρ—κακαί] an Iambic verse (yet, instead of χρησθ' which is conformable to the metre, χρηστά, with Grb. and others, is to be read) taken indirectly as a proverb, or directly from the Thais of Menander, as Tert. Jerome and others observe. See Menand. fragm. ed. Meinecke, p. 75. ὀμιλίας κακαί] *evil conversations, intercourse of pernicious society*; reference to the deniers of the resurrection, who then notwithstanding must have been frivolous people, whilst Paul, according to vs. 32, may give to the greatest part of his hearers credit for a still serious disposition. Differently Bllr. Olsh., but Mey. thinks otherwise. — V. 34. ἐννήψατος δικαίως] *be sober in the right way.* They were already therefore, as it were, beclouded with that levity. Odyss. XIV, 90: δικαίως μυνᾶσθαι (Mey.) κ. μὴ ἀμαρτάνετε] *be not hurried on to sin.* On the difference between the Aor. and Pres. in these imperatives, see Win. § 44. 5. ἄγνος. κ. τ. λ.] *for some have ignorance of God*, those designated in v. 12; Bllr. erroneously makes a distinction. Their doubts sprang from or were connected with a want of true knowledge of God, cf. v. 39. Matth. 22: 29 πρὸς ἐντρ. κ. τ. λ.] 6: 5.

Vs. 35—50. After the apostle has shown that there is a resurrection of the dead, he enters upon the manner. V. 35. Propounding of the question in the form of an objection. πῶς] *How?* refers to the manner of the process of resurrection. ποίῳ σώματι] *with what sort of, how constituted, body* (cf. 11: 5), refers to the result of the process. Cf. Kling as cited above, p. 507. These are always the questions which the doctrine of the resurrection suggests, and indeed so much the rather, the more grossly it is apprehended; for so much the rather can one raise difficulties against it from the *naturalistic* point of view. Such an one the apostle seems to presuppose in his opponents, since he begins with natural analogies and then points to higher possibilities. ἐρχονται] *they come, appear.* The Present represents the object as present in thought, cf. v. 42. Win. p. 308.

Vs. 36—41. *Analogies for the resurrection.* 1) Vs. 36—38. *Anal-*

ogy of sowing and germinating with reference to the πῶς, whereby particular reference was had to the difficulty of the new life proceeding from death. ἄρρον] A B D G 47. all. Lchm. Tschdf. Rck. Mey. read: ἄρρον (Nom. instead of Voc. Win. p. 209). and Meyer connects σὺ with it "because with the common connection an emphasis must be placed upon σὺ, which however the context does not furnish." ζωοποιεῖσθαι, to be quickened, awakened, used instead of: germinating, ἀποθνήσκειν, to come into a state of dissolution (Jno. 12: 24), and in v. 37 σῶμα body, instead of plant—general expressions and conceptions, in order to bring the figure and what is denoted by it nearer together. The reverse in v. 42.

V. 37. The construction, elucidated by no one but Mey., but not correctly by reference to Matthias II. § 478, is occasioned by that in the preceding verse, and becomes clear if we substitute εἰ τι for ὅ, or if we suppose, in the clause succeeding, οὐκ ἐστὶ instead of οὐ σπείρεις. From the resemblance of the verb and the object arises the advantage, that the subsequent or defining clause is more closely united with the preceding clause. εἰ τῦχοι, σίτου] perhaps (14: 10) of wheat. τῶν λοιπῶν] sc. σπερμάτων, which the connection shows. — V. 38. ὁ δὲ θεός] Paul regards this process of nature in the development of the plant so much the rather as an act of God, as he must attribute the resurrection to Divine omnipotence; but he considers it to be such an action as takes place by necessary laws, through the act of creation, to which ἡθέλησεν refers. καὶ] and indeed. τὸ ἴδιον σ.] its own (peculiar, different from others) body.

2) Vs. 39—41. Analogy of the manifold diversity of organic structures (to which the ἴδιον σῶμα, v. 38, forms the transition), by which the objection ποίῳ σῶματι, v. 35, is met. Those who doubted in Corinth, like the Sadducees, had narrow conceptions of the creative omnipotence of God and the richness of creation. V. 39. σάρξ] animal organism. κτηνῶν] of the four-footed animals, properly, jumenta. — V. 40. καὶ σῶμ. ἐπουρ.] sc. ἐστίν, and there are heavenly bodies, by which the ancient writers conceived of the blessed; the moderns, according to modern conceptions, and according to v. 41 (but there another analogy comes in), the heavenly bodies; Meyer, correctly, the bodies of the angels. σῶμ. ἐπίγ.] Bodies of men and animals. δόξα] glory, is to be regarded, in reference to heavenly bodies, as brightness of light (cf. Matt. 28: 3. Acts 12: 7); in reference to earthly bodies, as beauty. — V. 41. The idea of δόξα leads the apostle to the analogy of the heavenly lights, whereby he would point, not to the diversity of the bodies of those who are raised, but to the possibility of new and unknown forms. ἄλλα δόξ. ἀστέρων] another (in com-

parison with the sun and moon) is the *splendor of the stars*; at the same time also, by the plural ἀστέρων, the diversity is indicated in the splendor of the stars as compared with each other, as is shown by the explanatory clause: ἀστὴρ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.

Vs. 42—44 a. Application of the foregoing to the resurrection: the body of those who are raised will, notwithstanding death and corruption, be a much higher, a spiritual body. Vs. 42, 43. σπείρεται] an expression for *being buried*, taken from the comparison in vs. 36, 37. The subject, σῶμα, naturally supplies itself. ἐν φθορᾷ] *in the state of corruption*, (v. 50). Parallel: ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ] *in the condition of dishonor*, contrast of δόξα, cf. 12: 23. ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ] *in the condition of weakness*, in so far as the power of the human body is relatively small. After Chrys. Thdrt. Oec. Bez. Grt. and Hdrch. Meyer refers all these conditions to the *dead* corpse, which indeed is sown, i. e. buried. (Others, as Msh., erroneously assume a reference to different states, cf. Bllr.); but as σῶμα ψυχικόν does not denote the quality of the dead body as such, but of the living body, according to its organization, it seems better to refer the preceding qualities also to the latter (Calv. Est. Bgl. Rem. Fl. Rck.), so much the more, as the ἀσθενεία would be an idle predicate of the former. — V. 44. σῶμα ψυχικόν] a *psychical* body, in which the ψυχή, i. e. the sensuous part of the inner life, predominates, and which is organized accordingly, cf. 2: 14. σ. πνευματικόν] which is organized for the predominancy of the spirit.

Vs. 44 b.—50. Exposition and confirmation of the assertion, that those who are raised will receive a spiritual body. ἔστι—πνευμα.] *there is a natural (psychical) body, and there is a spiritual body*—Justification of the paradoxical conception of a σῶμα πνευμ. by the express assertion, that there is just as well such a body as a common natural one. A B C D * F G 6. 10. all. Verss. Patr. Lchm. Tschdf. Rck. read: εἰ ἔστι σ. ψυχ., ἔστιν καὶ κ. τ. λ., and after these Luther. But it is plainly a pretended emendation, because the thought is brought into the form of an inference.

V. 45. Scriptural proof, which leads back to the above (vs. 21, 22) parallelism between Adam and Christ. οὕτω] *in harmony with this*. The passage is Gen. 2: 7 according to the LXX (καὶ ἐγ. ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψ. ζ.) with the insertion of ὁ πρῶτος and Ἀδάμ. But the proof does not lie in the proper passage itself, (for from the εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, to a living soul [a psychical being] follows merely the existence of a σῶμα ψυχικόν, readily acknowledged without that) but in the addition of a Midrash (comment): ὁ ἔσχατος κ. τ. λ., which rests upon the antitypical parallelism of Adam and Christ, having with the apostle the power of an axiom. ὁ ἔσχ. Ἀδάμ] is Christ, cf. Ro. 5: 14, not the risen

man (Harduin, Teller W B., Jehne). *vis πρ. ζωοποιούν*] to a life-giving (others, resuscitating, cf. Jno. 5: 21 seq.) spirit (spiritual being). The question is, how far? According to Bez., in his Divine nature; according to Calov. and Fl., in his human nature, by virtue of the communicatio hypostatica; according to Grt. (cf. Calv. ad v. 47) in consequence of his resurrection and ascension; according to Est. in consequence of his resurrection; according to the Socinians and Mey., in consequence of the ascension, because (according to the gospel accounts) his body during his earthly life, and even after the resurrection, was psychical ['natural']. Whether Paul acknowledged the latter, is the question, because he places the appearances of Christ, soon after the resurrection, in the same series with those of the heavenly Christ, which were made to him. With him also the resurrection of Jesus is too much the principal point in the whole subject, for him not to have perceived in that the sufficient cause. Jno. 5: 26, 27 appears to attribute to Jesus the resuscitative power, even in his earthly life, cf. Jno. 10: 18.

Vs. 46, 47. But that the *spiritual* (σῶμα is not to be supplied to πνευματικόν, as has been common since Thphlct.) is not earlier than the *psychical*, is shown in the form (ἀλλά) of meeting an objection (Thphlct. Rck.) and is developed by analysis from v. 45. ὁ πρῶτος, ὁ δευτέρος] emphatic. ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός] formed from earth, and consisting of dust, cf. Gen. 2: 7. This predicate is used instead of the above ψυχὴ ζ., in order to make clearer the quality of the σῶμα ψυχ. ὁ κύριος] is wanting in B C D * E F G 17. all. Verss. Patr. in *Lehm. Teichsf.*, and is probably a gloss. If it is read, it must be understood as in opposition to ὁ δεύτ. ἀνθρ. ἐξ οὐρανοῦ] of heavenly origin, takes the place of πνεῦμα ζ. That it refers to the corporeal nature of Jesus, cannot be maintained; it denotes, like πνεῦμα ζ., the entire personality of Jesus, which, through its predominant spirituality, has also a spiritual body.

V. 48. Hence as there are two heads, so also there are two series or masses of mankind. ὁ χοϊκός] Adam. οἱ χοϊκοί] the descendants of Adam, i. e. all men, in so far as they stand in connection with him and partake of his nature, Christians also not excluded in their nature as mortal. ὁ ἐπουράνιος] Christ. οἱ ἐπουράνιοι] the Christians who have risen and are partakers of the kingdom of God. — V. 49. Application of what has been said to the reader. καὶ χοϊκοῦ] and as we have borne the image (form, organization) of the earthly (during our mortal life). φορέσωμεν κ. τ. λ.] we shall also bear the image of the heavenly, attain the same nature as Christ. The reading φορέσωμεν, for which there is, to be sure, preponderating evidence in A C D E

F G 28. all. Vulg. all. Patrr., and which is adopted by Lehm. Techdf. and Mey., makes the clause a warning. But 1) this has here no appropriate place, since v. 50 (to be sure, not according to Mey., see below) concludes the argument, consequently also v. 49 must accord with the form of this argument; 2) the clause would then take its point of view in the present time, whilst *ἐφορέσαμεν* κ. τ. λ. transfers the entire life to the past. Meyer gives an interpretation not contained in the previous train of thought: "as we were similar to Adam by sin (which however has not been spoken of hitherto, see below) before receiving Christ." And thus, after all, the genuine reading in the common text seems to remain, according to B 17. all. Syr. Arr. Aeth. Arm. Orig. ed. Thdrt. How the other reading originated, is not indeed so easy to explain, as it has not at all the character of correction or facilitation.

V. 50. Conclusion of the preceding, by the express (τοῦτο δέ φημι, cf. 7: 29) *negative* assertion, that (whatever one may think positively concerning the resurrection-body) *flesh and blood* (Thdrt.: τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν καλεῖ) and that which is *perishable* (ἡ φθορά instead of τὸ φθαρτὸν) cannot (namely, not immediately, without change, v. 58) be *partakers of the kingdom of God and of incorruption*. According to Ust. p. 364. Billr. and Olsh., Paul here makes an admission to his *spiritualizing* opponents: "but that I allow" (?). Meyer joins v. 50, as introduction or transition, to v. 51 seq. But besides that the principle here laid down is far too general, to form a transition to the particular communication, which follows in verse 51, it is also more appropriate, according to the manner in which, in Ro. 11: 25, a similar *μυστήριον* is announced, to suppose something new to commence with verse 51. Not until the exhibition of the result, in v. 50, does it come to the mind of Paul to explain himself concerning those still living at the second coming of Christ. *κληρονομεῖ*] does not stand for the future, which is the reading in C D F G Vulg. al., but denotes the nature of the case, cf. v. 35. The Christological expression *inherit* (6: 9, 10), is transferred, also, by means of the parallelism, to *ἀφθαρσ.* (state of imperishableness) as in Matt. 19: 29 to *ζωὴ αἰών.* In the contrast carried out, in vs. 21, 22, 45 seq., between Adam, mortal and communicating immortality, and Christ, risen and communicating the resurrection, the element of sin, by which death has come into the world, is passed over in silence and not considered until verse 56.

Vs. 51—53. Communication concerning the destiny of those, who will be still living at the second coming of Christ. Vs. 51, 52. *μυστήριον*] cf. Ro. 11: 25. *πάντες μὲν οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα*] This common reading is found in B (without *μὲν*) D * * E all.

codd. gr. sp. Hier. all., in Verss. Chrys. Thdrt. all., and is rightly preferred to the various others, which are to be regarded as introduced on dogmatic grounds. The more precise meaning would be: *we shall all indeed not die* (i. e. we shall be living till the second coming of Christ) *but shall all be changed*, so that the subject of both verbs would be Paul, and all those, who should live until the second coming, and *ἀλλὰ*, as v. 52, would refer only to those then living (Mey.). But it would have been an absurd prediction, if he had promised, that in the time before the second coming, no one of the Christians would die, cf. 11: 30. 6: 14. Moreover, in a grammatical point of view, it is opposed to this explanation, that *ἡμεῖς* is not used instead of *πάντες*, as in v. 52. 1 Thess. 4: 15, 17. Hence it may be regarded as certain, that *πάντες* denotes *all Christians*, and *ἀλλαγῇ* is to be referred, not, as in v. 52, to the living, but also at the same time to the dead, and in reference to the latter, is to be taken figuratively in the sense of *ἐπεσθ. ἀφθαρτοί*, v. 52. Meaning: *we shall not all die, but all (some by the process of resurrection, others by another) be changed*. In order not to be obliged, with Chrys. and most interpreters, to assume a transposition of the negation,¹ it is best, with Bllr., to refer even the first *πάντες* to *ἀλλὰ*. and regard the *μὲν οὐ κοιμηθ.* only as inserted: *we shall all—not die indeed—but all be changed*. After an opinion in Oec., Estius explains *οὐ κοιμηθ.*, pressing the meaning of the word, thus, that all *die* indeed, but do not *sleep* in death, i. e. would pass quickly from death to life. *ἐν ἀτόμῳ κ. τ. λ.*] belongs to *ἀλλὰ*: *ἐν αὐτοῦ* (*ἀτομον, individuum, small point of time*), *ἐν τ. ἰσχ. σάλπ.*] at (Win. p. 461) *the last trumpet* (at the last sound of the trumpet), not *that of the last day* (Pelag. Est. Fl. Hdrch. Bllr. Rck. Mey.), but at the last of the signals which will then be given. But the apostle does not mean thereby the last trumpet, Rev. 11: 15 (*τινὲς*, Thphlet. Wlf. Olsh. cf. Fl.), which does not by any means constitute the last decisive moment; and also not the last of the seven sounds of the trumpet, during which the resurrection shall take place by degrees, according to R. Akiba in his Othioth. f. 17. 3. in *Eisenw.* II. 929. Wist. (the *ἐν ἀτόμῳ* is, however, against this); but he means the last of the signals, during which, according to some primitive (not so much Matt. 24: 31 as his own, resting upon an *ἀποκάλυψις* made to him) apocalyptic representation, the events included in the 'last things' were to take place. (In 1 Thess. 4: 16, several sounds of the trumpet are not indeed expressly mentioned, but *ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ* re-

¹ Which, however, could find an explanation and apology in this, that Paul places the emphasis on *πάντες*, as in the case in Num. 23: 13: *πάντας μὲν οὐ μὴ ἰδῶς*.

fers either merely to the second coming, as the first act, and a second and several signals are presupposed, or it is to be taken collectively). The conception of the signals of the trumpet rests ultimately upon the use of the holy trumpets in the festivals of Divine worship among the Jews, and is the figure of the entrance of solemn catastrophies, produced from above. *The last signal of all* cannot be meant, if here only the *first* resurrection be spoken of, which, according to vs. 23, 24, is not to be doubted. *σαλπίσει—ἀλλὰ*] is a confirmatory clause, which is not, with Grb. and Scho., to be inserted in brackets, since the construction is not thereby interrupted; but rather, on the contrary, the following second confirmatory clause, v. 53, refers to *ἀλλὰ*. *σαλπίσει*] Impers. cf. Win. § 39. 1. *καί*] and then, in consequence of that. *ἡμεῖς ἀλλὰ*] Calov. Est. Strr. (Opusc. 1. 76) Fl. and others, after Chrys. Thdrt. Thphlct. and Oec., are of opinion, that Paul does not speak of himself, but of those who should then be living. V. 53. *δεῖ*] according to the principle, v. 50. *ἐνδύσασθαι*] *put on*, image of close union, Lu. 24: 49. Ro. 13: 14. Eph. 4: 24. Col. 3: 10, especially also of the resurrection-body, 2 Cor. 5: 3.

Vs. 54—57. *The apostle dwells in triumphant hope upon this conception*; it is, as it were, a lyrical conclusion to the whole section, like Ro. 8: 31 seq. V. 54. *γενήσεται*] *will take place*, “be fulfilled,” *κατεπόθη κ. τ. λ.*] Ia. 25: 8, not after the LXX. (*κατέπιεν ὁ θάνατος ἰσχύσας*), but after the original text, and indeed with this deviation, that שָׁחַד, Jehovah *destroys*, is translated passively, and עַדְעַד *for ever*, by εἰς νίκης (as LXX. 2 Sam. 2: 26 and elsewhere) *to victory* (so that victory is the result). Schemoth R. XXX. f. 181. 4. XV. f. 101. 3: in — diebus ejus (Messiae) Deus S. B. deglutiet mortem s. d. Es. XXV, 8 (Wtst.).

Vs. 55, 56. Thdrt. Thphlct. and Oec. seem to take these words of Hos. 13: 14, not as a quotation, but as borrowed, and as an expression of the triumphant feeling of the apostle, as also Meyer adopts this view. But as in v. 56 a Midrasch (commentary) follows, and as the apostle elsewhere (Ro. 11: 8) unites various passages, it seems better to regard them as a quotation. Hosea says: אֲדִירְךָ דְּבָרְךָ חַיָּה אֲדִירְךָ קִטְרֶךָ שָׂאֵל; LXX. : *poû* (= אֲדִיר cf. v. 10; others, *I will be*) *ἡ δίκη σου* (instead of *thy plagues*), *θάνατε*, *poû τὸ κέντρον σου* (instead of *thy diseases*), ἄδη. B C 17. all. Verss. Patr. *Lachm. Tschdf. and Rck.* have here νίκης first and κέντρον last, contrary to the order of words in the common text, but it is plainly through accommodation to the LXX. Again, B D E F G. 39. all. Verss. Patr. *Lchm. Tschdf. Rck.* have θάνατε instead of ἄδη, which, as a deviation from the LXX, is to be regarded as original (Mey.). By κέντρον Paul conceives of the sting

of a scorpion (Thphlet. Grt. Mey.), i. e. a destructive weapon, not a goad (Schltz. Bllr.); it is not parallel with δύραμις "as that which calls forth the expression of power: sin wakes the slumbering power of death, and again the law that of sin" (Olsh.), for κέρτερ. τ. θαρ. is the sting with which death kills, not by which its power is awakened. According to the familiar expression that death is the wages of sin (Ro. 6: 23), the latter is here represented as the destructive weapon, which death employs; and, that the strength of sin lies in the law, which awakens and strengthens it, is clear from Ro. 7: 7 seq.— V. 57. cf. Ro. 7: 25. τῷ διδόντι] the Present denoting the certain Future. τὸ νίκος] as v. 54.

V. 58. *Final warning*, in the form of an inference (ὥστε, cf. 11: 38. 14: 39), not from τῷ διδόντι κ. τ. λ. (Mey.) but from the whole previous instruction. ἰδραῖον—ἀμετ.] *firm, immovable*, namely in faith, cf. Col. 1: 23, and indeed here in reference to the doubts which have been considered. Bez. and Mey.: the readers are conceived of as ethical *athletes*; but there is no mention of combat. But as faith must be active, and moral action suffers by doubts, it is added: περισσ. κ. τ. λ.] *distinguishing yourselves in the work of the Lord*. This is not: the work which Christ has performed, the Christian plan of salvation, cf. 16: 10. Phil. 2: 30 (Mey.), or the spread of Christianity (Olsh.), but practical Christianity, cf. Jno. 6: 28, 29. τὰ ἔργα, τὸ ἔργον τ. Θεοῦ. The work belonging to Christ or that commanded by him (cf. Matth. 6: 33) is indeed for the apostle, the furtherance of the plan of salvation and the spread of the gospel (16: 10), but for *all* Christians the work of love (κόπος). εἰδότες] introduces the motive, not for following the whole warning (Mey.), but for the περισσύνειν κ. τ. λ., and this εἰδέναι is the conviction of the resurrection, fortified again by the defence of the apostle, in which there lies a reward (v. 32), of which κενός, *without fruit*, forms the contrast. ἐν κυρίῳ] belongs, to be sure, not to ὁ κόσμ. ὑμ. (Thphlet. 1 Oec. 1. Hdrch.), but also not to οὐκ—κενός alone (Thphlet. 2. Oec. 2. Mey.), but to the whole clause, cf. 9, 1.—Also in the character of this warning lies an argument against the reading v. 49, and the turn of warning thereby introduced.

ARTICLE III.

OF THE NATURAL PROOFS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

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HAVING in the last number of this Review, offered some thoughts upon the constitution of spiritual beings, as exemplified in the inhabitants of our globe, in accordance with a purpose there intimated, we proceed now to consider the question, in which above all others, such beings are interested; viz. that of their continued existence, after the destruction of the corporeal frames with which, in the present state, they are so intimately connected. In the prosecution of this inquiry, our attention will be directed more especially to the spiritual nature or soul of man, as it is that, whose destinies more immediately concern us. However gratifying to our curiosity it might be, to know what becomes of the more humble endowment of spirit, allotted to each one of the lower animals, on the dissolution of their bodies, such knowledge, it is probable, would have no direct bearing upon human interests, and consequently be of comparatively little value.

"If a man die, shall he live again?" has been the great question and too often the despairing question, of the innumerable multitudes of our race, from the time when the first human being looked abroad over the earth, down to the present hour. Priests have taught the doctrine of a future life; poets have sung of it, and philosophers have labored to demonstrate it; but still as each new generation has arisen upon that which preceded it, the question has been again and again repeated, with the same eager interest, and the same uncertain and unsatisfying results. The earliest regular treatise, which has come down to us, on this subject, is the *Phaedo* of Plato. It was written about four hundred years previous to the commencement of the Christian era. It is in the form of a dialogue, and although composed by Plato, is supposed to embody the arguments of Socrates, his master, whom he makes the principal of the interlocutors. It is a highly elaborate production, uniting to a clearness and vigor of thought rarely equalled, the most finished graces of diction. Cicero, who was a profound admirer of Plato, makes one of the characters, in his *Tusculan Questions* (I. 11, 24), referring to this work, say: "*evolve diligenter ejus eum librum, qui est de animo; amplius quod desideres, nihil erit.*"

The composition is dramatic in its character, and the scene is laid in the prison of Socrates, where, condemned to drink the hemlock for having corrupted, as it was said, the Athenian youth by his philosophy—more especially by teaching them disrespect for the ancient divinities of their country, and persuading them to substitute new ones—he is waiting the return of the sacred galley, for the execution of his sentence. Under these afflictive circumstances, his friends and disciples gather around him to express their grief and their sympathy, and to offer whatever of consolation his situation may admit. To their surprise they find him calm and cheerful, exhibiting, in his manner and conversation, the same undisturbed serenity which they had been accustomed so much to admire in him, under the ordinary trials and vicissitudes of life. Instead of administering the aid and consolations which they have come to offer, they are soon seated in the attitude of disciples, drinking in, as usual, the lessons of wisdom that proceed from the lips of their great teacher. On the morning of the last day, after the approach of the sacred vessel returning from Delos had been announced, perceiving that his bravery and firmness were still unshaken, they beg to be informed by what considerations he is able to maintain this equanimity, this lofty elevation of soul, so superior to the circumstances by which he is surrounded. In reply, he assures them, that his support comes from the belief that, on departing this life, he shall enter upon a far higher and more glorious existence—a belief which not only takes away all dread and fear of death, but awakens within him the liveliest desire to lay aside the encumbrance of the body, and commence that endless progress in virtue and knowledge, for which he thought the soul was destined. Again, they desire to know the grounds of this belief, which is so consolatory to him, and which, if well founded, would not only enable them to meet death with like equanimity, but also serve to mitigate their grief under the irreparable loss they were about to sustain in his removal from them. He then proceeds to unfold, in a series of familiar discourses, the reasons which inspired his own mind with the delightful hope of immortality, and which, if duly considered, he thought could not fail to awaken a similar hope in theirs. He argues the great truth,

1. From the capacity and desire of the soul for knowledge beyond what, in the present life, is attainable. All our knowledge in this life is phenomenal. Of things, we know nothing, and can know nothing. We may note the changes which take place within us. We may observe the events which are occurring around us. We may learn the order of these changes and these events. We may ascertain their conditions, their relations, their connections. We may resolve the

particular into the general, and from the general we may deduce the particular. But we cannot trace the phenomena back to the causes in which they originate, the essences from which they are evolved. Now the human mind is not satisfied with this merely relative and finite knowledge. It seeks for something higher and nobler. It aspires to grasp the absolute and the infinite, to comprehend things in their essence as well as their attributes, to know events in their causes as well as in their connections and their order; in a word, to penetrate into the depths of being, and there, beneath the ever-varying appearances, to recognise and apprehend the unchanging realities upon which they depend. This, however, it can never do, so long as it remains shut in on all sides by the body, with no other inlets to knowledge than consciousness and the five senses.

Nor is this all. In the acquisition of those kinds of knowledge which lie within the reach of our present faculties, we meet with various impediments and hindrances, arising from our connection with the body. A large part of our time and strength is necessarily employed in making provision for its constantly returning wants, so that we have but little of either left for the labors of investigation. Its weaknesses, diseases, and infirmities also frequently disqualify us for that high intellectual effort which is necessary for the discovery and apprehension of truth. Moreover, the various passions and desires growing out of our corporeal natures, exert such an influence upon the mind, so blind its perceptions, distort its views, and bias its judgments, that we can rarely place full confidence in its most cautious decisions.

But if the soul was made for knowledge, as its desires and capacities plainly indicate, and if in this life, owing to the restraints, impediments and hindrances of the body, it is unable to arrive at it, then it must be destined to survive the body, and to have another and higher life, in which it shall be freed from the clogs and connections at present encumbering it.

2. From the law of contraries. These, in nature, mutually terminate in and produce one another. Sleep begets vigilance, and vigilance sleep. Rest prepares for labor, and labor for rest. Growth leads to decay, and decay to new growth. Beauty springs from ugliness, and ugliness from beauty. Right grows out of wrong, and wrong out of right. Heat terminates in cold, and cold in heat; light in darkness, and darkness in light; unity in plurality, and plurality in unity; simplicity in complexity, and complexity in simplicity; strength in weakness, and weakness in strength; health in sickness, and sickness in health. In like manner life, leading to and terminating in death, death must, in turn, lead to and terminate in life. But this new life

cannot come from the body that decays and is soon wholly resolved into the elements from which it was formed. It must come, then, from the soul; and the soul must therefore survive death, must be immortal.

3. From the reminiscences of a previous existence, which the soul brings with it, into the present life. Every one is conscious of many ideas which he has not received through the medium of the senses, which he has not arrived at by any process of the imagination or the reason, which he has not acquired in any manner whatever, but which are immediately and spontaneously suggested by the mind itself. Such are our notions of the relations of number and quantity, which, expressed in language, we call axioms. Such are our conceptions of the necessary relations existing between matter and space, property and substance, cause and effect, God and the universe. Such are our apprehensions of right and wrong, of ought and ought not, of truth and justice and duty. These and many other similar ideas, suggested directly by the reason, and not derived through the senses, were believed, by Plato, to be the reminiscences of a former life—parts of that knowledge which the soul had acquired previous to its entering the body, but of which it retained, after that event, only certain dim and shadowy recollections. Indeed, according to the teaching of the great philosopher, that process by which the mind arrives at the truths of arithmetic and geometry, or by which it, in any instance, enlarges and perfects its own knowledge, is only the recalling of forgotten ideas—the recovering of what it once possessed, but has since lost through its connection with the body. Now these forgotten truths, which the mind thus brings with it into the present life, show that it must have had an existence previous to the commencement of that life, and afford ground for the presumption that it will also continue to exist after that life shall have ended.

4. From the simple and indivisible nature of the soul. It is only things compounded, gross and palpable, things which address the senses, which can be seen and felt and handled, that undergo dissolution. Of this kind are the different bodies formed of matter. They are continually changing. They do not remain the same, either in form or substance, for any two successive moments. The particles of which they are composed are in constant motion—passing continually from one body to another, without being permanently connected with any—entering, each moment, into new combinations, which are no sooner formed than laid aside for others, destined in turn to give place to still others. Whatever has such a nature, whatever is composed of such elements, must necessarily be mutable, must necessarily undergo change, decay, dissolution. But that, on the contrary, which is

immaterial and indivisible, which cannot be seen or felt or handled, which does not address any of the senses, and which makes itself known only to the reason, that must be unchangeable, indissoluble, eternal. Such are truth, and goodness, and beauty. Such are duration, extension, and number. And such, too, is the soul, which is alone capable of apprehending these ideas, and which, like them, must be always the same—incapable of change, exempt from all liability to decay, beyond the possibility of dissolution, immaterial, immutable, immortal.

5. From the essential vitality of the soul. The body is, by itself, dead. It derives all its life, all its activity, all its sensibility, from the spirit which pervades and animates it. When this is withdrawn, the vital phenomena immediately cease to be manifested, and the body, like any other portion of matter, yielding to the power of the elements, is soon resolved into its original atoms. The case is analogous to that of temperature, which is not an essential property of bodies, but depends upon the heat or caloric diffused through them. When this escapes, they lose all their warmth, and are no longer capable of awakening any of the sensations dependent upon that quality. But although the bodies have become thus changed from the escape of the heat which pervaded them, this latter principle remains unaltered. It is still heat, and, as such, retains all its calorific properties. Nor can it, by any possibility, lose these properties. They are inherent. They belong to it essentially, and must therefore continue to belong to it until changed in its nature by the same power that created it. Were caloric to become cold, from that moment it would cease to be caloric. So is it with the soul. Possessing a living nature, being itself life and the source of life to the body, it cannot die. As material substances become cold from the loss of caloric, so the body dies from the loss of the spirit. But the spirit still lives and must continue to live so long as it may please God to preserve it in being. Dependent for its living powers on no outward causes, it can lose them from no outward changes. It can lose them only by losing its existence.

" Vital in all its parts,
It can but by annihilating die."

Such are the reasonings by which Socrates, the wisest of uninspired mortals, the pride and glory of his own age and the admiration of all succeeding time, in the absence of that brighter and purer light which Christianity sheds upon the destinies of the race, lifted up his own faith and that of his disciples to the sublime truth of the soul's immortality.

Though not amounting, in his own estimation, to an absolute proof of the doctrine, he thought them sufficient, not only to deprive death of all its terrors, but to awaken in the mind of a good man, when approaching that event, the calm and cheerful hope of a better life. Such did he, at that moment, look forward to. He trusted that he was about to exchange the society of mortals for that of the gods, and that the mysteries pertaining to his own being and the being of the universe around him, which in this life he had endeavored in vain to penetrate, would thenceforward be laid open to him. He also thought these arguments were sufficient to impose upon every one the duty of cultivating his own spiritual nature, and preparing his soul, by the adornment of every virtue, for the more glorious existence awaiting it. In the neglect of this, what was intended by the gods as the most precious of all their boons, might prove to be, in fact, far from a blessing.

In reviewing the reasons which are thus presented as the ground of belief in a future life, it should be remembered that since the time of Socrates great advances have been made in knowledge of the real and actual in every department of nature. At that epoch there were able mathematicians, acute dialecticians, subtle metaphysicians, but there were none who had any just ideas of things really existing—of the properties of matter, of the constitution of vegetable and animal bodies, of the form, structure, and physical arrangements of our world, or of the magnitudes, distances, and motions of the innumerable other worlds with which ours is more or less intimately connected. In respect to all these branches of positive knowledge, the philosophers of that day were mere children. They had not yet entered the true path of inquiry. Of the real character of the things by which they were surrounded, and of the world in which they lived, they were almost totally ignorant. It is only by recollecting this general fact, that we are able to account for the strange confounding of mere attributes, and abstract conceptions even, with actual existences, which we so frequently observe in their reasonings. Could they have brought their ideas to the simple but sure test of experiment, as we are now able to bring so large a portion of ours, they would not have suffered these blemishes to mar the perfection and beauty of their processes. We may add, that in presenting the above arguments, we have endeavored to give each with whatever additional clearness or force it may have gained from the light thrown upon it by the present more advanced state of the sciences. Justice, not less to the author than to the argument, required that we should do this.

The first and by far the most important consideration adduced in proof of the soul's immortality, is its inextinguishable desire and un-

bounded capacity for knowledge. There is perhaps no one who does not, at times, feel that this fact alone is a sufficient reason for belief in the doctrine. When he considers the narrow sphere of his own immediate knowledge, and the vast unknown by which he is everywhere surrounded, when he reflects upon the nature, origin, and destinies of his being, when he contemplates the wonderful displays of power, wisdom, and goodness that are seen in every part of the material universe, and thinks of the greatness of that almighty Being of whose glorious perfections these visible and tangible forms are but the hidings, when the desire to look into the impenetrable mysteries which lie above, beneath, and around him, has acquired all the strength of a passion, so that he would fain give up his present existence and close his eyes forever upon all material things for one glance into the spirit-world, then he feels the full force of the argument; then the hope of immortality, for a time, burns brightly within him; for he thinks it impossible that an infinitely wise and good Being should have endowed his soul with capacities for no object, and awakened within it desires never to be satisfied. When, however, other subjects have, at length, engaged his attention, and this exaltation of intellect and feeling has passed away, he finds the strength of his convictions materially abated; and when, further, he considers how many of the powers and faculties connected with his bodily organization and designed to fit him for the duties of his present existence, are never fully employed, and how few of the hopes and expectations that are continually arising in this life are ever realized, he comes finally to doubt whether the argument should be regarded as having any bearing upon the question at issue.

But whatever difficulty there may be in determining the precise weight due to the consideration of the soul's unlimited desires and capabilities, there can be no doubt that it is justly entitled to a place among the proofs of a future life. Its proper place, however, we think is only a subordinate one. It should be employed as a corroborative, and not as a leading proof. Taken by itself, it has little or no weight. Every power of the human mind finds, in this life, the necessary objects and scope for its full exercise; and although God holds himself responsible for the truth of our rational and our moral perceptions, he has in no manner guaranteed to us the gratification of our desires, especially when directed to objects beyond the reach of our faculties. Viewed as an independent argument, moreover, its force is greatly weakened, if not wholly destroyed, by the consideration that were the same reasoning to be employed with reference to the expectations of this life, it would inevitably lead to false conclusions; for here, as all must admit, what we really do, is very far from being in proportion to

our ability; and what we actually attain is still further from equalling our desires. But if the probability of a future life of progress in knowledge and virtue, can be established on other grounds, then the natural qualifications of the soul for such progress, not only remove all inherent objections which may be supposed to lie against the doctrine, but become a source of important corroborative proof. In this humbler capacity of mere subsidiary evidence, we shall find occasion for making use of the argument in a more advanced part of our essay.

The second argument, derived from the law of contraries, so obviously rests upon an imaginary basis, that it scarcely requires notice. There is, in truth, no such law as the one supposed. It does not hold, even of the few cases adduced to illustrate it, although differing essentially from that to which it is applied. Sleep does not always beget vigilance, or vigilance sleep. Strength does not always end in weakness, or weakness in strength. Beauty does not always terminate in ugliness, or ugliness in beauty. Right does not spring from wrong, or wrong grow out of right. Within the earth's shadow, darkness never changes into light. Beyond the reach of the solar beam, cold never gives place to heat. It is not easy to understand how examples such as these should have seemed to afford proof of a future life; and yet we find the argument pressed with an earnestness which could only arise from a conviction of its importance.

The third argument, drawn from the reminiscences of a previous existence, which the soul brings with it into the present life, rests, like the preceding one, upon a foundation purely imaginary. As presented by the author, it owes all its plausibility to an ingenious confounding of the suggestions of reason with those of memory, which, though arising in a somewhat similar manner, are nevertheless, in their nature and origin, essentially different. This mode of arguing the probability of a future life seems to have been suggested by the doctrine of metempsychosis, which Plato received from the Pythagoreans, and which was brought by them from the banks of the Nile. Believing that every human soul had occupied, in succession, many different bodies previous to the commencement of its present life, he would naturally seek for the evidences of this in impressions, which might be left upon the memory; and what so easy to be mistaken for such impressions, by one looking for them, as those subtle ideas which spring immediately from our rational natures—of which we find ourselves already in possession, but which we cannot trace to any outward source. Detached from its connection with the Egyptian doctrine, and adorned by the imagery and clothed in the language of poetry, the original idea of the

Grecian philosopher has furnished the basis for one of the most beautiful conceptions to be found in modern verse.

" Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar ;
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home."

The fourth reason assigned for believing in the continued existence of the soul after death, is its indivisibility. This seems to have been a favorite ground of argument with nearly all those who have written upon the subject. Cicero adopts it, and bishop Butler, in his profound treatise on the Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature, makes use of it. And yet we think it quite as difficult, nay, far more difficult of proof, than the conclusion which they have drawn from it. We believe, as we have endeavored to show in a former Article, that all analogy is opposed to the idea of the unity or simplicity of the soul; while we think there are many and important facts which clearly and unequivocally point to its continued existence after the dissolution of the body. Plato endeavors to make good his premises by removing the soul from the class of things to that of mere abstract conceptions, such as the ideas of truth, beauty, justice, and equality, which, having no real existence, are incapable of undergoing change. Bishop Butler seeks to do the same by an argument drawn from the phenomena of consciousness, first proposed, we believe, by Dr. Clark, and about as conclusive as another remarkable argument of that distinguished metaphysician and divine, in which he proves the existence and attributes of Deity from the necessary ideas of infinite duration and space. Cicero does not attempt to prove the simplicity of the living agent, but affirms it to be a truth so clear that, " nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus," we cannot doubt it.

But, even admitting the premises upon which this argument rests, the conclusion by no means follows. Were the oneness and indivisibility of the human soul to be demonstrated, that fact alone would not prove its immortality. It would indeed be incapable, on such a supposition, of undergoing dissolution; but what, we ask, even in that case, should prevent its annihilation? Having accomplished the objects for which it was created, through the instrumentality of the body, why

should it be continued in existence after the destruction of that body?

The fifth and last consideration urged in proof of a future life, viz. that of the essential and necessary vitality of the soul, viewed merely as an explanation or illustration, is both striking and beautiful. As an argument, however, it has no weight. It in fact begs the entire question. To say that the soul is essentially vital, is the same thing as to say that it cannot die; and nothing beyond this can be intended even by those who affirm its immortality in the strongest sense which that word can express. Nay, most persons would be satisfied with much less than this; their ideas of the nature and destinies of the human soul only requiring that its existence should be continued through the will and power of God, and not from any absolute and inherent necessity growing out of its constitution. The argument of the great master, rendered into the syllogism of his illustrious disciple, stands thus: whatever is inherently and essentially vital cannot die; the soul is inherently and essentially vital; therefore the soul cannot die. The major premise, though in form regular, is in reality defective. It does not express the result of any inductive process, nor does it affirm either an intuitive or demonstrative truth. It is simply an identical proposition, and, as such, cannot be made the ground of any legitimate deduction. The minor premise, however, contains within itself all that is necessary to the argument, and would, alone, be sufficient to justify the conclusion, could its truth be, in any manner, demonstrated. But unfortunately this, in our present state of knowledge, is impossible. The supposed analogy between the soul and heat, or between the soul and any other principle or agent with which we are acquainted, is altogether too remote and shadowy to be of any avail towards such a demonstration.

From the foregoing examination it appears that of all the arguments made use of in the *Phaedo* of Plato for establishing the probability of a future life, only one can be regarded as having any real bearing upon the subject; and even this, as we have seen, is fitted, in its character, to be employed rather in corroboration of other and stronger evidence, than as a separate and independent proof. Taken by itself, it must be admitted to have but little weight. How then, we may ask, did these arguments produce so much effect upon the mind of Socrates? How were they able to inspire in him so strong a conviction, so lively a hope of immortality? In seeking for an answer to this question, it should be remembered that several of the considerations adduced, although they have no importance in our eyes, had much in his. This is especially true of the numerous class of ideas which we find in

the mind, but cannot trace to an origin in the senses. These, to us, prove nothing. They are the spontaneous suggestions of the mind itself. To him, however, they proved much. They were the reminiscences of a former life. They furnished incontestible evidence that the soul had somewhere had an existence previous to the commencement of its present life ; and why should it not continue to exist after the termination of that life ? . The second and fourth arguments, also, derived plausibility at least, if not weight, from that doctrine of the Platonic philosophy which resolved all essences into certain mathematical types and forms, and thus led to the confounding, as we have seen in these arguments, of real existences with mere abstract ideas and conceptions.

For a full solution of the problem, however, we think it is necessary to look further than this. We do not believe that the hope of a future life, in the mind of either Plato or Socrates, in reality sprang from the considerations with which, in the *Phaedo*, we find it connected. We believe that, on the contrary, it had its origin in the intuitions of their moral natures, coupled with that instinctive desire of immortality, which may indeed be weakened by a life of sensuality, or even extinguished altogether by the consciousness of ill desert and the dread of apprehended punishment, but which is always strong in the minds of great and good men. Springing from this source, the faith grew up within them, nourished and strengthened continually by high aspirations, by pure thoughts, and by noble deeds, until at length it acquired the fixed and permanent character of an original principle of belief. For what we have been long accustomed to regard as true, becomes to us as real and seems as natural as if it were a part of the visible constitution of nature. Indeed, the word natural, as applied to the phenomena of the external world, has quite as much reference to our habits of conception as to anything in the phenomena themselves. Had they been different, or had the order of their succession been different, they would have seemed to us as natural as they do now. These arguments, therefore, of Plato and Socrates were not, as we think, the real ground of their faith, but only reasons invented by them for justifying a belief which they found already existing, and which they desired to support and strengthen.

In following the history of this question, the treatise which next attracts our attention is that of Cicero, "the best or second orator that to the memory of man is known." It was written between three and four centuries after the *Phaedo* of Plato, and only about fifty years previous to the appearance in our world of Him who, by a divine revelation, brought life and immortality to light. It is not an original work,

nor does it claim to be regarded as such, but only a translation into the Latin tongue, of a portion of the Athenian philosophy, perfected and adorned, according to the invariable habit of the Romans, as Cicero informs us, of improving whatever they adopted from the Greeks. The argument is substantially the same as that of the *Phaedo*. One or two considerations, which the more advanced knowledge of his times had shown to be without weight, are omitted, and others are introduced to supply their place. The several topics are also disposed with greater rhetorical skill, and are, moreover, copiously illustrated by passages from Statius, Ennius, and others of his favorite poets. The argument is thus addressed to the imagination and the taste as well as the understanding, and the reader is lured onward not more by the interest of the theme than by the graceful and attractive manner in which it is treated. The work presents a fine example of that copiousness of illustration and elegance of diction which, according to the Roman orator, is the chief end of all philosophy. "*Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere.*" At the same time it must be admitted that there is less of that straightforward earnestness, and of that charming simplicity, which are so attractive in the original production.

The only argument of any importance added to those of the *Phaedo*, is that derived from the universal prevalence of a belief in the immortality of the soul, especially among the nations of antiquity, who, living nearer to the origin of our race, may be supposed to have retained the ideas and sentiments with which the first human beings were created, in a less corrupted state. It is based upon the assumed premise, that whatever obtains the general credence of mankind, is the immediate dictate of nature, and consequently must be regarded as having the divine sanction. "*Omni autem in re, consensus omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est.*" This universal belief in a future life, is not the effect of education, nor is it the result of any process of reasoning; it is an original law of our nature. All men are so constituted that they have an instinctive hope and expectation of surviving death. The feeling is especially strong in the noblest and most gifted minds. "*Inhaeret in mentibus quasi saeculorum quoddam augurium futurorum; idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et existit maxime et apparet facillime.*" It is a revelation, in the soul, of the divine will and purpose concerning its destinies, and, as such, is entitled to as full confidence as the dictates of reason or the perceptions of sense.

Were such the true origin of the very general belief of mankind in a future life, the conclusion which is drawn from it would be irresistible.

But unfortunately for the argument, there are other and less authoritative sources, from which it may have sprung. Lord Bacon, in treating of the different errors which are wont to preëccupy the minds of men to the prejudice of truth, divides them into several classes, one of which he denominates "idols of the Tribe." The ideas and opinions belonging to this class affect alike the entire race. They grow out of common features in the constitutions of men and common circumstances in the conditions under which they are placed. They have their origin especially in the limited and imperfect character of our rational and perceptive faculties, and in the influence which the various passions and desires exert over them. Hence the almost universal belief in signs and omens and dreams, in good and bad fortune, in lucky and unlucky days, in astrology, in vaticination, in spectres, in witches, and in demons. Hence, too, the various forms of superstition which, in the absence of true religion, have so constantly usurped its place in the minds of men. Universality of belief is therefore not alone sufficient evidence of the truth of any opinion. It may have sprung immediately from the intuitions of our rational or moral natures; it is then true. It may have been legitimately drawn from facts taken in connection with those intuitions; it is then also true. Or it may have had its origin in some one of the sources above referred to, and be only an idol of the tribe. In the latter case it may indeed be true, but the universality of its belief affords no evidence of it. For however widely or however long it may have received the homage of truth, it is not the less an idol on that account.

The general principle, therefore, "*omnium consensus naturae vox est*," which the Roman orator assumes as the basis of his argument, requires important modifications and restrictions. Without these it is not true; and, if adopted and reasoned upon as such, would, in numerous instances, inevitably lead to false conclusions.

But notwithstanding the want of universality in the principle, may it not hold in reference to the case before us, and so be all that is necessary to the argument? Is not the general belief of mankind in the immortality of the soul, in fact an immediate dictate of nature? We think not. We think it has neither the directness, nor the force, nor the universality of an original principle of belief. This we suppose to be sufficiently evident from the want of proof, which has been so generally felt, and which philosophers, moralists and divines have so frequently endeavored to supply. No one ever thought of proving or requiring proof that two and two make four, that the whole is greater than any of its parts, that what we see or feel or gain a knowledge of by any of the senses, actually exists, that every change is produced by

some cause, that virtue is more engaging than vice, innocence more lovely than guilt, fidelity more deserving than treachery. These and numerous other similar truths, force the assent of the mind immediately on being presented to it. Any attempt to demonstrate them would be alike useless and futile. They are necessarily involved in every process of reasoning, and are, consequently, incapable of deriving support from any. They have their foundation in the mind itself, and are so firmly planted, that they equally spurn the aid and defy the attempts of all logic. Such surely is not the character of that earnest desire, that trembling hope, that prevailing expectation of a future life which, in every age, has been the highest attainment of those who, aided by the simple light of nature, have investigated the subject most seriously and most profoundly.

The true explanation of the phenomenon under consideration, must be sought, as we think, partly in that instinctive love of existence, that "dread and horror of falling into nought," which is natural to man, and which was designed in the framing of his constitution to prevent under any circumstances self-destruction, and partly in the presages of conscience, taken in connection with the moral government of God, which he sees plainly commenced in this life, but of which the completion can take place only in another. So far as the belief in question has its origin in the former of these sources, it is a mere idol of the tribe, and the wide extent to which it has at all times received homage, confers upon it no title to respect. So far however as it comes from the latter source, its deduction we think is legitimate, and the fact of the almost universal prevalence of the doctrine, must be regarded as of real weight in establishing the probability of a future life. But of this we shall have occasion to speak further on.

Passing over a period of nearly two thousand years, we propose next to examine the argument of bishop Butler, contained in the first chapter of his immortal work on the Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of nature, to which allusion has already been made. It is not easy to conceive a more perfect contrast to the Tusculan questions than is presented by this work. Destitute of all ornament, and addressed purely to the understanding and the reason, it has little interest for readers who require to be allured by the charm of imagery, or the attractions of style. In the conduct of this noble defence of religion, no aid is sought from any of the lighter powers of the mind, but on the contrary, they are sternly rebuked away, as altogether impertinent and out of place in discussions pertaining to so grave a theme. At the same time there are evinced a precision of thought and comprehensiveness of view, as well as a pow-

er of delicate analysis, of subtle discrimination, and of rigid logical deduction which were unknown to the Roman orator, and which make it no boy's play to grapple in argument with the English theologian and philosopher.

We think, however, it must be admitted that the author of the *Analogy* is less successful, perhaps less fortunate in his efforts to demonstrate the doctrine of a future life, than in any other portion of his great work. Both of the main arguments employed by him, are no less applicable to the lower animals than to man, and just as much prove the immortality of the living principle connected with the minutest insect or humblest infusoria, as of the human soul. It is not a little remarkable that this fact which in reality converts the attempted proof into a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principles from which it is drawn, should not have awakened in the cautious mind of Butler a suspicion of their soundness, and led him to seek other means of establishing the truth in question. These he would have found, and as we think, far better suited to his purpose, in the facts and principles so ably and so fully set forth in his chapters on the moral government of God, and on probation considered as a means of discipline and improvement. Indeed, we have always been of the opinion that these two chapters contain the only real and solid grounds for belief in a future life which the work presents; the considerations adduced in the one particularly appropriated to that object, serving at furthest only to answer objections to the doctrine. But let us examine his arguments.

The first is from the analogy of nature. Without the explanations and illustrations by which it is accompanied, it is simply this. "From our being born into the world, in the helpless and imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being greatly different from those appointed to them in another period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds." "Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind with that we have experienced."

This argument, as we think must be apparent to every one upon reflection, does not really touch the question of a future life. The most that it goes to show, is that if there be a future life, it will probably differ widely in its character and circumstances from the present,

and that the different periods of that life will in like manner differ widely from one another.

Life in this world everywhere moves in cycles. Of these, some are of greater and some of less magnitude. Some embrace a period of many years, others are completed in a few days. At each successive point of these cycles, life is constantly assuming new phases, so that it never continues for two consecutive moments in all respects the same. But however numerous these phases may be, and however widely they may differ from one another, the movement is always in the form of a curve returning into itself, and never in a straight line of indefinite progression. This general law is well illustrated by the metamorphoses of most insects. There is first the egg. From this springs a worm. The worm is changed into a chrysalis. The chrysalis in due time bursting its envelop, issues from it a perfect insect. From the perfect insect proceed other eggs. These give rise to new worms, destined in turn to pass through the same round of changes; and so on interminably. The metamorphoses which all the higher animals undergo in passing through the successive stages of their development, are scarcely less remarkable, although as they take place for the most part during the embryonic period, they are less open to observation, and therefore less generally known. In some of the lower Articulata, the successive phases of existence are still more varied and striking. There are not only numerous metamorphoses, but successive generations, each differing widely from that which preceded it. In the case of the *Distoma Hepaticum*, it is only in the fourth, and in some species of *Aphides* not till the eighth generation even, that the descendant returns to the form, structure and habits of the original progenitor.¹

Now the only inference that can be drawn from all this by analogy is, that should the existence of man be extended into a future life so as to embrace a much wider cycle than it does at present, or should it be indefinitely prolonged and its type changed from the form of the cycle to that of a direct line in endless progression, it will probably continue to present, as it has hitherto done, new phases of character at each of the successive stages through which it is carried. Whether or not man be destined to experience such an extension of his being, is a question which these analogies by no means reach. Indirectly they may serve to answer objections to the doctrine of a future life, on the ground of its necessarily being so unlike the present; for they not only prove that God is able to continue the same being in existence under conditions and circumstances widely different, but show

¹ Agassiz.

that in respect to the inhabitants of this world, such is an essential part of the Divine plan. Whether that plan, however, includes a continuation of the existence of man, or any of the animal tribes associated with him, beyond the present life, must be learned, if learned at all, from other sources.

The second argument is from the law of continuance. It is briefly this. Whatever exists will continue to exist until something occur to destroy it. This proposition is in accordance with an original principle of belief, and its truth is moreover confirmed by the universal experience of mankind. Our powers of perception and action exist. They will therefore continue to exist until something occur to destroy them. The only event from which we can apprehend the destruction of these powers is death. That death will destroy them, cannot however be inferred either from the reason of the thing or from the analogy of nature. Nor is the connection subsisting between our living powers and the bodily organs through which they are exercised, so far as we are able to trace it, of such a nature as to afford the slightest presumption that the dissolution of the latter will be the destruction of the former. On the other hand, from the fact that our powers of reason, memory and affection are not dependant in any such manner as those of sense, or so far as we know in any manner at all upon our bodily organs, and from the fact that in many cases of mortal disease these powers remain in full exercise up to the last moment, there is good reason to believe that they are in no way affected by death—that they are altogether beyond the reach of the king of terrors. There is therefore good reason to believe that our living powers, including those of perception and action, as well as of memory, imagination, affection, etc. will survive death. 6

This train of reasoning and illustration which forms the main argument of bishop Butler, for a future life, is, we think, open to criticism at several different points. In commenting upon it, however, we shall confine ourselves to two general remarks.

The first is, that could we demonstrate the distinct nature and entire independence of the soul, could we prove beyond all doubt or question, that it sustains no other relations to the body than such as are necessary to enable each to act upon and receive impressions from the other, this would of itself afford no ground for the belief that the soul is destined to survive the body. The two having been created to form by their union the same compound being, why should we suppose one of them to be continued in existence more than the other, after that being has accomplished the purposes for which it was made, and its career of life and action is terminated? Since

they commence their existence at the same time, and grow up together, unfolding their respective powers and faculties in constant and harmonious relation to one another, why should we not suppose the parallel to be continued, and both on the termination of life to be alike resolved into their original elements? Indeed such is probably the fact in respect to all the lower animals.

The second remark is, that under our present constitution, the powers of reason, memory, and imagination, are just as much dependent upon certain parts of the body as those of sensation or perception. This is evident from the effect produced by disorders of the brain, the portion of the organization with which the spirit has its immediate connection. These commonly disturb the exercise of the former class of powers even sooner than they do that of the latter, and almost always to a much greater extent. Few persons, we apprehend, who have suffered only from slight irritability of that organ, can have failed to be conscious of a stronger tendency of the circulation towards it after any serious exertion of the mental faculties. That spontaneous succession of ideas which constitutes the natural train of thought, and which sleep or a swoon alone interrupts, would seem, in our present state, to be the result of one continued series of organic impressions—impressions similar in character, it is probable, to those by which the ideas were originally introduced to the mind. Indeed we are inclined to believe that perception and conception, whether considered in themselves or in relation to the causes which immediately produce them, are more nearly allied to one another than is commonly imagined. We think there is reason to suppose that they both depend upon the action of the same specific portions of the brain, and that the main difference between them consists in that action having its origin, in the one case, in impressions made upon the outward senses, while in the other it springs from habit, and is, to a greater or less extent, under the control of the will. But we will not extend our observations upon this subject, as we purpose to consider, in a separate Article, the nature and extent of the office performed by the cerebral organs, in evolving the mental phenomena. We will only add here, that no argument in favor of the separate and independent action of the mind can be drawn from the fact that, in many cases of mortal disease it retains the full possession of its powers up to the period of dissolution. In such cases, the brain is not the immediate seat of the disease, and its functions, like those of the heart, lungs, and many other parts of the system, continue to be performed in their accustomed manner, though not indeed with their accustomed energy, until they are finally interrupted by death. In other cases, where the brain is directly involved in the

disease, either disturbance of the mental faculties or inconvenience and suffering from their exercise, are commonly among the earliest symptoms by which its existence is indicated.

In constructing his proof of a future life, as we have already intimated, we think the author of the *Analogy* has erred in leaving altogether out of the argument the moral nature of man and his capacity for improvement—the two features of his constitution by which he is principally distinguished from the lower tribes of the animal kingdom, and which, taken in connection with what may be discovered of the character and government of God, point, as we think, most distinctly to another and higher existence beyond the present. We are also surprised that a mind so clear and penetrating, should have failed to perceive that the real question at issue is not whether the soul be naturally or essentially immortal, but whether he who formed the soul designs to continue it forever in being; and that the answer to this question must be sought in the indications of the divine will and purpose to be gathered from our own natures and from the constitution and government of the world around us. It might be supposed that the author had, in preference, adopted the course pursued by him, in order that he might render the argument independent of the being and attributes of God, did he not, in the commencement of the *Analogy*, take for granted the existence of an intelligent Framer and Governor of the universe. Owing to this misapprehension, as we think, in regard to the nature of the proposition to be established, and the consequent error in the choice of means for demonstrating it, although far more acute and subtle in his reasonings than the author of the *Tusculan Questions*, he does not, in fact, present so many of the true grounds for belief in the great and glorious doctrine of our immortality, as the Roman orator.

Having thus briefly reviewed the different considerations which have been urged to show, independently of the teachings of revelation, that the spirit of man is not, like his body, destined, on the termination of life, to be resolved into its component elements, we would now ask the attention of the reader, for a few moments, to a great and leading fact in the past history of our globe, which though never before considered, so far as we know, in reference to this question, we think has a real bearing upon it, which taken in connection with the capabilities and endowments of the soul, we think indicates, on the part of the Creator, a purpose to continue it in being beyond the brief period of its present existence. We refer to the gradual and progressive development of life, upon our planet, from the epoch of its earliest inhabitant down to the present hour. For a knowledge of this remark-

able though well established fact, we are indebted to the combined labors of the geologist and the comparative anatomist. It was unknown to the ancients; nor were there any phenomena, open to their observation, which could have led them to conjecture it. Indeed, it is only within the last half century that the different physical sciences have attained a degree of advancement rendering the discovery possible. The ordinary aspect of nature, as seen from the narrow point of observation occupied by a single generation, or even the entire race of mankind, would rather lead to a different conclusion, would suggest the idea of movement without progress, of change without development. As we have already remarked, life everywhere moves in cycles. In harmony with this primary law of the organic world, we observe in the phenomena of inorganic nature, whether of greater or less magnitude, the most perfect conformity to the same type. We see it in the continued round of combinations and decompositions through which each of the elements is constantly passing. We behold it in the successions of day and night, in vicissitude of the seasons, and in the more extended revolutions of the remoter cometic and planetary bodies, some of which require for their completion the lapse of centuries. These and other similar observations naturally impress the mind, when contemplating the universe, with the idea of a vast system which, complete in itself, is each moment accomplishing the entire purpose of its creation, which, though embracing all the provisions necessary for perpetuating its existence through the cycles of eternity, tends to no other or higher results than we see at present evolved from it.

To correct the erroneous impression which we are thus liable to receive from the character of the changes occurring around us, we must turn to the past history of the earth, inscribed upon the rocky tables of its crust. From the facts recorded here we learn that, beneath this stationary and unprogressive aspect of nature, in our world at least, constant advances have been making towards a higher and more perfect state.

If we examine the oldest divisions of the fossil-bearing rocks—those which were first deposited after the earth became the abode of living beings—we discover in the organic remains which they contain, only representatives of the lowest classes of the several departments of the animal kingdom. The different races, forming the higher classes, had not yet been called into existence. This general fact is true of the Radiates, of the Mollusks, and of the Articulates. It is more especially true of the Vertebrates, which constitute the highest division of animals, and of which the only representatives found in these rocks are certain inferior tribes of fishes. Hence geologists have designated

the long period occupied by the deposition of these ancient strata as the *reign of fishes*. There were as yet no reptiles, no birds, no mammals, no animals of any kind, either possessing lungs or breathing the air.

If we pass up through these ancient strata till we come to beds occupying a position midway in the series of fossiliferous rock, and examine the remains which we meet here, we shall find that a great advance has already been made in every department of animal life. Not only are the orders previously existing greatly enlarged, but animals belonging to new and higher classes make their appearance. We now have, in addition to fishes of a more advanced organization, reptiles in great numbers, some birds, and even a few mammals belonging to that remarkable family which is so largely developed at present on the continent of New Holland, and which presents a type of character in some respects intermediate between that of birds and ordinary mammals. On account of the great predominance, however, of the order of lizards during the accumulation of these secondary strata, the period has been denominated the *reign of reptiles*.

If we, lastly, direct our attention to the upper and more recently formed layers of the fossil-bearing rocks, we shall find here still further evidences of the gradual and progressive development of animal life. Mammals, such as the horse, ox, bear, wolf, elephant, lion, etc., make their appearance in great variety and abundance. Indeed, some of the families belonging to this class, seem to have been more largely developed than they are at present. This is especially true of the Pachyderms, of which nearly as many different species have been discovered in the gypsum of the basin of Paris, as are now known to exist on the entire face of the globe. Man, however, was still wanting, no remains either of him or of his works having been found even in the newest and most superficial strata. As the mastadon, elephant, rhinoceros, and other large mammiferous quadrupeds, were the dominant animals during this period of the earth's history, it has very properly been characterized as the *reign of mammals*.

At length, when the fulness of time has come, man, the last and most perfect of God's works, the head and completion of the animal creation, is called into existence. In him the long line of physical advances which we have beheld is terminated. Embracing in his bodily organization a wider variety of powers, and in his mental constitution a far more extensive range of faculties than any or all of the tribes which preceded him, he presents the highest development of the original and primary conception of life that is ever to be witnessed in connection with our planet; the complete embodiment of that perfect type, towards which we have seen, in the successive races of the lower ani-

mals, a constant and increasing tendency. The comparatively brief period that has elapsed since the appearance of this latest inhabitant, so greatly superior to all the rest, has with good reason been called the *reign of man*.

Such is a brief account of what we deem to be by far the most interesting and important fact discovered by the investigations of geology; a science which, though in its infancy, has already done more than any other, with perhaps the exception of astronomy, towards enlarging our ideas of the Creator's works, and which in its future progress, we think, is destined to shed more light upon the Divine character and purposes than even that noble science.

Although it is probable that the gradual and progressive development of life which we have witnessed was accompanied, at each step, by a corresponding development of the physical resources and capabilities of the earth, there is no reason for believing the former to have been in any manner dependent upon the latter. On the contrary, unless we regard them as two equal and parallel series of phenomena, we must suppose the material to have been evolved in subordination to the spiritual. Knowing from the beginning the purposes which he designed to accomplish through the instrumentality of our planet, God so arranged the elements in the primary synthesis of the original mass, that each of its subsequent unfoldings should be not only in perfect harmony with these ends, but constantly subsidiary to them. Whatever supposition we adopt, however, in regard to the relation between these two series of developments, they equally indicate the existence, throughout nature, of a great and fundamental law of progress, having its origin in an essential and permanent feature of the divine character, and afford ground for the belief that man, in being constituted with sensibilities in harmony with it, was only formed in the image of his *Maker*.

But if from the time of its first appearance in our world, life has been thus constantly advancing, assuming at each new epoch a higher and still higher type, and taking in a wider and yet wider range, if such has been its course, not for the brief period of a few thousand years, but, as geologists believe, for an incalculable series of past ages, if all this has, moreover, taken place only in accordance with a universal law of nature originating in the character of its Author, shall we suppose the long line of progress which is thus disclosed, to reach its termination in our own species? Having commenced with such humble beginnings, and gradually advanced through so many successive stages up to this point, shall life stop here, and become henceforward stationary? So far as its mere vehicles, the organizations with

which it is connected, are concerned, such will probably be the fact. As we have already said, man is obviously the head and completion of the animal creation, the perfect whole of which the lower tribes that came before him represented only parts, the great and final appearing which they from the beginning foretold, and in which all their predictions are realized. Each of the preceding races was formed for a specific mode of life, was adapted in its organization to particular physical conditions, and designed to subsist upon particular kinds of food. The constitution of man, on the contrary, is in the highest degree generalized. He is omnivorous. He dwells in all climes, and lives under every variety of circumstances. He is the universal inhabitant of the earth. He holds relation to the surrounding world at all points, and everywhere renders it tributary to him. Fire, air, earth, and water, nay, the elements themselves, vie with one another in doing him service.

But although there be no probability that any new and more highly endowed animal will ever be created, it does not however follow from this, that life on our globe is henceforward to remain stationary. On the contrary we find, in the being last called into existence, a new element, an element of progress, which was altogether wanting in the preceding races. In consequence of this, the advances which had previously taken place by the successive introduction of new species, fitted each for a higher sphere of existence, are now carried forward in the same species, through the improvement of its successive generations. The mode of the advance is changed, but the law still holds. Man is so constituted as to be capable not only of individual progress, but of progress as a race. The two chief instruments of human progress are wealth and knowledge. These are both transferable, and therefore tend to accumulate. The possessions which have been acquired by the father, descend to the son. The discoveries made by the individual become the property of society. Each generation is, in this way, enabled to start from the vantage ground which has been gained by the generation preceding it. The science, arts, and inventions originating in one age, are transmitted to the following, in which they become the means of a more advanced civilization, of higher individual and social life. The discoveries, improvements, learning, all the accumulated possessions of this age pass to the third and become, in their turn, the instruments of still further progress. Life, as it flows on through the successive generations of our race, may be, in this aspect, compared to a river which is constantly receiving, at each new turn in its course, tributary streams, so that it grows broader and deeper in proportion as you recede from its source. Whoever will

take the trouble to compare, in his own mind, the varied experience of a cultivated European, the wide circle of his activities and enjoyments, the entire assemblage of his consciousnesses with those of a South African, a Hottentot, or even an American savage, will be satisfied that what we are saying is not mere theory. The result will be equally satisfactory if he compare the knowledge of man at the present day, his power over nature, the arts and institutions which he has built up, and all the innumerable resources which he has opened to modern society, with anything which existed even in the most enlightened periods of antiquity. Indeed it is probable that, during the same length of time, life has never made greater progress on our planet than since the introduction of man, if we except perhaps the period immediately preceding and including that event. It deserves also to be noticed that in the present mode of advance, each succeeding step not only carries the race so much forward, but at the same time renders more secure the ground that has been gained. By the invention of gunpowder and the art of printing, wealth and knowledge, the handmaids to civilization, would seem to be forever placed beyond the reach of those casualties to which they were previously exposed, and which, at different epochs in the past history of mankind, have occasioned for a time apparent, perhaps real retrogradation.

The question naturally arises, how long is this progress of the human race destined to continue? Will it go on forever, or are there natural barriers which must finally limit it? Will this new mode of advance prove permanent, or must it, like that which preceded it, ultimately exhaust itself? The latter, we think, is the only supposition that can be adopted.

In the first place nature itself, so far at least as it is open to the investigations of man, is finite and limited. The different kinds of elementary matter are few in number. The powers of each are definitely circumscribed, and all their manifestations are governed by laws which are fixed and invariable. This is true not only of the material atoms, but also of the masses which are formed from them. These, whatever may be their dimensions, are pervaded throughout by gravity, that universal force which not only regulates and controls all the larger terrestrial phenomena, but, extending into the celestial spheres, determines also the different motions of the planetary bodies. The subtle, invisible, and imponderable agents which are everywhere associated with matter and which especially within the domain of life, play so important a part in the evolution of its changes, are equally limited in all their powers and equally governed in the exhibition of them, by fixed and determinate laws. The field for human research is

therefore definitely bounded, and however far it may extend on all sides beyond what we are now able to see or even imagine, by continued exploration its limits must be finally attained. Indeed, at the rate at which discovery is at present advancing in every direction, a mere fraction of the time occupied by the entire past history of the earth, would, in all probability, be sufficient for reaching them.

In the second place, besides this outer boundary, determined by the finite character of nature, there is another lying, it is probable, far within it, which is fixed by the limited capacities of man. As the progress of the race can take place only through the individual, any restriction on the powers of the latter must operate as a barrier to the advancement of the former. Now whatever be the capabilities of the soul, all its attainments in the present state must necessarily be limited on account of the extreme brevity of human life. Man only begins to learn, begins to make progress in knowledge and virtue and character, begins to acquire the means and qualifications for a higher and better existence, when his career, almost before it has commenced, is suddenly terminated by death. Nor is this all. The acquisitions of the individual are still further restricted by the necessities of his corporeal nature. The brain, which is the organ of the mind, the medium or instrument through which its powers are exercised, is subject to the same laws as the other parts of the bodily frame. Its capabilities are limited. It cannot work incessantly, but time must be allowed for the repair of its exhausted energies, by frequent intervals of rest. In the neglect of due regard to this essential condition of a sound and healthy brain, the organ at length suffers, and all its functions become more or less seriously impaired. From these and other necessary limitations of the capacity of the individual for acquisition and improvement, the race, it is probable, will cease to advance long before it shall have exhausted the means of progress offered to it by the surrounding world.

Is life then, at last, to become stationary? Shall the long line of progressive developments extending, as we have seen, from that remote epoch in the history of our planet when it first became the abode of living beings down to the present time, and destined to extend, as there is reason to believe, far onward into the distant future, shall it at length reach its termination in the perfected attainments and condition of our own species? Beyond this point are no further developments to take place? no further advances to be made? Shall the great law of progress which has hitherto marked the gradual unfolding of the divine purposes as connected with our world stop here, and all beyond be unprogressive and unchanging? Having attained this point, shall life henceforward stand still, or perchance retrograde, or

become extinct it may be, and the whole material creation which was formed to minister to it, sink back into its original nothingness, without having accomplished any permanent end, or left behind it evidence of any kind that it ever had been? Such an idea is contradicted by every principle of both reason and analogy. The entire history of the past is against it. The whole aspect of the present is opposed to it. The element of progress so intimately incorporated with every part of our being, is at variance with it. The ideas which we necessarily have of the attributes and character of God, whether derived from the immediate suggestions of our own natures, or inferred from what we behold of his works, are inconsistent with it. All of these point to still further advances, still higher developments, still wider and more glorious expansions of the original but divine conception of life.

But how shall this take place? The first mode of advance has already exhausted itself, and given place to a second. This, too, is in process of exhaustion. When it shall at length fail, by what third mode shall it be succeeded? One answer and only one, so far as we are able to conceive, can be given to this question, which shall fully meet the case—which shall at the same time harmonize all the analogies and satisfy the requirements of our intellectual and moral natures. That answer is found in the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul, and its endless progress in knowledge, virtue and happiness. For such progress, all that we know of it would seem specially to fit it. Its desire for knowledge, its capacity for improvement, its ideas of the true, the good, and the beautiful, and its aspirations after them, its power of tracing events back to their causes, of passing behind the seen and visible and laying hold of the unseen and invisible, of tracing in all around it, evidences of design, purpose and plan, and thus rising from the study of nature to the contemplation of the Being that formed it, of taking in the sublime ideas of the universe, God, and eternity, these wonderful endowments and faculties of the soul, all tend obviously to qualify it for so glorious a destiny, clearly point to it as the medium through which the mighty progression we have been contemplating is to be continued.

Nor is this all. There are certain intuitions and apprehensions belonging to the human soul, which, if duly considered, can hardly be regarded otherwise than as intimations of that future life which all the analogies of nature thus indicate, and for which its capacities so plainly fit it. Man is endowed with the power of distinguishing between actions as right or wrong, as worthy or unworthy. He is, moreover, so constituted as to have an instinctive feeling of obligation to perform such actions as seem to him right and worthy, and to avoid those

which appear wrong and unworthy. The neglect or violation of this feeling of obligation, awakens within him a sense of guilt and degradation, a consciousness of ill desert and an apprehension of punishment; while acting in accordance with it is followed by an inward peace and satisfaction and by a feeling of security. As this constitution comes from God, it must be regarded as a revelation of the moral attributes of his character, as indicating not only his approbation of right and disapprobation of wrong, but also his purpose respectively to reward and punish them.

But under that government which God exercises over men in this world, partly through the nature with which he has endowed them, and partly through the circumstances under which he has placed them, although we see enough to confirm these indications of his character, we do not witness that complete vindication of the Divine justice which we should naturally expect. Virtue is evidently favored and vice is discountenanced and frowned upon, sufficiently so to leave no doubt as to the manner in which they are viewed by him; but there is not that exact meting out of rewards and punishments which strict regard to their deserts would seem to require. Nay, more than this. In numerous instances, the good are allowed to endure hardship, to meet persecution, to pass their whole lives under circumstances of destitution and suffering, while the bad are permitted to enjoy, almost without interruption, every form of worldly prosperity and happiness. It was the contemplation of such cases that led the Psalmist to exclaim, in bitterness of spirit, "Behold! these are the ungodly who prosper in the world; they increase in riches. They are not in trouble as other men, neither are they plagued like other men. Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain and washed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I been plagued, and chastened every morning." Now only one explanation can be given of this apparent mystery, only one we mean in harmony with those natural sentiments of justice and right with which the Creator has endowed us. It is the explanation which the Psalmist himself immediately suggests, and to which the thoughts of devout and good men in all ages of the world have uniformly turned. It is the appointment to man of a future state, in which the wrongs of the present shall be righted, in which the righteous government of God, only commenced here, shall be carried on to completion, in which all the attributes of the Divine character shall receive a full and final vindication.

If then the analogies of nature thus point to another and higher existence beyond the present, if especially the great and fundamental law of progress, having its origin, as there is reason to believe, in an

essential feature of the Divine character and illustrated by each successive event in the past history of our planet—a law too, in accordance with which we ourselves are constituted, if that require it, if the endowments and faculties of the human soul plainly fit it for such an existence; if, moreover, such an existence explain, and if it be the only thing that will explain what we see in this world consistently with those moral attributes which our whole being leads us to ascribe to its Author and Governor, who shall gainsay the doctrine? who would gainsay such a doctrine resting upon such evidence? Who would do aught to weaken in himself or in others a faith which thus has its foundations in reason no less than in revelation; which tends to strengthen all the higher aspirations and better impulses of our natures, which chastens the joys and tempers the sorrows of life, which spreads beauty over decay and death, and makes the tomb the portal to a higher and more glorious state of existence.

ARTICLE IV.

THE DELUGES OF OGYGES AND DEUCALION.

The Deluges of Ogyges and Deucalion: were they real and specific events, or were they altered traditions of a universal deluge? By M. Cuvier.

Translated from the French, as given in Ovid's Works, Oxford edition, 1836, Vol. 3d. By Rev. J. Richards, D. D., Hanover, N. H.

GEOLOGISTS have admitted, from the actual state of the superficial strata of the terrestrial globe, that the surface of our planet must have experienced, at an epoch relatively not far remote, a grand revolution, which engulfed beneath its waters the continents then inhabited by men, and from which there escaped but a small number of individuals, the sole ancestors of the nations who successively repopled the new lands which that same revolution disclosed. Divers nations have preserved a tradition, more or less confused, of this catastrophe, whence recommences, necessarily, the history of men, such as has been transmitted to us; and, what is very remarkable, those nations who have preserved the slightest relations with one another have yet agreed in placing this event at about the same time, that is to say, from 4,000 to 5,000 years before the year now current (1820).

Every one indeed knows that the books of Moses, according to the text of the Septuagint, (which allows the longest interval between the deluge and us,) do not place the deluge higher than 3340 years ago; and according to the Hebrew text, whose chronology is the shortest, than 4168, following the calculation of Usher, or 4393 following that of Freret. But few have remarked that the dates given to this catastrophe by the Chaldeans, the Chinese, the Hindoos, and the Greeks, are very nearly the same.

The authors who have written in Chaldee, in Syriac, or who, by their means, have consulted the ancient traditions, as Berosus,¹ Hieronymus, Nicolas of Damascus, agree in speaking of a deluge. Berosus describes it with circumstances so similar to those of Genesis, that it is almost impossible that what he says of it should not have been drawn from the same sources. It is true that, so far as one can judge from the scattered extracts which Josephus (Lib. I. c. 8), Eusebius (Præp. Ev. Lib. IX. c. 12), and Syncellus (p. 30) have given us of his writings, he has removed the epoch a great number of centuries; but those numerous centuries, that long line of kings between Xixuthrus² and Ninus, is something novel and peculiar to him. Ctesias,³ who is anterior to him, had no such idea; nor have they been adopted by any profane authors posterior to Berosus. Justin and Velleius consider Ninus the first of conquerors, and do not place him more than forty-two centuries anterior to the present time.

The Armenian authors of the middle ages, who have collected the traditions concerning Xixuthrus, and perhaps extracted the ancient chronicles of their country make it reach back a little further (to 4916 years), according to M. M. Cirkied and Martin (Researches on the Ancient History of Asia, p. 26).

It is true that the principal of these authors, Moses Chorenensis, was a Christian and had known Eusebius; nevertheless, it is certain that the tradition of the deluge existed in Armenia long before him. The city which, according to Josephus, was called the *Place of the Descent*, exists still at the foot of Mt. Ararat, and bears the name of Nakhchevan, meaning *place of the descent*. See the Preface of the brothers Whiston, on Moses Chorenensis, p. iv.

The Chinese commence in Chouking, their authentic history, by a

¹ Berosus, a Babylonian historian, priest of the temple of Belus, lived in the time of Alexander. Hieronymus, of Cardia in the Thracian Chersonesus, a companion of Alexander. Nicholas of Damascus, friend of Herod the Great, wrote 144 books.

² Noah, by Chaldean tradition.

³ Greek historian, age of Artaxerxes Mnemon.

deluge occurring under Yao, and whose epoch would be but 4117 years anterior to the present time.

The Hindoos admit, in their sacred books, many revolutions, of which the last, called Caliyong, took place about 4924 years since.

The Greeks, who have always confounded everything, because their later authors have wished to consider as positive facts, the vague traditions or mythological allegories of their ancient priests and poets;—the Greeks, I say, speak of two deluges, whose epochs they pretend to assign, but to which they add circumstances irreconcilable among themselves, and even with the epochs.

Of those yet obscure deluges of Homer and Hesiod, the first is that called the deluge of Ogyges, said to have occurred in Attica and Bœotia. Its date as fixed by Varro, and referred by Censorinus¹ in his book entitled *Natal Day*, c. 21, to 1600 years before the first Olympiad, reaches back to 4196 years, that is, to within 28 years of the epoch fixed for the deluge of Noah by the Hebrew text of Genesis, after the calculation of Usher. Varro expressly places this deluge four centuries before Inachus; and every one knows that Varro passed, in his time, for a man who displayed the greatest erudition and judgment in chronology. Meanwhile it appears that Acusilaus² and Hellanicus,³ the first authors known who have spoken of the deluge of Ogyges, and from whence Plato, in the *Timæus*, pag. m. 524, Clement of Alexandria, in the *Stromata* I. p. m. 821, and Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* X. p. m. 489, have extracted what we know of it, placed it one hundred years after Inachus in the time of Phoroneus, consequently more than five hundred years later than Varro; but since this synchronism hinders neither those authors nor many others from making Phoroneus the first man, it is manifest that the traditions which they had of it were mingled with fables, and really appertain to nothing but mythology.

The second of these deluges is that of Deucalion. The most ancient author extant who mentions this deluge is Pindar, *Olymp. Od.* IX. He makes Deucalion land on Parnassus, establish himself in the village of Protogenia (first birth), and there reproduce his people with stones; in one word, he already refers to the whole human race, though applying it to one nation only, the fable afterwards generalized;—as we see in Ovid (*Met.* I. v. 399).

Moreover, the most ancient Greek historians whom time has preserved for us, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, make no mention of any deluge, neither of the time of Ogyges, nor of the time of Deuca-

¹ Rom. historians—Varro fl. A. D. 114, Censo. A. D. 238.

² Greek hist.—Acu. flor. B. C. 450, Hel. B. C. 460.

lion, although they name Deucalion and speak of him as one of the first Grecian kings. They seem even then to have considered these great inundations as appertaining to times anterior to history, or as making part of mythology.

What Herodotus says, that Thessaly must have once formed a lake, before the Peneus found an outlet between Ossa and Olympus, is but one of those geological hypotheses, applicable to any particular country, and such as we daily see in our own times. Herodotus makes no application of this to Deucalion nor to his deluge, although this, assuredly, was an occasion very natural to speak of a like event. But soon after the age of Herodotus, philosophers, to accredit either their physical systems, or their moral and political romances, availed themselves of this tradition and attributed to it an extension greater or less, according as it suited their ideas.

Plato, in the *Timæus* says but few words in commencing his recital of the grand catastrophe which, according to him, destroyed the Atlantis; but in those few words, he places the name of Deucalion immediately after that of Phoroneus, without any mention of Ogyges.

Aristotle, *Meteor.* I. 14, seems to consider the deluge of Deucalion as a local inundation, which occurred near Dodona and the river Archelous, places different from those of the ordinary locality, since he is at the same time treating of a Dodona and an Archelous in Phocis; as Clavier also, on Apollodorus, Vol. II. p. 79, seems to me to have clearly established.

In Apollodorus, *Bibl. Lib. I.* § 7, the deluge of Deucalion resumes something of its grandeur, and all of its mythological character. It happened at the epoch of the transition from the brazen to the iron age; Deucalion is the son of the Titan Prometheus, the fabricator of men; after the cataclysm he created anew the human race with stones; and yet, even according to Apollodorus himself, it inundated only Greece out of the Peloponnesus and Isthmus; as if all Greece out of the Peloponnesus and Isthmus could have been inundated, without a multitude of other countries and the Peloponnesus itself which is no higher than Greece, being inundated also.

Diodorus, *Lib. I.* p. m. 10, does not assign to this catastrophe so narrow limits, since he conjectures its effects might have extended even to Upper Egypt.

The tradition of Phrygia relative to Annacus or Nannacus, who was a sort of precursor of Deucalion, supposes also that that deluge extended over Asia Minor, and even destroyed the whole human race; for it is only after this deluge that the tradition places Prometheus, commissioned by Jupiter to reproduce the species. It is true that this

tradition, so different from the others, has been preserved to us only by authors of the Lower Empire, Stephen of Byzantium, under the word *Iconium*, Zenodotus or Zenobius, Prov. Cent. VI. n. 10, and Suidas on the word *Nannacus*. But Zenodotus cites authors more ancient, as Hermogenes, author of a treatise on the Phrygians, and Herode le Jambographe.

Iconium, where it is supposed Annacus reigned, is on the grand plateau of Asia Minor; so that it could not have been inundated without almost that whole peninsula being inundated at the same time.

Apollodorus as well as Pindar makes Deucalion land on Parnassus; but other authors assign different places. According to Servius on Virgil, Ecl. VI. 41, it was Mt. Athos; and according to Hyginus,¹ Fab. 153, it was upon *Ætna* that he found refuge. According to the account of Lucian in *the Syrian Goddess*, it was near the city of Hierapolis,² where they believed Deucalion made his descent.

The ark (*coffre*) which Apollodorus, in the place cited, gives to Deucalion for means of safety, the doves by whose instinct, according to Plutarch (*de Solertia Animalium*), he sought to know if the waters had subsided, the animals of every species which he had embarked with him, according to Lucian in *the Syrian Goddess*,—are circumstances so evidently borrowed from the narration of Moses, that it is almost impossible but that these authors derived them from him, either immediately, or by the knowledge they had obtained from the account of Berosus.

It appears certain, therefore, that the idea most commonly received, whether of the deluge of Ogyges or of Deucalion, was derived from the tradition of a universal deluge, insensibly modified and diversified according to the places where men lived. Each colony carried with it the memory of a deluge. But in those times, when nothing was yet fixed by writing, the priests were charged with preserving the memory of important events; and from that circumstance more than from any other, the deluge, by little and little, was localized,—following a tendency natural to all men of fixing near the places where they dwell, the great events of which they have but a confused remembrance; and following too the interest still more natural, which the priests of every place had to inspire religious veneration for their temples, so that by accrediting them they might at the same time accredit themselves.

It is particularly with this latter view that in many places openings

¹ Rom. writer—Augustan age.

² City of Syria, near the Euphrates, south of Zeugma.

are pointed out, through which it is said the waters of the deluge were engulfed: the most celebrated of which was that of Parnassus.

According to Pausanias (*Attic. Lib. I. c. 18*), there was something similar at Athens, in a sacred grove called Olympias. A hollow place of a cubit's depth, passed for having received the waters of the deluge of Deucalion; and they cast into it, every year, cakes of meal and honey. Also they pretended that Deucalion had dwelt at Athens, that he built there a temple to Jupiter Phyxius, and that they had there his sepulchre;—just as the people of Pyrrha in Phthiotis pretended that they had his sepulchre.

The Hieropolitans of Syria, according to Lucian in *the Syrian Goddess*, pretend on their part to possess an orifice, through which the waters of the deluge were drained. A celebrated temple covered this opening of the earth, into which they cast, twice every year, a great quantity of sea-water, which it entirely absorbed; moreover, that it was very narrow, proving that it conducted to some great cavity.

It is very remarkable that we find, in one of those numerous poems or versified romances which compose the body of the Hindoo mythology, a personage, whose name and adventures have striking relations to the Deucalion of the Greeks. It is Deva-cala-yavana, or in familiar language, Deo-cal-yun, who, having attacked Krishnool at the head of the northern people (the Scythians, such as, according to Lucian, the Deucalion of the Greeks was), was repulsed by fire and water. The resemblance extends even to his father Garga, one of whose surnames is Pramathesa (Prometheus), and who, according to another legend, is devoured by the eagle Garuda. From these details, truly astonishing by their conformity with the Greek fables, and which have been extracted by M. Wilfort (*Memoirs of Calcutta, Vol. V. of the Sanscrit Drama, entitled Hari-vansa*), M. Charles Ritter, in his "*Vestibule of European History before Herodotus*," concludes with great plausibility, that the whole fable of Deucalion was of foreign origin, and was imported into Greece with the other legends of that more ancient part of Greek worship which came by way of the North.

Those of the moderns who, with Freret and Clavier, have thought that the deluge of Ogyges and that of Deucalion are real events, but local and different, rely principally on what the Greek chronology assigns to those two princes in respect to their places being distinct in space and time. But who does not see that as to those remote epochs the Greeks, as well as all nations still less enlightened, have sought to ally their history to their mythology by factitious genealogies, and that on those genealogies reposes all their chronology before the Olympiads? He who believes, in good faith, that Codrus and Medon de-

ascended from Deucalion by Hellen and by Dorus, cannot refuse also to believe, that Deucalion descended from Uranus by Japetus and Prometheus, and that Saturn was his great uncle, and Jupiter and the Centaur Chiron his uncles *a la mode de Bretagne*. The same authors relate all these. Is there an Arab Sheik who does not trace his descent from Noah by Ishmael, or an Irish gentleman his by Milesius? We ourselves,—have we not long put faith in our Trojan origin, as Fredegaire asserts, and in that long catalogue of princes in direct line from Priam to Clovia, which the romances of the middle ages engrafted on that primal imagination?

Apollodorus gives to Deucalion a son, named Hellen, chief of all the Greeks, and makes descend from him Dorus, chief of all the Dorians, and Eolus, chief of the Eolians, with as much authority as Albugazi (Hist. Gen. of the Tartars, ch. 2. and 3.), gives to Japhet, son of Noah, a son named Turk, and to Turk two great-grand-sons, Tartar and Mongol, whence descended the two great nations which now bear those names; or as Jean le Maire (Illus. of the Gauls, p. 43) derives from Galatas king of the Gauls, Allobroges, prince of Dauphiny, and his son Romus, who founded the city of Romans, and gave birth to the Romane language.

Besides, although it were true that Deucalion had been in fact the head of the Grecians when that people first established themselves in the environs of Parnassus, popular opinion, regarding him as the author of the nation, would have placed in his time the catastrophe from which all nations date, by a simple confusion of epochs,—very natural when nothing is written, not even committed to verse and learned by heart,—and still no one be able at this day to draw any conclusion whatever concerning the reality of that event.

There have been also in certain places, traditions relative to a deluge with which the name of Deucalion was not connected. Such was the inundation of Arcadia, related by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. Lib. I. c. 61), and to which he attributes the emigration of Dardanus to the island of Samothracia, and then to the Hellespont; such, again, was that of a great overflow of water of which Diodorus speaks (Lib. V. c. 47), which behoves to have taken place in Samothracia before the other deluges, and which some attribute to the rupture of the Bosphorus and Hellespont.

Independently of this tradition of Samothracia on the rupture of the Straits, we find in antiquity various hypotheses.

The Bosphorus is a channel of small width, whose banks are steep but for a short distance, and of inconsiderable height. Nevertheless, these declivities have sufficed certain of the ancients for the hypothe-

sis that this channel was really the product of a rupture. Strato¹ of Lampsacus, according to Strabo (Geog. Lib. I. p. 49), even sought to explain by this supposed event, the shells and other marine remains which are seen in many places on the plains and plateaus of Asia Minor. Before this rupture, according to Strato, the Euxine Sea must have been much more extensive than at this day, and must have covered a part of Asia Minor. A similar rupture must have taken place at some epoch and from analogous causes, at the Pillars of Hercules, and the ocean have flowed in over the whole extent of the Mediterranean.

The moderns, from the observations made by Pallas of the great plains of sand which extend from the north of the Black Sea to the Caspian and to Lake Ural, have even imagined that, at some time these three seas were united, and were separated only by a draining of their waters, occasioned by a rupture of the Bosphorus. Certain traces of volcanoes observed at the Cyanean islands and towards the entrance of the Black Sea, have seemed to them sufficient to furnish a physical explanation of such a rupture; they have even gone further and believed they could connect this draining with the deluge of Deucalion by historical proofs.

Since it is said in Apollodorus that the deluge of Deucalion happened in the time of Nyctimus, king of Arcadia, Clavier (History of the first times of Greece, I. p. 44) supposes it was under that same king Nyctimus, that the inundation of Arcadia took place, which, according to Dionysius, constrained Dardanus to go to Samothracia; and, by a second supposition, he would persuade himself that it was this same inundation which obliged Deucalion to flee to Parnassus; consequently, according to him, Deucalion must have come originally from Arcadia.

But a combination stronger yet is that of M. Dureau de la Malle (Phys. Geog. Black Sea, etc., p. 241). Uniting the tradition of Samothracia touching the eruption of the Euxine, which Diodorus relates as far anterior to Dardanus, and even to *all other deluges*, with the tradition relative to the inundation of Arcadia and to the emigration of Dardanus, in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus from whom alone we obtain it, makes no mention of the Euxine; admitting next, that the second of these events is identical with the deluge of Deucalion, he makes of all this together with the rupture of the Bosphorus and that of the Pillars of Hercules which he also places at the same epoch,

¹ Gr. Philos. 286 B. C.

one and the same catastrophe ; to which, consequently, he can assign an historic date.

Unfortunately this whole theory is as little founded in physics as in history. The phenomenon of marine relics on continents is universal, and cannot depend on a local cause. Not only around the Black Sea are fossil shells found, but everywhere. Moreover, it results from the testimony of two learned men who have visited the places, M. Olivier, in a report made to the Academy of Sciences, and General Andreossy (*Voyage to the Outlet of the Black Sea*, p. 48 et seq.), that the Black Sea, had it been much elevated above its own level, would have found many drains through hills and plains less elevated than the actual banks of the Bosphorus, without the necessity of opening for itself this long and narrow outlet. Besides, every one knows that a volcanic irruption is incapable of producing such an effect in a limestone country like the plateaus which traverse the Bosphorus. Finally, had the Black Sea, at some period suddenly fallen, in cascade, through this new passage, the small quantity of water capable of being drained by an opening so narrow, would have spread itself gradually over the immense surface of the Mediterranean, without causing on its shores a tide even of a few fathoms, much less a deluge which would have destroyed provinces, and forced men to seek a refuge on the heights of Parnassus.

Gen. Andreossy, who has made these places a particular study, and whose talents as an engineer and hydraulician are well known, has himself proved from the elevation of the banks of the Strait,—that portion where they are steep,—that the simple inclination of the surface of the waters necessary for draining, would have reduced to nothing the excess of elevation they would have produced, when once they had reached the shores of Attica.

But if the historical proofs they pretend to give of the identity of the deluges of Samothracia, of Arcadia, and of Deucalion, and above all of their date, and the physical explanations they have imagined for them, disappear before a serious criticism ; there can remain little doubt that all which is real in these traditions, and even in those of the deluges of Ogyges, of Syria, of Phrygia, of Assyria, and of China, resolve themselves into the memory of one and the same event, viz., of that which is known in the Hebrew annals under the name of the **UNIVERSAL DELUGE.**

ARTICLE V.

THE GREEK DRAMA.

By E. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages in Middlebury College, Vt.

The Relation of the Poetry to the Government and Culture of the Greeks.

THE spirit of an age or people is most accurately and surely represented in its poetry. The statesman who would prefer the moulding influence of the ballads to the laws of a nation, indicates that he has not been unobservant of the more hidden influences which govern society. But it is not less true that the diligent and thoughtful student of history can better be ignorant of the legal enactments and penal code of that nation and age, whose inner life he would understand, than of the warblings of its minstrels, or the spontaneous, gushing effusions of its men of song. Indeed, if we desire to have an intimate acquaintance with the spirit of the political institutions, the religion, or culture of any people separated from us by time or distance, we not only *need* but cannot do without their poetical productions. What should we know of the spirit of the old Norsemen but from the productions of their Scalds, their Eddas, and the first rude combinations of their runic alphabet, the gift of their god Odin?

The poetry of Greece is perhaps more intimately connected with and descriptive of the state of society in which it arose, than that of any other nation. The history of the religion, civil institutions, and culture of long ages prior to authentic records of actual events, constituted this early poetry. It is true, that the earliest compositions of almost all nations are narrative songs, recited in their festivals, celebrating the exploits of their heroes, and the genealogies of their princes. It was so with our Saxon ancestors before they migrated from their German forests.¹ But all nations have not a Homer or such a past as the Greeks to look back upon. "The divine myths of the Greeks," says Grote,² "the matter of their religion constituted also the matter of their earliest history." Their past, long varied, stirring, earth-wide, heaven-high, their genealogical records none the less certain

¹ Tacitus, Germ. c. 2, says: Germani celebrant carminibus antiqua, quod unam apud illos memorias et annalium genus est, Tuisconem, etc.

² Hist. Vol. I. p. 71.

because let down from Olympian heights, had the two-fold charm of novelty and reality, marvellousness and certainty. In listening to the recitals of their minstrels, the cravings of the heart for higher revelations, and the desire for national honor and individual glory, was alike satisfied. No wonder, then, that they clung to them with a tenacity not easily destroyed, and built upon them with a confidence not readily shaken. It has been well said that "it was Homer who formed the character of the Greek nation."¹ The Homeric poems were the fountain-heads of all the refinement of the ancients. The Homeric rhapsodists were in fact the priests, the lawgivers and historians of Greece for several ages. They were the especial favorites of the princes, the praises of whose ancestors "of divine descent," they sung, and whose authority was itself heaven-descended.

The Homeric poems were evidently intended for the special gratification of princes, in whose banquets they were often sung. They exhibit "a government founded on divine right as opposed to the sovereignty of the people." The king was superior, in force of body and mind, as was well befitting his descent :

In the midst
Of heroes, eminent above them all,
Stood Agamemnon, with an eye like Jove's
To threaten or command, like Mars in girth,
And, with the port of Neptune, * * *
For he surpasses all, such Jove ordained
* * * the son of Atreus.²

He, to be sure, would sometimes condescend to counsel with his chiefs and elders, and communicate with the assembled people in the Agora, whose assent and submission was demanded by a sort of religious regard for the authority vested in the king. In the *Iliad* the nod of Agamemnon, king of men, is the end of all controversy. His word is truth,³ his authority is not to be resisted, his wrath no other than Achilles, the son of Thetis, goddess of the silver bow, dares to brave, or his vengeance incur. For woe to him who shall incense a king.⁴ It was Thersites alone, "loquacious, loud, and coarse," who

squinted halted gibbous was behind,
And pinched before, and on whose tapering head
Grew patches only of the flimsiest down,

¹ Heeren's *Hist. Res. Greece*, p. 115 seq.

² *Il.* II. 204. Cowper's Transl. and cf. *XII.* 310 seq.

³ *Il.* II. 101.

⁴ *Il.* I. 97.

that dared to inveigh against royal Agamemnon, nor he, without the indignant and severe rebuke of the wise Ulysses, for his want of the "deference due to kings." Many passages might be quoted, illustrative of the fact, that the epic poetry of Greece was the product as well as the representative of a monarchical age :

One and one alone,
Raised and instructed by Saturnian Jove
To govern and to judge, may well suffice,
for "Jove makes the king and loves the king
he makes."¹

The muse, too, who presided over epic poetry, Calliope, "proudly eminent o'er every muse, associate walked with kings magisterial." Even over the infant head of royalty the muses "placid look from high with smiling face," and "on his tongue they shed

A gentle dew, and words as honey sweet
Drop from his lips."²

It matters not, that from one point of view the heroes of the Homeric epic are essentially fictitious ; they were not so to the Greek. To him they were as real as his ancestors of the generations succeeding the fall of Troy, and served as a golden chain to unite the living man with his divine progenitor.³ The Atridae were the prototypes of the princes who long ruled in Hellas and its colonies, and the latter demanded of their subjects the same reverent regard that was shown to their god-like ancestors.

Epic poetry, which was probably preceded by the age of short narrative songs as introductory to it, prevailed in Greece from the era of the Homeric poems (probably 850—776 B. C.) until some time in the 7th century B. C. The hexameter,⁴ too, was the only measure much cultivated. There might have been lighter strains and more stirring and sprightly movements used in particular districts, especially in connection with the enthusiasm of religious festivals, but such innovations were probably rare, and worthy of little regard, except as straggling beams darted athwart the sky, as premonitions of approaching light. The appropriateness of the staid and even movement of hexameters is evident, not only if we take into account the subjects, the heroes of a former generation, contemplated with lively interest but without passionate emotion, but also if we consider the causes of this choice of

¹ Il. II. 204.

² Hesiod's Theog. 120 sq.

³ Grote's Greece, Vol. II. p. 73.

⁴ It is a curious fact that the first poem known to have been written in the German language, was in hexameters, the measure selected by the most distinguished heroic poets of modern Germany, by Wieland, for his *Cyrus*, and by Klopstock for his *Messiah*. See Taylor's German Poetry, Vol. I. p. 4.

subjects, the calm veneration of the past and longing for assimilation to it, instead of the stir and agitation of present events and scenes and individual life, which naturally express themselves in shorter and more irregular movement. But the Greek mind was too active and fond of progress, and too many local causes conspired, such as the small size of the petty kingdoms, composed of a city and the adjoining territory, or a few towns, which not only brought the king into close contact with his subjects, so as to expose his human weaknesses, but also gave much occasion for comparison between neighboring provinces, to admit of a long continuance of kingly authority.¹ How the change from monarchy to oligarchy was brought about in every case, we cannot determine, nor need we for our present purpose.² The fact is sufficient. But it is of special importance to note that the decline of epic poetry was coëval with that of kingly authority. "Such oligarchical governments," says Grote, after speaking of their origin in Greece, "varying in their details but analogous in general features, were common throughout the cities of Greece Proper, as well as of the colonies throughout the *seventh century B. C.*"³

Early in the seventh century B. C. the elegy began to be cultivated among the Ionians. It seems not to have been intended to make an entirely different impression from the epos, as the hexameter measure was retained, with the omission of the last thesis from every second hexameter, thus breaking up the even tread which the same feet constantly recurring occasioned, and substituting the "feebler and hesitating gait of pentameters." This innovation undoubtedly had a great influence on subsequent poetic developments, and this first timid step out of the hallowed precincts, to which the muse had previously been restricted, was like the first beginnings of evil, the sure precursor of ruin. It is worthy of note that the elegy was first cultivated among the Ionians, the people among whom liberal principles, although with some violence, soonest gained a firm footing.⁴ Almost contemporaneously with the elegy arose the iambic verse,⁵ totally different from the epos. Whilst calmness, rest, characterizes the latter and emotion the elegy, a succession of iambs produce a light, tripping measure,

¹ See Grote's History of Greece, Vol. III. p. 12 sq.

² Grote, Vol. III. p. 21, 22, says: "As far as we can make out, this change seems to have taken place in the natural course of events, and without violence; sometimes the kingly lineage died out, and was not replaced; sometimes, on the death of a king, his son and successor was acknowledged only as archon, or perhaps set aside altogether to make room for a Prytanis or president out of the men of rank around."

³ Hist. Vol. III. p. 23.

⁴ Müller's Hist. of Gr. Lit. p. 104 sq.

⁵ Invented by the Parian poet Archilochus. See Müller, 128 sq.

fitly expressive of railery and invective. These two species of poetry form a sort of connecting link between the Homeric epos and the proper lyric poetry of Greece, which marks the period of political struggle, from the first beginnings of oligarchy until the democratic element gained predominance in the Grecian States. This was the age in which the great deep of feeling was broken up. Individuals gave vent to long pent up emotions. "Poetical power had lost its heaven-appointed character, and had become an attribute legally communicable, as well as determined to certain definite ends."¹ The questionings which ensued, the dissatisfaction, the contests between the oligarchy and the despots, and again between the few and the many, kept up a constant succession of changes, which were not without their corresponding emotions. In order to express these emotions, diversity of tones would be required in poetry, and the Greek ear attuned by nature to harmony, seemed to demand the accompaniment of music. Both the emotion and the musical accompaniment would naturally demand rests, which led to the division into strophes, and thus to dancing, which was though not a necessary yet a frequent concomitant of the lyrics of Greece.² Pindar may be named as the most distinguished author in this species of poetry, although belonging to the last part of the era, being indeed contemporary with Aeschylus, but yet unacquainted with the modes of thought at Athens, as exhibited especially after the Persian war. He was a native of a small town in the Theban territory, and the influences under which he arose were rather Dorian and Aeolian, and his *epinikia* were distinctively either Doric, Aeolic, or Lydian in spirit and style.³

From Pindar and the era of lyric poetry, the transfer is natural and easy to the drama, the product and representative of the highest civilization and freedom of Greece. From the time of the Solonian constitution, B. C. 600, love of freedom constantly gained ground in Attica, although during the reign of the Peisistratids 560—510 B. C., "the people were as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire."⁴ But after the expulsion of Hippias, new life and vigor was aroused by the concurrence of two political parties. Kleisthenes, the Alcmeonid who had distinguished himself by opposition to the dethroned despots, as it is said by Herodotus, "took into partnership the people who had before been excluded from everything," and thus founded the Athe-

¹ Grote's Hist. of Greece, Vol. III. p. 24.

² See Müller's Hist. Gr. Lit. p. 149.

³ For an account of him, see Müller's Hist. p. 216.

⁴ Grote's Hist. of Greece, Vol. IV. p. 138.

nism democracy.¹ From this time, Athens shot forth into new life. Before, she had been comparatively little known politically, and had contributed far less than other cities, inferior in wealth and resources, to the intellectual progress of Greece. Her artists, notwithstanding the exertions of the Peisistratida, were inferior to those of Argos, Corinth and a score of other cities. Her poets were not worthy to be ranked with those of the Ionian and Aeolian schools. But now, power, influence, cultivation, refinement, seemed to be tending toward the little Attican province. She contended successfully against the Boeotians, Chalcidians and Aeginetans, and baffled the attempt of Sparta to restore the tyrant Hippias. Thus Herodotus says: "The Athenians when free felt themselves a match for Sparta," and he might have added, compelled the Spartans to feel it too, and to take heed how they attempted to extend their influence beyond the Peloponnesus. The battle of Marathon and Salamis tell the story of their valor, and of their success in repelling foreign invasion. The language of the historian just referred to, in regard to the influence of liberty at Athens, is too much in point to be omitted here. "The Athenians grew in strength.. And it is plain not in this one instance only, but every way, that liberty is a brave thing, since the Athenians, so long as they were lorded over, were in no wise superior in arms to their neighbors, but as soon as they were free from the despots, they shot far ahead of them all."²

The Persian invasion gave an opportunity for them to show their ability to take the guidance of affairs in Greece. If this war had not arisen, it cannot be known what would have been the result of the rivalry springing up between Athens and Sparta. The mutual ruin of the two cities would not improbably have ensued.³ The glory of the Athenians, acquired in the battle of Marathon, was not sufficient to awaken the enthusiasm of the other States to a general coöperation against the Persians. But the battle of Salamis gave a new impulse to the spirit of the Greeks, so that in the following year, when the final decision of the contest was effected at Plataea, the greater part of Greece was gathered there.⁴ The victory of these few little districts over the assembled hosts of half a continent, not only gave Greece a character among other nations, but by inspiring a consciousness of its power, gave an impulse to it in every department of cul-

¹ Grote's Hist. of Greece, Vol. IV. p. 169. The passage of Herod. v. 66—69, is as follows: ἐσπούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται—ὥς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, πρότερον ὑπασμένον πάντων, τότε πρὸς τὴν ἐωυτοῦ μοῖρην προσεθῆκατο, κ. τ. λ.

² v. 78—91.

³ Heeren's Hist. Res. Greece, p. 142.

⁴ Ibid. p. 149.

ture. Moreover its internal condition was not less changed. Athens, at first,¹ generously yielded the nominal primacy to Sparta as the strongest of the Dorians, but as Heeren says, "it was actually possessed by the State whose talents merited it." And soon after, Athens was nominally also at the head of Grecian States, which supremacy she endeavored to retain not by power alone, but by being *first* in everything.² Her valor and policy made her the chief of the Grecian confederacy, and the neighboring maritime States became her confederates and dependants; a flourishing commerce ensued with wealth and leisure in its train; "Athens rose again out of the Persian ashes, at once the eye and ornament of Greece."³ Just then when Athens was becoming⁴ the capital of Greece, the home of freedom, and the efficient patron of art and literature, this new kind of poetry, the drama arose, and took precedence of every other species of composition in public favor.

The circumstances in the age which gave rise to the drama, and the causes of the general interest felt in it, demand a passing notice.

Why is the age of Grecian freedom, progress and culture, fitly represented by the Greek drama? In the first place, the epic writer describes distant events, those separated from himself by a great chasm. It may be that he connects them in some way with the present, especially in regard to the results to be effected, yet the events themselves are viewed from afar. In lyric poetry, present feelings are uttered, but they are too often individual feeling, and short bursts of emotion. Now in the drama there is action, and action in the present. The author and his hearers live in the scenes portrayed; their hearts and their souls are in them. They suffer or rejoice, weep or laugh with the persons of the drama. Prometheus is bound at the

¹ In the invasion of Xerxes, before the battle of Salamis.

² Heeren, 149 sq. Müller's *Hist. of Dorians*, Vol. I. p. 208, says, "It is not true that the supremacy over the Greeks was in fact transferred at all from Sparta to Athens, if we consider the matter as Sparta considered it, however great the influence of this change may have been upon the power of Athens." It may be true that there was no formal transfer, but was there not a tacit one? And is there not a significance in the determination of Sparta to yield up the Persian war into the hands of the Athenians, as better fitted for it than herself (Thucydides I. 95), and in the refusal to send more expeditions to Asia, "that her generals might not be made worse," and the conclusion that it was not expedient for Sparta to aim at a mastery of the sea?

³ Potter's *Essay on the Grecian Drama*.

⁴ According to Müller's *History of the Dorians*, from about the year 580 B. C., Sparta had acted as the recognized commander not only of Peloponnesus but of the whole Greek nation, although it was rather, he concedes, by tacit acknowledgment than agreement that this precedence belonged to Sparta.

outer limits of the wide earth, on the "extreme cliff" of Caucasus, by the command of Jupiter, when newly raised to supreme dominion; but Scythia, to the assembled multitudes of the theatre, is no longer a pathless wild where human footstep never marked the ground,"¹ nor the sufferer there, the inhabitant of a distant age; but they all surround him as their persecuted friend, and listen to the commands of Strength to "draw close each massy link and bind his adamantine chains," and gnash on him with their teeth.

The constructive spirit of the age is also appealed to in the drama. The cultivation of the arts which preceded and were coëval with dramatic representations, had awakened a spirit which would not be satisfied with the simplicity of mere narrative, or the transientness and singleness of impression in the song. But the *free spirit* of the Athenian democracy is especially exhibited in the drama. It is true that most of the subjects of the drama are taken from the Homeric poems, but even in the treatment of these subjects, the leaven of liberal principles is diffused. The sympathies are enlisted for those who rebel against the Supreme ruler, as in the case of Prometheus, and for those who disobey the unlawful commands of earthly princes, as when Antigone performs the last sad rites upon the corpse of her brother, in opposition to the commands of Creon. There are many separate passages, too, in the drama, that breathe the spirit of liberty. But we must pass with this hasty view of the political relations of Grecian poetry, to a more detailed account of the origin, nature and manner of the exhibition of the drama.

The Origin and Nature of the Greek Drama.

To one whose notions of the drama are formed from the modern stage and the popular dramatists of our own age, it seems scarcely possible that this species of representation should have originated in connection with the ceremonies of religion. It is nevertheless true. If we pass by the sacred Scriptures, in which, according to many modern commentators, we have at least one dramatical composition, portions of a tragedy, on the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, are yet extant in Greek iambics, by Ezekiel, a Jewish dramatic poet who perhaps lived before the Christian era,² if not, soon after it. The early Christians seem also to have countenanced the exhibition of sacred dramas

¹ Prometheus, l. 8.

² Taylor's Hist. Survey of German Poetry, Vol. I. p. 148, where it is also said: perhaps the Spanish mystery: *Las Profetias de Daniel*, has traditionally preserved a canvass more ancient than Christianity.

and mysteries on the Sabbath and other feast days. Gregory Nazianzen, one of the fathers of the church, wrote a tragedy which is still extant, called *χριστὸς πάσχωσ*, or Christ's Passion, which was represented for a religious purpose at Constantinople.¹

From Constantinople such religious exhibitions were introduced into the west of Europe "by crusaders and pilgrims, and became favorite shows to an illiterate populace." A play entitled "The death of St. Catharine," was, for instance, performed by the monks of St. Denis, and eagerly listened to by the Parisians. At a later period it was imitated in Spanish by the celebrated poet Calderone; and among the Germans similar plays were almost innumerable. In England, too, "the earliest dramatic attempts were mysteries² and moralities." Even at the council of Constance, the English prelates at an interval between sittings, "entertained their other brethren by a spiritual play in Latin."³ "Christianity," says Taylor,⁴ "was first taught throughout the north of Europe by means of the stage. The mysteries and miracle-plays of the first missionaries, had familiarized the prominent incidents of biblical history, long before the art of reading could have been called in to communicate the chronicles themselves."

The religious origin of the drama of the Greeks will be plain, if we trace somewhat minutely the rise of the two separate parts, the chorus and the dialogue, of which the Greek tragedies are so manifestly compounded.

The indications of the existence of the chorus are discoverable in the earliest ages of Greece. At first the whole population of a town was accustomed to assemble in some public place, and sing hymns, and perform corresponding dances in honor of a god who had shown some signal favor. This meeting and the ceremony performed, according to some, took its name⁵ from the circumstance that it was first

¹ It has been supposed with some degree of plausibility, that plays upon religious subjects were, at Constantinople, modelled after the old Greek tragedies, in order to counteract their pagan influence. Accordingly, "as the ancient Greek tragedy was a religious spectacle, a transition was made on the same plan, and the choruses were turned into Christian hymns. Gregory wrote many sacred dramas for this purpose, which have not survived those inimitable compositions over which they triumphed for a time." — *Warton's Hist. of English Poetry*, Vol. III. p. 201.

² Mysteries seem to have originated among ecclesiastics, and to have been acted by them as early as the eleventh century A. D. From the monasteries they were transplanted to the schools and universities. — *Warton's Hist. of English Poetry*, Vol. III. p. 201 sq.

³ Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic Literature*, p. 369.

⁴ *German Poetry*, Vol. I. p. 154.

⁵ See Donaldson's *Theatre of the Greeks*, p. 7, note.

held in the principal square or open space of the town, i. e. the *ἀγορά*, or market place, which was emphatically the *χοῶρος* (*χοῖρα*), hence, *χορός*; but more probably, *χορός*, is kindred with *χορευτός*, *χορεύω*, and hence is descriptive of the motion of the dancers in a circle.¹ We are not however able to ascribe any exact historical date to the origin of the Greek chorus. Some traces of it are found in Homer and Hesiod, which carry its origin back into the heroic ages.²

There even seems to have been considerable variety in the choral exhibitions of the early ages of Greece. They were attended by young persons of both sexes, the sons and daughters of nobles, who sometimes danced together in rows taking hold of hands.³ The general arrangement was for the citharist to sit in the midst of the dancers who encircled him, with his cithara, or lyre, which he accompanied with his voice. The dancers at this early age did not join in the song, only regulated their movements by it, and when, as on the shield of Hercules, the muses are represented as singing in a chorus, they are to be considered as surrounding Apollo as citharist.

The chorus, which is alluded to in these poets, as employed in lamentations for the dead, and in hymenial processions, is quite different from that of a later age, with which we are at present more immediately concerned. It is among the Dorians in the Peloponnesus and Sicily that the chorus first assumed importance as a branch of literature.

¹ See Liddell and Scott's, and especially Pape's Lexicon, h. v. Perhaps the cities called *ἐβρύχοροι* in Homer, had this appellation, because they had open squares large enough to contain such numerous choruses.—*Müller's Hist. of the Dorians*, Vol. I. p. 334.

² In describing the shield prepared by Vulcan for Achilles, at the request of his mother Thetis, Homer (Il. XVIII. 612), in a hymenial procession, represents youths as dancing in circles to the sound of pipe and harp. Hesiod in describing the shield of Hercules, says:

———But next arose

A well towered city, by seven golden gates
Enclos'd that fitted to their lintels hung.
These men in dances and in festive joys
Held revelry. * * * * *
* * * Gay blooming girls
Preceded, and the dancers followed blithe;
These, with shrill pipe indenting the soft lip,
Breath'd melody, while broken echoes thrilled
Around them; to the lyre with flying touch
Those led the love-enkindling dance.

Elton's Translation.

See also Il. XXIV. 720—722, and Odyssey, VIII. 266, and Müller's *Literature of Ancient Greece*, p. 21 sq.

³ Il. XVIII. 593.

Two principal objects were aimed at in it, worship of the gods and military discipline. Success in war, was the primary object with the Dorians of an early age, and this could not be more certainly accomplished than by celebrating the aid received from gods and deified heroes, together with mimetic illustrations before the assembled people. The music was useful to enable large bodies of men to act in concert, and the dance accustomed the youth to the proper motions and positions for attack and defence.¹ In its origin, then, the chorus was essentially religious and political rather than aesthetic in its character. The deity first celebrated was Apollo, the god of war, music, and civil government.² And the chorus who celebrated his praises was identical, and drawn up in the same order, with the hosts that went out in battle array against the national enemy. Even the different parts of the chorus received the same name with the divisions of the invading army, and to be a good dancer was to be a good warrior.³

We cannot suppose that the chorus in its earlier stages, even among the Dorians, exhibited that perfection of form or harmony of voice and movement, which afterward characterized it. At first it formed a sort of medium between the epos, and the lyrics of the Lesbians,⁴ and so high was the enthusiasm of the people in these celebrations, and so great the demand for songs to be recited, that old traditionary verses were compelled to take the place of more fitting measures. The demand for choral poetry, as was very natural, gave rise to many authors in this species of literature, and even our own poetesses had their prototypes in the fair-haired Megalostrata⁵ and her feminine competitors of that age.

We cannot at present trace minutely the progress of the chorus in its early stages of development. We may however mention, in passing, that it received special encouragement at Sparta, which was for a

¹ Donaldson's Gr. Theatre, p. 7. — "The Spartans even sacrificed to the Muses before an action, these goddesses being expected to produce regularity and order in battle."—Müller, Dorians, Vol. II. p. 263.

² See Müller's Dorians, Vol. II. p. 266 sq.

³ Müller, Hist. Dorians, Vol. II. p. 262—3, says: The agreement which some moderns have found between the Greek chorus and the *lochos* [λόχος] is not a mere creation of the fancy; the large chorus was a pentecostys in number, which was divided into enomoties (hemichoria); it advanced in certain divisions, like an army, and had corresponding evolutions, [see Book IV. ch. 6. § 7). * * * * * In early times it was a preparation for battle, a use of it which was neglected in a later age; in the soldier heavy-armed for the battle, was also seen the practised dancer of the Pyrrhic. * * * * * Thus also the Thessalians called the soldiers of the front ranks "principal dancers;" and said of a good fighter that "he had danced well."

⁴ See Müller's Lit. of Greece, pp. 164 and 191.

⁵ See Müller's Lit. of Greece, pp. 192—3.

long time the seat of Dorian power and learning.¹ Grote says :² "Everything done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective, so that the chorus and its performances received extraordinary development. * * * * The chorus, usually with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of divine service throughout all Greece, and was originally a public manifestation of the citizens generally, a large proportion of them being actively engaged in it, and receiving some training for the purpose, as an ordinary branch of education." But in process of time, as the fine arts were more cultivated, the song and dance became more elaborate, and the duties and expense fell upon a few, and finally upon one, who was called *choragus*, and considered as the religious representative of the whole population. He was accordingly said to do the work of the State or people (*λειτουργεῖν*).³

The choral lyric poetry originally and preëminently belonged to the Dorians. Apollo was first worshipped among them, and his chief temples were in the Doric territory. Consequently in his worship the Doric dialect would naturally be employed.⁴ To such a degree is this true, that Doric and Choral were used as synonymous terms, when applied to Greek poetry; and whenever the Doric dialect occurred in lyric odes, these were generally for the accompaniment of choral dances. The influence of the Dorians upon this species of poetry, is especially conspicuous in the Greek tragedians, where, in the midst of the dialogue in the common dialect of Attica, the choral songs are all Dorian in language. There seems to be a peculiar fitness in this dialect for the expression of feelings of religious reverence and worship. With manliness and dignity, it combines a simplicity which especially belongs to solemn occasions. The peculiarities⁵ of its northern and mountain origin clings to it in its migrations to the more southern part

¹ The poets and sages of Greece were accustomed to frequent certain cities as literary emporiums. "Among these," says Müller, (p. 275), "Sparta stood the highest down to the time of the Persian war," etc.

² Hist. of Greece, Vol. IV. p. 112—13.

³ Derived from *λέω*, *λείπον*, and *ἔργω*, and hence explained by the Grammarians as equivalent to *εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι*, or *τῷ δημοσίῳ ὑπηρετεῖν*. The origin of our word *liturgy* from the Greek *Λειτουργία* (public service), will not escape notice.

⁴ "Its form was, on the whole, originally a Doric variety of the epic hexameter." — Müller's Dorians, Vol. II. p. 379.

⁵ Some of these peculiarities are the use of *a* for *η*, a concurrence of consonants producing roughness of sound, an aversion to *ξ* and the aspirated consonants, the use of *δ* for *β* and *γ* (as in *δᾶ* for *γᾶ*, *δένος* for *γένος*, etc.), the omission of letters both in composition and flexion, and the abundant use of the article, etc. See Müller's Hist. of the Dorians, App. V. Vol. II.

of the country, and in every variety of use to which it was put, whether in the simple choral song, or combined with the dialogue in the Attic tragedy.

Another peculiarity of the chorus is the variety and changes of measure found in it. In this particular these compositions furnish a striking contrast with the even tread of the epic hexameter, as well as with the staid and uniform movement of the later dialogue. The irregular metres, depending entirely upon the caprice of the poet, are as suitable for the expression of excited and changing feeling, at one time grave at another cheerful, now lofty then more humble, as uniform feet in equal number for the narrative or the dialogue, whose office is mainly explanation.

The connection of choral song with the dance, on the other hand, gave an artificial and sometimes a highly artistic character to the verse. Even an intricate and somewhat obscure plan of discourse could be understood, since the ear was aided in detecting the rhythm and the change of sentiment, by the eye, which followed the movements in the dance.¹ Thus, while the strophe was recited, the chorus made one movement, and returned to their former position during the antistrophe, and remained motionless there, until the epode had been completed. The public character of the chorus, also, was one ground of distinction between it and the lyric poetry which was so much cultivated among the Aeolians. The thoughts and feelings of private individuals would not be befitting the dignity of a large body of men; hence we find the chorus to be an expression of feeling in reference to the gods or heroes, or the State, whilst poets of the Lesbian school were much more personal in the choice of their themes, and made use of more light and lively metres, with frequent repetitions more nearly allied to the refrain in modern song.

We have already spoken of the celebration of the praises of Apollo, the sun-god, by means of the chorus. And this was continued even in the time of the tragedians. One of the finest lyrical passages in the *Alcestis*² of Euripides, records the blessings conferred upon Admetus, in consequence of the temporary abode of Apollo with him, when compelled to serve a mortal man. But its introduction into the festivals of Dionysius or Bacchus, is of special importance at present. Whether the worship of Dionysius was indigenous to Greece and afterwards modified by connection with Egypt and Asia, as would appear to be the fact from the Homeric Hymn,³ or introduced directly from Egypt

¹ Müller's *Literature of Ancient Greece*, p. 164.

² Line 569 sq.;

³ See Grote's *Greece*; Vol. I. p. 43 sq.

by Cadmus, or from Asia and adopted by the Dorians as kindred with the worship of their own Apollo, is not material at present to inquire.¹ His worshippers seem to have been at first a band of revellers (*κῶμος*), led by a flute-player.² But the song sung in his worship early assumed sufficient importance to receive a special appellation, the dithyramb (*διθύραμβος*).³ We know but little of the manner of its first performance. Archilochus (B. C. 678—629) says that "he can sing the dithyramb, the beautiful strain of Dionysus, when his mind is excited (thunder-stricken) with wine."⁴ But it does not seem to have been performed by the chorus until the time of Arion, about B. C. 600, who was known in Greece as the perfecter of the dithyramb. It previously, probably, consisted in ejaculations and the expression of excited feeling. He gave dignity and a regular character to it in connection with the circular choruses (*κύκλιοι χοροί*), that danced about the altar on which the sacrifice was made. It seems from a passage in Pindar that these improvements were made in Corinth, the city of Periander: "Whence but from Corinth arose the pleasing festivals of Dionysus, with the dithyramb, of which the prize is an ox."⁵ His style seems to have been of a graver cast than that of his predecessors, as Suidas says that he was the inventor of the tragic style (*τραγικὸν τρόπον εὐρετής*).⁶

Before taking leave of the dithyramb as practised among the Dorians, in order to trace its migration and establishment at Athens, we need to examine a little more closely into the nature of the Bacchic festivals. The high state of excitement in which the worshippers were accustomed to perform their service, is well known. The ac-

¹ Those who are interested in this question, are referred to Grote as above cited, the Greek Theatre, p. 15 sq., and Herodotus' History, B. 2 Euterpe.

² Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. p. 204.

³ The origin of the name, *διθύραμβος*, is much contested. Perhaps the explanation of Hartung (Classical Museum, No. XVIII.) is the most satisfactory. The first syllable of the word, like *Διόνυσος*, contains the name of Zeus *δι* contracted to *δι*. In *θυραμβος*, the *μ* is euphonic, as in many Greek words, and *θυραμβος* is a cognate of *θύρμβος* and *τύμβη*, which latter, according to Pausan. II. 24. 7, was the name of a festival of Dionysus at Argos. *Διθύραμβος* = *Διὸς θύρμβος*, signifies the "turbulent disorder of a storm or tempest," and fitly characterizes the hymn to Dionysus, which originally succeeded the calm Paean to Apollo, after the worshippers were heated with wine. See Class. Museum, No. XVIII. p. 375 sq. for a more extended explanation.

⁴ Ὡς Διωνύσου ἀνακτος καλὸν ἐξῆρξαι μέλος
Οἶδα διθύραμβον οἶνῳ συγκεραννῶθεις φρένας.

⁵ Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. p. 204.

⁶ It has been asked, with some plausibility, whether this tragic style may not have had reference to the introduction of satyrs into the dithyramb, as *τράγος* was another name for *σάτυρος*?—Gr. Theatre, p. 19, note.

tual presence of the god in his temple or at the altar, as was frequently supposed to be the case in Greece, and visible representations of his benefactions to man, and his personal doings and sufferings, would naturally call forth the loudest expressions of *feeling*. These mimic or anthropomorphic representations were frequently carried so far, that some man was made to represent the god,¹ and "thus at the Anthisteria at Athens," (copied from the Dorians,) says Müller,² "the wife of the second archon, who bore the title of queen, was betrothed to Dionysus in a secret solemnity, and in public processions even, the god himself was represented by a man. At the Boeotian festival of the Agronia, Dionysus was supposed to have disappeared, and to be sought for among the mountains; there was also a maiden (representing one of the nymphs in the train of Dionysus), who was pursued by a priest, carrying a hatchet and personating a being hostile to the god."

The worship of Bacchus as the god of the seasons, led perhaps most naturally to that form of the dithyramb from which tragedy was more directly derived. The tendency, in the Greek mind, to impersonate the objects and events of nature is especially conspicuous. The heavenly powers are the gods of earth.

Night

And day, near passing, mutual greeting still
Exchange, alternate as they glide athwart
The brazen threshold vast. This enters, that
Forth issues; nor the two can one abode
At once constrain.³

So Bacchus was supposed to represent the changing seasons. In winter, he was flying, struggling, dying; but with returning spring he was reanimated, joyous, victorious. In order to communicate his life-giving bounties, he was surrounded by ministers, sileni and satyrs,

¹ See Müller's *Hist. Gr. Lit.* p. 288.

² *Hist. Gr. Lit.* p. 288. A stratagem for procuring the return of Peisistratus from exile, recorded by the Greek historians, is illustrative of the belief in the personal appearance of the gods at their festivals. The two conspirators (Peisistratus and Megacles) clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phylê, in the panoply and costume of Athênê, surrounded her with the processional accompaniments belonging to the goddess, and placed her in a chariot, with Peisistratus by her side; in this guise, the exiled despot and his adherents approached the city, and drove up to the Acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people: "Athenians! receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athênê has honored above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own Acropolis." The historian adds that the goddess was received with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, and the deceptive epiphany was not discovered until Peisistratus and Megacles quarrelled. — *Grote's Greece*, Vol. IV. p. 140.

³ Hesiod, *Theog.* 992 sq.

through whom he dispensed his blessings, by the medium of whom, life-giving influences went forth from him as a sun, to all vegetative and animate nature. It was not difficult for the fancy of a Greek to people the grove and fountain with these fantastic beings, to witness their sportive dances, and even to identify himself with them as an actual participant. Hence the origin of the chorus of the satyrs, so frequent in the Dionysia, dressed in goat skins, painted in various fanciful colors, and otherwise oddly and wildly decorated, or masked. Müller well says: "The intense desire felt by every worshipper of Bacchus, to fight, to conquer, to suffer in common with him, made them regard these subordinate beings as a convenient step by which they could approach more nearly to the presence of their divinity. The custom, so prevalent at the festivals of Bacchus, of taking the disguise of satyrs, doubtless originated in this feeling, and not in the mere desire of concealing excesses under the disguise of a mask; otherwise, so serious and pathetic a spectacle as tragedy could never have originated in the choruses of these satyrs."¹

The testimony of the ancients is explicit in regard to the rise of tragedy out of the dithyrambic chorus. Aristotle (Poet. IV. 14) says: "Both tragedy, then, and comedy, having originated in a rude and unpremeditated manner—the first from the leaders in the *Dithyrambic* hymns, the other from those *Phallic* songs which, in many cities, remain still in use,—each advanced gradually towards perfection, by such successive improvements as were most obvious."² It is unnecessary to delay long to decide who has just claim to the originating of the Greek Drama. If the word is taken in its strictest sense, as *action*, i. e. "imitation in the way of action," its origin may be conceded to the Dorians. It is on this ground, according to Aristotle, that they claim "the invention both of tragedy and comedy. For comedy is claimed by the Megarians; — — — And tragedy also by some of the Dori-

¹ Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* p. 289. Cf. also Donaldson's *Greek Theatre*, p. 16: "The heavenly powers became gods of the earth, and it was natural, that the coördinate natural causes of productiveness should also have their representatives, who would form the attendants of the personified primal causes of the same effects. The sun-god, therefore, when he roamed the earth, was properly attended by the Sileni, the deities presiding over running streams; the goddess of the moon by the Naiades, the corresponding female divinities; nay, sometimes the two bands united to form one merry train. To these Sileni were added a mixture of man and goat called satyrs * * * * who were not, like the Sileni, real divinities, but deified representatives of the original worshippers, who probably assumed, as portions of their droll costume, the skin of the goat which they had sacrificed as a welcome offering to their wine god."

² Twining's Translation.

ans of the Peloponnesus. In support of these claims, they allege that the Doric word for a village is *Κῶμη*, whilst the Attic is *Δῆμος*; and that comedians were so called, not from *καμάζειν*, *to revel*, but from their strolling about the *κῶμαι* or villages before they were tolerated in the city. They also say that *to do* or *to act*, they express by *δρᾶν*; the Athenians, by *πράττειν*."

Herodotus, too, speaks of tragic choruses, sung in honor of Adrastus, at Sicyon.¹ Epigenes is also mentioned (Suidas, under *Θέσπις*) as the first of a series of nine dramatic poets ending with Thespias. It is evident that in whatever the dramatic element of these poets consisted, it had nothing in common with the dialogue of the Athenian tragedy, and nothing which would give much claim to the appellation dramatic, as used in connection with the modern tragedy.

We have seen that the chorus received its early cultivation and development among the Dorians in the Peloponnesus, of which Sparta gradually became the chief city, and acquired the political and literary primacy. But we must now turn our attention to the Ionian portion of Greece, especially to Athens, and examine a little more closely what preparation is there making, in the meantime, to fit it to become the capital of Greece, and to be known in all succeeding generations as the chosen abode of refinement and culture. From the commencement of authentic Grecian history, 776 B. C., for nearly two centuries, as before intimated, we know little else of Athens than that it, like other Grecian States, was first governed by a series of hereditary kings, and afterwards through an oligarchy, came under the dominion of what Aristophanes petulantly calls "that angry, waspish, intractable, little old man, Demus of Pnyx." Desert indeed is the journey of the antiquarian and annalist through these long years, and he is almost ready to conclude that the barren rocks and shallow soil of Attica, cannot be productive of the fruits of the more fertile plains of Argos and Thessaly. But the natural beauties of hill and plain and blissful clime, are harbingers of the future greatness of the quiet and thoughtful dwellers there. The plaintive tale which the clear voiced nightingale sweetly warbles forth beneath the ivy shade of the dewbesprinkled glade, where the vine in clusters pours her sweets, secure from wintry showers and scorching suns, where Cytherea's goddess quaffs from the gentle flowing stream, breathes over the land in genial

¹ See Herod. V. 67: Οἱ δὲ Σικυῶνιοι ἐώθεσαν μεγαλωσθὲ κάρτα τιμῶν τὸν Ἀδρηστον . . . τὰ τε δὴ ἄλλα οἱ Σικυῶνιοι ἐτίμων τὸν Ἀδρηστον καὶ δὴ πρὸς, τὰ πάντα αὐτοῦ τραγικοῖσι χοροῖσι ἐγέραιρον, κ. τ. λ. Themistius, Orat. xxvii. 337. B.: τραγῳδίας εὐρεταὶ μὲν Σικυῶνιοι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοί.

gales, and twines her hair with the fragrant rose and sweet narcissus,¹ will not fail to awaken corresponding notes in many human bosoms, although long vainly breathed upon the desert air.

The legislation of Solon, about 600 B. C., had much influence upon the political relations of Athens. To reconcile the claims of an hereditary aristocracy with the demands of the clamorous, oppressed and suffering multitude, to combine rigid morality and order with freedom of action,² to repress a general mutiny of the poorer class against the rich, was not the work of a weak head or faint heart. The humanity and warm sympathy of the great lawgiver of Athens, were not less conspicuous in his legislative enactments, severe though they sometimes were, than in his elegies and iambics; and it is doubtful whether his example as a writer, and as a patron and encourager of the rhapsodes, had a tythe of the influence upon the subsequent intellectual development of his countrymen, that was exerted by his political regulations.

Solon was succeeded at Athens by Peisistratus, with whom the second period of Grecian history may be said to begin. His dominion with that of his sons, together called Peisistratids, continuing with some interruptions for fifty years, from 560 to 510 B. C., is fraught with interest to the scholar. It is true that the emolument of the reigning family was the ruling motive with this prince, but it was sought by means that could not fail, in one point of view, to bring lasting honor to his native Athens. He extended his territory beyond Attica, and acquired the possession of rich mines, subsequently the source of much wealth to the Athenians. He encouraged industry, and did much for the improvement of the agriculture of his own little province. Works of art were commenced and carried on by him, although it was left for the more democratical age of Cleisthenes to produce artists of any considerable excellence, workers in gold, ivory and brass. The magnificent temple of the Olympian Zeus was begun in his reign, and though not half finished, was yet not without its influence in exciting to works of design. He also commenced the building of a temple to Apollo; and the Lyceum afterwards, in the age of the philosophers, so celebrated, was begun by him.³ The care taken by this family in procuring full and accurate copies of the Homeric poems, and the better recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival, their love and patronage of poets and men of letters, and their works, both native and foreign, such as those of Simonides, Anacreon and Lasus, had a

¹ Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 578, sq. ² Müller's *Hist. of Gr. Lit.* p. 278.

³ Thirlwall's *Hist. of Greece*, Vol. II. p. 63, 4.

highly beneficial effect upon the developments of the rising Athens. These all, though but the morning gleams before the meridian light of the era of Pericles, the golden age of Athenian culture, were yet the harbingers, the sure precursors of future glory.

It was during the reign of the Peisistratids, that the first foundations of the tragic drama were laid at Athens. The worship of Bacchus had long been prevalent there, but it does not appear that the Dorian choral songs had been introduced, before the Athenians recognized the authority of the Delphic oracle, which by a response sanctioned this form of worship. A legend in Pausanias¹ also indicates, that Pegasus was assisted by the Delphian oracle in transferring the worship of Bacchus from Eleutheræ to Athens. It cannot be doubted that this form of worship would meet with a ready reception at Athens, just awakening to some interest in literature and the arts, as well as in free institutions. Not less certain is it that the Dorian lyric drama, such as it was, accompanied or soon followed its parent, the dithyramb.²

We must go back a little, in order to explain the other part of the Greek tragedy, the dialogue. There existed in Greece, especially among the Ionians, from a very early age, a class of men called rhapsodes (*ραψωδοί*),³ "the successors of the primitive Aoedi or bards,"⁴ whose profession was much respected until the time of the Socratic philosophers. They differed from the bards by foregoing the use of musical instruments (the cithara or phorminx), as an accompaniment to their recitations. They sometimes held a branch of laurel, *ράβδος*, in their hands, and according to Grote, "depended for effect upon voice and manner,—a species of musical and rhythmical declamation which gradually increased in vehement emphasis and gesticulation, until it approached to that of the dramatic actor." Even Hesiod appears to have ranked himself among the rhapsodes,⁵ and the term is equally applicable to those who recited their own poems, and those who merely declaimed a piece a thousand times repeated before. It appears probable, that both the vocation of the bards and rhapsodes, was, for a while,⁶ exercised together. But "before the time of So-

¹ i. 2. 5.

² Donaldson's Gr. Theatre, p. 37.

³ Derived from *ῥάπτειν αἰοδῆν*, to stich, join together verses, i. e. in connected discourse, as distinguished from the strophic and irregular character of lyric poetry.

⁴ Grote's Hist. of Greece, Vol. II. p. 187.

⁵ Ibid. 187, 8.

⁶ According to Müller's Hist. Lit. of An. Greece, p. 33, in the early ages, the cithara was employed at the recitation of epic poetry only in the introduction (*ἀναβολή*), for the purpose of giving the necessary pitch, and hence the expression: *φορμίζων ἀνεβύλλετ' αἰεῖν*, Od. i. 115; viii. 366, etc. The *Gurla*, a stringed instrument of simple construction, is used at the present day, among the

lon, the rhapsode was the recognized and exclusive organ of the old epic; sometimes in short fragments before private companies, by single rhapsodes; sometimes several rhapsodes in continuous succession at a public festival."¹ We are undoubtedly, indebted to these professed reciters, for the preservation of many ancient treasures before the invention of writing, and even until it became somewhat common; for epic poems were rhapsodized for more than a thousand years.²

The office of the chorus was, to express its feeling in reference to some object prefigured by the sacrifice. It would occur that the events symbolized in the sacrifice would need some explanation, and what more natural than that the rhapsode should be called in to officiate in this respect. The first actual occurrence of this kind, of which we have any intimation, is perhaps that recorded in Hesychius, who says, that at Brauron, the Iliad was chanted in connection with the sacrifice of a goat;³ or that in Athenaeus, quoted from Clearchus, from which it appears that the rhapsodes came forward and recited in honor of Bacchus. Now, according to Aristophanes,⁴ the festival held at Brauron called Brauronia, was in honor of Bacchus; so that we may suppose, that there was a mingling of the dithyramb and the recitations of the rhapsodes in these celebrations.

But we have explicit testimony to the fact that Thespis introduced an actor, in order to rest the Dionysian chorus.⁵ This circumstance more than any other, perhaps, has been the ground of the general ascription of the honor of inventing Greek tragedy to him. There is good evidence to believe that he was a rhapsode, and that he was generally if not always himself the actor, *ὑποκριτής*, spoken of. But he made some advance upon the recitations which may be supposed to have been held at Brauron and elsewhere. He did not confine himself to mere narration, but held a dialogue with the chorus by means of its coryphaei. He also invented a disguise for the face, by means of a pigment prepared from the herb purslain, and afterwards constructed a linen mask, in order to be able to personate more than one

Servians by wandering minstrels for a similar purpose. But even the cithara was not necessary to the rhapsode, as appears from the fact that Hesiod did not make use of it; and later, it belonged exclusively to the bards.

¹ Grote, Vol. II. p. 189.

² For an account of the office of the rhapsode in the preservation of the Iliad and Odyssey, see Grote, Vol. II. p. 189 sq.

³ *Βραυρωνίους· τὴν Ἰλιάδα ᾗδον ῥαψῳδοὶ ἐν Βραυρῶνι τῆς Ἀττικῆς, καὶ Βραυρωνία ἑορτὴ Ἀρτέμιδι Βραυρωνία ἄγεται καὶ θύεται αἰξί.*

⁴ Pax, 874 and Schol.

⁵ *Diog. Laert. Plat. LXVI. : Ὅτερον δὲ Θέσπις ἐνα ὑποκριτὴν ἐξεῦρεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ διαναπαύεσθαι τὸν χορὸν.*

character.¹ According to Themistius, he invented a *prologue* and a *rhexis*; the former of which "must have been the Proemium which he spoke as exarchus of the dithyramb; the latter, the dialogue between himself and the chorus, by means of which he developed some myth relating to Bacchus or some other deity."² We have, then, a kind of drama, composed of two distinct elements, the first and most important, the basis of the representation, the modified Doric dithyrambic chorus, and the other, at first brief and secondary in importance, gradually usurping the place of the former, an offshoot of the Ionian epical *rhapsody*. The office of the actor, at first, was merely to present subjects or occasions on which the chorus expressed its feeling. Thus it was an ally of the action, which was previously exhibited in the sacrifice and mimetic gesticulation. But while the actor merely told the story of the piece in a series of monologues, the Attic tragedy could scarcely be said to differ from the choral songs of the Dorian cities.

We see from the above representation, the necessity of divesting ourselves of the notions of the drama as it appears among us, in estimating that of the Greeks. It is diverse in nature, origin, and design, as well as adapted to an entirely different state of society; and in order to appreciate it, we must place ourselves in the position of a Greek of the age of Peisistratus or Pericles. The effect of a misunderstanding of Greek tragedy, is especially conspicuous in the French tragedians, who, while they made the Greeks their models, struck out, to a great extent, the lyrical parts from their pieces, retaining the absurd law of the unities, especially those of time and place, thus rendering the plot insufficient to fill up the play, without the addition of irrelevant and puerile intrigues, and superabundant rhetoric. This is more evident when we examine the *Athalie* of Racine and the *Cid* of Corneille, which, according to Frederic Schlegel, are "the two most glorious productions of French poetry." In the former, the ancient chorus is restored, and the latter is intensely lyrical, which alone gives it such a magical power, that envy and criticism are of no avail against it.³

To the three Greek tragedians who, after Thespis, preceded Aeschylus, we can give but a passing glance. Phrynichus, a pupil of Thespis, was the most celebrated of these, and in great repute upon the Athenian stage, from 512 B. C. until even after the appearance of Aeschylus. His one actor personated different and even female characters, who had not before been brought upon the stage. His great excellence lay in the lyrical parts of his performance, and "his tender, sweet, and plaintive songs were still much admired in the time

¹ Donaldson's Gr. Theatre, p. 41.

² Donaldson's Gr. Theatre, p. 42.

³ See Schlegel's Lect. on the Hist. of Literature, p. 296 sq.

of the Peloponnesian war, especially by old fashioned people."¹ Phrynichus also took one further step in advance towards the perfecting of Greek tragedy. He broke up the chorus into parts, in order to produce variety in the lyrical portions of the pieces. He also frequently chose, instead of mythical subjects, those connected with the history of his own time. And although he even moved to tears, according to Herodotus, in a representation of the disaster of the Milesians, colonists of Athens, yet, subjected himself to a considerable fine "for representing to them [the Athenians] their own misfortunes;" "a remarkable judgment of the Athenians," says Müller, "concerning a work of poetry, by which they manifestly expected to be raised into a higher world, not to be reminded of the miseries of the present life."²

The two contemporaries of Phrynichus, Choerilus, who commenced his career a little earlier (B. C. 524), and Pratinas, perhaps a little later (before 500 B. C.), were most celebrated for their satiric dramas, which, even at this early date, were developed as a separate branch of dramatic composition. Subsequently, those pieces called "sportive tragedies" by Demetrius,³ assumed considerable importance, as forming a connected whole with a trilogy of regular tragedies, which we shall have occasion hereafter to speak of, in connection with Aeschylus.

*The Greek Theatre and Manner of representing Plays in it.*⁴

The manner of representation is not of little importance for the right understanding of the Greek drama. We must at once divest ourselves of the idea of a theatre as arranged and decorated by modern art. The difference between the Athenian and English theatre is certainly not less than between a Greek dwelling of the age of Pericles and one in the most fashionable part of a modern city. The place of representation, as with the English drama, began with the rising art, and grew with its growth and strengthened with its strength. In England, before the accession of queen Elizabeth (1558), no theatre had been established. Plays were at first publicly⁵ acted in the court yards of great inns, uncovered in fair weather, and protected by an awning in bad. The "Gorboduc" of Sackville, and "Damon

¹ Müller, *Lit. of Ancient Greece*, p. 293.

² Müller's *Hist. of the Lit. of Greece*, p. 294.

³ *De Elocut.* § 169 : *παίζοντα τραγῳδία*.

⁴ In this part of our subject, we have relied especially upon Donaldson's *Greek Theatre*, pp. 31—50, and have found much advantage in referring to the *Plato*, representing the Theatre of Bacchus at Athens, in the beginning of that volume.

⁵ They had previously been represented in the Monasteries and Universities.—See *Warton's History of English Poetry*, Vol. III. p. 193 sq.

and Pythias," by R. Edwards, were represented before the queen at Whitehall in 1562, and a translation from the Phaenissae of Euripides, by Gascoigne, called Jacosta, was acted in the refectory of Gray's Inn, in 1566. The first theatre was built in 1570, and a company of players licensed in 1574, a little after Shakspeare first went to London, and several years before the representation of his first play.¹

In Greece, the first scene of representation was about the altar of Bacchus in the Agora, or in some open and level space in the city, large enough for the free movements of the chorus. Here they first moved in a circle around the altar. Subsequently, a platform was raised about the altar, called the *thymele*, which was the resting place of the chorus; and when temples were consecrated to the god, they of course stood in the place of a theatre. But the union of the dialogue with the chorus, gave rise to structures arranged more in accordance with the nature of the piece to be represented. It should be borne in mind, however, that theatres in Greece were not confined to dramatical representations, but were used for all sorts of public spectacles and popular assemblies, and yet, the general arrangement was accommodated to the drama. It seems that at first, temporary seats were raised for spectators at Athens, as in England; and the falling of a wooden scaffolding² was (B. C. 500) the immediate cause of the building of the stone theatre of Bacchus,³ where the plays of the great tragedians were performed, and where many a prize was won and lost. This theatre, of which the ruins are now discoverable, may be taken as a representative of the whole class, although many splendid structures subsequently arose in various parts of Greece and Sicily.

This structure was beneath the south wall of the acropolis, on the east. It was of colossal dimensions,⁴ so as to be able to contain the

¹ About 1589 or 1590; see Warton's Hist. of English Poetry, Vol. IV. p. 179 sq., Drake's Life and Times of Shakspeare, 2 vols. 4to. London, 1817, and Hallam's Lit. of Europe, Vol. I. p. 367.

² According to Smith's Antiquities, Art. *Theatrum*, this disaster occurred at the representation of the first play that Aeschylus exhibited.

³ This theatre was not *perhaps* wholly finished for 150 years; but, according to Müller, "must very soon have been so far completed, as to render it possible for the master-pieces of the three great tragedians to be represented in it."

⁴ According to Plato (Sympos. 175. E.), more than thirty thousand persons could be assembled in it: *παρὰ σοῦ νέιν οὐτως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐφανῆς ἐγένετο πρόην ἐν μίμνῃσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρίοις*. Wordsworth (Athens and Attica, p. 94, note) contends that *τρισμύριοι* was used as a general term, to designate the free adult population of Athens, and, in the passage of Plato cited, is no more to be taken literally, than Juvenal's phrase: *Totam hostie Romam circus capit*. The term *τρισμύριοι* is still retained as a general designation of the population of the whole of Greece.

assembled citizens, as well as strangers who flocked to Athens at the time of the festival of the "Great Dionysia" Διονύσια ἐν ἄσται, ἄστικά or μέγα,¹ as much as, in modern days, to the carnival at Rome. The form of the building was that of a large segment of a circle, of which the centre was occupied by a raised square platform, called thymele [θυμέλη], originally an altar of Bacchus, but afterwards, according to the nature of the tragedy, occupied as a funereal monument, or anything about which the chorus might naturally cluster, and where they took their station when at rest. Around this was the orchestra, adapted to the motions of the chorus, a circular level space, and the lowest part of the building. From this platform, the leader of the chorus, as a representative of the whole, held discourse with the actors, using either the singular or plural number. The orchestra was not, however, strictly confined to the semicircle formed by the seats, but extended across the whole building back of this altar, to the outer wall on the side. This was called the δρόμος (Roman *iter*), and its extremities, beyond the concavity formed by the seats, was named πέραδοι, and the entrances into these, on either side, the εἰσοδοί.

Around the orchestra arose the rows of seats for the auditors, one above another, in the theatre of Bacchus, cut out of solid rock and forming an amphitheatre, surmounted and enclosed by a lofty portico adorned with statues, and encircled by a terrace with a balustrade. In these, the lowest being the seats of honor, the body of the citizens were arranged according to their tribes; whilst the young men sat apart in the Ἐφηβικόν, and strangers also had a separate place allotted to them.² On a level with the lowest tier of seats and over against them, was the part of the stage³ called logeum, λογεῖον (*pulpitum* in Latin), connected by two flights of steps with the δρόμος, where the actors in the dialogue were placed, thus affording facility of intercommunication between them and the chorus. The width of the λογεῖον was small compared with its length, which extended beyond the circle of the orchestra, since in stage representations as well as in the plastic arts, grouping was little attended to, actors as well as figures in sculpture

¹ Theatrical exhibitions also took place at the "country Dionysia," Διονύσια κατ' ἄγρους or μικρά, and at the "Lenaea," τὰ Λήναια; but the "Great Dionysia" was, *par eminence*, the time for the exhibition of new pieces, and indeed none but new plays could then be brought out. This festival occurred in the month Elaphebolion, corresponding to the last of March and beginning of April, in our calendar.

² Donaldson's Gr. Theatre, p. 139.

³ In the time of Thespis this was a mere table, ἐλεός. Thus Pollux, IV. 123, says: ἐλεός ἦν τράπεζα ἁρχαία ἐφ' ἣν πρὸ Θεσπίδος εἰς τις ἀναβὰς τοῖς χορευταῖς ἀπεκρίνετο.

being arranged in long lines. This *logeion* raised twelve feet above the orchestra, was ornamented in front and at the ends by pillars, called τὰ ὑποσκήνια, between which statues were placed. Behind the *λογεῖον* was the *προσκήριον*, built of stone for the support of the heavy decorations placed there, whilst the front part of the stage (the *λογεῖον* and *προσκήριον* together were called *σκηνή*) was of wood, so as to reverberate the voice in speaking.

It seems probable that no curtain was employed to conceal the stage from the spectators in the earlier representations of tragedy. In all of the plays of Aeschylus, and generally, if not always, in those of Sophocles, the stage was empty at the beginning of the play, and left unoccupied at the end. But not so in Euripides, and especially in the Comedians where the scene often changed. A curtain drawn up from between the Proscenium and *Λογεῖον*, not let down as now, was probably employed. It however, of course, only concealed the Proscenium, not the Logeum.

Back of the Proscenium was a high wall representing generally the exterior of a mansion (never the interior) with its colonnades, roofs, towers and accessory buildings, and a temple into which were three entrances. By means of these, the rank of the persons approaching upon the stage from this direction was readily known, since royal personages always approached by the middle and highly ornamented entrance, but menials and those of inferior rank, by those at the side. A principle of stage scenery seemed to be, that the most important and nearer objects should occupy the back ground, whilst openings into the distance were at the sides. Hence there were two other spacious entrances at the ends of the *logeum*, called *παρὰσκήνια*, the one through the *εἴσοδος* on the right, leading to the country, and the other on the left, from the town, and both connected by two halls with the *πάροδοι* of the orchestra, and with the portico around the highest range of seats. It was accordingly known by the spectators, whether the persons approaching were from the town, or from the country, or foreign parts. The principal actors might then approach from the back of the stage, or sides, according to the nature of the piece. For illustration, in the *Alcestis* of Euripides, the king Admetus would come upon the stage, which represents the area in front of his palace, from the middle entrance, which would be the main approach to it. The old servant (*θεράπαινα*) would make her appearance from one of the side entrances, probably the left one, as leading to the apartments of the women on the back of the stage. Hercules would approach by the right *εἴσοδος*, whilst the chorus, con-

sisting of old men of Pherae, would, if belonging to the city itself, appear upon the left side. Hercules, on the other hand, when sent to the apartments of guests separate from the main body of the house, would enter by the door to the right of the royal entrance.

It must not be forgotten that the Proscenium was not always a representation of architectural scenes. These would only be appropriate when the front of a palace was the scene of action. Of the seven extant plays of Sophocles, only four could be performed without a change of the proscenium. The *Philoctetes* required a representation of a desolate island (Lemnos) with its rock and cavern; the scene of the *Oedipus Coloneus* was a grove, the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus was bound to the rocks upon Mount Caucasus, and in the *Furies*, Orestes went from Delphos to the temple of Minerva at Athens; and from thence, the scene changes to the court of the Areopagus, where he is tried and acquitted. In comedy, still more variety of scenery was required than in tragedy. This was effected in various ways, as by introducing decorations in front of the proscenic buildings, to conceal them, or modify their appearance when it could be done, in accordance with the scene of the play. Indeed much trouble and expense seems to have been bestowed upon these scenic representations, and the skill of a Phidias and Zeuxis was called into requisition in their respective arts, in order to give new cause for the gratulation of national pride, or new pomp and splendor to the services of an imposing religious worship; but art seems not in its best productions to have satisfied them, for even living trees were probably introduced to give effect to the scenery.

The exposed state of the theatre without roof or awning, would appear to us to be a great hindrance to the comfort of those assembled to witness dramatic representations. But it should be recollected, that the climate of Greece was mild and delightful at the season of the year when plays were represented, and the people much more accustomed to exposure and out-door life than we are. Besides, their dramatic exhibitions were works of the day and not of the night, usually commencing when a trilogy was to be performed, in the morning, and lasting until evening. When a heavy shower came up, the auditors fled to the portico above the seats, and to the one back of the proscenium called *Eumenic*, for shelter, and even the inconvenience of a slight drenching, would not compare in the estimation of a Greek, with that of obscuring the sunny cheerfulness of a national festival, or breathing the air corrupted by contact again and again with the lungs of assembled thousands. Furthermore, it was at least thought

disgraceful, if not impious, to incarcerate gods and god-like heroes within closed walls.¹

There were besides, positive advantages connected with this exposure to the heavens above, and with numerous objects of interest around. It gave scope to the conceptions, and appropriateness to many of the allusions of the poet. It is only when we take into account both the situation and construction of the theatre, that we can fully appreciate much of the metaphorical language of the Greek dramatists. Thus Wordsworth well says:² "It will be found that most of the metaphorical expressions of Aeschylus are derived from objects which were *visible* to the audience, while they listened to the recital of those expressions in the theatre. Seas and storms, the building of ships and their navigation, the feeding of flocks on the hills, hunting in the woods, fishing on the sea, walls and fortifications, the Stadium and its course, all immediately in view or in close connection with the theatre, were almost the natural elements of which the poetical atmosphere of that place was composed, and the dramatic poet breathed them as his native air."

We do not, for example, feel the full force of the exhortation of the chorus in the *Eumenides*:³

Hail ye denizens who sit
Ranged beneath the throne of Jove
To the dear virgin-goddess dear,
By Time instructed to be wise.
You who dwell beneath the wings
Of Pallas, doth her sire revere,⁴

until we recollect, that the theatre was immediately under the Acropolis, the most sacred and beautiful structure in the city, with the temple of Minerva and the statue of Jupiter, guardian of the city (*Zēus Προλεύς*) looking down upon them, and, as it were, overshadowing them with the wing of protection. The scene of Athenian glory, Salamis, seems not to have lent more aid to the orator beholding it in the Pnyx, than to the poet, when he beheld the peaks of its high hills in the distant west, and exclaimed:

O noble Salamis, thou indeed
Buoyed on the wave, dost happy dwell
Conspicuous ever, in the eyes of men.

Euripides would hardly have given so vivid a representation of some

¹ A. W. Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic Literature*, Lect. III. init.

² *Athens and Attica*, p. 95.

³ l. 1064 sq.

⁴ Quoted from Wordsworth's *Athens and Attica*, p. 98.

of the tenets of his philosophy, if the open sky of Attica had not been over his head, and the soil of Attica under his feet. Many other passages might be given from the tragedians, illustrative of this influence of the construction and locality of the Greek theatre. I will, however, refer to but one more. In Sophocles' *Electra*, when the daughter of Agamemnon came upon the stage, she, undoubtedly, made her invocation to the open heaven above her, beginning with the lines :

ὦ φῶς ἀγνὸν, καὶ γῆς
 ἰσόμοιρος ἄηρ, ὥς μοι
 πολλῶς, μὲν, κ. τ. λ.

In the comedies of Aristophanes, many of the imaginative flights would be extravagant and unmeaning in the close theatre of modern days, without a view of the hills of Athens around, a part of the city below, and the infinite blue of the sky above. Passages almost innumerable, did our limits allow it, might be cited from the "*Clouds*," for example, illustrative of this fact. One must suffice :

O air despotic king, whose boundless chain
 Girds the suspended earth, and thou, bright aether,
 Ye clouds too, venerable deities,
 Who breed the thunder and the lightning's bolt,
 Appear on high to your philosopher.¹

There were several contrivances used by the ancients for giving effect to their theatrical exhibitions, which deserve a passing notice. In the first place the size of the theatre rendered some device necessary for aiding the eye and ear, by increasing the power of the voice and the size of the features,² aside from the desire to represent gods and godlike heroes as of a stature and bearing far above mortals. The mask (*ὄγκος*) first deserves mention. When originally invented, perhaps it was merely intended to enable one person to appear in several characters, but it was subsequently employed, together with the well known cothurnus, to give a height to the actor, corresponding to the size of the theatre. Proper proportion was preserved by padding and stuffing the arms, chest and other parts, to a size corresponding to the height. But these were not the only uses of the mask. It was not sufficient for the actor (*ὑποκριτής*) that he dieted

¹ line 267 sq. Wheelwright's Translation. Similar invocations to the clouds, air, etc. occur on almost every page.

² Donaldson's Greek Theatre, p. 142, says: If as we are assured 30,000 persons could be seated on its benches, the length of the *δρόμος* could not have been less than 400 feet, and a spectator in the central point of the topmost range, must have been 300 feet from the actor in the *Λογεῖον*.

and used much bodily exercise, in order that his voice might be strong and clear. He was aided by his mask of bronze or copper, in throwing his voice to the extremities of his audience. "This was effected, says Donaldson,¹ by connecting it with a tire or periwig (*πηνίκη, φερύκη*), that covered the head and left only one passage for the voice, which was generally circular (the *os rotundum*), so that the voice might be said to sound through it—hence the Latin name for a mask—*persona a personando*." How much aid was furnished to the voice by cavities and receptacles for sound about the building, mentioned by Vitruvius, it seems difficult to determine.

The intercourse between heaven and earth in the Greek tragedy is so frequent, that we should naturally expect much stage machinery for facilitating it. In this respect, the open theatre would furnish considerable aid, by allowing free motion and view upward. Thus to exhibit the gods in converse aloft, a platform surrounded and concealed by clouds, called *Θεολογεῖον*, was employed, and ropes, *Αἰωραί*, aided in supporting or conveying the celestial being aloft, or facilitating his descent. The *Μηχανή*,² a sort of crane turning upon a pivot on the right or country side of the theatre, when occasion required, snatched up a god or hero before the eyes of the auditors, and held him hovering in the air, until his part was performed, and the *Γέρανος*,³ of a somewhat similar construction, caught up persons from the earth and whirled them into the circle of the scenic clouds. Thus a dead body might be conveyed from the stage. They also had means of representing artificial lightning playing among clouds, and thunder was produced under the stage, scarcely distinguishable to an Athenian ear from the genuine Vulcanian. There were also other pieces of frame-work, to represent action taking place merely on the earth, as the *Σκοπή*, a look-out, *Τείχος*, a fortress wall, *Πύργος*, a tower, *Φυρτωρίον*, a beacon, and several others. In the opening scene of the Agamemnon, where the watchman complains that he is

Fix'd as a dog on Agamemnon's roof
To watch the live-long year,

and when he after the appearance of the signal fire, exclaims :

¹ Greek Theatre, p. 147. Great care was taken in the construction of the mask. There were, for example, twenty-six kinds of tragic masks, and those for comedy were still more numerous.

² Ἐ μηχανή δὲ θεοὺς δείκνυσσι, καὶ ἥρωας τοὺς ἐν αἴερι. It was called κράδῃ. Pollux, IV. 19.

³ Ἡ δὲ γέρανος, μηχανήμ τι ἐστὶν ἐκ μετεώρου καταφερόμενον, ἐφ' ἧς ἀπαγῇ σώματος ὃ κέχρηται ἢ Ἡὼς ἀρπάζουσι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Μένονος.—Pollux IV. 19.

— Hail thou auspicious flame,
That streaming through the night denoucest joy,
Welcomed with many a festal dance in Argos,

it is not improbable, that both the *Σκοπή* and the *Φρυκτώριον* were brought into requisition upon the stage. Perhaps also the *ἡμικύκλιον* was used, when in that same play Clytemnestra exclaims :

—— A Herald from the shore
I see ; branches of olive shade his brows, etc.

It has been said, that the back ground of the Proscenium represented frequently the exterior of a palace, but not the interior. They had a device, however, for changing the scene to the interior, by making the front wall of a temporary house to turn on hinges, so as, when drawn back, to expose the proceedings within an apartment of the house. Some such device would naturally be used in the *Electra* of Sophocles, when the dead body of Clytemnestra is exposed to view, and the discovery of her murder is revealed to Aegistheus by removing the veil from the corpse, supposed by him to be that of Orestes ; and also when Orestes compels Aegistheus "to go to the place where his own dear father fell, and perish there." So, near the beginning of the "Furies" of Aeschylus, where the temple of Apollo is opened to view.

We have spoken of stage devices that relate to human and super-human personages. But as Tartarus and the regions below furnished its representatives on the stage, means were sought for their convenient approach. A door under the stairs leading from the orchestra to the lowest range of seats, was reached from a vault below, by means of a flight of stairs called *Χαρόνιοι κλίμακες*, "Charon's stairs." By these the shades of the departed arose and disappeared. A little distance in front of these steps was a trap-door, communicating with the vault below, called *Ἀνέισμα*, "by means of which any sudden appearance, like that of the furies, was effected." From another similar door, on the right or country side of the *Ἀργεῖον*, marine and river gods and the like, presented themselves when the occasion demanded.

The manner of preparing dramatic representations, deserves a few words of explanation. We have already spoken of the dissimilarity of the parts of the Attic drama. A distinction corresponding to the nature of the parts was also retained in preparing for the exhibition. The chorus was collected, the teacher (*χοροδιδάσκαλος*) procured, and the whole provision, equipage (often splendid) and pay of the singers furnished by the choragus, who was appointed by the people. But the actors belonged to the poet and not to the people, and conse-

quently came not within the jurisdiction of the choragus, either in respect to training or pay.¹ When the author of a play proposed to bring it upon the stage, he applied to the archon, and if this dignitary approved the piece, a chorus was assigned (*Χορὸν δίδόραι*) and immediately put under training, whilst actors designated by lot, and exercised by the poet, were ready on the appointed day. Thus the prize was striven for by a union of the best taught actors with the most sumptuously dressed and most diligently trained chorus. And it should seem that the acting had no little influence upon the judges, who were appointed by lot, and generally five¹ in number, since the best dramatists were so often unsuccessful. The fortunate competitor chose his own actors for the following year.² The victorious poet was crowned, and his actors adorned with ivy, and the choragus generally received a tripod as a reward for superior excellence.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SPIRIT OF A SCHOLAR.

By Professor S. G. Brown, Dartmouth College.

THE term scholar has a broad and somewhat varied meaning. We apply it to him who learns with readiness, who performs his intellectual tasks with rapidity and beauty. In a higher sense, we mean by it one who invents or discovers, who makes original and independent investigation, who enlarges the boundaries of knowledge. Most liberally, however, we use the term with reference to all whose attention is devoted to science or letters. Homer and Dante and Chaucer were scholars. In this grandest sense, the calling is among the noblest that the earth affords. We venture no comparison between great thinkers and great actors, the Shakspeares and the Cromwells, the Goethes and the Napoleons. The question of supremacy between them we are willing to let remain in abeyance; but, without controversy, the eye of the world fixes not last on those whose investigations have determined the laws of its action; who, priests of nature, have

¹ Boeckh's *Public Econ. of Athens*, p. 454 sq.

¹ In the first contest of Sophocles with Aeschylus, the judges were Cimon with his nine colleagues, who happened to appear in the theatre and were impressed into the service by the archon.—*Donaldson's Gr. Theatre*, p. 78.

² *Donaldson's Gr. Theatre*, p. 136.

revealed her mysteries ; have adorned the world with structures of beauty and magnificence ; have evoked from the marble and the canvases lovelier and grander forms than our eyes ever saw before ; who have interpreted for us the manifold voices of experience, and made the past our teacher ; without whom there were no history, no poetry, no philosophy, no art ; and of humanity itself, nothing left but its dust and ashes.

There are few among us who can boast of a literary leisure. We come up to the annual festivals of our colleges, from the hard toil and strifes of the year, with the dust of the forum and the market still clinging to us. We have labored for our daily bread. Still it is none the less a duty and a privilege to cherish a scholar's hopes and tastes. Nor is this hard lot of educated men, if it be called such, so adverse to literature even, as it might at first seem. With certain exceptions, this too is as it should be. The scholar is not a hermit nor a monk. Like other men he is connected with the family, with society, the State, the church ; one whose learning is enveloped and permeated with sentiments and affections. Literature is the expressed thought of a people ; and as such, cannot be forced, and probably will not be much retarded by apparent infelicities in the condition of its votaries. Even for better interpreting the problems of life, for the better understanding of history, for the surer expression of common sympathies and wide-spread sentiments, of the stronger sorrows and joys,—the terrible excitements of passion, the awful thoughts which sometimes hover about the way of the most prosperous,—all the experiences which make up the varied life of humanity, it is well for the historian, the philosopher, the poet, to share the troubles of the common lot, to become part of that which they describe or portray. There was a Providence which drove Dante into exile, and bid Milton live in blindness and disappointment and penury.

The scholar is bound to cherish a profoundly meditative and thoughtful spirit, as the basis of both a vigorous independence and a wide and genial sympathy, and indeed, we may say, of almost every scholarly virtue. A reflecting mind alone can become creative. The true student is a teacher of men ; a thinker, not with the multitude, but for them ; a thinker, not a dreamer. His eye must be ever open, his mind ever active. They will be so if he habitually see causes in the effects, the essential in the accidental. Thus to the philosopher and the poet, the outward is an evidence, a symbol of the inward, and we seem to approach the domain of spirit in recognizing the existence of powers the most terrible, whose substance is yet too subtle to reveal itself to the acutest sense. By the very direction of his energies, the

scholar recognizes the fact that there is substance underlying phenomena; that there are vital principles which show their presence in actions. He remembers that Plato and Cudworth sit upon their thrones in virtue not only of their heaven-bestowed genius, but as the reward of severe and earnest labor. To object to any problem however difficult and abstruse, to sneer at it because it is dark and mystical, is treason against the fundamental laws of the intellectual domain. For what does *obscure* generally mean but that we, who call the subject so, do not understand it; and if we do not, we have no right to complain until we have gone far enough to comprehend our own ignorance, to assert that the cause of the perplexity is not in ourselves, but in the inherent viciousness of the subject.

And equally, on the other hand, is a more cautious student to be protected against contemptuous criticism, if he does not at once yield to every new theory, especially if it seem to disturb his cherished faith. Science is not always sufficiently cautious in its conclusions. But recently a theory of the universe was promulgated by the highest authority and with an apparent demonstration of its truth. In the far, far heavens were actually whirling, in their immense vortices, the luminous masses of star-dust, from which suns and planets were forming. Every new telescope, in failing to resolve the nebulae, added to the proof, when suddenly a better instrument scanned those distant regions, and there rolled before our eyes no embryo creation, but vast and complete systems. The demonstrated theory fell to pieces. At the most, it remains as a curious hypothesis. "The fault, dear Brutus, was not in the stars, but in ourselves."

The road the student travels, though full of pleasure, is also full of toil. He is not sensibly a trafficker with his wares, to whom village and country are nothing, flying on iron highways to the great commercial emporiums. It becomes him, assiduous seeker for costliest gems, to delve in many a field; patient and inquisitive traveller through the empire of thought, to toil over the common and dusty highways, to climb, by new paths, the delectable mountains, to repose in quiet meditation, in the grand solitudes of the Valombrosas. There has been a false notion more or less prevalent, that learning should be brought down to the capacity of the weak; as if ease of acquisition were a test of its value. From such a misapprehension of at least half the purpose of education, there must follow an inadequate estimate of thorough knowledge, and ultimately an unthinking and shallow-minded people. When youth are tolled on to knowledge by promises of learning made easy, and to virtue by assurances of religion made easy, one who felt the dignity of either would be tempted to entitle a work

Religion and Learning made hard ; or, if not quite so crabbed and repulsive, would be sure that the nature of both be well understood ; that the inherent grandeur of profound science, of vital religion be not, in his hands, degraded, but remain awful and venerable as at the first ; for he would feel that few things tend more surely to produce a conceited, arrogant, ignorant, virtueless people, than the belief that learning which deserves the name, can be obtained without labor, or religion be practised without self-denial.

It is as destructive in letters as it is in morals, to seek the popularity which is run after, not that which follows. One of the evils of associated action is, that it tends to weaken personal independence. We are afraid to speak or act without the sanction of society ; we receive with timidity and caution, opinions which are not pronounced with the authority of a learned or unlearned body. The rapid interchange of thought, the power and prevalence of criticism, makes writers with fewer faults, but with fewer virtues. There is a boasted freedom which, after all, is but a severer tyranny disguised. In the elder day of English literature, how refreshing to observe the genial freedom and manly vigor in every department its authors touched. Under their high, severe discipline, truths were revealed to them in broader and more sublime forms than we pretend to. Their march was so slow and ponderous that, to a more agile and sprightly age, they seemed tardy and dull ; but they still hold on their quiet courses, like the planets, while their lively and unsubstantial critics have long since exploded and vanished.

The scholar must both maintain his own idiosyncrasy and respect the same in another. Thus only can he produce anything fresh and original ; thus only be able to estimate fairly all operations of mind however diverse from his own. For inasmuch as all sciences and arts are mediately or immediately connected, the roots of one not only spreading and intertwining with those of others, but often springing from the same profound source, so will he who studies profoundly and not empirically, most fully recognize their vital union. Since the subjects of thought are as inexhaustible as the activity of the mind itself, it is a peculiarly unwelcome sight to see one scholar flouting at another, decrying his toil, sneering at his attainments, if they happen to be a little beside his own, still more if they come in competition with them. Of all quarrels, those of literary men bring, we suspect, least honor to the combatants. The professed aim of all is to enlarge the intellectual domain ; and though we may judge with discrimination of the value of different laborers, yet no sincere, earnest worker in so broad a field, should be harshly thrust from our sympathies. For, to

set one science against another, is to do harm to both; and much more disastrous to erect science against religion, or religion against learning, since an ignorant religion has generally landed its votaries in superstition or fanaticism, and irreligious learning has commonly led its possessor to infidelity. It is a great attainment to give to science that which belongs to science, and to faith what belongs to faith.

As deep reflection will bring one to appreciate all varieties of intellectual effort, to look with interest upon that even which he does not comprehend, to discover the true relation and harmony of the sciences, so will it generally be found akin to that *reverential spirit* which springs, in part, from a modest estimate of ourselves, in part from the recognition of the dignity of genius. No one age accumulates all wisdom. Although, if we believe the words of some, the sun shines on us, in this meridian of the century, as it has never shone on others, yet it will not hurt us to remember that before we were born, in times quite diverse from our own, there lived sages and heroes as wise as we, with a manhood as sturdy and vigorous, "brave men and worthy patriots, dear to God and famous to all ages." The first step which Socrates took with his pupils was, to teach them their ignorance, remembering that a consciousness of his own ignorance was a cause of all he knew.

The truly great do most venerate the great. How beautiful is the reverence with which the grand poet of Tuscany follows the steps of his Mantuan master and guide, "glory and light of all the tuneful train," and hesitating to affix a *grave* title to the work which made him first of the "all Etruscan three," modestly called it by the lighter name of Comedy—a Divine Comedy indeed. Remember, too, how the profoundest, most poetical philosopher of antiquity,—if we should say, of the world, who would dispute it?—how Plato venerated *his* master, who drank the hemlock in obedience to the law.

There is a tone in speaking of other ages and of great men, as unwise as it is self-complacent. To despise our ancestors, what is it but to give free license to posterity to despise us? There are centuries which we call dark, but the term most indifferently describes them; nay more, so far as concerns their spirit, their life (for they surely had a life), the state of bodies and the state of souls, the term is absolutely worse than nothing. It not only gives us no true idea, but one positively false. We call them dark, as Coleridge suggests, because we are in the dark about them. It were better to endeavor, calmly and patiently, to comprehend the mingled good and evil of those periods, than to excuse our ignorance by bringing them under one opprobrious epithet. We might find in them germs of institutions, which in the

nineteenth century even, have not attained their full growth. Doubtless there was disturbance, confusion, a semi-chaos, while the old elements of social life were dying out, a mingling with the new ideas which form our modern civilization, but he studies history most unwisely who separates the present from the past. There were creative centuries, when the earth was formless and void, when mighty internal fires were upheaving the mountains and wild currents were sweeping across the face of the earth ; but without them we might have had no majestic rivers, no broad and luxuriant savannahs, no sunny hill-sides, no sweet valleys, no heaven-reflecting lakes.

We sometimes forget our *necessary* connection with the past ; that each century has its controlling ideas, and though these may become obsolete, their influence must descend as a legacy to the future ; that we are organically connected with all that have gone before, and if they had not been as they were, we should not be as we are ; that out of the oppression of one generation springs the freedom of the next, and so from the lawlessness of the present, the tyranny of the future. We forget that, as a part of our great birth-right, we inherit the wisdom of the ancients ; that the ages are bound together by ties the holiest, most vital,—without which there were no flow of life, no nation, no possible history,—and none can attempt to sever the chain, but the jar of the audacious blow will quiver along every separate fibre of existence. We forget that the course of the world itself is but *one* ; that, like a grand drama, it is unfolding every century, and though we may not be able to determine whereabouts in it we play our little parts, whether in the bustle and hurry of the third act, or in the rapid and solemn consummation of the fifth, we should remember that we can comprehend each only in its connection with the others, and all, only in the light of the great plan of the Providence of God.

In those very ages which we so bravely despise, lay the germs of how many grand discoveries ! In those very dark ages were produced poems, which no mean critics,—a little wildly we doubt not, but yet with a show of reason,—have compared with Homer, not unfavorably. Then were produced music and sacred hymns, with which the hearts of the devout will be solaced or inspired to the end of time. Then originated that singular, sublime, religious architecture, misnamed Gothic, of which it is no extravagance to say that it ranks among the most marked and astonishing creations of human genius. The most free and untrammelled of all the orders of architecture, one hardly knows whether to admire most the invention and skill of the architects, or their extreme modesty and self-forgetfulness. All over Germany and the north of France, and the Low Countries, and England, rose as by

magic, those complicated structures, massive and graceful, their foundations firm as the hills, their spires shooting heavenward, a delicate, fairy-like fretwork of stone, the admiration of generation after generation,—and yet their builders are as little known as the builders of the pyramids. In those ages occurred some of those all-embracing movements of the masses, which seemed to break up society as an earthquake breaks up the strata of the earth, and which remain to some extent problems even now, but certainly incontestible proofs of the energy of the central forces which impelled them. In those ages were laid the strong foundations of governments, which have survived the disturbances of centuries, and are to-day laying their hands upon the islands of the eastern and the western continents. No surely, it will not do to be indiscriminate in condemnation of so many centuries and of people so various.

Reverence for the past is a necessary element, not of the peculiarly imaginative mind merely, but of every mind which would fairly understand the present. It is needful for that harmonious culture on which the beauty of character depends. Antiquity has indeed passed away, but it is not wholly dead; beauty, truth and knowledge cannot wholly die.

The intelligible forms of ancient poets
 The fair humanities of old religion,
 The power, the beauty and the majesty
 That had their haunts in dale or piney mountain,
 Or forest by slow stream, or pebbly spring,
 Or chasms and wat'ry depths; all these have vanished.
 They live no longer in the faith of reason!
 But still the heart doth need a language, still
 Doth the old instinct bring back the old names.

* * * *

And even at this day
 'Tis Jupiter who brings whate'er is great,
 And Venus who brings everything that's fair!

It has been said that whatever tends to emancipate us from the present, whether to carry us backward with the historian, or, with the poet, transport us to an ideal future, does something to elevate and dignify our nature. That is a low and narrow mind which is solely occupied with the passing hour. The scholar with his books is in closest communion with the "great living and the great dead," whom at any time he can summon from the niches where they stand enshrined, those "ancient saints," as Bacon calls some of them, "full of true virtue, and that without delusion or imposture." For him they have lived; all their wisdom they lay at his feet. "I no sooner

come into the library," said Heinsius, the librarian at Leyden with mild and beautiful affection for the volumes he had looked upon so much, "but I bolt the door after me, excluding lust, ambition, avarice, and all such vices, whose nurse is idleness, the mother of ignorance and melancholy herself; and in the very lap of eternity, amidst so many divine souls, I take my seat with so lofty a spirit and such sweet content, that I pity all the great and rich who know not this happiness."

Of the best things indeed there may be made the worst use. That which we commend as a just and healthful reverence, the parent of modesty and of wisdom, may possibly degenerate into a slavish and abject worship of objects most grotesque; of everything, indiscriminately, that has the stamp of age or a pretension to excellence. But this is the least likely of two extremes, and, if it exist, will probably be generated by the equally absurd and dangerous extreme of self-conceit and contemptuous rejection of authority. Between an irreverent and a superstitious mind, it is hard to choose. The line that divides them is not very broad; one is sometimes the product of the other. Both lead to intellectual barrenness; to bigotry, to tyranny; to the inquisition or the guillotine. Freedom from superstition is not always obedience to reason. The errors of the past should make us humble, not vain, since we are of the same nature with those whose mistakes we plume ourselves on avoiding. The star-gazer when he falls into the ditch, will neither get out the easier, nor be laughed at the less, because he flattered himself he was avoiding the errors of those dull souls who never saw anything but the dirt beneath their feet.

Rather will we use the treasures of ancient wisdom, than bury them for fear of base metal, or because some have made of them an idol. We will read the old books, we will wander among ancient ruins, we will meditate in the sombre cathedrals, we will rest in the dim cloisters, not to dream away our life there, not to congeal our mind under the immutable forms of antiquity, but that all of the past which is beautiful and good and true may clothe our spirit, that we may wisely estimate the contests of our fathers,—may not have to fight over again the battles which they fought at such bitter expense,—may enter with a filial and grateful spirit into their inheritance; that the infinitesimal present may not wholly engross us, and the dust and din of this noisy workshop do not blind and deafen us to the sights and sounds of beauty which fill the universe.

We venture to suggest, as another point, a practical spirit as of great importance to our scholars. A scholar should ever be imbued

with the spirit of humanity, should despise and spurn all affectation of niceness as if he were not mortal but something far higher. He should ever be ready to apply his mind to the exigencies of the times, as looking for the permanent good of society ; as having a foresight of the evils which threaten, and of the means of avoiding them ; a comprehending and working out the problems of daily life ; as guiding, not following the multitude ; as dwelling upon the essential, the true, the eternal, because of the power which principles, however abstruse, exert when once they fully possess the mind.

They who would portray great actions with most success, must have felt in their own hearts the power of true greatness. Aeschylus became not less sublime, earnest, terrible, by fighting at Salamis. A strong mind indeed pants for enterprise ; to *do* something, not always to think. So common is this, that it sometimes leads to an apparent anomaly in character, and we find the student forsaking his books for some apparently less genial pursuit, when, in fact, he is but satisfying the craving of his soul for that species of culture which books cannot give. "That," says Lord Bacon, "will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nearly and strongly conjoined and united together than they have been,—a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action." To this element of a scholar's life, our times are less adverse than to that which we have just adverted to. Indeed, the lowest practical aims too strongly entice us all. Like children, we are so anxious for the great play or struggle of life, that we can hardly wait to obtain or arrange our panoply, and were Richard Baxter alive, he might, perhaps, be tempted occasionally to repeat the criticism which he made upon certain preachers of his day, that 'they were like the animals which Herodotus speaks of as bred from the slime of the Nile, whose fore feet were pawing before their hind feet were made, and while yet they remained but plain mud.' The truly valuable practical spirit, is that which does not neglect thorough education for the sake of a present advantage, but, with its eye ever on the general good, would yet lead the student to the abstrusest, most recondite investigations ; the practical spirit of thoughtful minds applying the conclusions of their wisdom to the conduct of human affairs—the spirit of profound jurists, of far sighted statesmen, of wise historians.

There is a vulgar notion of the practical and the useful, as if it consisted in that merely which ministers to the physical wants ; or, if above this, that it is confined to the mere logical processes of the mind ; and so have souls of the finest mould, the most pure and beau-

tiful image of their Creator, been cast away with indifference; and nature herself seems liable to the charge of casting her pearls before swine. But, in truth, there often has been a close union between philosophic contemplation and executive skill. Scholars, as a class, have not been deficient in action. They have not always, like the prince of Denmark, had 'the native hue of resolution sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' From the days of Xenophon and Cicero, scholars have not been wanting in every age, great in the cabinet and in the field, as well as in letters.

Still further, all art, all literature, is, in some of its relations, eminently practical. So far as it is an expression of ideas, so far does it tend to diffuse those sentiments, notions, feelings, call them what you please, which are the basis of social and individual action. This is true in that department of literature which has been often called most artificial, most ornamental, written, it has been said, so merely for our pleasure, that its absence has been thought entirely compatible with the fullest and best mental culture. We are rather of those who believe that poetry is of the highest possible *utility*. We sympathize with the words of Sir Philip Sidney, that "poets were the first bringers in of all civility; that no philosopher's precept can sooner make you an honest man than the reading of Virgil." We in part perceive in the noble language of Milton, "what religious, what glorious and magnificent use might be made of poetry, both in divine and human things."

What is practical if that is not so which touches us nearest and deepest; which inspires us to be great and good, elevates us above ourselves, opens to us higher and more glorious regions of thought, snatches us from trivial pursuits, bears us backward to ante-mundane scenes, onward beyond "the flaming bounds of space and time," shows us something of which human genius is capable, and thus makes us respect ourselves the more, because we claim kindred with that genius no virtue of our common humanity, which reveals to us the most subtle, most essential, most comprehensive spirit of times and of peoples. It would indeed be easy to show that from the lofty summits of song, flow down streams to fertilize all the valleys and plains. There is a glory in Shakspeare and Milton that gilds every speaker of the English tongue. What money could purchase from Scotland (were the supposition possible) the fame of Burns? Modern Italy actually buys her daily bread with the cheerful tribute which the civilized world is annually paying to her ancient, or mediaeval art.

No, no, the practical spirit of the scholar has no affinity with the wretched quackery which takes away the charm of childhood by de-

stroying its admiration and wonder, substituting dribblets of natural philosophy and simplified metaphysics, for the instruction of eye and ear and hand and heart, most natural to that age when all the world is new and fresh, forgetting ever that

———A deeper import
Lurks in the legend told our infant years
Than lies upon that truth we live to learn.

Never, in utilitarian anxiety for immediate fame or wealth, or importance, will it send forth as educated, the witling so deplorably ignorant as not to know that in the estimation of wisdom he is a fool. Never will it call the philosopher from his retreat, the historian from his library, the poet from the haunts of the muses, and bid them toil in the public thoroughfares, or do homage to the omnipotent spirit of commerce, but will rather bid them, in the sphere determined by education, and the assignment of Providence, be greatly wise for the public good; will counsel them sometimes even to stand aloof from the enterprises of the majority, by virtue of their station, to warn men against the 'idols of the tribe, the market, the den,' contented, if it be necessary, to bear the reproaches of the violent and unthinking, but striving ever for truth and justice and the public welfare. It is this magnanimous and broadly practical spirit which will give to learning its most extended power, and, without checking the most thorough research, or quenching the fire of passion, or clogging the foot of fancy, will confer upon literature a permanent moral value.

We suggest again that the scholar should cherish a spirit of patriotism. We know how this word has been abused, how it has filled the mouth of "every new protester," till we become ashamed of the empty boast, but there is a profound virtue still in the genuine love of our country, beautiful link as it is in the golden chain of the virtues. An ill omen is it for a nation, that the loyalty of its people is dying out, and instead of the sincere and voluntary homage of affectionate hearts, there remains but a hollow and selfish pretence of regard, as if the State were made wholly for us, and we in no sense for the State. It bodes no good to the letters of a people, when its scholars receive their impulses from foreign nations of diverse laws and customs. And, on the other hand, be a nation couching under the rod of an oppressor, let the home-loving, country-loving spirit of her people be thoroughly awakened, and as surely as she retains intelligence and virtue and courage, her regeneration is sure. She may be Germany under the gigantic dominion of Napoleon,—she will be Germany flinging the fetters to the winds, and standing up in reinvigorated manhood.

There can be no fresh and genial literature which is not redolent of its age and nation. To be more than a spiritless, though perhaps beautiful imitation, it must utter the sentiments of a peculiar people; must be a mirror of their thoughts, passions, speculations, tastes, faith. Every scholar is a debtor to his country, and the tribute which he renders will be 'twice blessed, blessing him who gives and those who receive.' This is not a matter of speculation, but of literary history. Because Luther was intensely German his works are classics, his renown a part of the national treasure. Because Shakspeare was entirely English, because the varied character of a whole people speaks through his mouth, is he enthroned at once the intellectual king and representative of as mighty an empire as the sun ever shone upon. And because both were so strongly national have they become renowned to the world's end. For this very reason do they express feelings common, in a measure, to the universal heart of humanity; since that which lies deepest in our nature is most widely diffused, and what we imagine shut up and concealed in our inmost heart is the 'open secret' of the race. Who detects the very soul and life of things but he who recognizes those presentiments and affections which are all pervading?

It is a grand mistake to suppose that by sweeping away the boundaries of country, we enlarge the capacity of the mind, or give a wider scope to literature. We but substitute the general and the common for the original and peculiar; we increase the surface but diminish the depth. The affections, for their best growth, need the protection of an enclosure, with the natural supports of wholesome laws and customs, with common sympathies and pursuits. The soil and climate of the tropics will not produce the fruits of the temperate zone. Cosmopolitism may have its value, but never without harm to letters, to morals, to all social life, can it usurp the place and functions of the elder virtue. Ancient experience and modern have demonstrated its folly,—how nearly allied to selfishness in morals, how impotent of grand results in literature and in national character. The mind needs something definite to fasten upon, something within the possibility of its grasp, some country in whose fame it is honored, in whose misfortunes it is afflicted, of whose greatness and virtues it may feel a generous admiration, whose glories it may possibly enhance, may certainly help preserve.

He who vilifies the land of his birth, does a wider and more grievous injury than he may suppose. In taking from its glory, he takes from the motives for guarding its welfare; by pronouncing the sentence of its degradation he helps to make it degraded. By an unfilial

temper, he aggravates the evils against which he inveighs and helps not to make the country free, but to throw it more completely under the dominion of whoever may be strong enough to assume the mastery.

Every scholar preëminently owes his head, his heart, his arm to the country which has nurtured him; he owes it to the government itself, whatever be its form, until by extraordinary neglect, by irremediable carelessness of law and obligations, by a wide and nearly unexampled oppression, the limits of which have wisely been left undefined, the government forfeits its claim to the reverence and affection of the subject. Even then, for the country he must labor, to preserve, so far as he can, its high civic, literary, and moral eminence, to give its activities a wise direction, to guard it from the almost insanity to which nations no less than individuals seem sometimes exposed, and when false principles are rife, to restore her if it may be, to the path of rectitude, and therefore of honor. But to desert her, to take the part of her slanderers and enemies, even, or rather *especially* in her dark days, is not magnanimous, but mean and cowardly. For him there can be no other native land; here, or nowhere, must he garner up his hopes. Like another Demosthenes, he may raise his voice of warning and entreaty amidst her dying glories; like another Thucydides, he may portray, earnestly and sorrowfully portray her dissensions, her destructive ambition and lust of foreign conquest, the extinguishing, one after another (if it must be so) of the lights of her civil and commercial glory, and thus, like them, soften the rigor of her calamity, and enlighten, for a little, the night which seems descending, but there in adversity as in honor, is the field of his labor. This responsibility, however, greater to him than to the unthinking, leads him to touch cautiously even the evils of the State; impels him to inquire what are the necessary conditions of patriotism, how far a nation may spread its domains and lose none of that concentration which is necessary to afford an object for the general love, to preserve the national honor and a unity of national character. For him, if for anybody, is history instructive. He remembers that the destruction of Carthage, by taking away one mighty impulse to Roman energy and virtue, did much to weaken the security of the Roman State; he remembers that in the proudest days of that domineering republic, when the world acknowledged her authority, under the tropical sun of universal prosperity were germinating with fearful rapidity the seeds of her destruction.

The truly patriotic spirit is far enough removed from a blind and indiscriminate admiration of all which is ours, as it is from a condemnation of all that belongs to another. It is entirely consistent with a

full recognition of the virtues and the greatness of a foreign State. Although it may be pardonable, in the indulgence of a proper affection, to dwell upon the grand achievements of one's country, yet to be forever prating of our national greatness, is, to say the least, no proof of what we assert. It has not the merit even of pride, the stronger vice, but only of vanity, the weaker. That is not only a false and dangerous, but a low policy, which, at this age of the world, seeks to perpetuate national differences, to carry the bitterness and antipathies of one generation into another, to cultivate hereditary hate. It is peculiarly the part of scholars, even by virtue of their patriotism, looking to the largest and best interests of their respective nations, to cultivate assiduously a friendly spirit. Especially is this becoming in a republic, the genius of whose institutions is professedly so liberal. And if always becoming, where so beautiful as when exercised between two of the mightiest nations, boasting a common ancestry, common laws, a common fame, a common language, liberty, literature, religion? The world is wide enough for the mother and daughter to travel together in harmony, and even occasionally to render each other mutual "aid and comfort." To cultivate, magnify and extend the sympathy between them, is the privilege and duty of him who can command the ear and the heart of both countries. Most pernicious are those productions which systematically aim to dis sever the silken cord which binds such people together. Never to be forgotten, never to be remembered but with gratitude and praise, are those statesmen whose wisdom and magnanimity have removed from such people the prominent excitements of unkindness and hostility.

We venture, as a final characteristic, to allude to a high moral, a religious spirit even, as essential to the highest order of scholars. This may be established by the testimony of history, or as a deduction of philosophy. We use the terms here in no narrow or partial meaning; indeed it is difficult to use words strong enough without seeming to express too much; but it may, we think, be amply demonstrated, not only that a profound and broad literature must represent the religious tone of the nation, but that any people in whom the religious element is weak or deficient, are incapable of producing a literature of strong passion, a deep wisdom, or of enduring power, which will exalt man or honor God. "A hunger-bitten and ideal-less philosophy," to use Coleridge's expression, may "naturally produce a starveling and comfortless religion," but even as surely will a mean religion, much more no religion, produce a shallow literature if it produce any.

He who pursues letters not as a trade (by which both he and they

must be debased), but as a noble and permanent expression of the highest faculties in man, may, by them, be led to serious religious thoughts, but without such thoughts he cannot apprehend his responsibilities, nor recognize the truly grand in life. There are persons indeed of considerable knowledge, who seem to have no conception of anything sublime, of a great character or a truly momentous event. Flippant, dapper creatures, or thoughtless as flies, almost as insignificant and quite as troublesome, they *cannot* be scholars. He who has no dignified conceptions, whose tastes are trivial, whose life is vulgar, however learned, is not wise. The moral element is wanting.

It is as truly the affirmation of philosophy and history as of religion; a truth demonstrated in literature and art, as well as asserted by Revelation, that man is fallen, and, discontented with the present, is ever striving to realize a better future. So does art elevate and idealize the objects which it touches, and fiction portrays characters more magnanimous than history. Humanity is imperfect; it struggles upward to supply the deficiency. No human form equals the beauty of the Apollo, no ancient hero was like Achilles.

All art that deserves the name, in its last analysis, is found strongly imbued with the religious element. It depends for its highest development upon those feelings which can be awakened and sustained by nothing short of the hopes and fears born of the mysterious, limitless, beautiful, terrible future. Never was anything more true than that scepticism is narrow and degrading. It cannot produce a great school in poetry, in painting, in sculpture, or in architecture. It cannot make a heroic people. For such results it is too narrow in its sympathies, too cold and calculating. It may produce skilful mechanics, but not original discoverers or creators. In the pure sciences, it may accomplish something, but even here, the chances are, that its conclusions will be inadequate and unsatisfactory. It will not do much to dignify and render beautiful our race, not much to make us honor it more or feel thankful for its grander characteristics.

There is a close connection between unbelief and intellectual incompetence. The mind that self-complacently refuses to believe what it cannot understand, must of necessity believe very little; and the mind that will allow no mystery in its creed, and pretends to understand everything, really understands nothing. It will not be likely to recognize as real what will not yield to the test of the senses; faith it will resolve into knowledge; and while professing that the demonstrative process is the sole intellectual process worthy of cultivation, it will ever rest upon a second, and material cause; will cheat itself with the fancy that it comprehends substances and powers when it is only re-

peating, like a parrot, the names by which they are designated. It will carve out a log and hew out a stone and worship it as a divinity. The unbelieving and independent priest of reason becomes the devotee of superstition. A religious spirit, which regards the end and not simply the means, is necessary to relieve science itself of its imperfections,—to breathe life into the withered flower, to bid the dead stand up and live. Unless man have faith in spiritual powers before which he is an ignorant and feeble child, unless his philosophy rise above the visible and the tangible, and he feel the dependence of the finite upon the infinite, the seen upon the unseen, the created upon the Creator,—unless he look for his motives and objects beyond “this bank and shoal of time,” and his spirit be touched by the powers of eternity, how can his mind expand to the dimension of those themes which, as a scholar, he is bound to be conversant with? Of necessity he must fall below the tone of feeling requisite for the appreciation of the grand and beautiful in human life, and in nature itself; he will be a poor critic and a false prophet. As a statesman or a moralist, in natural philosophy as truly as in spiritual, he will carry the seeds of error and confusion.

Is it not the moral tone of literature, from Aeschylus and Plato downward, which gives it its true grandeur? How have the great bards ever been imbued with the ethical spirit! What but this has carried them to the profoundest depths, has bid them soar on boldest wing, has imparted to them a permanent interest, the same from age to age, unharmed by fashion, by caprice, by revolutions? Is it not precisely this which gives the prince of the modern drama his strongest hold on the heart? In his Tragedies, the mind is hurried away from its temporal, economical calculations, by the vast current of thought and feeling sweeping on towards the ultimate destiny of existence. Life is rendered dignified, awful, by its relations to infinite results. To teach morality is not the object of Shakspeare; but in some of his scenes there is the essence of a thousand homilies, and it is this solemn spirit, answering to the hopes, the fears, the trembling solicitude of the universal heart of the race, which informs those great works and makes them speak to every human soul. The catastrophe of each can be explained and justified only in reference to futurity, and thence it happened that the sceptical ages of English history were those in which this great poet sank comparatively out of sight; they knew him not. Hence, too, in the department of criticism, he has received the severest treatment at the hands of that nation whose lack of faith is their intellectual, no less than their moral curse.

Another consideration of no small consequence is, that many of the profoundest questions of the day, those to which the mind of every

scholar should be awake, are those in which the moral element is most prominent. The great problems in philosophy, in government, in philanthropy, not only cannot be solved, but cannot even be intelligently approached, but by a serious and earnest mind. There are grave questions to be determined in our day. It is not very wild to presume that the immense extension of our control over physical agents, the annihilation of distances, the throwing open to civilization of hitherto untouched domains, the increase of international sympathy, the wide-flowing currents of population pressing upon the heels of the pioneers, the unsettled elements of governments, the activity and energy of popular will—that all these, to say nothing of profounder moral facts, betoken at some time a vehement strife of opinion, to be paralleled, it may be, in former times, but not probably surpassed. Nor is it very difficult to see that many of the questions likely to arise are essentially religious in their grand characteristics. They are such as the authority and sanctions of law, the relations of governments and of governed, the conflict or the harmony of reason and faith, the means and the objects of philanthropy,—not to speak of those which pertain more especially to the nature, relations, and prospects of the church. In these wide subjects, the practical and the speculative meet. We cannot shrink from at least entertaining these questions, without forfeiting our rights as scholars; for whether we regard them or not, they will occupy the public attention, and a favorable or disastrous judgment will be pronounced. Themes beyond the apprehension of the undevout are ever present to the religious student; themes, before which those of ordinary concern, yes, and the grandest and saddest of secular history fade entirely from our vision. For him there is antiquity which the other has never thought of, and a future which no imagination has ventured to depict.

We may approach the same conclusion by another road. It has been generally conceded, that no study demands a broader mind, a profounder philosophy, or a better acquaintance with practical affairs than the really thorough study of history. But in most of the great epochs for the last 1800 years, the religious element has been most prominent,—the era of Gregory the Great, of Hildebrande, of Innocent III, of the Crusades, of the Reformation, of the English Commonwealth,—periods which no contemptuous, sneering spirit can comprehend, still less assign their true value in the progress of the race. Ever since the birth of Christianity, that gentle and subtle but mighty element has been working at the heart of all the activities of the civilized world. Everything that we see or hear is touched by it. The painting, the statue, the cathedral, the poem, the history, the oration, all are informed

with ideas that the old heathen never dreamed of. Nay, more: every dwelling house, with its comfortable and modest adjustments, every rail-road, every commonest and most practical arrangement of social life, bespeak the presence and activity of spiritual principles, such as the ancients never knew. What then are the anticipations, sentiments, speculations, faith, all that goes to make up the *intellectual* life of the modern? Are they not modified by the religious element of the times? And can literature, which is one expression of these sentiments, be truly interpreted, can there be a profound and philosophical criticism, without a mind in harmony with this all-pervading, plastic power? Even more certain, without such a mind, will be the impossibility of forming a just estimate of the great historical periods, or of seeing anything but a loose and purposeless flux and reflux in the strange currents of human affairs. The progress of the race will become an impracticable, but not harmless dream, or be resolved into a fixed cycle, where the *magnus saeculorum-ordo* shall bring round again, after a while, the same series of madness, and follies, and crimes. The mind which rests its hope, not in a fluctuating present, nor in a visionary future, but in the expressed purpose of Providence, will alone have security against disappointment. We cannot fully understand the parts without knowing something of the whole. Had the historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, to his gigantic learning but added a devout spirit, what an insight would it not have given him into the philosophy of his grand and melancholy theme! How it would have checked his sneering scepticism and rendered his work a more sublime monument to his genius, as well as more wholesome and safe. Had the moral tone of the historian of England but equalled the intellectual acuteness, how much broader, fairer, and profounder would have been both the investigations and the conclusions of his work; how much stronger his sympathy with moral and religious heroism, of which there were within his scope examples so abundant; how much more genial and earnest his care for human welfare; how much nobler his sentiments! With all the acuteness of that subtle genius, there was wanting the moral sympathies absolutely essential for estimating fairly a nation like the English, as truly as for judging wisely of the progress and the hopes of humanity.

We have thus endeavored to detail some of the elements of a scholar's life, mainly as springing from his most prominent relations,—his relations to truth, to his fellow men, to his country, and to God, in order to fix a little more definitely than may be usual, the spirit which we should bring to study, or, as scholars, carry into the business of life; the spirit with which every professional man, and every lover of learn-

ing should pursue his course, in order to leave the best impress upon his age, since it cannot but be of consequence to any people to secure a right aim and temper to its learned men. For the proper training of educated men, we must look mainly to our colleges and universities. We cannot create a literature by a wish or a word, or by long discourses. This is not the place to discuss the importance or the responsibilities of our highest institutions of education, yet from them have descended the strongest and best influences upon learning, and it is no mean element in our prosperity that they be liberally sustained and wisely guided. So far as these elements of a scholar's life are violated, or become depressed and despised and neglected, will his prevailing tendencies bear evidence of it. The best days of literature have been those in which were cherished sentiments most elevated, pure, patriotic, religious, and in proportion as these have failed, intellectual strength has fallen too. Sentiments which one age would have been ashamed to utter, have become the common possession of the next, but the loss of virtue has ever been the loss of life and energy.

Unfortunate for our institutions, and the best interests of sound learning will be the day when educated men neglect the high aims which, in all circumstances, even in those most adverse to letters, they are bound faithfully to cherish, or at least to remember and revere; the spirit of one familiar with great thoughts, refined, elevated, gentle, earnest, devout; the spirit which attended on Dante as he wandered, an exile, from the door of one reluctant patron to another; which went with Spenser to wild, distracted Ireland; and solaced Raleigh in prison. No learning, no skill, no measure of talent can afford the least substitute for this. There is nothing truly great in letters to be hoped for without it. Nay, without it, we almost shrink from learning itself, as from the earthy touch of Caliban, or the deadly evil of Iago.

Indeed it is no mean, no common thing to be a scholar. He may receive little public favor, the outward incidents of his life may be the briefest and least note-worthy, yet he may have fixed the laws of the world's thought for ages. Because of him, empires may flourish or go to premature decay, and, century after city and tower have sunk to their primitive dust, his name may hallow the very ground on which they stood. The ruined Parthenon has a beauty quite distinct from its exquisite symmetry, when we call to mind Aeschylus and Sophocles; we walk along the sands of the Troad with a fresher step when we know that once Homer passed along there. We stand upon the pyramid with a more thoughtful and solemn spirit, when we remember that *perhaps* the foot of Plato once pressed the same summit, and his eye looked off to Memphis and old Thebes.

A scholar's life is inward and spiritual, but not therefore ineffective. It is invisible, and its power may not be at once detected. Thoughts and feelings, sufferings and enjoyments, these records of the mind and heart, we are not anxious to protrude to the common gaze. They are the sacred treasure of the man, and when messengers from foreign kings come to him he is not, like the Hebrew monarch, so vain as to carry them through the secret chambers of his glory and power. How little do we know of the inner life of him who, when he was a young man, went from his native Stratford, lived carelessly with his fellow-players, wrote his thirty-seven dramas, then went quietly back again to the banks of the beautiful Avon, and spent serenely the remainder of his days; or of that other bard sublime who, blind and deserted, solaced the sad evening of his hopes with visions of immortality. In the common affairs which men call great, they had little share, and those faculties by which they wrought their work upon earth, were as much a mystery to themselves as to others; but in what civilized land, in whatever so remote age, will their power be unacknowledged? Great scholars speak to all time. What is earthly in them goes down to the common grave of mortality; their better part lives forever. Plato, in the *Critias*, still argues of obedience to the law; in the *Phaedo*, of immortality. Cicero discourses on old age, on friendship, on oratory. Kepler and Newton will hold their schools down to the end of time; Bacon, always propound his aphorisms; Butler, to the latest age, discourse on the Analogy. *Fit* audience shall they all find, speaking ever to the choicest minds. Those kings and priests of learning, we may follow, afar off indeed, but with true loyalty and faith. The aims of every true-hearted scholar of even the humblest pretensions, are the same with theirs. To be of large mind, of broad sympathies, to comprehend, if possible, art, science, practice, life itself; to bring a unity into the various branches of knowledge, to raise the public tastes, direct the public thought, conserve the public welfare,—these are the purposes, this the spirit of both.

In a country like ours, whose activities are so various and so intense, where public virtue is so universal that you cannot find a man afraid or unwilling to assume any responsibility, *ne quid detrimenti respublica caperet*, it is the more important as it may be more difficult, to see to it that learning loses none of its honor, and in order that it should not, that scholars should cultivate the best spirit, should never forget that their mission is to be sacredly joined to every other. Learning has been often opposed and its institutions suffered to languish in want, or actually to die from inanition, on account of low prejudices against knowledge, or a blind fear that it would oppose some vulgar

interest. These prejudices and fears may be, in part at least, allayed, if the life and temper of learned men be as they should be. A serious, solid, intellectual training is necessary to form a man. From the sacred fountains of wisdom shall exhale blessings to descend upon every occupation of life when least regarded, fructifying as the genial dews from heaven. What can be more beautiful, more ennobling, than thus to study with patience, with modesty, reverence, striving, with highest purpose, to realize the fable of Isis and Osiris, which Milton puts into language which no one should be foolhardy enough to mar by alteration, "to bring together every joint and member of truth, and mould them into an immortal figure of loveliness and perfection," bringing the fruits of his toil and laying them, with a filial spirit, at the feet of that Alma Mater, his country, which has produced and cherished him, and above all mindful of his highest relations, taking for his motto that on the seal of our oldest university, *Christo et ecclesiae*, and ever remembering, in the noble language of the poet we have just referred to, that "THE END OF LEARNING IS TO REPAIR THE RUINS OF OUR FIRST PARENTS, BY REGAINING TO KNOW GOD ARIGHT, AND OUT OF THAT KNOWLEDGE TO LOVE HIM, TO IMITATE HIM, TO BE LIKE HIM, AS WE MAY THE NEAREST BY POSSESSING OUR SOULS OF TRUE VIRTUE, WHICH, BEING UNITED TO THE HEAVENLY GRACE OF FAITH, MAKES UP THE HIGHEST PERFECTION."

ARTICLE VII.

ENGLISH PURITANISM IN THE TIMES OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

An Abstract of "Anglia Rediviva, or England's Recovery, by Joshua Sprigge, pp. 385. London, 1647."

Prepared by Edward D. Neill, Home Missionary in North Western Illinois.

THE life of Cromwell, and the history of England during the interval between the reigns of Charles the father and Charles the son, are two books yet to be written. The literary world, tired of the numberless tirades that have appeared from the defenders of the Puritan as well as of the Cavalier, is longing for some Niebuhr to arise and sift out the truth from the chaff of falsehood, and give to them a sober, truthful, readable history of that remarkable period.

Thomas Carlyle has done a great work for the future historian, in collecting and editing the speeches of the "Great Puritan;" but he is such a passionate admirer of the man that, at times, his comments degenerate into pure rodomantade, reminding one of the almost semi-deification that John Wesley sometimes receives from our Methodist Itinerants in the valley of the Upper Mississippi. There is some truth in a remark made by a reviewer of Carlyle's work, in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* for April, 1847: "It is worthy of note that however Mr. Carlyle extols his 'heroic ones' in a body, Cromwell is the only individual that finds a good word, throughout the work."

A perusal of the work whose title we have placed at the head of this Article, imparts a truthfulness and reality to those times, which we never experienced while turning over the pages of Guizot or Carlyle.

It is doubly valuable to those who glory in being descended from the English Puritans, from the fact that it was written by a non-conformist minister and published in London, before the elder Charles lost his head, and before the breach between the Presbyterian and Independent party was widened. The author, Joshua Sprigge, was chaplain in the new model army, at the same time as valiant Hugh Peters of New England memory, and pious Richard Baxter. Sprigge acted as chaplain to Sir Thomas Fairfax; Peters, to the train that was commanded by Lieut. Gen. Hammond; and Baxter, to the regiment of Col. Whalley. The book is divided into four parts, and gives a minute and circumstantial account of the daily operations of the Parliament army from April, 1645, to December, 1646. The account of Naseby Battle, in the "Historical Collections" of Rushworth, is abridged from "*Anglia Rediviva*," as we learn from Carlyle, whose opinion of the book is in these words: "a rather ornate work; gives florid but authentic and sufficient account of this new model army, in all its features and operations, by which 'England' had 'come alive again.' A little sparing in dates, but correct where they are given. None of the old books is better worth reprinting."

These old Puritan books can never cease to be sacred to the descendants of Adams, Henry, and Jefferson, for to their pages they often turned while struggling for the independence of this land. When the news of the Boston Port-Bill arrived at Williamsburgh, at that time the capital of the Virginia colony, a resolution was introduced and adopted by the House of Burgesses, then in session, fixing the 1st of June as a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer. Thomas Jefferson remarks: "No example of such a solemnity had existed since the days of our distresses in the war of '55, since which a new gene-

ration had grown up. With the help of *Rushworth*, whom we rumaged over for the revolutionary precedents and forms of the *Puritans of those days*, preserved by him, we cooked up a resolution somewhat resembling the phrases, for appointing the 1st of June, on which the Port-Bill was to commence, for a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer, to implore Heaven to avert from us the evils of civil war, and to inspire us with firmness in support of our rights, and to turn the hearts of the king and parliament to moderation and justice."

Rushworth was the secretary of Fairfax, and introduced an abridgment of Sprigge into his Collection, probably because he was the most accurate writer of that day. No doubt the account of Naseby battle was often perused by the founders of the American Republic, and we feel quite sure that copious extracts from the pages of "*Anglia Rediviva*" will not render this Journal any the less valuable as a "*Bibliotheca Sacra*" to the Puritan scholar and divine of the nineteenth century.

We now hasten to give to the reader some of the passages in the work, that are peculiar for quaintness or historical minuteness. Before the Dedication, there is "An Apologie. To his Excellencie Sir Thomas Fairfax." It speaks for itself, and we transcribe the greater part of it. In this instance, we shall not alter the spelling and pointing common at that time.

"Sir, It may be thought neither Justice nor Gratitude, That this Book is not dedicated to your Name, for your great merit and interest in the subject of it." * * * * "The truth is, This being but the Picture of that Wisedome and Courage, and what more of God did appear in You; I dare not present it to you, being not drawn to the life. But when moreover I consider of the Kingdoms interest in these things done, and more particularly the Parliament's, who set you on work; I am fully satisfied That if the right of Dedication be yours, yet the debt of Patronage (which is Onus as well as Honos; a Care as well as a Curtesie) I am sure is theirs; For though You are the Person by whom; yet it is the Publike, 'tis the Parliament for whom these Things have been done; And therefore the justice seems to be on that side, that They should take the Services off your Hands, and own and avouch them as having been done in Their name and by their authority. * * * * My only prayer for you is, That as you have seen much of God in the action, so you may live to see proportionably of God in Us, in the improvement of them, and that you may taste as much of God in the Kingdomes Peace, as you have in the Kingdomes Warres."

The Dedication is "To all True English Men," and is a most florid piece of composition, and abounds in parentheses, as often as the apostle Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

It begins: "My dear Country-men; (For to you I direct this story; for it is yours: In your land were these battles fought; these actions done for your sakes, (the vindication and defence of your Parliament, laws, and liberties) and by your hands.) You, that have with bleeding hearts, and distilling eyes, been spectators of, and common sufferers under the insulting paces of arbitrary power, and unlimited prerogative; and have felt the twinging convulsions, and violent concussions of the same; and at last (to accomplish your misery and your exactors sins) have had a cup of blood prepared for you (by divine ordination indeed, (and so righteously;) but immediately put upon you by the lusts of those, whom God for your sins, had given up to these things;) and have been drinking thereof these three years and more, (I pray God it hath passed from you.) Only, at present, God hath taken it out of your hands, (though we see not, yet, he hath made your enemies drink the dregs of it.) I cannot but hope and expect, that as those feet have been beautiful that brought you the retail tidings of your expiring warfare; so that hand that shall transmit the series of them to your view, shall not want his due proportion of benevolent acceptance." After a quotation from Virgil, he offers an apology that his book is "no fairer and no fresher."

"For the first, I may say of the actions of this army, in a good proportion of truth, what was said in another case: If they had been all largely expressed such a volume could not have contained them; for as in populous cities, especially if of great wealth and trading, houses are thwackt together without those liberties of gardens and orchards, which country villages are accommodated with; even so, in the story of this Army, into which so many great and glorious actions, and births of Providence have thronged, to make it rich and glorious by the mutual projections of their lights, you cannot expect to have such elbow-room of expression, and accommodation of words as in more single stories." * * * *

"For the latter" (that it is no fresher) "Should this story have been adorned with such artificial stuff of feigned speeches, prosopoeias and epistrophes, etc., it might find better access to some ears. But whether it be not the glory of the strong, not to need the trappings of words I make not question at all. Truth is that, which is the commendation of history." * * * * Well said, Joshua! would be the exclamation of Carlyle at such remarks. The dedication is concluded

with some reflections "first, concerning the Action, secondly, concerning the Instruments, and lastly concerning the Author, God."

We are now prepared for the history itself. The quarrel between the king and parliament, is thus described in the fourth section of Chap. 1st, Part 1st. "The king, with his unhappy counsellors and courtiers, who had promised themselves to be petty tyrants under him, had driven on far, and well near accomplished the great design of an absolute, arbitrary and tyrannical government. The popish and prelatical party fall in for their interest, hoping by this means to usher in the long-wished for alteration of religion within this and the neighboring kingdoms. The troubles of Scotland, and the parliaments of both kingdoms ensuing thereupon, the execution of Strafford, and prosecution of his companions and partizans, unexpectedly cross and interrupt this grand design. Many ways are attempted, many practices are set on foot, every stone is turned, the armies of both nations, English and Scotch, are tampered with to overthrow the proceedings and power of the parliament. And when all these ways proved unsuccessful, secret practices and bands are set on foot in Scotland, a rebellion is raised in Ireland, and in the end the king attempts to seize the persons of some eminent members of both houses, and by an example not to be paralleled in the story of any age, comes himself in person, accompanied with a band of ruffians to take five of the members of commons by force out of that house. 'As divers soldiers and other loose people flocked to court, so many well affected citizens and others testified their affection in a voluntary way, for the preservation of their persons and privileges. *These called the others Cavaliers, and they termed these Round-Heads*, whence arose those two names, whereby in common talk the two parties were in this war, by way of nickname, distinguished.

"The parliament, upon the attempt of violence on their members sitting in the parliament, having for the present in an orderly way, by the assistance of the Trained Bands of the city of London, procured for the security of their members, that they might sit and consult safely in parliament, considering the many practices of force that had been attempted against them and their authority, in order to the subversion of their religion, laws and liberties, desire the king that the militia might be in such hands as both houses of parliament should name and appoint. Hereupon the king withdraws himself, refuses to settle the militia according to the desire of his parliament, endeavors to seize on Hull and the magazine there, but is prevented; sends into the Low Countries for cannon, arms and ammunition, which after

it arrived was landed not far from Hull, and began the body of an army under the name of a guard, for his person at York; sets up his standard at Nottingham, and declared open war against his parliament.

‘Blood had already dyed
The king’s stained sword, and God did well provide
That there the mischief should begin, and we
First suffer wrong. Let no man call our arms,
Offensive wars; but for received harms,
Our country’s just revenging ire.’”

These lines the reader acquainted with the Latin poets of the first century of the Christian era, will recognize as a free translation of a portion of Lucan’s *Pharsalia*. The original is,

“Jam tetigit sanguis pollutos
Caesaris enses :
Dii melius, belli tulimus
Quod dama priores;
Cœperit inde nefas —
— Nec dicier arma Senatus
Bella superba decet, Patriæ
Sed vindicis iram.”

The concluding part of the first chapter also gives an interesting account of

The Formation of the New Model Army.

Having given a brief account of the former armies under the command of Essex, Waller and Manchester, and their want of success, he remarks, “The cause hereof the parliament was tender of ravelling into, only men could not be hindered from venting their opinions privately, and their fears, which were various and variously expressed, whereof I determine nothing, but this I would only say, *God’s time to deliver England was not yet come*. The parliament in prudence (says Carlyle “with Roman dignity”) waving a strict inquiry into the cause of these things, applied themselves to seek out the remedy which was most necessary. There being not only no other comparable, but scarce any other means at all that presented itself to them, this New Model was propounded, a design that carried danger enough in the front of it, both in respect to disobliging those at home, and giving advantage to the enemy abroad while we were without an army, or at least whilst our army was all in pieces. As desperate cures requires desperate remedies, so do they often prove very successful, as this has done beyond all expectation, God having in most fair and

great characters written upon it 'that it was his design,' and thereby owned both the counsel and counsellors.

"The New Model thus resolved on, is gone in hand withal; and now where to find a general puts them all to a stand, till by a strange Providence, without any premeditation or design, Sir Thomas Fairfax was nominated."

Chapter second of part first is full of interest, but our limits allow us only to transcribe with abridgment.

Fairfax and Cromwell.

"Sir Thomas Fairfax, eldest son of Lord Fairfax, of Denton, in the county of York, martially disposed from his youth, not finding action suitable to him in his own country, and there being employment in Holland, went over thither." Having returned and married, "he was entrusted by his country to prefer a petition to his majesty, the scope of which was to beseech him to hearken to his parliament. Which petition the king refusing, he pressed with that instance and intention, following the king so close, till at last he tendered the same upon the pommel of his saddle. But finding no propitiatory here, and seeing a war could not be avoided, he early paid the vows of his martial dedication, and so soon as these unhappy troubles broke forth, took a commission under his father, Ferdinando L. Fairfax. Now how delightfully remarkable is it, if God shall make him, who was by the king rejected in his mild endeavors to prevent the troubles of the land by a petition, a most powerful instrument of restoring peace by the sword. It was the first of April, 1645, ere parliament granted his commission, and the third of April he went from London to Windsor to see, and personally assist in the framing of a new army. He went in a private manner, purposely avoiding that pomp which usually accompanies a general into the field. His excellency continued until the last of April in that work. While the army lay about Windsor forming and fitting for the field, prince Rupert with the king's main force lay about Worcester and the frontiers of Wales. The king's person with most of the train and some of the foot being in Oxford, a convoy of horse reputed about ten thousand, was ordered from Worcester to fetch them off from Oxford. Upon advertisement whereof, the committee of both kingdoms wrote to the general to intercept the convoy. The charge of this service they recommended particularly to

Cromwell.

"Cromwell looking on himself as now discharged of military employment, by the new ordinance which was to take effect within few

days,¹ was the night before come to Windsor from his service in the west, to kiss the general's hand and take leave of him, when in the morning ere he was out of his chamber, those commands than which he thought of nothing less in all the world came to him from the committee of both kingdoms.

"This gentleman, a member of the house of commons, long famous for godliness and zeal to his country, of great note for his service in the house, accepted of a commission at the very beginning of this war. He served his country faithfully, and it was observed God was with him, and he began to be renowned, insomuch that men found that the narrow room whereunto his first employments had confined their thoughts, must be enlarged to an expectation of greater things and higher employments, whereunto Divine providence had designed him for the good of this kingdom. When the time therefore drew near that he as the rest had done, should lay down his commission, upon a new ordinance; the house considering how God had blessed their affairs under his hand, thought fit to dispense with his absence from the house."

Carlyle commenting upon Sprigge, remarks, "His words are no doubt veracious; yet there is trace of evidence that Cromwell's continuance in the army had, even by the framers of the self-denying ordinance, been considered a thing possible, a thing desirable." (Preface to letter twelfth.)

The Taking of Bletchington House, April 24, 1645.

The governor here was Colonel Windebank. Cromwell faced the house "with horse and dragoons, and summoned the governor with a sharp message (our soldiers casting out words for the foot to fall on, as if there had been foot in readiness). The answer was required to be instantly given, or else he must expect the greatest severity. The governor doubting relief from Oxford, rendered the house with all the arms and ammunition. Thus God was with our New Model, or rather a branch of it. Which was by the enemy esteemed of such evil consequence to their affairs, and so great an affront, since it was done by the *New Model*, as they scornfully termed this army, that they could not tell which way to redeem their honors, but by calling the governor to a council of war, whom they condemned to be shot to death. Much means was used for the sparing of his life; but notwithstanding the great interest secretary Windebank, his father, had

¹ The Self-Denying Ordinance, see Carlyle's Cromwell.—E. D. N.

at court, for the service he had done the church of Rome, he could not prevail for a pardon."

The first of May the New Model army began its march under Fairfax, and under severe discipline, as the result of a council of war near Andover fully shows. "The general, to lay an early foundation of good success, in the punishment of former disorders, and prevention of future misdemeanors, caused a council of war to be called the morning they marched from Andover, a mile from the town. The several regiments were drawn up, and the council tried several offenders for their lives. A renegado, and four more officers of the mutiny in Kent were cast, one of which with the renegado, were executed upon a tree at Wallop, in the way of the army's march, *in terrorem*. And the next day was proclamation made through the army, that it should be death for any man to plunder."¹

By the fourteenth of May the main army arrived at Newbury. "In their march, besides exemplary justice done to a rude soldier (as upon two before), and other things of particular note, there was one passage of great wisdom and condescension in the general. When the duty became so hard to some of the regiments as, each other day to bring up the rear, the general's own regiment claiming a privilege to march always in the van, which was convenient now to be waved for the relief; but they being unwilling thereunto, the general instead of severe discipline, alighted himself, and marched on foot at the head of his regiment about two miles, and so brought up the rear. To this day his regiment takes the turn upon all duties, a thing if rightly considered, nothing to their dishonor, and redounding much to the good of the army; there being not any one thing that more frequently and certainly breeds distempers and causes mutinies, than claiming of privileges, and insisting thereon in time of service."

Reflections at the close of the account of Naseby Battle.

"That it may the better appear of how great consequence this victory was to the whole kingdom, let us take a view of it. Suppose we behold it through the counter prospective of the contrary event, as if the enemy had had the victory, and we been beaten. Then methinks I see not only this army, the guardian of the kingdom, lying on a heap, furnishing the enemy with insulting trophies, but also our party in the West ruined, and the enemy there like a violent torrent carrying all before him. Methinks I see the king and Goring united, making

¹ In the French revolution of June, 1848, the citizens made a similar proclamation. In the suburbs of Paris was written, "Death to Robbers."—E. D. N.

a formidable army and marching up to the walls of London, encouraging their soldiers, as formerly, with the promise of the spoil of that famous city. And if this success had been indulged them, and London not denied, what could have ensued worse or more? When once that city, by such a fate, had restored an emblem of undone Rome, when Caesar came against it,

'The Senate shook, the affrighted Fathers leave
Their seats, and flying, to the Consuls give
Directions for the war; where safe to live.
What place t' avoid they know not, whether ere
A blest-ripe wit could guide their steps, they bear
Th' amazed people forth in troops, whom nought
So long had stirred.'

All this did God mercifully prevent by the success of that battle, and turned over this condition to the enemy, and thereby laid the happy foundation of all the blessed success we have had since. He that shall not, in this victory, look beyond the instrument, will injuriously withhold from God his due. He that doth not behold God in the instruments, will not know how to give him his due; for when he doth actions by instruments, his glory is to be seen in the instruments. Now had I only to deal with actions, I might possibly give an account of them; but who may undertake to represent the lively frame of an heightened soul, and the working of the affections in such heroic actions. The general, a man subject to the like infirmities of body as well as passions of mind with other men, especially to some infirmities contracted by former wounds, which however at other times they may hinder that illustrious and puissant soul that dwells within, from giving a character of itself in his countenance; yet, when he hath come upon action, or been near an engagement, it hath been observed another spirit hath come upon him, another soul hath looked out at his eyes. I mean, he hath been so raised, elevated, and transported, as that he hath been not only unlike himself, but indeed more like an angel than a man." It is hardly necessary to remind the "gentle reader," that our good friend Joshua is now excited. "And this was observed of him at this time: now with what triumphs of faith, with what exultation of spirit, and with what a joint shout of all the affections God is received into that heart, whose eye he uses as an optick to look through, itself is only privy to! What high transactions, what deep and endearing engagements pass mutually between God and such a soul!

"One passage relating to Lieut. Gen. Cromwell's service in this bat-

tle, which I received from those that knew it, I shall commend to this history. He had the charge and ordering of all the horse cast upon him by the general unexpectedly, but a little before the battle, which he had no sooner received, but it was high time to apply himself to the discharge of it; for before the field-officers could give a tolerable account of the drawing up of the army, the enemy came on, arraigned in passing good order; which the lieutenant general perceiving, was so far from being dismayed at it, that it was the rise and occasion of a most triumphant faith and joy in him, expecting that God would do great things by small means, and by the things that are not, bring to nought the things that are. A happy time, when the Lord of Hosts shall make his tabernacle in the hearts and countenances of our chief commanders."

The God of the Roundheads.

Among other spoils taken from the royalists, "there was brought to the head-quarters a wooden image, in the shape of a man, and in such form as they blasphemously called it the God of the Roundheads; and this they carried, in scorn and contempt of our army, in a public manner, a little before the battle began."

The Siege of Leicester

Is familiar to those acquainted with the life of Bunyan. In his biography it is stated that he was a soldier in the new model army, and was drawn, with others, to go to the siege, but when he was about to march, another expressed a desire to take his place, Bunyan consented, and the poor volunteer was shot. Our author tells a wonderful story, at the end of his account, of the re-taking of Leicester by the Parliament army. "It is concerning colonel Thomas, a Welchman and a Papist, who was slain at Naseby. The next day after the king had taken Leicester by storm, he came to the gaol, where the prisoners they had taken were put, and called for them, and commanded such as were willing to serve the king, to come to one side of the room. Divers of them coming, he commands them, one by one, to kneel down and swear this oath: 'By Jesus, I will serve the king,' which some did. Not satisfied, he required them to swear: ' * * * , I will serve the king,' affirming publicly that he was not fit to serve, that refused. They refusing, he drew his sword, cut them in the head, in the arms, and in other parts of the body, wounding them most cruelly."

The Storming of Bridgewater.

" On the Lord's day, July 20, Mr. [Hugh] Peters, in the forenoon, preached a preparation sermon, to encourage the soldiers to go on. Mr. Bowles, likewise, did his part in the afternoon. After both sermons, the drums beat and the army was drawn out into the field. The commanders of the forlorn hope, who were to begin the storm, and the soldiers, being drawn together, were there also exhorted afresh, to do their duties with undaunted courage and resolution, by Mr. Peters, who did it, as one says of him, '*tam Marte quam Mercurio.*' As soon as it grew dark, the soldiers drew every one to their several posts. The sign when the storm was to begin was the shooting off three pieces of ordnance. On Monday, July 22, about two of the clock in the morning, the storm began. Our forlorn hope was manfully led on by Lieut. Col. Hewson. The bridges prepared to pass over the moat, were quickly brought to the ditch and thrown in, on which the soldiers, with little loss, got over the deep ditch, and, with undaunted courage, mounted the enemy's works, beat them from their ordnance, and let down their draw-bridge, which made many of their foot instantly cry 'quarter ! quarter !' * * * * *

" Tuesday, July 22, at two of the clock in the afternoon, the general sent to the governor a trumpet with a message to this purpose : That his denial of fair terms [the day before] had wrought in him no other thoughts but of compassion towards those that were innocent, who otherwise might suffer through the governor's obstinacy. He also signified his noble pleasure, that all women and children that would accept of this liberty, should come out of the town by four of the clock in the afternoon, which being made known to them, the governor's lady and others came out. They were no sooner come forth, but our cannon played fiercely into the town, grenades and slugs of hot iron were shot in abundance, whereby several houses in the town were fired. The wind, being high, increased the flame, the townsmen within were in great distraction, the enemy in great amazement, and the governor so far melted as to send forth Tom Elliot, in haste, to desire to know the general's terms." After Tom Elliot had passed messages between the governor and the general several times, terms were agreed upon ; and, continues Sprigge,

" On Wednesday, July 23, the town was surrendered, about 1000 officers and soldiers, besides gentlemen and malignant clergy, having marched out as prisoners."

On the next sabbath the army rested at Martock, and observed as a day of thanksgiving for the success at Bridgewater.

The Storming of Bristol

occupies the whole of Chap. 4th, Part Second, and contains the correspondence between Fairfax and prince Rupert, Cromwell's letter to parliament, also a letter of condolence to their unsuccessful brethren, the Scots. We are informed that on Friday, August 29th, "a fast was kept through the army, to seek God for a blessing upon the designs against Bristol. Mr. Del and Mr. Peters kept the day, at the head-quarters. After the public exercises, a council of war was called. It being agreed upon, in the first place, to punish the vices of the army, it was then propounded, 'Whether to storm Bristol or not?' The debate was long, opinions various; however, it was agreed that all things should be prepared in order to a storm, and afterwards to take into further consideration whether to storm or entrench the leaguer. In the midst of these thoughts and resolutions, tidings were brought of the defeat given to our brethren, the Scots. *****

Lord's day, Aug. 31. Captain Moulton, admiral for the Irish coast, who was now come into the Severn, came from aboard his ship to the general, and expressed much readiness to assist in the storming of the city with his seamen. Tuesday, Sept. 2. A council of war being called, and all the colonels present, after a long debate, Whether to storm Bristol or no, it was put to the question and resolved in the affirmative." For the manner of the storm, it was referred to a committee, who were ordered to report, in writing, the next morning. "Accordingly, Wednesday, Sept. 3d, the manner of the storm was presented, in writing, to the general, which was to be after this manner." (The details, our space will not permit.) "The manner of the storm being agreed upon, the soldiers were drawn out to try their inclination, than in whom more joy, courage, and resolution could not appear in men." "At this council of war it was also agreed, that a letter should be written, and subscribed by the general and all the officers, to general Leven, to express how sensible they were of the losses their forces had received in Scotland, by Montrose," etc. The letter is as follows.

"May it please your excellency and the rest, honored friends and beloved brethren: We have, not without much grief, received the sad report of your affairs in Scotland; how far God, for his best and secret ends, hath been pleased to suffer the enemy to prevail there. And are (we speak unfeignedly) not less sensible of your evils, than you have been of ours, nor than we are of our own. The greater cause of sympathy have we with you, and the more do our bowels yearn towards you, because whatever you now suffer yourselves, in your own kingdom, are chiefly occasioned by your assisting us in ours,

against the power that was risen up against the Lord himself and his anointed ones. Wherefore we cannot forget your labors of love, but thought good at this season, even amongst our many occasions, to let you know, that when the affairs of this kingdom will possibly dispense with us, the parliament allowing, and you accepting of our assistance, we shall be most willing, if need so require, to help and serve you faithfully in your own kingdom, and to engage ourselves to suppress the enemy there, and to establish you again in peace. In the mean time, we shall endeavor to help you by our prayers, and to wrestle with God for one blessing of God upon both nations, between whom, besides many other strong relations and engagements, we hope the unity of spirit shall be the surest bond of peace. And this, whatever suggestions or jealousies may have been to the contrary, we desire you would believe, as you shall ever really find to proceed from integrity of heart, a sense of your sufferings, and a full purpose to answer any call of God to your assistance, as become your Christian friends and servants in the Lord." To this are attached the names of Fairfax, Cromwell, and twenty-three other officers. The next day, Sept. 4th, the general sent the following into Bristol.

"For his highness, prince Rupert : Sir, For the service of parliament, I have brought their army before the city of Bristol, and do summon you, in their names, to render it, with all the forts belonging to the same, into my hands, for their use. Having used this plain language, as the business requires, I wish it may be as effectual unto you as it is satisfactory to myself, that I do a little expostulate with you about the surrender of the same, which I confess is a way not common, and which I should not have used, but in respect to such a person and to such a place. I take into consideration your royal birth, and relation to the crown of England ; your honor, courage, the virtues of your person, and the strength of that place, which you may think yourself bound and able to maintain. Sir, the crown of England is, and will be, where it ought to be ; we fight to maintain it there. But the king, misled by evil counsellors, or through a seduced heart, hath left his parliament, under God the best assurance of his crown and family. The maintaining of this schism is the ground of this unhappy war on your part, and what sad effects it hath produced in the three kingdoms is visible to all men. To maintain the rights of the crown and kingdom jointly, a principal part whereof is, that the king in supreme acts is not to be advised by men of whom the law takes no notice, but by his parliament, the great council of the kingdom, in whom, as much as man is capable of, he heard all his people as it were at once advising

him ; and in which multitude of counsellors lies his safety and his people's interest ; and to see him right in this, has been the constant and faithful endeavor of the parliament, and to bring these wicked instruments to justice, that have misled him, is a principal ground of our fighting.

" Sir, if God makes this clear to you, as he hath to us, I doubt not but he will give you a heart to deliver this place, notwithstanding all the other considerations of honor, courage, fidelity, etc., because of their constancy and use in the present business depends upon the right or wrongfulness of this that hath been said. And if upon such conditions you shall surrender it and save the loss of blood, or regard the spoiling of such a city, it would be an occasion glorious in itself, and joyful to us, for the restoring of you to the endeared affection of parliament and people of England, the truest friend to your family it hath in this world.

" But if this be hid from your eyes, and through your wilfulness, this so great, so famous, and so ancient a city, and so full of people, be by your putting us to force the same, exposed to ruin and the extremities of war, then I appeal to the righteous God to be judge between you and us, and to require the wrong. And let all England judge whether the burning of its towns, ruining its cities, and destroying its people, be a good requital from a person of your family, which hath had the prayers, tears, purses, and blood of its parliament and people. And if you look on either as now divided, [England] hath ever had that same party both in parliaments and among the people, most zealous for their assistance and restitution, which you now offer and seek to destroy, and whose constant grief hath been their desires to serve your family, [but whose desires] have been ever hindered or made fruitless by that same party about his majesty, whose counsel you act, and whose interests you pursue in this unnatural war. I expect your speedy answer to this summons, with the return of the bearer this evening, and remain your highness' humble servant, Thomas Fairfax."

The trumpeter that went in with this summons was detained all night ; but on Friday, Sept. 5th, he returned with this answer.

" Sir, I received yours by your trumpeter. I desire to know whether you will give me leave to send a messenger to the king, to know his pleasure in it. I rest, your servant, Rupert."

On Saturday there was sent, in a reply to the above : " Sir, Your overture of sending to the king to know his pleasure, I cannot give way to, because of delay. I confess your answer doth intimate your intention not to surrender without his majesty's consent. Yet because

it is but implicit (inferred?), I send again to know a more positive answer from yourself, which I desire may be such as may render me capable of approving myself your highness' humble servant, Tho. Fairfax."

The trumpeter was detained all that day and night. Everything was prepared for a storm; the general was in the field to that end; the soldiers had their faggots on their backs and leaped for joy, that they might go on.

Lord's day, Sept. 7, in the forenoon, the trumpeter returned with the following: "Sir, Whereas I received your letter for the delivery of the city, forts, and castle of Bristol, and being willing to join with you for the sparing of blood, and the preserving of his majesty's subjects, I have upon those grounds, and none other, sent you the following propositions." (These are long, and sixteen in number.—E. D. N.) He concludes with these words: "By this you may evidently perceive my inclination to peace, and you may be assured that I shall never desire anything more than the honor of the king, and safety of the kingdom, and that I may become, sir, your servant, Rupert."

Several other letters passed, without producing an agreement, which we cannot extract; and, on Wednesday, Sept. 10, to resume the narrative: "The signal was given to fall on, at one instant, around the city and works, which was by setting on fire a great heap of straw and faggots, on the top of a hill, and the shooting off of four great guns against Pryor's fort, from the place where the general was to reside during the storm. * * * [The light] was terrible to the beholders." Here follows a succinct narration of the conflict, and the articles of surrender. Among the officers killed was a major Bethel, of whom our author says: "Tired through want of sleep, he is gone into the bosom of the Lord Jesus, whom he loved so dearly while he lived. I wish he may not go unlamented to his grave, who was so full of God, and the fairest flower of the city amongst us. He lived without pride and died full of faith." Determined that Bethel shall not go unlamented, the warm-hearted Sprigge, on the 142d page of his work, inserts a sort of elegiac and acrostic, with this title:

The Army's Tears over Major Bethel.

"Thou gallant charger! dost thou wheel about
To sable shades? Or dost thou rather post
To *Bethel*, there to make a shout
Of the great triumphs of a scorned host?
Or, blessed soul, was ~~it~~ unworthy we,
That made thee weary with such dust to be?

Or, tired with our new, reforming pace,
Tasting some sips of Heaven, dost thou therefore haste
To fuller draughts of that eternal grace,
Fearing thy spirit may be here embraced ?
Farewell, dear soul ; thy great deserved arrears
We'll pay in others' blood, or our own tears.

Only let all ages, when they tell
The unexampled tale of Forty-Five,
Yea, when these records to their glory swell,
And be completed by the saints alive ;
When Naseby, Langport, Bristol, names they hear,
Let them all say : Sweet Bethel, he was there.

Bear a part in these laments,
Every soul that longs for peace ;
Truly who with God indents
Here to have thereof a lease,
Enters with himself a war :
Lean on things that truly are.

As a rhymers, the composer of the above is surely of the school of Sir Francis Rouse.

Thursday, Sept. 11, Rupert left the great fort. "A great appearance there was of the country, to see the marching away of the prince, and extremely cried they, Give him no quarter ! Give him no quarter !"

As a confirmation of the story of the storming of Bristol, Cromwell's letter to the speaker of the house of commons is appended. Inasmuch as it is inserted in "Carlyle's Cromwell," and numbered letter fifteenth, we shall but extract one noble sentence, that we always love to read. Speaking of the army, he says, "Presbyterians, Independents, all have here the same spirit of faith and prayer ; the same presence and answer ; they agree here, have no names of difference : PITY IT SHOULD BE OTHERWISE ANYWHERE."

Hugh Peters' Relation of the Taking of Winchester

is found in Part 8d, Chap. 2d, and is in these words : "My commands from the lieutenant general are, to give this honorable house a further narrative of the castle of Winchester, being upon the place, and a spectator of God's good hand in the whole work ; as also to present his humble request to the house in some particulars. And before I speak to either of them, if gratitude itself were not sometimes unseasonable, I would in my own name, and in the name of many thousands, return this honorable house most humble thanks for our lieutenant general, in that you suffer with patience the vacancy of his place in this house.

My wish is, that his spirit, and that public English spirit of Hampden, Pym and Stroud may be doubled upon your new elected members.

“For our lieutenant general this I may say, that judgment and affections are in him striving for the mastery. I have rarely seen such heights and depths concentrated in one man. When I look upon the two chiefs of our army, I remember Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstiern, and I wish that our hopes may not be so short-lived as the Germans’ hopes in them were. More I might say concerning him that sent me who is so far above the world, and lives so little upon the State’s pay, and minds himself so little, but that he hath enjoined silence to all his friends, in anything that might turn to his own praise.

“For the castle of Winchester, we began our batteries on Saturday morning, which wrought so effectually, that a breach wherein thirty men might go abreast was made. The enemy sallied out and beat our men from the guns, which were soon recovered again. We played then with our grenades from our mortar pieces with the best effect. I have seen, which brake down the Mansion house in many places; cut off a commissioner of theirs by the thighs, the most austere and wretched instrument in that country; and at last blew up their flag of defiance into the air, and tore the pinnacles in pieces upon which it stood. Summons being sent as we entered upon this work, was refused by lord Ogle their governor; and another summons God sent them, in the middle of their battery. His lady, to whom our lieutenant general had given leave to come forth, and had gone some miles out of town, died, by whom the governor had during her life £1,000 a year, now lost by her death.

“The chiefest street of the town the enemy played upon, whereby divers passengers were wounded, and some killed, in which street my quarters were, I have that cause to bless God for my preservation.” Better had he died there, than to be jeered at and beheaded by a bloody executioner in 1660.¹

To resume the narrative. “The Lord’s day we spent in preaching and prayer, while our gunners were battering, and at eight of the clock at night, we received a letter from the governor for a treaty, which I have brought with me.” Here follows the articles of treaty. “These articles being concluded on, I was forthwith sent into the castle to take a view of it before my departure, where I found a piece of ground improved to the best advantage; for when we entered by battery, we had six distinct works, and a draw-bridge to pass through, so that doubtless, it was a very strong piece and well appointed, as

¹ See Graham’s Colonial History of the United States. Lea and Blanchard’s edition, Vol. I. p. 573.

may appear by this ensuing note, of the ammunition and provisions." The note we must omit; among other items are mentioned three hogsheads of French wine, and one hundred and twelve of strong beer.

"The castle was manned with 700 men, divers of them reformadoes. The chief men I saw there, were Viscount Ogle, their governor, Sir John Pawlet, an old soldier, Sir William Courtney, colonel Bennet, also doctor Curle, the bishop of Winchester who came forth to our quarters in the morning, with whom I spent an hour or two, who with tears and much importunity desired the lieutenant general's favor to excuse his not accepting the offer that he made unto him on his entering the town. He desired of me a guard to his lodging, lest the horse should use violence to him and his chaplain, who were in their long gowns and cassocks, and he was accordingly safely conveyed home. I do not verily believe that they will hardly bring to Woodstock 200 men. It did much affect us to see what an enemy we had to deal with, who themselves being judges, could not choose, but say that, "Our God is not as their God." This is the nineteenth garrison that has been taken this summer, through God's goodness, and he that will not take his share in this common joy, is either stupid or envious."

We are forced for want of space to make the abstract of the last half of the work very brief.

Preservation of a Jewel.

In November 1645, while the army was at Antree, "a fair jewel set with rich diamonds of very great value was presented unto the general, by Mr. Ash and some other members of parliament, in the name of both houses, as a signal of that great honor which God had done him, in the great service which by God's assistance he performed for this kingdom at Naseby battle, and according to the commands of the parliament, they tied it in a blue ribband, and put it about his neck."

Incidents at the Storming of Dartmouth.

Lord's day, January 18, 1645.¹ "Mr. Del in the morning, and Mr. Peters in the evening, exhorted the soldiers to their duty; for Mr. Bowles who had formerly attended the service of the army, being called to his charge at York, had taken leave of his excellency, Mr. Del succeeding in his room.

¹ Bear in mind, that previous to the act of parliament in 1751, the civil or legal year in England commenced on the twenty-fifth of March.—E. D. N.

"The soldiers were all drawn out. About seven at night forlorn hopes were set. The evening very mild as at midsummer, the frost being newly gone. The word was given, 'God with us.' The signal of the soldiers was, their shirts out before and behind."

The Escape of Prince Charles.

"Wednesday, March 4th, his excellency had certain intelligence that the prince was embarked, and set sail for Scilly with his lords and gentlemen, giving up all for lost. So evidently irrecoverable did their condition appear to all, that their refuge of lies failed them, and they did not stick to say in desperation, at their departure, that all was lost. The prince's flying much disheartened the enemy; and what a work should it have upon us? It might become us here to stay and pause awhile. I cannot but run upon that Scripture in my mind, 'Who art thou, that thou should'st be afraid of a man, that shall die, and of the son of man, which shall be as grass: and forgettest the Lord thy Maker, that hath stretched forth the heavens, and laid the foundations of the earth, and hast feared continually every day, because of the fury of the oppressor, as if he were ready to destroy? and where is the fury of the oppressor? The captive exile hasteneth that he may be loosed, and that he should not die in the pit, or that his bread should fail.' Isaiah 51: 12, 13. The poor Cornish, like the captive exile, hastened to be delivered lest they should die in the pit, and therefore took up arms on any side to make an end of the war, and restore a peace of any fashion for the fury of the oppressor; and where is the fury of the oppressor? A ship hath embarked them, a strong wind hath carried them away, Scilly hath opened her arms and received them."

Escape of the king from Oxford, 1646.

"Sunday, April 26, the general rested at Andover [reminding us of our own general Washington's rest at Andover, New England, on the Sabbath]. Monday, 27th, he marched to Newbury, where the next day, he received intelligence of the king's being escaped out of Oxford in a disguised manner, with his lock cut off, or tied up at least, his beard shaved, and in the habit of a serving man.

"In a distressed time

'Tis safe like kings for poorest men to seem;

Therefore lives he that's truly poor,

Safer than kings."—*Lucan's Pharsalia*, Lib. VIII.

Also with a cloke-bag, behind him, waiting upon master John Ash-

burnham. There was great doubting and questioning whither his majesty was gone, but within a few days after, it was resolved, by certain intelligence, that he was received in the Scot's army, being first entertained at the quarters of the French agent, who not long before had been in Oxford."

Just about the time, indeed the next day but one after Charles I. fled from Oxford, he who was shortly to be vice chancellor of the university of Oxford, was delivering to parliament a Home Missionary discourse from Acts 26: 2. The biographers of Dr. Owen say it was a bold and energetic appeal to the wisdom and benevolence of the legislature, in behalf of those parts of the empire which were destitute of the light of evangelical instruction. No doubt he did not forget that day to put the members in mind of their growing plantations in North America, and it is pleasant to reflect, that perhaps the hearing of that sermon induced the future vice chancellor of the university of Cambridge, Dr. John Lightfoot, to bequeath his valuable library to the then infant institution, Harvard University. We return from this digression to the account of

The Surrender of Banbury Castle.

Banbury once a great and fair market town, before the late troubles, was ever till now unfortunate in all means and endeavors used for its recovery. "The strange sights that were seen over that town sixteen years ago, in the night time, when as the appearance of fighting, pikes pushing one against another was discerned in the air, whereof I was an eye witness, with many others, might portend the sad fate that hath since befallen that miserable place, and the parts thereof.¹ The forces employed in the reducing of that place were about 1,000 foot, and some four troops of horse, all under the command of that approved gentleman, colonel Whalley."

¹ These "pikes pushing one against another," whereof Sprigge was an eye witness, recalls the following lines in "Julius Caesar."

"Fierce, fiery warriors fight upon the clouds
In ranks, and squadrons, and right forms of war,
Which drizzled blood upon the capitol;
The noise of battle hurtled in the air."

From the accounts which have been collected of the Aurora Borealis, it would appear that the phenomenon was less frequent in former ages than it is now. The description of "spirits riding in the northern blast," and of "armies fighting in the air," owes its origin to the flickering appearance of the northern lights. The "Aurora" spoken of by Sprigge appeared in 1621, and it is quite remarkable that no mention is made of another appearance of that phenomenon in England, until the year 1707.—E. D. N.

Chapter seventh of the Fourth Part occupies thirty-five pages, and contains a particular description of the siege and surrender of Oxford.

Chapter eighth treats of the siege and surrender of Worcester and Wallingford. The governor of Worcester is named Henry Washington; and the query arises whether he was of the same family as John Washington, who emigrated to America about the middle of the seventeenth century, and who was great grandfather of him whom the world honors?

Chapter ninth gives a history of the reduction of Ragland Castle and Pendennis. In this chapter there is a long correspondence between Fairfax and the marquis of Worcester, whose name is more distinguished as the author of the "Century of Inventions," than as a statesman or warrior. Sprigge says, that Ragland Castle was surrendered on Wednesday, Aug. 19, and describes it as a very strong work, "having a deep mote encompassing it, besides the river running by it." A large quantity of provisions were discovered by the parliament forces when they entered, but "the horses they (the royalists) had left were not many, and those that were, almost starved for want of hay, of which they had none left, and not many oats; so that the horses had like to have eaten one another for want of meat, and therefore were tied with chains. There was also great store of goods, and rich furniture found in the castle, which his excellency committed to the care and custody of Master Herbert, Mr. Roger Williams, and Mayor Tuliday, to be inventioned." This Roger Williams, like Hugh Peters, has a name in the churches of this land. It is not a little remarkable that we should find two that had been ministers in our own peaceful Salem, taking an active part in martial affairs beyond the Atlantic. Williams left Rhode Island in 1643 to obtain a charter for his colony, and being a friend of many in the army, it is easy to account for his presence at Ragland.

After describing the taking of Pendennis our author makes a few remarks, with which we must conclude this article, though sorry that we cannot spread more of "*Anglia Rediviva*" before the readers of this Quarterly.

"And thus," says he, "you have a true account of the actions of this army, which God reserved for such a time as our lowest estates, when his season was to deliver us. It was once intended the story should have broken off at Oxford, but you see it is continued to the last piece of service performed by this army." * * * * "And now there being no enemy either in field or garrison, his excellency, after some small time of refreshment and rest from his continued weariness and action, was by the parliament ordered from Oxford into the

West, there to disband Major-General Massey's brigades." * * *
 "Divers of the disbanded came from very remote countries, and had passes, some for Egypt, others for Mesopotamia and Ethiopia." This paragraph, Carlyle thinks, is some of Joshua's wit.

"This work was no sooner over but it pleased God to visit the general with a sore fit of the stone. Saint Paul needed a thorn in the flesh; and by thirst and lack of water, Samson might know himself to be a man. This fit continued on him for many days together. So soon as he was recovered he made a journey to London. This was the first time of his visiting London since he marched forth with the army, having a small desire to see that place till he could bring an olive branch in his mouth, choosing rather to hasten peace than spin out the war; which made an humble tent more acceptable to him until he had obtained his end, than a glorious city," etc., etc.

He arrived in London Nov. 12, 1646, and the volume is concluded with the speeches upon that occasion, a character of the army, a list of all its officers, and a journal of every day's march.

ARTICLE VIII.

DORNER'S HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

By Professor Henry B. Smith, Amherst College.

Die Lehre von der Person Christi geschichtlich und biblisch-dogmatisch dargestellt von Dr. J. A. Dorner. In drei Theilen. Erster Theil. Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi in der ersten vier Jahrhunderten: Stuttgart, 1845. [The Doctrine of the Person of Christ by Dr. J. A. Dorner. In three Parts. Part First; The History of the Development of the Doctrine in the first four centuries, pp. xxx. and 1129.]

THIS work of Dr. Dorner is one of the ripest products of German scholarship in the department of doctrinal history. The way in which it has grown up to its present form is an illustration of the historical thoroughness and philosophical method of that scholarship, as well as of the conflicts to which the orthodox faith is exposed in Germany,

and the mode in which it repels its assailants and maintains its integrity.

Two articles in the "*Tübinger Zeitschrift*" for the years 1835 and 1836 formed the basis of the present work. These were written with such command over the subject-matter, and were, besides, so adapted to the controversy about fundamental facts and doctrines of Christianity, which was then at its height in Germany, that they at once attracted the highest attention and admiration. Some extracts from the preface to these articles may serve to give an idea of the spirit of the circumstances in which they were composed. Beginning with the motto: *Descendit deus, ut assurgamus*, the author proceeds: "In the long conflict between Christianity and reason, it is a matter of congratulation that that point is gradually coming to be universally and distinctly understood, which is of the very first importance, if the controversy is ever to be decided. All the energies of the two conflicting parties are collecting themselves more and more around the Person of Christ, as the central point where the matter must be determined; and this is a great advance towards an adjustment of the hard strife; for when the question is rightly put, the answer is already half found. It is also easy to see, that in this case everything depends upon the question, whether there need have been, and really has existed, such a Christ as we find in the sense, if not always in the words, of the church — that is, a being in whom the personal and perfect union of divinity and humanity is truly consummated and historically made manifest. For if we suppose, on the one hand, that philosophy could incontrovertibly prove that the person of Christ in this sense is a self-contradicting notion, and therefore an impossibility, there would then no longer be any conflict between Christian theology and philosophy. With the overthrow of this doctrine, Christian theology and the Christian church would cease to have an existence in any legitimate sense of the word Christian; as with the capitulation of the metropolis the whole land falls to the enemy. There would then be peace between the parties. And, on the other hand, if, as some maintain, the idea of a Christ who is both human and divine can be proved on philosophical grounds to be rational and necessary, then, too, it is equally clear that philosophy and theology would be essentially reconciled with each other, and would ever after have a common labor, or rather would have really become one; and philosophy would then not have lost, but strengthened its claims to existence. Hence, in the great battle which is fighting between the greatest powers in the world, Christianity and reason, it is well for both

parties, that the contest should centre more and more around the point where alone all is to be won and all is to be lost."

The allusions made in the above extract are to the great parties which at that time divided, and which still divide, the German theological public. There was the extreme, destructive party, taking as its foundation the pantheistic interpretation of Hegel's system, and the attempted critical demolition of the historical basis of Christianity in Strauss's *Life of Jesus*: this maintained that the doctrine of the Person of Christ was by historical criticism proved to be mythical, and on philosophical principles shown to involve contradictions. There were, on the other hand, those who asserted, that they could show, on speculative grounds, the necessity of such a manifestation of the Godhead as that which the church, on other grounds, believed to be consummated in the person of its Redeemer. Besides these two philosophical parties, there was a third, which declared that all attempts to give a philosophical view of the doctrine were wholly vain and fruitless. This last position, the author says, cannot be admitted, unless we assume that there is a great gulf fixed between reason and faith, so that they which would pass from hence cannot, neither can they pass over that would come from thence: "For he that holds Christianity to be reasonable, must also assume that there is a constant upholding and strengthening of reason by means of Christianity itself, so that no limits can be assigned to its progress. If Christ, as theology must be convinced, is indeed the key to the world's history, as well as to the solution of all the great problems of our existence, it is not humility but wilful inactivity, not to be constantly learning to use this key better in the opening of the mysteries."

Such being the position of the different parties, Dr. Dorner proposed a twofold purpose in giving his historical exposition of this central doctrine of the Christian faith. On the one hand he would show, that the acts were not yet closed; that is, that philosophy had been precipitate in affirming, either that the doctrine involved irreconcilable contradictions, or that it had been demonstrated as necessary by an "a priori construction." On the other hand, from what has already been achieved for the understanding of this doctrine, he would draw the inference, that the attempt is not so fruitless as many maintain. In addressing himself to this work, he leaves out of view the history of our Saviour's life, and also his atoning work, and confines himself exclusively to a history of the doctrine of the Person, that is, of the Two Natures of Christ, as this has been unfolded in the progress and controversies of the Christian Church.

The two treatises which were written to carry out this view were expanded, some four years afterwards, into an octavo volume of about 550 pages, published in 1839. In the Introduction to this book he repudiates the notion that any one could give a true exhibition of the history of a doctrine without any doctrinal basis;¹ and sets forth as the leading idea of his work, that Christ is of importance, not merely as a historical personage, nor yet alone in an ideal or metaphysical point of view, (as the pantheist maintains,) but that both the historical and ideal, the divine and the human, are absolutely one in his perfected person; and that he is the head of the race, which race is not a mass, but an organism. And he propounds the "idea of the God-man Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who is man and the Head of the church, as the word which alone can solve the enigma that weighs upon German Christianity." This work established the reputation of its author. It is perhaps the most finished example, in historical theology, of the clear and masterly unfolding of the history of a doctrine in its successive stages. It is both critical and comprehensive. It unites, in rare proportion, historical accuracy and philosophical insight with a firm faith in the substantial truth of the orthodox doctrine respecting the Person of Christ. It is dictated by, and it serves to illustrate the wholesome influence of a firm conviction in the harmony and ultimate reconciliation of reason and faith, of Christianity and philosophy. One of the chief excellences of the work in this first edition, is its special criticism upon the later Christological controversies in Germany. We do not know where there is to be found so lucid an account of the bearing of the later philosophical and theological systems of Germany upon the great doctrines that centre in Christ, as is contained in the latter half of this volume. The respective influence and positions of the schools of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are clearly presented and thoroughly criticised. The Christology of Schleiermacher closes the series; and from this long research and review the author looks forward with earnest faith to the time of a rich harvest in which the

¹ For this position he is somewhat severely taken to task by Baur in his History of the Trinity. It is the claim of Baur, as of Strauss, that he goes to the study of history without any preconceived opinion; although it would not be difficult to show, that he goes there, assuming the essential truth of the pantheistic interpretation of the doctrine. So Strauss interprets the life of Christ without any previous bias — only he denies the possibility of a miracle. Dörner, in the continuation of the above sentence, implies the true reason for his seeming assumption — and that is, his personal faith in Christ on the ground of the testimony of the Scriptures.

ripest fruits of the past shall all be gathered. "And as Ethiopia and Arabia, after bowing down to the prophet, are to bring their loyal tribute to the Lord, so shall the middle ages with their scholasticism, and the later philosophy also, so shall the whole religious history of the world, both before and after the advent of Christ, be seen to congregate around that One; all shall lay down their best gifts before Him, who first gave them the key by which they could understand themselves, and who also makes them worthy to contribute to his honor; and by their labors the glories of his Person shall be displayed in ever-increasing lustre, and imbibed with conscious love by the human race." (p. 529.)

We should be glad to dwell more in detail upon Dr. Dörner's exposition of the German systems, but we must leave this part of his work, of which a second edition has not yet been published, that we may give a more full view of the book which stands at the head of this Article. This is the first volume of a new edition, which is to be comprised in three octavos. This volume was issued in three parts during the years 1845 and 1846, and makes a book of more than eleven hundred pages, fitted out with those admirable indices, which the Germans understand the art of making so well. The second volume, which is to comprise the remainder of the history, was promised for the year 1846, but it has not yet made its appearance.¹ The third vol. of the new edition is to be wholly new; it will contain a full biblical and doctrinal treatise upon the subject; to be published as soon as the leisure of the author will permit."

From the ability which has been displayed in his criticisms upon the opinions of others, and from his thorough acquaintance with all the forms in which the doctrine has been held, we are warranted in indulging the highest expectations of the value of this concluding essay. The partial obscurity which seems to us to hang around his own views of the doctrine, so far as these can be inferred from the principles on which his criticism is conducted, and from incidental

¹ At the time Dr. Dörner published the first edition of his book he was professor of theology at Tübingen; in the second edition he appears as professor at Königsberg; and in a German catalogue of Books for 1847, we find the title of a pamphlet on the "Relation of Church and State," which is said to be his Inaugural Discourse on assuming a theological chair at the University of Bonn. These rapid changes, taken in connection with the more rapid political changes of his country, may account for the delay in the completion of his work. The only other book of his we have seen, is an able and critical Latin treatise *De Oratione Christi Eschatologica*, (Matt. xxiv. 1—36. Luc. xxi. 5—36. Marc. xiii. 1—32.) *Asservata*, published in 1844, to celebrate the tri-centennial festivities of the University of Königsberg.

hints and phrases, will then, perhaps, be wholly dissipated. While the whole course and plan of his work prove him to be in harmony with the main current of orthodox belief, yet he also shows that he is not wholly satisfied with the terms in which this belief has been generally expressed. The increased interest in our own country in discussions respecting the nature of Christ, will also lead some minds to turn with interest to a volume written after so thorough a preparation. The present enlargement of the original work promises to make it more thoroughly scientific—a sort of arsenal for all the armory; but the first edition will still remain of independent value, and to the general reader, who does not wish to be embarrassed with the elaborate details of controversy and speculation, will perhaps be more attractive than the fuller and final exposition. The general plan, the leading divisions, and the fundamental views remain the same.

But that portion of the history which is contained in the present volume has been enlarged eleven-fold, from less than one hundred to more than eleven hundred pages. It embraces the first four centuries of the Christian era; and it may be considered as in some respects an independent treatise upon this most important period of the history of this doctrine, down to the council of Constantinople, when the elements of the humanity of Christ were ecclesiastically set forth and sanctioned. In no subsequent centuries have the Trinitarian and Christological controversies assumed anything like the same degree of importance; and their decisions have been received with general acquiescence by the great body of Christendom ever since. The Anglican discussions of the times of Bull and Waterland were not more thorough; the German discussions of these later years have not been so minute, nor more philosophical. In our New England contests we have not made more, though we have made more exclusive, use of the biblical arguments. The period traversed by this volume is, then, one of the deepest interest; it is, also, one most familiar to British and American research. And we think it may be safely said, that for the scholar who wishes to penetrate into the recesses of the thoughts of those wonderful centuries of the Christian church, when thinking minds and believing hearts were earnestly striving to elucidate the highest problems respecting the Godhead, and the relation between divinity and humanity, there is no work which will afford him so thorough aid, or be a more skilful and critical guide. The work of the Jesuit Petavius, *De Theologicis Dogmatibus*, is the one with which it would be most fitly compared, in its comprehensiveness

and apparent impartiality. The fourth volume of this treatise of Petavius, published at Paris in 1650, is devoted to the Incarnation; and it is a vast store-house of materials, well arranged, and skilfully used to enhance the necessity of authoritative decisions by Pope or council upon subjects where the fathers of the church were found to be at variance. But though this work is the most eminent example of doctrinal history which the Roman Catholic church has produced, and though it is more liberal in its tone and more free in its criticisms than most of the works of the theologians of this church, yet it is restricted to the elucidation of a few great points in respect to the Two Natures of Christ. Its learning, though vast, is cambrous; and it does not sufficiently mark the progress of doctrinal discussion. It is also suspected of having yielded too ready an assent to the position, that Arianism was prevalent in the church long before the time of Arius.¹ It was this concession, in part, which lead Bishop Bull to

¹ This learned Jesuit is one of the few theologians whom Gibbon praises, yet not without a sneer. He confesses his indebtedness to him, and adds: "His learning is copious and correct, his Latinity is pure, his method clear, his argument profound and well connected; but he is the slave of the fathers, the scourge of heretics, and the enemy of truth and candor, as often as they are inimical to the Catholic cause." His whole work is in four folio volumes; of which the second is devoted to the Trinity, and the fourth to the Incarnation, under which he includes the work as well as the nature of Christ. In this volume, the first book gives an account of all the heresies; the second relates to the causes of the incarnation, "especially that which is called the final;" the third is upon the "conjunctio sive unio" of the two natures; the fourth treats of those general "affections" of the two natures which resulted from this union; and the fifth speaks of the two natures separately. While Bull defends Petavius against the charge of being an Arian, Van Mildert, in his *Life of Waterland*, (p. 28,) seems strangely to imply that he was a Socinian.

Another large work on the History of Doctrines, written near the same period is less known than its merits deserve — the *Instructiones Historico-theologicæ* of John Forbesius, à Corse, a Scotch author, who composed it while residing in Holland, where it was published at Amsterdam, in 1645. He had previously been professor of divinity at Aberdeen. His work is polemical against the Romanists, and seems to have been drawn up at the request of the synod of Aberdeen, to "give them a taste of theological history," and to refute the exclusive pretensions of the Romanists to the possession of the verdict of the ancient church. The second book is upon "the mystery of the incarnation." Four chapters of it are devoted to as many kinds of heresies. The fifth gives an "orthodox antithesis, set forth in a metrical compend, against the various heresies and errors in the argument concerning the mystery of the incarnation." We give a few lines of this theological curiosity.

Verus homo, verusque Deus de Virgine Christus,
Persona insignis naturæ una duabus

compose his defence of the Nicene Faith, (1685,) a work which was written years before it was printed, since no bookseller could be found to undertake its publication ; but which (in connection with his *Judicium*, published in 1694) has long been of standard authority in the English church for the opinions of the early centuries in respect to the person of Christ. His chief object in these works is to defend the consistency as well as the authority of the fathers of the church, which were fast coming into disrepute even among the orthodox. He maintains their authority against the Socinians, who declared it to be of no value ; and their orthodoxy, against the Arians, who pressed them into their service. The three points which he chiefly insists upon are, that the preëxistence, the eternity, and the consubstantiality of the Son were held in the early church, by general consent ; and this being gained, he not only allows, but indicates, a certain subordination, or derivation of the Son, which he conceives to be consistent with these positions. Valuable as are the works of bishop Bull in a historical point of view, yet they neither do away with the difficulties which encompass his statement of the relation of the Son to the Father, as was abundantly shown by the subsequent English controversies ; nor do they furnish a full view of the proper history of the doctrine even up to the Council of Nice. They contributed more to increase respect for the fathers and belief in their harmony, than to exhibit the real nature of their differences, or to signalize the *stadia* of the doctrinal discussion, or to free the doctrine from philosophical objections.¹ Be-

Nascitur, Immanuel, Deus incarnatus, ut idem
Sit quod erat, fiat quod non erat, et sit utrumque
Virgo beata Deum peperit : Deus est homo natus.

The remaining chapters of this book give important documents and extracts relating to the history of the doctrine.

¹ Bishop Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith was written to counteract the influence of three continental authors, viz. Petavius, Sandius (in his *Nucleus Hist. Eccl.* 1669, who was an Arian), and Zuicker, a physician of Dantzic, whose works were making a decided impression in England. His *Judicium Eccl. Cath.*, published in 1694, was also directed against foreign authors, viz. Episcopius and his disciple Carcellæus, and is devoted to the proof of the position that the Nicene fathers held the belief of the true and proper divinity of Christ to be indispensable. It was also intended, incidentally, to uphold the authority of the fathers against the reproaches of Episcopius and others. He goes so far that Bossuet (*Hist. des Var.*) claims that he holds to the infallibility of the council of Nice. A third and smaller treatise, *Primitive and Apostolical Tradition* (1703), is a continuation of the former, and is directed against the position that the doctrines of Christ's divinity, incarnation, and preëxistence were introduced into the church from heathen or heretical sources. In the controversy between the two parties, called at the time Trkheists and Nominalists, the former of whom was represented by Dr. Sherlock (father of the bishop

fore the appearance of Dorner's work, Martini's *Pragmatic History of the Doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, in the first four Centuries* (1800), was the only considerable monograph which the Germans had on this subject; but while this work shows thorough study of the sources, it is incomplete, not coming down even to the Council of Nice, and it is not adapted to the present state of historical research.¹

In comparison with these leading works, and with others of less importance which might be named, the volume of our author stands on an equality with any of them in point of general ability, and it is superior in its plan, its exhibition of the views of the leading fathers, and its discernment of their differences as well as agreement. It is composed under the full pressure and advantages of the present enthusiastic study of doctrinal history in Germany; and it is up to the very highest requisitions which their finished scholarship imposes.

The voluminous expansion which the investigation of these first centuries has received in this second edition, is owing to several causes. It was perhaps too cursorily treated at first, partly because there were, at the time of its publication, a more general agreement in the views of German scholars respecting this period, and partly because it was written with direct reference to the current speculations upon Christ, which had been raised by the Hegelian philosophy. But in the mean time, the school of Baur in Tübingen had advanced some positions in regard to the views of the earliest church, which, if true, undermined the whole of Dorner's work, as well as the whole historical basis of the Christian faith. We will give, in a few words, the substance of Dr. Baur's views. The original Christian church was strictly Jewish; all the first Christians were Ebionites. Christ was, to them, only the

of the same name), and the latter by Wallis and South, he did not take any direct part. But after his death a work which he wrote for the satisfaction of lord Arundell, who was perplexed by this controversy, appeared under the title, "*Discourse on the Doctrine of the Catholic Church, for the first three Ages of Christianity, concerning the Trinity, in opposition to Tritheism and Sabellianism.*" Bishop Van Mildert, in his *Life of Waterland*, gives us the best sketch we have seen of these early English Trinitarian discussions.

¹ The *Apostolicity of Trinitarianism*, by G. S. Faber, 2 vols. London, 1832, is a most pains-taking collection of passages from the fathers, up to the Council of Nice, beginning with the last first, "to prove the bare historical fact, that the catholic church which flourished in the age and under the immediate teaching of the apostles themselves, received and maintained, on the avowed and express ground of apostolical authority, the doctrine of the holy Trinity, with the dependent doctrine of the theanthropic character of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." It is an array of testimony to prove a particular point, and includes an articulate refutation of objections, given in numerical order. To anything like the character of a history, it makes no pretensions. It does not unfold a doctrine, but proves a position.

Jewish Messiah. Of his higher nature neither Christ nor his first apostles had any conception. The Ebionites, instead of being heretics, were really the first Christians; they became heretics only after Christianity itself had been changed. The first division in the early church was occasioned by the question of circumcision. Paul was the chief means of bringing about this change, which was done by denying the absolute necessity of obeying the law, and asserting the doctrine of justification by faith. Thus a great division was formed in the church between the Jews and their opponents; Peter and Paul are assumed as the representatives of the two parties. That of Paul, to which the heathen Christians chiefly attached themselves, at length obtained the supremacy. His authority as an apostle was recognized; and his writings became the foundation of the new Christianity. But this was not all. The Ebionites were also at war with the Alexandrian Gnostics. The conflict of these two introduced another element into the new church, which gave it its chief impulse. This was the doctrine of the Logos, which is chiefly exhibited in the writings ascribed to John, and came into the church *about the middle of the second century*. In this doctrine the vacillating views respecting the person of Christ came to a fixed expression. The Ebionites held that Christ was essentially only man; Paul himself, though he allowed that in Christ there was something divine, that is, the Spirit (*πνεῦμα*), still held that in his own nature Christ was only man. But the doctrine of the Logos, as contained in John's writings, and as derived from the Alexandrian philosophy, produced a total revolution, and a higher form of Christianity, by asserting that Christ, in his real nature, was not a mere man, but was divine. This was the turning point of Christianity, made about a century and a half after Christ appeared; and around this idea of the Logos, combined and interchanged as it was with the expression "Son of God," the whole subsequent doctrinal disputes about the nature of Christ revolved. Neither Jesus, nor his immediate followers, knew anything of this article of faith; the genuine epistles of Paul do not contain it, (or, in other words, those epistles ascribed to Paul, which indicate that he had a higher view of Christ's nature, are not genuine); of course the doctrine is not historically true as applicable to Christ's person—it is an *idea*, the highest to which Christianity has led, introducing the highest form of Christianity, yet an idea not realized in the person of Christ, as the church has always held, but realized only (this is probably Baur's view¹) in the human race as a whole.

¹ For Baur's view, see his *Lehrbuch d. Dogmengeschichte*, s. 60, 71, 85, 93; his *Lehre von d. Dreieinigkeit*, Vol. I; and his work, *Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi*, 1845. It differs from the Socinian view in considering the original form of

The predominant notion in this entire re-construction of the early history of the church, is to detach the Christian system from its indissoluble connection with the person of Christ. Neither the philosophical nor the historical sense of the advocates of this scheme, would be satisfied with the position that the leading doctrines, always held by the church, are without some substance of truth. They are true, only not in the sense and application which Christianity has given to them. It is one of the striking peculiarities and advantages of the Christian system, that it makes facts, and historical facts, the basis of its chief doctrines. Thus, the atonement is not an abstract truth about the reconciliation of God with man; but, as a doctrine, it is based upon an act of Christ, upon something which he did and suffered for the redemption of the race. So, too, the doctrine of the person of Christ, that in him there is a union of humanity with divinity, rests, in the first instance, upon the fact that that union was really manifested, historically revealed, in the incarnation of our Lord. But if, now, it were possible for historical criticism to show, that this view of the person of Christ was unknown to Christ himself and to the early Christians, that it was introduced into the church one hundred and fifty years after Christ; then the whole historical basis of our faith would be subverted, and philosophy would triumph over Christianity; and all that could remain true, or could be proved to be so, in the Christian system, would be, certain very abstract principles, which have no more direct relation to Christ and his work, than they have to any other man and his work.

This virtual revival of Gnosticism is indeed a daring attempt; but then it is less daring and impious than the straight-forward course of others, who say outright that Jesus, by his own declarations, gave the impulse to such elevated faith in his power and nature, but that Jesus was an enthusiast, and that his disciples were most credulous. This is the most consistent scheme, and, in addition to supreme trust in

Christianity, the Humanitarian, as the lowest and undeveloped form; the subsequent form, instead of being a corruption, is a purification and progress of the faith. But still he agrees with the Socinian in denying the reality of the union of the human and divine in the person of Christ. He differs from the Socinian, still further, in giving this construction of the early Christian history a systematic and philosophical form; and his criticism upon the Scriptures is marked by the endeavor to prove, not that the obstinate texts will bear other constructions, but that the works in which they appear are of later origin. Thus, the epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians, are not Paul's, since they indicate a higher view of Christ's nature. There are some striking points of similarity between this scheme and what seems to be Gibbon's view of the rise of the doctrine of the Incarnation, in the 47th chapter of his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

one's own individual notions. It only needs supreme distrust in every body and every thing else, even in the possibility of a revelation, to make it perfectly satisfactory. It indeed makes Christ to be the greatest of impostors, the most daring of the sons of earth; for it makes him claim that he alone was sinless, while all others were sinful; when this claim itself, if he were like them, would prove him to be a greater sinner than they all. But then, as a recompense for the loss of belief in his virtue, it gives the most unqualified faith in the infallibility of one's own reason. It is content to assume that the whole race of man has hitherto been in error, if it may only maintain that one man is, at last, right. It will gladly abandon all trust in a revelation from God through Christ, if it may only trust in the revelations of one's own spirit. This is a more consistent theory; but it is so rebellious against history, so irreverent to Christ, so distrustful of God, that a philosophical mind would gladly be spared the pain, if not the reproach, of being its advocate. And therefore we have such theories as that of Dr. Baur.

Against these subversive views, the work of Dr. Dörner is chiefly directed. It maintains that Christianity was not originally a theory; that its beginning was not in the announcement of any abstract notion; but that its basis was laid in facts. The manifestation of God in the flesh, in the person of Jesus, is the historical and real basis of Christianity. "He that knows religion, knows that the chief thing in it is a divine act, which is intended to reconcile the whole man with God." The person of Christ is the centre and life of this revelation. Who that person is, what are the elements of his nature, is historically recorded. We know, on sure testimony, what Christ declared himself to be; we know what his early disciples believed him to be. That higher view of the nature of Christ, which makes him to be essentially divine, is not a phantastic and unaccountable product of a subsequent age; but was held by the earliest church, and this can be historically proved. And not only in the first century, but in the others, without any hiatus, is this truth set forth. This is surely an elevated conception of history, through all its strifes and conflicts, to trace the gradual and victorious progress of the sublimest truths of the Christian faith; and see them emerging with added lustre, in immortal youth and matured vigor from every fresh assault. And no Christian man who reads how the author has performed this office for the first centuries can fail to say, with him, that "like the astronomer gazing into unimagined worlds, he has often, in the contemplation of this sublime history, been overwhelmed by the feeling of adoring wonder."

In proceeding, now, to give a more full account of the way in which the history of this doctrine is here presented, our limits will oblige us

to confine ourselves to the introductory portion. This is of special value, as exhibiting the relation in which the Christian doctrine stands to those religious opinions prevalent in the ancient world which might, upon a superficial inspection, be considered as identical with it. The basis of the whole argument of the work, the general principles upon which it is conducted, and the true foundation and method of doctrinal history are also here insisted upon. The introduction closes with giving the great general epochs of the history itself. Though we shall be obliged to confine ourselves to a mere abstract, and thus obscure that excellency of the original which is found in its copious details, we shall still hope to transfer to our pages some reflected image of those elevated conceptions, which this history shows us have met in the person of our Saviour, as their luminous centre.

It is perhaps hardly worth while to remark, that even where we do not wholly agree with the author in his philosophical statements, we have not thought it advisable to interpose any criticisms; believing as we do, that the work as a whole will justify itself, and that on so difficult a subject it is often desirable to see a variety of expositions.

The great idea which lies at the foundation of the Christian revelation, the idea of a union of divinity and humanity, of a God-man, is not restricted to this religion alone; the elements of it are to be found in all creeds, so far as they are religious, and because they are religious. The difference between the various forms of religion, will be rather found to consist in the mode in which this union is conceived or attempted to be realized. The ideal of human life must always be, that it be not human only, but in some way connected with and influenced by what is divine. As soon as man thinks of himself in his relation to God, he cannot conceive of a holy life in any other form than as a union in some sense of divine and human life. And when, on the other hand, we think of God in his relation to man, our highest conception of a revelation will always be that of a manifestation of God, not merely in outward signs and wonders, nor yet in nature which is blind and dumb, but in the form of a being who may know him and be known of him.

This is not anthropomorphism. If it were, then it would be inexplicable that religion and science, as they advance, always employ themselves more and more about this great problem; that their constant tendency is to bring the divine and the human to a closer union. To think of God as wholly abstracted from the world and all that is

finite, is an easy and an empty task. If all that is needed in forming a conception of God, is to do away with all vital relations between the divine and the human, this work has long since been achieved, and the result is, mere abstract being, a notion only one remove from nonentity. An absolutely hidden, unrevealed Deity, is no God at all for us. Atheism would be the next step. And, further, it involves a contradiction to speak of God as absolute, and at the same time to assert that he has no intimate connection with what is finite; for if he have nothing to do with the finite, then the finite exists independently of him, and consequently he is not absolute; he is not absolute, unless the finite be a revelation of himself.

But while all religions necessarily embrace this idea of the union of the human with the divine, the peculiarity of the Christian religion consists in the form in which it is there presented. It is the universal belief of the Christian church, that in Jesus of Nazareth alone, this union of divinity and humanity has appeared in a personal form. It was manifested in him as a *fact*, a reality; not as a doctrine, but as a person. A common mode of attack against Christianity has been to deny the originality of its doctrines, and to derive them all from heathen or Jewish sources. The attack was plausible only so long as Christianity was considered as a set of doctrines, rather than as a series of divine acts. The real defence against such objections is to show the exact relation of the Christian religion to the antecedent ones; its differences from them as well as its agreement with them. And if it can be proved, that what other religions were striving after in an imperfect or disfigured form, is realized in Christianity in a new and perfect way; if in its fundamental idea of a God-man, we find the key by which we can read more clearly the enigmas and understand the perversions of other forms of faith, then will its true relation to them be detected, and its vindication made triumphant. This we will attempt to do by showing, in the first place, that the fundamental idea of Christianity, the idea of the God-man, cannot be explained as derived either from heathenism or from the Jewish system, while at the same time it is that which they both are seeking after. In the second place, it will be shown that this fundamental idea is original and essential to Christianity, though its full development in all its relations was reserved for subsequent centuries.

Can we then ascribe to the heathen religions, the origin of this idea of the union of the human and divine in one person? It is said that we must look for it there rather than in the Jewish system, because the latter from its strict monotheism was strongly prejudiced against any such dogma, as is proved by the extensive influence of the Ebion-

ites in the early church, by the slight recognition of this doctrine (even if it be found at all) in those books of the New Testament which were composed under Hebrew influences, and by the fact that those apostles who insisted most upon the divinity of Jesus were undeniably most concerned with paganism. Did this idea, then, come from paganism? In answering this question it will be necessary to distinguish between the oriental and the occidental heathenism. As the representation of the former, we will take the Indian religion; of the latter, the Greek. Both confound God and the world; yet in doing this they proceed from opposite extremes. The orient starts from the divine, the occident from the human, and both seek after the union of the two. In the Greek religion men become gods; they rise to Olympus. This is not the idea of Christianity; it is opposed to it. The early disciples of Christ knew nothing of such an apotheosis; man does not rise to God, God descends to man. It was first advocated in the Christian church by Paul of Samosata, and viewed with such abhorrence, that the council of Nice ordered its advocates to be re-baptized. May it not then be found in the *theogony* of the Greeks, if not in their apotheoses? Still less; for here was polytheism, here the gods are finite, they are national, and above them is a threatening destiny, the only and obscure vestige of monotheism; nor are these many gods essentially united with this all-embracing Fate. But Christianity from the very first was sternly monotheistic; its followers abhorred all polytheism; the God-man stands alone and is not national, and he is in the closest union with the Father.

But if the Greek faith will not give us this idea, may it not be derived from the dreamy and fantastic Orient? There we have the incarnation of the second member of the Trimarti; Vishnu becomes man, God descends to man. But this incarnation is not a real one; it is not a union of the divine and human; for Krishnu lays aside his humanity and returns to heaven. There is a complete and unreconciled dualism, and not a union. The finite and infinite are in an eternal and irreconcilable opposition. No sooner are the two united than one is lost. The finite is swallowed up in the infinite. Matter, too, is evil; the ethical and physical are confounded. So unreconciled are the two extremes, that this religion has been perpetually playing between pantheism and materialism—the elements of both of which it contains. In its latest form, that of Buddhism in the Chinese nation, it is wholly material; this world is all in all, the Chinese empire is also the kingdom of heaven.

But though these religions have not attained the true idea of the

God-man, yet it is that which they are seeking after. The Orient, starting from the notion of universal life is ever striving to realize the personality and presence of God; but its essential dualism prevents this, and it remains hovering in a region of perpetual uncertainty. The Greek religion made the desperate attempt to raise man to the gods, to produce the divine from the human; but when it had reached the highest point to which even philosophy could carry it, it found it had only a world without a God; or, as in New Platonism, only an abstract divine substance, in comparison with which all that is finite is but an illusion. Thus the Greek who began with such proud consciousness of human power, ended in the same abstraction with which the Oriental began, and found in it his grave. And since he began, when the Oriental ended, the whole circle of the heathen world is completed; it returns in the end to its empty and unsatisfying beginning. It was not able to grasp the problem which it was trying to solve; and history has written the judgment of its religions. The originality of the idea of the God-man, as this appears in Christianity, is not impeached by any of the conceptions to which these heathen religions attained.

One of the main hindrances in the way of these pagan attempts to reconcile the human and the divine, which made them perpetually sink down into an extreme they were always striving to avoid, was their defective views in respect to the moral character of the supreme being, universal deficiency, and their want of a sense of God's perfect justice. Where the moral element is wanting in our conceptions of God, it is difficult to realize his personality, it is easier to confound him with the world. And any idea of the union of the human and divine, which does not save the personality of God, and which does not recognize the moral element as essential to this union, must be incomplete. The Persians presented in a bolder relief than any other pagan people, the intense antagonism between right and wrong; but with them it is a perpetual strife between two elements without any reconciliation. Evil is a substance—fixed in nature.

In the Hebrew religion we have for the first time the full distinction between God and the world openly revealed; and we have also the moral element in the divine nature clearly set forth. In both these points it stands far above all the Gentile superstitions; and it may in these respects be considered as the disclosure of a mystery which weighed upon the whole of the ancient world. Other claims, and deeper mysteries than are those of paganism, it indeed has; but the enigmas of the ancient world on these points it has fully solved.¹

¹ The best view of the heathen religions which has been published, is probably Stahr's *Religionsformen der heidnischen Völker*. Berlin, 1836, 2. 8vo.

Before the union of divinity and humanity could be clearly seen, the distinction between the two must be clearly seen; and before the distinction of the divine and the human can be held fast, we must have a definite view of the moral attributes of God, especially as a God of justice, (without which love is not love). Neither of these heathenism had, both of these the Hebrew faith possessed; and this faith, therefore, made one step in advance towards the solution of the problem. It remains to be asked, whether this religion had the true idea of the union of the divine and the human in such a form that the Christian doctrine could be directly derived from it.

The Hebrew religion stands alone among the ancient systems in making a broad distinction between God and the world; and in its recognition of the personality of Jehovah. God is so elevated above the world, stands so alone in his spirituality and holiness; the difference between God and man is made so vast, that little is said of any other than a moral union between the two; — of a relation between the human and divine nature or essence, which is necessary to the idea of the God-man, we find no traces. And it is, besides, a characteristic of this people, that they had little to do with metaphysical questions. To raise them above and keep them separate from all Gentile polytheism, it seemed necessary that they should have such a view of the relation of God to man, as would be most remote from that which lies at the basis of the doctrine of the incarnation. This is not inconsistent with the fact that God revealed himself in various ways to his people; nor with the office which is ascribed to the Angel of Jehovah in many parts of the Old Testament. But this angel is not always represented as a definite person, nor are all revelations made through him; and there is no hint of a union of the human and divine in him. Such passages as Ps. 103: 20. 148: 2. 34: 8. 91: 11, where the angel appears to have a very intimate connection with the world, and to be less restricted to the theocracy, are probably to be interpreted as personifications, or, if not so, as referring to created beings. And it is worthy of remark, that the angels came to have the highest importance to the Jews after God had ceased to speak with his people; and that in proportion as a prodigal fancy in later time ascribed to them the most important works, the sense of the presence of God himself seemed to retreat, which is an opposite result from that of the true doctrine of a divine Mediator. Nor in the "*Wisdom*" of the Proverbs and the Apocrypha do we find the elements of this doctrine. While this wisdom is the boldest attempt which the Jewish mind made to bring God and the world into conjunction, yet, in its highest form, it is doubtful whether we can regard it as a per-

sonal agent ; and even if it be, it has closer affinities with the doctrine of the Logos than with that of the Incarnation. When the greatest power and knowledge are ascribed to wisdom, it ceases to have any direct connection with human nature ; the idea of a manifestation of God in *history*, which is essential to the Christian view, is lost sight of, and the only revelation recognized is in the soul of man. Nothing like a direct union of God with human nature is recognized in all that is ascribed to wisdom. The view of Philo respecting the Logos is often adduced as the precursor of the Christian doctrine. This is the most remarkable attempt made on the basis of the Jewish system, and by a contemporary of Jesus, under the influence also of the Greek philosophy, to bring the floating ideas of the Jews respecting the Messiah into a systematic form ; and by giving a philosophical system to do away with the need of having a real and personal Messiah. And the results to which this attempt conducts, when compared with the reality as it is found in the person of Christ, confirms our position, that from the Jewish system alone the idea of the God-man could not be engendered. There are two opposing elements in Philo's system ; on the one hand there is the strictest monotheism ; God is an absolute, simple and unchangeable being. On the other hand, there is the pagan notion of an emanation from God, which seems to relieve this idea of a purely abstract God, and to bring him into a more intimate connection with his creatures. But between these two elements Philo is never at rest. As soon as there is an emanation, it is taken back again. He has and he has not a difference between God and the world. And he also exchanges the ethical element, which distinguishes the Hebrew conception of God, for the physical element, which is one of the characteristics of Paganism. And as to the Logos of Philo's system, it is difficult to maintain the position, that he is a different hypostasis from God, having a middle position between God and the world. To regard him as a distinct hypostasis would be repugnant to Philo's severe monotheism ; and the passages which seem to favor this view can be explained on a different supposition.¹ Still more opposed is he to any idea like that

¹ We wish it were in our power to give even an abstract of the thorough discussion of Philo's system, which extends to nearly forty pages in the original. The import of this Logos, as is well known, is one of the vexed questions. High authorities, as Lücke, Ritter and Semisch take a different view from our author. The questions are two : 1. Whether the Logos of Philo is a personification or an hypostasis ; 2. Whether Philo considered this Logos as really divine. The whole question has more bearing upon the doctrine of the Trinity than upon that of the Incarnation. As far as Dörner's argument is concerned, the originality of the

of an incarnation of the Most High. And though some faint traces of the expectation of a Messiah may be found in his pages, yet they are with him only a traditional reminiscence, for they are inconsistent with the whole spirit of his system. His whole philosophy, while it is employed in discussing the great problems which the revelation in Christ was intended to solve, and while it has many phrases which sound almost like Christianity itself, is yet in its fundamental principles and inferences wholly alien from the Christian faith. It is only a *fata morgana* hovering uncertainly over the horizon where Christianity was to arise. Yet being employed speculatively about the same problems which Christ was in reality to solve, his philosophy may not only, in God's providence, have prepared the way for the Gospel, but also had an influence afterwards in giving shape and color to the Alexandrian speculations about the person and the work of Christ.

Thus we have seen that the Old Testament religion, neither in its earlier Hebrew nor in its later Jewish form, and this last neither in Palestine¹ nor in Alexandria, had such a view of the relation of God to man, that from it anything like the doctrine of the Incarnation could be directly derived. But if they could not conceive of God as taking human form, did they not, going from the other extreme, have the idea of a man who had divine attributes? The divinely illuminated Hebrew prophets, in the Servant of God, (עֲבָדֵי יְהוָה,) give the ideal of a man; he it is who is to be a perfect example of righteousness; he is not merely a servant, but is in the closest fellowship with God; but it is difficult to prove, even from Ps. 2: 7, that he is represented as being in his essential nature the Son of God, in the sense in which this phrase is used in the New Testament. He is, indeed, not merely the representative of Israel, but *the* servant; and the three-fold theocratic office, of king, priest, and prophet, is laid upon him, as it could be upon no common mortal. The powers and attributes as-

doctrine of the God-man in the Christian system would not be at all affected, even if the Logos of Philo and the Wisdom of the Proverbs were admitted to be distinct hypostases. That does not touch the question of the union of the human and divine natures in one person. Nitzsch in the *Studien und Kritiken*, for 1840, takes and ably maintains the ground, that in the "Wisdom," and also in the "Angel," of the Old Testament, we have at least the beginning of a distinction immanent in the Godhead. His argument upon this point, against Lücke, is one of great thoroughness and philosophical accuracy.

¹ In the fantastic and mystical Adam Cadmon, (or primitive man,) and in the Memza, (Word,) the Shekinah and the Metatron, we have either no real hypostasis, but only transient or symbolic manifestations of God; or if it be personal, like the Metatron, it is still a creature. To the idea of an incarnation of what is truly divine none of these representations have attained.

signed to him reach forward to a higher sphere; and what Isaiah prophecies of his effectual and vicarious priesthood surpasses all the power of any one man. In Daniel's vision we have the highest majesty ascribed to the Son of Man, but he is rather to be taken as a representative of Israel (9: 27) than as a man. Thus, though there are traces and indications that are in harmony with the full reality,¹ it is not so far anticipated, that one who knew only the Old Testament could say a man is God, or the Son of God, in a proper and metaphysical sense.

In the Hebrew religion, then, while we find those elements which when carried fully out and brought together would give us the idea of the God-man, we do not find them so carried out and united. Unite the Wisdom or the Logos, which expresses the idea of God revealing himself, with that ideal of the Servant of God, which is the highest view of man that the Jews possessed, and we have the basis of the Person of Christ. But this the Hebrew religion did not do, and, therefore, though it was seeking after the great reality, it did not find it until Christ himself appeared.

In this review, now, of the religions which preceded the coming of Christ, we find, that they are indeed, in the grandest sense, a *Præparatio evangelica*; and they prove that Christianity clearly announces the great truth which all religions are seeking after; but they also prove that the idea of the God-man first arose in all its fullness, not outside of Christianity, but within it; and that it is therefore one of its peculiar characteristics. This idea is original and essential to Christianity. It began with a fact, and it was the fact which gave the knowledge.

A new principle was introduced into the world when Christ appeared. The origin of this can only be ascribed to Christ himself, to what he declares respecting himself, and to the declarations which his inspired apostles made respecting him. He who was in the beginning with God, and was God, assumed human nature. Faith in him was the life of the new church. The church believed in him and trusted in him implicitly. They had the truth respecting him in its totality, but not in its fully developed form. It were unnatural to suppose, that from the very first, in all parts and parties of the church, the whole of what belongs to the fully unfolded idea of the God-man was expressly, and with a full sense of its import, ascribed to Christ. To add the more strictly definite terms, to bring out the whole idea

¹ Dr. Dörner here seems to have sacrificed something of accuracy to the purposes of his argument.

in all its relations, was reserved for other times. What was first presented in the simple form of faith was to be unfolded so as to meet the wants of the intellect, and to satisfy the demands of reason. And this process is one of the highest importance; it is that which constitutes the proper historical development of the doctrine. In it the church, especially of the first centuries, was always guided by a sure tact, which was supplied by the vitality and energy of its faith; and this it was which gave it that clearness and firmness in its final doctrinal decisions upon this subject, which have caused them to be freely received by the great body of the church, in all its branches, through so many centuries. In framing these decisions, then, it is not strange that they should even maintain, that they were adding nothing new, but only expressing the same ancient truth in a competent form, to meet new questions and controversies. Thus, while it would be incorrect to say, that the doctrine of the Incarnation was held by the body of the church in the same form in the fourth century as in the second; yet he who would on this account infer that the later form was wholly of human origin or untrue, would only prove his ignorance of the organizing and plastic power of a new principle, and his want of a historical sense. But this position needs to be more definitely applied to our doctrine.

That universal tendency to ascribe to Christ an exalted majesty, which was found in the lowest form of ancient Christianity, as well as in the highest, and which could not rest until it had declared the consubstantiality of the Son and the Father, has its ground in the very essence of Christianity. That such a Hebrew as Paul, in the face of his strict Jewish monotheism, could ascribe to Christ divine attributes, is inexplicable, unless we suppose there had been a mighty and total change in his religious conceptions. And all the early Christians were of one heart and mind, such was the power of their new-wrought faith, in putting the Person of Christ into the closest and most living relation to the Father. In the Son they had found the Father. But there was in them, even in the earliest, so far as we can infer from Scripture and history, a difference in the degree of knowledge which they possessed as to the exact relation between God and Christ. Some of them, whose culture was more universal and whose susceptibility for the loftiest views was more intense, express this relation more perfectly than others.

In the canonical Scriptures we do indeed find all the elements fully given. And it is the peculiar office of the history of the doctrine to show how the different elements which are there laid down, and which are the norm for all times, were successively and fully unfolded in the

progress of the church. No generation of the church, and least of all the first, has had in a developed form the full wealth of the apostolic revelation; over all the generations the word of Christ and the apostles extends as a sufficient norm to the end of days. To say that the Scriptures are a part of the process of development, is to put them in a false position. They contain the germs of the whole process; they give it its *impulse*.

In the received canon of Scripture, there is a difference in the different books and writers as to the mode in which this doctrine is announced; combined with an essential unity. The grand, fundamental position is in them all; but there is what may be called a higher and a lower type of the same doctrine. The former is given us in the writings of Paul and John. Of these two, Paul presents us with the new Christian element more in its relation to and distinction from the Old Testament views; while John, though he has the Old Testament also before him, brings out the doctrine in its adaptation to, and distinction from the Hellenistic conception (1 John 5: 20, 21). In respect to them there can be no doubt that both in their earlier and later writings, they ascribe divinity to the Son not merely in a moral but in an essential sense, and that they view the relation of the Son to the Father not only as "economic," but also as ontological or metaphysical; so that Christ, with the Father and the Holy Ghost constitutes a sacred triad. The real humanity of Christ is no less clearly presented in their epistles. The new idea of the God-man is thus fully recognized by them, and their writings give it to us in its highest type.

The second type of the doctrine, contained in our canonical Scriptures, is found in the first three evangelists, and in the writings of James, Peter and Jude. But in this type also we find the essential elements, which are necessary to the doctrine of the person of Christ. The synoptical evangelists may be considered as of special importance, since the proclamation of the gospel did not begin with doctrine so much as with history, in which doctrine was enveloped. We find now, in these Gospels, that Christ is usually designated as the Son of God and as the Son of Man. The former is used in three senses: in a physical sense, to designate his nature; in a moral sense, to declare his perfection; and in an official sense (in which both the others are comprised), to show his work, as Messiah. He calls himself, also, the Son of Man; and this expression is without force, unless we consider him as employing it in contrast with the consciousness he had of a higher nature; while it also refers to his peculiar and special relation to the race—he is *the* Son of Man, not of *a* man. As both Son of God and of Man, he is called Son in an eminent sense; the only Son

of God, so that even when his disciples were present, he could say *my* Father, and not *our* Father. He forgives sins; in the form of baptism he puts his name with that of the Father; he has power to send the Holy Spirit; he alone knows the Father, all other men know the Father through him; all power is given to him; in all space and time he is present; his coming is to be the end of the world; he is the judge of the world; for all eternity, the Son of God and Man is to be the centre of the Christian's blessedness. Such is the Person of Christ, in the first three Gospels. The boldest passages of John have their entire parallel in the other evangelists; and some of their strongest passages have no parallel in John (Matt. 9: 2—6. 28: 18—20). And though the pre-existence of Christ is not as distinctly declared in them as in the other parts of the New Testament; yet their full faith could not be expressed in any other form, nor are there wanting indications of their belief in this point. (Luke 7: 35. Matt. 12: 19. comp. Prov. 8: 11: 27. Luke 11: 49 compared with Matt. 23: 34. Matt. 13: 17. Luke 10: 23, 24 compared with John 8: 36 seq.

The author next proceeds to an examination of the epistles of James and Peter, on which special reliance is placed by those who claim that the early church was Ebionistic, and shows that these apostles held a form of the doctrine wholly inconsistent with such views; that they too, like the first three evangelists, possessed the essential elements in the doctrine of the person of Christ. Our space forbids us to follow him in this course; and it has also prevented us from giving more than the briefest summary of his full and able exposition of the Christology of the synoptical evangelists. It is a cheering contribution to the Biblical argument upon the subject.

Thus far we have been considering the two propositions which it was proposed to maintain: that is, that in none of the ancient religions did the elements of the idea of the God-man exist in such form, that they detract from the exclusive claim of Christianity to its possession, although it is the very idea after which these religions are seeking; and, in the second place, that in the earliest records of the Christian church, we find this idea described as realized in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is original with Christianity, and essential to it.

Being given in the Scriptures as a norm, containing such diverse elements, ushered into a world where there were so many conflicting views and tendencies, and where men were busied with the very problems which it was the purpose of this new revelation to solve; it becomes an inquiry of the greatest interest, how this new doctrine would be received and judged. And here is where the historical process of the doctrine commences. What then, we proceed to ask, was the

course and reception of this doctrine in the early church, where it at once came into the midst of two great, conflicting tendencies, those of the Jewish and the Grecian culture.

In considering the history of a doctrine there are two points that need to be carefully impressed. The first is, that the impulse to the development is given by the doctrine, as taught in the Scriptures. This is the seed. This is the origin of the whole. Unless we assume this, the entire history has no vital principle. The second point is — that it is unhistorical to suppose the whole early church to be as fully in possession of the whole doctrine in all its parts and relations, as was the church at a later era, or as it is found in the writings of the apostles, which are the standard for all times. The truth will rather be found to be this; that if there are two or more types of the same doctrine, the lower form will be the one first unfolded in the history of the church; and the higher form will be realized in its full import by the church as a whole only after a long process of discussion and controversy. And this is a natural order. Thus in respect to one doctrine, the lower type, while it still contains the essential elements of the truth, contains them in closer alliance with the views which prevailed, before the new idea was introduced into the world. This type would then probably be the one first discussed, and which would be most congenial to the general associations, especially of the Jewish Christians.

It is further worthy of notice, that the truth is not revealed in the Scriptures in the dogmatic form, but rather in the form of testimony, testimony in word and deed—the form best adapted to the purpose for which the Scripture was given, to awaken faith in the heart. But this does not prevent, nor detract from the necessity of also having the truth in a proper doctrinal form. It is in the nature of Christianity to penetrate the whole man. And he that would except the intellect, and remain content with implicit faith, deprives faith itself of its rights, since in all faith there is an element of knowledge. Testimony, the mere proclamation of the word, is indeed enough to lead the sinner to faith in Christ; and it has done this in all centuries. But the world — historical energy and influence of Christianity are not adequately recognized, where this is made to be all; it is also the office and duty of the church to increase in knowledge, to present its faith in a scientific form; and this, when done, reacts healthfully upon the faith itself. A scientific and philosophical view of Christianity is an absolute good, and essentially contributes to make man more perfectly conformed to the image of God.

But in order to reach this philosophical form, a long and severe process is necessary. It is a hard work. The revealed truth, imbibed by faith, comes into hearts already prepossessed by other notions. It comes among nations who have the widest diversity of opinion, derived from their schools of philosophy, or from their previous religious views. All these the new truth is to remould. It is to conquer their errors; but before it can conquer, it must contend.

Thus was it eminently with the doctrine of the person of Christ, when it was introduced into a world where Jewish or Hellenistic speculations respecting the nature of God and of man had full possession of all minds and hearts. What the radical conception of the two were, we have already seen; we are now to point out, in general terms, how the new truth would be received and affected by the old. We think it will appear that these influences, though they at first had a disturbing effect, contributed in the end to the consolidation of the doctrine; and the fact that they thus contributed, will be an additional proof of the power of this new idea; while the way in which the discussions were carried on and finally adjusted, will further show the difference of the new truth from the more ancient speculations, as also its adaptation to confront and overcome them.

Suppose now, that a man educated in the Jewish system had come, by faith, to know Christ as his Redeemer. He believes in Christ with all his heart. In the Son he has found the Father. There is, then, a close relation between the Son and the Father. What is the nature of this relation, would be his first inquiry, when he came to reflect upon his faith. In interpreting this relation, or the expressions by which the inspired apostles denoted this relation, he would naturally call to aid his previous views and opinions respecting the nature of God and of man. His Christian thinking would naturally be clothed in his traditional forms of thought; at least he would, by way of trial, endeavor to bring the new truth into connection with his former habits of reflection. Thus it would also be with the Greek. And the difference between these two circles of thought would be so great, that different parties would arise, there would be conflict between the two. But though there is a conflict, there is also a common element in them both, the new Christian faith. This faith, as we have seen, proclaimed in the doctrine of the person of Christ a truth, after which both Jew and Greek were seeking, yet which they were not able to find. On the one hand, in its description of Christ as the Messiah, as prophet, priest, and king it harmonized with and carried out to its fullest expression, the elements contained in the Jewish system; on the other hand, in

the idea of the Logos, it came into close affinity with the Hellenist.¹ The Jew would be attracted by those elements which allied it to his previous creed, but he would be repelled by the statements which gave it currency with the Greek; and the Greek would, in like manner, be both attracted and repulsed; attracted by that which the Jew would not be so willing to receive, and repelled by that to which the Jew would most naturally cling. The doctrine of the person of Christ would thus stand, as it were, in the centre between two conflicting tendencies; and it would prove its divine origin by gradually drawing the two together, as to a common centre. Thus it would show itself to contain a truth higher than either, yet adapted to both; and so persuasive and prevalent was it, that it at length drew together these two opposing tendencies, and made them one in the confession of the truth as it is in Jesus. And in this confession are contained the elements which animated the two contending parties, expressed in a higher form, and brought into a state of perfect union, and realized in the person of the God-man.

Had there been only the Greek tendency, this doctrine could never have been brought out; for the Hellenist had no definite sense of the personality of God, or of his highest moral attributes. On the other hand, had there been only the Jewish tendencies, these were too severely monotheistic, to allow them to come naturally to such a truth. Had the Greek and the Jew met in conflict, there would have been perpetual warfare, but no common or reconciling central truth. That reconciling truth was given only in the manifestation of God in the flesh.

Christianity thus solved the great problem which these two parties were discussing from opposite points of view. It contains the substantial truth of these two religions; since in the doctrine of the person of Christ it gives us the difference as well as the unity of the divine and the human, and thus leads to more correct views both of the nature of God and of man. Is heathenism seeking the apotheosis of human nature? In Christ it is given, for here is a *man* who is God. Is the true Jewish tendency that which seeks the completion of the revelation left incomplete in the law? This is given it in Christ, for in him is the revelation of the depths of the divine condescension and love; *God has become man*. Here is the point where the bond of unity between God and the world, which heathenism was always looking af-

¹ Hence, on the one hand the sect of the Ebionites, and on the other the influence of the Alexandrian philosophy, in the early church.

ter, is fully exhibited; but it is so exhibited, that the material notions of heathenism are entirely obliterated, and that the personality as well as the holiness of God, which are the great ideas of the Old Testament, come to their perfect expression: The highest view of man which heathenism could form was, that he is of divine off-spring, in a purely natural sense; but in Christ we have a man, who is not merely divine in nature, but all whose words and acts are divine; both in an ethical and natural sense, he is the Son of God. And thus he was fitted for his great work of reconciling man with God. And as far as man himself is concerned we have also, in the Christian view of his new life, a higher truth than ever Jew or pagan knew — and a truth which corrects and reconciles the highest conceptions of both. The pagan speaks of man as divine, without reference to his moral state; the Jew insists upon his obedience to the external law, without first and directly insisting upon a total change in his spiritual condition, upon his being made a partaker of the divine nature. Christianity would make men both in nature and in act to be the children of God and the brothers of Christ; but in opposition to heathenism, it enforces a moral likeness, and in contrast with the legal principle it demands a spiritual regeneration. And in demanding this spiritual and moral renovation, it annuls the heathen assumption that we are already by nature so closely connected with God that we need no moral change; while it also exposes the futility of that righteousness which comes from external conformity to the law. Thus the old man dies and gives place to the new, who by the grace of the Holy Spirit is made a partaker of the divine nature, and through the Son received into the fellowship of the Father. Man becomes the Son of God in a sense which neither Jew nor pagan ever conceived; and thus does the Christian faith rebut the errors which each held, and bring out the truth which reconciles the two, and which also leads man to a state of reconciliation with God.

But before the full truth could be received, it must contend against prevalent errors and partial principles. When introduced into the world it encountered masses of Jewish and heathen prejudices. It dissipated them, not by a sudden magical stroke, but by severe toil. The principle which gave life to the error lost its exclusive influence wherever Christianity was really embraced; and the innate and victorious power of the new principle is seen as it diffuses itself through a world filled with error, and forms a new world of its own.

To trace this triumphant progress of the doctrine of the Person of Christ is the appropriate office of a history of this doctrine. The animating principle of this history, as we have seen, is the new rev-

elation which was given to Christ, and which is laid down in the canonical Scriptures as a norm for all ages. Starting from this point, the history has to do, not with the simple faith of the church, which has been more nearly the same in all its centuries; nor yet alone with the successively framed confessions of faith, for these are but the condensed summary of ages of discussion; but the appropriate work of such a history is to exhibit the process and progress of human thought, as employed about the new revelation. It will show how men speculated upon a novel and grand truth; how they were often bewildered and led astray by their previous views; how the truth at length obtained full mastery; how its various elements were successively developed and combined; in a word, how that which was originally given in the form of faith, came to assume also the form of system and of science; how it came to be dominant in human reason, as it was from the first dominant in the human heart. And that historical view of this doctrine would be the true one which should be able to depict how it was introduced into the full current of human thought and feeling, and, with a quiet confidence in its ultimate victory, subjected to misrepresentations and perversions without number; and how it there worked still and constant, sinking deeper and deeper into the human heart, until when the hour had struck, it emerged in its grand and victorious progress, and, suddenly, as by enchantment, the bands fall from the eyes of Christendom, the mists are dispersed, and the radiant image of Christ stands forth in fuller form and glory than ever before. Such an exhibition would be a true one, for it would be animated by the same pulsation which beats in the history itself. Such a history will give the *development* of the doctrine in both its parts; it will show how the human or lower element was unfolded. To neglect this would be the Docetism of historical narration. It will also exhibit the evolution of the higher and divine element, for to neglect this would be the Ebionitism of an historical narration. Between these two tendencies the doctrine pursued its course; so to describe it is the duty of the historian.

The whole course of the doctrine is to be divided into three distinct periods, each of which has its special characteristics.

The *first* period comprises the first four centuries of the Christian church. It begins with the general consciousness that in the Person of Christ the divine and the human are united. Starting from this general assumption, the church proceeds to establish the concrete ele-

ments which respectively belong to the idea of what is divine, and what is human. These two extremes being thus brought into direct contrast, it then becomes necessary and possible, still further, to inquire into the *mode* of their union. This is a *necessary* inquiry, because in proportion as the differences of the two are distinctly discovered in that same measure will the unity, from which they first started, seem to be endangered, and to need a fuller exposition. It has also then only become *possible* to answer this inquiry, because there could be no adequate conception of the mode of the union before the differences of the elements which are to be united had been clearly defined.

The *second* period, now, proceeds to perform the task, for which the first has prepared the data, and it works with these data. These data are — the elements which belong to the idea of what is divine, and the elements which belong to the idea of what is human, both of which distinct elements have been combined in the great position, that in the Person of Christ are two distinct natures. Starting from the distinction of the two natures, this period would investigate the *mode* of their union in one person. The fact of their union is assumed. But so long, now, as there is such a conception of the divine nature as excludes all union with the human, or the converse, so long will this union be imperfectly recognized in the Person of Christ; that is, the two factors will not have equal rights conceded to them. One epoch will be liable to give the preponderance to one side, and another to another. These two epochs are found historically prescribed. One of the characteristics of the dogmatic views of the period before the reformation is that the divine (the theological) element has the preponderance; equally remarkable is the preponderance of the human element over the divine in the centuries after the reformation. Thus our second period naturally falls into two epochs; between them stands the Reformation, whose wide historical significance in relation to our doctrine consists in this, that while it retained the substance of the theological truth of ancient times, it also opened a free course to the attainment of a correct knowledge of what belongs to human nature. Thus the period of the Reformation, continuing the two sides, is a testimony against the one-sidedness both of the earlier and the later epoch. It contains the essential elements of an era which was to introduce a new order of things. It is freed from the exclusive theological tendencies of the scholastics, and it bears testimony against the too great partiality for the human nature of Christ, which has been so prevalent in the later centuries.

Finally, the *third* period, which begins with the commencement of the nineteenth century, has for its peculiar and special problem to exhibit the person of Christ, as the perfect union of the divine and the human, with a full recognition of the difference as well as equilibrium of these two elements.

ARTICLE IX.

REMARKS ON CERTAIN ERRONEOUS METHODS AND PRINCIPLES IN BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

By Prof. B. B. Edwards.

A MORE sober and just method of studying the Bible may be among the favorable results which will flow from the the political revolutions which are taking place in various parts of Germany. Some essential and salutary changes in the general habits of thinking and modes of investigation may be expected. We confidently look for this valuable moral product from these political strifes. The grounds for this encouragement are various. In the first place, a profounder and more practical religious feeling may be awakened. This was one result of the wars which followed the first French Revolution. It is said that there are indications in various parts of Germany of more earnest religious emotion. The "present distress," the uncertainties which hang over all earthly things, have led some to look for "a city which hath foundation." A natural consequence of these awakened sensibilities will be a more reverential regard to God's written word, a profounder conviction that it is infallible and eternal truth. In the multifarious and conflicting systems of morals — each containing more or less of important truth — which have rapidly succeeded each other, in the attractive and exciting political theories which are now brought forward, not a few of which, on experiment, will be found insufficient or baseless, there may be a yearning of the heart for the simple truths of the Bible, a desire to place the feet on the rock of ages, a craving for an *objective* guide that cannot mislead. In other words, a revived sense of practical religion implies that serious state of mind without which the Scriptures will not be used aright, and will, therefore, be misinterpreted.

In the second place the Germans will become a more practical people. They now enjoy a much larger degree of civil liberty than at any former time. The responsibility of governing masses of people, of maintaining order, security and the rights of property, will be devolved, to a great extent, on the people themselves or their direct representatives. Now it may be safely asserted that all who undertake to govern men, or in other words to maintain law and public order, will find the Christian religion indispensable, not a vague, shadowy, merely subjective religion, but a positive faith, which has definite articles, and is susceptible of external proof. A republican government of any considerable duration, is inconsistent with the effects of a rationalist interpretation of the Scriptures. A despotism may be sustained in the absence of Divine revelation, or in methods of interpreting such a revelation which really undermine all its authority. But the supreme power cannot be made dependent on the popular will unless that will is enlightened by some trustworthy, objective truth, and is made willing to bow to its teachings. It is yet to be proved whether a desirable republican liberty can be maintained where the Christian Sabbath is not regarded as a Divine institution binding on all men. If it be placed in the category of things which are expedient, if learned theologians are willing to consider it as a remnant of Jewish prejudice, then so far is it doubtful whether a people can be entrusted with the political sovereignty. If the States of Germany are destined to enjoy popular forms of government, then of necessity there must be introduced into the German character a much larger infusion of practical good sense. And if this result shall take place, the imperative necessity of a scriptural education will be felt, an education based on the belief that the Bible is really, the whole of it, an infallible Divine revelation.

The reasonableness of this expectation might be argued, in the third place, from the influence of political and historical studies, and of the pursuits of civil life. The great historians and statesmen of Germany have felt far more profoundly than many theologians, the importance of a fixed standard of religious faith and the insufficiency and worthlessness of that vaunted "higher criticism," which would disintegrate the Scriptures and rob them of their objective importance. We refer to such illustrious statesmen and writers, both among the living and the dead, as John Von Müller, Heeren, Niebuhr, Lüdén, Leo, Von Savigny and others. "A protestant Christian is nothing to me," says Niebuhr, "who does not hold the historical of Christ's earthly life, in the proper, literal sense, with all its wonders, and holds it as historically certain as any other event belonging to history, and

is as calmly and firmly convinced of it; who has not the most steadfast conviction of all points of the Apostles' Creed in their literal sense; who does not consider every doctrine and every command of the New Testament as an undoubted Divine revelation. A Christianity after the manner of the modern philosophers and pantheists is nothing to me; without a personal God, without immortality, without the individuality of man, without an historical faith, it is nothing to me, although it may be a very clever and acute philosophy. I have often said that I will have nothing to do with a metaphysical God, and that I will have no other than the God of the Bible, who is heart to heart."¹ In the studies of a statesman, who has been seriously engaged in the administration of public affairs, there is an earnestness, a depth, a comprehensiveness, a wisdom most favorable to the reception of evidence such as that by which the Scriptures are supported, and for which we shall look in vain to the closets of many professed theologians.

The same result may be anticipated, in the fourth place, from the new fields for study and effort which will be opened in Germany, and the consequent diminution in the number of those who shall pursue theological studies. The schools of theology in Germany have been greatly overstocked. Every department, district and corner of the theological field has been searched. All conceivable questions, all possible ramifications, all imaginable aspects of the science, it should seem, have been the subjects of earnest study, many of them of separate essays. Of course novelty is sought rather than truth. Startling theories have been brought forward, rather than consistent results, or well-balanced opinions. Notoriety must be secured at every hazard. A name, perhaps daily bread, must be earned at all events. A subject is studied laboriously rather than comprehensively; effect is sought more than utility; ingenious disquisitions are the result, not well adjusted and wholesome thoughts. Hence Germany may be said to be filled with books rather than with wisdom, with theological treatises rather than with theological knowledge. The mind has been in an unnatural state, put upon the stretch for subtleties or wire-drawn distinctions or novel modes of exhibiting an old error. When a patient, truth-loving disposition is wanting, solidity or value can hardly be expected in the products of thinking or of investigation. To this cause is to be attributed not a little of the neology which disfigures and corrupts the sacred literature of Germany. The Strauss-es, the Baur-s, and the new Tübingen school, may not be actuated so much by hostility to the gospel as by a prurient love of startling nov-

¹ *Lebensnachrichten über B. G. Niebuhr*, II. 344.

elties, a morbid desire to show how far the "higher criticism" can carry one. The main cause of the mournful attacks on the gospels is not that malignant hatred which characterized some of the English deists, or that impious levity which ruled in the French school. Some of these neologists are men of excellent temper, of the kindest feelings, and of unexceptionable morality. They have been led to seek to undermine the Christian faith, partly at least from wrong mental habits; and these habits have grown out of the peculiar political circumstances of the country. Thousands have pursued theological studies, have written on the most holy mysteries of the Christian faith, who had little moral fitness for this work, who ought to have been earning an honest livelihood in some civil profession. Multitudes, almost without number, have essayed to comment on the Bible, with as little moral qualifications for the work as a common versifier would possess who should undertake a *Paradise Lost*. The purity of heart, the honesty of motive, the reverential fear, the desire to accomplish an important practical good are not there. Such commentators necessarily fail. Instead, therefore, of being awed by their learning, or dazzled by the boldness of their propositions, we need only to examine their arguments with patience, and we shall be convinced how unsubstantial they are. In such a combat David may enter the lists with the proudest Philistine.

This leads us to remark, once more, that the dissolution of the union between the church and the State, which is likely to follow these political changes, will exert an auspicious influence on theological learning. If rulers, resembling in character the counsellors who control the Swiss cantons, or some of the grand dukes of Germany, possess the right of naming theological professors, how is it possible that the fountains of Divine truth shall remain uncorrupted? The church, in its most vital interests, is in the power of a radical and godless reformer, or of a more polished, but not less dangerous skeptic. If the appointing power happens for the moment to be evangelical, then the chairs of theological instruction will be filled with men of the spirit of Hävernack and Tholuck. But if the civil government is in the hands of worldly or infidel politicians, as it is more likely to be, then no pen can adequately describe the evils which will flow from a theological fountain poisoned at its source. On no point is the union of church and State fraught with greater calamities. The theological departments of the German universities have often in this way been filled with men who had not the slightest moral fitness for their station.

Now with mental and national peculiarities such as we have indicated, with an organization of the theological departments in the universities, such as has long existed in the German universities, we might expect that modes of theological investigation, principles of biblical inquiry would be adopted, which would lead to sad results in weakening, if not subverting, all faith in Divine revelation. Before, however, we enumerate some of these erroneous principles, it may be proper, in order to prevent misunderstanding, to allude to the great obligations which all Protestant nations are under to the biblical scholars and theologians of Germany. No person of candor, who has any knowledge of this subject, will deny these obligations or wish to abate from their value. The true Christian scholar will welcome light from every possible source, and will not consider it necessary to maintain his character for orthodoxy by any illiberal and unworthy prejudices.

First, we are indebted to the Germans for an immense accumulation of valuable materials. Germany is a storehouse crowded with spoils from every region of the earth, from every province of inquiry. Her libraries are receptacles of most elaborate speculation and of widely gathered knowledge. On all the subjects which have a near or a remote relation to theology, on almost every topic which is at all kindred to it, the scholars of that country have toiled with incredible patience. In this affluence of materials, one needs especially the power of a wise selection, the ability to sift the wheat from the chaff. Still, secondly, not a little of these theological treasures is admirably simplified and digested. Indeed the scholars of no country are so fond of *methodology* as the German. In respect to clear arrangement, the grammars and lexicons of the Latin, Greek, Hebrew and other languages have been constructed with surpassing ability. The grammars and lexicons of Zumpt, Freund, Kühner, Buttmann, Thiersch, Pape, Gesenius and others, are the common property of all in Christendom worthy the name of scholars. So it is in dogmatic theology and in church history. The manuals of Hahn, Hase, Bretschneider, Hagenbach, Gieseler, etc., stand at the head of the list in their respective departments, not only for the value, but for the scientific arrangement of the materials. Then, in the third place, we have the advantage, which is by no means inconsiderable, of possessing truths which have come unharmed from the sharpest conflict, views which are the product of the keenest comparison, gold that has been seven times purified. Every truth which is admitted in Germany, we may be sure, has a firm foundation, because it has come uninjured from the

hardest fight. Many positions, capable of the amplest defence, have been given up; those which remain, though they be few in number, challenge our instant and cordial belief, because they have been put to a fiery trial in every form. If any part of the Scriptures is acknowledged by the German to be authentic, then we may be sure that it is so; if there were a weak place in the evidence, it would have been infallibly detected. And in cases where the authenticity or genuineness of a passage has been given up, on insufficient grounds, there may be no ultimate loss. Truth does not fear the sharpest scrutiny. And it is no mean advantage to the Christian cause, that its opponents have been men of eminent learning, of the keenest powers of criticism, and of practised ability in sifting evidence.

Again, it is not without its advantages, that the truths of religion and morals have been investigated by German theologians, who are so unlike those of England and France, theologians so learned and so marked by idiosyncrasies. We obtain aspects of truth which we might never otherwise reach. A door is opened into treasures on which we might not otherwise gaze. The peculiarities of the German scholar become, in this way, productive of good. In the final result, we possess profounder and more comprehensive conceptions of truth than were otherwise possible, in the same manner that we obtain a more adequate and truthful view of the French Revolution by tracing it on the pages of the German historian, as well as on those of the English and French writers.

These advantages, however, have been attended with serious evils. The peculiar intellectual and religious culture of Germany has given birth to mental habits and modes of investigating truth, which are unsound and pernicious.

I. The first to which we will allude is the erecting of a standard of judgment, often termed "the higher criticism," to which everything is made to bow without appeal. If an assertion or a narrative will not abide this test, they are summarily dismissed as unworthy of attention. If an ancient document cannot stand this arbitrary and fiery ordeal, it receives sentence of condemnation at once. An objection to this highly vaunted standard, is its uncertainty. Who has defined it? What are its necessary bounds and metes? It is a varying quantity. On approaching it, it recedes, so that we cannot grasp its form or colors. With one writer it may mean one thing; with his neighbor, another. A second objection is, that this "higher criticism" has been set up as a standard in a country and in a period where the spirit of skepticism and doubting in regard to all ancient

monuments has been carried to an extraordinary and unwarrantable length. The influence of Wolf and Niebuhr has been injuriously extended to a department of ancient knowledge with which they had little to do. A spirit of suspicion has been breathed over all ancient writings, because some have been found spurious, or because a little flaw has been detected in a trustworthy document. Nothing is incorrupt if anything is corrupt. This skeptical tendency has become a national characteristic of German scholarship, a tendency which as really unfits one to set up a standard of criticism, or to judge fairly of a literary production, as the easy faith or the superstitious credulity of the Roman Catholic. In a school of criticism founded in such circumstances, we cannot place confidence. Candor, fairness, a large and honest view of a subject, and a truly comprehensive judgment, are sadly wanting. Again, this standard of criticism has been erected on a basis almost exclusively *subjective*, on the strength of individual feeling and opinion, without much regard to objective truth or external testimony. The "spiritual philosophy" has prevailed to such an extent in Germany, it has so pervaded all departments of thought, it has so colored and shaped all the aspects and tendencies of the mind, that evidence drawn from history, from human experience, from the tangible and visible universe, and from the honest and every-day feelings of common men, is neglected or is unknown. German culture has been, to a melancholy extent, a *one-sided* culture. It has embraced only a part of man. We cannot expect, therefore, a standard of criticism entirely just and reasonable. True rules of judgment in matters of taste, or in matters pertaining to any department of literature, can be found only in proportion as all mental phenomena and all the facts of human experience are taken into the account.

II. Another erroneous principle in biblical interpretation is, the setting up of one's own feelings, or intellectual and moral judgment, as the final arbiter. Thus a miracle is to be rejected because it is psychologically impossible. A narrative is pronounced to be a myth, because it does not coincide with our observation or experience. The state of mind in which a seer could foretell future events, is inconceivable, and is therefore to be denounced. We cannot imagine how an individual can be under the immediate influence of a malignant spirit and retain his free agency; consequently, we must abandon the doctrine of a personal evil spirit. Thus we set up ourselves as the ultimate standard of appeal. Nothing that will not stand the test which we have assumed, is worthy of belief. At the bar of our judgment all alleged facts, the minutest and the most stupendous events recorded in history are to be tried. By the light of our own conceptions, a uni-

verse of truth is to be accepted or disowned. The sun could not have stood still on Gibeon, if it is at variance with our preconceived notions of what is practicable. There must be an error in the alleged number of the Israelites who marched through the wilderness, as the physical difficulties would be insurmountable. The miraculous conception of Jesus presents embarrassment to the interpreter, which he sees no means of overcoming.

Now one difficulty connected with this standard of judgment arises from the want of an accurate perception of the true province of reason. Alleged facts are summarily rejected because we cannot perceive their consistency with other facts, or because we cannot precisely determine the mode of their existence and operation. They do not really contradict each other, but simply rise above our comprehension. Another difficulty is, that we do not clearly distinguish the reason from other powers or qualities with which it has little to do. The light of this faculty may be compelled to pass through a murky atmosphere. A thousand influences may come in to mislead us. What we imagine to be the decision of an unbiassed intellectual faculty, is compliance with the spirit of the times, or results from a dread of giving offence, or is one method in which our idiosyncrasy is revealed, or it is one of the thousand aspects in which prejudice shows itself. Again, a fruitful source of error lies in our ignorance of what is fit and becoming. We have not the power to transport ourselves into the distant past, and reproduce states of society which no longer exist, or with which we are not familiar. The miracle is incomprehensible because we are unable to understand the state of the society for whose benefit it was performed. A book of the Old Testament (*Canticles*, e. g.) has no divine authority because we cannot see the utility of it. It affords no spiritual nutriment to us, therefore it is psychologically impossible that it was ever intended for the spiritual benefit of any portion of our race. Civil and political usages were tolerated under the Jewish theocracy which would not be borne now. Wars were authorized at which the philanthropy of the present age stands aghast. A perfect Being could not take delight in these scenes of barbarism and bloodshed. The Scriptures which profess to give the Divine sanction to them, could not have proceeded from God. Now in this way, we make our own limited experience, our own culture, our states of mind, modern and occidental habits and feelings, the rule, the fixed standard, with which distant ages, states of society, manners and customs totally different, must be made to square. Obviously erroneous as such a standard must be, inapt and unanalogous as such methods of comparison necessarily are, yet they have constituted the favorite standard, the constant source of

appeal, consciously or unconsciously, to hundreds of learned commentators. The biblical books have been subjected to a system of interpretation which has been applied to no other productions. A bill of rights, a legal document, any ancient parchment or scroll, are explained according to certain well known objective rules, acknowledged and approved by all. Nothing would be considered more preposterous than to expound the Twelve Tables, Magna Charta, or an American Constitution, according to the personal feelings of the reader, or the subjective tendencies and habits of different annotators.

III. Another erroneous method of interpretation may be termed the monotonous or mechanical. It represents the sacred writers as shut up to one stereotyped style, to a diction confined, as it were, by iron clogs and clasps. Moses could not have been, in any sense, the author of various parts of Genesis, because the style and language are not run in the same mould. The book of Deuteronomy is thrust down several centuries, because it has a different complexion from the other portions of the Pentateuch. A Psalm is assigned to the Maccabean period, because it has a few Chaldaisms, or half a dozen phrases which are not found in other compositions that are supposed to be earlier. The two parts of Zechariah have not the same author, for there are striking differences of expressions in the earlier and later chapters. The three Pastoral Epistles are not Paul's, for they contain scores of words that do not appear elsewhere. John, the apostle, did not write the Apocalypse, as the Greek is quite foreign to his Gospel and Epistles. Thus the beautiful form of scriptural truth has been dislocated, marred, patched up, and amalgamated in a way which shows a most lamentable ignorance of the operations of the human mind, and of a thousand phenomena in literary history. A multitude of facts and considerations may be adduced to show the absurdity of the rule in question. Advancing age very often produces important changes in one's style of writing. In general the fancy and imagination become less prominent; the judgment, the reason, common sense, give tone and direction to the style. Copiousness of words gives place to copiousness of ideas. An individual at twenty-five years of age delights in a flowery, or an anti-thetic, or an ambitious style; at forty-five his compositions are remarkable for condensed energy or mathematical precision. At the same time there are instances where the reverse of this is true. The style grows more picturesque and lively with advancing years. The later writings of Burke have much more exuberance than his Essay on the Sublime. The sharp trials of life, the bitter sorrows which fall to the lot of most literary men, exert a mellowing influ-

ence on the course of thought and on the diction ; there is more depth, sincerity and power of impression ; words take their shape and coloring from the heart. New occasions, too, sudden emergencies, fresh fields of thought and effort, presuppose changes in the style. Paul addressing the uncultivated Galatians and Paul writing to his beloved Timothy, would be expected to vary his language somewhat. The heart of the same apostle, when he was on the eve of his martyrdom, would overflow with tenderness and solemnity ; new words would naturally be introduced ; a patriarchal solicitude would lead to earnest repetitions. This would account for some of the differences which exist between the book of Deuteronomy and the other four books of the Pentateuch. In the case of the inspired writers, new revelations, more powerful operations of the Spirit, a deeper insight into divine truth, would create a necessity for new words, new phrases and an altered style. These causes would occasion the same changes as might occur in merely human productions where the authors were making rapid progress in knowledge, or adopting new methods of culture. The three Pastoral Epistles have many peculiarities ; but not more than the epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians. The first epistle to Timothy is said to contain eighty-one of what are *ἀναξ λεγόμενα* ; the second, sixty-three ; the epistle to Titus, forty-four ; the epistle to the Philippians, fifty-four ; that to the Galatians, fifty-seven ; the epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians together, one hundred and forty-three.

Why then should we create an obstacle to the authenticity or genuineness of the books of the Scripture, where none exist ? Why should we apply a rule there which will apply nowhere else ? Why do we single out a volume from the vast treasures of literature, and try to maintain that its authors shall be confined to one monotonous, unvarying diction, while in all other literary productions we are charmed with the freshness, the ever varying shades of style and diction ? On what grounds must the inspired writers be denied the liberty of adopting new modes of speech, phraseology fitted to new exigencies of thought and outward life, when the utmost liberty is taken by writers of ancient and modern times ? The fact of inspiration in the one case and mere natural power in the other, would not materially vary the result.

IV. It is maintained by some critics, "that faith in Christ can set no limits to critical investigations, otherwise faith would hinder the knowledge of the truth."¹ In other words, the declarations of our Lord

¹ See Vater's Comm. III, 829. De Wette's *Einführung* ins. A. T. p. 226

in regard to historical matters, his references to the facts of the Old Testament may be true or they may be erroneous. Criticism must proceed on its independent course in accordance with these declarations, or in opposition to them, as the case may be. But can we judge of the Old Testament separate from the New? Is not historical criticism compelled to find some of its most important materials in the records of the New Testament? Has it not been established with more certainty than any other event recorded in ancient history, that Jesus Christ came into the world, that he perfectly obeyed the law of God, was full of grace and truth, that in his lips was no guile, that he never accommodated himself to the sinful prejudices of his countrymen, and that all the words he ever uttered are worthy of the most implicit belief? Is not criticism then compelled to admit these facts and act upon them? Are not his declarations in regard to the Old Testament to be credited without any misgivings? Would he propound as historical facts what he knew to be mere Jewish fables, or uncertain traditions, out of deference to the common belief of his countrymen, or from his unwillingness to disturb their prejudices? No right-minded man will believe any such thing. Every one capable of estimating evidence, or of discriminating fable from facts, must admit the truth, the historical truth of the Gospels. If he admits this, he must also admit that our Lord would not and could not deceive. But he did deceive, if he affirmed those things as historical verities which never occurred. Our faith in Christ must rest on historical facts. It is not a mere subjective feeling. It has its basis on the personal character of the Redeemer, on his truth, his veracity, his perfect knowledge of all past events, on his unshrinking honesty. Historical criticism, therefore, on the Scriptures cannot act independently of faith in Christ. His testimony in regard to the Old Testament is one of the main elements which must come into the account. His word is unerring and decisive.

V. We advert to one more fact, which may be indicative rather of a wrong state of feeling than of an erroneous method or principle of interpretation. We refer to the tone of confident assurance with which a critical judgment is pronounced, the decisive, if not contemptuous air with which an alleged erroneous theory is discarded. The manner of the neological critics in this particular is strikingly analogous to that of certain modern writers on the prophecies, who lay down their propositions as if they were mathematical axioms, who seem to have no more doubt that they have arrived at the truth on some most difficult and recondite themes, than if they were the subjects of inspiration themselves. It has been commonly supposed

that modesty is an attribute of genius; that deference to the opinions of the great and good of past ages is not inconsistent with the progress of knowledge or with independent investigation. Most men of genius, the great thinkers, the profound inquirers, have written under the conviction that the human mind in its best estate is not infallible, and that an overweening confidence is one of the surest marks of error, or of superficial thought.

As an illustration, we may select the assertions of some of the modern critics in relation to the authorship of the Pentateuch. Lengerke has the courage to say: "The question whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch should no more be raised by those who have in themselves any consciousness at all of the development of the history." De Wette subjoins: "The controversy can now be only in respect to the time of the post-Mosaic authorship."¹ Now we suppose that these critics would consider of no account the nearly unanimous opinion in favor of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch which is held by the scholars of Great Britain and the United States. These scholars would be set down, possibly, as still laboring under the prejudices of education or of traditional belief. But can the numerous body of learned scholars in Germany, Ranke, Hengstenberg, Drechsler, e. g., be classed in the same category? Is it given to the "liberal" critics of Germany to decide a momentous question for all Christendom besides? Are such summary and sweeping judgments indicative of that honesty and candor of mind which can alone lead to satisfactory results? Are they likely to be acquiesced in, especially when the critics themselves are by no means agreed as to the manner in which the Pentateuch should be dislocated, and its various parts rearranged, and in face, too, of the many corroborating proofs furnished by the Egyptian discoveries in favor of the antiquity and general truth of the Mosaic narratives? In short, assumption and an arrogant tone betray the weakness of the object for which they are enlisted, rather than furnish occasion for doubt and dismay to those who are not inclined to follow in the path which some of the modern critics have marked out.

¹ De Wette Einl. ins. A. T. p. 226, 6th ed.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS, AND MISCELLANIES.

Die Gegenwart. Eine Encyclopädische Darstellung der neuesten Zeitgeschichte für alle Stände. [*The Present. An Encyclopedical View of the latest History of the Times for all Classes.*]

UNDER this title the publisher of the *Conversations-Lexicon*, proposes to continue that work, from the point where it was left in the ninth edition, of which an account was given in the last number of the *Bib. Sacra*, pp. 778—790. It is a kind of supplement to that edition; but it has distinctive characteristics of its own, which give it special value. It is to be published in numbers, each of sixty-four closely printed pages, at the rate of two or three a month. The numbers may be obtained in this country for 12 1-2 cents each — twelve of them will form a volume, to the close of which will be appended a register. This will give a volume of nearly 800 pages about every six months, containing a thoroughly digested account of the events and subjects of the greatest interest in the present state of European affairs.

In this publication, greatly to its advantage, the alphabetical order is dropped, so that subjects can be treated of as they occur, while the interest in them is still fresh. It thus becomes a sort of review for the times. According to the prospectus, the plan proposed is to give an account of the most important movements in religion and theology, in philosophy and art; to discuss all questions that relate to politics, especially the social problems of the day; to give the results of historical research, as well as events in recent history; to communicate discoveries in all branches of the natural sciences, and detail the progress of the arts; and also to give biographical sketches of the leading characters of the age. To carry out this plan, the editor has engaged a body of able and competent contributors; and the numbers as far as issued, of which we have seen seven, show that the work will be both popular and thorough. It enters much more into detail than a regular *Lexicon* could do; but this is an advantage to him who wishes to keep up with the times. It treats, for example, very minutely of the revolution in Paris; it gives a full narrative of the contest between the Russians and Circassians; it supplies a history of the various socialistic and communistic schemes.

The thread of historical narration is generally taken up with the year 1840; though, wherever necessary, it runs further back. Perhaps the best view of the work will be obtained by giving the titles of its Articles: The French Revolution of Feb. 1848; the German People, as distributed over the Earth; the Social Movements of the Times; the Newest Discoveries in our Planetary System; the Eastern Provinces of Prussia, in relation to other Nations; the right Constitution of Armies in a National Spirit; the Geographical and Political Position of Italy in Relation to other Nations; Bavaria and its King, Louis I.; the Christian State; the Street-Fight of Paris, in June, 1848; State-Service and State-Officers; Schamyl and the Holy War in the Eastern Caucasus (the Circassian war); Socialism and Communism, in France; the Higher Burgher School; David Frederic Strauss; the Political Relation of the Jews in Germany; the Cavaignac Family; the Occurrences at Mayence, in May, 1848; the German Navy. It promises, in the subsequent Numbers, articles on the Cholera; Archduke John, the Vicar of the Empire; the Russian Bakic Provinces; the Gagern Family; the Death-Penalty; Labor; Chemistry and Medicine; the Preliminary Parliament, in Frankfort; Würtemberg; Louis Blanc; Pestalozzi; the Caucasus; Afghanistan; Prussia, under William the Fourth.

The historical value of such a work will be apparent from this list of its subjects. Its articles on society and political matters are candid and thorough, and on the liberal side. If we may judge of its theological position by its account of Strauss and his works, we should deprecate its influence in this respect. It is not impartial nor neutral, but shows decided leaning to his subversive criticisms and speculations. And, in point of fact, much of the liberal spirit of Germany in politics is connected with anti-Christian elements. Political freedom is not there born of a zeal for religious liberty, as it was in England and America.

The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences of the French Institute is engaged in the publication of a series of small treatises upon social and political movements and theories of the day. In the preface to the first of these tracts, an account is given of the origin of this enterprise. The "chief of the executive power," general Cavaignac, summoned the president of the Academy, M. Charles Dupin, to invite that body "to concur in the defence of those social principles which were attacked by all sorts of publications. Being persuaded that material order could not be re-established by means of force, if moral order were not also re-established by means of true ideas, he thought that the only way of pacifying men's minds was by enlightening them." The Academy accordingly appointed

a commission to carry the plan into effect, composed of MM. Cousin, de Beaumont (afterwards replaced by de Tocqueville), Troplong, Blanqui, and Thiers. M. Blanqui was sent to the manufacturing cities of Marseilles, Lyons, Rouen, and Lille, to investigate the moral and physical condition of the working population. A series of publications was also commenced, to be issued by Didot, in numbers of from 60 to 100 pages, and sold at 40 centimes each. The first of these is by Cousin, upon Justice and Charity—showing that these are the two pillars of all social order, that neither is right without the other. He traces most of the false systems of morals and politics to the exclusive reliance upon one of these elements. He applies these principles, with skill and clearness, to many of the questions of the times. The second treatise is on Property, according to the Civil Code, by M. Troplong. The tendency of a true democracy is asserted to be, the confirmation of the right to property. Despotic and aristocratic societies alter the rightful conditions of property; but the merit of democracy is that it respects and guards all the natural rights of men, and all that man obtains in the use of these rights. "Liberty is necessary to acquire property; equality makes it sacred." The foundation of the right of property, the different theories respecting it, are ably discussed. It is interesting to notice the tribute paid to the merits of Locke and Reid, in the course of this treatise. The third number is on the Causes of the Inequality of Riches, by M. Hippolyte Passy, who has recently been made Minister of Finance by the new President of the Republic. These are all the treatises we have seen. It is also proposed to treat of the family and its organization; of the condition of the different classes of society; and of the main points in social economy. All these tracts are written in an enlightened and philosophical spirit, yet in an eminently practical manner. They seem well adapted to carry into effect the aphorism with which the Introduction ends: "The first right of a people is the right to the truth."

Under the same auspices we also have some 25 pages of "Popular Philosophy, by Victor Cousin," as a preface to the republication of the first part of Rousseau's Confession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar. Cousin sets this Confession over against the Social Contract. In this Popular Philosophy, he lays down his own confession, in clearer terms than he has ever before done, of his faith in the freedom, the spirituality, and the immortality of man, in the supremacy of the moral law, in the being and moral attributes of God, in the necessity of obedience to conscience, and of a religious life. The contrast between such a series of publications, and those which were published in the era of the first Republic, is signal and auspicious.

Commentar über den ersten Brief Pauli an die Corinthier, von J. G. Osiander. Dekan in Göppingen. pp. 830. Stuttgart, 1847.

The most recent Commentaries on the First Epistle to the Corinthians are those of De Wette and Meyer, in their Manuals, Heydenreich, Flatt, Olshausen, Billroth, and Rückert. Special topics have been discussed by Baur, Schenkel, Dähne, Goldhorn, Becker, and others. Osiander has been well known, for some years, as an acute and learned theologian, partly by his Apology for the Life of Jesus, in opposition to Strauss. The Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians is said to be the fruit of many years' study. "We here meet," says Kling, "with a beautiful and rare combination of the theological and philological element, a copiousness of learning, a solid and fine grammatical culture on the principles of Buttmann, Kühner, Lobeck, Hermann, Winer, etc., a true use of the materials which the ancient, the modern, and the most recent interpreters have furnished," etc. His position is that of a decided believer in inspiration.

Wilhelm Gesenius' Hebräische Grammatik. Neu bearbeitet und herausgegeben von E. Rödiger. Fünfzehnte Auflage, Leipzig, 1848. pp. 316.

We give the editor's Preface to this Fifteenth edition: "In the midst of the pressure of great political events, in which, unquestionably, the day of freedom for our German father-land dawns, I do not find an inclination to multiply words, in order to introduce a scientific work, completed under the roof of a dull, peaceful repose, to a Public absorbed with higher struggles and cares. I content myself with saying that, in this new revision of a book, whose usefulness has been sufficiently proved by the rapid exhaustion of an extraordinarily large edition in the form which I gave it, I have been at the pains to make it more worthy of the favorable reception which it has found. Throughout the book, individual improvements and additions will be found; so that, with all the saving of type, the number of pages in this edition has been somewhat enlarged. More important alterations have been made, e. g. in §§ 21, 40, 41, 44, 49, 52, 68, 86, 117, 145." The 14th edition contained 303 pages. In the paper and printing the last edition shows decided improvement.

Biblical Hebraica, nunc denuo recognita et emendata ab Isaaco Leeser, V. D. M. synagogae Mickve Israel, Phila. et Josepho Jaquett V. D. M. Presbyter Prot. Epis. Eccl. U. S. Novi Eboraci. Sumptibus Joannis Wiley, 1849, 8vo. pp. 1416.

This Bible is designed to be an exact reprint of Hahn's edition. Much

pains appear to have been expended by the editors in collating it with the editions of Athias, Van der Hooght, Vatablus and Opius, and with the various readings of Kennicott and De Rossi. In securing typographical correctness, careful use has also been made of the labors of W. Heidenheim, who published very accurate editions of the Pentateuch, Psalms, and fragments of other portions of the Bible. How far this edition is free from errors can of course only be determined by time and careful examination. The bringing out in this country of so handsome an edition of the entire Old Testament, edited apparently with so much care, and accuracy, is certainly an honor to the publisher, to the editors, and the country. The type is large and distinct, and the appearance of the page is grateful to the eye. In the copies which we have examined, the paper is so thin that the impression of the type is seen on the opposite page. This fault can be rectified, as the work is stereotyped. The price of the volume is three dollars. We hope that the undertaking will be liberally remunerated.

The Harmony of the Apocalypse with other Prophecies of Holy Scripture. With Notes and an Outline of the Various Interpretations. By the Rev. William Henry Hoare, late fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London. John W. Parker, 1848, 8vo. pp. 227.

"The text of the Apocalypse is placed in one column and in another a combination of passages from other parts of Scripture most nearly agreeing with it, both in expression and in subject-matter; — and thus forming a kind of Scripture Paraphrase to this book." Explanatory notes are added at the bottom of the page, and in ten brief appendices various matters are discussed. The author speaks very respectfully of the Commentary of Prof. Stuart. The great political events of the times seem to have given a fresh impulse to the study of the prophetic Scriptures in England.

A Dictionary of the German and English Languages. Compiled from the works of Hilpert, Flügel, Grieb, Heyse, and others. By G. J. Adler, M. A., Professor of German in the New York University. D. Appleton & Co., 1849, 18vo. pp. 1162.

This Dictionary is printed with uncommon care and taste. The paper is fair, and the type and the arrangement of the articles are such as to strike the eye pleasantly. The book, too, is apparently printed with great accuracy. The German and English part occupies 840 pages, and the English and German 522. This preponderance of the German portion over the English is a great advantage. Indeed, we could wish that the English part were entirely excluded, and its place supplied with

more copious explanations and illustrations of the difficult German forms and phrases. A valuable peculiarity of this Dictionary is that several hundred German synonyms are explained. There are also an alphabetical list of the irregular verbs, and a full dictionary of German abbreviations. Many scientific and technical terms have been incorporated. Though we have not been able to test the merits of this dictionary by practical use, yet it appears to have been prepared with conscientious fidelity, and with an intelligent appreciation of the wants of the multitudes now studying this noble language.

Among the interesting books in press or in process of preparation in Germany, are the *Life of Schleiermacher*, by Dr. Jonas, of Berlin; some supplementary numbers to *Winer's Bible Dictionary*, containing drawings, illustrations, etc.; the concluding parts of *De Wette's Manual*, embracing the epistles of James, Peter, Jude, and the Apocalypse; a *New Testament Lexicon*, by Dr. Winer; the concluding number, long promised, of *Gesenius's Hebrew Thesaurus*, by Rödiger; the continuation of the excellent *Critico-Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament*, by Dr. H. A. W. Meyer, of Hanover, (the last volume being on the Epistle to the Ephesians, and the second edition of the first volumes extending to the Acts;) the conclusion of *Becker's Manual of Roman Antiquities*; the 3d volume of *Brandis's History of Greek and Roman Philosophy*, and the second of *K. F. Hermann's History of the Platonic Philosophy*; etc.

PUBLIC LIBRARIES. The number of public libraries in Europe is stated at 383; of these, 107 are in France, 41 in Austria, 30 in Prussia, 28 in Great Britain, 17 in Spain, 15 in the Papal States, 14 in Belgium, 13 in Switzerland, 12 in Russia, 11 in Bavaria, 9 in Tuscany, 9 in Sardinia, 8 in Sweden, 7 in Naples, 7 in Portugal, and the others in the remaining States. The number of volumes in the libraries of the chief European cities, compared with each 100 of the respective population, is as follows:

Weimar,	800	Parma,	278	Edinburgh,	116
Munich,	750	Prague,	168	Petersburgh,	108
Darmstadt,	652	Berlin,	162	Brussels,	100
Copenhagen,	465	Madrid,	152	Stockholm,	98
Stuttgart,	452	Paris,	143	Naples,	69
Dresden,	432	Venice,	142	Dublin,	49
Hanover,	335	Milan,	135	Lisbon,	39
Florence,	313	Vienna,	119	London,	20
Rome,	306				

Publishing Statistics. By the publication of the "Catalogue of Books published in Great Britain during the Year 1847," and by other informa-

tion, derivable from the Publishers' Circular, the following statistical information is obtained as the result of the printing and publishing speculations during the year; but it is necessary to observe that many books, old and new, are from time to time reprinted, of which reprints no authentic information is obtainable. This being the first attempt at any such statistics, there is no doubt the system may, in future years, be improved upon and enlarged, and therefore be usefully applied. There have been published, during the year,

3414 new works, the advertised selling price of which amounts to	£1135
579 new editions, " " " "	200
<hr/> 3993	<hr/> £1335

These comprise 4251 vols., of which 56 are folio, 135 quarto, 162 imperial and royal 8vo, 1320 demy 8vo, 310 post 8vo, 2010 12mo *et infra*; containing, altogether, nearly one million and fifty thousand pages, exclusive of numerous illustrations on steel, copper, wood, stone, etc. 135 of these works are printed in Scotland, and 64 in Ireland. 482 are Pamphlets; and 102 single Sermons, Charges, etc.; but Periodicals, Law Reports, Reviews, Magazines, and Newspapers, are not acknowledged.

Nineveh and its Remains, with the accompanying Monuments, 100 plates, folio, by Austin H. Layard, the 5th and 6th volumes of Grote's History of Greece, and the 4th and 5th volumes of the new edition of Thirlwall's Greece are published.

The following are among the more recent theological and classical publications in the United States, and works now in press:

Rational Psychology; or the Subjective Idea and the Objective Law of all Intelligence. By Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary of Auburn, N. Y. Derby, Miller & Co., Auburn, 1849. 8vo. pp. 717.

A First Book in Greek; containing a full view of the forms of words, with Vocabularies and copious Exercises, on the Method of constant Imitation and Repetition. By John M'Clintock, D. D., Prof. of Languages, and George R. Crooks, M. A., Assistant Professor of Languages in Dickinson College, Pa. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1848. 18mo. pp. 315.

Man: his Constitution and Primitive Condition, by John Harris, D. D. Boston, Gould, Kendall & Lincoln.

Hours of Christian Devotion, by A. Tholuck, translated by Rev. William Hall, 1 vol. 8vo.

An Account of the Dead Sea Expedition, under the charge of Lieutenants Lynch and Dale, 2 vols. Harpers.

A new number, completing the first volume of the Journal of the American Oriental Society.

A Complete Dictionary of the German and English and English and German Languages, by Dr. G. J. Flügel, American Consul at Leipsic, containing all the words in general use, in 2 vols. 8vo. Third edition.

A new Latin Lexicon, in one large octavo volume, is in the process of preparation, by Prof. E. A. Andrews, one of the Authors of the Latin Grammar. It is to be a translation or condensation of the great work of Freund. The third number of Klotz's Lexicon, extends from *Animus* to *Augustus*, making 208 pages.

A complete Alphabetical List of all American Publications since 1820, 8vo. pp. 350 or 400, with more than 15,000 titles, by O. A. Roorbach.

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ARTICLE I.

SPIRITUALITY OF THE BOOK OF JOB AS EXHIBITED IN A
COMMENTARY ON CHAPTER XIV, EXAMINED IN CONNECTION
WITH OTHER PASSAGES.

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THE chief point of interest in this portion of Holy Writ is found in the touching interrogatory contained in the fourteenth verse—*If a man die, shall he live again?* It was to be expected that the un-evangelical or Grotian class of commentators would give the least spiritual view of this and other similar passages. Critics of this kind generally profess to be, beyond all other expositors, free from any bias that may lead to results not sanctioned by the most legitimate principles of hermeneutics. And yet it may be maintained, that even they, with all their boasted claims to fairness and freedom from prejudice, do actually start with a prejudged theory, which modifies, controls, and in many cases, suggests the very interpretations on which they so strongly insist as arising directly from the *usus loquendi*, or strict philological examination of the text.

They too, we maintain, have *their* prejudged theory. They start with the assumption that neither the writer of the book of Job, whoever he may have been, nor the age, nor the country in which he lived, could have had any idea of a future, separate, spiritual state of existence, much less of any future judgment, much less of any resur-

rection of the body, and still less of any Divine Redeemer to appear in the flesh.

By the light of this theory, opposed as it is to what we know of the most ancient nations mentioned in profane history, must its advocates, of course, decide all questions of probability. When, therefore, they meet with passages, which, as far as grammatical interpretation is alone concerned, may present either a spiritual or a naturalistic aspect according to the side from whence they are viewed, such interpreters do not hesitate to adopt the latter as the most easy, the most obvious, the most in accordance with what they assume to be the *usus loquendi* of the writer, and of the age in which he lived. What makes this, in some respects, the more strange, is the fact, that such an unevangelical view is held the more firmly by those who insist upon bringing down the date of the book to the latest period,—even to the time when, according to another of their favorite theories, the Jews themselves began to learn the doctrine of a future life from the nations among whom they had been led captive. These nations, too, they can believe, had long been in possession of it, whilst the chosen people of God had never risen above the grossest materialistic belief in our merest animal existence, and had never exhibited the least trace of that which forms the first essential element of spiritual religion.

We may keep very far from that extreme which finds almost any doctrine of the New Testament in the book of Job, and yet believe, both from external and internal evidence, that it manifests a higher spirituality than has generally been conceded to it. The internal evidence of this kind may be concisely presented under three heads.

1st. *Its pure moral theism*, embracing such sublime views of the Divine purity, holiness and uncompromising righteousness, as have never, in any other age or country been found associated with materialism in respect to man.

2d. The positive doctrine of a spiritual world as presented in the introductory chapters, and to which we may rightly attach a similar inferential scholium, namely, that the belief in angels, or sons of God, and ministering spirits, and evil demons, has never since been found joined with that remaining dogma of the Sadducean creed which denies a separate spiritual life of the human soul.

3d. The revelation of an antagonism going on in this spiritual world for the trial of our moral integrity, which representation necessarily suggests the correlative idea of some great beneficent heavenly power contending on our behalf against the evil adversary, thus making probable what have been regarded as Job's allusions to a Redeemer, or Messiah, and also rendering easy of belief the supposition that he

sometimes speaks of deliverances connected with another state of existence.

Under these general heads we would briefly present a few introductory inferences, which the reader is desired to keep in mind throughout the whole of the following interpretation. The true key of the poem, we assume, is most naturally to be sought in the first two chapters. Nothing could seem at first view, and on almost any view, to be fairer than such a position as this; and yet it has been strangely overlooked by almost all who have written on the book. In these introductory chapters, there can be no doubt of an intention to bring before the mind, in some way, vivid ideas of invisible or spiritual beings, and of a spiritual world. This would seem clear enough as a fact in itself, whatever we may think of the manner of making the representation,—whether we regard it as subjective or objective, as mythical or real. The poem, most strikingly commences with the supernatural, the superhuman, and the unearthly. It also most impressively closes in the same remarkable manner. It is not easy, therefore, nor natural, to suppose that the intervening parts suddenly lose every trace of this character, and have reference only to *earthly* trials, *earthly* retributions, *earthly* vindications of the divine justice, and contain only a sort of Confucian morality, presenting the merest *earthly* manifestations of man's highest accountabilities. Again, it is hard to believe, that the writer meant to represent the great evil spiritual being as playing so important a part in these impressive opening scenes, and then that there should be not the least allusion to him in anything that follows. Among all other manifestations of religious belief, or in all other mythologies (to use a favorite phrase of the unevangelical school), *the doctrine of a spiritual world* inhabited by good and bad *spiritual agents*, has ever existed in conjunction with the idea of a surviving and separate future life for the human spirit. And so, on the other hand, as far as we can historically trace its effects, either as a philosophical or a popular tenet, a denial of such a separate and surviving human principle, or, in other words, *materialism in respect to man*, has ever, and from the very nature of the connection between the two dogmas, must ever ally itself with some species of *atheism in respect to the universe*. We do not believe that a pure *moral* theism, especially so sublime an aspect of it as is exhibited in the Psalms and in the book of Job, could exist for one century among a people who had no such belief in the soul as a separate essence surviving dissolution. Such a theism could have no *moral* sustaining power, and would inevitably soon sink down into a pantheistic impersonal naturalism.

In the view we have thus presented of the book, it would indeed be, what it has so often been styled without much meaning,—a *grand drama*, or rather epic,—a most sublime poetical representation in which revelation withdraws the curtain from *one scene* in that universal battle (μάχη ἀθανάτου) between good and evil, and between good and evil powers, which has been going on from the creation. In this sacred Iliad, if we may so speak of it, the field of the strife may be said to lie in the hopes, and fears, and faith of the tempted sufferer. The prize of victory is his moral integrity, in view of all the influences that might be brought to bear upon it both from the good and evil department of the spiritual or superhuman world. There is a more than Homeric grandeur of conception here. The ἀθλον proposed in this spiritual ἀγών is something far transcending that of the ordinary heroic.

οὐχ ἑρῆιον, οὐδὲ βοεῖν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ ΨΥΧΗΣ μύρνανται ὑψανύτοιο.¹

Again, this grand conflict necessarily suggests the idea of two chief antagonistic powers essentially pertaining to it. In respect to one of these the introduction, or argument of the poem, leaves no doubt. It is Satan, the old adversary, the enemy of man, the accuser, who is represented as roving to and fro in the earth, in search of the victims of his never sleeping malice.² Who then can be the other but HE, who, as we have good reason to believe, is repeatedly alluded to throughout the book? Who else can it be but Satan's ancient and everlasting opponent—The Only Begotten among the Sons of God—The Angel of the Presence—The Guardian Angel of the people of God in all ages—The Goel, or the Near Kinsman—The Angel Mediator—The Interpreter—The Witness on high—The Friend of man—The Divine Redeemer whose incarnation was promised away

¹ An accommodation or rather elevation of Homer. Iliad XXII. 161.

² It would certainly be very strange, as we have said, that Satan should never again be alluded to after the opening chapters, or that there should be no intimation of Job's having any belief or knowledge of the evil being, who was the immediate cause of all his miseries. We therefore think that there are such allusions in repeated instances, especially in those agonizing speeches in which the tempted sufferer is supposed to utter such violent and even blasphemous declarations against his Maker, but which, in reality may have been directed against his tormenting adversary! Of such a nature may be regarded those in Chap. 16: 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. In verse 11, he would seem to have in his mind's eye a company or legion of mocking fiends—"They have gaped upon me with their mouth," etc. In verse 11, ὁ ἄθεος, instead of *ungodly*, may be rendered, *The evil one*; and when thus viewed, compare it with ch. 1: 12. 2: 6. How natural then the transition to *The Friend on High*, verse 19.

back in the very beginning of the roll of revelation—HE “*whose delight had ever been with the sons of men, rejoicing always in the habitable parts of our earth*”—HE whose theophany, at some future period, was the theme of obscure tradition all over the eastern world—HE in whom (unless we are to discard the express testimony of the very men commissioned by our Lord for the very purpose of declaring the truth respecting himself), the most ancient patriarchs did, in some shadowy, it may be, and yet consoling, form, hope and believe.

But this is not the place for a full argument on this and the related subject. It is enough, for the present, to ask the reader to bear in mind, in connection with the following comments, a few suggested propositions, which will commend themselves, we think, to such as believe in the integrity and mutual relation of all the parts of God's word.

Without asserting that the doctrine of a future life, distinctly conceived, was the formal, habitual belief of Job and his immediate contemporaries, we may, at least, regard him as having occasionally recurring to his mind some such hope as Paul says the patriarchs possessed, when they called themselves pilgrims and sojourners upon earth, thereby professing to seek an unearthly *abiding place*, a city with foundations; which hope was grounded mainly on those oft repeated declarations, with one of which Christ confounded the Sadducees, “*because He was not ashamed to be called their God.*” With them a spiritual theism and a moral providence were connected with the hope of an abiding life for man; which hope necessarily grows out of the sense of such a relation to the Eternal One. So our Saviour taught the neologists of his day, when from one of the most common texts of the Old Testament (chosen because it was so common, and not because it contained any peculiarly recondite meaning), he showed the inseparable union of these truths with any scheme which had the least claim to be called a spiritual religion. Such a connection is also taught by reason and by that which is higher than reason, the human conscience. It may, therefore, be maintained, that it is not *improbable* that the soul of Job (even on the supposition that he lived in the days of the patriarchs) did, at times, in the midst of afflictions so adapted to drive him out of all earthly expectations, and in view of the dark dispensations of God in this world, revert to a more spiritual hope, although such hope might be of the most shadowy kind, and almost instantly lose itself again in the gloom of his desponding spirit. We say, then, that it is *improbable*, in view of all the considerations suggested, that Job should, under no circumstances, make allusion to the hope of another life.

Our second proposition is, that it is a *still more improbable* view which represents him (according to Rosenmüller and others) as *expressly denying* it; and not only that, but also as using terms which would seem to imply, that the thought could not be for a moment entertained, and, should it ever occur to the mind, must be silenced by the strongest form of negation. We may have doubts about the distinctness and firmness of his faith; but the supposition that would make him a dogmatic materialist, a stubborn denier of any spirituality in man, or of any connection with an unseen world beyond what belongs to the lowest *animality*—this, we say, ought to transcend the credulity even of the most obstinate rationalist.

The third proposition is, that both these improbabilities are greatly enhanced, even on the reasoning of the neological interpreters themselves, in view of that theory which brings down the writing of the book, if not the life of Job himself, to the later age of the Jewish State, or to a time near or subsequent to the Babylonish captivity.

Our ideas of a future life, generally, as one doctrine, and of the resurrection of the body as another, are usually kept tolerably distinct. It was not so, however, in the time of our Saviour. He himself, in his reply to the Sadducees, did not deem it necessary to view separately the then existing spiritual state of the Old Testament saints (as affirmed by him,) and their more distinct and higher life after the general resurrection. There was doubtless still more of this blending of the two ideas, or rather this dim accompaniment of the latter was still more obscurely apprehended, if at all, in earlier periods of the Old Testament history. And yet the idea once received of a renewed life for the spirit, it would seem to be most naturally followed by a shadowy hope, that the body also might, in some way, be a partaker of the same. It seems difficult on any other ground to account for the early and universal care manifested in the embalming, careful sepulture, and solemn funeral rites, which have ever attended the last disposal of the poor remains of our corporeal humanity. But it is time to commence our explanation of the chapter before us.

Verse 1. אָדָם יָלִיד אִשָּׁה — *Man of woman born*. An expression as Rosenmüller well observes, used to denote the frailty of our physical origin—*de infirmo stipite*. The same idea, ch. 15: 14, and 25: 4. *How shall man be just unto God; and how shall he be clean that is born of woman*. See Matt. 11: 11. Luke 7: 28, γεννητοὶ γυναικῶν. There are circumstances which have ever attended the first introduction of man into this fallen world, that seem to give peculiar emphasis to the expression which introduces this wailing lamentation over the weakness and darkness of our physical humanity. Whether a part

of the primal curse or not, there are scenes of anguish attending the human birth, and even of revolting deformity, which seem to await no other physical generation. They can only be alluded to, and our meaning cannot be better expressed than in the words of Plutarch's comment on the Iliad XVII. 446.

Οὐ μὲν γάρ τί που ἐστὶν ὀϊζυρώτερον ἀνδρὶς
Πάντων, ὅσα τε γαίαν ἐπιπνέει τε καὶ ἔρπει.

On which the philosopher remarks: *Τοῦτο οὐ ψεύδεται λέγων—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὕτως ἀτελὲς, οὐδ' ἀπορον, οὐδὲ γυμνόν, οὐδ' ἄμορφον, οὐδὲ μιᾶρόν, ὡς ἀνθρώπος ἐν γοναῖς ὀρώμενος, ὃ μόνον σχεδὸν οὐδὲ καθαρὰν ἔδωκεν εἰς φῶς ὁδὸν ἢ φύσιν· ἀλλ' αἵματι πεφυρμένος, καὶ λύθρου περίπλεως, καὶ φουενομένῳ μᾶλλον ἢ γεννωμένῳ ἰοικαίς.*—Plutarch De Amore Proliis.

יָמֵינוּ קָצֵר — *Short of days—brevis dierum.* מְלֵי צָרִים — *Full of commotion or excitement.* Jerome: *Repletus multis miseriis.* From the cradle to the grave, one scene of excitement and unrest. Compare the description given in the book of Ecclesiasticus or Wisdom of Sirach, ch. 40: 1, 2, 3, ἀσχολία μεγάλη—ζῆλος καὶ ταραχὴ—ὀλίγον ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν ἀναπαύσει.

V. 2. מִן הָאֵרֶץ כְּצֶחְקֹה — *He cometh forth like a flower.* The desponding mourner views man here solely in his physical relations. The allusion is to his mother earth. He cometh forth from her bosom and soon returns to it again. The term צֶחְקֹה also strikingly suggests a sort of scenic or phantasmagoric representation, as though the brief human existence were a mere *transitus*—a coming out from a dark past eternity, and a rapid passing in to a darker still to succeed. There is this thought, Eccles. 6: 4, יָקָם בְּהָבֶל בָּא בְּהָבֶל וְיָחַד בְּאֵרֶץ חֹשֶׁךְ — *He cometh in with vanity, and he departeth in darkness, and his name shall be covered with darkness.* He comes forth from one עֵלֶם, or *hidden state*, flits swiftly across the narrow isthmus of time, and seems to be lost in the great עֵלֶם that follows. In contrast with such a view, God is said to be, מִן הָאֵרֶץ לְעֵלְיוֹתָא, *ab eternitate ad eternitatem*, or as the LXX. express it, Ps. 90, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος σὺ εἶ.

יָחַד כְּצֶלֶל וְלֹא יִבְרָח — *He fleeth like a shadow, and abideth not.* The Greek poets are so full of these two most simple yet expressive comparisons, that we hope to be pardoned in presenting them at some length, although but little necessary by way of interpretation of a passage which so interprets itself to the conscious human sentiment. It is well to bring out comparisons of this kind, because they present a species of language which is confined to no one age or aspect of the world. It dates from the fall; it is found abundantly in the Scriptures

(see Ps, 103; 15. 90: 5. Job 7: 9. 13: 12, etc.) and in all the most ancient reminiscences of our world. This universal wailing cry could only have proceeded from some deep impression of a fall, from some consciousness of a strangely perverted condition, in which all the hopes and fears of the soul, its reminiscences of some heavenly origin, its conviction of a deeper inner life, and of the high moral importance of its relations to the Divine government, seem ever in strange contrast with its sense of the inadequacy, and inefficiency, and dream-like nature of its outward phenomenal existence. We find it in Homer, in the midst of all that pride of martial and heroic inspiration which would seem the furthest removed from any such humiliating confession of human insignificance.

Οἷε περ φύλλων γενεή, τοιήδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
 Φύλλα τὰ μὲν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δὲ θ' ὄλη
 Τηλεθώσα φύει· ἔαρος θ' ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη.
 Ὡς ἀνδρῶν γενεή, ἡμὲν φύει, ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει.

Iliad, VI. 146.

We might almost translate Homer here by David, and give a version of the passage in the very words of the Psalmist: *Frail man, (חֲנָנִי) as grass are his days; as the flower of the field, so he flourisheth. The wind passes over it and it is gone, and the place thereof knoweth it no more.*

The other comparison of the flitting shadow is still more common. *Man*, says the writer of the 39th Psalm, *walks in a shadow* (צֶלֶל), a shade, an image, a land of unreality. Watts, in his beautiful yet somewhat inaccurate version, has made it more conform to the idea of the present passage.

See the vain race of mortals move
 Like shadows o'er the plain.

A more striking resemblance may be found in the Ajax of Sophocles, 125.

Ὅρῳ γὰρ ἡμῶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἕλλο πλὴν
 εἶδωλ', ὅσοι περ ζῶμεν, ἢ κούφην ΣΚΙΑΝ.

The same, Euripides' *Medea*, 1220.

τὰ θνητὰ δ' οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἵγουμεν ΣΚΙΑΝ.

So again, in the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus, 1259.

ὣδ' βρότεια πράγματα· εὐτυχοῦντα μὲν
 ΣΚΙΑ τις ἂν τρέψειεν· αἱ δὲ δυστυχῆ,
 βαλαῖς θηρώσων σπύγγος ὄλεσεν γραφῆν.

which may be paraphrased—"Human life, when prosperous, is such a shadow, that even a shadow may turn it; or rather, a picture which a shadow may spoil (as it is admirably rendered by Professor Felton, in his edition of the Agamemnon), but adversity, like a sponge, blots out every lineament,"—that is, reduces again, to utter darkness, the visionary representation of human life, which gleamed but for a moment, to disappear in the greater obscurity.

In like manner, Pindar, Pyth. Od. VIII. Last Epod.

Ἐκάμεροι · τί δέ τις ; τί δ' οὐ τις ;
ΣΚΙΑΣ ἕναρ ἀνθρώπου—

Of a similar kind, although with somewhat different imagery, is Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1186, or that most striking passage, commencing—

ὣδ γενεαὶ βροτῶν,
ὡς ἑμῆς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν
ζώσας ἐναριθμῶ.

Even the light hearted Aristophanes joins in the wailing strain, and writes, in one passage, almost every epithet descriptive of the frailty, transitoriness, dream-like, shadowy nature of human life—

* Ἀγε δὴ φύσιν ἄνδρες ἡμανρόβιοι ΦΥΛΛΩΝ ΓΕΝΕΑ προσόμοιοι,
ὀλιγοδρανέες, πλύσματα πηλοῦ, ΣΚΙΟΕΙΔΕΑ φύλ' ἡμενῆνῳ,
ἀπτήνες ἐφημέριοι, ταλαδί βροτοί, ἄνέρες ΕΙΚΕΑΟΝΕΙΡΟΙ.

Birds, 686.

יִרְחַח — *It fleeth swiftly*. The image or shadow intended, is doubtless that of a cloud or vapor (καπνοῦ σκία, Soph. Antig. 1170) which seems to pass so swiftly over the plain, and which never, for a moment, stands (רַחֲבֹדֶד) or keeps the same position, but is ever passing away, as some of the old Ionic materialists said of *all things* — οὐδὲν ἔστηκε — πάντα πάντως κινεῖται. It is certainly true of man physically, and of the whole physical system. It *standeth not*, but is ever passing away. It reminds us of Paul's most solemn declaration—*"the fashion of this world (its σχῆμα, figure, outline, phenomenal being) passeth away; it abideth or standeth not.*

V. 3. אָפֶּלֶה — *Upon such an one*—on such a being, so frail, so transient,—on such a fleeing shadow, coming out of darkness and going into darkness, dost thou open thine eye? The expression may be taken *in bonam vel in malam partem*. An example of the former may be found Zech. 12: 4. Here, however, it is to be regarded as having the latter sense. It is *the eye of justice*, the ἐκδικαστικὸν ὄμμα of the Grecian drama. This is determined by the succeeding clause — וְאַחֲרַי תְּבִירָא בְּמִשְׁפָּט עֵינַי — *And bring me into judgment with*

thee? Compare Job 7: 8, *Thine eye is upon me, and I am not*; that is, I cannot endure it. In reference to the same idea, God is called the *watcher of men*, Job 7: 20, as the word נָצַר there should be rendered, instead of *preserver*.

There is no mode of expression which varies more, according to the accompanying conception or aspect in which it is viewed, than this kind of impassioned interrogatory. Under each such aspect, it admits of a widely different answer; and this, too, varies very much according to our view of the emphatic point of the question. Thus, there may be here imagined a threefold latent response. It may be the strong negative—*minime vero*—which Rosenmüller and Mr. Barnes so unhesitatingly regard as the true answer intended to the famous question, verse 14; and it would be difficult to say why this positiveness would not be as much warranted in the one case as in the other. This same negative answer, too, would vary much, according as we regarded the emphasis of the interrogatory as concentrated on the object, or the action, or the agent. Is it SUCH AN ONE that thou bringest, etc.? Again—Dost THOU bring such an one into judgment with *thee*? Or, thirdly—Dost thou bring such an one into JUDGMENT with thee? Is he an object not merely of thy general physical providence, like other insignificant parts of the creation, but also of a *moral* contest, and dost thou judge the actions of this brief temporal being by laws and principles eternal in their nature and their sanctions? In one case, and according to one assumption, the supposed negative answer would be the strongest affirmation, that man was not *wholly* such an one as had been described, and which description was doubtless intended as true of him, considered in his mere physical relations. It would be equivalent to asserting that there really is something more than this physical aspect, to be taken into our entire estimate of humanity; however ill defined may have been the conceptions of the interrogator respecting it. Again, on the assumption that man is *wholly such an one*, the same supposed answer would be a denial that God attaches importance to his moral conduct; or, in other words, that the good or evil that befel him had anything to do with any moral considerations. An assumed affirmative would give rise to a similar variety in the statement of its bearings. So also the question itself, as a whole, takes different aspects, from a consideration of the state of mind from whence it may be supposed to have emanated. It may be regarded, if we choose to take the lowest view, as the language of one who has no doubt of the mere *animality* of the human condition. It may be, on the other hand, the mode in which the clearest faith expresses its assurance that man has a higher being, and is related to a higher world

of truth than would seem from the contemplation of his mere phenomenal existence. It may, again,—and to this middle view the whole aspect of the passage forces us,—be rather a musing soliloquy, than any strong expression of belief or disbelief. It may be the language of one seeking to invigorate a desponding faith; or of surprise at some great conception which passes through the mind, seeming for the moment too great to be entertained, and yet too intensely solemn and interesting to be rejected. Can it be, that man has no higher destiny than this! Why, then, should God bring him into judgment?

V. 4. The same train of thought may be regarded as pursued in the succeeding verse—*מִי יָבִיא טָהוֹרָה מִתְּמֵחָה*—*Who can bring purity out of impurity?* How can holiness, or moral excellence, be derived from so low a state, from such a mere *physical* existence? How can any moral relations be at all connected with such a being?

We need not suppose that there passed through the mind of Job just such a development of this thought, as would now result from viewing man in the clearer light which Christianity and an improved philosophy have shed upon his moral existence. Still, may we believe, that in this musing of the spirit, the ground of the developed thought was there, and that in that germ was contained, *potentially*, all that will be ever brought out in its highest and most perfect manifestation. In reading and interpreting Holy Writ, we are not shut up to the precise measure of the conception, as it may have darkly existed in the mind of the ancient writer or speaker through whom any parts have been transmitted to us. To put ourselves just in their position—according to what some have styled the great law of Biblical hermeneutics—would be to forget that inspired revelation was actually, in some high sense, the product of the Eternal Spirit, and that, therefore, its fulness of meaning cannot be wholly bounded by the inadequate conceptions of those who were used as the medium of its utterance. Some check, of course, must be interposed to extravagant and false interpretation; and this is found in the safe principle, that the law above mentioned must be carefully applied to limit and define the external and internal circumstances attending the origin of the thought, and the true conditions under which it was first given forth. These must certainly be regarded as indicative and regulative of its true *nature*, if not of its extent, and as presenting the true germ of subsequent development. By the nature of the *thought* we mean—whether it is moral or physical, whether it has respect alone to animal and earthly, or to moral and spiritual relations, even though it be but the merest glimmering view of them, in their most germinal aspects. But when this has been carefully determined, then we are to make a distinction—

and a most important distinction it is—between the *thought* or *idea*, which may be expanded ad infinitum, and the *inadequate conception*, by which it may have been at first represented, or by which it may afterwards have been measured, according to the varying knowledge, or capacities, or circumstances of human readers. The former, in the largest extent to which it can be carried by finite faculties, and even far beyond them, may be regarded as the mind of the Spirit. This may be taken as the true *word*, in a sense as real and as much intended by the author of the inspired volume, as the more limited view of its meaning which may have attended its first utterance recorded in the Bible. We may even say, in a sense still more real and true, rising higher and higher, (after having been thus grounded in a true hermeneutical foundation, as the security against cabalistical, mystical, or visionary interpretations,) according to the reader's spiritual-mindedness, or his communion with that Spirit of Truth through whom all *γραφή θεόπνευστος* was given to mankind. In other words, we are bound to get at the sacred writer's *true thought*, as distinguished from every other, and as built upon the true historical or hermeneutical sense of the passage; but then we are not to be limited by his measurement of the *thought*, or to take his objective *conception* as the full interpretation of his own idea,—so as to regard this conception and nothing more as being alone *the word*, or as all that God intended to say to the church through him. The *Thought* has a true existence *per se*, for all mind, and independent of the particular mind through which it is originally given. Whatever soul possesses it, even with the feeblest *conception*, may, in one sense, and a most real sense, be said to have it all; and yet it may be far more fully *developed* in one mind than in another,—far more fully developed, it may be sometimes, in the mind of the scholar than in that of the teacher, in the mind of the reader than in that of the author, in the mind of the humblest gospel-enlightened student of the Bible, than as it presented itself to some of those holy men through whom God imparted his primitive embryo revelations in the earliest periods of our race.

Such a germ we conceive to be presented here. The thought would seem to have respect to our moral relations, and to be capable of immense expansion. It affirms that we are not beings of a day, by seeming to ask—*What would such have to do with the ETERNAL principles of moral obligation? How can moral purity be deduced from a merely animal or physical existence?* These ideas may have just gleamed upon the mind of Job, under circumstances so adapted to the springing forth of their germ, and then have passed away again as rapidly into the gloom of his despondency. Yet still it may be

maintained, that they are not only consistent with the context, but suit it the best of any answer that may be implied to his impassioned imagination. Compare the similar language, Job 7: 17—19, *What is man, that thou shouldest magnify him* (that is, make his action of great moral account), *or that thou shouldest set thy thought intently upon him; that thou shouldest visit him every morning and try him every moment!* So also the closing verses of the chapter just preceding—*Wouldst thou frighten the driven leaf? Wouldst thou chase the withered stubble; that thou shouldest write bitter things against me, and make me inherit the sins of my youth?* If he is *such an one*, why shouldest thou make him an object of thy constant providence, and bind him by the laws of thine eternal justice?

There is here an expressive force in the sudden change of the person, so common in the Hebrew—*And bring ME into judgment with thee*. By this the speaker, without any new declaration, fixes attention upon himself, as the being whose frail physical life seems connected with such wondrous moral and providential relations. It is also important, in a hermeneutical point of view, as striking evidence of the soliloquizing nature of the whole chapter.

V. 5. *חֲדָרָיו* *decided, decreed*; literally, *cut short*. It contains the same etymological metaphor with the Latin *decido* and Greek *συντέμνω*. There is a continuance of the same train of thought in the style of expostulation, strongly implying that this is not all of human destiny. *If his days are determined; if the number of his months are with thee; if thou hast made a decree which he cannot pass; if this indeed be so, and this is the whole of man, then—*

V. 6. *שָׁמַח בְּעֵינָיו*—*Look away from him*. It is to be contrasted with the expression above—*On such an one dost thou open thine eyes!* Compare Job 7: 19, *How long will it be that thou look not away from me?* Also Isa. 22: 4 and Ps. 39: 14 (in Hiphil), with the same sense and in a similar connection—*Avert thine eye from me, that I may enjoy myself before I go hence and be no more.*

יָחַד—*And let him cease—let him rest*. The same word is used below (v. 8) of the tree. This, and the meaning required Ps. 49: 9, seems to show that something more expressive is intended here, and would justify the paraphrastic rendering that has been given—*ut desinat esse ac vivere*. Take from him *thine eye of judgment*, and let him die (or, that he may die), *that he may* (at length) *enjoy like a hireling his day*. See also the use of the verbal adjective *יָחַד*, Ps. 39: 5 *Let me know the measure of my days*, *יָחַד יָחַד*. From the same idea comes the noun *יָחַד*, as used in the lamentation of Hezekiah, Isa. 38: 11—*I shall no more look upon men when I am with the inhabi-*

tants of *Hodol*—namely, the place of rest or cessation from all that occupies men in the land of the living. So also in Greek, ἀπολήγω and ἀπόληξις are used for death or the decline of life.

V. 7. *For there is hope of a tree, that if it be cut down, it will again spring up*—תִּחְיֶה. Few words in Hebrew are more difficult to translate than this, so as to give its true spirit in many places, by any one English term. It is rendered—to change, to pass through, to pass away, to perish, to disappear,—periit, prasteriit, abiit, transiit, evanuit, also reviruit. Its Hiphil and Kal senses are very much alike. In its most primary and general sense it may be defined as meaning to pass from one state to another; hence ever including the idea of phenomenal change, whether from life to death or from death to life. Thus, it may mean to perish, or pass off from the organized to the unorganized; also the contrary, from the unorganized to the organic state—to revive, or be renewed. Along with the idea of change, there is also generally implied that of suddenness. Thus, as it is used in Kal Job 4: 15, where it is rendered, “A spirit passed before my face,” there is evidently intended something more than that mere motion, which might have been expressed by עָבָר. There seems to be denoted one of those fitting and unaccountable transitions which are so common in dreams, and which we find it so difficult to define in language, or even to explain to our own thoughts—

“A change came o’er the spirit of my dream.”—In its Hiphil sense of renewal or substitution, it admirably expresses the transition intended in this place, and described more fully in the two subsequent verses. For a parallel use of the word, see Ps. 90: 6.

V. 9. מַיִם מִיִּדְּיָוָה. Rendered—*From the scent of water*. More properly—*From the breath*; or, more correctly still, *from the inhalation of water*; referring to the absorption of moisture through the fibres of the roots, which, in respect to the plant or tree, may be regarded as somewhat analogous to lungs in the human body. To preserve this analogy, water is treated as the breath of vegetable life; and thus it is said to revive, to breathe again—ἀναπύχειν to live a new life, whilst,—

Vs. 10. *Man dies, and loses the vital energy; man exhales* (ἐκπύχει), or gives up, his breath, and where is he! נָפַח is a word which seems evidently derived from the action it represents—expiravit, efflavit; like the Greek παν, or παφ, in κάπτα, κάφω, whence the Homeric phrase κενάφηότα θυμός—*gasping forth one’s soul*; see Iliad 5. 698. Odyssey 5. 468; hence the noun κάπης, Eolic κάπας, *breath*; also κάπνος, and the Latin vapor. On the same resemblance are built our English words *gape* and *gasp*.

שָׁפַח. This word is rendered, actively, to subdue, bring low;

passively, *to be subdued*. The primary sense seems to be *to weaken*, or *render powerless*; or, intransitively, *to become powerless*. In Joel 4: 10, we have the derivative adjective, in the same sense of *debilis*, *weak—without energy*. This seems well adapted to the context here. Its position after *ἔντα* is some evidence that it means a state or process posterior in nature and time to dissolution—something which follows death, and which therefore cannot be referred to the sickness or debilitation which precedes it. The rendering of our common version—*wastes away*—as though referring to the body in the grave, has nothing to warrant it in any other application of the word. We cannot help regarding it as having here, very much such a sense as the Greeks attached to their word *καμόντες*, when applied by them, not to the body, but to the departed shade, or ghost. As in the *Iliad* III. 278.

Καὶ οἱ ὑπένερθε ΚΑΜΟΝΤΑΣ
ἀνδρώπους τίνυσθον, ὅτις κ' ἐπιόρκον ὁμόςση.

So also the *Odyssey* XXIV. 16.

Ψυχαὶ εἰδῶλα ΚΑΜΟΝΤΩΝ.

Buttmann regards this as merely a euphemism for—the *dead*, the *weary*, the *weak*—as though referring to the body. It seems astonishing, that he should not have seen that this is utterly inconsistent with most of the passages in which the term occurs, and especially those where the *καμόντες* are spoken of as the subjects of moral retribution,—as in the first of the last two quoted; or where they are described as acting and conversing—as in the example from the *Odyssey* XXIV. 14. It rather represents the most ancient Greek conception of the state of the departed yet still existing *spirits*. Their condition, although one of continuous, and, to a great extent, conscious being, was yet comparatively the mere shade or *umbra* of the former life. The *post-mortem* animation, we might almost say, was regarded as the ghost of the former intelligence; very much as the ghostly form itself represented the appearance of the former living body. They appear to have, in imagination, transferred to this state of existence the continuance of the phenomena first presented, and of the thoughts immediately suggested by dissolution. Hence the *ψυχή* itself was regarded as weak, emaciated, powerless; and we may almost say, although it implies a seeming paradox, *mindless* and *senseless*. Thus the ghosts are so frequently called, in Homer, *ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα*, *φυλ' ἀμενηνά*, etc. They were said to be without *φρένες*, having no thought or recollection of previous existence; in fact, reduced or carried back very far towards the rudimentary or embryo state of human animation. Hence

is said of Tiresias (Odys. X. 493), that *his* mind, or *phēres*, remained firm (*ἰμάρδου ἦσαν*),¹ and that to him alone it was given, as a special favor, to exercise understanding (*πεννύσθας*), whilst the others were but flitting shades (*τοὶ δὲ οὐαὶ ἀίσσουσιν*) who had to drink of the blood—the ancient symbol of life, or rather the life itself—before they could have firm thoughts or recollections.

According to Herder, and as we think can be shown from various passages in the Old Testament, something of this kind entered also into the common conceptions of the Jews, and of the people around them, respecting the inhabitants of Sheol. The departed were regarded as still having an animate though shadowy existence, and yet without that living power and activity which distinguished them in this world. Quietness was the predominant idea, and yet it was not strictly repose. Instead of a real life of energy, and of motion regarded as proceeding from thought and purpose, they wandered, or—to use the more appropriate phrase, which has ever been applied to the motion of ghosts—they only *flitted* about in the realms of the dead, in the valley of *Tzalmaveth* (צֶלְמַבֶּתַח אָבְרָהָם), *the shadow of death*, or *the nether world of shades*, as we think was intended by this expression in its most primary sense, although it is sometimes used metaphorically of sombre scenes and circumstances in the present life.²

For other passages illustrative of the word *xaiórrēs*, and of the ideas of Homer and the other Greek poets on this subject, see the *Odyssey* XI. 475—*Aesch. Supplices* 231, where the *xaiórrēs* are also represented as subjects of justice, and of punishment by the Infernal Zeus. A similar use of the perfect participle *xexμῆνότες*, may be seen in *Aesch. Sup.* 164; *Eurip. Troad.* 96; *Eurip. Sup.* 758; *Plato, Legg.* 718 A.; *Thucyd.* III. 59.

A very strong proof that the Hebrew conception, in this respect, was about the same with the Greek, is found in a Hebrew word for the shades or manes, namely רְפָאִים. Gesenius rightly defines it, from its etymology, *umbras, manes in orco degentes, quos et sanguine et vi vitali destitutos, neque tamen animi viribus, ut memoria, plane carentes, sibi fingebant veteres Hebraici.* See *Isa.* 14: 19: 10. *Ps.* 88:

¹ Some critics have regarded this expression as having reference to the unfailing nature of the prophecies of Tiresias, and not to any peculiarity of his ghostly state. That it refers, however, to the active exercise of mind, in distinction from the condition of the other shades, will appear from comparing *Odys.* X. 240.

² In *Ps.* 23: 4, there is strong reason to believe that a state after death is intended. *Though I walk through the valley of shades, the terra umbrarum, still thou wilt be with me.* In *Job* 38: 17, the *gates of Tzalmaveth*, come in the parallelism after the more common expression, the *gates of death*, as though denoting something more interior, consummate, and remote.—*Portas mortis umbrarum.*

11. Prov. 2: 18. 9: 18. 21: 16, and Job 26: 5, where it is applied to the *manes*, or ghosts, beneath the waters; referring, in all probability, to the ancient sinners who were swept away by the flood, and whom Peter describes as the *spirits in prison*, 1 Pet. 3: 19. This other Hebrew term, שֹׁלֵה, which we are now considering, seems to have the same etymological significance, and to be grounded on the same idea in its applications to the departed, as the Greek *καμόντες*. So also the similar word, רוּחַ, as used Isa. 14: 10, where the ghosts are represented as saying to the descending shade of the Babylonian monarch,—“Hast thou also become *feeble* (*ἀσθενής*), like one of us?”

The whole passage, in this view, may be thus paraphrased: “Man dies, and lies down among the *καμόντας*, the שֹׁלֵה, the shadowy, nerveless, dreamy tribes of the ghostly world, *whose thoughts*,¹ that is, their active schemes and purposes, “*have perished*” (Ps. 146: 6), and who have no more part in anything that takes place beneath the sun. Man exhales his breath, and Oh! where is he? To what region of the *Terra Umbrarum* has he departed; to what undiscovered country, from whose bourn no traveller has ever yet been known to return?”

This explanatory manner of putting the question, shows that Job was far from denying the possibility of a separate existence for the soul after death, whatever he may have thought of any future revivification of the body. It is the tone and language of one striving to pierce the unknown, and yet with feelings of repressing awe, rather than of dogmatic and denying scepticism. It is very much in the spirit of the famous interrogatory, Eccles. 3: 21—*Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth up, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?* The ancient traditionary distinction is not there denied by the soliloquizing philosopher; it is only intended to suggest the incompetency of man ever, in this life, to pass beyond the mere fact, or to explain the law of the matter, or to trace the way of the spirit, either in its upward or downward course; or to show how the spiritual and material elements do respectively return, at dissolution, to their appropriate departments—

¹ There is probably something of this same strange conception of a state of conscious animation, yet almost without mind or memory, in Ecclesiastes 9: 10 אֵין עֲמָלָה וְאֵין חֵכְמָה וְאֵין מַדָּע וְאֵין מְצָאָה “For there is no *work*, no *invention*, or *purpose*, no *wisdom* in Sheol.” We cannot think that is intended to denote absolute *cessation*, or *annihilation*, but rather a state of being almost entirely rudimentary and *introspective*—without outward energy, or purpose, or that active employment of means to ends which characterizes the present busy life—a state where men are no longer *ἀλφεισταί*, *gain-seeking*, *enterprising*, etc. as Homer styles them, but are reduced to an inward rudimentary condition of life, it may be (although this is very imperfectly revealed in the O. T.), as preparatory to a more perfect existence.

πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα
τὸ σῶμα δ' εἰς γῆν.¹

The resemblance between this comparison of the tree and the striking lines of Moschus, in his epitaph on Bion, have attracted the notice of almost all classical and biblical scholars.

Αἱ αἱ τὰι μαλίχαι μὲν ἐπὶ κατὰ κῆποι δλωνται,
ἢ τὰ χλωρὰ σέλινα, τὸ τ' εὐθαλὲς οὖλον ἀνηθον
ὕστερον αὖ ζῶντι, καὶ εἰς ἔτος ἄλλο φύντι.
ἄμμες δ' οἱ μεγάλοι, καὶ καρτεροὶ, ἢ σοφοὶ, ἄνδρες,
ὁππότε πρῶτα θύνημες, ἀνάκοι ἐν χθονὶ κοίλα,
εὐδομες εὖ μάλα μακρὸν ἀτέρμονα νήγρετον θπνον.²

V. 11. *ἕλκ* — *The waters fail*; more properly, *depart, flow away*. This verb is of comparatively rare occurrence, but is evidently allied to the more common *ῥέω*, *fluent*, which is ever applied to water. See 1 Sam. 9: 7, where the present word is used of food; also, Deut. 32: 36, where it is used of strength; and Prov. 20: 14, where it denotes a secret withdrawal. The LXX. render it *σπανίζεται*. Grotius and Rosenmüller understand *ῥέω*, not as the sea, but as a stagnant lake. There is, however, no need of any such explanation (having no warrant from any other passage), if we regard the comparison as purely hypothetical; which seems to be the most natural view of it. *As if the waters failed from the sea, so man*, etc.—intimating the most complete view that could be taken of his dissolution under this mere physical aspect. There is a *fountain* of nature, from whence the tree may drink a new supply of life; but when man dies, it seems to us as though the *ocean* had failed, the very source of physical life had been (for him) forever dried up. Or it may be intended as a measure of an immensely long period, by way of heightening the conception, here presented, of the apparently long sleep of the grave. The LXX. seem to have had some idea of this kind. *Χρόνῳ γὰρ σπανίζεται θάλασσα*—*in time, or at length, even the sea fails*, or may be supposed to fail; that is, the longest processes in nature may be regarded as having their determined periods; but “man lieth down and riseth not.” *Can this be!*

¹ Eurip. Sup. 533.

² Alas! the herbs, the tender herbs, that in the garden lie;
The spring returns, they live again, and bloom once more to die;
But man, the great, the strong, the wise, when once he yields his breath,
Nor morn or spring disturbs again that endless sleep of death.

Or, as the last part has been accidentally paraphrased in a modern hymn:

His labors done, securely laid in this his last retreat,
Unheeded o'er his silent dust the storms of life shall beat.

Is man so inferior to nature /—is the silent query that underlies the passage. Such may be regarded as the implied force of the declaration; which, instead of intending doubt or denial, may have been used rather to bring the gloomy thought distinctly before the mind, in order that its contrasted shade might give relief and distinctness to the feeling which seeks encouragement for the opposite hope. But of this elsewhere.

V. 12. עַד־כִּי־יִבָּנֶה may be rendered—*until*—or *quandiu*—*as long as the heavens are*—*usque dum non erunt coeli*—that is, *numquam*, as Rosenmüller observes. It might be maintained that here is an assigned period, and that it was meant that then, when the heavens were no more, man *should* awake out of his sleep; at the last trump, when the elements were melting with fervent heat, and the heavens were departing as a scroll. Although it is said that such an interpretation “is not countenanced by the most ‘respectable critics,’ and would be inconsistent with the *usus loquendi*,” etc., still it might be maintained to be in harmony with that *analogy of faith*, or that evangelical and apostolical law of hermeneutics, which regards all the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testaments, as being not merely the productions of the authors whose names are attached to them, but as the work of one Eternal Spirit, and as designed to have relation, more or less, in every part, to one harmonious system of revealed truth. On the ground of such an analogy of inspiration—an analogy in the highest degree rational if revelation itself is a rational idea—it would be no absurdity to refer to a passage in Peter by way of illustration of one in Job, any more than to cite, as Paul does, the books of Genesis and Leviticus in support of doctrines maintained in the Epistle to the Galatians. One who held this view might give all due weight to the common objections arising from the age, and style, and historical circumstances of particular books, as far as they were not carried to the extreme of breaking up into a fragmentary chaos the whole canon of Scripture. He might admit that particular views and doctrines are more naturally to be looked for in certain parts than in others. With all this, he would most rationally contend, that some account be taken of the fact—if it be a fact—that the Bible is a supernatural revelation from God, and cannot, therefore, have been written like any other book. He might maintain that this at once introduces a new, and, to say the least, *modifying* law of hermeneutics which it would be most absurd for one who believes in it to overlook, and that warrants the most rational expectation of finding germs, at least, of evangelical truths, more or less vividly presented, in portions where the neologist never discovers them, for the plain reason, that he cannot, in any case,

admit the probability or even possibility of their presence there. As whatever book (or by whatever book) God has made a revelation to us, there must be a most important fulness of meaning, for which, in the exercise of a devout and chastened judgment, we are to seek as for hid treasures. It was in the acknowledgment of this principle, that Jesus and his apostles found so much more in the Old Scriptures than has since been discovered by Grotius and Rosenmüller. But our rational commentator, as he styles himself, does not truly believe that God thus speaks to us in the Old Scriptures. He would never have allowed of any rational antecedent probability in the interpretation with which Christ confounded the materializing Sadducees; and yet what Christian will dare to say that the Light of the world did not follow a safe and rational law of hermeneutics?

We may not expect to find the system of the gospel truth distinctly set forth in the Jewish Scriptures, but what faith can stand the shock, or rather who can have any faith in revelation at all, if he is compelled to believe that those who are called God's chosen people, and even the most pious among them, were for so many centuries the veriest materialists, or annihilationists, destitute of the first elements of anything like spiritual religion, in perfect ignorance of any key to the mysteries of God's providence or of his moral justice, inferior, in this respect, not only to all the other nations of antiquity, but even to the savage tribes of our own continent—in short, with no more conception of another life, or of the eternal moral ideas that have no true existence apart from it, than the beasts that perish. Believe this who can. If we must have either extreme, I would prefer to it all the dreams of Origen, and all the wild interpretations of a Cocceius or a Parkhurst.

To a consistent believer, then, in the true idea of revelation, there should be no difficulty in such a view of this passage as has been taken by Drs. Good, Chalmers, and many others—that is, no difficulty arising from any alleged antecedent improbability, if the words and context will fairly bear the interpretation. In the passage before us, however, we think that the whole purpose may be regarded as better answered by taking this verse in the way of the strongest hypothetical negation, and the expression, *until the heavens be no more*, for the common method of denoting unbounded time.¹

The greater part of the verse admits of being regarded as a direct interrogatory. *Man lieth down, and shall he arise no more? Shall they never awake out of their sleep?* This method has sometimes been

¹ To the ancient mind, the revolutions of the visible heavens were much more the actual measures of time than to us. Artificial expedients have superseded the constant and necessary observation of the celestial motions.

resorted to by the best critics, when there were far less grounds for it than in this case. According to another view, it may be regarded as a desponding denial, from which the writer represents the sufferer as recovering in the next verse. Or it may, more properly, be taken as neither interrogatory, nor affirmation, nor denial, but rather, as before intimated, as a meditative or ejaculatory presentation of the darkest side of the case, for the very purpose of strengthening, by such a contemplation of an extreme hypothesis, a weak yet hoping and rising faith. Why may we not suppose Job to have talked with himself after the manner of Beattie's minstrel?—

Nor yet for the ravage of winter I mourn ;
Kind nature the embryo blossom will save ;
But when shall spring visit the mouldering urn ?
O when shall day dawn on the night of the grave ?

It might as well be said that this, too, was the language of an unbeliever in any future existence. Here, too, the merely exegetical or rhetorical answer, necessary to preserve the keeping of the despondent thought, would be a strong negative ; just as Rosenmüller and Mr. Barnes say *minime vero* to the impassioned interrogatory, verse 14 ; and yet the very tone of the verse above quoted, and of the similar verses of the poem, considered independently of anything else in any other parts of the context, would of themselves show that they were used for a very opposite purpose. The pensive strain was intended to usher in the more cheerful note of hope ; and so here, in the passage before us, it is followed, at once, by an earnest prayer, springing from a feeling altogether different from that which seemed to prompt the apparent denial, and in fact irreconcilable with it.

It may be justly said, too, and the remark is applicable to a great part of the chapter, that Job here confines his contemplations of man mainly to his *physical* or *phenomenal relations*, it may be, to bring out more strongly the apparent contradictions between this aspect of humanity, and the importance he is compelled to attach to our moral being, of which importance, he never seems to entertain a doubt. Contemplated thus in his mere *animal nature* (and by this term, in its widest sense, we mean what may be called the physiology or physical constitution of the soul regulated as a physical production under physical laws as well as of the body), everything in man does seem to come to an end in death. So strong, so exclusive, so unbroken is this negative evidence which comes up from the phenomenal world, from all that we see and hear and feel of dissolution, that we may well wonder how this universal belief in some future life and a ghostly state,—a belief held by the most savage as well as the most

enlightened—has ever maintained its ground against so powerful an antagonistic influence. And yet both views, we know from experience, have a *mysterious practical consistency*. The most firm Christian may at times indulge in the contemplation of this aspect of his nature, and, whilst thus confining his mind to it, employ just such language as is sometimes used by Job and the speaker in Ecclesiastes. We too may talk, and talk consistently, of our existence as but a handbreadth, our life as a vapor, as a cloud that goeth and returneth not again. We may speak of the grave as our long home, our resting place. We may even, at times, feel a sort of melancholy pleasure in regarding it mainly in its aspect of repose from the toils and anxieties of the present stormy life—as a state where the small and the great, the bond and the free, lie down together—where the wicked cease from troubling and the *weary are at rest*. We may also, as Job seems to have done here, contrast our physical frailty and transitoriness, with the apparent stability and immensely long periods of nature. Such language is everywhere congenial to humanity. It is to be found, in very numerous places, among the Grecian poets; and yet we know that the common belief of their age respecting another world was the very ground and life of their highest poetry. Pindar, for example, will tell us in one place of the “Isles of the Blessed,” of the “tearless eternity” (*ἄδακρον αἰῶνα*) where “those who have rejoiced in piety and revered their oaths, enjoy the never setting sun of one eternal day.”

Ἴσον δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰεὶ,
Ἴσα δ' ἐν ἡμέραις,
Ἄλιον ἔχοντες, ὑπονέστερον
Ἐσλοὶ δέκονται βίοντον.

Παρὰ μὲν τιμίῳις Θεῶν,
Οἵτινες ἔχαιρον εὐδοκίαις,
Ἄδακρον νέμονται αἰῶνα.

Olymp. II. Σ. δ.

He speaks, too, most distinctly of that world of awful retribution where incorrigible lost spirits suffer the dread penalty of their sins.

Θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκ' ὑπύλαμνοι φρένες
Ποινὰς ἔτισαν.

and “from whose fearful doom the eye of the soul turns away with horror,”

Τοὶ δ' ἀπροσδόρατον ὀκχέοντι πόνον.

Viewing man, also, in his higher aspect, he represents him as the subject of Immortal Law, and of an Eternal Justice; and then again,

like Job he speaks of us as the merest ephemerae (Pyth. VIII. 'Ε. ε'), or beings "crushed before the moth,"—as a *passing shade*,—as the *shadow of a dream*, or the *dream of a shadow*.

Ἐπάμενοι τι δέ τις; τι δ' οὐ τις
ΣΚΙΑΣ ὄναρ ἀνθρώπου.

The poet Moschus, from whom we have quoted that touching comparison, so much resembling Job's, and seeming to imply a hopeless cessation of human existence, had just before in the very same poem, spoken of his departed friend as "still singing sweet strains in the realm of Hades." Homer certainly manifests an undoubting belief in a ghostly world, or separate place of souls, as the settled opinion of his day, and yet he does not hesitate at other times, to speak of us as the most transient and ephemeral of all existences; φύλλον γενεῇ, "leaves which the winds scatter upon the ground, and which perish in every revolving season," (see the lines quoted p. 212). One of his most common epithets of death, is etymologically opposed to every idea of continuous conscious being—*ταπηλεής*—not simply *lying prostrate*, as some grammarians say, but rather *long-oblivious* or *uncaring*. The term seems to be derived directly from the most exclusively phenomenal aspect of mortality.

The Christian, too, as we have said, may indulge, and sometimes rightly indulge, in similar pensive strains. It is good for him sometimes to contemplate this mere physical aspect of frail humanity, and he may do so without any disparagement of his highest and purest faith. Of this kind are the lines from Beattie's minstrel above quoted. Such effusions are frequent in the poetry of the pious and heavenly minded Watts. With what solemnity of feeling does Dr. Dwight indulge in the expression of similar thoughts:

In those lone, silent realms of night,
Shall peace and hope no more arise?
No future morning light the tomb,
Nor day-star gild the morning skies?

Such language, we say, even when unqualified by anything of a contrary kind, is not only lawful, but appropriate, when the mind is led by peculiar circumstances to dwell on the physical frailty of our human state, as presented in most impressive contrast with the *real* eternity of God, and the *apparent* eternity of nature. We may properly wish to take a steady view of this side of our being, unaffected, for the moment, by any other considerations; or we may entertain such thoughts as preparatory to, and suggestive of, a higher faith in our moral and spiritual relations. On either ground, it is a sufficient justi-

fication for us, that the language occurs so often in the Scriptures, not only in the Old Testament, but also, occasionally, in the New. We therefore adopt, without misgiving, into our hymns, and, at times, even into our prayers, the very words which are found in passages of this nature, from Job and the Psalms. We sing and repeat, with emotion, in which there mingles no consciousness of inconsistency, such lines as these—

Silence and solitude and gloom
In those forgetful realms appear;
Deep darkness fills the silent tomb,
And hope can never enter there.

The same may be said of that solemn dirge, so often sung on funeral occasions—

Unveil thy bosom, faithful tomb;
Take this new treasure to thy trust;
And give these sacred relics room
To slumber in the silent dust.
Nor pain, nor grief, nor anxious fear
Invade thy bounds; no mortal woes
Can reach the peaceful sleeper here.

We feel no inconsistency between such strains and the bright hopes to which they sometimes serve as the dark, minor prelude. They no more jar upon our speculative theology, than that touching language of the New Testament which represents death under the soothing conception of a sleep. In the same way, and on the same principle, are we fond of employing the words of the Preacher, whose sermon was ever upon the frailty and nothingness of the present life, and the silence which, to the natural ear, seems to rest on all beyond it. "*The living know that they must die, but the dead know not anything; their love, their hatred, their zeal, has perished; they have no part in anything that is done beneath the sun.*"

There are no acts of pardon passed
In the cold grave to which we haste.

The pious and intelligent Christian discovers no inconsistency here. All is in accordance with his own most serious feelings and thoughts, until "rational criticism" steps in and turns into infidel poison one of the most interesting and instructive portions of Holy Writ.

Even He who brought life and immortality to light, not by revealing, but by shedding light upon Sheol—even He seems to give us a warrant for occasionally dwelling on this aspect of humanity, when he speaks of "*the night coming, in which no man can work.*" The very

fact, then, that such passages, from the Old Testament, so well fall in with even a Christian train of thought, shows that our nature may yet sympathise with this language of the Idumean Mourner; and that, even with our boast of a better faith and a higher spirituality, he was, after all, not so far behind us *practically*, however dark he may have been in his theoretical views.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE II.

THE SOOFEEES.

Compiled from Tholuck's *ESURISMUS sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica*, and from other sources, by Daniel P. Noyes, M. A., Byfield, Mass.

THE Soofees are a sect of Mohammedan Mystics, or Quietists. "Traces of the Soofee doctrine," says Sir John Malcolm, "exist, in some shape or other, in every region of the world. It is to be found in the most splendid theories of the ancient schools of Greece, and of the modern philosophers of Europe. It is the dream of the most ignorant and the most learned, and is seen at one time indulging in the shade of ease, at another traversing the pathless desert." The opinions of this sect have prevailed most extensively in Hindostan and Persia. At the time when the author just quoted wrote his history (which was published in 1829), their numbers, in the latter kingdom, were estimated by some as high as two, or even three hundred thousand; and the great reputation acquired by one of their ancient priests, enabled his descendants to occupy the Persian throne from A. D. 1500 to 1736.

The name (Soofee) is derived, in the opinion of Tholuck, from the Arabic "*sof*" (wool), in allusion to the material of their garments. Others have referred it to the Arabic "*sufa*" (pure), and some to the Greek "*σοφός*" (wise).

A variety of opinions have prevailed, likewise, with regard to the origin of the Soofic doctrines. Some have been disposed to look for it in the philosophy of India; others, in that of Greece; and Tholuck was, at one time, inclined to the opinion that it took its rise shortly after the death of Haroun Al Raschid, among the Magi of Khorassan. But these views, on thorough examination, appear to be untenable; and we must, therefore, look to Mohammedanism itself, and the native character of the Eastern nations, for the source of this ancient mysticism.

Mohammed found the Arabs strongly inclined to monastic life; and, for the purpose of checking this tendency, he declared that "the journey to Mecca was accepted, by the Most High God, in its place." But his effort was unavailing. For in less than thirty years after his death, hermits had become numerous in the deserts; and so strong was the national propensity, that even the most eminent of his followers, Abubeker and Ali, were founders of monastic communities. These were the parents of the later organizations of like nature, and from them, even as late as the twelfth century, Scofism derived all its most famous doctors. The genius and the opinions of those holy men who were placed at the head of these associations, and whose memoirs have employed the ablest pens, furnish the most satisfactory proofs that the Scofic mysticism was something well known in that age. Anecdotes and sayings illustrative of this fact are abundant. The following may be taken as an example of them: Among the most distinguished of these Mohammedan pietists was a woman named *Rabia*, who died in the 135th year of the Hegira. In the *Teskirat ol Aulia* (Lives of the Saints), by Ferdeddin Attar, occurs the following: Once when *Rabia* was sick, Hassan Bassariensis, with Malik Dinar, and Schakik Balchi, came to see her. Hassan remarked, "He is not sincere in his prayers who refuses to endure the chastisements of the Lord." Then Shakik demurred, and said, "He is not sincere in his prayers who does not rejoice in the chastisements of the Lord." But *Rabia*, detecting an odor of self (*egoitatis*) in these words, spake as follows: "He is not sincere in his prayers who, looking upon his Lord, does not altogether forget the chastisements."

Ibn Chalican (a historian of high authority) relates of *Rabia*, that she was accustomed, late at night, to ascend to the roof of the house, and there to cry aloud: "O my God! The tumults of day are silent now, voices are hushed, and in secret the maiden rejoices with her lover; but I, in the solitude, delight in thy society, for Thee I avow to be my true lover."

Another saying of *Rabia* is particularly note-worthy: Once when walking over the pastures, she exclaimed: "Longing for God seizes me. The turf and stone, indeed, art Thou; but yet Thee, Thyself, I long to see." Then the Most High God, in his own person, without intervening instrumentality, spake in her heart, "O *Rabia*! hath it never reached your ears, how, when Moses prayed that he might see God, the mountain, to which certain particles only of the Divine majesty manifested themselves, was violently shaken and broken asunder? Do thou, therefore, remain content with my name!"¹

¹ Created things were called, by the Eastern Mystics, the *names* of God.

Rabia visited Mecca. But having seen the Kaaba, for the purpose of worshipping which she had come—"For the Lord," said she, "do I need the Kaaba? What is the Kaaba to me? For I, indeed, have approached so near unto God that I may claim the promise, 'He who comes an handbreadth toward me, toward him will I go an ell;' what is the Kaaba, then, to me?" Once, when urged by her friends to marry, she replied, "Now for this long time has my person been held in the bonds of wedlock; and for this reason am I wont to say, that my existence in mine own self is extinct, but re-created in God; and from that time forth, dwelling beneath the shadow of His dominion, I am wholly in Him (*tota Ille sum*). Therefore let him who wishes me to become his spouse, seek me, not of myself, but of God."

When asked in what *manner* she had reached this height, "In this," she replied, "that all that I have found, I have lost in Him." But Hassan again inquiring, "By what method hast thou known Him?" "O, Hassan," she answered, "thou hast known after a method, and through certain means, but I *immediately* (*sine modo*)."

Some one inquired of her, whether she beheld God while worshipping Him. "Assuredly," said she, "I behold him, 'for whom I cannot see, I cannot worship.'" Once, when taken violently ill, she was asked the cause of her sickness, and replied, "I have been dwelling upon the delights of Paradise, and therefore my Lord hath chastised me." At another time, she exclaimed, "I am inwardly consumed, and there is no cure for me, but in union with my friend. Evermore shall I pine away, until, on the last day, I reach my goal." Hassan Bassariensis is reported to have been the author of the following: "In the first place, it will happen that the blessed, through the unveiling of the Divine majesty, will be lost in ecstasy for seven hundred thousand years; through their awe of Him they will perish, and, having beheld his loveliness, they will be absorbed into unity."

These examples (says Tholuck) of the mysticism of the first century of the Hegira, are by no means to be despised; and no one who is even moderately skilled in such matters, can deny that the closest agreement exists between it and Sufism; he could not fail of recognising here the seeds and elements of the entire Sufic system.

But it was not till the second century of the Hegira, that this mysticism began to make its most extraordinary developments. This age holds a marked place in the history of Mohammedanism. Scarcely had the Grecian philosophy been introduced to the followers of the prophet, when a great diversity and conflict of opinions arose. The old traditional ways of teaching and of believing were, in some places, modified; in others, abolished. Men sought, in the solitude of ascetic

life, a refuge from the zeal of party. All things, in fine, began to assume new forms. This age beheld the rise of the four "orthodox sects," viz. that of Hanbal, of Haneefa, of Schaffei, and of Malik. It witnessed, also, the beginnings and the progress of the scholastic theology, with that of the heresies of the Mutasilitas and Batenici, the establishment of numerous monkish orders, and finally the rise of Soofism. While all things were in dire confusion, and doubt of the truth of their religion was filling the minds of men with uneasiness, mysticism, as is wont to be the case, insinuating itself, by degrees, into the breasts of those who clung the more steadfastly to their faith, secured an immense number of adherents, and spread its branches far and wide. From classes of men the most diverse, appeared those who, moved by conscientious impulse, gave up their accustomed habits, and devoted themselves solely to the task of commending to their fellow-countrymen a fervid zeal in the things of religion, and of showing by example as well as by precept, what the divine love can do. In some cases, persons of high rank and even robber-chiefs from the mountains, assumed the coarse garments of religionists.

A saying of one of these pious bandits has been preserved by Dachmi, in the Beharistan (*hortus remus*): "Fedil Ajad being asked, *who was bass?*" replied, "He who worships God out of fear, or from hope of reward." And again, when they inquired, "But then, in what way dost thou worship God?" "In love," said he, "and friendship; for by the bond of love am I held in subjection to Him."

That the foundations of Soofism were laid at this time is evident from the fact, that from the 200th year of the Hegira onward, we find frequent mention made of it by authors whose writings still remain. It is settled, moreover, that the sect was already thriving in the time of Schaffei, who died in 204 H. There is extant, in the *Teskirat ol Aulia*, a saying of that learned Imaam, in which the Soofees are mentioned by name with commendation. Schaffei was wont to say: "The science of the whole world cannot compare with mine; but not mine, even, can compare with that of the Soofees." And Hanbal, another of the four great doctors, bestows no less praise upon them. He affirms that "the Soofee's quiet trust in God excels the most anxious zeal of other men."

The founder of the sect is even mentioned by name. Casivinius (the Arab geographer, "*Plinius Orientalium*") says that "*Abu Seaid Abul Cheir* was the founder of the system of Soofism or mysticism. After the manner of the Soofees, he built a caravansary, in token of his love to God, and commanded his followers to take food twice in the day. He is the founder of all the Soofic institutions and author of the

Soofic asceticism. Their "sheikhs" are all, to a man, disciples of *Saaid*, and their discipline rests upon the illustrious acts of our revered prophet."

Saaid's opinion of the aim and purport of Soofism, is given in Dechmi's Beharistan. When the "sheikh" Aben Saaid Abul Cheir was asked, "What is Soofism?" He replied, "What thou bearest on thy head, put down; and what thou bearest in thy hand, throw away; and whatsoever cometh upon thee, turn not back." That is to say, Renounce your possessions, and devote yourself without reserve.

From the above statements, we may gather the following important facts.

1. That within one century from the death of Mohammed, mysticism had made no inconsiderable progress among his followers.

2. That these earlier mystics claimed an immediate communion with God, which needed no words or signs, and expected a complete "union" with Him. They placed little value upon any forms or methods of approaching God. They insisted upon a "pure, unselfish" worship.

3. The views of some of them were tinged with Pantheism; but—

4. Their mystic "science," and their "quiet trust," commanded the respect of some of the greatest, most learned, and pious among the Mohammedans.

5. It required about one hundred years for this vague, floating mysticism to organize into a system and a sect.

6. The man who was chiefly instrumental in this organization, regarded the *essence* of the system as consisting in the renunciation of worldly possessions, and an unflinching self-consecration.

The origin of Soofism, therefore, having been found, and its early form ascertained, we shall next endeavor to give some account of its subsequent development. It did not long restrain itself within the limits of a simpler piety and of a pure mysticism. In the third century of the Hegira, the Soofees divided into two leading parties. Both of these, the one under Bustamius¹ openly, the other under Dschuneid,² somewhat covertly, began to assume a mysterious style of discourse, to affect profundity in abstruse speculations, and to sow pernicious doctrines among the people. For this reason Ghasalius³ accuses Bus-

¹ Died 261 H.

² Died 297 H.

³ Ghasalius died at Bagdad, A. D. 1127. This man, says Tholuck, if ever any have deserved the name, was truly a *divine*, and he may be justly placed on a level with Origen, so remarkable was he for learning and ingenuity, and gifted with such a rare faculty for the skilful and worthy exposition of doctrine. All that is

tamius and inveighs against him severely. The following passage is quoted by Pococke. "The matter went so far that certain persons boasted of a union with the Deity, and that in His unveiled presence they beheld Him, and enjoyed familiar converse with Him, saying, 'thus was it spoken unto us, and thus we speak.' Bustamius himself is reported to have exclaimed, 'Laus mihi! Laus mihi!' that is, 'Let divine honors be paid me!' This style of discourse exerted a very pernicious influence upon the common people. Some of the husbandmen, indeed, letting their farms run to waste, set up similar pretensions for themselves; for human nature is pleased with maxims like these, which permit one to neglect useful labor in the conceit of acquiring spiritual purity through the attainment of certain mysterious degrees and qualities. This notion was productive of great injury, so that the death of one of these foolish babblers was a greater benefit to the cause of true religion than the saving alive of ten of them." Such are the words of Ghasalius. The divinity of man is more explicitly asserted by Bustamius than by any other of the Soofee teachers. Many of his sayings and precepts are imbued with so senseless a fanaticism, that weak minded persons would be led by them into a contempt for law as great as that of Carpocrates¹ or the Beghards.²

The Teskirat ol Aulia among other sayings of this mystic, has the following. Said Bustamius, "I am the sea that is bottomless and shoreless; (sine fundo, sine initio, sine terminis)."

When asked, "What is the throne?" "I am the throne of God," was his reply. "What is the tablet?" (i. e. on which the commandments were written.) "I am the tablet." "What is the pen of God?" (ὁ λόγος, the "Word" by whom God made the world.) "I am the pen." "What! Abraham, Moses, Jesus?" "I am Abraham, Moses, Jesus." "The Angel Gabriel, Michael, Israfil?" "I," said he, "am Gabriel, Michael, Israfil, *because* whatsoever has attained unto the true essence is absorbed into God and therefore is God."

There is nothing new under the sun, says Solomon; and however insane this pantheism of Bustamius may seem to be, the same errors

good, noble and sublime which his great soul had compassed, he bestowed upon Mohammedanism, and he adorned the doctrines of the Koran with so much piety and learning, that in the form given them by him, they seem in my opinion worthy the assent of Christians. Whatsoever was most excellent in the philosophy of Aristotle, or in the Soofic mysticism he discreetly adapted to the Mohammedan theology; from every school he sought the means of shedding light and honor upon religion; while his sincere piety, and lofty conscientiousness imparted to all his writings a sacred majesty. He was the first of Mohammedan divines.

¹ See Murdock's Mosheim, 2d Cent. P. 12. ch. 15. § 14.

² See Mosheim, 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries.

have existed among Christians. What S. Epiphanius hands down concerning the Messalians agrees with this word for word; e. g. "The sayings of these Messalians are surpassingly absurd. For, ask any one of them, and he will assert that he is anything that you please to name. If you mention some prophet, they are that prophet; or Christ, the reply is, 'I am Christ,' or one of the patriarchs, or an angel; they hesitate not to declare themselves to be whatsoever you name."

Again, Bustamius says, "While men imagine that they are worshipping God, it is God himself who adores Himself."

At another time he exclaimed, "How long, my God, art thou pleased that I remain intermediate between the individual and the absolute (inter egoitatem et Tuitatem). Cause this distinction to cease, that I in mine own individuality may cease (remove egoitatem)."

Again, "If on the last day they shall inquire of me, Wherefore hast thou done nothing? I shall be better satisfied than if the question had been, What hast thou done? For whatsoever I do belongs to my own individuality. But all individuality (egoitas) is idolatry, and idolatry is surely the worst of sins."

There is even current in the East an incredible report of Bustamius having ascended up to heaven. But although this is treated of in the works of the more pious Mohammedans as a sure and indubitable reality, Tholuck inclines to the opinion that we ought to understand Bustamius as using the term in the metaphorical sense of the Mystics who adopted it to designate the last and highest stage of the progress toward union. It is nevertheless true, that he has described this event in the most graphic and exalted language. His account is still extant in the *Tesk. ol Aulia*, and may be found in the *Bombay Trans. Lond. 1819. p. 100.*

Dschuneid, the leader of the other party, claimed by them to be the light of Soccism, although manifestly led into the same errors, was nevertheless, more cautious than Bustamius, and never affected so abstruse or so paradoxical a style of discourse. A few of his sayings are here quoted from the *Tesk. ol Aulia*.

They inquired of Dschuneid, "When a servant of God can be said to be truly his servant?" He replied, "If he is satisfied that from God all things have their source, that they remain in Him, and will at last return to Him." That is to say (if we understand him rightly), He is a true servant of God to whom God appears the beginning and the end of all things, literally and really, the "*all in all*."

Once when inquired of concerning "*Tauhid*" (Union), he replied, "When with an absolute assurance thou knowest that activity and rest are created of God, without any operance of man, then hast thou

observed the laws of 'Tauhid;' i. e. when thou hast lost all notion of individual activity, and of personal existence, in the recognition of the Eternal and the Absolute.

The end and aim of Soofism was thus described by him. "To free the mind from the too frequent assaults of perturbations, to take away the habit that is of nature, to extirpate human nature, to repress sensual instinct, to assume spiritual qualities, to be borne to the heights of true knowledge, and to do whatsoever is good—behold the end of Soofism."

To these sentiments of Dschuneid, it may not be inappropriate to subjoin the sayings of some of his illustrious contemporaries.

Abul Hussein Nuri says, "Soofism is neither a rule (*præscriptio*) nor a doctrine, but a something inborn. For were it a rule, the good of it might be secured by diligent observance; if a doctrine, by study. But it is a something innate; according to the words of the Koran, we are created with a Divine nature (*cum indole Dei*). Evidently no one is able by any diligent observance or study to possess himself of a Divine nature."

Hussein Nuri was accustomed to say, "If God veil himself from thee, no guide and no direction can lead thee to Him." In these words, according to the opinion of Theluck, the fact that God does reveal himself to man, is adduced to prove that God is our true essence. 'If God be not our true essence, we cannot know Him,' would then be the proper interpretation of the above remark.

Abu Rugaim, a Soofee of great renown, who died 308 H., is reported by Casivinius to have spoken as follows respecting the "Union." "Tauhid is the extirpation of human nature and the unfolding of Divine types" (*indicia*).

Helladachius ben Manssurus was another famous mystic who was noted for his sayings. Fancying that he had not gone far enough in assigning to man a Divine nature, he even presumed to declare himself openly to be *The Most High God*, and stripped the veil from his pantheism in the presence of the multitude, with strange audacity, even amid the flames of his funeral pyre, crying out in a loud voice, "*Numeri Unius (Dei) sunt membra Unius.*"

The disciples of Manssur were accustomed to write to their master in language like the following.

"O of all essences the essence, summit of all delights! We testify that thou assumest diverse forms, but now thou hast taken the form of Manssur; grant us thine aid! we seek assistance from thee!" etc. The inquiry naturally arises, now, whether these pantheistic notions were of foreign origin, and were engrafted upon the simpler

mysticism of Saïd, or whether they are developments from a basis of Mohammedan doctrine. Tholuck inclines decidedly to the latter opinion, and considers that all the peculiar dogmas of the Soofees, their views respecting the enunciation of the world, or the annihilation of the distinction between "good and bad" and the rejection of all human laws, that these all *depend*, as it were, from that one doctrine of the "mystic union." It is not claimed that explicit and convincing testimony can be adduced that this dogma was held in *specific form* during the first two centuries after the Hegira. But whether known, by name, to Rabia and the mystics of her age or not, it was *really* familiar to them, and well understood. Nay, Mohammed himself may be claimed as the originator of it. Who has not heard of that saying of his, so often celebrated by his followers: "Momenta habeo ubi nec cherubinus me capit nec propheta" (I have moments when neither prophet nor angel can comprehend me). But this state which Mohammed speaks of is placed on a level with the "mystic union" of the Soofees. There is a little Turkish book which treats of this subject, where the "Conjunctio Mystica" is defined to be "a union with God free from every impediment." On another page, it is explained as "the extinction of one's individual existence in the being of God, as snow is lost in the ocean, and an atom in the sun."

In prosecuting our inquiries concerning the mysticism of the Soofees, the next question which presents itself is, Whether, after the manner of the Hindus, and others, they believed that the Divine union could be promoted by external rites and observances. The essence of those ceremonies of the Indian mystics (called by them *maschgul*—*occupatio*) consisted in shutting up, so far as possible, all avenues of sense, through which the external world can affect the mind; that, freed from every perturbation of thought, it may attain a state of profound tranquillity: this brings with it divine knowledge; nay, even the very light of Deity.

The discipline of Fo is similar to this. In the *Su-che-uh-hang-king*, which is the most important of the sacred books of that religion, may be found the following passage: "He must abandon father and mother, his wealth, his possessions, and all conveniences of life, stifle all his passions, even to the least desire, to the end that he may attain a state of complete self-annihilation. He must be, in this state, immovable as mount Siumi."

That those enjoying the light of Christianity and professing its faith are not wholly secure from the invasions of this wondrously absurd superstition, our next extract affords but too convincing proof.

The following *recipe* for contemplation, used with signal success in

the eleventh century by the monks of Mount Athos, may be found in Waddington's Church History, Vol. III. p. 214: "Being alone in thy cell, close the door and seat thyself in the corner. Raise thy spirit above all vain and transient things; repose thy beard on thy breast, and turn thy eyes, with thy whole power of meditation, upon thy navel. Retain thy breath, and search in thine entrails for the place of thy heart, wherein all the powers of the soul reside. At first, thou wilt encounter thick darkness, but by persevering night and day, thou wilt find a marvellous and uninterrupted joy; for as soon as thy spirit shall have discovered the place of thine heart, it will *perceive itself luminous and full of discernment.*"

The Soofees, though much inclined to solitary contemplation, appear never to have fallen into any such gross absurdities. So far were they, indeed, from conceding any mysterious virtue to these observances, that Dschelaleddin, a Soofee of great authority, eloquently rebukes the practice of them. Sir John Malcolm bears testimony to the same fact. "The Persian Soofees," says he, "though they have borrowed much of their belief and many of their usages from India, have not adopted, as a means of attaining beatitude, those dreadful austerities which are common among the visionary devotees of India." They appear not even to have subjected themselves to the ordinary rules of monastic life. These, although by no means held in contempt, and though strongly recommended by some of their teachers, were yet practised by very few. Those who were able to attain the loftiest heights of contemplation, considered that if the mind were only free to divine meditation, all outward action were of small consequence. This disregard of the external and formal, sometimes amounted to a contempt for all rules of conduct, like that of the Beghards and Mes-salians. The following sentiment occurs even in the Metsnewi of Dschelaleddin: — "When, on a certain time, a monk was accused to his superior of garrulity, sluggardliness and gluttony, and was admonished by him of the trite proverb, 'Medium tenuere beati,' he is said to have replied as follows: 'Although to hold a middle course is wise and good, yet even this is to be done with reason. I am lord of meditation, not subject to it.' Therefore," adds Dschelaleddin, "be to whom a cake becomes divine light, eats whatsoever pleases him. It is permitted." If charges, then, of dissolute life are brought against the Soofees, it is not possible altogether to deny their correctness.

But although these Oriental mystics rejected the strict observances and absurd austerities of some of their European brethren, we still find certain "rules" for such as wished to enjoy the divine "approach." The first injunction laid down for their observance, returns to the

Plotinian ἀπλῆσις—a pure simplicity of soul, as may be seen from the following extract from the Gulshen ras of Asiasia.

"It becomes him to lay aside every impurity and defilement that may chance adhering to him, the depraved doubts that arise in secret spontaneously, and the instincts of our brute nature. Freed from these hindrances, thou mayest attain that which is the highest achievement of all—*reject and expel wholly all thoughts whatsoever*; then, believe me, thou wilt be honored with the divine approach (appulsu: i.e. *diverbio, colloquio de arcanis rebus*), and all distinction between the knower and the known will cease."

The same fact is illustrated in the following sentences from Dschelaladdin: "Ho! thou who goest bowed down beneath the burden of thy knowledge! How is it that thou art contented with the name merely? Hast thou ever gathered roses from the letters *g. l.* (of Gul., Pers. for *rose*)? Remember, I pray, that the moon is in the heavens, and not at the bottom of the well.¹ What more shall I say? That thou mayest the better know thy pure essence, it is necessary that thou become a pure mirror, all individual qualities being rejected. For the Prophet hath said, 'He belongeth to the number of my people, who becometh my essence and my delight. And thus will he become when his soul shall behold me by that same light in which I see him; i. e. not through mere traditions and opinions, but in the drinking of the water of life.'"

If the above render the matter none the plainer, what follows may be more intelligible.

Once upon a time the Chinese, having challenged the Greeks to a trial of skill in painting, the sultan summoned them both into edifices built for the purpose, directly facing each other, and commanded them to show proof of their art. The painters of the two nations immediately applied themselves, with diligence, to their work. The Chinese sought and obtained of the king, every day, a great quantity of colors, but the Greeks not the least particle. Both worked in profound silence; until the Chinese, with a clangor of cymbals and of trumpets, announced the end of their labors. Immediately the king flew, with his courtiers, to their temple; and there stood amazed, almost beside himself with astonishment at the wonderful splendor of the Chinese painting, and the exquisite beauty of the colors. But meanwhile the Greeks, who had not sought to adorn the walls with

¹ The meaning seems to be: human knowledge is but the symbol that stands for the real truth—the reflection of the true essence—God: why so ambitious for knowledge, then? Seek the substance, which is, the immediate knowledge of God through union with Him.

paints, but had labored rather to erase every color, and give to the walls the finest polish, drew aside the veil which concealed their work. Then, wonderful to tell, the manifold variety of the Chinese colors was seen still more delicately and beautifully reflected from the walls of the Grecian temple, as it stood splendidly illuminated by the rays of the mid-day sun. And to these Greeks, the Soofees may well be likened; since, without formal repetitions, theories, or management of any kind, they aim at this one thing alone—that the heart, free from depraved desires, may be bright in its purity; for, with such purity, images of infinitude enter therein. Forms without form, and immense, resplendent from the world of mysteries, are imaged in the mirror of the heart within the breast; which neither the heaven that Moses writes of, nor the ocean is able to enfold, but the soul's mirror comprehends them; inasmuch as the seas and the realms of heaven are finite and circumscribed by boundaries, but the human spirit is infinite. What more? Either the heart is God, or God is the heart, and hence silence is imposed on the reasoning intellect."

Elated with delight at this simplicity, Attar exclaims, "O, how well with me! in that I am seen as one in my singleness, alone, lying hid in my love!" And the same again, "God is infinite, and breathes with a divine life, because he is seen in the singleness of unity (*quia simplex videtur*)."

Not unlike these are the views found in the Upnekhatum of the Hindus. We read there that, "In this so equable and quiet state of mind, when no change or succession of thoughts affordeth means for the measure of time, the infinite divine Power, in which abideth no notion of time, entereth the mind; nor can man, then, have any idea of time." For this reason they consider that the instant of union falls on eternity, and is exempt from all the limitations of time.

So in *Metsnewi*: "In my sorrow, the days (*venia sit verbo*) became *intemporal*—days and moments of activity all infinite." And in the same, again: "Once, early in the morning, the Prophet inquired of Ssaid, 'How hast thou arisen, my child?' To which he replied, '*faithful*.' Then the Prophet: 'But hast thou any sign that the garden of faith hath bloomed in thee?' And Ssaid answered, 'Day and night have passed over me as a sword glances by a shield; for in a single act of thought have I comprehended the perpetuity of time, both that which has preceded the creation of the world, and that which comes after it. In such a state it is all the same whether thou numberest 100 years or one single hour.'" Also in the *Metsnewi*, we find the following: "So soon as Moses had perceived these words of God in his heart, he fled with headlong speed from the eternity that

was before the creation of the world to the eternity that will engulf its ruins."

Like some of the European Quietists, these Oriental mystics permitted themselves, at times, to adopt terms and figures from the marriage relation. Dschelaleddin, in Metenewi, calls his doctrine *nuptias*. Mohammed is said to have been admitted "to kiss the right hand of the bride." Yet the phrase seems to have been rather an unusual one; for in the same book, Dschelaleddin humbly prays that "they will not impute it to him as a fault, that he applies the word *sponsam* (betrothed) to the Deity."

Whether the Soofees, like other enthusiasts of both ancient and modern times, imagined that they saw God under a certain luminous appearance, it is not easy to determine. The Hindus had a superstition of this kind, as appears from the following passage from the Upnekhatm. "Brahm comes in the fancy sometimes dimly shining like a pearl, sometimes obscure as smoke, sometimes like sunlight or the brightness of fire, or like a breathing wind, or a glow-worm in the darkness, or coruscations of lightning, or a pure whiteness like unto crystal." God himself was held to be Light. We read: "God is light—more luminous than all luminaries." And again, "A form of light am I." With regard to the opinions of the Soofees respecting the Divine appearance, we have merely the intimations contained in two anecdotes. One of these, in which the saying of Rabia is quoted, has been already given. The other is on this wise.

"There once came a certain person to Dschaffar Ssadiq who said to him, 'Show me the Lord!' To him Dschaffar replied, 'Art thou ignorant what the divine oracle said to Moses—'*Never shalt thou behold me*?' He replied, 'That indeed I know well; but now the religion of Mohammed is our religion, and people are found who cry aloud, '*My heart seeth the Lord*,' or, '*I worship not a Lord whom I do not see*, or other like things.' When Dschaffar heard these words, he commanded the importunate man to be thrown into the Tigris. This was done; and so long as he was borne about upon the surface of the stream, with loud outcries he implored Ssadiq to save him. But when he began to sink, and the waves to gather over him and threaten his life, and he seemed just ready to drown, then he began to pour forth prayers to God. Whereupon Dschaffar bade them draw him forth from the river; and so soon as his strength and senses had returned, 'Tell me, now, my friend,' said he, '*Hast thou seen God now*?' Then the man answered, 'While I was calling upon thee, O Ssadiq, I was in a cloud; but from the moment I commenced praying to God, I beheld what I desired through a window opened in my breast.'"

It seems, on the whole, probable that the Soofees did not, in general, believe in any apparition of the Deity visible to sense. In the absence of reliable and decisive testimony, however, Tholuck refrains from expressing any decided opinion.

In reflecting upon the examples which we have now quoted from the Soofic writers, one is struck with the variety, the contrasts even, of opinion that are found among them. While some use such language only as is natural to every devout, meditative spirit, others rise to heights of extravagance and impiety that are absolutely insane. Some appear to be seeking after mere tranquillity and purity of soul, and habits of holy living, others are bent upon attaining a certain unknown, ineffable state of introversion and absence; a sort of crazy, religious dream, in which all rational and voluntary action shall be annihilated, and all consciousness of time and of life shall be thrown into utter confusion. The sentiments of some appear to contain nothing which is inconsistent with a sincere faith in the religion of the Koran. Others are pantheists, or *egotheists*.

Again, the extravagances of the system evidently arose from a perversion of very simple truths, such as usually takes place, when any one principle becomes the subject of exclusive and continuous study. They are, almost without exception, abnormal developments of doctrines common to the whole Christian and Mohammedan world. Thus, "Man is totally depraved." Accordingly, "human nature must be eradicated," "natural instinct must be repressed," all thought and sense of things external must cease, and the soul must be held in a continuous vacant dream, in which all earthly things shall be forgotten, and all "natural" action of the intellect and susceptibilities shall cease. So the Christian world all believe that man should be united with God; that he should live in close communion with Him who is the fountain of goodness and truth. This is our duty. It is a high privilege, proffered to us in infinite love. Let us therefore, said the Soofee, shut out the external world, and renounce all action but that of prayer and silent meditation. Here fanaticism begun; but it ends, as we have seen, in those swelling words of vanity, and acts of license, which proclaimed that the rule of reason and conscience had given place to the insane anarchy of passion and conceit. But the most extravagant of these mystics appears to have had a certain "reason in his madness," a mode of explanation that sufficed for himself; and as the philosophy of religion and of life made all clear and noble in his own view, he could afford to disregard the opinion which might prevail with the majority. Bustamius, for example, appears to us to have reached a pitch of conceit, which amounted to insan-

ity. He declared himself to be identical with the Deity, and with all the angels and the patriarchs. But he has a "reason" to give. His argument, in his own words, is as follows: "*quidquid ad veram essentiam pervenit, in Deum absorbetur, proinde Deus est.*" That is to say, "Whatever attains unto true essence, is absorbed into God—therefore is God." His philosophy of the matter, then, was probably something as follows: There is only one original, eternal, absolute essence—the "true essence" of all things. This essence is *one*—absolute unity. Men, who are individual and personal existences, are somehow separated from this great Unity of being; but they may return to it, be reabsorbed, and again become one with this infinite, undivided, indivisible Power. All the angels and the patriarchs have long since reached this state. And I, Bustamius, have reached it, at last; and so I am one with God, who is the Absolute Unity. Hence I am one with whatsoever else is one with him, for his Unity is perfect. I am one with Gabriel, and Abraham, and Moses, and with the creative "Word."

Furthermore, since in the view of Bustamius the Deity himself is nothing more than this primal, *absolute* Power, in which, as in a vast sea of latent force, all other powers which now sustain specific forms, were originally held in solution, and into which all these individual natures, intelligent, brute, vital, and elemental, will ultimately merge—it follows, that the real *essence* of the human spirit is deity. In man, then (Bustamius probably argued), this divine power recognizes itself, and sees itself to be divine; and so, "while men suppose that they are worshipping God, it is, in reality, the deity who is paying adoration to himself."

In like manner, Manssur, regarding himself, thus, as a specific form of deity, could easily prove to his own satisfaction, that he was the Deity, temporarily clothed in a finite appearance, i. e. the Deity in specific form. What more reasonable, then, than that his disciples, being manifestly his inferiors, should address him in the language we have quoted—"O ens entium," etc.

The account given by Sir John Malcolm agrees well with the preceding. "It was the theory of the Soofee," says this author, "that God is diffused over all his creation. He exists everywhere and in everything. They compare the emanations of his essence or spirit to the rays of the sun, which, they conceive, are continually darted forth and reabsorbed. It is for this reabsorption into the divine essence, to which their immortal part belongs, that they continually sigh. They believe that the soul of man and the principle of life which exists throughout all nature, are not *from* God, but *of* God; and hence

those doctrines which establish an equality of nature between the created and the Creator." "Some, believing that the principle which emanates from God can do nothing without his will, and can refrain from nothing that he wills, altogether deny the existence of evil. They are complete optimists: everything is good with them, religion and infidelity, the lawful and the unlawful." "The Nazarenes," say they, "are not infidels because they deem Jesus a God, but because they deem him alone a God."

In concluding the present Article, we give a paraphrase of the remarks of Tholuck upon the subjective origin of the doctrine of "union."

"There is almost no religion," says our author, "that does not attribute many of the motions and affections of our souls to a certain superior guiding power, who according to his own good pleasure rules and sways the human heart. With regard to the extent of the Divine power which is thus put forth, neither Christians nor the world in general, have ever been able to come to a satisfactory conclusion. The philosopher concedes none to God; the Calvinists, with Augustine at their head, leave none for man; while the Lutherans have chosen, unsteadily indeed, but nevertheless with wisdom, a medium course. This discussion in which Christian theologians have striven to determine merely how much is to be attributed to Divine agency in *the reform of the life*, has been turned aside by the Mystics into questions of much greater difficulty. For they have gone on to inquire, to what "principium" our other actions are to be referred; and they ended in the conclusion that God must be regarded as the sole fountain of all human actions. Pursuing the same strain of argument, they infer that nature in its inner nucleus and source is divine, and that he who withdraws his mind from things corporeal to his own essence which exists in perfect purity within the recesses of his breast, he having drawn nearer to the Deity, as it were, is able to hear His voice. The error of the Soofees, therefore, is identical with that which has caused so many Christians to fall into mysticism and pantheism. For this question of "free-will" has vexed the Mohammedan theology not less than our own. The doctrine of "Divine influence" holds as high place in their system as in that of Christians.

"Unceasingly," says Dschamius, "a Divine affluence (copia) flows down from the world unknown into souls." And Dschelaleddin: "Into the breast of Omar floweth the voice of God, which is the root of all speech and of every language. All other tongues whatsoever, that which the Turk, the Persian, the Arab understands, are but echoes of this. But why speak of Turk and Arab? Nay, even the wood and stone are but repercussions of this voice; for in what mo-

ment soever it shall please God to cry aloud, 'Alas?' (i. e. Art thou not a creature of mine?), matter replies, 'Beh!' (Even so).

"But while natural philosophers use the words 'copia' and 'vox' (affluence or power—word), moral philosophers have chosen the term 'attractio.' Thus we read that God in the first place 'draws' towards Himself by 'attractive' influences, so that his servant may turn his mind in the direction whence the attraction comes, and may be lighted up with love. Then follows the second step or the '*iter*' (the journey), and this is divided into two parts, the journey *unto* God, and *into* God, but ends at last in the 'ascent up to heaven.'

"When we reflect upon these things, the real source of this dogma of union becomes abundantly plain. The 'union' itself may be defined to be, a steady bending of the mind upon God—a tranquil drinking in of the affluence that flows thence into the minds of mortals, so that those divine notions which we otherwise experience but scantily and only for single moments, then unitedly and in one flood as it were, overwhelm the soul in their tide and bear it away to Deity."

Now the seeds of this doctrine are most evidently contained in every religion which acknowledges the operance of Divine power upon the human heart. And so easily did they take root and grow, that we find this doctrine, or something very much like it, even in the writings of Ghasalius, that man of renewed orthodoxy, and hater of fanatics.

In his chapter on "prayers," occurs the following. "Prayers are of three degrees (involucra), of which the first are those that are simply spoken with the lips. Prayers are of the second kind, when with difficulty, and only by a most resolute effort, the soul is able to fix its thoughts on Divine things without being disturbed by evil imaginations; of the third kind, when one finds it difficult to *turn away* the mind from dwelling on Divine things. But it is the very marrow of prayer, when He who is invoked takes possession of the soul of the suppliant, and the soul of him who prays is absorbed into God to whom he prays, and his prayer ceasing, all consciousness of self has departed, and to such a degree, that all thought whatsoever of the praying is felt as a veil betwixt the soul and God. This state—adds Ghasalius—is called by the Mystics 'absorption,' for the reason that the man is so absorbed that he takes no thought of his body, or of

¹ This language is not so very unlike what we hear in our own day. There is the "awakening" corresponding to the "attractio;" the "seeking" (*iter*); the "finding" (*unto* God); and next, "communion" or "union" with God (*into*); and among some enthusiasts, a state answering even to the Sufic "ascent to heaven," may be found in the "*trance*."

anything that happens externally, none of what occurs in his own soul, but, absent as it were from all such matter whatsoever, is first engaged in going *toward* his Lord, and finally is wholly *in* his Lord. If only the thought occurs that he is absorbed into the Absolute, it is a blemish; for that absorption only is worthy of the name which is unconscious of itself. And these words of mine, although they will be called, as I well know, but foolish babbling by raw theologians, are yet by no means without significance. For consider. The condition of which I speak, resembles that of a person who loves any other object, as wealth, honor, or pleasure. We see such persons so carried away with their love, and others with anger, that they do not hear one who speaks to them, nor see those passing before their eyes; nay, so absorbed are they in their passion, that they do not perceive their absorption. Just so far as you turn your mind upon your absorption, you necessarily turn it away from that which is the object of it."

Again he says: "The commencement of this is the going to God (*ad Deum*), then follows the finding Him (*in Deum*), when the 'absorption' takes place. This, at first, is momentary, as the lightning swiftly glancing upon the eye. But afterwards, confirmed by use, it introduces the soul into a higher world, where the most pure, essential essence meeting it, fills the soul with the image of the spiritual world, while the majesty of deity evolves and discovers itself."

Says Tholuck: "He who has seen these examples, and given them a diligent examination, will cease, as I think, to search further for the origin of the doctrine of 'union.' For who can have failed to observe the close bond of connection which exists between pure and genuine piety and the dreams of enthusiasm? And who has not noted that succession of steps, of which the earlier demand a simple devoutness merely, while the later ones fade into the fume and vapor of fanaticism?"

"The question, How far this power, which instils itself into the human mind and fills it, and bears it aloft, how far this flows from man's own nature, as from something divine and of independent existence, and how far from Deity, this I know not whether it is within the scope of any mortal to determine. It is certainly beyond mine. Whatever philosophers may gauge concerning this matter, the disciples of Christ will never assign to the human mind a higher place than as a vessel or an instrument to receive divine gifts.

"The Soofees always professed—and this deserves our special attention—that the foundation of their doctrine lay in the maxim, '*Nosce teipsum.*' By this, they assuredly add themselves to the number of those mystics, according to whose theory the nature of the mind,

although one of the greatest simplicity as well as dignity, affords of itself, when correctly and skilfully developed, a knowledge of divine ideas and realities.

"But some may, perchance, inquire, What were those deceptions by which the Soofees were led to imagine that, in very truth, by this 'union,' they could attain divine knowledge? I answer, with Cicero: the same happens to ourselves, when we meditate diligently and continuously upon the mind, as they were wont to do. Those who gaze intently upon the sun in eclipse, frequently lose their eyesight altogether. So the eye of the mind, turned to gaze upon itself, is sometimes paralyzed. But this very paralysis is called, by the mystics, the moment of absorption, for the reason that then, not less than in the contemplation of God, all thought and all self-consciousness ceases. In this misty and torpid state of the mind, how easily one person can come to believe that he has been made a participator of divine life, and another that he has received into his mind the Supreme Divinity himself, no one finds it difficult to understand, especially when he remembers how, with many of these mystics, the powers of both body and mind are broken down by rigid fastings, and other macerations of the flesh."

There are several other chapters in this interesting book, giving the speculations of the Soofees upon the creation of the world, our first parents, free-will, and connected subjects; but our limits do not permit further extracts.

ARTICLE III.

MÜLLER'S CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.

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[In the August Number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1848, we gave a brief abstract of the first book of Müller's *Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, on the Nature and Guilt of Sin. The following Article is an outline of the remaining part of the work. It will be seen that the author unhesitatingly admits the generally received doctrine of the native depravity of man; but the view, which this doctrine leads him to take of the origin of sin, will probably be dissented from. Neither is it generally received by the theologians of his own country.

It is an interesting and encouraging fact, that the attention of the theological world is now directed more particularly to Theology than to Anthropology ; but the deeper and clearer our views are of sin, so much the truer and more comprehensive will be our view of Redemption.—E. R.]

§ 3. *The Origin of Sin.*

IN order that man may be accounted guilty for the sin which is in him, it is necessary that he be its author. Most of the theories which have been given for the explanation of sin do, in fact, destroy its guilt, and thus deny its reality, inasmuch as they make it to be the necessary result of influences for which man is not responsible. To maintain the reality of sin, it will be necessary to point out in the sinner a principle of such power and independency, that it can originate actions for which it alone is responsible, and thereby place a limit beyond which the origin of sin is absolutely not to be sought. Such a principle is the human will. Generally man is conscious of necessity only when the determining power is an external one. Only when he strikes upon obstacles, and finds himself hindered in the prosecution of his effort, does he feel the power of necessity over him. He is aware of necessity only so far as it is constraint. It needs, however, but a little observation of the phenomena of human life to be convinced that besides this external necessity, which limits the sphere of human action, there is also an inner necessity arising from the agent himself, and determining the course of his action. The soul of man is not originally *tabula rasa*, but it is rather to be regarded as a closed book ; it contains, in itself, a multitude of tendencies, and these are not the same in all, but are different and peculiar in the sexes, races, nations and individuals. It is an inner necessity, with which already in the plays of children the opposition of sex and the peculiarity of the individual is revealed. If the youth embraces a calling for life, he is to be regarded as happy, if he was not led to it by a calculation and comparison of consequences, but by the certainty of a higher instinct, by an undoubting consciousness of his peculiar destination. The artist, the poet wavers not, chooses not in the original conception of his creations, but feels himself borne onward and altogether pervaded by the silent necessity of nature with which Genius works in him. The more completely his plan succeeds, the less does it occur to him that, perhaps, he could have done otherwise. Such are the mighty personalities which early, as if it must be so, devote themselves to an important purpose, and with undivided, unhesitating energy hold it fast for life. In political

communities, those constitutions are the best which have grown up organically and unconsciously out of the history and life of the people, or which owe their legislative power to the inspiration of a great man who was conscious of being the organ of the Divine Will, as well as the bearer and representative of the national spirit; separate, by a wide cleft, from these are those constitutions which a calculating reflection has prepared to be imposed upon a people, and which by excessive minuteness of regulation check the national life.

If a necessity of the kind now illustrated be one which excludes all indifference, all wavering of choice between opposites, yet at the same time it must at first view be regarded as freedom; for it is the acting out of one's own nature. That moral action is free which expresses unconstrainedly the moral condition of the agent, whatever it may be. But the question arises, Does the moral condition of man, as it actually is, stand in such a relation to his true nature, his nature as it ought to be, that an action which the former puts forth, can with confidence be regarded as corresponding to the latter? We know that it does not. Sin cannot belong to the true nature of man; for if it did, it could not produce inward strife and conflict. Man, accordingly, is not truly free when his will is estranged from God, but then only does he realize his true nature, then only is truly free, when with full decision he wills what is good, and in his actions expresses that inner necessity which excludes all thought of the possibility of the contrary. This idea of freedom is confirmed by the Holy Scriptures. In those passages in which the designations *ἐλεύθερος*, *ἐλευθερία* refer to the inner sphere of life; they do not express anything belonging to man in his natural condition, but a possession imparted to him by virtue of Redemption. 1 Cor. 10: 29. 2 Cor. 3: 17. Gal. 2: 4. 5: 1, 18. 1 Pet. 2: 16. The Christian is free, so far as he is delivered from the power of sin. This is the idea of freedom in John 8: 32, 36, where the *δουλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* is put in contrast with the *ἐλεύθερος*, cf. Rom. 8: 2. This freedom, says Christ, has he alone to whom He gives it. In like manner, James denotes the law fulfilled by Christ as *νόμος ἐλευθερίας*, 1: 25. 2: 12. The Christian cannot be free from the external yoke of the law, if he be not free from the ruling power of sin. But he could not be free from the power of sin, if the law stood over him as merely external authority. In germ, in principle, the redeemed possess this freedom already in the midst of the contests of this life. It will not be manifested in its perfection until their entrance into the kingdom of glory, Rom. 8: 21, 23. But since freedom from sin is at the same time submission to God, obedience to his will from inner impulse, the New Testament denotes this condition as *δουλαία τοῦ θεοῦ*,

Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τῆς δικαιοσύνης, and both designations (ἀπελευθέρως κυρίου and δούλος Χριστοῦ) are placed side by side, 1 Cor. 7: 22. 1 Pet. 2: 16. In this freedom a power of choice is not thought of, but a condition of the firmest decision. The identity of the same with necessity, is testified in Scripture by the doctrine that the principle of sanctification received into the inner life cannot but produce a corresponding action, Matt. 7: 17—20. 12: 33. 1 John 3: 9. Such an action is accordingly free, and at the same time necessary. In designating the state of obedience to the law of righteousness as freedom, there is not merely the relative meaning of freedom from sin, but of a real self-determination, the purest, most unrestrained spontaneity of the soul. Man realizes his idea when his will is entirely obedient to the Divine Will.

But however significant and important this idea of freedom may be, it is evident, that, in itself considered, it does nothing for our purpose, which is to find in man a power of sufficient independency to originate sin, and thus separate the origin of sin from the Divine causality. But by the preceding view the possibility of sin is excluded from freedom. Now there is another view of the moral freedom of man, which is even as deeply fixed in common consciousness as it is prevalent in science, and which seems perfectly to satisfy the want which the former view left unsatisfied. Here freedom is regarded as a power of choice between good and evil—an action which is free could either have been omitted, or exchanged with another of an opposite character, and the decision between these possibilities rested entirely in the will of the agent.

From the Holy Scriptures this view of freedom does not seem so capable of proof as the other. It matters little that by freedom it never means a power of choice between good and evil. It might, without having the name, yet give instruction respecting the thing itself. But we seek in vain for any such instruction. Nevertheless, this may be accounted for by the practical character of the gospel, which everywhere finds men in the bondage of sin, and does not offer him a first choice between good and evil, but a redemption from the consequences of the perverse decision which he has already made. It constantly appeals to the consciousness of guilt in man as an undeniable part of his inner life, and leaves it quietly to the development of Christian thought to make clear to itself the necessary condition of this consciousness of guilt. Is now this condition no other than that freedom of will by means of which alone man can be the responsible author of his sin, then all those elements of Christian doctrine which confirm the truth of the consciousness of guilt, form at the same time

a foundation for this idea of freedom. And thus the gospel is the strongest testimony of that original freedom in which man was created by God. If one desires a direct confirmation of this idea of freedom from the Holy Scriptures, there is a decisive acknowledgment of its truth in the history of the fall. Not merely the preceding prohibition and the subsequent punishment, but also the process itself, the opposition to the temptation in the lively consciousness which was had of the prohibition, and the commission of the sin notwithstanding this consciousness, all this sets man before us as one who has the power to decide between good and evil. Moreover, in the present condition of the human race, this freedom of choice is acknowledged in various ways by the Holy Scriptures. In the books of the law, not only are there threatenings for the disobedient, and promises for the obedient, but we have the express testimony that the decision between obedience and disobedience, between life and death, is placed in the choice of men, Deut. 30: 15, 16. In the gospel a willing and seeking on the part of man, though it be ever only a yielding to the drawing of the Father to the Son, John 6: 44. Rom. 9: 16, is often denoted as the condition of the efficacy of Divine grace, Matt. 7: 7. 11: 12. Luke 11: 1—13. Heb. 8: 8, and the want of success to the offers of mercy is ascribed to the unwillingness of man, Matt. 23: 37. John 5: 40. Acts 7: 51.

These two ideas of freedom seem mutually to destroy each other, so that, so far as the first, which, as the unity of the will with its true purport, we may call *real* freedom, belongs to man, the other, or *formal* freedom must be denied to him, and *vice versa*. And yet we feel obliged to hold both of them fast, the one, because in it we find an expression for the true independence of our spirit from every foreign power, the other, because the consciousness of guilt and faith in the holiness of God require it. Without the first, we cannot regard the perfection of the human life in Christ attainable; without the second, we cannot explain man's present moral condition.

How are these two definitions of the idea of freedom to be reconciled? Man is originally endowed with formal freedom, in order that by his own self-determination, he may attain unto real freedom. The will were not what by virtue of its formal freedom it should be, the power to determine itself by itself, if it could not set itself as determined, i. e. if it could not give to itself its own direction. Real freedom, or that entire decision for the good, which excludes every possibility of evil, were not possible as freedom, if it did not proceed out of the formal freedom. The one is the essential precondition of the other. To begin with real freedom would not be self-determination,

but a being determined from without, would, therefore, be nature, and not spontaneity. But formal freedom has no other destination than to pass over into real freedom. The former is only means to the latter as end. Formal freedom is the starting point, real freedom is the goal.

Formal freedom contains in itself the possibility of sin, but only the *possibility*. How very far this is from a disposition to sin, appears from the fact that there is also in formal freedom a possibility of choosing the good. The Pelagian idea of freedom is liable to the charge of inconsistency, in representing the same faculty as a root both of good and of evil. Doth a fountain at the same place pour forth sweet water and bitter? And it may seem that formal freedom, as implying the possibility of good and evil, is equally indifferent to both. So it would be, if freedom were already fully determined as *formal*, but in connection with formal freedom, there is the idea of duty to God, by realizing which, the will is to come into possession of real freedom. Moral evil, therefore, arises from formal freedom by no means in the same manner as moral good, for it arises not in the course for which the freedom was originally designed, and which is pointed out by the accompanying consciousness of duty, but by a fall from this destination.

It is not a mere abstraction, but it expresses a real distinction, when we regard *freedom* not as something which is necessarily involved in the idea of will, but as something which the will can be destitute of without ceasing on that account to be *will*.¹ Scripture, church, ex-

¹ By *will* is meant *conscious self-determination*. In considering the subject of moral agency, it is necessary to beware of sundering the will from its living union with the other activities of the spirit's life, and of regarding it in an external relation to them. Rather as the soul makes use of the body as her instrument, and subjects all its members, muscles and nerves to her unity, and is present through them all with determining power; so the feelings, inclinations, interests, convictions, principles, which make up the sum of our spiritual life, together make up, as it were, a body for the will; the will is their forming and moving principle, their proper soul. With a correct view of this relation, the old phraseology, that the will is determined by motives, that these bring forth the decision and the act through the will as their instrument, will give no more embarrassment. Truly a strange psychology, which regarded the conceptions as the properly operative agencies in the soul, and on the contrary, gave to the will a merely receptive, or, to speak more correctly, *passive* place. No less false is it, to represent motives and will as two powers in the inner life which mutually exclude each other, so that, when the motives do not suffice to bring forth a definite decision, the will turns the scale. If the freedom of a volition is in inverse ratio to the degree in which it is determined by motives, the necessitarian always has the advantage; for it will be easy for him to show, that such determining motives are present even when in the moment of volition they escape the notice of consciousness. But even supposing that, on such an hypothesis, it were possible to maintain the freedom of the will, yet the result would be, that man is only then free, when opposing motives have thrown

perience teach of an enslaved will, *servum arbitrium*. The will, which cannot withdraw itself from the ruling power of sin, or resist temptation, is destitute not only of real freedom, but also of formal freedom. Is there in such a man still a desire which resists that ruling power of sin, but only a *velleitas*, a desire which cannot carry itself into execution, as in the state described, Rom. 7: 14—24, then he will feel the want of freedom as a heavy burden, as the sick man feels his pain so long as his constitution reacts against the power of sickness. But has that resisting desire vanished, and is the will wholly given up to selfishness, then the bondage of sin is no more felt by such a one, but is yet, notwithstanding the assent of his will to it, so much the more completely present. The *voluntarium* remains, the *liberum* is lost.

Has man in this life formal freedom?

If there were, at the commencement of our conscious existence, such an individual act as the stepping forth of the will out of a state of indecision into a sinful purpose, it would remain as a dark background in the memory. But who is able to say definitely when and how he for the first time acted in contradiction to his moral consciousness? Certainly our recollection, if our attention is directed sufficiently early to this point, goes back further than is generally supposed, and many a one will be able to say, when, for example, the first feelings of hatred and of revenge were enkindled within him, and what a tumult they produced in the soul of the child. But if we descend deeper into the shaft of self-recollection, we discover behind these earliest moments of sin, still others by which they were prepared, and which accordingly must have been of the same sinful character, and, if we seek to fix these, yet other similar emotions loom up in our memory, and these again, if we seek to hold them fast, lose themselves in an uncertain twilight. To a pure beginning, to an original determining act it is impossible in this way to attain. The earliest sinful act, which presents itself to our consciousness, does not appear as the incoming of an altogether new element into the youthful life, but rather as the development and manifestation of a hidden agency, the awakening of a power slumbering in the deep. Sin does not then for the first time exist in us, but only steps forth into light. However im-

him in some doubt before his decision is made, and, that he manifests his freedom the most essentially, when he decides without motives, or even against them. But every one regards it as something unworthy, to decide in any important matter without or against motives; and no one feels it as a want of freedom, but rather he has then the strongest feeling of freedom, when in any instance he is moved to a definite decision quickly and without at all wavering by the force of powerful, and clearly perceived reasons. A volition, then, is not a simple, but a complex exercise of the spirit.

portant the epoch of awakening moral consciousness may be, it has a past behind it, which is not without co-determining influence upon the conduct of the child in that crisis.

And is it probable that a decision on which depends the future moral character of an immortal soul, would be entrusted to the weak hand of a child? Go back as far as we may, we do not find formal freedom in this life. From the earliest period of his existence in this world, the moral character of man is already determined. On the ground of a practical empiricism, i. e. a mode of thinking which seeks for the circumstances and conditions of the moral actions of men only in what comes under our observation during this earthly life, the doctrine of necessity cannot be refuted.

To originate one's own character is an essential condition of personality, and since from the beginning of this life man's character is already determined, we are obliged to step over the bounds of time to find the source of his freedom of will, to discover that act of free-will by which he determined himself to a course of sin. Is the moral condition in which, irrespective of redemption, we find man to be, one of guilt, and a consequence of his own act; is there truth in the testimony of conscience which imputes to us our sins; is there truth in the voice of religion that God is not the author of sin, then the freedom of man must have its beginning in a domain out of time. In this domain is that power of original choice to be sought for, which precedes and preconditions all sinful decisions in time.

In contemplations of this kind the unfathomable depth of our depravity and guilt is opened to us, and we find a solution to the riddle of that inextinguishable melancholy and sorrow which forms the hidden ground of all human consciousness, until relieved by the light of redemption. The irrational animal is joyous and contented, if its natural wants are supplied, and if it is undisturbed and unendangered from without; in the human consciousness the dark background of sinful choice casts its shadow even upon the brightest scenes of life, and amid the sounds of hearty joy is mingled the tone of secret complaint. Here we may find a cause of that spirit of sadness which breathes in the arts and mythology of ancient times, and in the popular poetry and music of the moderns. Moreover, that anxiety and sorrow which modern philosophers have regarded as the pervading and constant character of animal life, is scarcely anything else than the coloring of that gloom which the sorrow of the human self-consciousness throws upon the animal world; only *personal* beings have in themselves this original source of pain and discomfort, and only they can have it, because they alone have the beginning of their existence without the domain of time.

§ 4. *The Universality of Sin.*

Sin is not merely to be found here and there among the children of men, but it is a universal characteristic of the race. With but one exception, no human life is free from it. It is sufficient to say of any person that he belongs to the family of man, and at once to settle the point that he is a sinner. The natural condition of man presents itself as a supremacy of selfishness over moral and religious impulses, and in connection therewith, as a partial and often almost total perversion and obsecration of the knowledge of God and of duty. Consistent with this is the acknowledgment, that even in heathenism and generally in the entire extent of unrenowned life, there are found elements of a nobler striving which betoken a reverence for moral law; for, in human nature in its present condition, there is a discordant action; there is the idea of God and the sense of duty, there is also a propensity to selfishness, but the latter is the dominant one. Consistent also is the acknowledgment of a relative innocence in early childhood in comparison with the period of riper years, and by reason of which it is set before us as a pattern for imitation, Matt. 18: 3. 19: 14. 1 Cor. 14: 20; for this innocence rests upon the fact that the germs of sin are still undeveloped, but that the germs are already present in the child, is evident from the fact, that as soon as moral consciousness is awakened by the moral law, sin appears.

The Holy Scriptures declare the universal presence of sin in the human race, not merely by individual texts which expressly teach it, Rom. 3: 9, 20, 23. 5: 12. Gal. 3: 22. Eph. 2: 3. 1 John 1: 8. 1 Kings 8: 46. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 20: 9. Eccles. 7: 20, but still more decisively by the facts, that the New Testament everywhere refers redemption to the whole world, and thereby describes the whole world as needing redemption, therefore sinful, John 3: 16. 6: 51. 12: 47; that it knows of no other salvation than in Christ, John 1: 12. 14: 6. Acts 4: 12. Mark 16: 16; that Christ announces as an indispensable condition of a share in this salvation to all without distinction, repentance and regeneration, Matt. 4: 17. Mark 1: 15. 6: 12. Luke 24: 47. John 3: 3, 5, and even designates as evil those who had already allied themselves to him, Luke 11: 13.

There are many facts of common life which serve for confirmation of the doctrine that in every man there is a deeply rooted, an inborn tendency to sin. On what other ground are we to comprehend the certainty with which, whenever a human form meets us, we know we have to do, not with a holy, but with a sinful being? Whoever presumes to have a little knowledge of men, compassionates him as a

good natured fool, who would work upon them or with them in the various relations of life without taking into the account their moral weakness, and the consequences that may result therefrom. We would not, indeed, deny that that view of human nature which teaches us to expect only evil of others, is itself of evil. We must rather acknowledge it as duty to meet every one with confidence in the honesty of his disposition, till we have proof of the contrary; but will any one, on that account, call in question the general conviction above referred to? On the contrary, the certainty of it is so great, that if any one should profess to be absolutely sinless, the conclusion would be, that his share in human sinfulness was doubled by his arrogance and conceit. So universal is sin, that it is precisely the morally earnest man, the man who means to do right, that least ventures to declare himself to be free from it; and only then would we acknowledge an exception to the doctrine, when the entire moral appearance of a man who announced himself as holy, was altogether another and a higher than that of other men, even of those who were prominent among their fellows for their virtue.

If we consider the general course of the moral development of man, it is one of the most known and acknowledged facts, that in order to progress in good, constant exertion, toil and conflict are necessary; while, on the other hand, progress in wickedness is easy, and can be made without difficulty. The seed of sin grows and ripens in the human heart of itself, without any special care; one needs only hold no restraint upon himself, and he is at once deep in sin. But that any man can, only through new and repeated conquests over himself, make progress in good, has no meaning, if there is not something in the natural condition of man, which must be resisted as striving against the good, and which consequently is a propensity to sin.

Another fact which shows us how deeply rooted sin is in our nature, meets us in the observation, that virtues are usually so intertwined with faults, that often the latter present themselves as the reversed side of the former. Serious earnestness imperceptibly glides into a censorious hardness, and mildness into softness; a ready activity for the welfare of others goes over into an imprudent intermeddling, and quiet moderation into a lazy ease; firm decision, which would make one's own conviction avail, becomes intolerant narrowness, and a regard for the rights of the individuality and convictions of others becomes an idle and crippling indifferentism; a lively, vigorous confidence degenerates into haughtiness and presumption, and wise caution into pusillanimity and wavering fear. Upon every human virtue easily creeps its degeneracy, and this exchange is wont to take place by such slight transitions,

that by the comparatively unimportant alteration of a few features, the noble countenance has become a repulsive caricature.

One of the most convincing testimonies of the exceeding depth of human depravity is, that it is still everywhere present in the life of those who, by means of the new powers imparted to them by redeeming grace, are striving after sanctification. True, in them the dominion of sin has been broken; the individual will is, with determined purpose, devoted to the Divine will; this unity is the impelling and determining principle of their life; in them, sin is deprived of its power to develop itself progressively; it is to be regarded as declining and vanishing, as the after-working of the old man, Eph. 4: 22 sq. And one should not be induced to doubt this because of those occasional progressive movements by which sin sometimes, in the life of the renewed, seems again to recover a lost domain; for every such result, since it cannot sunder the continuous connection of the new life, calls forth a stronger and more deeply penetrating reaction of the Divine principle; and so, taking into view the entire condition, it still remains true that the power of sin is on the decline. Yet notwithstanding all this, it is a decided fact in reference to the life that is renewed by Christ, and a fact which will be denied least of all by those in whom this life really is, that in its earthly development it never becomes completely free from sin; that in the Christian life there is a continual conflict; that it needs careful watching lest by an imperceptible decline of the principle within which comes from God, and by a corresponding unperceived growth of the selfish element, it be made to suffer losses which are hard to be retrieved. Sometimes the power of sin, yet remaining in the renewed, manifests itself in the form of an unholy emotion which arises in the heart before the better will can hinder it; at other times, in the form of unknown or indistinctly perceived intermingling of impure and selfish elements with those services which arise from worthy and holy impulses. And there is also another remarkable fact in Christian experience, that scarcely anywhere, where sanctification has begun, is there wanting an accompanying consciousness (as if of an essential necessity), that within the bounds of this earthly life one cannot come to a complete and perfect purity from sin. This can be explained only on the ground that sin is so interwoven with our nature from the beginning of our earthly life, as to co-determine the form of its development.

The universality of sin in the human race has been generally explained by the doctrine of *Original Sin*. The doctrine is briefly this. God made man in his own image, i. e. he endowed our first parents

with an original righteousness, the elements of which are holiness of will and wisdom of understanding. These glorious attributes belong to human nature itself; so that, if they fail, the purity of nature is lost. Therefore, God gave them to man not merely as a personal possession, but with the destination, if they should truly keep the same, to continue them to their posterity, of course in such a manner that in the latter they should at first be only as a disposition, or a faculty to produce and exercise these qualities with unconstrained ease. But our first parents fell from the state wherein they were created, by disobedience to the divine command; and thereby not only lost the divine image, but also poisoned human nature in soul and body with a lust to all iniquity. The loss of the divine image, together with the dominant sinful inclination, passes over from them to all their children, who are descended from them in the way of natural generation; and in these two elements (the negative—*defectus justitiae originalis*; and the positive—*concupiscentia*) consists original sin, the inexhaustible source of all actual sins. But original sin is by no means to be regarded merely as a calamity, which brings no guilt with it to him in whom it is; but as it is really sin, so it makes every man, from the beginning of his life, guilty before God and worthy of eternal damnation. Original sin is, at the same time, original *guilt*.

In the doctrine thus stated, two principles are manifestly presupposed. 1) Where sin is, there is guilt. 2) A condition of human nature, from which all kinds of actual sins proceed, must be regarded as itself sin. These principles are true. But it is equally true, that where in relation to actions and states which appear as sinful, the origination of those actions and states by the subject of them is absolutely impossible, there those actions and states are not really sinful. It is a question, whether the doctrine is sufficiently protected against the application of this principle. Only a personal being, and not a mere being of nature, can render himself a subject of guilt; for only a personal being is the real author of his actions and states. Where there is no personality, and accordingly no freedom of will, there the power of original self-determination is wanting; what appears as a self-determining, if traced into its real causes, is resolved into a being determined. Accordingly, reprobate actions and states can be regarded as criminal, only so far as they have their ultimate ground in the self-determination of the subject. If the subject is merely the transition point for influences received from another power, whether that other power be of nature, or a personal one, then these states and activities are not his fault, unless he by some preceding self-determination gave entrance to the determining influence of such power upon him. Now

the doctrine of original sin teaches, that the sinfulness, which is rooted in our nature, and which, according to the canon, *semper cum malo originali simul sunt peccata actualia*, is continually producing actual sins of every kind, is in all mankind solely as the consequence of the sin of our first parents. But if this sinfulness is in us solely by the action of other personalities, without our having had anything to do with it, it cannot be imputed to us as its authors, but only to them; it is in us, not as guilt, but solely as evil and calamity. Moreover, in all the actual sins which arise out of this sinfulness, it is not properly we who act, but the first man in us; how then should our apparent action be real sin, on account of which we should be condemned?

In this theory two undeniable facts with regard to sin are brought to view which appear to be irreconcilable. 1) Sin is innate in our nature. 2) Each individual, in whom it is, is responsible for it.

It is a superficial view of human nature which regards the race as being in a moral respect merely an aggregate of individual personalities, morally connected with each other, and dependent upon each other, only in so far as in the progress of their development they receive, one from another, discipline, doctrine, example. Behind this division into atoms may be discerned a native substantial unity, in which the moral life of the individual is rooted as in its maternal soil. It would be a very superficial conception, if one should suppose that the community, in which he lives, exercises a determining influence upon him only so far as he pleases to give room for it. Rather he grows up in it unconsciously, in its moral tendencies and interests, in its modes of thinking, and even when he acts with the most complete self-consciousness, the moral atmosphere in which he has lived hitherto, and which has become a quality of his own being, has a co-determining influence upon his decisions and actions. Yea more, if the community is not merely an artificial one, but has a firm ground in nature, the individual is born into it, and breathes a common life with it. For example, the Caucasian, notwithstanding the essential unity of the race, has a different destination in life from that of the Negro; the German, from that of the Slavonian. But the individual receives his particular share of this common impress, not merely by education and custom, but he is supported and determined by the moral substance of the community, from which he is arisen.

Here the question is of a character which belongs, not to one community only, but to the race. This character, although spread over the race, is yet in its nature discordant with the idea of man, consequently, does not belong originally to man, but must have been originated by him; if now its extension over the race shall be accounted

for consistently with its origination by man, how natural it becomes to regard the universal corruption of man as having arisen in our first parents by their apostacy from God! And corruption having once penetrated into the substantial nature of the species, as this nature continually produces individuals and becomes individualized in them, so must corruption appear in all the individuals, and that too, not as something foreign, imparted to them from without, but as something rooted in their innermost nature, arising from the depths of their own being, as a characteristic of the race, and yet at the same time the property of each, interwoven in all the tendencies of their being. Experience teaches us clearly enough, how often in a family, vices are propagated from generation to generation, of course not as ready formed exercises, but as evil dispositions and inclinations, and yet those who are swayed thereby, if they perceive the operation of this law, do not on that account feel justified in their conscience.

We are far from denying a relative truth to this view of sin (which we may designate as the *organic*, in opposition to the *atomistic*, which, overlooking the generic character of sin, regards it merely as pertaining to the individual); much rather must we acknowledge that the fundamental idea, the hereditary transmission of sinful dispositions, must have its place in every not altogether one-sided and therefore defective theory of sin;¹ but there is a difficulty in reconciling this fact with the idea of guilt. If the individual, by means of a necessity preceding his own self-determination, is the subject of a perverse disposition which inheres in the race, then is this hereditary sinful condition, however closely it may be interwoven with the nature of the individual, and be cherished and nourished by his own active power, by no means to be imputed to him, but to the nature of the race, and to him who brought this disorder into human nature.

This difficulty has given rise to the following modification of the doctrine of original sin. It is admitted that the sin of Adam has brought not merely a physical, but also a moral disorder and corruption into human nature; so that the descendants of Adam are not born in the same integrity in which he was created, but from the beginning

¹ The process of generation by beings endowed with souls is a true generation of souls, calling into existence not merely a new manifestation of animal life, but a psychical principle, which serves as the frame of a definite individuality. But that a mere process of nature should bring into existence what is qualitatively different from nature, appears to us as a perfect contradiction. Much rather does the personality, as such, proceed from a timeless ground, and the process of generation gives to it a basis for development in time. That this leads to a certain pre-existence is true; but it is such, that the *prae* is to be understood not as a relation of time, and the existence not as a ready formed state of being.

are affected with a certain *impurity*, with a *strong inclination to sin*. But this inclination to sin, it is said, cannot be imputed to them as guilt, because it is born within them without their agency; it is in them as an evil, as a disease, but not as sin. Sin arises not till the individual yields to the allurements of this corrupt disposition, and, according to the theory, each individual has the power, although weakened by the sinful disposition, to abstain from such consent.

Now aside from the difficulty of reconciling such a theory with some texts of Scripture, especially Eph. 2: 3, it is a question, whether it solves the proposed problem. The problem is manifestly twofold; it relates partly to the possibility of a definite distinction between the corruption which is native and for which, therefore, man is not guilty, and the sin which is connected with individual guilt; partly to the compatibility of the fact, that no human life, which has passed over the period of moral unconsciousness, is free from guilt, with the fact that there is no guilt except by free self-determination. Now it is impossible to draw the line between the corruption which is native, and the voluntary transgression, and, in the next place, it still remains an unaccountable fact that none of the human race should have exercised and maintained their power of resisting and overcoming the in-born propensity.

Because of the indissoluble connection of sin with guilt, it is evident that the native sinfulness of man can with justice be referred to the original sin of Adam as its source, only when it is proved that all the descendants of Adam share personally in the guilt of his fall. Can this be shown? The passage of Scripture specially relied upon in proof of this, is Rom. 5: 12—19. With regard to the doctrinal import of this passage, it first represents the universal dominion of death as a consequence of the fall of Adam, and in so far as it sets forth death as the consequence of sin, it puts the sinfulness of Adam's descendants in a real connection with his fall; and a doctrinal view, which denies any determining influence of this fall upon the development of sin in the race, cannot be reconciled with the purport of these words of Paul. But that the sufficient causality of the dominion of sin in the natural life of the race lies in the sin of Adam, the apostle does not say. This doctrine is not contained, as some suppose, in v. 19, for the apostle would then have chosen some other word than *καθίστασθαι*, since *καθιστάσαι* in the New Testament, with the exception of Acts 17: 15, is expressive not so much of a constitutive as of a declarative agency. The many have been (as it were, before the divine tribunal), through the disobedience of one man (as the determining starting-point of the

sinful development), declared sinners thereby, that they have become subject to death.

If we turn now to the section of the Old Testament, to which the apostle here evidently refers, to the account of the fall, Gen. iii, we need not enter upon the question how far a historical character is belonging to it, since it is the doctrinal import alone, with which we are at present concerned. We cannot, however, assent to the prevalent assumption, that it is a philosopheme, clothed in a historical garb, by which a reflecting Israelite would explain the origin of evil, since this would bring it into a later period of philosophical reflection, with which the simple and ancient character of the language and style is at variance. Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend how the deep, meditative piety of an Israelite, exercising his imagination upon the holy traditions of the first parents of the race, would have dared to represent his own imaginings as history. Much rather, in this narrative there is an historical germ, certain features of which appear in many other Oriental traditions respecting the origin of evil. Its historical character is further evinced by its internal and external connection with the first eleven chapters of Genesis, the historical character of which no prudent critic will easily give up. It finds a confirmation in the testimony of the inspired apostle, who not merely occasionally refers to the fall, 2 Cor. 11: 13. 1 Tim. 2: 14, but in such a manner, that it forms unmistakably an element of his religious consciousness. Rom. 5: 12—19. 1 Cor. 15: 21. 22. If we thus go beyond the mythical view of this narrative to the acknowledgment of a historical basis, it is not meant thereby that theology must take upon itself to defend the historical character of every individual feature. It may easily be supposed that an event, which took place amid altogether peculiar relations, which relations have vanished in consequence of that event, handed down in oral tradition through a series of generations, should gradually have woven for itself a garb in order to represent its meaning to those who, through the absence of these original relations, were incapable of understanding a literal statement of it. If, then, later theological investigations labor in vain to separate the figurative elements from the original substance, and to draw a mathematical line between what is historical and what is allegorical, they will better preserve their scientific character by an open confession of their present inability, than by setting up some untenable solution, in order to avoid the unpleasantness of not giving a categorical answer.

But supposing that we could take every feature of the narrative in its strict literal sense, still it teaches nothing of a moral corruption which entered first with the fall, and, by reason thereof, is transmitted

to the posterity of Adam, so that thereby all the children of men from the beginning of their life are affected with sin and guilt. Rather the design of the narrator is not to explain the origin of the universal *sinfulness*, but the origin of the universal dominion of evil; It teaches us to regard the toils and sufferings of our earthly life, and especially death, as the consequence and punishment of sin, and the sentence pronounced upon our first parents in Gen. 3: 16—19, is doubtless meant to be that of the entire human race. The idea of a transition of the first man from an absolutely pure condition, free from every sinful disposition, is not necessarily contained in it, but only this at all events is taught, that the corruption of man, in whatever manner it may have originally arisen, has its ground in himself. When it is said, Gen. 1: 31, God looked upon all that he had made, and, behold, it was very good, this refers only to what God had made, and is well compatible with a germ of sin still lying concealed and inoperative in man, provided it had its origin in man, not in God. And the Divine sentence, v. 31, which relates to irrational, as well as to rational creatures, was designed to express, not their moral goodness, but their adaptation to their designed ends.

And here arises the question, whether the Old Testament, or Scripture anywhere, teaches anything of an original holy condition of the human race at the beginning of its history, from which, by the first actual sin, there was a transition to the opposite condition of natural *sinfulness*. That the narrative of the first sin, as well as the description given of the condition of man preceding the same, does not necessarily mean anything more than an initial non-appearance of sin, is partly in itself clear, and partly is evident from what has already been remarked. The main argument for the affirmative of the question is based upon what is said in Gen. 1: 26—28, respecting the *divine image*, in which the first man was created. Lutheran theology understands by this image (principaliter) a perfect holiness and wisdom, and maintains, that our first parents by their transgression forfeited the same for themselves and all their posterity.

The Mosaic record employs as the designation of the Divine image, which man bears in distinction from all other earthly creatures, two expressions, עֶצְמוֹת and דְּמוּת, sometimes both together, sometimes separately, cf. Gen. 1: 26, 28, with 5: 1. 9: 6. In this two-fold designation most of the Greek Fathers, and following them, Bellarmin and other Catholic theologians found a difference of meaning, inasmuch as they understood עֶצְמוֹת (*εἰκών*) of the moral and intellectual faculties belonging to man, and דְּמוּת (*ὁμοίωσις*) of the godlike perfection, which it was the destination of man to strive after. Doctrinally considered,

such a distinction is correct, but exegetically, there is no ground for this interpretation, and the duplication is only to render the meaning more definite or intensive.

The Socinians, in part also the Arminians, understand by the Divine image the dominion granted to man over the lower creation. That this dominion is closely related to the Divine image, is clear, but the relation is one, not of identity, but of cause and effect. Because man by the image of God is different from all that is merely nature, and *toto genere* exalted above it, has he also the destination and the power to rule over it.

The argument by which it has been attempted to prove that a condition of holiness is meant by the image of God spoken of in Genesis, is derived from those passages in the New Testament, especially Col. 3: 10. Eph. 4: 24, in which it is said, that the new man in Christ Jesus is renewed after the image of him that created him, from which it has been inferred that the same was lost by the fall. But there lies at the basis of such an argument an assumption, that must first be proved, namely, that the new creation by redemption is essentially nothing else than a restoration of the condition in which Adam was before the fall. Undoubtedly the Divine image, which is the result of redemption, stands in close and essential connection with the image, which man bears from his creation; the former is the true realization of the latter; the one is first given to man in order that he may attain unto the other, if not in the straight way of faithful continuance in communion with God, then in the circuitous way of redemption; but from the nature of this connection it follows, that the purport of the two is not the same.¹

So far from there being any biblical testimony for the loss of the Divine image of which mention is made, Gen. i, that we find on the contrary decisive evidence of its presence after the sin of our first parents. In Gen. 9: 6, the violent destruction of human life is sentenced with the severest vengeance, and it is given as a reason therefore, that God made man in his own image, which manifestly presupposes that man still bears this image, as the seal of his inviolableness. In a very similar connection, James (3: 9,) gives as a reason why we should not curse our fellow men, that men (*τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* not *τὸν ἄνθρωπον*) were made in the image of God.

¹ The loss of the Divine image by the fall is not proved by Gen. 5: 3. In v. 1, we read, God made man in his own likeness, and without mention of any change having intervened, in v. 3, it is said, Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; from which an impartial exegesis would conclude, that also Adam's son bore in himself the image and likeness of God.

Consequently out of all which the Holy Scriptures contain respecting the image of God in which man was originally created, the proposition cannot be established, that Adam by his fall introduced into human nature a new principle before foreign to it, which usurped dominion over his descendants, and ensnared them in sin and guilt.

What is to be understood by the Divine image, is not expressly stated in Genesis, but may easily be inferred. When after the account, how the different orders of the creation arose into being by the creative word of God, the creation of man is introduced in a peculiar manner by the counsel of God to create a being in his image, after his likeness, it is manifestly implied, that in the aforementioned orders his image is not to be met with. Therefore, the image of God in man is that by which man is different from all beings of nature, and exalted above them. This he is thereby, that he has ideas of moral truth, the idea of God, of eternity, in short, that he is a *personal being*. The other orders of creation may reveal God and his eternal thoughts; but images of God can they only be, who are a revelation of God, not merely for others, but also for themselves, who not merely are, but are *for themselves*, who are conscious of themselves, and therefore conscious of God. God has made us in his image. Therefore, we are capable of knowing and loving God.

The problem is, to reconcile the guilt of each individual with the universality of sin in the race, and thus show the falsity of the conclusion drawn from that universality, that sin is an essential constituent of human nature, or a matter of metaphysical necessity. On the one side, there is in all men an innate sinfulness, and on the other side, wherever sin is, there is guilt, i. e. each individual is, by his own self-determination, the author of his sin. This would be a manifest contradiction, if there were not preceding our earthly development in time, an existence of our personality as the sphere of that self-determination by which our moral condition from birth is affected. And so, from these undeniable facts of human life, we are led to the same idea to which the examination of human freedom brought us, the idea of a mode of existence of created personalities out of time, and from which their life in time is dependent. Should we, however, ascribe to *all* personal creatures in the timeless state of their being such a perversion of will as is found in man, we should transfer the same difficult problem to the sphere, in which, we suppose, is found its solution. But here we are met and relieved by a doctrine which finds a place in the religious belief of most nations, that a part of the spirit-world by their self-determination founded a moral state of being in undisturbed harmony with God, and thus elevated the original purity

in which they were created, to a free holiness, and that another portion of those beings entirely and decidedly turned away from God, whereby for their existence in time every inclination to good was excluded. In human nature sin has produced a division. The will of man is not so decisively sundered from its eternal law, as to be entirely beyond the reach of its influence, but by the reaction of that law against the dominant principle of selfishness, arises the strangely mingled and wavering condition in which we find the natural man. Not out of total darkness, but out of a night, in which there is left yet some glimmering of day, man's moral development proceeds. Hence that deep seated desire after light, which every moral and religious influence may calculate upon meeting with, provided it begins its work sufficiently early.

If, preceding our development in time, there was an original decision of our self-will, by which it usurped the place of a ruling principle, we may understand why it is, that our earthly life, in its general course as well as its minuter circumstances, is for nothing so well adapted as to check and subdue our self-will. Self-denial it preaches to us wherever we turn; from the first awakening of consciousness this hard lesson is sounded in our ears; our dearest wishes we must bend to the commanding will of others; accustom ourselves to regulations which we did not make, and revere authorities whose grounds we do not see. No plan of life, unless the knowledge of the necessity to be resigned to disappointments had not already deprived it of all definiteness, is really executed; what we would hold fast, is torn from us by the power of circumstances, and something else pressed upon us, of which we did not dream. No individual work remains truly our own, its going out from us is its entrance into incalculable combinations, in which it not only becomes free from our control, but may become a burdensome restraint upon our favorite inclinations. To break the self-will of man is the aim of the discipline of life. For as unbridled self is evil through and through, even when in its outward actions it agrees with the regulations of social morality, so earnest discipline is the soil, in which alone true virtue can flourish, and obedience the sure though bitter root, from which is developed the growth of a genuine freedom.

§ 5. The increasing Power of Sin in the Development of the Individual.

The timeless original act, in which every human will determines itself, generates an inherent quality, a moral condition; it is that in which we all are born. At first present only as a hidden power, it becomes actual with the awakening of moral consciousness.

Of all sinful acts within our life in time, there is none which can possess an equal power of forming a condition, a state; but they all in a less degree share in this determining power. The freedom of the will is not an ability by which the will, after the commission of any sin, can return to its former undetermined state with respect to that sin, but the self-determining of the will becomes immediately a being determined; by an act of sin the will gives itself a tendency to sin. The element of lust becomes a constant factor of the inner life.

It is the might of the divinely appointed law of the universe, which is thus active in the rebellious will of man. The will sunders itself from the moral law, and God hinders it not, but it still remains subject to the universal law of development, and thereby necessitated to a continuous course and a certain order of progression in sin. Without this order, it is not conceivable how man could ever become free from sin and attain to an unchangeable holiness. If this element of disorder has once entered into being, it must then unfold its nature with a certain completeness, because only so can it be thoroughly taken away. As the heavy vapors, which, arising from the earth, fill the air, are drawn together by the powerful rays of the sun into clouds, in order that falling as rain they may restore to the atmosphere its purity, so must sin gain a definite form in the life of man, in order that it may be duly striven with, and the strife be carried through to an ever enduring victory, which, indeed, is not possible to man left to himself, but only through redemption, John 8: 36.

The relation which progress in good and progress in evil hold to formal freedom, is directly the opposite, one of the other. The good, having its root in love to God, is the truth of the human will, and the will, uniting with it, is conscious of no restraint of its freedom in so doing, but finds rather the confirmation thereof. The more closely the will cleaves to the good, so much the freer, so much the more the master of himself is the man. Evil on the contrary is foreign to man's being. Although taken up into the will freely, it produces only bondage. Whoso committeth sin, says Christ, John 8: 34, is the servant of sin, cf. 2 Pet. 2: 19. There is but one way from formal freedom to real freedom, the way of sanctification; all development in evil is at the same time a progressive envelopment in its bondage. And if in his growing deterioration by constant yielding to sin, any one should lose the feeling of the foreignness of sin to his being, this would be an indication of its power. As in the sickness of the body, the coming on of an insensibility to pain is a sign of the deadly power of the disease, since organic nature no longer works against it, so man ceases to feel painfully the power of sin when it meets no more restraint

in his moral consciousness; but then it is at its highest point, and man must feel its despotic dominion in being given up a prey to conflicting desires and passions.

However fearful the power of sin in consequence of the *law of gradation* may be, yet it is not a single decision of the will which is sufficient to give a man wholly up to iniquity. Though the way downwards is beyond all comparison easier to the human race than the upward way, yet it has its definite steps; and if man with one stride would pass over them all, he would be as little able to do it, as one in the fellowship of redeeming grace is able by a single decision, a single act of inner submission, to become a perfect saint. We can imagine the horrible case, and it is in reality not unheard of, that men, who to a certain degree were already affected by holy principles, perhaps driven to despair by frequent relapses, in some dark moment formed the definite decision rather to give themselves over to the devil, or (if their theory would make no account of him) to sin, and from that moment were violently driven in a mad, reckless career. But in spite of this evil will, they will yet for a period experience the after-workings of a better nature within them, until the constant execution of their decision has gradually brought about a complete obduracy,

Nevertheless, progress in evil is not of so simple a nature that it depends solely upon psychological conditions. Not merely his own inner constitution, the outward world also holds man fast in his sinful wanderings; the productions of his freedom become fetters to his freedom; his choice becomes his destiny. For example, a lie obliges the liar to lie yet more daringly; hate enkindles hate, and itself thereby burns the more ardently. How often does a single act, which seems to be one only of weakness and haste, ensnare its author in a labyrinth of sins! The dark thought, scarcely expressed, malicious powers seize upon and weave from it an invisible net which gradually folds itself around the will and drags it, as with irresistible force, to the purposed fulfilment; the enticed falls by sin in the power of the enticer who knows fiendishly how to use it; after the first hesitating step in transgression, the door closes behind the lost one, he finds himself compelled to cover crime with crime, and by new sins to give new strength to the works that sin has produced. *One* way of return there always is; but only he can find it, who is ready to forego himself, his entire earthly life.

There is one fact which, perhaps, more than any other illustrates the increasing power of sin, and that is, the *hardening* influence of divine truth upon the soul that refuses to receive it. No one can withdraw from the revelation of God which comes near to him, and have

his moral condition remain as before ; but the sluggish disinclination which he opposes to it, necessarily rises to positive hatred and obstinate resistance to what is holy and divine. If a ray of divine light meets one, he cannot, as many would like to do, pass by it with quiet unconcern and indifference ; but, if he closes himself to the light, he is driven to bitterness and spite against it. In relation to such a one, the means of spiritual recovery not merely lose their saving efficacy, but immediately operate in an opposite manner. Christ himself hath expressed this law in those words of deep moment : Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance ; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath, Matt. 13: 12.

The New Testament speaks of *one* sin as absolutely unpardonable, the *blasphemy of the Holy Ghost*, Matt. 12: 31, 32. Luke 12: 10. Mark 3: 28. This sin is not designated by Christ as one particular kind of unpardonable sins, but as the *alone unpardonable sin*, in express distinction from all others. We conclude, therefore, that the acme of sinful development in every instance, unless prevented by redeeming grace, is blasphemy of the Holy Ghost.

The nature of this sin may be understood by a view of the system of God's revelations to man.¹ They who have merely the light of nature with regard to God and holiness and eternal life, do not commit this sin, for the dispensation of the Spirit has not yet been given to them. It is the office of the Spirit to take of the things of Christ and to show them unto men. He who refuses to accept the salvation offered to him by the Spirit of God in Christ, sins against the highest and final revelation of God's mercy to man. It is the sin unto death, 1 John 5: 16.

Divine Love draws to itself all that does not resist its drawing ; but in the freedom of the will there is the possibility of eternal sinning, and consequently of eternal damnation. Sin is something spiritual in its nature. It is the setting up of one's own will in opposition to the will of God. The body is rather a check upon it than an incentive to it. The fine, subtle poison of selfishness receives in the earthly corporeity an alloy, as it were, of gross material, which retards its diffusion through all the veins and nerves of the inner life, and prevents it from uncovering its satanic depth ; and what is to hinder the sinful self-will, when free from the body, from manifesting the intensity of its hatred against God and his holy law ?

It is sometimes objected, that it is inconceivable that an element of

¹ Vid. Schaf's Treatise Ueber die Sünde wider den heiligen Geist.

disorder should exist forever in any part of God's universe. But this difficulty is solved by the correct idea of *punishment*. Opposition to the Divine will does not prevail, but is then absolutely vanquished when the entire condition of the beings, in whom it is, is a condition of punishment. God will certainly realize his idea of the world in all its completeness; but whether every member of the human family shall, as one of the redeemed, have a share in this realization, cannot *a priori* be decided; and the words of Christ with regard to the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost, decisively deny it. The manifold wisdom of God has at command infinitely many ways and means for the attainment of its ends; should the individual withdraw forever from the place where he might be an accord in the harmony of the whole, yet creative wisdom has certainly otherwise provided that nothing shall be wanting to this harmony; but he, even by his opposition and against his will, will be obliged to affirm the same. He who will not humble himself in order to be truly exalted, who will not die in order to live, all hatred and yet utterly powerless, unceasingly raging against God, will yet be obliged forever to acknowledge him as the almighty Creator of all things, whose he is and whom he is bound to obey.

There is One among men who is wholly free from evil; and this his freedom he imparts to all who become one with him by the act of justifying faith. But still they have this freedom only in him, not in themselves; still their being-in-him is not become a perfect being-in-themselves; still their self-will is not entirely purified and glorified; therefore, every exercise of their consciousness of being one with him, is ever conditioned by a new giving up of self. It is the significancy of the Christian hope, that one day all which they have in him, they will at the same time perfectly have in themselves. Then the broken accords, which now, like the sound of far distant music, we can but faintly hear, will become united in a full chorus of harmony, from which every dissonance has wholly vanished away.

ARTICLE IV.

THOUGHTS, WORDS, AND THINGS.

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HUMAN language may be regarded under two opposite aspects, or according to two diverse theories. The first of these, which may be termed the mechanical theory, considers words as nothing more than the *materials* of thought, out of which the mind constructs its own works in much the same manner as a builder does a house. According to this view, language is something wholly external and artificial, which can be analyzed and put together like any other mechanical product. Words are indeed the signs of thought, but the signification is wholly arbitrary, like that of an algebraic formula. They stand for thought as its representative or substitute, not as its manifestation. There is no interior and vital connection between the two, organizing them into one, but only an outward, mechanical union. There is properly no *soul* of language, and therefore no *life* of its own.

The other view is the result of a deeper and more philosophical insight into the nature of language, according to which words are not so much the materials or instruments, as the natural *body* of thought, and language is not a dead mechanism, but a living organic *growth*, springing directly out of the life of thought, partaking its vitality and pervaded and organized by its spirit. According to this theory, words are not mere arbitrary signs, representing something beyond them, but the manifestation of a spirit that lives in them. Their power is not conventional and fixed, like the signs of algebra, something which can be measured and weighed by definitions, but is rather a spiritual and inward power, like that which resides in a human countenance. Language in short, like man himself, is a living thing, subject to the laws and conditions of life. It is the synthesis of two elements, which must be considered together, in their vital unity, as the presence of one and the same fact.

It is evident, at a glance, that we have here touched upon what will be deemed no slight or unreal distinction. These two theories of language differ in their essential and radical idea, and like all other radical differences, must produce a corresponding diversity of effects. According to the idea we have of what language is, will be our everyday use and interpretation of language. This idea will not slumber

In theory, but will pervade and affect, more or less, the whole body and life of literature.

What we propose in the present Article, however, is not to vindicate a theory but to use it. Accepting the truth of *one* of these conceptions, we shall employ its light in exploring some of the interior or vital laws of language.

It is hoped that the triteness of the theme will not deter the reflective reader from a fresh examination of it, since it is among such common subjects of inquiry that the springs of all that is highest, most earnest and practical in human life lie hidden.

As guide and goal to our investigation, we shall endeavor to keep in view its twofold practical bearing on the interpretation of language and its use in what is termed "style;" for if a true idea of virtue be essential to a perfect style of piety, a true idea of language and of the relation between words and thoughts, is not less essential to a perfect style of writing.

Language we have said, considered as embodied thought, is made up of two elements, which we may designate as soul and body; or, if we adopt a more strict analysis, of three, which three parts may easily be distinguished and referred to their several sources or provinces, mind and matter, the world of spirit and the world of sense. There is, first, the *sound* or articulate enunciation; next, there is the *image* or sensible type, some fact or appearance of nature, represented to the eye of the mind in every word. This, we say, *belongs* to every word, and may be discovered by tracing it to its origin, though in very many words of common use the image is lost or fallen away, and the verbal symbol stands in immediate connection with the idea. Lastly, we have the thought itself, or *idea*, something purely spiritual, born within the mind, of the mind's own essence. This innermost part, the proper *soul* of language, may be most clearly distinguished in what are called "abstract ideas," i. e. ideas abstracted from all sensible phenomena; although these cannot be *represented* without the aid of some form or image.

Take as an example the first pure idea of the reflective consciousness, that of soul or *spirit*. This in all men, and hence in all languages, is the same. While it slumbers in the mind as an idea, it needs no language, and therefore no outward image. But in order to be communicated this idea must link itself to something sensible. Hence the words *spirit*, *spiritus*, *πνεῦμα*, *רוח*, etc., all of which signify *breath*, the outward and natural symbol of soul, or the invisible principle of life.

Language then is not essential to the existence of thought, but only

to its expression or manifestation. Pure thought, like pure spirit, is certainly a conceivable thing, however rare or impossible it may be to find it. It may exist in the mind as an idea, just as the mind itself may exist without the body; but in order to manifest itself, to become an actual as well as an ideal existence, it must be "clothed upon" with some outward or sensible form. Now there are three modes in which thought can become external. First, the form may be strictly *material*, as in the plastic or fine arts; or secondly what, for want of a better term, we may call *phenomenal*, as in actions; or thirdly *verbal*, as in language. It is with this last form or vehicle that we have more immediately to do, although the essential principle in all is the same.

Thus it will be seen, that language holds a relation on the one side to *thought*, since it is the expression and embodiment of thought, and on the other to *nature*, since it must draw upon nature for its materials. Language may thus be said to stand as a mediator between spirit and matter, or between thoughts and things, not as being something intermediate between both, but as reconciling and uniting both in one organic whole.

We proceed to trace out, more distinctly, this twofold relation.

I. *The relation of Language to Thought.*

The nature of this relation may be best defined by calling it an *organic* and *vital* relation; the same in kind as that subsisting between the soul and body, or between the life of the plant and its organized form. We use the terms "organic" and "vital" in distinction, on the one hand, from an arbitrary, and on the other from a merely outward or mechanical relation. Thus it is not an arbitrary or accidental circumstance which determines a certain specific form and structure to the oak, another to the vine, and another to man. The laws which constitute each living thing what it is, constitute and preordain the precise form in which it shall develop itself; insomuch that we say, the oak is included in the acorn, and grows out of it, although not one of the future *materials* of the tree is contained in it. Again, the animating principle in man and the organic principle in the tree, are certainly distinct things from the material organisms with which they are found combined; yet the two are held together by more than a mechanical union. The latter is not a mere instrument, but the organ and *body* of the former. The life-principle in each penetrates, pervades and assimilates the material part, so that both become truly *one*. What we see is no longer the same when existing as the organ and vehicle

of life, i. e. as *body* and as bare, isolated matter. Not only so, but the vital principle is properly said to create, to organize, and to mould the body in which it dwells. Now just this is what we wish to assert with respect to language. There is an organic and vital relation between thoughts and words, just as there is between soul and body. It is not an arbitrary matter what words shall be used to express a certain thought, but to every thought is assigned a certain form or body, we may say by a natural necessity, as truly as to the planted and germinating seed; and to every thought its *own* body, which, if it be true to itself, it must assume.¹

Again, it is implied in this organic relation, that language or the outward form of thought, is determined, produced, organized by the thought itself; in other words, the individual form or body which any thought assumes must *grow out of* the inward life and laws of the individual thought, and not be imposed upon it from without.

Lastly, when thus organized and embodied, language and thought are vitally joined together; they are no more twain, but one substance.

In transferring thus the laws and relations of nature to things of the mind, we proceed, let it be understood, upon no mere fanciful analogy. We simply recognize certain fundamental principles, which underlie and pervade both nature *and* mind. We apply to one department what indeed is common to both, but is seen in more clear and palpable operation in the other.

But while the same laws or principles are found in both, viz., what we have indicated by the words life, growth, organization, etc., yet operating through and upon subjects so diverse as mind and matter, the *mode* of working or development in each must, of course, be different. The one is an unconscious process, proceeding according to necessary physical laws; the other a process going on in our own consciousness, and therefore in some sense voluntary, or at least *free*, like all which takes place in the realm of spirit. We therefore have it in our power to violate the law of development and disturb this organic relation, by arbitrarily *imposing* upon the thought a body which does not belong to it. To this, as we conceive, is to be traced all that is false and perverse in the world of letters. For we hold to original sin in literature as well as in theology; an obliquity of lan-

¹ We do not deny that there is *something* arbitrary in the *original* construction of language. What we affirm is the existence of a *law* extending from the thought to the word in which it is expressed, first apprehending, then uniting and assimilating it to itself, so that when once joined together the relation between them becomes organic and vital, as we shall see more distinctly hereafter.

guage, which, originating like the former in the will, has with it descended upon all, and from which it should be the aim of all true literary culture to redeem and recover the race.

Every thought, truly such, is a *fact*, a spiritual fact indeed, but not the less real, not the less possessing its own laws and principles. Leaving its origin out of view as a mystery we cannot solve, before which, as before every other spiritual phenomenon, we can only bow in wonder,—we approach and study this fact. We distinguish certain general laws, which belong to it as to every created thing, serving to mark its *genus* or kind, and distinguish it from everything else which is not thought. Of this nature are what are called the laws of logic, which relate to its internal form and structure. Logic is the anatomy of thought; its province is reached by stripping off the flesh from the body of the living creature, and laying bare its bones. Logic merely shows what is the essential structure of all thought which is thought, that law or order to which it necessarily conforms, and without which it cannot be. Its rules can never be propounded as rules for thinking or writing; as well might one set up a skeleton before him, and study it daily in order to grow by it.

Beyond these general laws, common to all thought, are certain specific and individual laws, often overlooked, which distinguish each individual thought from every other. For every thought, so far as it is a living thing, like every individual person and mind, differs from every other. Even what we call the same thought in different minds, is not wholly the same; since if it be *of* the mind, and not simply attached to it, it must partake of the mind's individuality, must be shaped, or in some degree modified by the mental character of the individual. Hence we may infer that its outward form or expression in words, will be no less distinct and peculiar to itself. Accordingly, if we examine the great original thoughts interspersed throughout the literature of the world, and which constitute its treasures, those which stand out most conspicuous above the common level of thought in the race, we shall find the language marked by the same individuality that belongs to the thought. The words present the same bold outlines, the same massive and compact solidity, which constitute the strength and grandeur of the latter. The language fits closely and perfectly the frame of the thought, like the well knit flesh and sinews of an athlete; and for the reason, that it grew out of the thought and is vitally joined to it, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. Take, for example, any passage of Milton or Shakspeare, and try the experiment of unclothing the thought or

sentiment, and of substituting other words. You might with equal success attempt to impose a new form on the lily or the swan, or to realize the fable of antiquity by a voluntary transmigration of souls. It is easy to disembody the thought, by analysing, i. e., killing it; but to inclose it in other words brought from without, to make it inhabit another body at your will, is an intrusion on the prerogatives of nature, or rather a violation of the laws of nature and mind, which neither will submit to. There is an organic relation, as we have said, subsisting between every individual thought and the expression of it in words. We may say that the thought *expresses itself* in its own language, and will not have another form imposed upon it by the will. It may even be taken as a criterion of the true expression of a thought, that it cannot be otherwise expressed; that whenever a thought can be expressed equally well in two forms of language, so as to admit of choice or arbitration in the writer, it indicates a want of individuality, and hence of vitality in the thought itself.

Again, every thought, truly such, is a *creation*; a coming into existence of what before was not. Hence, in coming into the world, it must find or fashion for itself a body or vehicle, perfectly adapted to contain and manifest its spiritual nature. This organization of language, or the embodiment of thought, is not distinct from the evolution of the thought itself, but is coincident or identical with it; the process, whatever it be, is one and the same. Thinking, says Plato, is the talking of the soul with itself. Thinking, as an *act* of the mind, is here to be distinguished from a thought or idea in the mind, which we have said may exist without language. The same difference is here apparent, as when we speak of a *principle* latent in nature or in man, and the *acting out* of that principle in natural or human life. Thinking, which is the development of latent thoughts or ideas, involves language, just as the vital principle in the plant develops itself only in and through its organization. Hence the labor of thought and composition. True thinking, and all true reading which involves thinking, differs from that superficial and passive operation, which often passes under the name, as the idle gazing upon a scene in nature differs from the deep, genial, plastic activity of nature itself; elaborating out of its own life the manifold forms we behold; putting forth privately, and with tender care, the blades of grass, secretly enamelling the violet and the rose, and building up the oak and the cedar by the slow toil of centuries.

The relation we have found to subsist between thought and language implies, moreover, that language is not merely the embodiment, but the proper *production* and *creation* of the thought. To

make this evident, let us consider for a moment what we really mean by language. This is not, as many seem to suppose, the mere aggregate of the individual words and letters into which it may be resolved. What meets the eye, and can be analyzed by the grammarian, is the least part of language. Words are indeed the materials out of which it seems to be constructed; but words alone, in the popular sense, will not account for, do not really constitute language, any more than the physical or chemical elements into which a rose may be resolved, constitute a rose. The essential nature of a rose does not lie in the materials which appear to the eye, or which the chemist can detect, since these same materials may exist in any other body, but in that invisible power or principle, whatever it may be, which acts and manifests itself through them; which penetrates, informs, in a word *organizes* these elements into the body of a rose and not of a crocus; which remains the same, and thus gives it identity, through all the changes and stages of its growth. So of language. Who knows not that words as used by Milton, fused, spiritualized and transfigured by his genius into the form of a *Paradise Lost*, are different things from the words found in the dictionary. *There* they are no longer words, but the living radiant *creatures* of his immortal thought, at once vehicle and spirit, like the wheels seen by Ezekiel at the river of Chebar; *here*, they are the dry and scattered *bones* seen by the same prophet, waiting for the breath of life to organize and animate them. It is only when thus organized and vitalized by the power of genius, that we come to understand what language is. The language which such a writer employs is as truly his own creation as the thought which animates it; it grows out of the thought, partakes of its essence, and is linked to it by a vital and indissoluble law. The popular impression, that language is a common and universal property, which thought finds ready existing for its use, is true only in a very superficial sense. Whence, we may ask, did the first writer or speaker derive his language? There was no common stock then which he could draw upon, save only the world of nature without, and the world of mind within him. The hypothesis of a revelation or Divine communication of language is improbable, except perhaps in the sense of a Divine mental illumination, and withal unnecessary, as we conceive. His thought, or reason created for itself a language through its own natural and spontaneous working or development. Being an inherent and necessary want of the mind, without which the mind could not unfold itself, it came or was supplied partly from without, but more and chiefly from within. Thought unfolded into language spontaneously, as the plastic principle in the germ un-

folds itself into the tree; and this process, call it creation, development or growth, is substantially repeated whenever a new thought is born into the world. The elements of language lie around us everywhere, in books, literature and common speech, but more especially as we shall see, in nature; just as the elements of the organic growths of nature are everywhere. But a vital and creative power is needed distinct from and sovereign over these, to appropriate, assimilate, organize and quicken them before they can become language in the highest sense; and this power is thought.

It is the distinction and prerogative of genius, to subordinate everything to itself; to transform all it touches into its own essence. This is especially true in regard to language, which is the nearest to its sovereign agency, being the very incarnation of its might. It is not so much subject to it, as *of* it, and incorporated with it. Hence the individuality of which we have spoken, always impressed upon it, which sets it far apart from all vulgar reach or imitation. Hence too the absurdity, not to say sacrilege, of attempting to interpret such language by a mere logical or grammatical analysis.

We are able to see from these observations, wherein the *vitality* of language consists. This is the vitality of thought, which lives in it, organizes, quickens and new creates it continually. Language may lose its vitality and become dead, by being divorced from the living thought which created it. All mere isolated words are so. They are the disorganized and disintegrated parts of language, which, like the elements of a decayed and crumbled tree, must be reorganized into new forms, must be taken up and combined anew by the creative power of a fresh and living thought, before they can live. And even as in nature, the organic form and structure of the tree may be entire and perfect and yet the life be extinct, so in literature. Much that is written and preserved in books, and is called fine or elegant reading, is of just this description. It is the outward form without the life; all style and no thought. It is truly amazing to see how much of this dead material is accumulated at the present day; whole books filled to repletion with words without thoughts, standing like dead forests, upright, indeed, and "regular" in form and structure, but presenting no fruit nor verdure, sheltering no life, monuments only of past vitality, and soon to crumble into oblivion; to say nothing of what is called the lighter literature of the day, masses of verbiage heaped together with scarcely thought enough interspersed to give it consistence. Wandering through these catacombs of the mind, one meets everywhere with the most admirable "styles," which doubtless when first constructed, were the vehicles of as admirable thought, the fit language

of great and stately minds, but which transported from the past, and made to represent the little and despicable "notions" of their plunderers, become a very mockery.

Hitherto we have considered thought in its abstract character, as detached from the individual mind which originates it. But all thought is *personal*, i. e. is the product and property of an individual spirit. Its whole value is that it belongs to a subject, and is the expression or manifestation of the individual mind, just as language is, in a more outward degree, of thought itself. It has no absolute and independent existence or life apart from the life of the mind, any more than virtue or love or any other personal and spiritual attribute. It is true we often speak of thought as impersonal, or as detached from its personal ground, but here, as when we speak of volition, action, character, etc., we abstract or set off, in order to distinguish the effect from the cause, or the property from the subject, not as implying any actual separation. If this view be correct, or if it indicate a partial truth, for we admit that it does not embrace the whole truth on this subject, its application to language will be obvious. The personal life and character of the individual extends and passes into the thought, and through this into the language, so that this becomes linked to the former not only by organic and vital, but even also by *moral* laws. As man is not a mere bundle or aggregate of powers, but an organic whole, as no faculty exists or acts isolated or independent of the rest, but all are combined in the unity of the moral life; so this life includes within its sphere all the developments or outward actings of these powers. This is readily enough conceded in the case of bodily acts, which though outward and physical, have yet a moral value attached to them. We simply assert the same in respect of language, which is a kind of bodily act of the mind. But this province of our subject is so fertile of reflection, and connects at so many points with what is most vital in the whole philosophy of man, that we must restrict ourselves to one or two inferences more immediate to our purpose.

It follows from the personality of thought, that all true language is a direct and spontaneous growth or development of the individual being. Its whole significance lies in this, that it is an integral part of the man himself; that it expresses not what he has, nor what he thinks simply, but what he is. This we say is the *true* idea and import of language, though we need not add that as such it is seldom realized. It is a serious and significant fact, that language as used by the mass of mankind, is anything but a true growth and exponent of the individual man. We speak not here of any wilful or conscious insincer-

ity; the very seriousness of the evil in question is that it is below consciousness, is so deeply rooted and grounded in the character as to become almost a part of human nature, and operates by a kind of necessity. The words of most men are separated from themselves by a double divorce; the first, between the thought and its expression, their language being conformed, not to the internal and individual law of the thought, i. e. vitally grown and wedded to it, but to some external conventional "style" or standard; the second, between the thought and the *being* of the individual (and here we deem that we touch the fundamental error), for thought, even when genuine, is too rarely an *original* and *vital* growth of the mind which holds it. It is a thing *acquired* and held in the memory as a possession, not evolved from within as a growth. It is seldom indeed assimilated to the mind by reflection, as all which is received into it must be before it can pass into knowledge. Knowledge comes thus to be merely the sum of what a man has, not the result and exponent of what he is. It is something detached from the true substance and being of the man, as truly so as if it were a coin in the pocket instead of a thought in the mind. What wonder that language should so often be the powerless and lifeless thing it is, when thought itself is divorced from spirit and converted into mental lumber! Hence the false and pernicious maxims that lie at the root of all false culture; which speak of the learner's *acquiring* knowledge, or the writer's acquiring a style, as if either were a thing to be imported from without, and not rather produced or educed from within.

This *organic unity* subsisting between thought and its expression on the one hand, and between thought and *spirit* (including the heart or whole moral life) on the other, is what we cannot insist upon too strongly, since upon it depends all true *effect* whether of character or genius, if not the reality of genius itself. Indeed, the difference between a man of genius and an ordinary man, we are persuaded, is more a moral than an intellectual difference, at least as these words are commonly understood. If we might indicate it in one word, it would be *integrity*, comprehending in this, sincerity and entireness; or since genius manifests itself chiefly in this department, we may call it *intellectual integrity*, integrity possessing and pervading the mind, thoughts and words, in distinction from moral integrity, or that which is applied and limited to moral actions. Two conditions belong to this power, or at least to every manifestation of it, viz. thought and its expression. Now whatever may be the differences of these, since they must necessarily differ in power and value in different individuals, which differences constitute the *more or less* of genius, yet there

is one element or quality common to all, which stamps every thought and word of genius, a sort of family likeness running through and marking all as of one family or kindred. This is sometimes called "originality," sometimes "vitality;" we call it here *integrity*. It is that which connects or links together in one vital whole the innermost power and being of the man with the outermost expression of it. A man possessing it, is not one thing in himself, another in his thoughts, and another in his words; but the stream of life and personality, so to speak, flows out through all in one unbroken current, just as we see it in childhood, which is the truest type and symbol of genius. Hence the spontaneousness which always characterizes this power. Hence, too, the originality or individuality of the man impresses itself upon his language. The language of a man of genius is a living growth, not borrowed from without, not isolated and detached from the living soul which utters it, but is an integral and organic part of the man himself. The same spirit which animates and informs the body, which looks out through the countenance, informs and dwells also in his words. Hence they are *living* words. The human soul is embodied and enshrined in them as truly as in any other part of the man. "The words that I speak unto you," said Christ, "they are *spirit*, and they are *life*." And this leads us to make one remark respecting *interpretation*. To interpret a writer's language, we speak of that which is worth interpreting, by the appliances of logical or grammatical rules, or any merely external system of hermeneutics, appears to us very much like the attempt to interpret a *smile* by the laws of physiology. It is not what a smile is physically, as a certain contraction of certain muscles, nor what it is generically, as an expression of mental pleasure; but what we wish specially to know is, what does *he*, the individual, here and now, *mean* by it? To know the full meaning of a smile, we must first know (constructively, at least) the individual character of which this is a symbol, and as such partakes of that character; next, the peculiar thought or emotion or spiritual current which gave rise to it and flows through it, whether complacent fondness or mirth or derision. In other words, we must look at it not from without but from within, by a profound sympathy with the spirit and mind of the individual, not with the eyes only, but with the heart. And this is as truly necessary in the case of words as of looks. No one truly comprehends his author, no one is fit to be an interpreter, who cannot look as far behind and below the letter as the heart is below the countenance; who is not so penetrated with the *spirit* of the writer, as to supersede in a measure the help of the words.

We cannot conclude this part of our subject concerning the relation

of words to thoughts, without analyzing this relation a little further. It is not the whole truth to say that language is an expression of thought; it is also, in some sense, a *limitation* of thought, a compression of the infinite life and activity which belongs to mind within certain *terms* or limits. In language, certain thoughts stand forth from the mind, embodied in words. But these embodied thoughts do not express or exhaust all that is in the mind of the writer or speaker. No poet, we may believe, ever expressed a tithe of the poetry and beauty that was in him. Behind and below all that is written, is an infinite deep of thought, which cannot be embodied in words, which outreaches all possible combinations of language. Now this unuttered thought, so far from being of no account because not put into language, is, if we may be pardoned the paradox, the most essential part of language. It is that from which the latter grows, which *charges* it, so to speak, with its spiritual and vital energy. It is only through this vital or *electric* connection with what cannot be contained in words, that words themselves derive their almost magic might, that they become vehicles of power, of beauty or of terror—are spells to awaken and thrill the world, or but empty sounds, according to the spirit which employs them. All words are powerful according as they are symbolical or suggestive. Their value lies not so much in what they express as in what they indicate. Or, more strictly, the individual thought embodied and expressed in words, is a symbol, more or less suggestive, of what lies below and is unexpressed. The great secret of writing with effect, therefore, is to employ such words or symbols as are most suggestive and characteristic; which indicate, most truly and comprehensively, not only what is in them but what lies beyond them.

It would be interesting here to contrast the power of different writers in this respect; to look at what may be termed the comparative *depth* of their words. Some writers seem to be all surface in their language, to possess no silent and reserved stores of thought underneath the page, no soil to which what is given forth is attached, and from which it grows. Their sole labor seems to be to empty themselves in words. Their language is not so much the expression or growth, as the *eradiation* of thought. They are not content to put forth an idea, but must pull it forth with all its roots (if by any means, in any rare interval of reflection, it has taken root in the mind) and lay bare all its hidden fibres, dis severed from their vital attachments in the soul, as if they feared there might be some secret shared of thought within, which the world should not discover! Hence their words are as powerless as they are shallow and "obvious." Involving no thought in themselves, they demand no thought in the reader; of course they cannot

be misunderstood, for there is nothing below or behind them to understand.

With others, and these are invariably the men of most thought, and who have therefore most to express, words are used chiefly as external symbols, the summits, as it were, of what lies concealed and cannot be expressed. The "art" or excellence of such writers consists in *suppressing* rather than expressing the entire thought. This is especially true of that which involves strong emotion, which is uttered in the fewest words, but these the deepest and most intense. It is as if silence were the only fitting language, and the few words that escape were the involuntary outbreak of thoughts too great for control. More than this were a violence done to nature, an overstepping of the boundary between language and its mental interpretation, between what can be written or spoken, and what can only be *mediated*. The words of Milton and Shakspeare are mostly of this nature. They contain much—more, a great deal, than all their commentators have gotten out of them; but they suggest and indicate far more. They open recesses and mines of thought, deeper and richer than language can explore. They are transparent windows, through which we look down into an unknown and infinite deep, "the unknown depth of *silence*," as Carlyle calls it.

Every one who has studied Shakspeare, has been astonished at the wonderful depth of his characters. By a few significant actions and speeches seemingly the most casual, he lays open a whole internal world of character. We seem to know the beings thus casually presented to us, *personally*, all their past experience and history, not simply what they here say and do. What in actual life takes us years of intimacy to attain, is here accomplished by a few touches and incidents, we know not how. There seems an utter disproportion between the means employed and the result. The Oriental fable is for once realized, and the poet, by the utterance of a magic word, lets us into the inmost enchanted chambers of the heart. But it is the word of a master, which none other can pronounce. There are certain outward traits and demonstrations which *involve* the whole internal character, as the blossom involves the whole past growth, and all the individual parts of the plant which produces it. The poet, by seizing upon these, has put us in connection with all the secret principles and workings of which they are the result. Now just what these outward traits are to character, certain *words* are to the inner world of thought; and whose has the insight and the skill to seize them, whether poet, or orator, or essayist, is the man of power.

The connection we have thus attempted to trace between thoughts

and words, applies to what is strictly and distinctively thought, i. e. a distinct mental act or conception ; for though all which is thought may not and must not be worded in language, yet what is thus worded must in a manner stand for and represent the rest, as a flower may be said to represent the entire plant. But there is a whole department or province in the soul, a deep and fertile province, which is not made up of thought, which therefore cannot be represented by words ; the province of *feeling*. Who has not experienced at times the utter inadequacy of words to measure and express what he felt. Who has not found a broad chasm, as it were, between his meaning and his words, which he wanted another language to bridge over ; for want of which, while his thought has found its way out in words, the feeling which was blended with it, and was its soul, remained unexpressed. We pity the man, we had almost said, who can tell all that he means ; whose soul is never visited by an inspiration which he cannot utter in words ; which all the powers of language, aided by tone, looks, action, everything in nature and in man, can only suffice barely to indicate. It is to meet this want of a language to express what is below and greater than thought, that *music* exists. Music comes from a depth and reaches a depth in the soul where thought and feeling are one ; or rather, where feeling has not yet emerged into thought, but swells and heaves in its first chaotic ferment, and must express itself, if at all, in broad, interminable *surges* of sound. The feeling inspired and expressed by music, is of something *infinite*, without beginning or end, of which the sound is a sensible image or echo. Hence its appropriateness as a vehicle of worship. Its language is, "*more—more.*" Hence a strain of music never seems to *end* with the words, but only to become inaudible. Music is the inarticulate speech of the heart, which cannot be compressed into words, because it is infinite.

II. *The relation of Language to Nature ; or of Words to Things.*

Thought, as a pure idea in the mind, is formless and incorporeal ; but in order to manifest itself, it must enter into or incorporate itself, in some outward form, must link itself to an *image* which shall locate, convey and represent the thought, as the body the soul. For this the world of nature exists, which is an exhaustless treasury of forms and images adequate for every birth of the mind. From its myriad objects and appearances, thought may supply itself with its necessary and appropriate vehicles. But here, as already observed, it is not an arbitrary choice or allotment which assigns to every thought its own body. A fixed law reigns here, as in all other organic forms of life, a law seated in the thought itself, which, from all the material elements

around it, selects and appropriates those only which its inherent nature and wants demand. The possibility of this organic union or incorporation presupposes a certain affinity to exist between the two terms. There is, indeed, a most wonderful analogy and correspondence between the human mind and nature, as if each were created and conformed unto the other; a correspondence extending to the minutest features and operations; so that not a thought can arise or be born in the world of mind, but its corresponding image or symbol forthwith presents itself in the world of nature. The two domains are everywhere interlinked by the vital nerves of language, holding them together at every point, and weaving them into one indissoluble whole; just as in man himself, who partakes of both, these two elements are seen to meet and blend in one harmonious and vital union.

But the true relation which language holds to nature, can be understood only as we conceive of nature as being itself a language, the language of a universal mind; as the creation and embodiment of the Divine thoughts. Here we trust we shall be pardoned if we indulge in a little metaphysical analysis, for the sake of precision, on what we deem a fundamental point in the philosophy of language.

Every *thing* in nature embodies and represents some *thought*. This we presume will not be questioned, except perhaps by those who *derive* all thought from things sensibly perceived, and who cannot therefore conceive of the former as the ground or original of the latter. But for such it may be sufficient to reply, that the things must first have been *thought of*, i. e. existed as thoughts in the mind of the Creator, else how could they have been created? These thoughts, moreover, of which things are the sensible types, are not to be considered as abstractions merely, remote from the things themselves, or as resident only in the mind of Deity; but as vitally present in the objects we behold, in the same sense at least that a human thought is present in the word which expresses it. It is true we do not commonly recognize these indwelling thoughts, as such, in the things around us, partly because our conceptions of nature are so grossly material, and partly because we are wont to disguise them under a different name.

The most rigid and penetrating insight into the world we live in, conducts us to a point where we must recognize two elements as entering into the constitution of all things, the material and the spiritual; or, to speak more modestly, since we know not what is matter or spirit, the sensible and the intelligible, that which appears to sense and that which mind only can perceive. The further we get below the surface of things, the more does the former disappear, as being only the *παρόμοιον*, the outward index or symbol, of which the latter is

the substance. The dynamical theory of the universe, which is slowly but surely superseding all other views of nature, resolves all natural phenomena into certain elemental and vital *forces*, acting not blindly but intelligently, or at least intelligibly, and hence called *laws* of nature. These it is the province of science, in its various departments, to explore; and beyond these it is impossible to go in the analysis of things. These, in fact, are *all* with which we have to do either practically or scientifically. Thus the mechanist deals with matter only as the manifesto of a certain law or *force* called gravity. The chemist regards it as a complex of *powers* interacting in certain determinate *ratios*. The physiologist has to do with the higher power of *life*, as it develops itself by embodying its own idea in organized forms.

Now what are these laws or ideal forces? That they are something *spiritual*, is implied in the very idea of force or *power*. That they originate in *mind*, is evident from the fact that they are *ideal* and the sole matter of science. Are they anything else, if we may so designate them, than *efficient thoughts*, thoughts made actual, or *externalizing* themselves in things? Plato's "divine ideas," when rightly understood, as not merely the archetypes but the constitutive soul of all things, are not a mere fiction of poetry, but the result of the calmest and deepest philosophy, and even coincident with the highest teachings of Christian faith. These ideas differ from our own only as being themselves creative or constitutive; i. e. when interpreted into the language of theology, the divine intelligence and power, as manifested in nature, are not separated like the human, and as in our contemplation of them, but exist and act together as one and the same spiritual activity. Viewed on the side of intellect, they are *ideas*, after which the divine working proceeds; on the side of will, they are *energies*, directed always by an intelligent design. Regarded concretely, as the synthesis of both, they are *laws*, i. e. manifestations, in time and space, of a divine, omnipresent *Spirit*, of which nature is at once the language and living organ.

What we wish to come to, from this preliminary view, and which may have been already anticipated, is briefly this: that *the soul of language and the soul of things are the same*. Things, i. e. sensible objects, are the original, divine words, from which our words are derived. In language, we do but imitate or repeat the creative process of nature, and embody in words the same thoughts which are there embodied in things.

If we are understood in what we have here rather summarily advanced, it will be seen that language, as the offspring of reason, deals wholly with the ideal, with *thought* in its immaterial and spiritual essence, and has to do with things only as they are the exponents

of thought. Words represent *ideas*, whether these be considered as furnished to the mind from without, or as generated in it. When applied to external objects, language denotes, not the outward and sensible type, the *material* of the thing, but that which *this* represents. In short, the process involved in language is precisely the same as when we read or translate a book. We first apprehend the thought through its written symbol, and then express or interpret it into another symbol or language of our own. Hence too it will be seen, that the name of a thing, the "word" (*λόγος*) by which it is known, is not that arbitrary and insignificant matter it is sometimes taken to be. It indicates the true *substance* of the thing itself.¹

To know the full significance of names or words, therefore, is to know and understand things; and to be able to give its true name to any object, requires a previous insight into its real and essential nature. Hence the opinion entertained by Plato, that a superhuman intelligence must have imposed the first names on things.

Again, since words represent something fixed and substantial underneath phenomena, we may see how language, ever wiser than all skeptical philosophy, recognizes even in its most common and popular usage, the identity of things, which a superficial reasoning from appearances would lead us to deny. Thus we speak of a tree, a forest, etc., as being the same from one generation to another, although not one of its original materials may remain. The form or appearance, too, is continually changing, yet it is still the same tree; and this not in a loose sense, but verily and strictly the same. On this ground alone are we able to rest the identity of the human body at the resurrection.²

¹ The senses alone do not give us the notion of *substance* when we look at a thing, but only certain isolated *sensations* or appearances, as color, shape, hardness, etc. These the mind receives, combines into unity, and attributes to an individual thing or *sub-stance*, which *stands under* or behind them. This is properly an inference or induction of the mind, as truly so as the law of gravitation. Hence we *understand* a thing, when we look through its outward phenomena to its idea or substance. Hence the brute does not attain to the notion of an individual *thing*, because he does not *think*. These words, it is hardly necessary to say, are primarily one and the same.

² As we have here touched upon the great question of what constitutes identity, we take the liberty to subjoin a few remarks. Some writers have thrown a good deal of needless confusion over this subject, by confounding identity of substance with identity of matter or material phenomena. Thus it is argued that there cannot be a resurrection of the *same* body, because the body itself does not continue the same from one period to another, since its particles are constantly changing, etc. Now without stopping to inquire whether the popular notions respecting this doctrine are right or wrong, let us simply ask ourselves what we mean when we utter the word "*body*?"

Nature, we have said, is a universal language, whose words are things, and the true prototypes of our words. But these single terms, i. e. individual things, do not comprise the whole of this language, any more than the terms found in a dictionary are the whole of human language. They are only its elements or materials. There are other and deeper thoughts in nature than those which a scientific analysis can discover, thoughts and meanings which can be expressed only by combinations of these terms which are thus expressed everywhere and constantly, in the thousand-fold linked forms and aspects and voices around us; in the mountain and vale and forest, the deep blue ocean, and the deeper heaven and all which it contains and canopies; moral and spiritual meanings, which carry us far into the heart and mind of nature, or rather of that Being who, in all this wonderful and stupendous language, is evermore expressing Himself! Now as individual objects must be *read* before they can be named, or become words, so these deeper spiritual meanings must be apprehended before they can pass into language, and become the symbols of corresponding thoughts within us; and this is the province or prerogative of the poet, as the former is of scientific insight. The man of science and the poet are both properly interpreters of nature. Both are conversant with the *thoughts* embodied and expressed in nature; only the former stops at the scientific thought; the latter passes beyond this, to the moral and spiritual. Nature is a language, the meaning of which is deep or shallow according to the insight we bring to it; and it is no less absurd to limit its significance to the *literal*, i. e. scientific import

Simply the sum of its material particles! If so, these would still be a human body, though decomposed and scattered to the four winds. We mean something else; that viz. which makes or *constitutes* it a body and not a heap of dust, that which lives and walks before us as the incarnation of spirit. The *substance* of the body, or the *idea* which is represented by the word, is something besides matter or which appears to the senses. It is one and permanent, notwithstanding the manifoldness and flux of the latter. The same identical substance *stands under*, lives through, and causes each successive change of form and particles. It *includes in itself* all the changes and successions of growth, as the mind includes all its own thoughts; and we might just as well say that the mind loses its identity with every successive thought, as the body with every change of its particles.

The bearing of these remarks on the doctrine of the resurrection is obvious. Since the idea or law of the body, and not the matter of it, constitutes its identity, the same body which lives through successive changes of matter, may, for aught we can see, survive or *live over* successive organizations. What we bury in the earth, is manifestly *not* the same body which lived and moved as the incarnation of spirit, but only its *exuviae*, the "remains" of what *was* a body, but is now—dust. It therefore need not be raised again. The Bible teaches the resurrection of the *body*, not of the *corpse*.

of its individual terms, then to interpret *Paradise Lost*, for example, by the light of grammars and dictionaries. The moral and spiritual are as truly contained and expressed in it, as the scientific. The poet does not bring his thoughts and impose them upon nature, or merely link them to its forms; they are there already, as truly as what are called natural or organic laws. He simply finds them, apprehends them by the power of imagination. He does not read the inscriptions written upon things, as many are fond of saying, but he reads things themselves, i. e. the real thought and meaning of which they are the language and expression. In other words, what we call the language of nature is not an artificial language, the arbitrary association of natural forms and phenomena with human feelings and fancies, but the true and appropriate vehicle of God's thoughts. Poetry, in its true sense, is the translation of the language of nature into the language of feeling. As science is rightly called the interpretation of nature, i. e. if we understand ourselves, the reading of God's thoughts in nature; so poetry is only a deeper and more thoughtful reading of the same book; viz. an insight into its interior and spiritual meaning, its beauty, its pathos and its passion. Poetry is indeed "the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science."

The last and deepest insight we get into nature, is when we read it *religiously*, as a divine revelation, with a heart to understand in it what God would say to his creatures, his intelligent and spiritual, but sinful and *alienated* creatures; when we connect this language vitally with a living, *personal* and omnipresent *Spirit*, who is evermore speaking through these outward symbols to our hearts.

Here we can see the reason of the close affinity between the human mind and nature, and why the latter is such a perfect mould and mirror of the former. It is because there is mind in nature, because it is itself the language of a universal mind, that the human mind can find in it the vehicles of its own thought. Nature supplies human language with its materials, i. e. with forms and symbols to convey human thoughts, but only because they have first been moulded and organized to convey the thoughts of God. There is thus a twofold union and affinity between language and nature; language has all its roots in nature, but the life which vitalizes it is derived from *mind*, which is present equally in both.

The fundamental law of language, or the expression of human thoughts, is that they be embodied in the very forms or images in which the like thoughts are embodied in nature. Hence a close familiarity with nature, with all its aspects and phenomena, especially

with the *spirit* expressed in and through them, is essential to the perfection of language. For this reason poets surpass other men in the use and mastery of language. A true poet reproduces nature in his own verse. The streams flow, the forests wave, the birds soar and sing with all the truth and reality of nature; and the reason is, that the very spirit which lives and works in nature, animates and moulds his words.

Again, there is in nature a *manifoldness* of meaning. It has not only innumerable voices, but each voice has many tones, which together make up a whole infinitude of meanings. Every individual thing, every leaf and flower and pebble, is crowded with divine thoughts, of which the wisest student may read a part, but not all. Shakspeare, who if any man ever did or could, may be said to have looked through nature, saw in the humblest and meanest thing a world of truth, where ordinary minds saw nothing. Yet not even Shakspeare comprehended the whole meaning of nature, or of a single object. Nature is an inexhaustible book, not only in its extent but its profundity; and for the reason that it is the product and expression of an infinite mind. In like manner we might expect that human language, which is a copy of that of nature, in proportion as it approaches the divine, would be distinguished by the same manifoldness of meaning. This many-sidedness of *things* we might look to see reflected in the *words* of the greatest and wisest minds, i. e. of those who see the deepest into things. This, we need not say, is eminently the fact. Without citing lower instances, look only at the words left us of Christ. What manifold treasures of thought are piled up in a single one of his sublime aphorisms. The profoundest thinker will find in these words enough to task and baffle his deepest insight; and new and still deeper meanings will continue to be found in them to the end of time. So also of the language in other parts of the Bible, especially the symbolic language of prophecy; which, being the language of *things* rather than of words or abstract terms, has necessarily many meanings. The Bible is the most figurative book in existence, and for this reason contains more of truth; or rather, having more of truth to convey, it necessarily resorts to figures or symbols as the only adequate vehicles. Finding therefore one truth or meaning in a text, we are not hastily to conclude that this is all there is in it, or that what another finds is of course false; since in most texts there are many meanings, thought within thought, as law within law in nature. If it be said that we are here advocating the obnoxious and "refuted" doctrine of a "double sense," it may be sufficient to reply, that the Bible was written for persons having two senses as well as one. We hold to an inward and

spiritual, as well as logical insight, one which looks through the latter as the soul looks through the eyes. The logical faculty is very welcome to all it can see in the Bible and elsewhere; only let it not hinder other and higher faculties from seeing too.

But more seriously. Since the Bible is a *universal* book, designed for the whole race and for all capacities, there must be in it a *universality* of import, as there is in nature, so that the highest and humblest may each find therein his own *level* of truth; and one level no more supersedes or interferes with another, than the laws or truths of mechanics interfere with those of chemistry, or these with the deeper laws of *life*. On the other hand, since there are truths in the Bible which *transcend* any one form of expression, a single truth will often require many forms or figures to express it; and the greater the truth the more forms will it permit and demand, as in nature, the more general or universal the law, the greater the number of its specific manifestations. Every *idea* truly such, comprehends in it many minor thoughts, and hence can be adequately set forth only by many and manifold symbols. We may say that a spiritual truth never can be adequately expressed in language, since every symbol employed is *specific* and limited, and expresses the idea only in part, holds to it only on one side or border. It therefore requires many and often opposite and even contradictory forms of expression, in order that it may be included and upheld as it were between them. Accordingly, he who looks only at one side of the idea through one symbol, and takes that for the whole, will assuredly err, and this in a twofold degree: first, because he sees only a side or border of the truth; and secondly, because he deems the real truth to be included in the symbol, whereas it is only included *by* or *between* this and many others. Only the deep-seeing and comprehensive mind, who can look through *all* the symbols to the central idea, and again through the idea at the surrounding symbols, and thus harmonize all in one total view, can be said to *comprehend* the truth.

To illustrate still further what we mean, by an example: God, the greatest of all possible ideas, is truly said to be expressed in every one of his works. All creatures and things "declare his glory," i. e. are so many symbols expressing each according to its measure, the one great and ineffable Idea. This, we say, and truly, is the *end* of their existence. Yet no one creature or thing, surely, can express or declare the whole glory of God. This can be done only by the whole created universe, all worlds, systems, beings, minds; all events past and to come; all opposites of good and evil; all that exists or comes to pass, in time or place. This is done and is doing forever. Who-

ever, therefore, shall approach this idea from *without*, i. e. through any one of these symbols, (for obviously none but the infinite mind itself can survey them all,) will find something of God therein; but he will be equally sure, unless inwardly enlightened, to include God *within* this one form or symbol. Here we may see the truth and the falsehood of idolatry, which is nothing but a misinterpreting of symbols, through a defect of spiritual insight. But if God himself cannot be adequately expressed in any finite form, neither can those truths relating to his being and government, truths which partake of his infinity and eternity, be adequately set forth in the forms of space and time, or in words drawn from them, but only *shadowed* forth, as eternity itself is shadowed forth by time. It is from losing sight of this, and the mistaking of the shadow for the substance, that all the wars of doctrine have arisen, and never can they cease till interpreters have learned to look beyond the shadow, and above the finite to the infinite; and to read both in and through each other.

We have alluded already in the course of this essay, to the power of imagination. As there is no element so absolutely essential to language, so constantly active in the use and interpretation of it, and at the same time so little understood, we shall devote the remainder of this Article to the consideration of this power and its relation to language, by tracing out as briefly as we can some of its workings.

Imagination may be regarded as twofold; or at least as acting in a twofold capacity, viz. as a *perceptive* and a *creative* power. The first is when it is employed to *read* external objects; by which we mean, the looking through the outward form or appearance to the thought or idea conveyed by it. In this sense it is the power to *see* in all which meets the senses, all the objects and aspects of the material universe, that which they mean or express; whether individual features, or their combination in what is called the face of nature. It is the same thing as when we look thoughtfully into the countenance of a fellow-being, to read therein the spirit and character of the man. It is pre-eminently the *eye* of the mind, without which it may grope and calculate about things, but has no real insight *into* them. Hence it is no less essential to the philosopher, who investigates the science of nature, than to the poet, who looks beyond to its spirit, since both are after the true *meaning* of nature. Thus Kepler, looking long and thoughtfully at the stars, reads in them the laws of physical astronomy, those thoughts or ideas after which the planetary system is constructed, and which had heretofore existed consciously only in the mind of Deity. In the enthusiasm of a true philosopher he exclaims, "O God,

I think thy thoughts after Thee!" Milton, looking on the same objects with the eye of a poet, thus interprets their motions around the sun :

" Where the great luminary
Aloof the vulgar constellations thick,
That from his lordly eye keep distance due,
Dispenses light from far; they as they move
Their starry dance in numbers that compute
Days, months and years, towards his all-cheering lamp,
Turn swift their various motions, or are turn'd
By his magnetic beam, that gently warms
The universe, and to each inward part
With gentle penetration, though unseen,
Shoots invisible virtue even to the deep."

Here the poet anticipates the discovery of the philosopher, and seizes with his imagination the grand truth, which Newton afterwards demonstrates by calculation.

Finally, the Hebrew Psalmist, regarding the same religiously with the eye of devout contemplation, represents the heavens as telling to the earth, night discoursing unto night, of "the glory of God." All these are instances of *imagination* looking through the outward form or letter of the universe, to its inward law or spirit. Imagination always has to do with the *truth* of things. It is not as sometimes represented a false and lawless faculty, but the truest of all, since it pierces into the inmost laws and spirit of nature, and does not stop with the bare truth of science. It is no less sure in its operations than reason, but it works more directly and intuitively. It reaches its conclusions, not by slow deduction or calculation, but by direct insight. It is the pioneer and torch of reason, which she sends on before to explore the way and guide her footsteps, or rather it is reason itself kindled to its intensest glow, and lighting up the universe with its penetrating lustre.

Imagination is sometimes confounded with fancy, which has to do only with outward and accidental relations or resemblances, and is therefore a superficial and often deceptive faculty. There is the same difference between imagination and fancy, that there is between looking at the stars in the light of modern astronomy, and as they appear to the eye under the aspect of constellations; or between perusing a book by its meaning, and amusing oneself with coincidences in the size and shape of the letters. Hence the analogies, so called, which fancy detects in nature, and the poetaster deals in, are always those which strike the senses chiefly, and are most apparent, while those which imagination apprehends and embodies are outwardly false, and

whose truth approves itself only to the inward sense. Examples crowd upon us here, but we deem it unnecessary to give them. Whoever can seize the distinction here indicated can adduce them for himself.

Secondly, imagination is a *creative* power. And here its relation to language becomes more conspicuous. 1. Its simplest exercise in this capacity is when we give a name to an external object, i. e. when we express or *image forth* our idea of a thing by a word. Here the word which corresponds to the *material* of the thing, i. e. some outward symbol or phenomenon of which it is commonly an imitation, manifests our idea or thought of it, just as its counterpart in nature manifests *its* idea, so that this first step in language is truly a creative process, an imitation by the mind of that which is ever going on in nature. Perhaps this process will be better understood by an analogous example from the department of *pure* ideas. A geometrician represents a mathematical or ideal line by an actual stroke drawn on the slate. This *visible* line or stroke is not the *real* line (which is without breadth or thickness), but only its *image* or symbol, which represents and conveys the idea to the imagination. It is important to remark here, that the same power which creates or constructs the image out of the idea, is employed to read or apprehend the idea through its image; and the same precisely is true in the case of *words*, which also are images of ideas. 2. The next operation of this power is, when we body forth in language the thought or meaning expressed by the *collective* object or features of nature. As when a poet represents the beauty of a summer evening, not by a bare description or detail of its external features, but by first *reading* these features, i. e. receiving into his soul the indwelling law or spirit of the scene, and then expressing this in the same images and symbols in which it is expressed in nature, that is, *re-creating* the scene as a whole through its idea. A perfect example of this is seen in Milton's *L'Allegro* and *Penseroso*. Here the poet looks at nature not so much with the outward eye as with the eye of the mind, and depicts it also with the same faculty, viz. imagination. The scenes and objects presented stand before us *idealized*, and for this reason are more *true* than in an ordinary description. 3. But there are other thoughts to be expressed than those we receive from without, and which we find actually embodied in nature, thoughts born within the soul itself, ideals above nature, which can therefore be only proximately represented by its forms. And here imagination assumes its most important prerogative, in seizing the elements of this natural language, i. e. the forms and appearances of nature, and *re-combining* them into a perfect language

for the mind; appropriating and assimilating the materials found in nature to the inward thought, just as the organic principle in the tree subordinates the like elementary materials to its own life.

Every moral term, however abstract, if traced to its root will be found to stand originally for something sensible, some fact or appearance in nature, which appearance and not the abstract term is the primary symbol or body of the thought. Thus *right* primarily means *straight*; *wrong* means *twisted*; *attention* is a *stretching to*; *reflection*, *turning back*, etc. These it will be seen are not arbitrary applications, but rest on a real affinity and correspondence between physical and mental phenomena. The image and the thought conveyed by it have an inward relationship which imagination discovers; and this is not limited to a few striking analogies, but pervades the entire realms of nature and mind, showing that both rest upon one and the same ground.

The human mind, then, through its perceptive and creative faculty of imagination, finding these natural images preadapted to its necessities, transfers them out of the relation and use they hold in nature, and re-combines them after a new and higher law in its own thought; thus forming a new creation out of the old, but without violence to its laws. This is the creation of *language*, of which imagination is the organizing soul. The forms and images without are transferred within, or to the pages of literature, and wrought into new structures, made to body forth and represent new ideas. But this is possible only through a like power with that which originally constructed them, viz. the power of thought.

Thus nature may be said to possess a two-fold existence or life. The first is that which exists for the senses, in the manifold forms and creations around us, which is its earthly and temporal life; the second when it passes into a higher and spiritual life in the immortal forms of language and of literature. Language also passes through two stages, the primary or *physical*, when words represent simply *things*; and the secondary or *moral*, when things and their corresponding words become the representatives of *moral ideas* in the mind. This second stage or process is discernible in what are called metaphors, which are things taken from nature to represent or body forth other things or thoughts resembling them; as when we say *light* for *knowledge*, a *rock* for *stability*, etc. Now in these and similar cases, there is more than an arbitrary association between the thing or sensible image and the moral idea. There is first an inherent and preëxisting affinity or fitness to each other; next a recognition of this fitness by the imagination; and, finally, the actual joining or marriage of the

two in a word. Or to vary the illustration, there is in every such word a real *incarnation*; the ideal or spiritual thought enters into a sensible form, so that it addresses the mind through the sense, or rather both at once in the imagination, which is the connecting or mediating faculty between them.

Since almost all the terms of language are thus metaphorical, i. e. are images brought over from nature, we may learn how much we owe to poets who first discover and wed these images or symbols to human thought. Poets are indeed in all ages the creators and regenerators of language. They supply its life by keeping it in ever fresh and vital contact with nature, whence it is derived. The poetry of a language is its true life-blood; and so soon as a language has lost its poetry, i. e. so soon as its words have become abstract, and no longer remand us to nature, or *things* as the types of thoughts, it is already dead; dead not by the extinction of the thought but of its body, the natural image which incarnates the thought. For a word as truly dies when its body decays and falls away, as a man.

In the infancy of a language all its words are poetical, because they are taken fresh from the living mint of nature. They are the true images of *things*, whose presence they recall whenever used. By and by these images become defaced and worn off by constant attrition in the market. They are then like worn out coins, which although "current" have only a *nominal* value. Then new poets or *makers* are needed to restore the original images and to create new. All living languages are constantly undergoing this decay and renovation.

4. The last and highest exercise of the imagination, is when not only individual forms and images, but the universe as a whole is subordinate to some ruling thought or passion of the mind. The *whole of nature* here becomes plastic to the sovereign power of imagination, held in solution, as it were, by the mind, which attracts and crystalizes around its own thought whatever without is kindred to it or can be made to receive its mould. The human world within and the material world without are for the time commingled into one, and love, weep, tremble and rejoice together. This is possible only as the result of high wrought emotion, and under the stress of the most intense and absorbing passion, when imagination is always the most active; and constitutes the highest triumph of the poet and the orator. This triumph is achieved in Lear, where the poet gathering around this "despised old man" all the congregated symbols of his state, all that is wildest and most desolate in nature and in man, night and tempest, an open heath and raving lunacy, he sends forth this forlorn but kingly soul to reign among them as the genius of the scene, to

subject and harmonize these discordant elements to his own infinite despair.

It will be seen from this review, what is the relation which imagination sustains to nature, and through this to language. It is the true *mediator* between the mind within, and nature or the world of things without; first, *reading* things, or educing the thoughts contained in them, and then *embodying these thoughts anew*, and sending them forth as things of the mind in the immortal creations of language. In both capacities, whether as looking through the outward forms of nature to the Divine indwelling thought, and thus wedding the universe to the mind as *science*, or as linking its own thoughts to the forms and imagery of nature, as in literature and art, it is the same sovereign, reconciling and assimilating power. Language is the true creature of the imagination, both originally and always; and the power or perfection of the one indicates and keeps pace with that of the other. This is seen most strikingly by contrasting the ancient Greeks and the Chinese, the intellectual antipodes of the human race. The latter people are utterly devoid of imagination, hence they have no language, or none that deserves the name. Of the former, imagination was the distinctive attribute, and in its highest degree; and their language is the most perfect ever created by man, the true child and image of the Grecian genius.

But we may not dwell longer on the nature of this power, the highest, as we think we have shown, among the intellectual powers of man, the most essential to the perception and expression of truth, yet alas, how sadly misunderstood and abused! We have dwelt thus long on the exposition of it, and still linger a moment in its application, because we feel deeply its claims to a better understanding and regard, and not without the hope of awakening in others a like sense of its value. Without it, as we have seen, language is impossible except as a dead and mindless formula, and thinking, which involves language, is not less dependent on it for all its life and energy. Whoever apprehends the close and vital relation subsisting between thoughts and words, and the consequent reflex influence which the latter must have upon the former; especially whoever considers the almost miraculous charm and potency of "a word fitly spoken," and the pernicious and baneful effect both upon speaker and hearer, of a word *unfitly* spoken, or untrue to the thought, will be able to appreciate that power which *gives* the right word to the thought, which is the sealing and witnessing bond that *unites* the two, and is therefore the only true interpreter and mediator between them.

It is the only security we know of clear, profound and accurate

thinking, since it gives a body, with form and outline, to thought, and thus sets it before the mind with all the distinctness and reality of outward things. It illustrates and irradiates thought, and truth likewise, so that it is beheld in clear sunlight, not as a dim abstraction, but as an actual and living incarnation. The man without imagination may stumble upon truth, or hear its voice and follow it, but cannot *discover* it or discern its form. The difference between *his* thinking and that of its possessor, is just the difference between darkly "feeling after, and haply finding" the truth, and *beholding* it in clear and solemn vision. Hence the Divine revelations made to prophets, in the olden time, were addressed to the imagination, as the only faculty which could truly apprehend and convey them.

To the metaphysician, by which we mean one who is conversant with the *things* of the mind, and not merely with abstract and dead terms divorced from these, and to whomsoever would obey the heaven-descended precept, "Know thyself," this power is the most indispensable of all, and the highest degree of it too. None other can penetrate deep enough into the mind to seize its hidden and central laws, or arrest the subtle and vanishing apparitions that make up its phenomena, hold them in their individual shapes before the eye of the soul, and question them of their birth and issue. None but this can apprehend those tenuous distinctions which are the hieroglyphics of the mind, that must be traced and understood before it can be read. Hence it is that poets have hitherto been our best mental philosophers; and we must believe they will ever continue to be.

But if this high power be thus essential to the thinker and student of truth, it surely is not less so to him who would exhibit it to others. Truth to be seen and embraced, must be embodied, clothed in a sensible and living form, that so it may meet and satisfy the *whole* being of man, and not the intellect alone. To satisfy a living man it must present itself as *life*, having form and breath and motion, and not as a dead abstraction. Hence the universal charm of fables, of ballads, of true romance, and even of allegory; where, as in Bunyan, moral truths are really incarnated, and live and walk in this our human world, and are not apparitions only, ghostly virtues from the realm of shades.

To none, then, for hither our remarks and illustrations tend, to none is this power so absolutely indispensable, especially at the present day, as to the *preacher*, the commissioned seer and herald of divine truth to men. He of all others has to do with *truth*, and with truth alone. He is required to look the deepest into nature and man, to seek out and recognize its sacred presence wherever it abides, in all its near and

open or remote and secret dwelling places, to bring together and build again into a living body the departed members of truth scattered everywhere among all the sects and schools of Christendom; in short, to read and interpret the divine word, both the written revelation and the no less sacred revelation of things, not superficially but as looking through and beyond the letter to the indwelling spirit. He needs therefore an insight, a searching depth and clearness of vision beyond what logic or hermeneutics can supply, a conscious light shining out of his own spirit, as well as a light meeting him from without. In a word, he needs "the vision and the faculty divine" of imagination, purged indeed and sanctified, first of all to see, and then to body forth in its own form, the truth it is given him to behold. Nothing, we repeat, will compensate for this, not piety itself; for are there not standing examples on every hand, of preachers eminent for godliness and orthodoxy, and sound wisdom withal, whose words are powerless because they come from them not as things, i. e. living and embodied realities, but as ghostly abstractions, detached from all communion with the actual living world, from aught that can move the senses or sensibilities of men, as truly so as if they were demonstrating a theorem in mathematics by the use of exponents x , y , and z . It is for the sake of the truth itself, which never is thus disembodied except in the mind of man or the domain of pure reason, it is for the truth's sake chiefly that we seek to vindicate the nature and claims of imagination; that in passing from the written word or the universe of things, through the mind of its interpreter, it may not suffer mutilation, but may go forth from man to man in the same radiant and living form in which God has arrayed it.

If it be not too sacred an illusion here, we may refer to the Great Teacher himself, as the highest example of what we mean by the right use of this power. Himself the incarnation of Eternal Truth, it was his prerogative in all that he said to exhibit it in fresh and living forms. Never have we read words so instinct and *alive* with imagination in its very highest activity, as are to be found in the discourses and parables of Christ. Observe how he looks on nature with a spiritual and even poetic eye; how he seizes everywhere its open or lurking analogies, and makes all outward objects tributary to his thought, by furnishing alike the lesson he would teach and the words to convey it; lighting up by his illustrating similes not only the spiritual but the outward and material world, till it almost loses its materiality, and becomes a transparent language. How he goes even beyond the poet and the philosopher in his insight into nature; since to these it yields only partial and superficial meanings, but unveils to him its innermost

divine import, as if the Lord and Author of nature were himself reading and interpreting his own works; making the houseless raven, the deciduous grass, and royally-apparelled lily, perennial preachers of trust and faith, and linking his immortal doctrines to the life-imprisoning seed, the clustered and embracing vine, and the heaven-descended, universal and emancipating light.

Finally, for we must not proceed further, we would recommend to all readers, as one of the best means of cultivating this power, and the only means of getting at the full significance and power of words, to accustom themselves to the calling up of the primary images of the words they read, of looking at thought through the medium of things, and not merely of abstract terms. The mind will thus have a double grasp upon the thought, first with the senses, and then with the reason, or rather with both in one in the imagination. We shall come to know words as we know men, after the flesh, as well as after the spirit. At the same time it is well, and somewhat important we think, to be able to know and discriminate what is flesh and what is spirit, by a discernment that can distinguish without separating, and can apprehend the limits and power of each in the unity of both.

ARTICLE V.

REINHARD'S SERMONS.

By Edwards A. Park, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary.

§ 1. *Prefatory Remarks.*

THE clergy of every land are apt to regard their own pulpit as superior to every other. Bossuet, Fenelon, Saurin, Bourdaloue, Massillon, are in France thought to be unequalled. Luther, Dinter, Spener, Herder, Zollikofer, Reinhard, Schleiermacher, Dräseke, Hofacker, are in Germany regarded as without a foreign rival. Who, asks the Briton, have discoursed like Latimer, Barrow, Taylor, South, Tillotson, Whitefield, Hall, Chalmers? And the American is unwilling to exalt any preacher above Edwards, Bellamy, Davies, Mason, and some of more recent times. Now, if it be true that the clergy of every land are superior to their foreign brethren, in their ability to influence their own countrymen, they may still obtain essential aid from

the study of a foreign pulpit, how inferior soever to their own. As, according to the proverb, wise men have learned more from fools than fools have ever learned from wise men, so the most accomplished preachers may derive instruction from those who are most open to criticism, even from the very faults of the faulty. We should remember, that the excellences of every pulpit vary from those of every other, and are a complement to them in the formation of a perfect model of sacred eloquence. The object of the present Article is, not to eulogize the divines of any particular land, nor to make lengthened criticisms upon any individual preacher, but to give some illustrations of the sermons of Reinhard, who is confessedly one of the princes among the pulpit orators of Germany. It is not pretended that his sermons are patterns for indiscriminate imitation, that they are free from glaring faults, but it is supposed that they deserve a studious examination, as specimens of a peculiar style of preaching, which, while it contains many evils to be shunned, contains also many excellences to be admired. Before we make any excerpts from his discourses, let us briefly consider the

§ 2. *Life and Labors of Reinhard.*¹

Francis Volkmar Reinhard was born in Vohenstrauß, a market-town once belonging to the principality of Sulzbach, Bavaria, March 12, 1753. His early education was superintended with great skill by his father, who was the learned preacher of Vohenstrauß. In his sixteenth year he was sent to the Gymnasium Poeticum at Ratisbon, and in 1773 he entered the university of Wittenberg, where in 1778 he was invited to take part in the instructions of the philosophical faculty. In 1780 he was appointed Professor Extraordinary of Philosophy, and in 1782 Ordinary Professor of Theology at Wittenberg. In 1792 he was called by the Saxon government to be First Court Preacher, Ecclesiastical Councillor, and First Assessor of the Consistory. To fill these important stations he removed to Dresden, and there resided twenty years. He died Sept. 6, 1812, in the sixtieth year of his age. A view of his philosophical and theological principles was published by Pöhlitz, in four volumes, in 1801-4. The same author issued, in 1813-15, in two volumes, an account of Reinhard's life and writings. A description of Reinhard's character was also given by Charpentier and Böttiger in 1813. Since his death, some of his works have been edited by such men as Schott, Bertholdt, and Heubner.

¹ The statements in this section are derived from several notices of Reinhard, particularly from that in *Cona. Lex., Auf.* 1836.

In the year 1721, Reinhard published his celebrated *Inquiry into the Plan* which the Founder of Christianity devised for the good of the race. The fourth edition of this work was issued in 1798; the fifth, under the superintendence of Heubner, in 1830. He commenced, in 1782, a *Psychological Inquiry* concerning wonder and the wonderful. Between the years 1788 and 1815, were published the five volumes of his *System of Christian Ethics*, of which the first volume has passed through five editions; the second and third, three each. All things considered, this is the most elaborate of his treatises. In 1801 was published his work, originally written in Latin, on the Worth of little things in Morals, of which a second edition was issued in 1817. His *Lectures on Dogmatic Theology* appeared in 1801, and the fourth edition of them in 1818. His *Epitome of Christian Theology* was published in 1804, and the second edition in 1819. His *Opuscula Academica* appeared in 1809, in two volumes. He published, in 1810, his far-famed *Confessions* relating to his sermons and ministerial education.¹ The fifth edition of this work was issued in 1811. Besides the above-named volumes, he printed several learned dissertations, and contributed largely to the periodical literature of his time.

In the homiletical department, the number of his printed works is larger than we could expect from a philosopher so deeply read. The uniform collection of his sermons is contained in the thirty-five octavo volumes, published between 1795 and 1813, many of which have passed through several editions, and some have been translated into foreign languages; the four volumes for the use of families, edited by Hacker, in 1813; one volume, edited by Kenzelmann, in 1825; and one, edited by Haas, in 1833. In addition to the preceding, are two volumes of sermons, published in 1793; one on the *Refining of the Moral Sentiments*, in 1798, a second edition in 1813; one on *Providence*, in 1805; and three volumes of *Reformation Discourses*, published between 1821 and 1824. Many of the sermons issued by his editors since his decease, had been previously given to the public by himself; but, on the other hand, some which he had occasionally published, are not inserted in the above-named volumes; so that it may be safe to affirm that his printed sermons occupy forty-six or seven octavo volumes, each containing from three to five hundred pages.

The extent of his labors will be best appreciated by a comparison of them with those of our own Pres. Dwight, who was born one year before Reinhard, and died four years after him, of the same disease. Both of these distinguished men were obliged to struggle, in their lite-

¹ Reinhard's *Plan* and also his *Confessions*, were translated into English, by Rev. O. A. Taylor, and published in 1831 and 1832.

rary efforts, against obstacles resulting from impaired health. Reinhard was necessitated often to suspend his studies for successive months. Dr. Dwight was occupied in collegiate instruction twenty-seven, and Reinhard taught in the university fourteen years. Moreover, while Church Councillor at Dresden, the superintendence of both the school and university education of Saxony was, in a considerable degree, confided to Reinhard. His published works are at least sixty octavos and one quarto; those of Dr. Dwight, if printed in the same style with Reinhard's, would be less than twenty octavos. Both wrote systems of theology; Dwight in the form of sermons, Reinhard in the form of a logical treatise. All the published sermons of Dwight are not more than two hundred and fifty; those of Reinhard are about nine hundred.¹ The discourses of Dwight, however, are longer and more argumentative than those of Reinhard, and he wrote hundreds which were never published.² Nearly all of Reinhard's written sermons have been given to the public. What he wrote, he finished for the press. We read of Wesley that he preached annually eight hundred sermons, of Whitefield that he preached during his life fifteen thousand; these, however, were not different discourses, but many of them repetitions of each other. One of our New England clergymen wrote three thousand sermons, which having been consumed with his house by fire, he began anew and wrote fifteen hundred more. Several of our divines have written, each, four thousand discourses; one, at least, has left to his heirs five thousand; but these preachers have not prepared their manuscripts, either in substance or style, for publication. It had been wiser if they had written no more sermons than Reinhard, and had elaborated with more care the few hundreds on which they should have concentrated their energies. Dr. Chauncy, who spent fifteen hours every day in his study, lamented toward the close of his ministry that he had written so many sermons, and remarked that two hundred were sufficient for a long life. His motto was, "Think much, write little."

Before we give any abstracts of Reinhard's discourses, it may be well to consider the

§ 3. *Novelty and Variety of his Themes for the Pulpit.*

When a reader, familiar with the strain of English preaching, opens

¹ In the *Repertorium sämmtlicher Predigt-Sammlungen* of Reinhard, which is confessedly imperfect, there are in the first edition 873, in the second 880 of his sermons enumerated.

² He is said to have written a thousand in twelve years.

the volumes of Reinhard, he seems to come into a new hemisphere, and like a traveller into the Oriental world, he is interested in the hitherto unseen flowers and fruits which attract his vision. There is a contracted circle of subjects on which some divines run a perpetual round ; but our author has overstepped the circumference of this circle, and expatiated on themes which have seldom been approached by others. The variety of his subjects is as remarkable as their novelty. Like all other authors he has, indeed, his favorite themes ; he recurs with pleasure to the dignity of human nature, the virtues of the Messiah, his relations to men as they are mortal, bereaved, prosperous, etc. ; but many of these themes he was *obliged* to discuss by the ecclesiastical rules which fettered him. While hampered by these rules, to have prepared nine hundred sermons for the press on subjects so different as his from each other and from those ordinarily discussed in the pulpit, indicates a fertility of genius, an extent of observation, a richness of spiritual feeling, a practical tact, which are but seldom combined in one man. The following are selected, not by any means as the most peculiar, or the most fruitful of his topics, but as giving a fair specimen of their original, fresh, diversified character ;

We should derive nourishment for our philanthropy from the unexpected discovery of good qualities in others ; The influence of old age upon our love to men ; The desire of living long enough to witness certain expected and important events ; The results of that Providence by which men of different ages in life are associated together ; Necessity, a means of intellectual and moral improvement ; The connection between humility towards God and a hearty confidence in him ; The union which Christianity forms between the love of one's country and the love of the entire race of man ; The evil influence which the pleasures of the table exert upon the human heart ; Why do the most weighty truths generally excite the greatest opposition ? How important for us is the connection which Christianity, at the beginning, formed with the lowest classes of society ; The instruments which God chooses for executing his benevolent purposes, are not such as man would have chosen ; How happy should we be in taking our departure from the world, if, like our Saviour, we should leave no one behind us who would regret that he had formed our acquaintance ; The history of Christ's resurrection gives the best instruction on the rapid changes in the affairs of men ; We should live for those high ends which will make our existence important for our fellow men, and worthy of mention when we are dead ; How appropriate it is to the feelings of true Christians, not to distrust the future amelioration of human character ; The best men do not receive their merited honor until

they are dead ; The duties imposed upon us by the promising prospects of the young ; The duties resulting from the fact, that many persons have far more good qualities than we have usually ascribed to them ;¹ The injurious influence of sudden prosperity upon the moral feelings of men ; Even in our opportunities of doing good, there are sometimes temptations against which we should be on our guard ; The disposition of men to strive for communion with the higher orders of being ; Warnings against false conscientiousness ; A cheerful, equable temper essential to the most active piety ; Hindrances to true peace of mind among real Christians ; How carefully good men should guard against becoming the sport of circumstances ; The impossibility of satisfying the unwarranted hopes which men cherish concerning us ; The birth of Jesus is the most instructive memento of our own birth ; The serious thought on the incarnation of the Son of God, is the best means of awakening within us a lively feeling of the dignity of our own nature ; In entering upon a new year, how much reason we have to be thankful for the pressure of duty ; The providence of God toward our little ones ; The furtherance of truth by means which are uncongenial with it ; The duty of deriving useful lessons from our past mistakes ; We should not be offended at the mingling of worthy and unworthy members in the Christian church ; What shall we think of the uncertainty in which our religion leaves us, with regard to the particulars of our residence in the future world ? etc.

The question arises, where does Reinhard find passages in the Bible suggesting such themes ? This leads us to consider the

§ 4. Connection of his Themes with his Texts.

The German Lutheran church, it is well known, prescribe a series of biblical lessons, a *pericope*, for every sabbath and religious festival day of the year. From these lessons the preacher is obliged to take his texts.² Year after year, therefore, he is compelled to preach on the same passages of Scripture. Hence results a danger of monotony in the choice of his themes. In order to guard against this tiresome sameness, an inventive mind like that of Reinhard is prompted to search out the hidden meanings of the lessons selected for him, and to found his discourses on implications rather than on assertions of Scrip-

¹ The text of this discourse is Luke 17: 11—16 ; which is said to imply that the Samaritan who was healed had more gratitude than was expected of him.

² The supposed advantages of preaching from such prescribed texts, rather than from such as each clergyman chooses for himself, are stated in Bib. Sac. Vol. III. p. 473.

ture. The reader is constantly surprised at the ease and naturalness with which our author merges his texts into Propositions which, but for his ingenuity in explaining them, would seem altogether too far-fetched. The artifice with which he connects his novel themes with the lessons which suggest them, may be seen in the following examples. Often it is a fault incident to the circumstances in which he wrote; although it is far more disagreeable in these insulated illustrations, than in the neat and flowing discourses from which they are detached.

From the fact mentioned in Jöbn 4: 47—54 that Christ, when urged to visit the nobleman's house, persevered in refusing the entreaty, and even rebuked the supplicating father, although he restored the dying son, Reinhard discourses¹ on the doubtful value of complaisance, and the duties resulting from the ambiguous morality of this trait. We should not say, yes, to every solicitation. From the same text he discourses² again on the immodesty which leads men to ask too much of God. The narrative, in Matt. 9: 1—8, of the palsied man who was brought to Jesus by persons who showed great faith in the Messiah's willingness and power to heal their friend, is the foundation of a discourse by our author, on the conduct required of Christians by the confidence which others repose in them.³

An English or an American divine discoursing on Luke 8: 4—15, the passage containing the parable of the sower, would have derived from it a lesson with regard to the duty or the mode or the results of hearing, or preaching the gospel, or with regard to the good and evil influences which operate upon man while listening to the truth. But the German divine shows from this text, how we ought to be influenced by the known fact, that we must live and hold intercourse with men of the most widely different characters and manners.⁴ In another sermon from the same text,⁵ he proposes to state some grounds of consolation for those who think that they can effect nothing by their most faithful exertions. A discourse in relation to Christ's healing the dropsical man on the sabbath, Luke 14: 1—6, would ordinarily be devoted to the mode of keeping holy holy time; but as the Pharisees were inquisitive to know whether the Saviour would heal on the sabbath day, and as he at once performed the miracle without previously explaining the reasons for it, Reinhard devotes his sermon on this text to the habit of answering men by ac-

¹ Predigten im Jahre 1795 gehalten, Band II. ss. 332—345.

² Predigten im Jahre 1796 gehalten, Band I. ss. 312—330.

³ Predigten im Jahre 1795 gehalten, Band II. ss. 356—370.

⁴ Predigten im Jahre 1801 gehalten, Band I. ss. 116—137.

⁵ Predigten, 1797. Band I. ss. 87—104.

tions instead of words, *Das Antworten mit der That*.¹ We are accustomed to hear discourses on the proper use of the tongue from such texts as Ps. 39: 1, or James 1: 26, or 3: 2 seq., but our author has a sermon² on the duty of manifesting the true Christian spirit in our words, and founds it on the record of the miracle which Christ performed on the man who "had an impediment in his speech," Mark 7: 31—37. The narrative of our Saviour's miracle of feeding the four thousand, Mark 8: 1—9, would suggest to an ordinary preacher the benevolence or power of Christ, but Reinhard deduces from it the theme, Christians must always rely on themselves more than on others.³ Men are apt to rely on their companions for even the entertainment of a social party, but Christ attracted four thousand persons to himself, entertained them three days by his own words, and at last, although he asked the advice of his disciples, did not follow it, but fed the multitude by his own power. So should we rely upon ourselves: a) we should expect more from our own judgment than from that of our fellow men in forming our plans; b) from our own activity than from that of our fellow men in executing our plans; c) from our own energy than from that of our fellow men in extricating ourselves from trouble. We should rely upon ourselves in this manner, because such reliance best accords with, a) our duty, b) our honor, c) our interest, d) the general welfare. If we would thus expect more from ourselves than from others, we must, a) cherish a fitting regard for our own dignity, b) endeavor to discipline our powers so as to become more and more judicious and practically useful, c) strive to possess within ourselves as many resources as possible, d) in all ways confirm within us the filial assurance that, while in the way of prudence and duty, we shall receive the aid of the Most High. The fact that the multitude had been with Jesus three days and without provisions, suggests to Reinhard, as a theme of another sermon from the same text,⁴ the Proposition that we should be very miserable if God did not, without ceasing, remedy the evils of our improvidence; a theme ingeniously illustrated by the incidents of the text, but too homely and secular for the taste of English and American divines. From the expression, Many prophets and kings have desired, etc., in the lesson Luke 10: 23—37, our author preaches an intellectual discourse,⁵ on the yearnings of the noblest minds after a higher good than they have already attained.

¹ Predigten 1807, Band II. ss. 121—138.

² Predigten, 1797, Band I. ss. 297—315.

³ Predigten, 1797, Band II. ss. 292—308.

⁴ Predigten, 1799, Band I. ss. 41—58.

⁵ Predigten, 1800, Band II. ss. 147—166.

When there are several parallel passages of Scripture which might, with some propriety, be used as texts for a particular sermon, Reinhard is often obliged to employ the least appropriate of these passages for his text, and refer to the more appropriate as illustrating it. The healing of Jairus's daughter is described more fully in Mark 5: 22—53 and Luke 8: 41—56 than in Matt. 9: 18—26; yet the latter is one of the selected lessons, and must therefore be the foundation of Reinhard's sermon, although the principle which he derives from it is far more clearly developed in the other histories. "Jairus came to Capernaum," says our author in one of his discourses from Matt. 9: 18—26,¹ "but found the Messiah thronged with inquisitive men. He persuaded the Saviour to accompany him, yet the multitude of curious observers streamed after this object of their unceasing wonder. When Jesus arrived at the ruler's house, he saw the same love of novelty developed there. A crowd had assembled to gaze at the scene of death. He expelled the inquisitive multitude from the house, that he might perform his miracle in quietness. The curiosity of modern times is greater than was that of ancient days; for then it was limited to the news of neighboring villages, now it is extended to the news of distant nations. This curiosity is not itself blamable, but should be regulated on Christian principles. The inquisitiveness of Christ's contemporaries led but very few of them to a hearty faith in him; and our curiosity for the social or literary, written or oral news of the day, is often unproductive of good, because it is not subjected to the law of Christianity. The design of this sermon is, to state the duties which the Christian religion devolves upon us in regard to the news of the day.

A. A Christian is required to be deliberate in his attention to the news of the day. He should attend to them, but, a) should not eagerly seize at popular rumors, for they are generally too frivolous to be hunted for; and, b) he should not credit them without a searching examination, for they are often untrustworthy.

B. A Christian is required to be cautious in communicating the news of the day. a) He should guard against repeating them in a gossiping spirit, for such a spirit leads to exaggerations of the truth, b) he should be influenced by circumstances in communicating them. The Saviour performed his miracle in the house of Jairus privately, for circumstances rendered such a mode expedient. But on his way to this house, he made known a miracle which he had secretly performed. Why did he expose the woman who had touched the hem of his gar-

¹ Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band IV. ss. 145—163. An abstract of this sermon is here given, as illustrating the mode in which Reinhard constantly refers to his text.

ment? No one of the throng was aware that he had miraculously cured her. He was not accustomed to publish abroad his miracles. But unless he had published this, the report might have arisen that the power of healing diseases lay in his very garments, and was not dependent on his rational action. To preclude this superstition he gave publicity to the fact, that he perceived virtue to have gone out of him. Circumstances require us occasionally to promulge, and occasionally to conceal what we know.

C. A Christian is required to employ the news of the day for his own instruction. a) He should extend his knowledge by their means. Our Saviour would not allow the crowd to witness his miracle in the house of Jairus, for they had no disposition to learn useful truths from what they saw, and we deserve to be thrust out of our heavenly Father's house, if we derive no useful information, with regard to character and duty, from what we daily hear. b) He should improve his principles of action by the new knowledge which he acquires of men and things. Not merely for himself, however, should he labor, but,

D. A Christian is required to employ the news of the day for the welfare of others: a) for the good of those present with us; our text specifies four particulars in which Christ employed the new events of a few hours, for the welfare of those who were with him; b) for the good of those absent from us; often may we rebuke slanderers and thereby save their absent victims from serious evil.

Reinhard had a twofold difficulty imposed upon him in the choice of his subjects. He must pay some regard to his texts, and some to the days of the calendar. Hence we are led to speak of the

§ 5. *Connection of his Themes with the Occasions on which they were discussed.*

A glance at his discourses confirms the remark, that in the Lutheran church of Germany the Reformation is not yet completed. We not only find his annual sermons on Palm Sunday, Whitsuntide, Epiphany, etc., but also on Septuagesima and Sexagesima Sundays (so called because the former is *about* seventy, and the latter *about* sixty days before Easter), on Exaudi Sunday (so called because on this day the passage Exaudi, Domine, vocem meam, etc., Ps. 27: 7, is to be read in the Romish church), on Quasimodogeniti Sunday (so called because the passage Sicut modo geniti infantes, etc., 1 Pet. 2: 2, is appointed in the Romish Missal to be publicly read on this day), on Cantate, and Esto mihi Sundays, on the festival of the visitation of the virgin Mary, and in fine on nearly all the holidays of the dark ages.

His themes, therefore, must have relation not only to his texts, but also to the ill-regulated festivals on which they are discussed. It is easy to see, however, that a tedium would ensue, if, for example, one sabbath in every year should be devoted throughout the whole land, to a discourse expressly on Saint Michael and all angels. It becomes necessary, therefore, to use great latitude in the treatment of the texts selected for this festival. One of these texts is Matt. 18: 1—11, which derives its pertinency to this occasion from a clause in the 10th verse. In one of Reinhard's sermons on this text,¹ he considers the importance of cherishing a constantly active conviction of the freedom of the human will. But this Proposition has no relevancy to the 10th verse. It is derived from the 7—9 verses, in which, our author supposes, the will is summoned to assert and use its freedom in opposition to the appetites, desires, emotions and affections which induce it to sin. In a subsequent discourse² on the same text, and on the same festival, he considers the constantly decreasing earnestness which is manifested in the religious life. Were it not for the subtle ingenuity of Reinhard, it would be difficult to see the harmony between these two themes with the spirit of their text or of St. Michael's day. One of his discourses³ preached on the day of the Purification of the virgin Mary, is professedly founded on Luke 2: 22—32. Its Proposition is, The Christian should love life and not fear death. Its Division is, He should love life because of his duties, and he should be fearless of death because of his hopes. Its Subdivisions are, I. He should love life, because of his duty, a) to acquire knowledge in life, b) to improve his character, c) to promote the welfare of men, d) to know God. II. He should be fearless of death because of his hope, a) that death will be less terrible to him than it is commonly regarded, b) that all his concerns will remain under the divine guidance, c) that he shall enter, at death, on an immortal existence, and, d) that through God's grace in Christ he shall be perfectly blissful. But what has such a sermon to do with the purification of the virgin Mary? And what connection has it with the text? When Mary presented herself in the temple, Simeon incidentally met her, and having taken the child exclaims, "Now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace," and this exclamation is contained in the lesson of the day, and indirectly suggests the Proposition of the discourse, a Proposition, however, equally appropriate to the Rogate, or the Reminiscere, or the Invocavit or the Misericordia Domini Sunday, and to a multitude of dissimilar texts.

¹ Predigten, 1795, Band I. ss. 274—293.

² Predigten, 1800, Band II. ss. 187—208.

³ Predigten, 1801, Band I. ss. 93—115.

In another discourse on the same festival and from the same lesson he propounds as his theme,¹ At death men never lament their having been, but often their not having been religious; a very good theme, but much more opportune to the Green (Maundy) Thursday or to the Oculi Sunday, than to the festival in honor of the virgin while at a period long anterior to her decease.

A Puritan would suppose, that if there were any reason for observing the Epiphany, the same reason would require us to meditate during the festival on some truth connected with the mission of Christ or with the state of the heathen. One of Reinhard's Epiphany² sermons is devoted to a warning against obstinacy in adhering to designs previously formed. By what circuitous path is such a theme arrived at on such a day? The lesson for the festival is Matt. 2: 1—12; this passage includes the account of Herod's slaying the infants of Bethlehem; this murderous act of the king was prompted by his headstrong perseverance in his scheme of retaining the rule of Judea; and hence the appearance of Christ to the magi is historically connected with an act which warns us against obstinacy in adhering to designs previously formed. On the second Sabbath after Epiphany in a sermon from John 2: 1—11, our author treats of the moral worth of great assemblies, or social parties.³ But why was not this subject equally appropriate to the "Laetare Sunday," and why might it not have been exchanged for one of his themes on Annunciation day, the duties devolved upon us, whenever our hopes are surpassed by the event, text; Luke 1: 26—28?⁴

The Lutheran church observes the New Year's day as a religious festival, not merely on account of its relations to the course of time, but also and professedly on account of its being the day of Christ's circumcision, or the eighth day after Christmas. It is therefore called the festival of the Circumcision, and the sermons preached on the occasion are adapted both to the recollection of this event, and likewise to the commencement of a new year. It is frequently a problem how to combine in one discourse the appropriate references to such different objects; and the ingenuity of Reinhard is often tortured to present the two themes in a fitting union. The trouble is increased by the fact, that the lessons for the Festival, Gal. 3: 23—29, and Luke 2: 21,⁵ refer exclusively to the circumcision rather than to the

¹ Predigten, 1799, Band I. ss. 105—123.

² Predigten, 1796, Band II. ss. 1—18.

³ Predigten, 1800, Band I. ss. 61—80.

⁴ Predigten, 1800, Band I. ss. 252—271.

⁵ Reference is here made to the lessons in the old Sächsische Kirchen Agende,

new year, and it requires great versatility of mind to educe from either of these lessons for successive years the trains of thought which are expected on the first of January. An illustration of the manner in which Reinhard steers through the difficulties of his position, is seen in the following summary of one of his sermons from Luke 2: 21.¹

Introduction. The new year suggests to a man the importance of time. But time would lose for him much of its value were it not for his being known to the community by a proper name, which suggests his person to every one who hears it. Criminals often think that, by changing their names, they are made over again. If any one, of us should give up the cognomen by which he has been designated, he would seem to have lost a part, at least, of himself, and after this disturbance of his identity, his future life would seem to be less intimately connected with the past, and would thus appear to him less important than it now does. Many persons had been called Jesus, before our Saviour was thus designated; but what a dignity has he imparted to that word! What a worthy appellation it has become through his virtues!

Proposition. We shall best spend the year on which we entered to-day, if the names by which we are known, are as valuable to us, as they should be to true Christians.

Division. I must first illustrate the value which a true Christian finds in his name, and secondly, show that we shall spend the new year in the best manner, if we feel that our own names possess this value.²

First Head. The name of a Christian is valuable to him,
A. As a mark of distinction from other persons; for society would be confused and would fall into many and ruinous mistakes, if there were no such convenient methods of distinguishing different individuals.

from which Reinhard usually preached. Different systems of lessons are used in different lands.

¹ Predigten, 1797, Band I. ss. 1—21. It should be said, however, that Reinhard speaks of his train of thought in this sermon, as unusual for the pulpit.

² Here Reinhard inserts an explanation which exemplifies his extreme, sometimes unnecessary care in making all his assertions perspicuous and precise. "By the word name, I here mean those words which are employed for precisely designating our persons, and for distinguishing us from all others. They may or may not be in themselves specially significant, may be derived from our own or foreign languages, may have been selected for us with consideration and for some peculiar distinctive purpose, or capriciously and under the influence of accidental circumstances; all these things are of not the slightest weight, and do not affect the minds of rational Christians with regard to the intrinsic value of their names." a. 6.

- B.** As a remembrancer of his reception into the bosom of the church. It was given him at his baptism, as Christ's at his circumcision, and is associated with all the vows then made for him, and all the significance of that initiatory rite.
- C.** As a sign of his connection with an honored or beloved family. If the family be honored, how precious the word which associates all that reputation with himself; if it be not unusually revered by society at large, many members of it are beloved by himself, and how sweet the word which indicates his consanguinity with those to whom his heart clings in the fondest attachment.
- D.** As the object around which is entwined all that others think of him or feel toward him. It is the ring which encircles within itself the various opinions and emotions which men have in regard to his character. What a multitude of thoughts and feelings are awakened at the bare name of Jesus! And in a degree, all the followers of Christ should associate their names with such a demeanor, as will give a peculiar meaning to those otherwise arbitrary letters, and make them suggestive of whatever is great and good. The mere mention of their names may and should be a stimulus to high and holy efforts.
- E.** As the vehicle by which our influence may be transmitted to posterity. Our names will survive us, perhaps for centuries. We may so conduct ourselves that they will be associated with lessons of instruction to coming ages, will excite emotions, elevating men to virtue or alluring them into sin. Can a Christian, then, be indifferent to the spiritual associations, which may fruitfully cluster around his cognomen when he himself is no more?

Second Head. We shall best spend the year on which we this day enter, if we attach to our names the importance which we have just ascribed to them; for this view of their importance will lead us,

- A.** To rectify our faults; not to allow the very sound which suggests the idea of our persons, to be significant of odious qualities to our contemporaries and successors, and thus to disgrace ourselves, our relatives, and the church:
- B.** To rescue our names from obscurity; not to permit them to be unconnected in the memory of man with deeds of wisdom and beneficence, with habits of punctuality and faithfulness:
- C.** To adorn all our social and public relations; to make each member of our families rejoice in our names; each of our fellow citizens love to repeat them; the church of Christ at whose baptismal altar we received them, derive comfort from the virtues

which they bring to mind, and delight in them as the names which are written in heaven :

- D. To commend ourselves more and more to the consciences of men by multiplying our meritorious deeds ; if we are now eminent and all eyes directed toward us, we should increase the worthiness of our example, so that our names shall be mentioned with new complacency by the multitudes who are proud to imitate us :
- E. To occupy every hour of the new year with zealous labors for the general welfare ; for life is short ; and we must be diligent, if we would scatter all along our pathway such memorials of ourselves as will excite the gratitude of posterity, and quicken them to cultivate the virtues which will be suggested by the very letters which designate our persons. By useful industry each man may acquire a good name, and one which is permanently useful.

The preceding abstract from Reinhard leads us into the

§ 6. *Rhetorical Structure of his Discourses.*

It is needless to say that one excellence of his sermons consists in their accurate arrangement. His mind was so severely disciplined that he wrote, both on the most intricate and the most familiar themes, with a remarkable exactness of method. Almost every one of his sermons is a system, having its general Divisions, each of which is subdivided into tributary parts, and each of these parts exhibits a wonderful precision in the sequence of its component thoughts. A skeleton of one of his sermons fails to exhibit the rigid order which pervades the entire composition, for the muscles of the body are as nicely and systematically collocated as the bones. He generally announces his main Divisions immediately after the statement of his theme. He often enumerates the Subdivisions of each principal topic, immediately after that topic is brought forward to be discussed. He distinctly repeats the Subdivision both at the commencement and at the close of its discussion. He announces its minute and specific parts with so much neatness and accuracy, as to make the whole discourse appear like a congeries of themes, particular and general, one rising above another, and all in their inter-dependencies, constituting a single, comprehensive, extensively related, organized, almost living subject. It must be confessed, indeed, that his arrangement is often artificial, that he sacrifices ease to order, and thus extends his excellence into a fault.¹ He

¹ Reinhard comments very freely on his own errors in the arrangement of his sermons, but denies that he ever intended to force his thoughts into a preconceived or favorite order. See *Geständnisse*, Sulzbach, 1810, ss. 156, 157.

is too much enamored of the poetry of the mathematics, the rhythm of numbers. He is, for example, too fond of a division into four general topics, and a subdivision of each of the four into a couple of secondary parts. He often divides the body of his sermon into six heads, and concludes with three inferences. Four and two, six and three are with him far preferable to seven and three, five and two. He devotes nearly an equal amount of space to each of his regular divisions, and thus gives to the whole sermon a balance and equipoise which indicate constraint in his own mind, and interfere with the natural growth of his theme. But although a syllabus of his discourses will not expose the whole extent of their symmetry, it will indicate the principle on which he elaborated them, a principle far too excellent to be disregarded as it often is, and appearing none the less important from the excess into which a scholastic preacher has carried it.

Perhaps the structure of our author's and of many other German discourses, may be well exhibited in the following abstract of a double sermon which he preached on the two successive days of the Easter Festival.¹

Doxology, from 1 Pet. 1: 3, 4 (instead of the Benediction with which his discourses usually commenced).

Introduction, closed with a brief prayer. The instability of all things on earth depresses the heart; hence man strives to make himself immortal in the respect and affection of posterity. But he fails in his design. This festival presents the only object which can gratify man's love of permanence and immortality; for it shows him that he is not born to die, but dies to live forever and ever. The resurrection of Christ suggests the following

Proposition.² The Infinite in the employments and the experiences of man.

Division. 1. Explanation and proof of the Infinite in human affairs. 2. The importance of recognizing it.

Before discussing this subject let us entreat for the Divine aid in a silent prayer. (Here the congregation rise, offer a secret petition and remain standing until after the announcement of the text.³)

¹ Predigten, 1807, Band II. ss. 257—299.

² Although the Introduction in the German discourses usually precedes the text, yet it is not the general, although with Reinhard it is a frequent custom to insert the Proposition before the text.

³ This practice of the hearers' standing while the text is read commends itself to the taste and judgment, as indicating reverence for the Scriptures and interest in the discourse.

Text, same as the lesson of the day which had been previously read; Mark 16: 1—8.

Explanation and Transition. The female friends of Jesus supposed that all was over with him. "They trembled, therefore, and were amazed," when they heard that he had returned to life. Suddenly the thought rushes into their minds, that in the duties and events of human life there is something boundless, infinite. Jesus is a man, but after his death lives forever. The design of his resurrection suggests our first Division, and leads us to show the meaning and the reality of the Infinite in the duties and events of life.

Subdivision of the First Head, constituting the body of the first sermon.

- I. The employments and experiences of man contain the Infinite,
 - A. in their design,
 - A. In their design, as they relate to ends
 - a. which are infinitely important, and
 - b. which cannot be compassed without unceasing progress; both of these facts being illustrated by Christ's rising from death.
 - B. In their continuance as they belong to a nature
 - a. which will ever exist,
 - b. which will be ever active, both of these truths being suggested to us by Christ, "the first fruits" of the general resurrection.
 - C. In their consequences as these are
 - a. ineffaceable in their nature, it being impossible for a man to revoke the influence which he has already exerted upon himself and upon others;
 - b. immeasurable in their power, the influence which a man exerts being communicated from one to another interminably; an illustrious example of these indestructible results of life being suggested by Christ's resurrection.

Conclusion of the first sermon, growing immediately out of I. C. b. above, in the form of an address to the Deity.

Introduction to the second sermon, containing a recapitulation of the first, and a statement of the influence exerted on great men by a belief in their immortality.

Text, Luke 24: 13—34, the lesson for the second day of the Easter Festival.

Explanation and Transition. The two travellers to Emmaus were

enlightened and renovated by the discourse of Jesus; for they now perceived their relations to the Infinite. Hence we come to our second Division, The importance of recognizing the Infinite in the employments and experiences of man.

Subdivision of the Second Head, constituting the body of the second sermon.

II. The recognition of the Infinite in human affairs is important, because it conduces

- A. to our intellectual advancement,
 - B. to our moral improvement,
 - C. to our practical activity,
 - D. to our inward peace.
- A. It conduces to our intellectual advancement,
 - a. as it clears our minds from hurtful prejudices; we do not regard anything aright if we look upon it as intended for time merely;
 - b. as it directs our attention to the right objects; to those which are of the loftiest and most enduring interest. Christ was not understood by others until he rose from death to reign forever.
 - B. It conduces to our moral improvement,
 - a. as it shows this moral reformation to be indispensably necessary; for how can we hunt like brutes for earthly pleasures, if we are made for an unending existence, and if we are to be judged by Christ?
 - b. as it exhibits the great blessings derived from such improvement; for all our virtuous self-denials will be compensated at the last. The friends of Jesus did not see the importance of their living a new life, nor the advantages resulting from it, until they saw that he had risen from a state of suffering to glory and honor.
 - C. It conduces to our practical activity,
 - a. as it makes our activity more powerful; for we are operating on minds which will through eternity develope the results of our influence;
 - b. as it makes our activity more persevering; for no obstacle can ultimately prevent the success of our efforts in the right cause. Christ's disciples became far more efficient after his resurrection than before, and none of them after this event, forsook his cause.
 - D. It conduces to our inward peace,
 - a. as it emboldens us to fear nothing; for why should we

tremble before the greatest earthly loss, since it conduces to our eternal welfare?

- b. it encourages us to hope for all good; in the compass of our everlasting life we shall enjoy every real blessing which we can conceive. The resurrection of Jesus emboldened his disciples, and animated them with the most cheerful courage.

Conclusion, immediately growing out of II. D. b. above, in the form of an address to the Deity.

The four Subdivisions of each of the two general Heads in the preceding sermon are discussed at equal length, and each couple of the subordinate Heads under each of the four Subdivisions, occupies in its discussion about the same space with each of the others, and a similar equality and balance are visible between the two minor Heads composing each of these couples.

We give another abstract¹ illustrating the symmetrical structure of Reinhard's discourses, and free from some peculiarities of the preceding.

Benediction. "The grace of our Lord," etc.

Introduction, closed with a brief prayer. Jesus often extols the Samaritans and the heathen as superior to the Jews. The ancient pagans exhibited many noble characteristics which we seldom see surpassed, or even equalled among men who adopt the true faith. If it be said that these were merely the semblances of virtue and not virtue itself, then we ask why do we not discover such good appearances more frequently in the Christian Church? These facts suggest the theme of our present discourse.

Text, Luke 17: 11—19, the same as the lesson which had been previously read.

Transition and Explanation. This passage records that among the ten lepers who were healed, one who was a Samaritan and therefore despised by the Jews, manifested gratitude to his benefactor, but the nine who were blessed with the Jewish faith, exhibited no thankfulness for the favor which they had received. This incident suggests the

Proposition: Why are those who believe that they possess the true religion, so often put to shame by the virtues of men who appear to live in error?

Division.

- A. Because the true religion is often, in the minds of those who adopt it, not what it ought to be.

¹ Taken from Predigten, 1802, Band II. ss. 252—275.

- a. It is often mingled with superstitious notions.
- b. It is often depreciated into a mere intellectual and inoperative faith.
- B. Because those who adopt the true religion are easily inflated with pride.
 - a. They become proud of their superior knowledge.
 - b. They become proud of the distinguishing favors which they have received from God.
- C. Because those who adopt the true religion easily sink into carelessness and negligence with regard to it.
 - a. They become careless and negligent with regard to the preservation of the true religion in themselves, and the propagation of it among others.
 - b. They become careless and negligent with regard to the application of the true religion to the peculiar and diversified circumstances of their time.
- D. Because those who adopt the true religion often derive from it excuses for their sinful conduct.
 - a. They place too high an estimate upon its external duties.
 - b. They abuse its most sacred truths into a defence of their misdeeds.

Peroration. A personal application of the subject involved in the last Subdivision of the fourth head.

Lest the regularity of Reinhard's discourses should seem to interfere with their ductile, flexible application to the varying states of his hearers, we add a fuller syllabus of a sermon,¹ which is as practical in its character as it is exact in its plan.

Introduction. A thoughtful man must have often lamented, that the great majority of men and women are immersed in labors which apparently interfere with their mental improvement. They need but a short time for learning the processes of their handiwork, and ever after they seem to go through a routine of services which require no thought, and which at length not only indispose but also incapacitate them for high intellectual exertion. "Sad, indeed, is the condition of our race, if these petty and monotonous duties, which pertain more or less to every vocation, must be in fact so enervating to our faculties and depressing to our aspirations, as they at first appear to be. But can we believe that the wise and benignant Ruler of the world has condemned by far the greater part of men to wring out their life in fruitless pains-taking? Has the Father of spirits sunk so many millions of his noblest creatures into a state, in which they must necessarily

¹ Predigten, 1797, Band II. 258—274.

enfeeble their own minds, and gradually lose not only the wish but also the power to act in accordance with their dignity? Oh! ye who look with aversion and abhorrence upon the dull sameness, the littleness, the insignificance of human toils, and upon their oppressive, enslaving influence; ye who find your own calling to be so odious and intolerable, that ye cannot conceive why God has put a yoke upon you which weighs down into the dust your aspiring minds, hear me to-day. I will attempt to give you another view of the matter. I will venture to unfold the propriety of that constitution of things which has been established by the Ruler of your destinies. I will take pains to reconcile you with your lot and to comfort you."

Text. Luke 5: 1—11 (previously repeated in the devotional service).

Explanation and Transition. "Fear not," says Jesus, "from henceforth thou shalt catch men." What a change from the employment of an humble fisherman on the lake of Gennessaret, to the most intellectual and sublime office with which a man can be honored! But in what manner had Peter been preparing himself for the duty of persuading the world to obey the truth? Would he have been elevated to this vocation, if he had not, in his lowly employment, acquired the discipline which fitted him for a nobler sphere? Let us attend to our

Proposition. The faithful discharge of the duties imposed on us by our appropriate calling, qualifies us for still higher functions.

Division. First, let us explain; secondly, prove; thirdly, show the importance of this Proposition.

First Head. In explaining the Proposition we will consider,

- A. What are the duties of our calling? They are all the services which Divine Providence requires of us.
- B. What is the faithful discharge of these duties? Our text illustrates it. "We have toiled all the night," says Peter, "and have taken nothing; nevertheless, at thy word I will let down the net." We must not be wearied with our services, for Peter was ready still to labor. We must devote the most appropriate time to them, for Peter toiled all the night. We must not be repulsed, as he was not, by failures. We must gladly receive the stimulus to new duties, as Peter was prompt to let down the net. We must regulate our affairs by the will of God, as Peter was quick to obey the first word of Jesus.
- C. What is meant by being qualified for still higher functions? Whatever our calling may be, the conscientious performance of its duties has such an influence upon our mind and heart as to

make us better in ourselves, more capable of doing good to others, more suitable for being introduced into a higher sphere of operations in the eternal world. But does our devotedness to even the minute employments of household life, tend to such a spiritual result?

Second Head. In proof of our Proposition, we remark,

- A. The faithful discharge of the duties of our station, how low soever that station may be, enriches us with useful knowledge. The harvest of true wisdom is not reaped in those fascinating fields which open to you unnumbered volumes for your indolent perusal; not in that world of phantasy, where the imagination is disordered by dreams; not in those abysses of speculation, where the reason broods over its own subtilities; but wherever God has appointed you to labor, in the fields of that every-day occupation which duty requires of you, there shall you pluck the flowers of the fairest knowledge, reap the most wholesome experiences, garner without interruption the most profitable wisdom. The mother, sedulous to perform her domestic duties, acquires a fund of more solid information than the fashionable devotee of light literature, who lives that she may shine in society; the industrious farmer, hand-workman, artisan, obtains more substantial knowledge than the learned man who is absorbed in trivial speculations.
- B. Fidelity to our vocation inures us to the practice of beneficent virtues. Our daily business is the central point where all the moral duties meet; as regularity, punctuality, patience, perseverance, self-denial, contentment, modesty, love to others, readiness to serve them, etc.
- C. The same fidelity strengthens all the faculties of our nature. There is no honest trade, however menial, which when attentively pursued, does not exercise the memory, imagination, judgment, feelings, in fine the whole man. Experience and the nature of the case prove, that our mental and moral powers gain a vigor, flexibility, versatile activity from our appropriate labors, and are thereby qualified for higher functions than are now assigned to them.

Third Head. The Proposition of our discourse is important, because,

- A. It must awaken within us a thankful admiration of God's fatherly goodness and wisdom. The daily labor of men, which seems so forbidding, is the school in which he is educating them for himself.

- B. It binds us to the most sedulous activity in our vocation. Jesus tried Peter by requiring a new duty, before he elevated him to be a fisher of men. And if we do not endure our trial, if we are unfaithful in the unrighteous mammon, will God commit to our trust the true riches? Will he call to the higher sphere of heaven, those who are remiss on earth?
- C. It consoles us for our want of visible success in our labors. The crowning result of these labors is inward. What if men have toiled all the night and gained no external good? They have qualified themselves for a nobler labor with which they are to be honored. Was the net full of fishes the chief reward for Peter's diligence? "When they had brought their ships to land," says the text, "they forsook all and followed him."
- D. It proves that we should not abandon our present calling, be it what it may, until God summon us to another. Almost every one has, at times, a prurient desire to do something else: women to manage the affairs of men, the lower classes to imitate the higher, the ignorant to set up for scholars, etc.; and multitudes ruin themselves by fickleness and instability in their profession, by overstepping their proper limits. But He who called fishermen to a more exalted office, will call us to one when we are fitted for it.
- E. It awakens in our hearts the hope of immortality. All this discipline of our daily business is not to be wasted on our ephemeral comfort, but was designed to form our characters for an eternal state. What if thousands on thousands die in obscurity, "we are not concerned for them, Almighty Father, since we know how much thou workest in stillness, to what perfection thou ledest all who follow thee. Let us only hear, when thou teachest, let us obey, when thou commandest; let us all, after we have been faithful over a few things, be made rulers over many things, and enter into thy joy. Amen."

From precisely the same text with that of the preceding discourse, our author introduces another sermon,¹ with remarks on the frequency of commencing new friendships, the indifference with which they are regarded, etc., and then, after stating his text, explaining the particulars of Christ's first interview with Peter, he announces his theme, The Beginnings of our Acquaintances, which he divides thus:

- A. They are often on our part accidental;

¹ Predigten, 1808, Band II. ss. 40—58.

- a. in the time,
- b. in the circumstances of their occurrence.
- B. They have always a wise design on the part of God ;
 - a. as means of good to us,
 - b. as tests of our character.
- C. They are rich in their results ;
 - a. upon our moral feelings,
 - b. upon our happiness or misery.
- D. They impose on us new duties ;
 - a. to be circumspect in our conduct,
 - b. to make a zealous use of our new privileges. Peter instantly left all and followed his new friend.

Sometimes Reinhard adopts the alternative or disjunctive division ; and very often employs the disjunctive phraseology in his plan. In a sermon on Luke 15 : 1—10,¹ his Proposition is, The conversion of a sinner is an event which gives joy in heaven ; and his Division, first, The meaning and truth of this Proposition, secondly the application and use of it. I. In giving the import and proof of this Proposition I remark, that it admits a double meaning, and is to be understood as either an emphatic description of the great importance of the sinner's moral improvement, or as an express announcement that this event does rejoice the hearts of beings in heaven. In other words, it is a figurative and rhetorical sentence, or a literal and historical one. A. It may be an emphatic but figurative description of the great importance of the sinner's conversion. Such phrases are used in this rhetorical manner. a) Reason proves, and b) the Bible teaches that the reformation of a man is thus inconceivably momentous. B. The Proposition may be a literal and historical announcement that a sinner's conversion pleases the inhabitants of heaven. They actually feel this interest in his spiritual condition. a) Reason makes this statement probable, and b) the Scriptures favor it. II. In the application and use of this Proposition I remark, A. it teaches that human nature, even in its degraded estate, merits our high regard ; B. it is fitted to touch the hearts of the impenitent especially, and make them zealous for their own moral transformation ; C. it should encourage the regenerate to perseverance and to progress ; D. it should stimulate all who can contribute to the moral improvement of their brethren, to do so with an unwearying zeal.— This skeleton also illustrates a peculiarity, and a somewhat monotonous one, of the Plans of Reinhard's discourses. He is too much inclined, first to explain, secondly to prove, and thirdly to apply

¹ Predigten, 1804, Band I. ss. 373—390.

every subject which he discusses. Now many subjects need no explanation, or no proof, or no personal application. Besides, the explanation when introduced, should not ordinarily be deferred to the body of the discourse, but should precede it,¹ as the practical appeal should follow it, being not a part of the discussion but a consequence of the same.

Instead of announcing his subdivisions technically as such, Reinhard sometimes compresses them into a single sentence, and afterwards recurs to its successive clauses, each of which is the topic of a distinct part of his discourse. Thus, in a sermon which we should suppose might be appropriately delivered in a hospital, but which, in the exuberance of his ethical instructions, he introduced into the order of his services before the Saxon Court,² from the text Mark 7: 31—37, he adopts the following plan: "Therefore will I devote this hour to a useful contemplation on the state of those unfortunate persons, to whom nature has given a deformed or imperfect body. How should we look upon their state, and what practical use should we make of it?" In what light should we regard it? "It is not the play of accident, but the unavoidable consequence of good natural laws, and it results from them according to a design of God which we cannot entirely understand, but which, as we may believe, is to promote the welfare of the sufferers themselves, and thereby of others also." This last sentence contains five clauses, which are five subdivisions of the first general head, and which are afterwards introduced as topics of remark, not numerically but distinctly in the order above specified. But what practical use should we make of the condition of these unfortunate men. a) It should increase our abhorrence of sin, for although often not, (as in our text,) yet often it is the result of violating the divine laws. b) It should incite us to the Christian treatment of those who are thus afflicted. c) It should awaken within us sentiments of gratitude to God for giving to us sound bodily organs. d) It should animate us to a conscientious use of our physical powers. e) It should stimulate us to hold fast the hope of immortality and of the resurrection of the body.

From the text Matt. 6: 24—34, Consider the lilies, etc., Reinhard derives the Proposition³ "On Sensibility to Nature," and discusses it in the following Plan: "Let me, first, show wherein this sensibility

¹ Reinhard himself confesses that the first heads of his Divisions are often inappropriate to his Propositions. See Geständnisse, ss. 148—151. Sulzbach, 1810.

² Predigten, 1801, Band II. ss. 151—171.

³ Predigten, 1801, Band II. ss. 192—213.

consists, then illustrate its importance, and lastly state the results which flow from the preceding considerations." 1. The nature of this sensibility. Then follows a sentence including the three subdivisions of the first head: "This sensibility involves an attentive and meditative observation of the visible works of nature, accompanied with lively emotions in view of them, and with an elevation of the mind to the useful truths which they may suggest, and to God himself," a) It involves an attention, etc., b) lively emotions, etc., c) an elevation, etc. 2. The importance of the already explained sensibility to nature. a) It is a source of enjoyment, b) a test of moral character, c) a means of moral improvement. 3. The results flowing from the preceding considerations. a) If we find that we want a sensibility to nature, we should be very studious and distrustful of our own character. b) If we possess it, we should scrutinize it, and see whether it be of the right kind. c) We are bound to praise God, that he has made "it so easy for us, my hearers, to attain a taste for the beauties and the teachings of nature. The natural scenery of our residence [Dresden] is peculiarly rich and suggestive. Let our fields become, in our mental associations, a temple of God, a porch of heaven."

A philosopher, having never perused Reinhard's sermons, and judging of their vitality from their form, might conjecture that they were "coldly correct and critically dull." It is certainly unusual to unite a punctilious regard for symmetry of construction, an artificial regularity of paragraphs, sentences, and even clauses, with a fervor and energy of feeling. But Reinhard does unite these apparent opposites. Hence we proceed to the

§ 7. *Vivacity of his Discourses.*

His phraseology being lucid and precise as well as masculine and elegant, his ideas being so arranged that one readily suggests another, his illustrations being apt and forcible, and his whole style being instinct with the life of a vigorous mind and a benevolent temper, Reinhard carries the feelings of his readers with him through the most carefully adjusted series of topics. His evenly balanced sermons are in a glow. Their rigid structure breathes with emotion. His delivery was so impassioned, that his audience would overlook the almost finical niceties of his arrangement, his occasional straining after originality, and would remain enkindled with the ardor of his consecutive appeals. No paragraph, severed from its connections, will represent the life of the system to which it belongs, more than a

heart excised from a human body can exhibit the action and warmth of the organized structure which it once animated. It may be interesting, however, to examine the syllabus of a discourse which combines the exactness of Reinhard's method with the fervidness of his emotion. The following abstract of a double sermon preached on the days of a Christmas festival,¹ illustrates many peculiarities of his and of other German discourses. Their introductions are often so animated as to promise more than can be easily performed. Even their Propositions and Divisions are sometimes announced with a degree of vehemence, which would be deemed excessive in the concluding appeal of a Scotch or New England discourse. Reinhard introduces his Christmas sermon thus :

" Oh ! thou Infinite, Incomprehensible, and Invisible One, who hast all sufficiency in thyself ; who dwellest in light which no mortal eye can endure ; thou hast come forth from thy silent hiding-place ; thou hast tempered the brightness of thy glory into the softest radiance, for the sake of being able to manifest thyself unto thy creatures, and among them unto us also, us the feeble inhabitants of this earth. Everywhere around us do we behold the proofs of thy greatness, the master-pieces of thy wisdom, the benefactions of thy goodness ; the heavens declare thy glory, and the firmament sheweth thy handiwork. But oh ! how hast thou in a peculiar manner distinguished this earth ; what a theatre for the display of thine attributes hast thou made it ! With deep amazement, with tremulous joy, does this festival devoted to the contemplating of thy most magnificent, thy most wonderful, thy most condescending revelation, fill my heart ; for I am now about to announce this revelation ; I am now about to declare that thou whom no finite mind comprehendeth and no sense reacheth, hast sent to us thine only begotten ; that thou the Invisible hast, in one of our race, made thyself as it were perceptible to our feeble eyes ; I am now to proclaim aloud that thou hast clothed the splendor of thy glory and the image of thy being with our own nature, and hast given to us him who could say, Whoso seeth me seeth the Father also.

" So important, beloved brethren, so noble, so useful is the great event to which are devoted the days now to be celebrated. True, the devices are innumerable by which God imparts to his creatures the knowledge of his greatness and his will. All nature around us is a vast and splendid temple, where his glory sometimes expresses itself in forces that cause all things to tremble, sometimes beams

¹ Reinhard's Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band IV. ss. 284-316.

forth in the order and beauty of the illimitable whole, sometimes can be felt in the mild luxuriance of a goodness that embraces in its care every living thing, and fills every thinking being with awe, admiration, and joy. But to-day, to-day, we celebrate a revelation of God, which comes to us and to our race nearer and in an altogether peculiar form; which has immediate regard to the improvement of our character, the most important of all benefits to every one; which cannot present itself to our view without causing us to feel the dignity of our natures, and to regard them with reverence and admiration, for God, God is manifested in the flesh.

“What a thought, my brethren, God is manifested in the flesh! The birth of Jesus, the Son of the highest, which we call to remembrance in these days, is a device by which God chose to be more fully known to us, by which he chose to accommodate himself to our weakness, to come into the most intimate connection with us, and open the way for us to attain the highest perfection. Let us not long hesitate in regard to the aspect in which we shall now look at this momentous event. Can anything be more worthy of our attention than the idea, that the birth of Jesus is a new, plain, unspeakably useful revelation of God to our race? Yea, let this be the theme which shall occupy our thoughts to-day and to-morrow. I propose to show that among all the revelations of God, the incarnation of his Son is the most desirable for us in our state of weakness. But how much is here to be considered, to be explained, to be proved! Let us, therefore, my hearers, divide our contemplations. I will to-day confirm this statement by the fact, that the humanity of Christ imparts the greatest light to our understandings; and to-morrow, if it please God, I will show that it also gives the greatest power to our hearts. Yet before we proceed further, let us draw near to him who became a man, like unto us, that he may make known unto us the Father, and conduct us to the Father, and with united veneration let us ask for his aid and blessing in silent prayer.”

Text, Luke 2; 1—14, the lesson of the day, which, having been read in the devotional service, is here repeated.

Having used the word *Revelation* in the statement of his theme, the preacher now defines it, dividing it into two kinds; ordinary, i. e. that by the works of nature, and extraordinary, i. e. that by special messengers; and subdividing this latter into two species; the one, given by created messengers, as angels, prophets; the other, given by an uncreated messenger, the God-man. After this unduly prolonged explanation, he subdivides his theme in the following regular and balanced manner:

First Head. Among all the revelations of God the incarnation of his son is the most desirable for us in our state of weakness, because it imparts the greatest light to our understandings.

- A. It gives the most completeness to our religious knowledge ; for
 - a. It enlarges our view of God's nature ; the Son dwelleth in him.
 - b. It vivifies our ideas of his feelings ; he condescends to our low estate.
 - c. It liberalizes our conceptions of his purposes ; he designs to "give us all things."
- B. It gives the greatest certainty to our religious knowledge ; for
 - a. It confirms every right judgment of our reason ; we are pleased to find our individual deductions corroborated by the great teacher.
 - b. It gives to us an eye-witness of the truth ; and in our weakness as abstract reasoners, we are relieved by the testimony of one who speaks what he doth know.
 - c. It satisfactorily solves many difficulties, which had previously discomposed us ; for some questions cannot be answered by natural religion.
- C. It gives the greatest perspicuity to our religious knowledge ; for
 - a. It leads in the shortest way to the truth ; the testimony of Jesus contains succinctly all needful doctrine.
 - b. It teaches truth in plain language ; Christ not only instructs us by actions but by words, as a father his children.
 - c. It presents to us a visible image of the perfect infinite one ; whoso hath seen Christ hath seen the Father also.

At the commencement of his second sermon on this theme, the preacher recapitulates the Subdivisions of the first, adds an earnest prayer, introduces a new text, Luke 2 : 15—20, (the *pericope* requiring him to do so, at whatever expense to the unity of his discourses,) and then makes a neat transition to his

Second Head. The incarnation of Christ is, of all God's revelations, the most desirable for us in our state of weakness, because it gives the greatest power to our hearts.

- A. It inspires them with a living confidence in God ; for
 - a. It is the greatest proof of his condescension to our weakness ; were it not for this visible evidence, we should not feel emboldened to believe in his willingness to dwell with us.
 - b. It is the most affecting pledge of his tender paternal love ; it shows the oneness of our own nature with his, and the dependence of our hearts on his fatherly care.
- B. It inspires our hearts with an earnest love to the good ; for

- a. It, more than all other causes, shows us the infinite worth of virtue; as something to be revered for its own excellence, and to be connected with eternal glory.
 - b. It, more than all other causes, illustrates the capacities of our nature for moral goodness; the shepherds found the Saviour as small as other infants, but he developed the capacities of the human spirit so as to encourage us in aiming at high attainments in virtue.
- C. It inspires our hearts with animating consolations in trouble; for
- a. It shows that a wise government is exercised over all the events of our life; the sufferings of Christ afford an example of the benevolence of God in afflicting his children.
 - b. It shows us that the events which we experience are expressly designed for our good. "Father of us all, who hast here subjected us to so much weakness, ah! this assurance, this assurance we most deeply need." After describing the manner in which Christ has sanctified the path of our affliction, he exclaims, "Blessed be to us, therefore, blessed be to us, thou rough, toilsome pathway through the dust! The footsteps of the Son of God have distinguished thee; thou hast been moistened with his blood. Canst thou conduct us elsewhere than to him? Oh! with silent resignation, with steadfast, manly firmness, will we pursue thee, so long as our Father commands. We know, from the example of our Redeemer, how thou endest; what a victory awaiteth the faithful ones who follow the Son of God."¹
- D. It inspires our heart with a joyful hope; for,
- a. It promises a happy future for our race on earth; the design of the atonement to bless all men will not be lost.
 - b. It promises a blessed eternity to the children of God. "Father, Father of us all! Oh, how hast thou unveiled before our eyes thy glory; that glory of which we could not endure the brightness, because we are dust! How considerate of our frailty, how mild, how condescending hast thou been in the manifestation of thyself! How highly hast thou distinguished us among thy creatures! What feelings, what designs, what immeasurable kindness hast thou made known unto us. Oh,

¹ Notwithstanding all the consecutiveness of Reinhard's style, it abounds with such abrupt apostrophes as the above. He sometimes, rarely however, indulges in those exclamations, so common among the French preachers, which border on profaneness; thus: "För, Oh, my God! how much pains do all men take to appear better than they are."—*Predigten, herausgegeben von Haeker, B. IV. s. 262.*

since he hath appeared, the Day-spring from on high, our earthly darkness hath been transformed into a bright day. Through Him hast thou changed our trembling into confidence, and doubt into certainty, our fear into hope. With the thankfulness, with the emotion, with the trustful sentiment of happy children, do we this day cast ourselves down before thee and send up our prayer. Our great leader whom thou hast sent to us, and who already hath gone before us, him do we follow unto thee, O Father, and to thy glory. We all follow him with joy and with him shall we one day go to thee, O Father, and to thy glory. Amen."

But although Reinhard's style is distinguished for the vital warmth which permeates its compact organization, this is not its most distinguishing trait. Let us, therefore, attend to the

§ 8. *Fitness of his sermons to excite the curiosity of hearers or readers.*

Their tendency to arouse the inquisitiveness of men comes, in part, from the novelty of their subject-matter; in part, also, from the ingenuity with which they are arranged; from the original, quaint, often paradoxical and questionable expressions in which many of their ideas are clothed; from the rapidity and vehemence with which their thoughts hasten after each other. His fondness for startling phrases, especially in his Propositions, is well illustrated in one of his sermons preached on Reminiscere Sunday, from Matt. 15: 21—28,¹ of which the following is a meagre abstract.

No one can fail to notice that the last years of our Saviour's residence upon earth were filled up with beneficence, his days crowded with care, even his nights often spent in supplication. Common men, thus actively employed, are apt to overstep the mark and do too much; but with his amazing activity was combined an equally wonderful self-command, a considerate temperance, an occasional, judicious abstinence from that which was expected of him. He retired from the multitude when they were most interested in him; he did nothing in self-defence when his enemies seized him. A woman of Canaan cries to him for help; he answers her not a word. His disciples entreat him to send her away;² he refuses. She again beseeches him

¹ Predigten, 1800, Band I. ss. 210—228.

² On the Reminiscence Sunday of 1788, Reinhard founded his discourse on the request of the disciples to be freed from this troublesome woman, and derived from it the following Proposition: The custom of doing good for the sake of avoiding personal uneasiness.

in piteous tones; he replies to her severely, but does not grant her request, and thus at the right time discharges the duty of *doing nothing*. The result of his inaction was, that he called forth such noble feelings from the woman, as justified him in subsequently doing something for her. It is often difficult to regulate the impulses of our nature so as, on fitting occasions, to abstain from a course of action in itself desirable. The object of the present sermon is to show that a Christian exhibits true philanthropy in so tempering his spirit as, at the proper time, to do nothing.

First, let us consider what this duty of doing nothing implies.

A. It occasionally implies that we *seem* to be ignorant of the concerns of others. Their welfare sometimes depends upon their supposing that we do not know their state. It is useful for them to mortify their pride by communicating to us their necessities, and if they think that we are already apprized of their humiliating condition, they will not break down their pride in speaking to us concerning it. By officiousness, then, on our part, and appearing to know what it were useful for them to make known, we deprive them of some opportunities for self-discipline.

B. This duty implies that we *seem* to be doing nothing in reference to the concerns of others; that we seem to have no design of aiding them. An apparent indifference, on our part, to the state of those who desire our help, may sometimes fortify their moral principle. A man is often benefited by a favor which we confer upon him, if he is not aware of our agency in the deed; as he is often enervated by supposing that we stand ready to aid him. In order to promote his self-dependence, his resolution and energy, we must for a season appear either ignorant of his condition, or, as our Saviour in the text, indisposed to relieve him.

C. This duty often implies not only that we appear to do nothing, but that, at the proper times, we actually do nothing; that we leave a necessitous man to himself, and thus elicit his force of character.

But, secondly, let us consider in what cases it is the dictate of philanthropy to do nothing, in the sense above explained.

A. In the education of the young, it is a frequent duty to refuse aid and compel the learner to work his own way into the truth. a) Whenever we find that our assistance makes him indolent, more disposed to rely on us than on his own effort, we should do nothing for him. Many a parent spoils his children by doing, himself, the work which he ought to require of them. So in moral education, whenever we discover that the youth does not cultivate his own conscience, but sluggishly waits for our instructions, warnings, reprimands, we may

for a time throw him upon his own resources. Many a youth is enfeebled by being too constantly under the obvious watch of his guardian, too minutely directed, too uniformly reprov'd or punished for the slightest misdemeanors. b) Whenever, likewise, we find that our interposition disturbs the natural action of the learner's mind, interrupts those processes of his own which would lead him into the truth, we should do nothing. So in moral training, the youth has frequently been overladen with specified duties, and his elasticity of spirit has been subdued thereby. The fault of education often lies in the teacher's doing too much, and easing his pupils of their responsibility.

B. In our efforts for the improvement of men, it is a frequent duty to abstain from positive action. a) When we discover that our exertion for their improvement does actually increase their faults, we should suspend such exertion. The improvident man may be reformed by being allowed to suffer, for a season, the bitter consequences of his recklessness, and the spendthrift by not being relieved until he has felt the pressure of want. We may sometimes make the beggar an industrious man, by doing nothing for him. b) When we discover that our interposition embitters the minds of men against the cause of virtue, we should not interpose our good offices. We should not obtrude a reproof upon men for their private faults, when we are not sufficiently intimate with them to have earned the right of alluding to their personal concerns. We should not apply harsh epithets to a delicately sensitive person, nor perpetually remind a high spirited man of his foibles, nor heap reproofs upon one who is already discouraged by his reminiscences of error; for there is danger, by these inconsiderate appliances, of exciting the animosity of such men against the claims of virtue. We should be more philanthropic, in striving secretly to remove such temptations as have led them into vice.

C. In laboring for the external welfare of others, we should suspend our positive activity, a) whenever the person whom we would assist is made careless or proud by our willingness to aid him, as in frequent cases of mendicity, and b) when he is exposed to the hatred and opposition of others by our activity in his behalf, and is more injured by the envy of those who dislike to see him aided, especially by us, than he is advantaged by the reception of that aid.

D. In promoting the contentment of others, we are often under obligation to avoid positive action. a) By our officiousness in intermeddling with another man's concerns, we may disturb his peace. He may wish to be left alone; do not thrust yourself upon him. He may be ignorant of some evil which it were useless for him to know; do not distress him by the unprofitable communication of sad tidings.

Friends would be alienated from each other, if they were informed of some occurrence with which you are acquainted; be no talebearer. Say nothing, do nothing, to excite the fruitless desires of men who are contented in their humble sphere of duty. b) By our pragmatical intermeddling with the affairs of others, we may merely enkindle their resentment against ourselves. Is it a prudent love, which induces you to disturb the innocent joys of your neighbor, and fill him with an anxiety which can be of no profit? Is it a considerate love, which induces you to urge the mourner into scenes of festivity for which he has no taste, and which will only increase his gloom? Do you not thus excite a mere feeling of displeasure against yourself? Philanthropy suffereth long, doth not behave itself unseemly, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, beareth all things, etc.

There is a startling originality of expression in another sermon¹ of Reinhard, which contains the following course of thought.

We live in a world of show. We labor for the outside appearance. As soon as we can lisp, we are taught to utter words of politeness which we do not understand. Habitually and by the influence of our earliest and latest education, we appear much better than we really are. But we ought, in fact, to be better than we seem to be. In our text, Matt. 11: 2—10, John desires to know of Christ whether he be the real Messiah, and Christ in reply makes no professions of his Messiahship, but simply refers to some of his works, and lets them speak for him. His deeds, if known, would prove more in his favor than all his professions. The Proposition of this discourse is, that true Christians should, in all respects, be more than they appear to be. This Proposition let us first explain; secondly, prove.

I. In explaining it, let us begin with, A. Its general meaning. And here, a) it does not mean, that we should sedulously conceal our good qualities, for we are bound to let our light shine. b) It does not mean, that we should be coldly indifferent to the opinions of men; for we are bound to labor for their approbation, so that we may exert a good influence over them. c) It does mean that we should strive to attain a perfection of character, which can not be fully detected by human observers; so that the more they do know of us, the more highly they may esteem us; so that in the emergencies of life, we may not only satisfy but surpass the expectations of men.

But, B. let us specify *particular* points in which we should be more than we appear. a) We should have more knowledge than is apparent to others; for the Christian love of truth leads its possessor

¹ Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band IV. ss. 252—267.

to engage in many investigations which are not communicated to the world. The results of them may be known to the community; the processes are secretly useful to him only who performed them. b) We should have more virtue than is obvious to others; for religion is, in many of its features, too modest for exposure to the crowd. c) We should have more power of influencing the world than is accredited to us; for we should possess such a character as will command the respect and love of men, and such as will exert an authority which cannot be estimated in the common scenes of life, nor fully disclosed even in those great emergencies which call for its exercise. d) We should be more actively useful than we are seen to be; for many of our good deeds must be performed in secret.

II. Having now explained our Proposition, we will prove it, although the very meaning of it may be a sufficient argument in its favor. A. It is commended to us by the example of Christ and of his followers. B. It is involved in the duty of laboring earnestly and fundamentally for our own improvement. The reason why we do not strive with more vigor for our moral reformation is, that we hope to conceal our faults and to appear better than we are. If we had no such hope, and if we were truly desirous of advancement in excellence, we should work at the foundations of our character, even if they be out of the world's sight. C. It is favored by a prudent regard to our own welfare in this world. When we seem to be better than we are, we dread to have others come near to us, lest they detect our spiritual poverty; we live an artificial life, enjoying the good opinion of the ignorant, which we are liable to lose at any moment; we are walking on the brink of mortification. But when we are better than we appear, we live in no such terror of exposure, and we enjoy a reputation with the discerning, and this reputation is more pleasing and more permanent than is the applause of the vulgar. D. It is recommended by a regard to our welfare in the world to come. That world is one of realities, not of appearances. The day of judgment will strip off all disguise. Let us, then, no longer toil for a vain show which will soon end in shame, but for those solid properties which, although escaping the notice of the multitude in this world, will be brought into light and honor before the throne of God.

The discourse¹ preached on the eighth day after the preceding, resembles it in its fitness to awaken curiosity. Its text is John 1: 19—28, a passage which describes the behaviour of the Baptist toward those who had formed too high an opinion of him. The object of the

¹ Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band IV. ss. 268—283.

sermon is, to state how Christians should conduct themselves when they are over-estimated by others.

I. But, in the first place, this over-estimate is to be explained. And here,

A. We will define the expression, "men form too high an opinion of us."

B. We will state the manner in which they express this extravagant opinion. They express it sometimes, a) in silent reverence and admiration; sometimes, b) in active zeal for our honor; thus the admirers of John were jealous for his reputation and many of them attempted to exalt him above Jesus of Nazareth; sometimes, c) in cherishing with regard to us, hopes which are too exalted for us to fulfil; sometimes, d) in calling us to perform duties which transcend our ability.

C. We will consider the causes which give rise to this over-estimate. a) The most fruitful source is the short-sightedness of men. b) Their great respect for externals, leads them to regard a man as being all which he appears to be. They are imposed upon by the personal appearance and address of those who, by nature or artifice, exhibit the outward signs of wisdom. John's austere habits caused men to over-value him. c) The fact that men agree in opinion and feeling with another, induces them to extol him beyond measure. The Pharisees, in our text, exalted John because they supposed, falsely however, that his ascetic code would harmonize with theirs. d) Selfishness induces men to entertain unreasonable esteem for one from whom they anticipate personal favors.

II. Having now explained this over-estimate in its nature, expression and causes, let us, in the second place, describe the manner in which a Christian should conduct himself when he is the object of it.

A. He should not be inveigled by it into too high an opinion of himself. It is more dangerous for us to appear to be better than we are, than to appear to be worse; for we are apt to agree with our flatterers, and to be injuriously influenced by them. John did not allow himself to coincide, for a moment, with the extravagant opinions which were expressed concerning him.

B. He should not encourage others in their over-estimate of himself. He need not assume the positive attitude, and search into the opinions of men in order to detect their truth or falsehood; but when he knows that too much confidence is placed in him, he should, as John in our text, undeceive his admirers. He may thus save the community from much painful disappointment, and gratify his own love of honesty.

C. Least of all should he make use of the unwarranted esteem which is felt for him, as a means of injuring those who are deceived in his favor. John did not, as he might easily have done, employ his great popularity in prejudicing the Jews against him who was to be their only Saviour. How many offices are unworthily filled, because candidates encourage the unjustifiable respect which is entertained for them! How many marriages are unhappy, because at the beginning the parties do not honestly rectify those exalted expectations which they know that they cannot satisfy.

D. The Christian should be stimulated by the over-estimate of men, to *become* what they already think him to *be*.

The phraseology of Reinhard's Exordia and Propositions, often excites the fear that he will mislead his hearers. He seems to be entering on perilous ground. In the midst of our agitation, he proposes to explain his meaning. We are eager to hear his explanation. We attend to it, are instructed by it, satisfied with it; and our previous doubts as to the safety of his course, after having sharpened our attention to his explanatory remarks, give us an impulse to pursue his subsequent train of thought. In the following schedule of his sermon¹ on the parable of the unjust steward, Luke 16: 1—9, we may detect his power of arresting attention, and of preparing the mind for an instructive argument.

Generally, he says, when we speak of a vicious man, we load him with opprobrious epithets. We deem it unsafe to do otherwise. When we read of the unjust steward, we instinctively expect that Christ will condemn him. But no. The Saviour approves of some features in the steward's character. As we should imitate Christ's example, let us consider the duty of paying suitable respect to the merits of wicked men.

First, we will explain the meaning of this Proposition. a) We should accurately recognize the good which exists in wicked men, their noble talents, dispositions, etc. b) We should sincerely value it; gold does not cease to be such, because in an unclean vessel. c) We should manifest our esteem for it in our outward conduct. Wicked men should be treated with a confiding deference, in all those particulars in which they deserve to be so treated; else they may complain that we undervalue the gifts of God which are in them.

But such regard for sinners will be disapproved by some as perilous to ourselves and injurious to the community. Let us then, in the second place, consider the reasons for paying suitable respect to the

¹ Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band III. ss. 167—186.

merits of wicked men. a) Caution requires that we should qualify our condemnation of those who are accused of crime; for they may have been too hastily and harshly condemned, and we should not bring false charges against our fellow-beings, even if they be sinners. b) Love requires that we ascribe to base men, all the good qualities with which their heavenly Father has endued them. c) Prudence requires that we pay due regard to their excellences, so that we may derive profit from them. They who do much evil are capable of doing much good, are sometimes the ablest of our race. We should recognize their ability and make a prudent use of it. d.) The example of God and Christ requires that we properly appreciate the good qualities of bad men. Notwithstanding their transgressions, their Father in heaven blesses, in his providence, the mental power, the natural virtues, the industrious efforts of his enemies. Christ looked with favor upon certain characteristics of the Samaritans, the heathen, publicans and sinners.

But let us, in the third place, prescribe some rules which we must never lose sight of in paying the merited respect to the wicked. a) We must by all means guard against that indifference toward the sins of bad men which is apt to arise from an esteem for their good qualities. They are dangerous persons to associate with, for their shining accomplishments often blind our eyes to their dark faults. b) We should guard against intimate connections with them. We should esteem whatever is estimable in their characters, and at the same time cherish an abhorrence of their perverseness, and therefore refuse to admit them to a near intercourse with us. c) We should remember that no man can be a true Christian while he allows any one sin to have dominion over him. We are tempted to palliate the wickedness of some, by imagining that they atone for it by certain noble virtues. But if they habitually indulge in any single violation of the law, they cannot be disciples of Christ.

[To be concluded.]

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ARTICLE VI.

THE DISCOURSE OF PAUL AT ATHENS. A COMMENTARY ON
ACTS 17: 16—34.

By Professor H. B. Hackett, Newton Theological Institution.

It was in the course of his second missionary tour that the apostle Paul came to Athens. From Troas in Asia Minor, he had crossed the northern part of the Ægean Sea into Europe, landing at Neapolis in Thrace, but passing on thence directly to Philippi in Macedonia where he remained and labored for some time. From there he followed the course of the great military road leading from the north of Greece to the south, as far as to Berea; whence having been driven away after a short residence by the machinations of the Jews, he set forward again, and proceeded, in all probability by sea, to Athens. It is at this point that we take up the narrative in the present Article.

The antecedent Circumstances.

Vv. 16—21. *Effect of the idolatry at Athens on the mind of Paul.*
V. 16. *ἐκδεχόμενον αὐτοὺς*, while he was waiting for them, viz. Silas and Timothy whom he had left at Berea, and to whom he had sent a message that they should rejoin him as soon as possible; see v. 15. The most natural inference from 1 Thess. 3: 1, is that Timothy, at least, soon arrived in accordance with Paul's expectation, but was immediately sent away by the apostle to Thessalonica. As Silas, however, is not mentioned in that passage, it has been supposed that he may have failed for some reason to come at this time, or if he came, that like Timothy, he may have left again at once, but for a different destination; which last circumstance would account for the omission of his name at this place in the letter. Our next notice of them in the Acts, occurs in 18: 5, where they are represented as coming down from Macedonia to Corinth, which is consistent either with the supposition just stated,—the intermediate journey having been passed over here in silence,—or with the view that they went directly to Corinth from Berea without having gone to Athens at all. Still other combinations are possible. *παρωξύνετο* — *ἐν αὐτῷ*, his spirit was aroused in him, comp. 15: 39. 1 Cor. 13: 5. The verb expresses not merely a strong but specific emotion: He was deeply moved with a

feeling allied to that of indignation, at such a profanation of the worship due to God as he saw presenting itself to his view at every point. *κατείδωλον*, an objective term, *full of idols*. The word is otherwise unknown to the extant Greek, but is formed after a common analogy, e. g. *κατάμπελος*, *κατάδεσμος*, *κατάφοβος*, etc. On the force of such compounds, see Herm. ad Vig. p. 638. The Peschito has given the exact sense by *ܟܠܐ ܢܚܬܐ*, *idolis refertam*. A person could hardly take his position anywhere in ancient Athens, where the eye did not range over temples, altars and statues of the gods almost without number. One ancient writer says satirically, that it was easier to find a god at Athens than a man. Another says that there were streets there through which it was almost impossible for one to make his way, they were so crowded at all times with the sellers of the articles of idol worship. Pausanias affirms that Athens had more images than all the rest of Greece put together. Cicero, Livy, Lucian and several others still, testify expressly to this preëminence of Athens in the possession of the outward symbols of idolatry. It deserves notice, therefore, that Luke has not applied here the epithet *full of idols*, at random. The Greek language offered to him a hundred other terms which would have stated what was true in relation to a heathen city; but we see that he has chosen among them all the very one which describes the precise external aspect of Athens, which would be the first to strike the eye of a stranger like Paul. This mark of accuracy in the writer our English translators have obliterated, or at least, very nearly obliterated in making the expression refer to the devotion of the Athenians to idolatry.

V. 17. Some place this verse in a closer, others in a looser connection with the one preceding. De Wette regards *οὖν* as progressive merely *now*. Meyer adheres to the stricter sense *therefore*. The apostle's excitement of mind did not permit him to pursue the ordinary course, which was to address himself exclusively at first to his own countrymen and the heathen proselytes to Judaism. He is now moved by the spectacle around him, to commence preaching simultaneously to Jews and Greeks. Some who take *οὖν* as illative, propose to restrict it to the second clause, which is evidently forced. So Schneckenburger, Ueber den Zweck, etc., p. 84. *ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ*, *in the market*. Kuinoel's remark, *plura erant Athenis fora*, which Bloomfield also repeats, is incorrect; unless they mean by the plural the different divisions of the market, which were set apart to different sorts of traffic. It is now generally admitted that there was but one *ἀγορὰ*, properly so called at Athens, although Leake has shown it to

be probable that "during the many centuries of Athenian prosperity, the boundaries of the Agora, or at least of its frequented part, underwent considerable variation." See his *Athens and Demi*, p. 217. The notices in ancient writers in regard to its course and extent, have not been so arranged as to produce as yet an entire agreement of opinion among scholars. See Winer, *Realw.*, p. 112. It is certain, however, that the site of the market was never so changed as to exclude the famous *στοὰ ποιικίλη*, which according to Forchhammer's Plan stood off against the acropolis on the west. In this porch as is well known, the philosophers, rhetoricians and others were accustomed to meet for conversation and discussion; and hence it lay entirely in the course of things that some of these men should fall, as Luke states, in the way of the apostle.

V. 18. *τῶν Ἐπικουρείων*. The frivolous spirit of this sect may be traced as some think, in the first of the interrogatories addressed to the apostle. The Epicureans were the "minute philosophers," the Greek Sadducees of the age; they admitted the existence of gods, but regarded them as indolent beings who paid no attention to the actions or affairs of men; they did not believe in a providence, or in accountability, or in any retribution to come. Their great practical dogma was, that a wise man will make the most of every means of enjoyment within his reach. Epicurus, the founder of the sect, had taken some pains to guard his definition of pleasure against too gross abuse, but it served only to secure to his followers a more specious name for their profligacy. The Stoics were distinguished in some respects for a more reflecting turn of mind; but their religion, at bottom, was nothing but the rankest fatalism; and it was eminently characteristic of their philosophy, that it led them to entertain a high conceit of their own self-sufficiency, both as to progress in virtue and the attainment of happiness. They praised morality, insisted on the subjection of the passions to reason, and boasted of the perfection to which they raised themselves by this discipline. With some good elements which are not to be denied, Stoicism was yet intensely proud, self-complacent, dogmatizing; so that, on the whole, it offered quite as many points of opposition to the gospel as Epicureanism itself. It might have seemed very much to the credit of Christianity, if it had been represented as having gained, on this occasion, at least, a few proselytes from among these representatives of the highest forms of Grecian culture and learning; but no such triumphs are recorded. The manner in which these Epicureans and Stoics are described as having treated the message of the apostle, is precisely what we should look for as the natural result of their peculiar systems of belief; and, in

this point of view, the narrative bears on it, again, the stamp of historical truth. *συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ* sc. *λόγους*, which is sometimes inserted in this phrase; they interchanged words, *disputed* or *conversed with him*, comp. 4: 15. Bengel renders *congregiebantur, met with him*, as in 20: 14. The manner in which *καὶ ἔλεγον* follows, agrees best with the first sense, but cannot be said to be decisive. *τί ἂν θέλοι*, etc., *what would this babbler say*, does he mean to say? *ἂν* with the optative here, may refer to the suppressed condition = if his words have any meaning; see 2: 12. Comp. Win. § 43. 1. Cr. § 604. *σπερμολόγος* denotes strictly a seed-gatherer, and then as used here, one who picks up and retails scraps of knowledge without sense or aim, *an idle prater*. *ξένων δαιμονίων*, *foreign gods*, hitherto unknown to us. As the expression is cited from the mouth of the Greeks, we are to attach to it, of course, their sense of *δαιμόνιον*, and not that of the Jews. The plural may be the generalized one of the class or category, comp. Win. § 27. 2. St. § 95. 2; or it may be founded on what Paul had said to them concerning the agency of God in raising up Christ from the dead; see v. 31. Meyer and others understand it in the first way; De Wette, Bloomfield, and others, in the last. Some of the older critics explained the plural as embracing *ἀνάστασις*, supposing the Athenians to have understood Paul to speak of some goddess when he preached to them the resurrection. But one can hardly conceive that the apostle would have expressed himself so obscurely on this subject as to have given them any occasion for falling into so gross a mistake; and we are not authorized by any intimation in the narrative to impute to them anything like a wilful perversion of his language. Yet a few modern writers adhere still to this view. Bauer admits that the Athenians could have had no fair pretence in any obscurity of Paul's statement, for giving this turn to it; but he thinks nevertheless, that it is what they are represented as having said, and that they said it ironically. But even irony, if it has any point, must have its show of justification.

The Place where Paul spoke.

Vv. 19—21. *Paul is conducted to Areiopagus and requested to explain his doctrine.* V. 19. *ἐπιλαβόμενοι τε αὐτοῦ*, and taking hold upon him, not necessarily with violence, which would be at variance with the general spirit of the transaction, though the word involves often that idea; but rather by the hand, for the purpose of leading him onward; comp. 9: 27. Mark 8: 23. Luke 9: 47. *ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀρειον πάγον*, unto Mars Hill, to the top of it. On the force of *ἐπὶ*, see 10: 9.

Matt. 4: 5. 24: 16. Luke 23: 33, etc. Win. § 53 l. This common usage of the preposition deserves notice only on account of the false sense which has been so often assigned to it here, as mentioned below. The Areiopagus whither Paul was now brought, was a rocky eminence a little to the west of the Acropolis. See Leake's Athens, p. 165. The object of the movement undoubtedly was, to place the apostle in a situation where he could be heard by the multitude with greater advantage. The following description of this important locality, is given by Dr. Robinson, who visited the place. "This is a narrow, naked ridge of lime-stone rock, rising gradually from the northern end (of the city), and terminating abruptly on the south, over against the west end of the Acropolis, from which it bears about north; being separated from it by an elevated valley. This southern end is fifty or sixty feet above the said valley; though yet much lower than the Acropolis. On its top are still to be seen the seats of the judges and parties, hewn in the rock; and towards the south-west is a descent by a flight of steps, also cut in the rock, into the valley below. Standing on this elevated platform, surrounded by the learned and the wise of Athens, the multitude perhaps being on the steps and in the vale below, Paul had directly before him the far-famed Acropolis with its wonders of Grecian art; and beneath him, on his left, the majestic Theseium, the earliest and still most perfect of Athenian structures; while all around, other temples and altars filled the whole city. On the Acropolis, too, were the three celebrated statues of Minerva: one of olive-wood; another of gold and ivory in the Parthenon, the master-piece of Phidias; and the colossal statue in the open air, the point of whose spear was seen over the Parthenon by those sailing along the gulf."—Biblical Researches, Vol. I. p. 10 seq. It is obvious that the peculiar boldness and power of Paul's speech can be adequately realized, only as we keep in mind the impressive outward scene which was here spread around him.

Instead of translating *ἐνὶ τὸν Ἀρειοπαγεῖον* as above, many have rendered *ἐνί, before*, a forensic sense which it often has, as in speaking of sending up a prisoner for trial, comp. 16: 19. 18: 12. 28: 8, etc.; and hence they have maintained that Paul was arraigned at this time before the court of the Areiopagus, and underwent a formal trial on the charge of having attempted to change the religion of the State. But this opinion rests entirely upon two or three expressions, which like the one just noticed, are ambiguous in themselves; while, in other respects the entire narrative, as well as the improbability of such a procedure, testify against the idea. First, we find here no trace whatever of anything like the formality of a legal process. Secondly,

the professed object of bringing the apostle ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρειον πάγον was to ascertain from him what his opinions were, not to put him on his defence for them before they were known. Again, the manner in which the affair terminated, would have been a most singular issue for a judicial investigation in the highest court of Athens. And, finally, the speech which Paul delivered on the occasion, was precisely such as we should expect before a promiscuous assembly; whereas if he had stood now as an accused person before a legal tribunal, his plea has most strangely failed to connect itself, at any single point, with that peculiarity of his situation. It proves nothing in regard to the question, to show that the court of the Areiopagus had powers (that is admitted) which would have given to it jurisdiction in the case of Paul, supposing that he had been charged at this time with subverting the established worship; since the narrative on which we must rely for our information as to what was done, not only contains no evidence that the Athenians took this serious view of his doctrine, but ascribes their eagerness to hear him to a mere love of novelty; see v. 21. Calvin, Kuinoel, Neander, Winer, Olshausen, De Wette, Meyer, Lisco, Bauer, Doddridge, and the best critics generally, at present, reject the opinion above considered. The authority of Chrysostom, among the ancient critics, stands in favor of it. Hess, Hemsén, Scholz, and a few others among the Germans, also follow on that side; except that some of them would say (this is true of Hemsén), that the Areiopagus was called together not exactly to try the apostle, but to hear from him some account of his doctrine. But was that one of the functions of this court? It is entirely improbable. No evidence is adduced to show it. Bloomfield, in like manner, speaks of the "decorum" with which the apostle demeaned himself before "so august a court;" and a great many of our English writers go in the same direction. The other ambiguous expressions, which have been supposed to favor the view which has been objected to, will be noticed in their place. *Ἀνάμεθα γινῶναι*, *Can we know?* It would have been an excess, certainly, even of the Attic politeness, to have interrogated a prisoner at the bar in this manner. The object, too, of the inquiry as defined by the accompanying terms, shows clearly that they did not regard him as occupying that position.

Vv. 20, 21. *ξενίζοντα*, the cause for the effect, *surprising* since the things were foreign, unheard of before. *εἰσφύρεις* — *ἡμῶν*. This phrase, drawn from common life, has an appearance of the utmost reality in this connection. *τί ἄν θελοι*, etc. See on v. 18. *τί* here in apposition with *ταῦτα*, is to be noticed. It is not precisely like the plural. "The singular *τί* may stand in such connections as *τί ταῦτά σοι*, when the question is, what sort of a whole, what combined re-

sult, do the particulars form?" Krüger, Gr. § 61. 8. 2. V. 21. Their only motive for making the request was, the gratification of their curiosity. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πάντες, now all Athenians. The omission of the article unites the characteristic more closely with the name, as its invariable attendant. Comp. Win. § 17. 10 b. οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες, i. e. the foreigners permanently resident there; unde iidem mores, as Bengel remarks. εἰς οὐδὲν — εὐκαιροῦν, spent their leisure for nothing else. The imperfect does not exclude the continued existence of the peculiarity, but blends the reference to it with the history. See similar examples in 27: 8. John 11: 18. 18: 1. 19: 14. Comp. Kühn. § 256. 4 a. Cr. 567. γ. The verb affirms, first, that they had leisure, and, impliedly, at least, an ample share of it; and, secondly, that they made the use of it which is designated καιρότερον newer, sc. than before. Win. § 36. 8. St. § 118. 4. The comparative form of the adjective or the positive could be used in this phrase; but the former characterizes the state of mind in question much more forcibly than the latter. Bengel has illustrated well the point of the idiom: Nova statim sordebant; noviora quaerebantur. Bloomfield speaks of the comparative here as loosely used for the positive. It is worth remarking, that this singular scene of setting up the apostle to speak for the entertainment of the people, occurs, not at Ephesus, or Philippi, or Corinth, but at Athens; not only the only place, in all his journeyings, where Paul met with such a reception, but just the place where the incident comes up as the spontaneous product of the state of things existing there. We know, from the testimony of ancient writers, that this fondness for hearing and telling some new thing, which Luke mentions, was a notorious characteristic of the Athenians. It would be superfluous to adduce citations in proof of this. See them, in almost any number, in Wetstein, Kuinoel, Bloomfield, and others. The entirely incidental manner in which the exemplification of this trait comes forth in the narrative here, speaks for its truth.

Outline of the Course of Thought.

The speech which Paul delivered at this time is remarkable for its adaptation, not only to the outward circumstances under which he spoke, but to the peculiar mental state of his auditors. De Wette, whose aesthetic judgment no one will question, calls it "a model of the apologetic style of discourse." "The address of Paul before this assembly," says Neander, "is a living proof of his apostolic wisdom and eloquence; we perceive here how the apostle, according to his own expression, could become also a heathen to the heathen, that he

might win the heathen to a reception of the gospel." "The skill," says Hensen, "with which he was able to bring the truth near to the Athenians, deserves admiration. We find in this discourse of Paul nothing of an ill-timed zeal, nothing like declamatory pomp; it evinces throughout clearness, brevity, coherence, and simplicity of representation." Dr. Robinson, speaking under the impression produced on his mind by a personal survey of the scene, says that, "masterly" as the address is, as it lies on record before us, "the full force and energy and boldness of the apostle's language, can be duly felt only when one has stood upon the spot." Yet Bauer adheres to his habit of objection and dissent even here. He thinks the speech has been over-praised by critics, because Paul did not succeed in bringing it to a formal close. The astonishment which one feels as he reads the address, is not that the speaker was interrupted at length, when he came to announce to the Athenians the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, but that he could command their attention so long, while he bore down with such effect on their favorite opinions and prejudices, exposed their errors, and arraigned them as guilty of the grossest inconsistency and absurdity of conduct.

We have first the introduction, which, in the technical language of rhetoric, is eminently conciliatory. The apostle begins by acknowledging and commending the respect of the Athenians for religion; vv. 22, 23. He states next, at the close of v. 23, his design, which is to guide their religious instincts and aspirations to their proper object, i. e. to teach them what God is, his nature and attributes, in opposition to their false views and practices as idolaters. He goes on, then, in pursuance of this purpose, to announce to them, first, that God is the Creator of the outward, material universe, v. 24; secondly, that He is entirely independent of his creatures, having all sufficiency in Himself, v. 25; thirdly, that He is the Creator of all mankind, notwithstanding their separation into so many nations and their wide dispersion on the earth, v. 26; and, fourthly, that He has placed men, as individuals and nations, in such relations of dependence on Himself as render it easy for them to see that He is, verily, the Creator and sovereign Disposer, and they the creatures; and that it is their duty to seek and serve Him, vv. 27, 28. The ground has thus been won for the application which follows. At this point of the discourse, stretching forth his hand, as we may well suppose, towards the gorgeous images within sight, he exclaims: "We ought not, therefore, to suppose that the Deity is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, sculptured by the art and device of men," v. 29. And that which men ought not to do, they may not safely do any longer. It was owing to the forbearance of God

that they had been left hitherto to pursue their idolatry without any signal manifestation of his displeasure ; *now* they were required to repent of it and forsake it, v. 30 ; because a day of righteous judgment awaited them, which had been rendered certain by the resurrection of Christ, v. 31. Here their clamors interrupted him. It is not difficult, perhaps, to conjecture what he would have added. It only remained, in order to complete his well known circle of thought on such occasions—that he should have set forth the claims of Christ as the object of religious hope and confidence, that he should have exhorted them to call on his name and be saved.

It will be seen, therefore, by casting the eye back, that we have here all the parts of a perfect discourse, viz. the exordium, the proposition or theme, the proof or exposition, the inferences and application. It is a beautiful specimen of the manner in which a powerful and well trained mind, practised in public speaking, conforms spontaneously to the rules of the severest logic. One can readily believe, looking at this feature of the discourse, that it was pronounced by the man who wrote the epistles to the Romans and Galatians ; where we see the same mental characteristics so strongly reflected. As we must suppose at all events, that the general scheme of thought, the *nexus* of the argument, has been preserved, it does not affect our critical judgment of the discourse whether we maintain that it has been reported in full, or that a synopsis only has been given. On this point opinions differ.

Examination of the Discourse.

Vv. 22—31. *The speech of Paul on Mars Hill.* V. 22 ἐν μέσῳ may be said obviously of a place or an assembly. It is one of the ambiguous expressions, therefore, already adverted to, which leave it uncertain whether Ἀρείον λόγον is to be understood of the hill merely or the court assembled there. Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The remark just made is to be repeated here. It is the style of address which Paul would necessarily use in speaking to a concourse of Athenians ; and at the same time, he might use it in speaking before judges. In the latter case, however, the Greeks oftener said ὦ ἄνδρες, δικάσται. See Stallb. Plat. Apol. 17, A. κατὰ πάντα, in every respect, as it were, in every possible mode of exhibition. ὡς — θεωρῶ, I see you as (those who correspond to the description, viz.) more religious sc. than ordinary or than other men. For this suppression of the other term of the comparison, see on v. 21. That δεισιδαιμονιστίους which is a *vox media* is to be taken here in a good sense, is rendered certain by the illustration which the apostle subjoins.

The corresponding noun has this signification in 25: 19. See the remarks of Neander on the word in his *Pflanzung*, etc., p. 318.

V. 23. καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν — βωμόν, and (not transiently but) *closely observing the objects of your religious veneration, I found also an altar.* σεβάσματα denotes not acts of worship, devotions, but temples, images, altars and the like. It is a generic term, as καὶ — among them, shows, and comprehends under it βωμόν. The pluperfect ἐπεγέγραπτο includes the present, and is to be explained like the imperfect in v. 21. Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, to an unknown god. "That there was, at least, one altar at Athens with this inscription," says Meyer, "would appear as historically certain from this passage itself, even though other testimonies were wanting, since Paul appeals to a fact of his own observation, and in the presence too of the Athenian people themselves." But the existence of such altars at Athens is well attested by competent witnesses, e. g. Philostratus and Pausanias. The former in his *Life of Apollonius*, 6. 2, says: σωτηροτέτερον περὶ πάντων θεῶν εὐ λέγειν καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθήνησιν, οὐ καὶ ἀγνώστων θεῶν βωμοὶ ἰδρύνται. Pausanias in his *Description of Attica*, 1. 1, says: ἐπὶ Φαληρεῷ (a port of Athens) — βωμοὶ θεῶν τε ὀνομαζομένων ἀγνώστων καὶ ἡρώων, etc. It has been made a question here, how we are to understand the use of the plural in these passages; whether as referring to the number of the altars on which the inscription occurred, or to the number of the gods to whom the altars were dedicated. Some have assumed the latter as the correct view; and have said that Paul has arbitrarily changed the plural into the singular, in order to accommodate the fact to his purpose; or even that the writer by this inaccuracy, has betrayed himself as a person who had no direct knowledge of the circumstances which he professes to relate. But even if the inscription on these altars was in the plural, it does not follow, as has been suggested already, that Paul may not have found one having the language which he recites. Such appears to be Bengel's view. Again, it would not follow that he has necessarily misrepresented the sense, admitting that he may have substituted the singular for the plural. The heathen writers often employed θεοὶ to convey the general idea of divine power, providence, deity and the like.¹ With that meaning the plural could be relinquished for the singular or the singular for the plural, just as an individual pleased. Here the apostle might have preferred θεῷ, merely for the sake of its stricter *formal* accordance with the doctrine which he was about to advance. Kuinoel appears at a loss to decide whether the plural in the case under remark

¹ See examples of this interchange in the passages collected by *Pfanner* in his *Systema Theologiae Gentilis Purioris*, p. 102 and elsewhere.

has reference to the number of the altars, or to that of the gods. Bauer knows certainly that the latter was the fact, and proceeds to draw thence his inferences adverse to the truth of the narration.¹ Another class of critics, as Calvin, Olshausen apparently, and some others, seem to take it for granted that Paul deviated from the strict form of the inscription, but deny that he violated its proper import or availed himself of any unworthy artifice.

But even the appearance of a difficulty here vanishes entirely, when we give to the language of Philostratus and Pausanias the interpretation, which is beyond any reasonable doubt the correct one. Winer states his view of the case as a philologist thus: "It by no means follows from the passages (of the writers above named), that each single one of the altars mentioned by them, had the inscription ἀγνώστοι θεοὶς in the plural, but more naturally that each one separately was dedicated ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ; but this singular the narrators were obliged to change into the plural, because they spoke of all those altars in a collective way. It appears, therefore, that there were several altars in different places at Athens with the inscription ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ." See his Realw. Art., *Athen*. So also among others, Eichhorn, Hess, Hensen, Meyer, De Wette; a union of authorities, which shows that the decision on this point is not one of party-interest. It should be added that several of the older commentators render ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, to the unknown God, supposing the God of the Jews, i. e. Jehovah, to be meant. Such a view mistranslates the Greek, and violates all historical probability.

The precise historical origin of these altars at Athens so dedicated, is unknown. The conjectures are various. One is that they were very ancient, and that it was at length forgotten to whom they had been originally built; and that the inscription in question was put on them at a later period, to apprise the people of this fact. If that was their character, it is not easy to see what proper point of connection the apostle could have found for his remark with such a relic of sheer idolatry. Another is, that in some time or times of public ca-

¹ His remark here is the following. "Eine solche Verwechslung der allein historisch nachweisbaren ἀγνώστοι θεοὶ mit dem unhistorischen und dem Polytheismus überhaupt fremden ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ konnte nur ein Schriftsteller sich erlauben, welcher der erzählten Begebenheit ferner stund, und keine Widerlegung an Ort und Stelle zu fürchten hatte, wie diess beim Apostel Paulus hätte der Fall sein müssen." See his *Paulus, der Apostel*, etc., p. 177. De Wette having pronounced the refutation of such criticism superfluous, adds: "Jene masslose Kritik hebt sich durch sich selbst auf; und darin besteht eben ihr Nutzen, dass sie durch Ueberschreitung aller Schranken das Gefühl der Nothwendigkeit sich beschränken zu müssen weckt." See *Vorwort zur dritten Auflage* of his Commentary on Acts, 1848.

lamity, the Athenians not knowing what god they had offended, whether Minerva or Jupiter or Mars, erected these altars so as to be sure of propitiating the right one. The same objection may be made as before; since their ignorance in this case relates merely to the identity of the god whom they should conciliate, and involves no recognition of any power additional to their heathen deities. The most rational explanation as it seems to me, is that these altars had their origin in the feeling of uncertainty, inherent after all in the minds of the heathen, whether their acknowledgment of the superior powers was sufficiently full and comprehensive; in their distinct consciousness of the limitation and imperfection of their religious views, and their consequent desire to avoid the anger of any still unacknowledged god who might be unknown to them. That no deity might punish them for neglecting his worship or remain uninvoked in asking for blessings, it appears that they not only erected altars to all the gods for whom they had names, but distrustful still lest they might not comprehend fully the extent of their subjection and dependence, they built them also to any god that there might be, although they knew him not.

No one can say that it is ascribing too much discernment to the heathen to affirm this. It would be easy, as far as relates to this point, to justify the representation by any amount of proof. Not to allude to other considerations, that comprehensive address in Horace—*At o deorum quicquid in coelo regit*—the oft used formula—*si deo, si deas*—and the superstitious dread which the ancient heathen are well known to have entertained, of omitting any deity in their invocations, prove the existence of the feeling to which reference has been made. Out of this feeling, therefore, these altars may have sprung; first, because the supposition is so entirely consistent with the genius of polytheistic heathenism; secondly, because, as Neander suggests, the language which Philostratus imputes to Apollonius, *σωφρονέστερον* — *Ἀθήνην*, as quoted above, indicates that he regarded the altars at Athens of which he speaks, as the expression of such a sentiment; thirdly, because the many-sided religiousness of the Athenians would be so apt to develope itself in some such demonstration; and, finally, because Paul could appeal with so much effect to such an avowal of the insufficiency of heathenism, and to such a testimony so borne, indirect yet significant, to the existence of the one true God. Under these circumstances, an allusion to one of these altars by the apostle, would be equivalent to his saying to the Athenians thus: “You are correct in acknowledging a Divine existence beyond any which the ordinary rites of your worship recognize; there is such an existence. You are correct in confessing that

he is unknown to you ; you have no just conceptions of his nature and perfections." He could add then with truth : "Ὁν οὐκ — καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν, *Whom, therefore, not knowing ye worship, this one I announce unto you.* The inverted order gives point to the declaration. ἀγνοῦντες has the same object as the verb ; hence not ignorantly as if they did not know whither their worship was directed, but = without any just knowledge of him. The word points back evidently to ἀγνώστω. εὐσεβεῖτε has seemed to some a strong term, as the cognate words in the New Testament always express the idea of true piety ; but the term occurs farther only in 1 Tim. 5: 4, and denotes there not the exercise of piety, but of something merely kindred to it, filial reverence. It needs only a similar modification to adapt it to the use required here.

V. 24. The connecting idea between this verse and the preceding is : *God* (whom I announce to you, being or since he is) *the Creator*, etc. To raise in the mind some proper conception of his exalted nature and glory, the apostle calls attention to his character as the Infinite Maker of all things ; whence it must be self-evident that he was not to be confounded with any of their idols, whose existence was limited by the space which they occupied. οὗτος, etc., *inasmuch as this one is the Sovereign*, supreme Ruler, etc. οὐκ — κατοικεῖ. The mass of the heathen in practice made no difference between the symbol and its object ; the block was the god ; comp. 19: 26. ἐν ταῖς, because the statues or images were kept in the recesses of the temples.

V. 25. The apostle illustrates the character of the true God still further, by another contrast between him and the deities of the heathen. He is independent of his creatures ; he needs nothing from them ; they can earn no merit by serving him. οὐδὲ — διακονεῖται, and (after a preceding negative) *he is not ministered unto by the hands of men.* The heathen considered it meritorious to lavish wealth on the temples and shrines of their idols ; they brought to them costly gifts, and even offerings of food and drink, as if they stood in need of such things, and could be laid under obligation to their worshippers. That prayer of Chryses, priest of Apollo, in Il. 1., l. 37—42, expresses the true spirit of heathenism in this respect. αὐτὸς διδούς. The relation of the clause is causal : *since he himself gives.* The emphasis of the pronoun arises from its opposition to the idea of others giving to him. τὰ πάντα, *the whole*, i. e. of the things which they enjoy. In such an expression, τὰ restricts the adjective to the class of objects intimated by the preceding words or the context. Yet some editors omit the article here. Comp. further, Rom. 8: 32. 1 Cor. 9: 22. Phil. 3: 8, and some others. But in most of these passages, too, the manuscripts fluctuate.

V. 26. ἐποίησε τε, etc., and he made of one blood every nation of men that they should dwell. This is the more obvious view of the construction, and is the one which has been generally adopted. Yet several of the best critics, as Kuinoel, De Wette, Meyer, regard ποιεῖν here as an instance of its use with an accusative and infinitive, as in Matt. 5: 32. Mark 7: 37, and translate: *and he caused every nation of men (sprung) from one blood to dwell.* κατοικεῖν connects itself more easily in this way, it is true, with the rest of the sentence; but the facility gained here renders the expression hard at εἰς ἑνὸς αἵματος, so that a term must be inserted to make the thought flow smoothly. The main idea in this verse beyond question is, that God has created the entire human race from a common stock; and the more prominent way, therefore, in which the translation first stated, brings forward this proposition, appears to me to be a reason for preferring it. It is an objection to the other mode that it assigns a too subordinate place to the principal thought. But why does the apostle single out thus the universal brotherhood of the race? Olshausen says it was intended as a reproof to the Athenians for their contempt of the Jews. Meyer, Neander, De Wette and others consider it as directed essentially against the polytheism of the heathen. If all are the children of a common parent, then the idea of a multiplicity of gods from whom the various nations have derived their origin, or whose protection they specially enjoy, must be false. The doctrine of the unity of the race is closely interwoven with that of the unity of the Divine existence. This more comprehensive view of the meaning, however, does not exclude the other; since if all nations have the same Creator, it would at once occur that nothing can be more absurd than the feeling of superiority and contempt with which one affects to look down upon another. As the apostle had to encounter the prejudice which was entertained against him as a Jew, his course of remark was doubly pertinent, if adapted at the same time to remove this hindrance to a candid reception of his message. It will be observed that what is denied in regard to polytheism, is affirmed as directly true here with reference to God. The conception (I include the entire verse) thus brought before their minds was a vast one. All that power exerted in giving existence to men, controlling their destiny, exalting entire nations or casting them down, which they had parcelled out among such an infinity of gods, they are now led to think of as concentrated in a single Possessor; they get now the idea of one infinite Creator and Ruler. κατοικεῖν is the infinitive of design. The various lands which the different families of mankind occupied, with all the advantages connected with their position, God had

assigned to them, comp. Deut. 32: 8. Ps. 115: 116. Yea, he had proceeded from the very first with a view to their welfare. He designed, in creating men, that they should inhabit and possess the earth as their own; that they should all of them enjoy the manifold blessings allotted to them in the various places of their abode. It was to Him they were indebted for them, and not to accident or their own enterprise, or the favor of some imaginary god. The remark is made as a universal one, and has its justification as such in the fact that notwithstanding the inequalities which diversify the condition of nations, they have severally their peculiar advantages; it is natural for every people to esteem their own land, in some respects at least, as the best.¹ But the remark was specially aimed, beyond doubt, at the feeling of self-congratulation with which the Athenians were prone to contemplate the peculiar felicity of their own position, their national renown, their past and present prosperity. This view of the meaning prepares the way for the thought which is next introduced. *ὁρίσας* — *τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῶν*, *having fixed the appointed seasons and limits of their abode*. The second participle repeats the idea of the first, not superfluously, but with the evident effect of affirming it more strongly. The approved reading is *προσσεταγμένους*, rather than *προτεταγμένους* as in the common text. The apostle, by adding this, admonishes the Athenians that they, like every other people, had not only received their peculiar advantages from the common Creator, but that they could hold them only during the continuance of his good will and favor. In assigning to the nations their respective abodes, he had fixed the *seasons* of their prosperity—the *limits* of their territory, i. e. it was He who decided *when* and *how long* they should flourish, and *how far* their dominion should extend. The remark was adapted both to rebuke their spirit of self-elation and to warn them of the danger of slighting a message from Him who had their destiny so perfectly at his command.

Another interpretation of these last words has been extensively received, which is plainly incorrect. Some have explained them as referring to the limits which God has assigned to the lives of men individually: they have their appointed seasons and bounds, beyond which they cannot pass. But that idea lies entirely out of the present circle of view, as the subject of discourse here is that of nations and not of individuals. It is also philologically inadmissible; since *αὐτῶν* can naturally refer to *ἀνθρώπων* only as connected with

¹ This principle Tacitus has recognized in his fine remark in the *Germania*, § 2: Describing that country, he says—infirmem terris, asperam coelo, nisi si patria sit.

πᾶν ἔθνος. The anti-polytheistic aim, which forms to such an extent the ground-tone of the discourse, is to be recognized perhaps, also, in this part of it. The separation of men into so many different nations, might seem to oppose the idea of their common parentage; that separation itself is therefore represented by the apostle (*obiter*) as having been contemplated in the divine plan.

V. 27. ζητεῖν, telic infinitive, *that they should seek*. It attaches itself more particularly to the part of the sentence which commences at κατοιχεῖν, and states the moral object which God had in view with reference to men, in making such provision for their convenience and happiness. It was that they might be led, by such tokens of his goodness, *to seek him*, i. e. a more perfect knowledge of Him and of their obligations to Him. Some, on the contrary, make the infinitive depend, almost wholly, on the clause just before, and find the connection to be: — that excited by the proofs of his power, as manifested in the varying fortunes of nations, *they should seek*, etc. But as already explained, the controlling idea in that clause is that of the goodness of God (subject, as to its continuance, to the divine pleasure); while that of his power, as displayed in the infliction of judgments, is only incidentally involved. Again, that clause is a subordinate one, as its structure shows, and that it should break off ζητεῖν so much from the main part of the sentence, would be violent. εἰ ἄραγε — εὗρουσιν, *if perhaps they might feel after him and find him*. ψηλαφησείαν denotes, properly, the motions of a blind man, who gropes along after an object in the dark. On the peculiar Aeolic termination, see Win. §13. 2 d. St. § 69. 8. This verb, as well as the problematical form of the expression—εἰ ἄραγε,—are chosen, because the apostle would concede the comparative indistinctness of the light which the heathen have to guide them. καίτοιγε, *although indeed*. This clause is added to show that the concession just made was not intended to exculpate the heathen for their estrangement from God. Although so benighted as to be compelled to grope for the object of their search, it was still within reach; they had not, after all, so far to go for a knowledge of God, that they might not find it if they would. Compare the sentiment with Acts 14: 17, and especially with Rom. 1: 20.

V. 28. Ἐν αὐτῷ — ἐσμέν. We are not, I suppose, to insist on a sharp distinction between these words. They present the idea, on every side. We derive our existence solely from God; we depend on Him, every instant, for life, motion, thought, all our varied activity. From creatures thus dependent, the evidence of a Creator cannot be very deeply hidden, if they have only a disposition to seek for it. οὐ καί, *as also*, i. e. the sentiment is not only true, but has been ac-

knowledged. καὶ ὑμεῖς, viz. Greeks in distinction from Jews; not Athenians in distinction from other Greeks. Τοῦ γὰρ — ἐσμὲν, *For his offspring also are we.* Derivation implies dependence. The creature cannot exist apart from the Creator. The apostle brings forward the citation correctly, therefore, as parallel in sentiment to ἐν αὐτῷ — ἐσμὲν. Here τοῦ stands for the pronoun. Win. § 20. 2. St. § 94. 1. The words form the first half of a hexameter, and are found in Aratus, a Cilician poet, who flourished about 270 B. C. The celebrated hymn of Cleanthes to Jupiter, l. 5, contains almost the same words, viz. ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν. The same idea, variously expressed, occurs in several other Greek writers. The form of the citation the apostle took, undoubtedly, from Aratus, but says τινὲς εἰρήκασι, because, as some affirm, he had distinctly in mind, some of the other passages where the thought is found; or, according to others, because he inferred that so obvious a remark must be a common one; or, finally, because he would generalize the idea, i. e. the categorical plural: = The truth is so plain, that even your poetry recognizes it. See the grammatical references in the note on v. 18. I am inclined to think that the last is the true explanation. γὰρ καὶ, as Meyer observes correctly, has no logical connection with Paul's speech, but is to be viewed merely as a part of the citation, which it was necessary to retain on account of the verse.

V. 29. *Γένος οὖν*, etc., *since, therefore, we are the offspring of God.* The inference drawn here is, that idolatry is supremely absurd inasmuch as it makes that which is destitute of life, motion, intelligence, the source of these attributes to others. Comp. Isa. 44: 9 sq. *καρὰ γυναι* stands in apposition with the nouns which precede, i. e. the state or form of the materials just enumerated, artificially wrought.

V. 30. The relation of this verse and the one following to the preceding one is this: Since such is the nature of idolatry, you must *therefore—οὖν*—repent of it, because God now lays upon you his command to this effect, in view of the retributions of a judgment to come. The most important word here is *ὑπεριδών*. It does not occur further in the N. Test., but is found often in the Septuagint, where it signifies to neglect, which is its proper classical sense, then to despise, but especially to suffer to pass as if unnoticed, to withhold the proof of noticing something which is, at the same time, a matter of distinct knowledge, i. e. in the sense of עָזַב Hiph., and Hithp., comp. Deut. 22: 3, 4, etc. In this last signification, the verb represents perfectly the apostle's meaning here. God had hitherto permitted the heathen to pursue their own way, without manifesting his sense of their conduct, either by sending to them special messengers to testify against it, as he did to the Jews, or by inflict-

ing upon them at once the punishment deserved. The idea is virtually the same, therefore, as that of *εἶλε* Acts 14: 16, and *παρέδωκεν* Rom. 1: 24. To understand *ὑπεριδών* as meaning that God would not judge or punish the heathen for the sins committed in their state of idolatry, would be at variance with Paul's theology on this subject as he has unfolded it Rom. 1: 20. 2: 11 sq. Not only so, but the repentance which the apostle now calls upon them to exercise, presupposes their guilt.

V. 31. *διότι*, *because*, states the reason why the heathen also, as well as others, must repent; they could not, without this preparation, be safe in the day of righteous judgment, which awaited them. *ἐν ἀνδρί*, etc., *by the man whom he has appointed*. *ἀνδρί* omits the article because a definite clause follows. Win. §19. 4. St. §89. 3. *ὃ* stands, by attraction, for the accusative. *πίστιν παρασχὼν ᾧ*, *having afforded assurance*, confirmation, to all, viz. of a judgment to come. The sentence being left incomplete, it is impossible to say just how much the apostle intended to represent as proved by the resurrection of Christ. He himself referred to it, undoubtedly, in the first place, as establishing the possibility of such a resurrection of all men from the dead as was involved in his doctrine of a general judgment; but whether he had yet developed this doctrine so far that the Athenians perceived already this bearing of the fact, is uncertain. It was enough to excite their scorn to hear of a single instance of resurrection. Again, the resurrection of Christ from the dead confirms the truth of all his claims; and one of these was that he was to be the judge of men; see John 5: 28, 29. But whether the apostle meant to extend the argument to these and other points, we cannot decide, as he was so abruptly silenced.

Effect of the Discourse on the Athenians.

Vv. 32—34. *Paul is interrupted in his speech and leaves the place.*

V. 32. The apostle was heard with attention until he came to speak of the resurrection; when, at the announcement of a doctrine which sounded so strangely to the ears of the Athenians, some of them broke forth into expressions of open contempt. It is altogether incredible that a judicial process, in the highest court of Athens, should have terminated in this manner. *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, *a resurrection of the dead*. As we do not know how much of Paul's idea the Athenians had apprehended, it is doubtful whether we are to take the plural here as generic or numerical, i. e. whether Christ merely be meant, or men in general. *νεκροὶ* is one of a class of words in the New Testament which fluctuate as to the use of the article. Win. §18.1.

Ἀκουσόμεθα — περὶ τούτου. It is disputed whether we are to understand this as said seriously, or as a courteous refusal to hear anything farther on the subject. The latter is the more common view; Heinrichs, Kuinoel, Meyer, Hensen, Lisco, De Wette, Bloomfield, and others adopt it. The manner in which Paul now left the assembly, and the termination of his labors, immediately after this, at Athens, favor this interpretation. Such a mode of speaking, too, was entirely consonant to the Athenian character. See, besides, the first remark on v. 34. Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Rosenmüller, are among those who would impute a serious meaning to the language. That sense lies nearer to the literal form of the words, it is true; unless one might think that *παλιν* itself casts some suspicion upon their sincerity. Compare this with the answer of Felix, 24: 25.

Vv. 33, 34. *καὶ οὕτως*, and thus, after such an experience, with such a result; comp. 20: 11. V. 34. *τινες δέ*. This notice seems to be introduced, *but certain*, as if it stood contrasted, in the mind of the writer, with what is stated respecting the effect of Paul's address, in the preceding verse—a contrast between what was unfavorable in the result on the one hand, and what was favorable on the other. Yet *δὲ* may be taken as continuative. *κολληθέντες αὐτῷ*, not adhering, but inchoatively *joining*, attaching themselves to him. *ὁ Ἀρεοπαγίτης*, the Areopagite, i. e. one of the judges in the court of the Areopagus. Of the number of these judges, nothing certain is known, except that it appears to have varied at different times. See Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie, Vol. I. p. 700 sq. Eusebius and other ancient writers say that this Dionysius became afterward bishop of the church at Athens, and ended his life as a martyr. *καὶ γυναῖκα*, and a woman, not the wife of Dionysius, as some have said, for the article and pronoun would then have been added, comp. 5: 1; or at least the article, comp. 24: 24. It has been inferred, from her being singled out thus by name, that she was a woman of rank, but beyond this, nothing is known of her.

Having delivered this speech with such a result, Paul appears to have left Athens at once, to return no more. Although he spent the most of the next two years in Corinth and the vicinity, he did not (so far as any notice exists) direct his steps again to this city. On his third missionary tour, he came once more into this general part of Greece, but at this time passed by Athens, certainly once and again, without repeating his visit thither.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICE OF DAVIDSON'S INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE value of this elaborate work will depend, in part, on the answer to the following question, Is it wise to bring before the British and American public objections to the genuineness and authenticity of the canonical books, which have been urged only in Germany, and which may possibly never be heard of in any other country, even if these objections are met by able and satisfactory replies? Shall the antidote be furnished where the disease is unknown? We are disposed to answer this question in the affirmative. Some of these cavils, indeed, for they are not worthy of the name of objections, are so trivial that they will not repay the time and talent necessary to describe them. Not a few of the allegations of such writers as Schwegler against the Gospel of John, might be suffered quietly to float into the limbo that speedily awaits them. It is degrading to an honorable man to try to discuss them. It is true, also, that objections which have weight or plausibility with a German, may find no favor with an Englishman or an American. They rest on a German basis only, are fitted to a German idiosyncrasy. One, who has a tolerable measure of common sense, even if inclined to skepticism, would perceive no special pertinence in them. One educated under the influence of the views on mental philosophy prevalent wherever the English language is spoken, finds it difficult to understand fully either the objections or the answers to them. Accordingly, to discuss biblical topics in the German method, requires caution, sound judgment, acquaintance with the peculiar character and tendencies of the English and American mind. In our well-meant but ill-advised efforts, we may perplex and unsettle the faith of Christians; the objection may occasion an injury which the answer can never repair.

Still, we are disposed to welcome a treatise like that of Dr. Davidson, which goes so thoroughly into the recent German criticism on the Gospels, adducing and overthrowing the most plausible objections to the truth of the evangelical history, which the "latest form" of German neology has brought forward. In the first place, in the final result, the Gospel will stand on a firmer basis. Every new assault only reveals its impregnable position. Every fresh trial only shows the

sterling character of the gold. An attempt to degrade Shakspeare or Milton from the position which they now occupy, only excites wonder or contempt, and is sure to recoil on the head of the assailant. So it will soon be in relation to the Gospels, ultimately, even in Germany. Books that can outlive such an array of learning and ingenuity as has been directed against the evangelists within the last twenty years, must be divine. The effect of the unsuccessful, reiterated attacks which are made upon them, will be to place them on that high eminence where the mere critic and scholar shall be content to let them remain, open indeed to still profounder investigation and ever widening illustration, but in trustworthiness no longer assailable. It is coming to this result even in Germany, if we understand the signs of the times. Most of those who have impugned the authority of the Gospels, or parts of them, since the days of Strauss, are but his feeble imitators. Even the wavering critics, as De Wette, seem almost ashamed to refer to B. B., as they abbreviate Bruno Bauer.¹ Writers of the stamp of Schweizer, Schwegler, and Zeller, are left to gather up the crumbs which fall from their master Strauss's table. Really, some of the difficulties and hypotheses which they adduce, would have subjected a member of college, one hundred years ago, to discipline. Schweizer, e. g., undertakes to separate the spiritual substance of John's Gospel from a Galilean interpolation, of a different character! As a proof of a gradual return to sounder views, we may mention that De Wette complains, in one of his late Prefaces, that the younger scholars are coming back to the "old orthodoxy." The persons to whom he refers, we suppose, are Ebrard, Wieseler, Stier, J. P. Lange, etc. Meyer, in the second edition of his Gospels, is returning to "conservatismus." The tendency in the late edition of Winer's Bible Dictionary, is in the same direction. Even De Wette himself, in the preface to his Apocalypse, appears to be much alarmed at the progress which the "young Hegelianism" is making in Germany.

Again, a promptitude in meeting the ablest and most learned of the opponents of the Gospel, may not be unattended with good results, even if much of the German skepticism is not transferred to English soil. It reveals a confidence in the power of truth, a vigilance in guarding the fortress, a keen vision in detecting coming danger, and a learning and ability which must command respect. If German criticism is to be subjected to a criticism as sharp, and a learning as acute in England and the United States, joined to a judgment and common sense much more trustworthy, a reflex influence may be ex-

¹ Of De Wette's opinion of Von Baur, see a note on p. 348.

erted on Germany herself. A more healthful tone will pervade her theological literature. More caution will be exhibited in propounding startling theories, and some respect for the views of scholars of other nations will be cherished. Hitherto, the Germans have had the field of biblical criticism, with few exceptions, to themselves, much, as we conceive, to their own disadvantage.

We may add, in the third place, that it will be impossible to exclude German biblical criticism, either from England or from the United States. The attempt to lay an embargo on any species of foreign literature is preposterous. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* has been translated in England, and is in the process of diffusion there and in this country. Another book, which makes sad havoc with the Old Testament, De Wette's *Introduction to the Old Testament*, has been brought out in two large and handsome volumes in Boston. Other translations might be named, which contain more or less of what is rightly named destructive criticism. Many of the evangelical theologians have not wholly escaped the neological influences so rife around them. Besides, the knowledge of the German language is greatly extending. Twenty scholars now read German commentaries in the original, where one scholar used them twenty years ago. The theological publishers in Germany have, for some years, looked to this country as one of their most important foreign customers. The German emigration hitherward will open another door for the influx of good and of bad German books. So that the evils of German literature, whatever they may be, will find an introduction and currency, just as it has been impossible to exclude a pernicious French literature. The only safeguard is that which Dr. Davidson has adopted—to meet learning with learning, argument with argument, and if possible, before the poison is introduced, prepare an effectual remedy.

We will now proceed to give some account of Dr. Davidson's work. It is entitled an "Introduction to the New Testament; containing an examination of the most important questions relating to the authority, interpretation and integrity of the canonical books, with reference to the latest inquiries." It is printed in the most finished style of London typography by Samuel Bagster and Sons. The first volume contains the Four Gospels in 430 pages 8vo. The second volume will be published about the first of July next, and will probably end with the Pastoral Epistles. The third volume will include the remainder of the New Testament. In the first volume the matter is distributed as follows: 187 pages to Matthew, 32 to Mark, 50 to Luke, and 148 to John. This proportion is a pretty good indication

of the relative importance of the questions which have been started in relation to the several gospels, or the nature and number of the attacks which have been lately made upon them. The concluding pages are devoted to a consideration of the correspondences in the first three gospels. One part of what is commonly embraced in Introductions is omitted in this work, viz. the criticism of the text. This topic the author proposes to take up at large in a new edition of his *Lectures on Biblical Criticism*. The following topics are treated, at more or less length, in relation to each of the gospels: Some notices of the writer, the persons for whose use it was designed in the first instance, the apostolic origin or authenticity, integrity, time and place in which it was written, characteristic peculiarities and contents. In addition, there is a discussion on the language in which Matthew's gospel was originally written, relation of Mark's gospel to Peter, and the language in which it was written, Luke's preface and relation of his gospel to Paul, the immediate occasion and object of John's gospel, and a comparison of its contents with those of the synoptical gospels.

The question in relation to the language in which Matthew's gospel was first composed, is very elaborately and learnedly discussed. The conclusion is, that it was written in the Aramaean or Syro-Chaldaic, "the ancient historical testimony being unanimous" in favor of this position. The evidence of Papias, the earliest witness, whom Irenaeus terms "a hearer of John, and a companion of Polycarp," is patiently examined, and "on the whole it would appear that small as his abilities were, he was a credible and competent witness in the matter before us." "Great stress too must be laid on the testimony of Pantænus, because it is unquestionably independent of Papias." In addition to the evidence of antiquity, Dr. D. argues that as the gospel was written for the Jews in Palestine, it would be more natural for Matthew to write in Syro-Chaldaic, as it was the vernacular tongue and especially dear to the Jews, even allowing that the Greek had attained great currency. Special stress is laid on the circumstance that Josephus terms the Syro-Chaldaic *πάτριος γλώσση* as contrasted with the Greek which he terms *ξένη καὶ ἄλλοδαπή διάλεκτος*. Besides, the Hebraisms of the first gospel are favorable to the hypothesis of a Hebrew original. The mode of quotation is also urged on the same side, though many quotations very nearly coincide with the Septuagint. The strongest arguments against a Hebrew original "may be reduced to four." The first is, that the old Syriac version, the Peschito, was made from the Greek, not the Hebrew. It would certainly be very strange for a Syriac translator to prefer a Greek copy instead of a Syro-Chaldaic original, especially, since from the

relation of the latter to Syriac, a large part of the work would be done to his hand. It is attempted to weaken the force of this reasoning by showing that Christianity was diffused in the north-eastern parts of Syria, not directly from Palestine, but from Antioch, where the Greek edition of Matthew was perhaps the only one known, the Syro-Chaldaic not having travelled out of Palestine. It is said, again, that there are no characteristics of a translation in the Greek. "This is merely a proof of its excellence. It bears the marks of an original. The author was so fully competent to his task, as to produce a version, having all the appearance and character of an original." Again, paronomasias occur in the Greek gospel. "This fact is neutralized by the circumstance, that they are also found in the Septuagint." Lastly, the Greek gospel only is quoted or referred to by the early fathers. The Hebrew document must have been unaccountably neglected. "But if we reflect on the fortunes of the Jewish Christians in Palestine till the time of Hadrian, we cannot be surprised at the paucity of copies which must necessarily have been made, nor the neglect on the part of the Gentile Christians of a Hebrew gospel which they were unable to read."

We confess that we are not quite prepared to accede to this conclusion. The external evidence is in favor of a Syro-Chaldaic original; the internal evidence is against it. The Greek gospel certainly bears all the marks of an original. And if Matthew wrote a Syro-Chaldaic gospel, possessing of course apostolical authority, a trustworthy history of our Lord, from an eye-witness, it is very remarkable that this gospel should perish so suddenly, that there should be no hint in regard to its fortunes in the fathers, that they should fail to quote it, that there should be no legend whatever in regard to its fate. Then if some other person had translated the Syro-Chaldaic original into Greek, either with or without Matthew's sanction, why is there no allusion to it? The fathers are quite careful to report the sanction which Mark's gospel receives from his connection with Peter, and Luke's from his relation to Paul. But there is a profound silence in relation to Matthew and his translator.

Dr. Davidson vindicates the authenticity of the first two chapters of Matthew against the attacks of Schleiermacher, De Wette, Norton and others. The reasons alleged against this passage are of a subjective kind, and are entitled to little weight. They amount to this: that we cannot reconcile all the discrepancies between Matthew's chronology and Luke's, nor understand the nature of the star that appeared to the Magi, nor perfectly comprehend the different repre-

sentations in the two gospels in respect to Joseph's abode at Bethlehem and Nazareth.

One point discussed in the Introduction to Mark, is the relation of this gospel to Peter. "It may be inferred from the varying notices of some of the fathers, with some degree of probability, that Peter was not with Mark when the latter undertook to write the gospel." "If the gospel contain a faithful abstract of Peter's discourses, the writer having been exceedingly careful to omit nothing of what he had heard from the lips of his spiritual master, and to set down nothing falsely, as John the presbyter assures us, we may safely rely on it as ultimately based on apostolical authority." The integrity of the last eleven verses of the gospel is discussed at considerable length, and the conclusion is adopted that they were added by another person after Mark's death. We think, however, that this decision is not borne out by the facts, and that the preponderance of arguments is in favor of the genuineness. Dr. D. says that "on the whole the external arguments in favor of the paragraph outweigh those on the other side." In our opinion, they *greatly* outweigh them. The passage is found in all the existing Greek MSS., except B, in all the ancient versions, the Syriac of Jerusalem included, in all the Evangelistaria and Synaxaria, and is sanctioned by nearly all the fathers. There is some reason to suppose that the objections to the passage had their origin in exegetical difficulties. Some of the internal arguments alleged against it, seem to us to have but little weight; e. g. "the desire of the miraculous is too great for Mark, vs. 17, 18. The kind of miracles indicated, and the power of performing them attributed to *all* believers, are adverse to the supposition of the evangelist being the writer." But was this promise more comprehensive, or has it an air of greater strangeness than the performance? Thus Acts 5: 15, "They brought forth the sick into the streets and laid them on beds and couches, that at least the shadow of Peter passing by might overshadow some of them." Acts 2: 4, "And they were *all* (believers) filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues." So from Acts 5: 17, it would seem as if the great body of the Samaritan believers received the power of working miracles. The same general diffusion of miraculous power, we infer from the first epistle to the Corinthians. Again, the words "he that believeth and *is baptized* shall be saved, are very suspicious. They remind us of the post-apostolic period when a greater efficacy was attributed to baptism than it was intended to have." But has the insertion of this second condition in this place, an aspect more strange than Peter's summons, Acts 2: 38, "Repent and *be baptized* every one of you," or than our

Lord's declaration that men must be born of *water* and of the spirit? "The style of the whole piece is unlike that of the gospel. Its manner resembles that of brief notices, extracted from larger accounts and loosely linked together." But it has to our mind no more of this fragmentary and summary manner than other passages in Mark, e. g. 1: 9—21, where four or five important events are crowded into a few verses. "Instead of *ἐκβάλλειν ἀπό*, Mark uses *ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ*." Yet he does this only in *one* place, 7: 26. *ὁ κύριος* is used in the 19th and 20th verses, instead of *Ἰησοῦς*. Mark nowhere employs this appellation." But perhaps it was natural to apply the term Lord to Jesus after his resurrection, as before his crucifixion, Jesus had applied it to himself as recorded in Mark. On the whole, though there is weight in some of the internal objections, yet they do not throw so much doubt over the passage as to outweigh the strong external testimony in its favor. The introduction of a number of *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* into a passage would not be a circumstance so extraordinary as the abrupt closing of the gospel at ch. 16: 8.

The author comes to the conclusion that Luke's gospel is not of canonical authority because of the special influence which Paul had upon it. Its credibility and authority must be placed on another basis equally secure. That it fully deserves its present position among the gospels is unquestionable; but it does not deserve it by virtue of any truth in the ancient tradition." The internal objections against the authenticity of Luke, viz. in the matter of the census, 2: 12, and in the alleged false chronology in regard to Lysanias, 3: 1, are examined, and shown to be capable of fair, if not of perfectly satisfactory explanation. The integrity of Luke seems to be unimpeachable. Vv. 13, 14 of chap. 22, have been assailed, but without adequate reason.

On John's gospel our author lays out his strength, as it has been pertinaciously assailed and with not a little acuteness by numerous recent critics. The time and place in which this gospel was written are uncertain. The place was probably Ephesus. The early external evidence establishes the apostolic origin of John's gospel. Yet it has been assailed by various writers on historic grounds. A recent critic, Lützelberger, ("The Church Tradition on the apostle John, 1840") has produced a work which Bleek characterizes as the most important attack made upon the gospel in modern times, and which has had no little influence on the later productions of Baur and Schwegler. It has been assumed as an indisputable fact that John the apostle lived and labored in Asia Minor during the latter part of his life. Lützelberger attempts to destroy the credit of the ecclesiastical tradition on which the fact rests. The acute reasonings and

plausible conjectures of this writer are met and rebutted with great ability by Dr. Davidson. "How impotent," he concludes, "do these objections appear! How unlike the statements of men simply desirous of arriving at truth. If the bad cause they resolved to espouse did not appear desperate in their eyes, they have resorted at least to desperate weapons."

A group of internal objections are next considered, viz. diversity in regard to the scene and duration of Jesus' public ministry, the diversity relating to the description of his person, and that which belongs to his discourses. John's peculiar temperament, his intimacy with his Master, the fact that he wrote at a later day, probably in Asia Minor, and for a different class of readers, may account for some of these diversities. Again, there are great resemblances between him and the Synoptists. All which is taught in the gospel of John may be found in the other gospels or in the epistles. It is not necessary to trace his doctrine of the Logos to Philo or to any extra-Palestinian source. The germs of it are in the Old Testament. The geographical and archaeological difficulties in John have never been proved to be insuperable. E. g. Bethabara may be the true reading for the town called Bethany at the Jordan, or there may have been two Bethanies. The Synoptists place the principal scene of Christ's ministry in Galilee, John places it in Judea; they appear to limit its duration to one year, he alludes to several passovers. They, however, intimate that the Saviour's ministry was not confined to Galilee, and their speaking only of his last journey to Jerusalem does not exclude similar journeys. In order that we may obtain a comprehensive view of the Messiah's person, the descriptions of all the evangelists must be combined. Xenophon's delineation of Socrates does not exclude that of Plato. That Jesus' discourses, as recorded by John, are different both in matter and form from those found in the other gospels is obvious, but it remains to be proved that the one class is inconsistent with the other.

After discussing the immediate occasion and object of the gospel, that its special object was not polemic, and that it was not designed, except in a subordinate sense, as a supplement to the Synoptists, the author considers briefly the characteristics of the gospel, in manner and style, and then discusses at some length the question of the genuineness of chap. 21, of the two last verses in this chapter, of chap. 7, v. 51, 8: 11, and of 5: 3, 4.

We have thus referred to a few of the topics in this instructive volume. The first and the decided impression which the reader receives is, that the author has mastered his subject, has patiently threaded his way through the toilsome labyrinth of German research, and has

clearly presented the main questions relating to the gospels in the light of the latest and most thorough investigations. Painful as it must be in some respects for a believer in the gospels to explore the cavils and objections of modern skepticism, yet the author has not shrunk in the slightest degree from his task. The inquiry is not only thorough and extensive, but embraces the most recent literature. So far as we can judge, the author has allowed nothing of importance to escape him. We are also struck with the general candor and impartiality of the discussion. If an objection has apparent weight, it is not summarily dismissed. If the arguments of the friends of revelation appear to be more specious than solid, the author has independence enough to say so. An evident desire to arrive at the truth, without fear or bias, pervades the volume. Though this honesty of purpose may occasionally lead to results which will surprise the unreflecting reader of the gospels, yet, in the final result, the authenticity of the gospels is placed on a firm basis. One rises from the perusal of this volume with the deepest conviction, that he is not following cunningly devised fables, or honestly devised myths. A fundamental discussion like that of Dr. D's, is attended with an excellent moral effect. The sharper the scrutiny to which the evangelists are subjected, the more intelligent and the profounder is the faith which one feels in them. Thus a scientific discussion, if conducted with seriousness and dignity, becomes a means of grace, prompts to faith in God's word, and to love towards the Saviour.

This Introduction is not designed to be popular in the common acceptance of that word. It is not composed in a style which will be attractive to the mass, perhaps, of educated men. The author is very sparing of ornament, makes no popular appeals, indulges in very few stirring descriptions. The style is direct and perspicuous, and the entire method is scientific. Occasionally, it seems to us there is a little unnecessary dryness. E. g. the enunciation of the topics at the beginning of the discussion on each gospel, might be less formal and skeleton-like, and when the author is considering the characteristics of the gospels, there might have been more pleasant descriptions and a greater outflow of feeling without injury to the scientific aspect of the treatise. Still, the book is, in this respect, substantially as it should be, a systematic and exact exhibition of the subject. The study of it ought not to be confined to a few biblical scholars and clergymen. It treats of a subject which surpasses every other in interest, the records of the life and atoning death of our Lord. All clergymen, all who are called to defend the gospel in these days when it is attacked from so many quarters, will here find armor on which they can rely.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTES ON BIBLICAL GEOGRAPHY.

By E. Robinson, D. D. Professor at New York.

I. THE A'WAJ, THE SECOND RIVER OF DAMASCUS.

In the Number of this work for Nov. 1848, p. 760 sq. there are extracts from a letter of the Rev. Wm. M. Thomson of Beirût, describing some antiquities on the route to Damascus. At the close he spoke of having on his return traced to its sources the river *A'waj* (the crooked), probably the ancient Pharpar; and held out the hope of further information in respect to it. The following letter relates chiefly to that journey. I subjoin a few notes, comprising former notices of this stream, and the reasons for regarding it as the Pharpar of 2 Kings 5: 12.

Beirût, Nov. 29, 1848.

"You were pleased to express a desire for the remainder of my hurried journey to and from Damascus; and if I had supposed that the latter half led me over the region least known and therefore most interesting, I would have been more particular at the time in my observations, and more prompt in writing.

"I will dismiss the city of Damascus with one or two remarks; as it is well known and visited by all travellers. There are more extensive remains of antiquity in it, than is generally supposed. Not far from the site of the great church of St. John, (in which also are large antique columns and foundations,) are the remains of an immense building, constructed of heavy stones and evidently very ancient. It is at present about fifty-three paces long on the west side; and, on a stone about twenty feet from the ground, is a long Greek inscription, which I copied.—The great castle is built of stones having a *bevel* somewhat like the Phœnician. It is, however, evidently Saracenic; and has smooth cut stones mingled with the bevelled.—At the place where the Barada breaks through the mountain into the plain of Damascus, is a long Cufic inscription, thirty-five or forty feet high up in the perpendicular face of the mountain. I have got a splendid fac-simile of this curious relic of early Mohammedan times; the only one of the kind I have found in all my rambles. I may send a copy of this beautiful inscription, with a translation, at some future time.—Now for the ride home.

"April 19, 1848. Passing out of Bâb Allah, the south-western gate of Damascus, I entered at once upon the great plain which stretches away to Haurân and the desert. In an hour and a quarter came to Dârâya; where is a large square ruin, said to have been a convent (Deir), as most ruins are christened. This is the first place irrigated from the *Nahr A'waj*. In half an hour more reached a deep canal of water, in many places carried under ground by a good tunnel. Another hour brought us to Jûn; on a hill west of which is an old deserted castle named after the village. Here begins the trap rock formation, which continues throughout Haurân. Thirty-five minutes from Jûn is the bridge over the great canal of the A'waj; and in twenty-five minutes more I reached the Khân esh-Sheikh on the bank of the river itself. The Khân is a large square caravanserai, built of black compact lava. From this to Sa'sa' is three hours. During the last hour, the perfect level of the plain is broken by low hills and abrupt gullies; and small tributaries from Jebel esh-Sheikh begin to fall into the A'waj. The river is about as large as the Barada before the junction with the fountain Fijy. The largest of these tributaries is called *es-Sâbirânay*, from a village at the base of the mountains called Beit Sâbir. Sa'sa' may be regarded as the point of union for all the tributaries of the A'waj. Various streams from the south, south-west, and west, here unite; and the river, full grown, begins its meanderings across the vast plain, in a general direction north-east, towards Damascus,—an endless series of windings through boundless fields of wheat, now in its glory. The great highway to Palestine and Egypt appears always to have passed along the line of our ride to Sa'sa'; and I noticed frequent traces of the Roman road. Along this road travelled caravans in the days of the Patriarchs; and caravans to Mecca, Jerusalem, and Egypt, follow still the same track.

"Sa'sa' is a fortified town, with large Khâns all in ruins. The walls are twenty-five or thirty feet high, built of trap rock and faced with smooth cut limestone. The figure of the city is square; and the corners of the walls were strengthened and defended by round towers. The whole is less than a mile in circuit. A large ruined mosque is the most conspicuous object within the walls. The villagers are all Muslims, a sad set of villains, who would cut your throat for a piastre. They have had a bloody quarrel lately; and, living on the borders of the desert, they have frequent fights with wandering Arabs and dogged Druzes. Shibly Aryan, the famous Druze chief who repeatedly defeated the whole Egyptian army in the Ledja, took Sa'sa', killed the guards of Ibrahim Pasha, and plundered his large stores laid up here for the army.—It must be nearly thirty miles from Damascus to Sa'sa'. We rode rapidly six and a half hours; part of the time on the gallop.

"I had often heard of people freezing to death on this plain. Many of

the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, and many horses, are said to have perished in this way in a single night. My experience during this day removed all my scepticism on this point. When we issued from Bâb Allah, a pleasant south wind barely sufficed to render the burning rays of Syria's sun endurable. As we advanced the wind rose and blew the dust, in whirling eddies, high into the air. Soon we put on our cloaks. The wind rose to a tornado. We were obliged to tie our cloaks around us with ropes, and our hats tight down with handkerchiefs. To keep warm we undertook to walk ; but could not stand against the wind. It began to rain and hail. We put our horses to the gallop ; and in an hour got into Sa'sa'. My Arab companions had already become stiff with cold and hardly able to speak. I had a great fire kindled ; and by hot tea and friction they were restored. But had we been in the open desert, and obliged to pass the night without shelter or fire, I think some of them would have died. And this was the 19th of April.

"*April 20th.* Started for Bâniâs in a direction nearly west, over rolling volcanic plains well watered and clothed with wheat, extending to the great fountain of Menbej. This fountain issues from a low cave beneath a hill of pudding-stone. There is no village near it. Many years ago I heard from an Arab sheikh of Haurân, that at certain periods this fountain rose from a great depth in the earth, threw out great quantities of fish on the plain, and then subsided. In Damascus, Dr. Mezbaka told me that the water came out with a loud noise, like the roar of cannon ; that at certain times the water was blood-red ; and that it threw out immense quantities of fish, etc. At Sa'sa', and at the fountain itself, they told me that late in autumn the fountain dries up ; that after the heavy rains of December, it returns with a loud noise deep in the cave ; that the water is bloody at first, and crowded with fish. I examined the cave as well as I could ; it being now full of clear cold water, swarming with fish, and very deep. A man at the place told me, that even when the stream is dry they cannot go into the cave ; as the descent from the very mouth is almost perpendicular. Stones rolled down appear to fall into an abyss of water.

"I suspect there are several reservoirs or pools under this pudding-stone projection of Jebel esh-Sheikh ; one at least of the interior ones acting upon the principle of the syphon ; which, put in play, sends its large volume of water, with sudden and noisy violence, down a succession of waterfalls, into the pool immediately below the mouth of the cave. This may account for the suddenness, violence, and noise, attending the return of the stream. When the pool at the mouth of the cave is filled up, these precipices, causing the waterfalls, are covered ; and the noise ceases. Probably some of these precipices are of trap rock highly col-

ored with oxyde of iron or manganese ; and this will account for the red color of the water at first. To this cause, I know, may be ascribed the blood of Adonis which sometimes tinges the Nahr Ibrahim.

“So much for Menbej; which sends forth a large mill-stream, completely covered with long and gracefully trailed sedge-weed, altogether unique in appearance. The water unites with the Nahr Jennâny, which comes down from Beit Jenn, a village high up in a wild gorge of Jebel esh-Sheikh, an hour and a half from Menbej, a little south of west ; and the united stream passes by Sa'sa'.—I think there can be no reasonable doubt, that the A'waj is the second river of Damascus. It waters ten times the arable land that the Barada does ; though the other alone passes through the city.

“Passing through Mazra'at Beit Jenn, at the termination of the gorge we began in earnest to climb the heights of Jebel esh-Sheikh, over vast fields of trap rock ; and in two hours reached the summit of this pass, near a small village called Hâdr. The descent towards the Hûleh, by Sahita, Mejdél, and the castle of Baniâs, to the town of this name, took three and a half hours. We passed the lake Phiala a little on our left. The whole ascent was on trap rock, near the junction of the limestone, which constitutes the towering summits of Hermon. Those heights rose steeply on our right ; and to-day, at least, were battling with a wild snow-storm. At our elevation, it was a cold rain ; but the snow was whitening the cliffs within a bow-shot of us. It was a gloomy, sour ride, with now and then an opening into the sullen sublime. The view over Gilead and Bashan and the plain of Damascus was, at times, very grand and very desolate.

“At Baniâs there had been no rain ; it was a glowing *summer* evening. In three short hours we had descended from Arctic snows and storms to the balmy breezes, sweet birds, and sweet flowers of the tropics. It is a prodigious come-down, to the level of the Hûleh.

“I reached Beirût in two days of hard riding from Baniâs, by the ordinary route.”

Yours, truly,

W. M. THOMSON.

NOTES.—1. The route of Mr. Thomson from Damascus to Baniâs, seems to have been precisely that of Irby and Mangles in 1818. As they passed from Sa'sa' westward, “the first part of the road,” they say, “led through a fine plain, watered by a pretty, winding rivulet, with numerous tributary streams, and many old ruined mills ; from whence we began to ascend over a very rugged and rocky soil quite void of vegetation, having in some places traces of an ancient paved way, probably the Roman road lead-

ing from Damascus to Cesarea Philippi. As we ascended we had the highest part of Jebel Sheikh on our right. We found the snow in some places of considerable depth, and difficult to cross with our horses." This was on the 24th of February. In descending to Baniâs, they had the lake Phiala close upon their left. They do not mention either Menbej or Beit Jenn; though they must have passed near to both.—Burckhardt, travelling in 1810 from Baniâs to Damascus, appears to have followed nearly the same route reversed, as far as to Beit Jenn; though he does not speak of Phiala. He describes Beit Jenn as situated an hour and a quarter below the summit of the mountain, on the east side, in a narrow Wady, at a spot where the valley widens a little. A quarter of an hour further down is 'Ain Beit Jenn, a copious spring; and after another half hour, the valley opens upon the plain on the eastern side of the mountain. Burckhardt did not at that time visit Sa'sa'; but took the route from Beit Jenn, by way of Keft Hauwar and Katana, to Damascus.¹

2. The part of Jebel esh-Sheikh which Mr. Thomson speaks of climbing, above Beit Jenn, is the lower ridge which branches off from the lofty Hermon proper, towards the south, and is called by Burckhardt Jebel Heish. Further towards the south it sinks down into a broad swell of high table land; and is there crossed by the usual caravan road from Sa'sa' by el-Kuneitrah to the bridge of the Jordan. Burckhardt says that from el-Kuneitrah, "the ground continues to rise, until we reached the chain of [isolated] hills, which here form the most conspicuous part of the mountain Heish. The ground being here considerably elevated above the plain of Damascus and Jaulôn, these hills, when seen from afar, appear like mountains; although when viewed from their foot they are of very moderate height. They are insulated; and terminate at the hill Tell Faras, towards the plain of Jaulôn."² With this agree substantially the accounts of Schubert and Wilson, who speak of a plain of table land and of single hills; but not of a chain of hills.

3. Burckhardt, in speaking of the A'waj lower down, at Kesweh, gives its name correctly; but as he passes along its banks below Sa'sa', he calls it the Sâbirâny.³ It appears from Mr. Thomson's account, that this latter name belongs strictly to a tributary of the A'waj. Some travellers have copied Burckhardt; while others name the stream according to the place where they happen to be; as Nahr Sa'sa', Nahr Kesweh, etc.

4. Burckhardt speaks, at Kesweh, of "the river A'waj;" and describes it, half an hour below Sa'sa', as running "in a deep bed of the Haurân black stone."⁴ Irby and Mangles merely mention it as "a fine stream." Monro, in 1833, describes it⁵ as "a rapid stream flowing towards Damascus, which, being increased by others in its course, forms the Pharpar,

¹ Trav. p. 45 sq.² P. 314.³ P. 53, 312.⁴ P. 53, 312.⁵ II. p. 54.

one of those rivers which have ever been the pride of the Damascenes; while the Abana, issuing from the mountains near to the city, is now called the Barada." According to Schubert,¹ the A'waj at Sa'sa' is "a small lively river." Dr. Wilson, who rejects the idea of its being one of the rivers of Damascus, because it does not water the city itself, speaks only of its course as "rather notable in a geological point of view. The basaltic and cretaceous rocks meet at it on the same level. The first of these forms its right bank, and the second its left. The basalt ceases where the Damascus road leaves it."² I do not remember to have met with any further notices of the A'waj, beyond the mere mention of it by some name.

5. In 2 Kings 5: 12, Naaman the Syrian says: "Are not Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel?" In the Hebrew Keri, and in the marginal reading of the English Version, the first river is written *Amana*; and this is probably the correct form, as affording a good etymology, 'the perennial'; comp. Isa. 33: 16. Now by "rivers of Damascus," it is hardly to be assumed that Naaman intended streams running through or watering the city itself. He doubtless meant rivers of the territory or plain of Damascus; just as he did those of the territory of Israel. It is then not difficult to identify the *Amana* with the Barada; first, because the larger and more important stream would naturally be first mentioned; and then, because we find a part of Anti-Lebanon adjacent to Hermon also called *Amana* (Cant. 4: 8), corresponding to that portion of the mountain where the Barada has its sources, and taking its name apparently from the stream. This leaves the Pharpar to be referred to the A'waj, which beyond all question is the second river of the plain of Damascus, both in size and importance. I was led to this conclusion some years ago, while investigating the waters flowing east from Anti-Lebanon; but have not found this view brought forward by any one before Monro, as quoted above. The notices of Mr. Thomson go strongly to confirm the view.—There are only two other hypotheses respecting the second river. One regards it as a branch of the Barada, where that river is divided up into many channels in order to water the city of Damascus and its environs. The other refers it to the fountain and stream of el-Fijeh, described by Mr. Thomson in his former letter,³ which joins the Barada after a course of a hundred and twenty paces. These hypotheses were obviously mere shifts to escape a difficulty, while no appropriate second river was yet known. But why they should be persisted in at the present day, it is more difficult to see.

¹ III. p. 271.

² Lands of the Bible, II. p. 324.

³ Biblioth. Sac. 1848. p. 763.

II. NATURAL BRIDGE OVER THE LITANY OR LEONTES.

In April, 1844, the Rev. Eli Smith and Rev. S. H. Calhoun left Jerusalem by way of Jericho, intending to pass up the valley of the Jordan to Tiberias. They proceeded as far north in the valley as the mouth of Wady el-Fâria'; beyond which they were unable to obtain guides or any other aid from the terror-stricken Arabs. They therefore turned their course by way of Sânr to 'Akka; and from thence took their way across the mountains, by Rumeish and Bint Jebeil, to Kadesh of Naphtali and Baniâs, by a route before unexplored. They returned to Beirût by way of the bridge of Khûrdela and the castle esh-Shûkîf; continuing along upon the higher parts of Lebanon until they came opposite to Sidon, where they descended. A full journal of the whole tour was kept by Mr. Smith, a copy of which is in my hands. It is exceedingly valuable; and we may hope that it will one day see the light.

In May and June of the same year, Mr. Smith resided for some weeks at Hasbeiya; and made excursions into the neighborhood and also to Damascus. Full notes of all these were kept by him; of which, too, I have a copy.

A third journal, by the same hand, is made up from notes of various excursions into different parts of Lebanon; mainly the portion lying in and between the tracts drained by the Nahr el-Kelb, north of Beirût, and the 'Awâly, which enters the sea near Sidon. Within these limits there is scarcely a village which has not been visited and its position described. It is by far the most minute and exact topographical account of Lebanon, its features and its villages, which has ever been drawn up.

In the journal at Hasbeiya there is brought to notice for the first time the natural bridge over the Litâny, which Mr. Smith visited and described. It is understood that he directed the attention of the officers of the late Dead Sea expedition to this bridge; who also visited it and brought away a drawing. It is due to Mr. Smith that his account, as the earliest, should be laid before the public. Some other extracts are prefixed, describing the nature of the country and the singular channel of the Litâny.

In passing up Wady et-Teim, and not far above the fountain of Hasbeiya, Mr. S. left that valley and crossed the intervening ridge to the valley of the Litâny, near the little Metâwileh village of Kilya. "On the left," he says, "a hill projected [from the ridge just crossed] towards the bold side of Lebanon, which but for the Litâny it would have joined. Just there, however, the river rushes through an awful chasm; and soon passes Bûrghûz [with its bridge] on the further side of the hill. The village of Kilya stands just on the brink of the left bank of the river. Both banks were perpendicular, and corresponded with each other in the strata of the

rocks ; being just far enough apart for the passage of the stream, and probably hundreds of feet high. In a similar position, on the opposite bank, was another little village called Lusah. The inhabitants could converse with each other across the river ; and, notwithstanding the steepness of the banks, they have got a footpath up and down them. The ridge we had crossed slopes gradually on this side ; and is generally arable. Beyond the stream, also, Mount Lebanon (north of the pass towards Bûrghûz) does not come quite down to the river, but leaves an arable tract. Some distance [three or four miles] to the north, a higher tract crosses from the eastern ridge to the mountain, intersected by the river, and having the village of Yûhmur upon its top, just on the left bank of the stream. The region thus defined has the general form of a large basin. Through the midst of it runs the river, everywhere between the same precipitous banks. There is, most of the way, no depression of the ground as you approach the banks, the undulations of surface on each side being the same ; so that, whenever you lose sight of the chasm of the river, you would not suspect that the whole was not one continuous surface. So deep a channel, formed with so little disturbance of the contiguous region, seemed to me not to be the work of an earthquake ; but the result of the gradual wear of a waterfall. I should add, that everywhere it seemed to have selected the lowest part of the tract."

From Kilya Mr. S. proceeded to Yûhmur, a Metâwilah village on the higher tract north of the basin, in an hour and three quarters, by a somewhat circuitous path. At Yûhmur he goes on to say :

" We were now at the most majestic part of the wonderful chasm. Its banks I judged to be at least a thousand feet in height ; higher than at any other point. The rock, being less firm in its texture than below, had, in many places, been worn away or had slidden down ; thus widening the distance between the banks, but adding much to the variety and beauty of the views presented. At the bottom, like a silvery ribbon, rushed the stream from rapid to rapid, foaming among the rocks, and decked with the gay blossoms of the oleander along its margin. It was a scene to be visited at leisure and studied for hours. But we hastened on.

" I could not, however, resist the temptation to turn aside and examine a curiosity of which I had heard at Hasbeiya—a natural bridge across the Litâny ; which, from its name Kûweh, I expected to find an elevated perforation through the rock. After traversing the open fields beyond [north of] Yûhmur for a time, I descended into a Wady which came down from the right. The declivity soon became so steep, that I lost my confidence in the feet of my careful horse, who in innumerable defiles of Palestine and Lebanon had never yet betrayed me, and I dismounted. The Wady soon descended by a bound into the river far below ; and I, turning to the

left around a lofty precipice, continued my descent, having the precipice above and the awful chasm below, with the river roaring at its bottom, and here so narrow as to coop the stream within straitened bounds; while the opposite precipice, near at hand, rose up so high above as to exclude every prospect but the sky. I seemed to be descending into the bowels of the earth; and a fitter haunt for beasts of prey or marauding robbers I never saw. Yet even here nature had her ornaments; and the beautiful oleander smiled upon me from many a nook in the frowning precipice. At length, with knees wearied by the steep and long descent, I reached the bridge, the Kûweh. The river was still many feet below me, running in a channel worn in the rock entirely by its own friction, and so narrow and tortuous as occasionally completely to hide the water from view. The Kûweh has evidently been formed by the falling of masses of rock from the precipices above, which still threaten to throw down more. The fallen masses, spanning the narrow stream, have in time become covered with earth and bushes, and now form a bridge. It is in fact now crossed by a road; for, difficult as I had found the descent, this is one of the roads from Hasbeiya to Deir el-Kamar and Beirût. It ascends, on the other side, a declivity apparently as steep as the one I had descended; and crosses the ridge of Lebanon by a gap somewhere south of Niha."

III. KEDESH OF NAPHTALI AND THE HÛLEH.

From the first journal of the Rev. Eli Smith, mentioned above, I extract the following account of the ancient Kedesh of Naphtali, still known as *Kedes*. The place has seldom been visited by travellers; and, so far as I know, this is the most full and exact account we have of it in modern times. A few notices are added respecting the streams of the Hûleh.

On the 23d of April, 1844, Messrs. Smith and Calhoun left the direct road from 'Akka to Hasbeiya at Bint Jebeil; and turned more to the east in order to visit Kedesh. Passing over a high rolling region of country, they came in an hour and a half to the village of Mâlikiyeh, situated in a beautiful though not large plain, in which were growing some very large and old terebinth trees. This plain forms one of the first offsets or steps of descent on this side towards the Hûleh. On the eastern hills, which rise but little, they stopped.

"We had here, considerably below us, another *step* towards the Hûleh, in which, directly beneath us, was the plain of Kedes, separated by hills and a Wady from another plain on the north. We descended immediately and rapidly to Kedes; which we reached, directly at the foot of the hill, in two and a half hours from Bint Jebeil.

"Kedes, the once ancient Kedesh of Naphtali, is on a Tell, resting against the side of the hill which we had descended, with a plain of uncommon loveliness lying before it. On the highest part of the Tell, over which we first passed, is the modern village. A step down from this towards the south-east, an offset projects for some distance towards the plain; but yet at a considerable height above it. Here we encamped in the midst of grass of a luxuriant growth. On the south-west side of the Tell the plain extended up in the form of a narrow valley; in which, just at the foot of the Tell, bursts out a copious spring of the most limpid water. On the opposite side, lower down than the projection just mentioned, there projects another and larger offset; in the centre of which, at its junction with the main Tell, is also another beautiful fountain.

"On this lowest part were two ruins, of large hewn stone, apparently of Roman origin. The walls of one, in part, and one door-way, were standing; but we saw no traces of columns. Between the two ruins were some uncommonly large sarcophagi, which we conjectured to be older, but we could discover no inscriptions; one or two of them were double. In the village above, we saw one or two columns lying on the ground.

"Everything indicated that this was once a large and important place. And well it may have been; for I have rarely seen a place with which I was so much charmed. The abundant supply of water has been mentioned. The plain, three or four miles long, from north to south, and a mile wide, is perfectly level, and has the fertility of an alluvial bottom. The eastern hills in front are low and partly wooded. They hide the Hûleh; but you see over them the vast table-land of Jeidûr, extending from the foot of Jebel esh-Sheikh to the Jaulôn, with its groves and luxuriant pasturage, and now spotted everywhere with the black tents of the 'Anazeh Arabs; while Jebel esh-Sheikh, with its snowy summits, rose up in all its majesty full before us.

"The present village is occupied by people from Haurân, who had moved over but a few months before. Previously it was nearly or quite deserted. It was interesting to remark, in this case as well as in that of Mâlikiyeh, how the country of the Metâwileh is becoming the asylum of the oppressed. This is owing to the present upright and mild but firm government of Hamid el-Beg and Husein Suleimân, hereditary sheikhs of the family of 'Aly ez-Zûghîr, who now jointly govern the districts of Beshârah and Shûkîf. In passing through the territory twice, I have never heard them otherwise than well spoken of, whether by Muslims or Christians. The people here had fled from Haurân, to escape the depredations of the nomadic Arabs on the one hand, and the enormous exactions of the Damascus government on the other.

"The following bearings, among others, were here taken :

Jebel esh-Sheikh	50
Castle of Baniâs	53
el-Khureibeh	186
Benit	195

"*Khureibeh* is a Tell, apparently with ruins on it, at the south end of the plain of Kedes. Just there, in a deep ravine, the Wady el-Mu'adhdhamlyeh, known before in going from Safed to Bint Jebeil,¹ finds its way into the plain of the Hûleh at the fountain of Mellâhah. By this fountain there rises a conical peak from the superjacent mountain, which serves as an important landmark." There is some reason for supposing that el-Khureibeh marks the site of the ancient *Hazor*.²

"*Benit* appears as the point of a higher and distant table-land." It was from Benit that Mr. Smith and myself obtained a view of the basin of the Hûleh in 1838.³

The travellers left Kedes the next morning, and in half an hour reached the eastern edge of the plain. "It here extended up in a small offset into the eastern hills; but there was no outlet, nor did any appear anywhere. Indeed, this portion seemed the lowest, and was covered in part with water; which however seemed fast drying up. Coming in a few minutes to the eastern declivity of the hills, we ascended a point on the right, which commanded a magnificent view of the whole basin of the Hûleh.

"Our principal object was to discern the course of the rivers; but from this position it could not be determined. They appeared at one point, and disappeared in another; and finally seemed entirely lost in the marsh before entering the lake." Two days afterwards they were informed by an old man resident at Tell el-Kâdy, that the four rivers which enter the Hûleh, viz. that from Baniâs, the Leddân from Tell el-Kâdy, the Hasbâny, and the Derderah from Merj 'Ayûn, all unite below Sâlihiyeh a large encampment of Arabs in the Hûleh, near a cluster of trees. In the afternoon of the same day they crossed the high ground above Abil, on their way to the castle of Shûkif. "This position gave us the most distinct view we had of the rivers of the Hûleh. It produced the conviction of certainty, that the rivers do not continue distinct to the lake. We could clearly see the junction of two of them, the Hasbâny and that from Baniâs, at the point above specified, below Sâlihiyeh; and these form but one stream below that point. I was not sure but that the Hasbâny and Leddân unite a little higher up; but Hasbeiyans well acquainted with the Hûleh assured me afterwards, that the *three* rivers form a junction at the

¹ Bibl. Res. in Palest. III. p. 370.

² See Biblioth. Sac. May 1847, p. 403.

³ See Bibl. Res. in Palest. III. p. 339 sq.

same point, and that it is called *el-Kaiteh*. The Derderah, on the contrary, wanders off towards 'Ain Belâtah, and is lost from the view.

"*Difneh* is a small collection of cabins used by the Arabs for granaries, with a cluster of trees near it, in the direction of the Hûleh, and bearing 202° from Tell el-Kâdy. Our guide, an old man from Bâniâs, thought it had its name from an Arab burying-place in the neighbourhood. The etymology will allow of this; but it seems also to be a resemblance to *Daphne*." Many have supposed this to represent the *Daphne* (Δάφνη) mentioned by Josephus (B. J. 4. 1. 1.). But the reading of Josephus is far more likely to be an error for Δύρη, which is read in Antt. 8. 8. 4; seeing it required but the accidental insertion of a single letter. Josephus too speaks (B. J. 1. c.) of the place as having in it the fountains of the lesser arm of the Jordan; which is not true of *Difneh*. The old Arab's etymology is probably the correct one.

IV. KADESH-BARNEA, "IN THE UTTERMOST BORDER OF EDMOM."

From the northern Kadesh we pass at once to Kadesh Barnea in the southern extremity of Palestine. Since the discovery of the great valley of the 'Arabah by Burckhardt, most commentators and geographers have sought the position of the place somewhere in that valley, not far south of the Dead Sea, "in the uttermost border of Edom," Num. 20: 16. In the *Biblical Researches*,¹ I have assigned the reasons for probably fixing it at the fountain el-Weibeh, or some other fountain not far distant, on the western side of that valley, north-west of Mount Hor and in full view of it, and at the foot of the western mountain by which all the ancient roads from the valley and from Petra and Edom ascended into the south of Judah. Those reasons it is not necessary to repeat here.

In the appendix to the work of Mr. Williams, entitled *The Holy City*, Lond. 1845, is printed a letter from his companion, the Rev. J. Rowlands, who travelled from Gaza through the desert by way of el-Khûlasah (Elussa) and Ruhaibeh to Suez, giving an account of his supposed discovery of a *Kûdes* or Kadesh near his route, and quite in the interior of the desert. Until recently it has seemed to me, that the very fanciful and amusingly credulous character of the whole narrative would put every one upon his guard; and furnish in itself the best exposition of the fallacy of the whole matter. But the idea has since been taken up by Prof. Tuch of Leipzig, as falling in with a theory of his own on another topic;² and his article has been translated by Prof. Davidson, and published in England.³ Winer, also, in the new edition of his *Realwörterbuch* (art. *Kadesh*)

¹ II. p. 533, 610.

² Zeitschr. der D. Morgenl. Gesellsch. I. p. 179.

³ Kitto's Journ. of Sac. Lit. July 1848. p. 90.

adopts the same view, relying on the supposed identity of the name. Hence it has become worth while to bring the matter to the test of examination.

Mr. Rowlands appears in his writings, and is described by those who know him, as a very amiable man; but fanciful, visionary, and full of credulity. A letter written some years ago mentioned respecting him the following incident: "He said, that in passing Mount Carmel he observed a tumulus, as to which he at once conjectured that it covered the remains of Baal's prophets (1 K. 18: 40); and on inquiring of his Arab guides, he was assured that it was a fact! And his eyes glistened as he proceeded to tell of several other like things he had discovered in those parts. His letter in Williams's Appendix, is a tissue of moonshine." After this, no one can wonder that he should have found Kadesh, his "much-talked-of, and long-sought-for Kadesh," to his "entire satisfaction!"

Mr. Rowlands went first from Gaza to Khūlaah; in which he thinks he finds the ancient *Chesil*; though very few now question its identity with *Elusa*. From thence to Ruhaibeh his route was of course the same with that of Mr. Smith and myself in 1838, in the opposite direction. A quarter of an hour before coming to Ruhaibeh, he found an ancient site, "only a few traces of a city, pottery, etc." called *Sepāta*; this he holds to be the ancient *Zephath* or Hornah. We passed over the same ground, but neither saw nor heard of any such place; and, most assuredly, Mr. Rowlands heard no such name, for the word *Sepāta* is an impossible one in Arabic; that language not having the sound of *p*. Ruhaibeh itself, he "has not the slightest doubt whatever," is the *Rehoboth* of Gen. 26: 22. I had already pointed out the identity of the name; but with the remark, which still holds good, that Isaac's Rehoboth was simply a well with no mention of a city, and was situated apparently, according to the context, much further north.¹

In ten hours with camels from Ruhaibeh Mr. R. came to el-Muweileh, a brackish fountain in a Wady of the same name. This is a usual station on the direct route between Sinai and Gaza; but lies a little west of our route; though it is mentioned by us and inserted on our map.² The name *el-Muweileh* is a common one in Arabic, and signifies "salt places." Mr. R. writes it *Moilāhhi*, and finds in it nothing less than Hagar's *Beer-lahai-roi* of Gen. 16: 14. He "has no doubt about it whatever;" and "the grand settling point is its present name;" that is to say, the Hebrew *Beer* (well) has been changed into Arabic *Moi* (water); and then of course *lāhhi* corresponds to the *lahai-roi* of the Hebrew! This is the proof; and such is the philology in which we are invited to put faith.

¹ Bibl. Res. in Pal. I. p. 291.

² Bibl. Res. in Pal. I. p. 281, 561.

The next place is the Kadesh in question. "The water of Kādés or Kūdés, called 'Ain Kādés, lies about twelve miles (or four and a half hours by camel) to the E. S. E. of Moilāhhi." Where then is this Kūdés? The reader, perhaps, will be surprised to learn, that the spot here pointed out is mentioned both by Seetzen and in the text of the Biblical Researches, and is inserted on our map. If he will turn to the map he will find marked, in that direction and about that distance from el-Muweileh, a fountain called '*Ain el-Kudeirāt* ; it is a little east of our route, and is described by us according to the accounts of the Arabs.¹ The *Kudeirāt* are a tribe or clan of Arabs in this region, who water their flocks at this fountain, and sometimes also as far north as Beersheba.² Seetzen lodged at one of their encampments.³ The conclusion is inevitable, that the name *Kūdés* as here presented by Mr. Rowlands is the mere blunder of a tyro in Arabic for *el-Kudeirāt* ; nor is it to be wondered at in one who could first make *Moilāhhi* out of *Muweileh*, and then form it into the representative of *Beer-lahai-roi*.

As therefore the whole hypothesis of a Kadesh in this place rests upon the supposed identity of name ; and the said name is thus shown to be a mere blunder ; it might perhaps be sufficient to let the matter rest here. There are however certain other considerations bearing so strongly upon the point in question, independently of any name, that it may not be labour-lost briefly to present them.

1. We read in Ex. 13: 17, that in the exodus of the Israelites out of Egypt, "God led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near ; for God said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return into Egypt : but God led the people about through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea." The object of this circuitous route was to avoid the Philistines ; and therefore in approaching Palestine they came first to Kadesh. Now if Kadesh was at 'Ain el-Kudeirāt, or anywhere in that region, then the direct and usual route from it into Palestine is and always was by way of Beersheba. But this would have brought the Israelites directly along side of the Philistines ; and thus have frustrated the very purpose for which God led them by so great a circuit. Besides, if here was to be the point of their approach to the Promised Land, they might just as well have taken the route of Jacob when he went down from Beersheba to Egypt ; and the whole circuit, and the visit to Kadesh itself, were unnecessary and without purpose.

2. In Num. 20: 16, Kadesh is described as "in the uttermost borders of

¹ Bibl. Res. I. p. 280.

² Bibl. Res. II. p. 619.

³ Ritter, Erdk. XIV. p. 837 sq.

Edom." Now, at that time, as all agree, the territory of Edom was limited to the mountains on the east of the 'Arabah. At a later period, indeed, in and after the exile, when the Nabatheans from the east pressed upon the Edomites, the latter passed over and took possession of the south of Judah as far as to Hebron; where they were afterwards subdued and incorporated with the Jews.¹ But in the time of Moses they had no territory west of the 'Arabah; otherwise, the Israelites in journeying three times between Kadesh and Ezion-geber must have passed twice through Edom; which we know was not permitted.—It follows, that if Kadesh was at 'Ain el-Kudeirât, it lay more than forty miles distant from any part of Edom; and was therefore in no sense "in its uttermost border."

3. According to the scriptural account, both the spies and the Israelites in entering the Promised Land from Kadesh, had immediately to ascend a mountain.² If Kadesh was at 'Ain el-Webeh or in the vicinity, all this is a natural and exact representation; since the ascent from the great valley begins immediately back of that fountain. But if Kadesh be sought at 'Ain el-Kudeirât or anywhere in that region, the language of Scripture is wholly inapplicable. The tract between the latter spot and Beersheba is an open rolling country; there are swells, but no mountain, to be crossed; and none to be ascended until we reach the mountains of Palestine proper on the north of Beersheba towards Hebron; a distance from 'Ain el-Kudeirât of about sixty miles, or four days' march for troops.

4. While at Kadesh the Israelites sought permission from the king of Edom to pass through his territory, in order to shorten their journey around the Dead Sea; and when this was refused, they "turned away," and "journeyed unto Mount Hor," Num. 20: 14—22. If Kadesh was at or near 'Ain el-Webeh, all this again is easy and natural. Over against that spot is the broad Wady el-Ghuweir, affording an easy ascent into the land of Edom; while in the south-east towers the lonely summit of Mount Hor, toward which they "turned away," and at whose base they encamped after a day's march. But if they were at 'Ain el-Kudeirât when the refusal of Edom came, they did not "turn away" at all; but, in proceeding to Mount Hor, they marched for at least three days, through a mountainous and pathless region, in precisely the direction they must have taken had Edom granted their request. But as "Edom came out against them with much people, and with a strong hand," such a march is hardly supposable.

5. The testimony of Eusebius and Jerome, if it does not serve definitely to fix Kadesh at 'Ain el-Webeh, is yet wholly inconsistent with any position of it on the high desert west of the 'Arabah. In the Ono-

¹ See Bibl. Res. II. p. 557 sq.

² Num. 13: 17. 14: 44, 45. Deut. 1: 24, 41.

masticon, art. *Cades*, they write as follows: Euseb. *Κάδδης Βαρνή, ἔρημος ἢ παρατείνουσα Πέτρα πόλει τῆς Παλαιστίνης*. Jerome, translating and correcting: "*CADES, ubi fons est judicii, et CADESBARNE in deserto quae conjungitur civitati Petrae in Arabia.*" Also in art. *Barne*; Euseb. *Βαρνή, αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ Κάδδης Βαρνή ἐν ἐρήμῳ τῇ παρατείνουσῃ Πέτρα πόλει*. Jerome: "*BARNE, haec ipsa est, quae et Cades Barne in deserto, quod extenditur usque ad urbem Petram.*" Again in his Comm. on Gen. 14: 7, Jerome writes: "*Significat locum apud Petram, qui fons judicii nominatur, id est Cades.*"—At that time Kadesh was a known place; for both Eusebius and Jerome speak of the sepulchre of Miriam as still shewn there in their day. It must have been situated on the route between Hebron and Petra.

NOTE. It may not be out of place to mention, that the name Kadesh under different forms has been not unfrequently found of late years. So Mr. Rowlands says that el-Muweileh is also sometimes called 'Moi-lāhbi Kadēsah;' from which I infer that it may occasionally be known as 'el-Muweileh el-Kudeirāt,' i. e. as a watering place of the Kudeirāt. Messrs. Williams and Rowlands, also, when at a point of the high ground some hours west of the Tell of Madūrah, and overlooking the south-western part of Wady Fikreh, had pointed out to them "some hours to the west, in a valley, the site of *Kaddese*, the Kadesh of Scripture." Now this could hardly have been 'Ain el-Kudeirāt, the Kādēs of Mr. Rowlands;' which is at least thirty miles distant from their position on an air line, and towards the south-west. Bertou likewise says he found 'Kadessa' (Kadesh) at the Tell of Madūrah itself.¹ Earlier than all these, Seetzen speaks of a dry 'Wady el-Kdeis,' on his route between Gaza and Sinai; but it is difficult to fix the locality of it. At an encampment of the 'Azāzimeh the Wady and fountain el-'Ain were described to him as lying a few hours towards the east; and from thence he travelled one and a half hour on the usual road from Hebron to Suez, before reaching Wady el-Kdeis. This would seem to place it some fifteen or twenty miles south-west of el-'Ain. At any rate the Wady can have no relation to Mr Rowland's 'Kādēs;' nor has any one else heard of the like name in that quarter.²

V. POSITION OF THE ISRAELITES AT SINAI.

A discussion has of late years sprung up, not only in respect to Sinai itself, but likewise respecting the position which the people of Israel must have occupied before the mount. This latter point has been brought into consideration only in recent times; the earlier travellers and writers appear never to have thought of it.

¹ Bibl. Res. II. p. 662.

² See Ritter XIV. p. 839 sq.

The decision of both these questions, so far as they can be decided at all, must have reference to and depend upon the specifications in the 19th chapter of Exodus. The verses which have a bearing upon the points before us, are the following:

V. 10. And the Lord said unto Moses, Go unto the people, and sanctify them to-day and to-morrow, and let them wash their clothes, (11) and be ready against the third day: for the third day the Lord will come down in the sight of all the people upon mount Sinai. (12) And thou shalt set bounds unto the people round about, saying, Take heed to yourselves that ye go not up into the mount, or touch the border of it: whosoever toucheth the mount shall be surely put to death. (13) There shall not a hand touch it, but he shall be surely stoned or shot through: whether it be beast or man, it shall not live.

V. 16. And it came to pass on the third day in the morning, that there were thunders and lightnings and a thick cloud upon the mount. . . . (17) And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God; and they stood at the nether part of the mount. . . . (21) And the Lord said unto Moses, Go down charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze, and many of them perish. . . . (23) And Moses said unto the Lord, The people cannot come up to mount Sinai: for thou chargedst us, saying, Set bounds about the mount, and sanctify it.

Chap. 20: 15. And all the people saw the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it, they removed and stood afar off.

In this language there are implied *three* specifications, or particulars, which must all be present in any spot answering to the true Sinai:

1. A mountain-summit, overlooking the place where the people stood.
2. Space sufficient, adjacent to the mountain, for so large a multitude to stand and behold the phenomena on the summit.
3. The relation between this space where the people stood and the base of the mountain must be such, that they could approach and stand at "the nether part of the mount;" that they could also touch it; and that, further, bounds could appropriately be set around the mount, lest they should go up into it or touch the border of it.

Let us now apply these tests to some of the leading hypotheses.

Jebel Serbâl, which has recently been very strenuously and ingeniously put forward by Lepsius as the true Sinai, is at once excluded by its utter want of adaptedness in the *second* and *third* particulars. According to the special map of Lepsius himself, and the description of Mr. Bartlett, there is no place near that mountain where a multitude could stand or even approach the base.¹

In like manner Jebel Kâtherin, proposed by Rüppell, is excluded, and for the like reasons. For although a large multitude might by possibility

¹ See Lepsius *Reise nach der Sinai*, spec. Map. Bartlett *Forty Days in the Desert*, p. 54 sq.

be congregated in the valleys either on the east or on the west of this mountain ; yet its base is so irregular and shelving, and extends so far, that the circumstances required in the third particular are wholly wanting.

There remains the isolated ridge of Sinai, strictly so called at the present day ; having on its southern end the peak of Jebel Mûsa with an open region towards the south-east, and at its northern end the lower summit es-Sûfsâfeh impending over the plain er-Râhah. The question is narrowed down to this, viz. On which of these two summits was the Divine glory manifested, and on which of the tracts below did the people stand ?

In 1838 the Rev. Eli Smith and myself spent a day in visiting and exploring the ridge of Sinai, in reference to this very question. We ascended both Jebel Mûsa and es-Sûfsâfeh ; though Lepsius, who must have read our account very cursorily, represents us as unable to climb the latter. We had no prejudices to warp our minds in any direction ; not even the poor motive of desiring to differ from our predecessors ; for at that time the question had never been put forward. After full and earnest consideration, the conviction forced itself upon us both, that all the particulars and circumstances above enumerated, existed very strikingly in connection with es-Sûfsâfeh and the plain er-Râhah ; but did not thus exist in respect to Jebel Mûsa and the tract on the south. In the former case, the naked and perpendicular mountain, impending over the plain at the height of twelve or fifteen hundred feet, and rising abruptly from its base, so that one may approach and touch it ; the plain itself shut in like an *adytum* by stern mountains, and enlarged by a recess on the west and by the opening of Wady esh-Sheikh on the east ; these satisfied all the conditions of the question ; and the language of Scripture, as applied to them, became singularly descriptive and beautiful. As the southern summit (Jebel Mûsa) is not visible from any part of the northern plain, we felt that if the people stood in er-Râhah, then Jebel Mûsa could not be assumed as the place of the celestial phenomena ; because Scripture describes these as having been manifested "in the sight of all the people ;" Ex. 19: 11. 20: 18. The observations and measurements made by us, as well as our conclusions, are fully described in the Biblical Researches.¹

It has not as yet been denied, I believe, that the statements on which our conclusion was based as to the northern summit and plain, were correct ; nor that there is, in all the circumstances, a very striking correspondence to the specifications of Scripture. But yet there attaches to Jebel Mûsa such an idea of veneration, either as a higher summit or as the seat of tradition, that many are still desirous to regard it as the scene

¹ Vol. I. p. 130, 140 sq. 154 sq. 157 sq.

of God's wonders and the giving of the law. To this end the place of the people has been sought in the tract on the south of that mountain. Laborde, in his *Commentaire Géographique* published in 1841, was the first distinctly to propose this view; and he gives a plan of the southern tract, but so distorted and incorrect that no one would ever recognize it. Other travellers have examined the ground with more care, as Mr. Kellogg in 1844, and Strauss and Krafft in 1845; and, on the report of the latter, Ritter in his great work¹ has adopted the same view. They have doubtless established,—what no one has ever called in question,—the *possibility* of a standing-place for the Israelites in that quarter. At the same time they appear to me to have overlooked several circumstances, which militate strongly against the *probability* of such a position; circumstances, too, which leave the third particular or test above specified wholly out of view. The weight of Ritter's authority gives an importance to the subject, which it would not otherwise possess.

As to Jebel Mûsa itself: If its claim is supposed to rest on its greater elevation, then we ought rather at once to assume Jebel Kâtherin, which is much loftier. If it depends on tradition, then it remains to be shown that there is any tradition at all reaching back beyond the fourth or fifth century. The Scriptures afford no evidence that the later Jews had any tradition on the subject. The flights of steps and the many inscriptions on and around Jebel Serbâl are supposed to indicate, that this mountain was at one time regarded as the true Sinai. When too the angels bore the dead body of St. Catherine to this peninsula, it may be supposed that they intended to deposit it in the most sacred place; and if so, then Jebel Kâtherin was at that time regarded as the holy mount. Indeed, there is nothing which definitely connects tradition with the present Sinai, before the establishment of the convent by Justinian in A. D. 527.

In respect to the application of the three particulars, above specified, to Jebel Mûsa, there is here of course the mountain, and also space before it on the south-east sufficient for all the people. But as to the *third* particular,—and this is the point I wish to bring out,—it may well be doubted, whether the relation between this space and the foot of the mountain is such, that bounds may be supposed to have been necessary, lest the people should *approach* and *touch* the mount. It is just this point, which those who adopt this view seem to me to have overlooked.

Mr. Smith and myself sat for hours upon the summit of Jebel Mûsa examining this very question in all its bearings. And I suppose it will be admitted, that, from whatever part or tract there is a view of the mountain from below, there will be an equally full view of that tract from the summit above. There is visible in the south-east the head of Wady es-

¹ Erdkunde, Th. XIV.

Sebâ'yeh, spreading itself as a narrow plain (Burckhardt calls it here a broad Wady, p. 539, er-Râhah he calls a plain, p. 596;) among what appeared to us as naked gravel hills; which, however, Mr. Kellogg says are *granite* hills. There is also the similar bend of another valley, Wady el-Wa'rah, running south-east, towards the gulf of 'Akabah. But let the space in these heads of vallies be larger or smaller,—and I think it has been not a little exaggerated,—there were two main reasons which led us to believe, that this was not the position occupied by the Israelites before the mount; viz. *first*, the distance from the base of the mountain, which at the nearest point cannot be much (if any) less than half a mile, and for the most part is much more; and *secondly*, the rough and impassable character of the intervening ground, consisting of abrupt, gravelly (or, still better, *granite*) hills, accumulated apparently around the base in irregular masses of low broken cliffs, precluding all idea of easy approach, or of the setting of bounds.

This general view appeared to us so convincing, that we neglected to examine more particularly the immediate base of Sinai on this side. But it has since come to light that there is here a deep ravine between the mountain proper and the low adjacent cliffs, completely separating them and the open ground beyond from the mountain; thus demonstrating still more strongly the correctness of our view. Such a valley Ritter infers (p. 592) from the language of Schimper, who speaks of passing in his botanical excursions quite around the ridge of Sinai, by following several irregular vallies with only some hills between. It is, however, most fully described by Mr. Kellogg in the *Literary World*, of Feb. 19, 1848; accompanied by a sketch on wood, which is “inaccurate,” as he admits, and is also greatly exaggerated.

Mr. K. had ascended for about five hundred feet the *south-western* face of the Mountain of the Cross or Jebel ed-Deir, in order to obtain a good view of the peak of Sinai, which he was anxious to sketch.

“Here,” he says, “close at my right, arose, almost perpendicularly, the holy mountain. . . . Clinging around its base was a range of sharp, upheaving crags from one to two hundred feet in height, which formed an almost impassable barrier to the mountain itself from the valley adjoining. *These crags were separated from the mountain by a deep and narrow gorge; yet they must be considered as forming the projecting base of Sinai* [?] * * *

“I remained at work until nearly sunset, when I discovered people coming towards me through the deep ravine between the mountain of Sinai and the craggy spurs which shoot up around its base. I feared they might prove to be unfriendly Arabs; but, as they came nearer, I discovered them to be my companions and their guides, who were returning from Mount St. Catherine.” * * *

Returning the next day, with a companion, he says: “From Wady es-Sebâ'yeh, we crossed over the granite spurs, in order to pass around the southern border of Sinai into Wady Leja. These spurs are of sufficient size to have separate names

among the Arabs. Around them were generally deep and rugged gorges and ravines or water-courses whose sides were formed of ledges of granite nearly perpendicular. . . . Whilst crossing over these low hills, my friend pointed out the path between them and Sinai, through which he had passed yesterday on his return from St. Catherine. . . . This ravine around Sinai becomes a deep and impassable gorge, with perpendicular walls, as it enters Wady Leja, passing through the high neck connecting Sinai with the mountain on the south. Descending into el-Leja, under the rocky precipice of Sinai, we found the Wady narrow and choked up with huge blocks of granite, which had tumbled from the sides of the adjacent mountains. We could now see the olive-grove of the deserted convent el-Arbain."

Had Ritter been acquainted with the nature of the ground and the ravine here described ; and especially could he have stood for half an hour on the summit of Jebel Mûsa ; I cannot help thinking, that the authority of his great name would hardly have been given to the view in question.

One other point may be noticed. It would appear from the language of Scripture, that Moses ascended the mountain in the presence of the people ; and the bounds were set (in part) lest the people should "go up into" the mount (Ex. 19: 12, 20, 24). Now on its southern side the peak of Jebel Mûsa is perfectly inaccessible ; and it can be ascended only from near the convents in the vallies on each side, out of sight of any space on the south. But from er-Râlah, a ravine leading up through the steep face of es-Sûsâfeh, affords a way of ascent directly in sight of the whole plain. This is not improbably the *Derb el-Serîh* of Pococke.¹

ARTICLE IX.

GREEK INSCRIPTIONS.

[Addressed to one of the Editors.]

Yale College, March 26, 1849,

MY DEAR SIR :—I send you copies of inscriptions transcribed by Mr. Thomson during the tour, his account of which is contained in the *Bib. Sac.* for November 1848. The inscriptions are, I regret to say, unimportant in themselves, and in an extremely corrupt state. They ought however, to be published, as a slight contribution to the epigraphic de-

¹ See Pococke, *Descr. of the East*, I. p. 144. Ritter, *Erdk.* XIV. p. 542.

partment of Greek archaeology. I have added some few corrections or conjectures.

1. Found on the cornice of the sepulchral chamber at Bshindelayeh mentioned under date of Aug. 29th, in the Bih. Sac. Vol. 5. p. 669. The inscription which occurs immediately under the wreath, extends in large letters the entire length of the cornice, and is very plain except where it has been purposely defaced.

ΤΙΚΑΦΙΛΟΚΑΗC ΤΙΚΑΕC ΟCΑΝΔΡΟΝ - ΤΟΝΠΑΤΕΡΑ . ΥΤΟΥΚΑΙΚΑΚΙΠΑ-
ΡΟΥ||| ΤΗΝΜΗΤΕ C ΚΜ||| Κ' . . ΗC ΧΑΡΗ

The fourth letter ought to be Δ; and we have here an abbreviation for *Τιβέριος Κλαύδιος*, which again occurs for the accusatives of the same words. The father's name was perhaps *Σώσανδρος*. With the mother's I can do nothing. The inscription may have run thus: *Τι. Κλ. φιλόηλης Τι. Κλ. Σώσανδρον τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ * * * τὴν μητέρα τιμῆς καὶ μνήμης χάριν*.

2. A few inches beneath this is the following in smaller characters.

ΕΤΟΥC . ԵΓΓΡ . ΜΗΝΟC ΑΥCΤΟΥΡΑC . ΑΝΑΡΕΠΑΥΗΡ . Ե

I seem here to discern *ἔτους 579. μηνὸς Δύστρον ὁ Σώσανδρος . . .*. The year 186, if that be the year, belongs to some aera first used in the Roman times. See Ideler's *Handbuch der Chronol.* Vol. I. 457—476.

3. On a piece of broken cornice belonging to a ruined church at the village of Kokaniyeh. See Mr. Thomson's tour, p. 670.

ΙCΘΕΟCΟΤΕΔΙΩCΑC . .
CΑΓΝΟCΑΝΗΓΙΡΕ . . . Ρ

4. On a pedestal of one of the columns is this:

ΟΥCΓΗΤ
ΝΟCΑΟC

i. e. *ἔτους 579. Μηνὸς Αἰῶν? or Δίου?*

5. From the face of a tomb on Jebel Arbayln near Riha. See p. 673.

+ΕΤΟΥC ΕΤ * ΜΗΝΟΓΛΩΟΥΤ+
ΕΕΛ . ΡΟ . . . ΟΕΤΟΟΕΚΑΙΚΑΝΚΟΛΛΑΙΟΥΕΟΑ * ΡΧΩΝΤΙΟΥΑΙΕΛΤ
ΗΥΤΑΙΑΓΕΡΓΟΝΙΕΥΡ

All following the second cross seems to be in one line, if I understand Mr. Thomson correctly. The date is legible; and towards the end something occurs which looks like *Ἰουλιὰ . . . Γοργω[ω]ρίου*.

6. On another tomb in the same place

▷ ΟΑΙΤΕΝΤ
ΜΑΧΟCΟΕΝΑΝΔΡΟ

7. From the south cornice of a canopy over the fountain at Kefr Lata, mentioned p. 673. The letters are in one line and some of them nearly illegible.

ΥΤΑΙΜΟΛΟΙΑΙΠΠΟΝΗ . . . ΙΟΝΠΕΤΟΥΙΕΝΙΑΙΠΙΝΟΙΕΤΟΥΙΖΥΙΝΑΥ

8. Over the door of a large house at Bara. See p. 676.

+ΚΥΡΦΥΑΖΗΤΝΙΕΔΔΝΕΔΥΚΑΙΤΗΝΕΣΔΔΔΝΑΠΕΤΕ
ΥΝΤΝΚΑΙΛΙΙΙ . . . ΙΟΑΙΩΝΩΝΑΚΙΗΝ

This is Psalm 121: 8, with τῶν αἰώνων for τοῦ αἰῶνος, and ἀμήν following. The same verse is copied by Mr. Thomson from an inscription over another door partly obliterated.

9. "Above the north window of a palace is the following."

ΔΟΣΑΝΙΤΗΡΟΙΕΗΙΙΚΑΙΕΠΙΤΗΠΙΡΗΝΗΝΚΑΙΕΔΙ

This must be Luke 2: 14, as far as ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίαν], with the nouns put into the accusative. But the first part is not clear. After δόξαν there is not room for ἐν ὑψηλοῖς Θεῷ.

10. The following is over a doorway at the same place.

ΝΕΓΑΔΗΗΔΥΝΑΝΙΕΤΗ(ΑΓΙΑ(ΤΡΙΔΟΣ+ΟΚΟΝΙ(ΠΡΙ
CΚΟΕΝΤΟΥΤΩΝΙΚΑ

That is μεγάλη ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος. + ὁ Κομης Πρίσκος. ἐν τούτῳ νῆα. Count Priscus lived after Constantine, perhaps a great while after.

11. Near the modern village at the same place.

ΕΤΟΥ(ΗΚΨΑΗΙΚΟΥ(ΗΜΧΟCΕΤΡΑ

This is probably ετους η, κ, ψ. Ξαντικου μηνός [ετρα?] II of the inscription is probably N and T joined together. The Macedonian month Xanthicus is also written not unfrequently with α (see Bergk's Beiträge zur Griech. Monatskunde, p. 54), and also with ζ, comp. Boeckh Corp. inscr. Vol. 3. No. 4672. The name of the month usually follows μηνός.

12. On two sides of a large cross upon a coffin occurs Psalm 91: 9, second clause, and 10, which it is unnecessary to copy.

13. In the porch within one of the gates of the castle at Salamiyeh, copied by Dr. De Forest. See p. 682.

ΑΙΒΙΤΕΝΚΕΠΡΟ
(Γ?)ΙΙΙΕΙΜΙΟΘΕΟΕΑ
ΓΑΚΙΑΚΙΙΙΒΟΘΕ<
(ΙΙΙ?)>ΙΙΙΥΝΟΥΤΝΕΚΡΗΝΤΟ

This stone must have been broken in two nearly in a direction down-

warda. The first line is unintelligible. The rest is the passage occurring in Matt. 22: 32. Mark 12: 26. Luke 20: 37, 38, somewhat abridged. It stood thus probably: *ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσ[ε]άκ, Ἰακώβ, ὁ Θεὸς θῶς ζώντων, οὐ νεκρῶν.* [το?]

14. The following is on the base of a column outside of the gate of Salamiyeh.

ΤΙΚΑΛΗΕΠ
 ΤΑΝΤΟΥΟΙ
 ΩΤΑΤΟΤΗΕ
 ΠΙΟΝΙΕΠΠΙΟΙ
 ΚΕΚΥΡΟΥΙ
 ΚΟΝΟΝΟΥΤΕ
 ΓΟΝΕΝ

This appears to be a Christian inscription. Although a number of words can be made out, I have nothing satisfactory to offer in explanation of it. I submit the following reading of the inscription in the hope that it may lead some one on a better track.

ἡ καλὴ . . . τοῦ ὁσιωτάτου. τὸ ἔργον Σεργίου καὶ Κύρου οἰκονόμου γέγονεν.

15. An inscription on a block of marble found near the castle of Sheizar (Seidjar, Burckhardt). This block was dug up by Burckhardt, and he has given the inscription in his travels in Syria, p. 146. It has been transferred to Boeckh's Corpus, Vol. 3. p. 224, No. 4477. Mr. Thomson's apograph is almost precisely like Burckhardt's.

16. Found at ed-Deisunlyeh (on a sarcophagus) by Dr. De Forest. Bib. Sac. p. 690.

+ ΕΑΜΒΕΑΛΩΠΡ(ς) ΑΡΧΕΜΑΝΔΡ

i. e. *Σαμου(ὶ)λ . . . ὁ Ἀρχεμανδρ[ίτης].*

On the cover under a cross, the lower angles of which contain the letters Α ω, is the following inscription.

ΓΑΙΔΗΠΑ
 Ν . . ΓΡ
 ΠΡΩΕΚΑΝ

17. Found at Ksair el-Gharb. See Bib. Sac. p. 692.

ΕΩΕΙΕ
 ΝΓΙΝΔΙΩ
 ΙΜΑΧΩΑΥ
 Ι. ΠΕCΑΙ
 ΓΤΕΥΕΖΑ
 ΜΗΙ-ΧΗΤΙΤ
 ΡΕΙΤ. ΡΤ

I seem to read here something like this: *Σωσιγένην Ἀνσιμάχου . . . ἀπέθανεν ἔτους ΖΧ (?) μηνὸς Περ(ε)ιτου.* The fact that the first word is tolerably well made out, and in the accusative, throws doubt on the rest. I believe that *ἐτελεύτα* is the usual word on inscriptions and not *ἀπέθανεν*.

18. From the base of a statue at Judeithab, a small village at the foot of Jebel Knisch, copied by Dr. De Forest.

IVNONI. REGINAE
PROSALVTE. IMP. CAES. T.
AETI. HADRIANI. ANTONI
NIAVG. PII. P. LIBERO
RVM. QVE. EIVS. BABICA
IVS. FI. CEMFILVSFRATES
EX. ESTAMENTOPETIII
ELVCIAE. MATRIS. EOR.

The necessary corrections are almost too evident to be noticed, viz. AELI in line 3, BALBICANVS in line 5, ET for FI and FRA TRES line 6, supply T line 7, and read PETILIAE line 7.

19. The following was copied at "Kusr Wady, Hummara, Anti-Lebanon," by Dr. De Forest.

ΑΑΩΘΤΗ ΗΔΙΟCAXCITYXΗΑΙ
ΕΠΑΒΩΘΕΟΥC ΔΙΝΑΡΙΟΥΑΡΧΙΕΡΕΩΕΕ
ΑΤΡΗΔΙΟΙΒΑΡΕΑΔΑCΦΙΔΙΗΟΥCΚΑΙΟΚΒΕΟCΟΚΒΕΟ
ΚΑΙΒΗΡΥΔΑΟCΑΒΡΩΕΟΥCΚΑΙΑΕΙΑΝΗCΓΕΡΜΑΝΟ
ΚΑΙΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙCΑΒΙΜΕΟΥCΚΑΙΒΕΕΔΙΑΚΟCΔ
ΕΠΕΜΕΛΗΤΕΑΠΟΚΩΜΗCΑΙΝΚΑΙΙΗΑCΕΚΤΙCΑΝΤ

"Two or three letters are wanting at the end of the last line. The *II* over the third line was so in the original." Dr. De Forest expresses doubt respecting letters 5 and 14 of line 1, letter 5 of line 2, letter 21 of line 3, the last letter of line 5, and letters 24 and 25 of line 6.

The latter part of the first line I have not been able to decypher. The rest may have been as follows:

Ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ
Επ' Ἀβωθέους (?) Δεινάρχου (?) ἀρχιερέως,
Ἀνρήλιος Βαρεύλας Φιλίππου, καὶ Ὀκβεος Ὀκβέον,
καὶ Βήρυλλος Ἀβραμέους, καὶ Ἀειάνης Γερμάνου
καὶ Μακεδόνιος Ἀβιμμέους καὶ Βελίακος δ (?)
ἐπιμελήται ὑπὸ κώμης Αἰν Καπῆας (?) ἐκτίσαν τοῦτο, οἱ ἐκτῆσαντο.

This inscription adds to the number of names appearing on Syrian inscriptions Abôthes (if that be the reading), Barealas, Okbeus, Abrames, Aeianes, Abimmes and Beeliacus. The name of the village is uncertain, as Dr. De Forest is in doubt respecting two of the letters. Can *Δ* after

Beelicius denote that he is the fourth in descent bearing the same name? Comp. Γερμανοῦ β', i. e. δ'is, or in other words son of Germanus in Boeckh, No. 4648. Still more strange Syrian names occur in No. 4612 of Boeckh's collection.

In the Bibl. Sacr. for May, 1848, p. 253, the following line occurs in an inscription copied by Mr. Thomson at Ruad.

ΑΙΤΕΟΝΟC ΔΕΚΤΟΙΝΗΘ

In attempting to restore the inscription of which this is a part I failed of ascertaining the name of the legion here mentioned. A little more experience would have led me to what I now see to be the certain emendation in this case, viz. Δ. Σκυθικῆς, i. e. legionis quartae Scythicae. The traces of the letters, as given by Mr. Thomson, are followed nearly throughout, and the fourth legion with the same title, appears from at least one other Greek inscription, to have been stationed at one time in Syria. Comp. Boeckh. 3. No. 4460.

Most sincerely yours,

T. D. WOOLSEY.

ARTICLE X.

NEW PUBLICATIONS AND MISCELLANIES.

LAYARD'S NINEVEH. We wish to preserve on our pages a brief record of the explorations and discoveries of Mr. Layard which are very interesting in themselves and which seem destined to cast no inconsiderable light on the Old Testament Scriptures, as well as on other ancient histories.

Mr. Layard began his labors in Nov. 1845, and closed them in June, 1847. The results are published (English edition) in the best style of London workmanship, in two volumes, large duodecimo, pp. 399, 492. Besides a detailed and very interesting account of the excavations at Nimroud, there is also a narrative of a visit to some of the native Christians of Kurdistan, to the Yezidees (see Bib. Sac. Nov. 1847), and of several excursions among the surrounding tribes of Arabs. The narrative proper closes at the 149th page of Vol. II. The remainder of the second volume, about 330 pages, is devoted to a series of remarks on the Ancient History of Assyria, the Semitic origin of the people, the architecture, and other arts, military system, manners and private life, religion, etc.

The conquest of Nineveh by Cyaxares, the Persian, is satisfactorily ascertained as having occurred about 606 or 607 B. C. It will be readily admitted, says Mr. L., that all the monuments hitherto discovered in Assyria are to be attributed to a period preceding the Persian conquest, for among the Assyrian ruins no trace has been found of the Persian variety of the cuneiform character, which is so common on the monuments in Persia and Armenia. Had the kings, who erected the edifices at Nimroud been Persians, they would hardly have failed to record their deeds in their native tongue. To what period anterior to 606 B. C. the monuments at Nimroud belong, is not yet determined. Several individuals are now earnestly engaged in deciphering the inscriptions which have been brought to light. The cuneiform character has been divided into three branches, the Assyrian or Babylonian, the Persian, and the Median. To one of these three divisions, may be referred all the forms of arrow-headed writing with which we are acquainted. The three together occur in the trilingual inscriptions, containing the records of the Persian monarchs of the Achaemenian dynasty. "Several proper names in these trilingual inscriptions, particularly those of kings and countries, have given us the undoubted value of many letters, and have enabled us to find corresponding geographical names on the Assyrian monuments." Mr. Layard informs us in a note that "Major Rawlinson has succeeded in deciphering the inscription on the obelisk found at Nimroud. It contains, according to him, the annals of the reign of the son of Ninus. He has obtained, moreover, fifteen royal names. From several arguments and facts, Mr. L. comes to the conclusion, that on the most moderate calculation, we may assign a date of 1100 or 1200 years B. C. to the erection of the most ancient palace at Nimroud, but the probability is that it is much more ancient." The general conclusions which are drawn, are as follows: 1st, that there are buildings in Assyria which so far differ in their sculptures, in their mythological and sacred symbols, and in the character and language of their inscriptions, as to lead to the inference that there were at least two distinct periods of Assyrian history. 2d. That the names of the kings on the monuments show a lapse even of some centuries, between the foundation of the most ancient and the most recent of the edifices. 3d. That from the symbols introduced into the sculptures of the second Assyrian period, and from the Egyptian character of the small objects found in the earth, above the ruins of the buildings of the *oldest* period, there was a close connection with Egypt, either by conquest or friendly intercourse, between the time of the erection of the earliest and latest palaces; and that the monuments of Egypt, the names of kings in certain Egyptian dynasties, the ivories from Nimroud, the introduction of several Assyrian divinities into the Egyptian pantheon, and other evidence, point to the 14th century B. C. as the

probable time of the commencement, and the 9th as the period of the termination of that intercourse. 4th. That the earlier palaces of Nimroud were already in ruins, and buried before the foundation of the later; and that it is probable they may have been thus destroyed about the time of the 14th Egyptian dynasty. 5th. That the existence of two distinct dynasties in Assyria, and the foundation, about 2000 B. C., of an Assyrian monarchy, may be inferred from the testimony of the most ancient authors and in accordance with the evidence of Scripture, and of Egyptian monuments.

The following are Mr. Layard's conclusions in regard to the site of ancient Nineveh. Strabo says that the city stood between the Tigris and the Lycus or Great Zab, near the junction of these rivers. Ptolemy places it on the Lycus. These notices would identify it with the ruins at Nimroud. Strabo makes the area of the city larger than even that of Babylon. Diodorus makes it a quadrangle of 150 stadia on the two longest sides, and 90 on the opposite, the square being 480 stadia, or about 60 miles. Jonah calls it an "exceeding great city of three days' journey," and the number of people who did not know their right hand from their left, was 120,000; if this number formed one fifth of the population, the whole number would be 600,000. The evidence afforded by the examination of all the known ruins of Assyria seems to identify Nimroud with Nineveh. From its close proximity to the junction of two large rivers, no better site could have been chosen. It is probable that the great edifice, in the north-west corner of the principal mound, was the temple or palace, or the two combined, the smaller houses being scattered around it over the face of the country. To the palace was attached a park or paradise for the preservation of game. Perhaps this enclosure, formed by walls and towers, may be still traced in the line of low mounds branching out from the main ruins. Succeeding monarchs erected the centre palace at the side of the first. As the people increased, the dimensions of the city increased also. A king, founding a new dynasty, or solicitous for fame by erecting a new palace, may have chosen a distant site. The city, gradually spreading, may at length have embraced such additional palaces. The son of the founder of Nimroud seems to have added a second palace in the centre of the mound, also the edifice at the great mound of Baasheikha, as the inscriptions on the bricks prove, and to have founded a new city at Kalah Sherghat. A succeeding monarch added to the palaces at Nimroud, and recorded the event on the pavement slabs. At a much later period, when the older palaces were already in ruins, edifices were erected on the sites now marked by the ruins of Khorsabad and Karamles. The son of the founder of the last two, built the great palace at Kouyunjik, more magnificent than any of the earlier palaces. His son raised one

more edifice at Nimroud. The city had now attained the dimensions stated in the book of Jonah and by Diodorus. From Nimroud up the Tigris to the northern extremity of Kouyunjik, is about eighteen miles; from Nimroud to Karamles on the east, about twelve miles; from the latter to Khorsabad on the north-east is eighteen; and from the last point to Kouyunjik, about twelve. The circumference would make the 60 miles of the geographer and the three days' journey of the prophet. Within this space, there are now many large mounds, including the principal ruins in Assyria. The face of the country is strowed with the remains of pottery, brick, and other fragments. The space between the great public edifices was probably occupied by private houses, standing in the midst of gardens or arable lands. Besides the vast number of small mounds everywhere visible, scarcely a husbandman drives his plough over the soil, without exposing the vestiges of former habitations. Each quarter of the city may have had its distinct name. Thus the Mespila and Larissa of Xenophon seem to have been applied respectively to the ruins at Kouyunjik and Nimroud.

Existing ruins thus show, in Mr. L.'s opinion, that Nineveh acquired its greatest extent in the time of the kings of the second dynasty; that is to say, of the kings mentioned in Scripture. The earliest Assyrian habitations were probably but one story in height. When it became necessary to make temples and palaces more conspicuous, artificial mounds were raised, there being no natural eminences. The mound was regularly and systematically built of sun-dried bricks. On this platform, thirty or forty feet high, the royal or sacred edifice was built. The plains and the low lands between the Tigris and the hill country, abound in a kind of coarse alabaster or gypsum. Large masses everywhere protrude in low ridges from the alluvial soil, or are exposed in the gullies formed from winter torrents. It is easily worked, and its color and transparent appearance are agreeable to the eye. This alabaster, cut into large slabs, was used in the public buildings. The walls of the chambers, from five to fifteen feet thick, were first made of sun-dried bricks. The alabaster slabs were used as panels. They were placed upright against the walls, care being first taken to cut on the back of each an inscription, recording the name, title, and descent of the king undertaking the work. They were kept together, and held in their places by iron, copper, or wooden cramps and plugs. The cramps were in the form of double dove-tails, and fitted into corresponding grooves in two adjoining slabs. The subjects were designed and sculptured and the inscriptions carved *after* the slabs had been fixed. The principal entrances to the chambers were formed by gigantic winged bulls and lions with human heads. The smaller doorways were guarded by colossal figures of divinities or priests. No remains of doors, gates, or

hinges were discovered ; but it is probable that the entrances were provided with them. On all the slabs forming entrances, in the oldest palace of Nimroud, were marks of a black fluid, resembling blood, which appeared to have been daubed on the stone. The slabs used as panelling to the walls of unbaked brick, rarely exceeded twelve feet in height, and in the earliest palace of Nimroud were not generally more than nine, while the lions and bulls, forming the doorways, vary from ten to sixteen. Even these colossal figures did not complete the height of the room ; the wall being carried some feet above them. This upper wall was built either of baked bricks, richly colored, or of sun-dried bricks covered by a thin coat of plaster, on which were painted various ornaments. In some cases, the colors had lost little of their original freshness. The roof was probably formed by beams, supported entirely by the walls ; smaller beams, planks, or branches of trees, were laid across them, and the whole was plastered on the outside with mud. There is no evidence that an arch or vault was thrown from wall to wall. The narrowness of the chambers in all the edifices at Nimroud, with one exception, is remarkable. The hall may have been entirely open to the sky, but this could hardly have been the case with the other chambers. The great narrowness of all the rooms compared with the length, seems to prove that the Assyrians had no means of constructing a roof requiring other support than that furnished by the side-walls. The most elaborately ornamented hall at Nimroud, though above 160 feet in length, was only 35 feet broad. Beams supported by opposite walls may have met in the centre of the ceiling, and this may account for the great thickness of some of the partitions. Remains of beams were found in great quantities at Nimroud, but in a sound state only in one corner. The only trees now in Assyria large enough to span a room 30 or 40 feet wide, are the palm and poplar, both easily decaying.

Among the illustrations of the Bible in these volumes are the following : Embroidered clothes or trappings were frequently thrown over the backs of the chariot horses. " Dedan was thy merchant in precious clothes for chariots." Ez. 27: 20. The horsemen formed a no less important part of the Assyrian army than the horse. " Assyrians clothed in blue, captains and rulers, all of them desirable young men, horsemen riding upon horses." Ez. 23: 6. 1 K. 10: 36. They were armed with bows or long spears : "The horseman lifteth up the glittering spear." Nahum 3: 3. The earliest Assyrian sculptures show that the horses were drawn from the finest models : " Their horses are swifter than the leopards, and more fierce than the evening wolves." Hab. 1: 8. There was a horse especially consecrated to the sun, comp. 2 K. 23: 11. The rarest woods, in which the cedar was conspicuous, were used for the wood work of the cham-

bers: "Ceiled with cedar and painted with vermilion." Jer. 22: 14. The passage Ez. 23: 14, 15, describing the interior of the Assyrian palaces, completely corresponds with and illustrates the monuments of Nimroud and Khorsabad. As Ezekiel lived in Mesopotamia, he had undoubtedly seen the objects which he describes. One of the king's eunuchs usually carried a shield for his use. Goliath had one "bearing his shield, who went before him." 1 Sam. 17: 7. Attempts were made to set fire to the gates of a city by a besieging army by placing torches against them: "Abimelech went hard unto the door of the tower to burn it with fire." Judges 9: 52. In a bas-relief at Khorsabad, captives are led before the king by a rope fastened to rings passed through the lip and nose. "I will put my hook in thy nose and my bridle in thy lips." 2 K. 19: 28. The castles of the maritime people at Kouyunjik are distinguished by the shields hung round the walls. "They hanged their shields upon thy walls round about." Ez. 27: 11. M. Botta states that in letters on the pavement slabs of Khorsabad, traces of copper were still evident, the stone being colored by it. "With an iron pen and lead in the rock forever." Job 19: 24.

In this connection we insert some biblical illustrations furnished by a friend who spent a number of years in Mesopotamia, and Syria: "The language of the Old Testament is not more conformed to the laws of the Hebrew, the style of the New Testament is perhaps not so much in accordance with the best models of the Greek, as is the groundwork of the illustrations in both essentially and fundamentally Syrian, using that word in its largest sense as it occurs in Gen. 25: 20, embracing Mesopotamia as well as the region west of the Euphrates. It is a Syrian sun, a Syrian wilderness, Syrian fruits, and Syrian manners and customs, that look out upon us, from every page. Hence it is to be expected that the Bible will appear more natural and simple to those living amid the scenes which surrounded the holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Not that anything can take the place of that Spirit or compensate for his absence, for without his teaching none can understand. But of all taught by him, those living in the same places once occupied by those through whom he revealed his will, will be better able to enter into the spirit and meaning of those expressions by which it is revealed. If we would fully sympathize with Isaiah, we must roam through the vineyards and olive-groves, the gardens of herbs and the desolate wildernesses that met his eye and were familiar to his thoughts. If we would enter into the sorrows of Jeremiah with an intelligent sympathy, we must move among the famine-stricken inhabitants of lands desolated by the wars, the locusts, and the plagues which still infest the places once watered by his tears and vocal with his cries. While the present inhabitants of Western Asia so easily understand things that can be comprehended by us only after long

and careful study, our faith in the Bible itself is strengthened and refreshed by the incidental testimony thus afforded to the truth of its declarations.

"There is much yet for the most learned scholars of other lands to learn from the unlettered dwellers in Arab tents. This may seem a strong assertion, and though we are not prepared to prove it directly by adding to the stores of Scripture Illustrations, already derived from that source, yet a glance at a race equally rude and unlettered with the Arab, but still further removed from the centre of the scenes of Scripture narrative, may afford some indirect evidence of the fact and urge some other investigator to pursue a path from which we are persuaded that much as has been obtained, there are still rich harvests of information to be gathered in.

"Surely no one will complain that the selection is unfair, if we choose one of the wild denizens of Koordistan as the illustration. A race of men, so savage and unpolished that the very Turks themselves call them wolves (Koorder—Anglicé, Koords), and their country, the land of wolves (Koordistan). So the Turkish New Testament, John 10: 12, reads thus: 'The hireling seeth the Koord coming, and leaveth the sheep and fleeth.' The Koordish shepherd pastures his flocks on the cold, bleak mountains of Koordistan. He is clad in the coarse garments of his native hills; his girdle of leather, his coat of cloth woven from goats' hair, and as is sometimes the case his scull cap of camel's hair, would leave him at no loss to understand the description of the dress of the Forerunner of our Lord, who like himself was a dweller in the desert. His outer garment of homemade felt, though it might not give him a correct idea of the material or the mode of preparation, would yet leave him in no perplexity as to the possibility of a coat's being without seam. This same article of dress, as it serves the double purpose of a cloak by day and bed by night, would lead him into no puzzling conjecture as to the manner in which a man could take up his bed and walk.

"His custom, at certain seasons, of separating the sheep from the goats, would give to that illustration of the Judgment all the force of a familiar scene. The grass on the earthen roof of his humble dwelling, which, nourished by the abundant moisture of spring, promises a rich harvest, under the fierce heat of summer 'withereth afore it groweth up, a striking illustration of the prosperity of the wicked. The writer could not but be impressed with its beauty as, in the month of April, he saw a bird, that had managed by some means to clamber upon the roof, sporting among white and withered grass from which it sought in vain to gather its accustomed meal.

"His household mill, propelled neither by water nor steam, but by the stout arms of the women in the family, two of whom generally labor to-

gether, would afford him a startling idea of the distinction that would take one and leave the other. Besides this, he would be delivered from the blunder of those in other lands, who suppose a woman could lift and throw such a millstone as is used among us, on the head of Abimelech; or that a mass of similar magnitude was ever tied about the neck of a culprit before he was thrown into the sea. The family-quarrels of Abraham or Jacob, only paint to the life the internal broils of the polygamous families of his native village. And the state of Israel without a king, or in the days of Deborah when the highways were deserted and travellers walked through by-ways, only describes the state of society in which he lives. When he reads of the avenger of blood, he might fancy that he read a description of the customs of his own tribesmen, so exactly do they coincide, save that no cities of refuge now open their gates to the shedder of blood. Living as he does in a state of society which compels every village to imitate the fortifications of a walled city, where, in passing through the country, you find them either occupying the top of a hill, with the houses so arranged as to form one continuous wall of defence, or else sleeping under the guardianship of a castle situated on a similar elevation, such expressions as, 'Jehovah is my rock and my fortress, my strength, in whom I will trust, my defence and my high tower,'¹ would express the views of God of all others most precious and consoling. The spear and the shield of the days of David are not the weapons of a past generation, to be found only in the repositories of the curious; but they are his own accustomed weapons, the instruments of his own warfare, even the coat of mail has not become entirely obsolete among his warlike tribes. The timbrels and dances of the danisels of other days, he finds amid the merry-makings of his own native village. He still builds cottages in his vineyards to protect them from the ravages of the bears that to this day infest his native hills. He still treads the wine press so as to stain all his raiment. His old bottles, taken from the goats years ago, are too weak and rotten to withstand the ferment of the fresh juice of the grape, and new ones are provided to meet the new demand. The red pottage of Esau forms a portion of his own daily food. Nor, Koord though he be, is he altogether destitute of that interest in the

¹ "Perhaps no better illustration of the 'high tower' could be found than that of Koomreh Kaliseh, a castle to the north-west of Amadiéh and not far from the Khaboor. It is perched on the very top of a needle-like mountain, one of nature's obelisks, not far from 1000 feet in height. The mountain is entirely isolated from the adjoining range.

"The summit is built up to an artificial level, completely covered by the castle, and it is only by long and tedious stairways cut in and around the solid rock, that the ascent is practicable at all.

"Immense cisterns have been hewn in the rock to supply water for a siege, and it is only by the slow process of a blockade that the castle has ever been taken."

Scriptures which attaches to histories connected with home scenes and familiar localities. The Euphrates and Tigris rise amid the wild recesses of his native mountains. According to a favorite theory of the learned, Eden once bloomed not far from the still lovely shores of the lake of Van. And whether Armenian or Chaldean tradition be regarded, whether Jebel Judi, or that which now bears the name be the true Ararat, they are both on the boundaries of Koordistan. From its mountains he can look down on the native land of Abraham, and it is a chief of his own race who now rules in Khaznaoor, the treasury of Ur, a few hours to the south of the far-famed Nisibis. Still farther south, he overlooks the ancient seats of Nimrod and Sennacherib. In Koordistan lie the bones of the slain of the king of Grecia, when Persia fell before his resistless arms. Perhaps, too, in the little village of Gohava, near the mouth of the Khaboor, he might be disposed to find the Ahava of the fast of Ezra. But the enumeration of all the passages of Scripture illustrated in their household arrangements, their salutations, their customs in the house and by the way, would detain us too long. Let those already enumerated serve for a sample of the rest, while we accompany our shepherd on a journey to Syria, whither he goes to dispose of the increase of his flock. His preparations are soon made. Besides the produce of his flock, two or three goatskins filled with millet or barley meal, hard dry bread and perhaps some nuts and raisins, constitute his provision for the road. These are borne by a donkey as rough and shaggy as himself. So that should he meet with Joseph's brethren on their way to Egypt, it would be 'hail fellows well met;' and should he pass through Gilgal, it would need neither craft nor cunning to present himself at the camp with bread dry and mouldy, ragged garments, and shoes old and clouted, as did the wily Gibeonites in olden time.

"Our Koord, however, goes on no such errand. He only seeks a market for his sheep, among the cities and silk-growers of Syria. Leisurely does he travel with his fleecy charge, and should Esau inquire the reason, he might return the same answer as did his prudent brother. In the morning he rises from his couch on the green hill-side—perhaps he may further resemble Jacob in leaving a stony pillow. He goes before his flock and they follow him, for they know his voice, and therefore, 'my sheep hear my voice and I know them and they follow me,' are to him familiar words. Is the region about him sterile and bare? Driving his donkey before him and his flock running behind him, he hurries forward to more fruitful scenes; perhaps carrying some weakling in his bosom, or less scripturally, fastening it on the donkey amid 'the stuff.' When he reaches more fertile regions, he allows them to lie down in the green pastures and rest, or crop the tender grass. Day after day you may find him leading them by the deep, still waters of the Euphrates, lingering among the trees

planted by the rivers of water, loath to strike out again across the intervening waste. At noontide, shepherd and sheep find shelter under the branches of some spreading walnut tree; or they huddle together under the shadow of some great rock in the more weary land before them. At evening they lie down together; the shepherd taking turns with his companion in watching over their flocks by night.

"Or some hospitable patriarch runs to meet them from the tent door and bows himself and says: 'Behold now, my lords, turn in, I pray you, into your servant's house and tarry all night and wash your feet, for we have both straw and provender enough and room to lodge in.' Between the Euphrates and the plains of the Orontes, he lifts up the stone that is let down into the well's mouth, somewhat on the principle of the glass stopper of a decanter; draws the water with such a leathern bucket as the daughters of Jethro used before him; pours it into such rude stone troughs as might have received it from the hands of Moses and David; and perhaps quarrels with other shepherds, who in modern as well as ancient times seek to monopolize the precious element. So also the Arab herdmen may dispute his title to the pastures through which he passes, as the herdmen of Lot sought to deal with those of Abraham.

"At any rate he will find no cause to complain that the treatment Israel received at the hand of Edom and the Amorite on their journey to the same land, is become either old fashioned or obsolete. So in perils of robbers, in perils of his own countrymen (for the tribes are not always at peace among themselves), in perils in the wilderness, fighting like David with the wild beasts of the desert, and sympathizing with Jacob when in the day the drought consumed him, and the frost by night, he reaches the end of his journey full of Biblical if not spiritual experience.

"I was much interested once in watching one of these shepherds in the streets of Mosul. He had just arrived with a large flock; part of which he had left outside the walls in the care of his companions, and a part which had been sold he was himself conducting to the place of slaughter. The narrow streets of the bazaar were full of confusion. Camels and donkeys, mules and muleteers, almost choked up the passage way. Some of these were loaded with huge, unwieldy burdens; others were just relieved of loads that still stood in the way, making confusion worse confounded. Arabs and Fellaheen, bustling townsmen and noisy hucksters, stood, elbowed, or passed along as opportunity offered. It seemed a hopeless endeavor to take a flock of sheep through the crowded thoroughfare. But the shepherd stalks on before, picking his way as best he may, gazing with open mouth and dilated eye on the novelties which distract his attention. Now he is struck by some loaded animal; but he receives it as a matter of course, and resumes his gaze. Now he must stop, for his

way is completely hedged up, and he turns round to encourage his frightened followers. These, stunned and bewildered by strange sights and sounds, are intent only on one object—that of keeping near their master. They dart through between the legs of the camels, brush past the men, leap over the bales, and leave locks of white wool on the sharp corners of the platforms (*mustubebs*) before the shops. Pressing close behind the shepherd, they seem to tell him of their troubles and claim his protection. So they follow him as eagerly and as closely as ever they went after him on their native hills.

“Looking on such a scene, who could hold back his thoughts from the Lamb of God? And it was a relief to know that, not bound by a cord and dragged by main force, not driven by fierce butchers from whom he could not escape; but just as these, going cheerfully and obediently to the death before them, free and unconstrained, overleaping every obstacle and pressing onward, so ‘*He was led as a lamb to the slaughter.*’ And yet not altogether as these: *they* go in ignorance; he knew whither he went, and yet knowing it, that knowledge did not slacken his speed. Even then he could urge on his lagging disciples with an ‘*Arise, let us go hence,*’ though he knew that he went to insult and agony, to death and worse than death, the being forsaken of his God and suffering unpitied and in shame the just for the unjust, that we might be the sheep of his pasture, and joint heirs of his glory.”

DE WETTE'S APOCALYPSE. From a cursory examination of De Wette's Commentary on the Apocalypse, last part of Vol. III., Basil, 1848, pp. 207, it does not strike us as adding many things of special value to the interpretation of the book, aside from the accurate explanation of words and phrases. He speaks of Ewald's Commentary, 1828 (see Stuart's Apoc. I. 473), as having taken on the whole the right position, and that Lücke, 1832, has given the correct, fundamental outlines of a theory of the interpretation of the Apocalypse. De Wette arranges the contents of the book into I. the Superscription and Introduction, ch. 1—3, notice of the author, contents, and the epistles to the seven churches; II. the Revelation, ch. 4—22: 5. The first series of development is contained in ch. 4—11, viz. 1. the Exposition, vision of God, book given to the Lamb to open, ch. 4—5; 2. the revelations in respect to the future, viz. the opening of the first six seals, ch. 5: 7, and the opening of the seventh seal, and the seven trumpets. The second series of development embraces ch. 12—22: 5. 1. Intermediate scenes, ch. 12—14, the enemies of Christ and his kingdom, symbols and proclamations of victory and of judgment; 2. The seven woes, trumpets, Babylon's fall, ch. 15—19: 10. 3. Victory over the two beasts and Satan, and their punishment, the thousand years' Reign of Christ, 19: 11—

20: 6. 4. The End. Final triumph and last Judgment. The New World and the heavenly Jerusalem, 20: 7—22: 5. III. Confirmation of the truth of the visions by the angel and Christ himself, 22: 6—21.

Commentar über das Buch Josua, von Karl Friedrich Theil, professor of Exegesis and Oriental Languages at Dorpat, 1848, pp. 411. The author's views are decidedly orthodox. He published a Commentary on the books of Chronicles in 1833, and on the books of Kings in 1846. He proposes to continue his researches on the other historical books. The second edition of a work of some value, entitled "Der Buch der Richter, by Prof. G. L. Studer of Berne, was published in 1842. — Zur Geschichte des Kanons, von Dr. K. A. Credner of Giessen, 1847, pp. 424, is the work of a rationalist critic of much ability. The third edition of De Wette's Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, 1848, pp. 190, scarcely differs from the preceding edition. — Wieseler on the Chronology of the Acts (Göttingen, 1848), is a very important production, though he goes into some unnecessary minuteness of detail. We shall give a further account of it hereafter. He decides in favor of the theory that Paul was imprisoned only once at Rome. He also maintains that Peter visited Rome but once. — Dr. H. A. Meyer's Commentary on the Philippiana, (forming the first half of Part Ninth of his work, 1847), is a rich addition to our means for understanding this epistle. The second part, containing Colossians and Philemon, has also appeared.

Die Reden des Herrn Jesu : Andeutungen für gläubiges Verstandniss derselben, von Rudolf Stier, D. P. Barmen, 1843—48, Vol. I. pp. 289. II. 449. III. 470. IV. 627. V. 551. VI. 1054. The place of the publication of this work would indicate its character. It is strictly orthodox, and its predominant aim is practical. It is a most copious review of all the important opinions and discussions in relation to the discourses and words of Jesus, and is brought up to the most recent time. Its philology is precise, though the views of the author are sometimes fanciful. He has not a little genius, and many of his remarks are quite striking. E. g. he terms Jean Paul "a great heathen in Christendom," as Plutarch might be said to be a great Christian in heathendom. The principal fault of the work is its vast length.

Das Leben Jesu nach den Evangelien dargestellt, von Dr. Joh. Peter Lange, professor der Theologie in Zürich, 1844—48, in five volumes octavo, in all, 2782 pp. This is one of the most important works on the Life of our Lord which has been called forth in recent times. The author goes over the entire ground. While the exegetical element is not deficient, it is written in a continuous style, in an earnest and devotional spirit, and contains profound and original thoughts. It labors with much success to account for and reconcile the discrepancies in the Gospels.

The work was not first suggested by Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, as the author had been making preparations for many years. It is pleasant to find that the city of Zuingli's abode has so able and excellent a defender of the faith as Prof. Lange.

Gottfried Hermann, philologist facile princeps, lately deceased at Leipzig, his native city. He completed his 76th year on the 28th of Nov. 1848. We had the pleasure of seeing him at the meeting of the German Oriental Society in Jena, in Sept. 1846. He took no active part in the proceedings, but was treated with distinguished honor, being conducted to and from his seat by the president of the society, Prof. Hand of Jena. He was about the middle height, erect, nimble in his movements, his countenance not unpleasing, yet with a sharp look, and his air that of a man of business. At the table and in social life, he was full of animation and glee, wholly merging the philologist in the boon companion. Dr. Parr, many years ago, called him "the greatest among the very great critics of the present age." This philological sovereignty, no one has been of late disposed to question. In an exact knowledge of the structure and laws of the Greek and Latin languages, of the niceties of prosody, of the shades of meaning in the particles, of idioms and of dialectic peculiarities, and in that tact or instinctive judgment which is partly the result of long practice, no one, we suppose, was regarded as his equal. He was by eminence a philologist, a grammatical student. In what is called the general, philosophical study of language, apart from the principles of grammar, he had but little faith. Hermann belonged to that class whose talents are very early developed. At fourteen, he was ready to enter the university. Though he tried awhile, in obedience to paternal wishes, to study law, he yet felt an uncontrollable inclination towards history, philosophy, and particularly the classics. He became an academical *docent* in Leipzig in 1794, defending the thesis *De Poeseos Generibus*. In four years he became professor extraordinarius of philosophy, and in 1803, professor ordinarius of Eloquence, to which Poetry was added in 1809. His connection with the Greek Society founded by him in 1793, with which the philological seminary was afterwards joined, contributed greatly to his own reputation and that of the university. By his essay *De Mythologia Graecorum antiquissima*, a correspondence was occasioned between him and Creuzer, which subsequently appeared in print. In consequence of his Review of Böckh's *Inscriptions*, in 1826, a war broke out between these veteran philologists, which was maintained with great spirit and some animosity on both sides.

We are pained, also, to see a notice of the death of the distinguished philologist and classical editor, John Caspar Orelli, professor in the university of Zurich. He was a learned and indefatigable scholar, and his works are well known and highly appreciated throughout the world. His

edition of Cicero's Works is regarded by competent judges as the best which has appeared. It was finished in 1838, in eight large octavo volumes, admirably printed in all respects. In the last volumes, Orelli enjoyed the aid of his friend Professor Baiter. It contains all Cicero's works, including those which are spurious, and a most ample apparatus, with a Life of Cicero; indexes geographical, historical, legal, of forma, etc.; the *Fasti Consulares*, etc. Orelli also published a critical history of the MSS. of Cicero's works; also a valuable "*Collectio Inscriptionum Lat. selecta*, in 2 vols.; and a careful edition of the entire works of Tacitus. Whether the last was completed, we do not know. Orelli was born at Zurich, Feb. 13, 1787, and was a descendant of a patrician Italian family, who sought refuge in Switzerland, at the period of the Reformation. He was highly esteemed as a teacher, securing in a high degree the love and confidence of his pupils. In concert with his friends Hirzel, Bremi, Kaiser, Ott, Zschokke, Frey, Merian, and others, he labored with the utmost zeal in behalf of the Greeks, at the time of their emancipation from the Turks.

Mr. S. Prideaux Tregelles of Plymouth, England, has published a *Prospectus* of a Critical edition of the Greek Testament. He proposes to give: "1st, the text, on the authority of the oldest MSS. and versions, so as to present, as far as possible, the text commonly received in the fourth century; always stating what authorities support, and what oppose the text given. 2. In cases in which we have *certain proofs* which carry us still nearer to the apostolic age, to use the data so afforded. 3. In cases in which the oldest documents agree in certain undoubted errors of transcribers, to state the reading so supported, but not to follow it, and to give the grounds on which another reading is preferred. 4. In matters altogether doubtful, to state distinctly the conflicting evidence, and thus approximate towards a true text. To give the various readings of all the uncial MSS. and ancient versions *very correctly*, so that it may be clearly seen what readings possess any *ancient authority* whatever. To these we intend to add the more important citations of the earlier writers. The places are also to be indicated in which the common text departs from the ancient reading." Mr. T. published, in 1844, a Greek text of the Apocalypse from ancient authorities, and an English translation. This text has been well received by English expositors, and has been used to some extent by De Wette, in his late Exposition of the Apocalypse. Mr. T. has been already engaged in the work ten years, and has collated a large proportion of the MSS. He has yet to collate Gospels K M, Epistles of Paul D; also the cursive MS. marked 33 in the Gospels, 17 in the Epistles. "The especial desideratum is, however, a perfect collation of

the Vatican MS. B, if this could be at all attainable." The *spirit* in which the work will be accomplished, is indicated in the following paragraph. "As to the text which I shall give, I wish to assure all who might feel any alarm on the subject of criticism, that I have to follow my authorities; and I desire and pray that God may enable me not to be guided by any preconceived thoughts of my own, but simply to attend to the truth of the text of his holy word, according to evidence. What the early Christians read as the genuine text of the New Testament, that I desire to read and edit."

The 7th, 8th, 11th and 14th volumes of Clark's Foreign Theological Library consist of Torrey's Translation of Neander's Church History; the 5th, 10th, and 13th, of Olshausen's Commentary on the Gospels and the Epistle to the Romans. Two volumes, to contain Hengstenberg on the Genuineness of the Pentateuch, and one large volume on the Commentary on Daniel, Zechariah, and the Prophecy of Balaam, will soon appear. Four volumes, 8vo., bound in cloth, lettered, are furnished to subscribers for one pound sterling.—An edition of Prof. Stuart's work on the Canon of the Old Testament, with some Notes by Dr. S. Davison, is about to be published in London. — A new edition of the Greek Testament is announced, with the Greek text and critical and exegetical notes (on the plan of Bloomfield), by the Rev. Mr. Alford, formerly of the university of Cambridge. — We learn that Isaac Taylor is now editor of the North British Review, Dr. Hanna having retired. Mr. T. is a theoretic Episcopalian, and the Review will not, probably, be so closely connected with the interests of the Free Church as formerly. — The great work which has been several years publishing in London, under the charge of William Smith, LL. D., entitled Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, is just completed. It is printed in small yet very distinct type, in double columns. The third and concluding volume has 1406 pages. The editor has been assisted by some of the principal classical scholars in England and by a few Germans. The names of the authors of the articles are in all cases given. The article on Plato, of eleven pages, was written by Prof. Brandis of Bonn, with one or two pages of supplementary literary matter by another person. Prof. George Long is the author of some of the principal articles, e. g. Tacitus, Virgil. From the variety of authors, there is of course great diversity in the style of execution. In some cases we notice a deficiency of information in regard to the best or latest German editions of the classics; Orelli's Tacitus, and Stallbaum's Plato, e. g., are worthy of a more discriminating notice than is given to them. Accurate information in regard to the best editions of the classics would be one of the main uses of a dictionary like this. The work contains an immense amount of valuable and well digested infor-

mation, and will doubtless take the place of all previous treatises of the kind in English.

The Hellenes: the History of the Manners of the Ancient Greeks. By J. A. St. John. New edition. Three volumes in one. London, 1844. 8vo. pp. 424, 433, 475. In a touching dedication to his son, the author remarks: "The work has been produced and has grown up under very peculiar circumstances. Whithersoever we have travelled, the wrecks of Grecian literature have accompanied us, and the studies to which these pages owe their existence, have been pursued under the influence of almost every climate in Europe." "Here probably [in northern Africa], the action of pestilential winds, and of the sands and burning glare of the desert, commenced that dimming of the 'visual ray,' which in all likelihood, will wrap me gradually in complete darkness, and veil forever from my sight those forms of the beautiful, which have been incarnated, so to speak, in marble." A work, which is the result of so much loving and original research, could not well be otherwise than refreshing and instructive. It takes up and presents in a very readable and attractive form, without any parade of learning, such topics as the education of the Greeks, women, marriage, dwellings, amusements, rural life, slavery, and commerce and industry. A map and a very full index are supplied.

A Complete Greek Grammar for the use of Learners. By John William Donaldson, B. D., head-master of King Edward's School, Bury St. Edmunds. London, 1848, 18mo. pp. 272.

Mr. Donaldson is well known as a classical scholar, and an able and original investigator in the philology of the Latin and Greek languages. His principal works, are the *Theatre of the Greeks*, fifth edition; *The New Cratylus*, or contributions towards a more accurate knowledge of the Greek language; (a second edition, enlarged and improved, is preparing for publication;) *Varronianus*, a Critical and Historical Introduction to the philological study of the Latin language; and the *Principles and Processes of Classical Philology applied to the Analysis of the Hebrew language*. The present work is intended to adapt the conclusions of the *New Cratylus* to the use of younger students. "Though many Greek grammars," the author remarks, "have appeared during the last ten years, there has been scarcely any attempt to connect the teaching of the language with a recognition of those general principles which are obtaining every day more and more acceptance with all scholars who are worthy of the name." We suppose Mr. D. here refers to grammars of the Greek language published in England. The remark does not apply to Germany nor to the United States. Our best scholars use, and have used for some time, the grammars of Kühner, Krüger, Madvig, etc., and other grammars which owe their principal excellences to those just

named. Were we to make a criticism on Mr. D.'s work it would be, that it betrays a certain air of assumption and confidence, which are not quite befitting even in an advanced and able scholar.

The death of the well known cardinal Mezzofanti, the universal linguist, is announced. From his gentle and peaceable character, and from the fact that he died at Rome, we infer that he has taken no part in the late political transactions. Indeed, no man could well make war on one who was so harmless, and whose countenance was the very index of good will. For some notice of his extraordinary attainments, and of his person, see *Bib. Sac.* Vol. IV. p. 601. What has become of the rigid and unaccommodating librarian of the Vatican Library, cardinal Mai, we have not heard. We presume, however, that he accompanied the Pope to Gaeta. The new government have taken possession of the inestimable treasures of the Vatican. Every friend of learning and human culture earnestly hopes that these treasures will be allowed to remain untouched. Who would wish to see any of them in Paris or in London? Who can desire to look at Titian's great and undying works in any place but Venice? How strangely the Assumption or the Apollo would appear in the British Museum, or in a London banker's country seat! Yet there is great reason to fear that the Italian cities will be despoiled of some of their noblest works by the pressure of the times. We trust that all the European governments, in Italy and without, both monarchical and popular, will unite in preventing this spoliation. We see that the Pope and Austria are interfering in the matter.

Man Primeval; or the Constitution and Condition of the Human Being. By John Harria, D. D., president of Cheshunt College. Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln. 1849. 12mo. pp. 480.

The Earth and Man: Lectures on Comparative and Physical Geography, considered in its relation to the History of Mankind. By Arnold Guyot, late professor of Physical Geography and History at Neufchatel. Translated from the French by Prof. C. C. Felton, with illustrations. Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln. Prof. Agassiz writes as follows: "Having been Prof. Guyot's friend from childhood, as a fellow-student in college, and as a colleague in the same university, I may be permitted to express my high sense of the value of his attainments. He has not only been at the best school, that of the Ritter and Humboldt, and become familiar with the present state of the science of our earth, but he has himself in many instances, drawn new conclusions from the facts now ascertained and presented most of them in a new point of view."

Sacred Rhetoric: or Composition and Delivery of Sermons; including

Ware's Hints on Extemporaneous Preaching. By H. J. Ripley, professor in Newton Theological Institution.

Dr. John M. Mason's works are published in four volumes 8vo., under the editorial charge of his son, Rev. Ebenezer Mason, who deceased as the last sheets were passing through the press. We regret that there is no memoir of a pulpit orator so distinguished as Dr. M. The impression which his eloquence made in England is still vivid on the minds of those who listened to him. The late eminent and excellent R. W. Hamilton, D. D., of Leeds, mentioned to the writer a number of incidents illustrating the power of his oratory. Another individual said that on entering the church when Dr. M. was delivering his "Messiah's Throne," he was instantly so impressed, that he passed some distance, and had taken his seat without being aware that his hat was still upon his head, till it was indicated by those near.

A new volume of the Select Sermons of Dr. Channing is soon to be published.—A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles for the use of schools and colleges, is preparing by Rev. J. J. Owen, D. D. A commentary on the same book by Prof. J. A. Alexander of Princeton is also announced.—Mr. Putnam of New York has reprinted Layard's *Nineveh*, in two handsome vols. 8vo, with all the illustrations and wood-cuts of the English edition. An introductory note from Dr. Robinson is inserted. Two other English works, illustrative of oriental scenery, manners and objects, have also been reprinted by the same house, viz. *Adventures in the Libyan Desert and the Oâsis of Jupiter Ammon*, by Bayle St. John (son of the author of "Hellenes"), and *Visit to Monasteries in the Levant*, with numerous illustrations, by Robert Curzon.—Lieut. Lynch's *Narrative of the Dead Sea Expedition* is in the press in Philadelphia and will soon be published.

Since the preceding was in type, we notice an announcement of the following works: *Bibliotheca Judaica*, a Biographical Manual of the entire circle of Jewish Literature, by W. Fürst, 1 Th. A—H.—Hagenbach K. R. *Die Kirchengeschichte des 18 u. 19 Jahr.*, from the Evangelical Protestant Position, Vol. I.—Maurer *Comm. in Vet. Test.* Vol. IV., section 2nd and last, on Ecclesiastes and Canticles by A. Heiligstedt.—A School Grammar of the Heb. Lang. by Dr. Goldstein of Breslau.—The Proper Mode of rendering the word God, in translating the Bible into Chinese by Sir George Staunton.—The Life and Epistles of Paul in 2 vols., by Rev. J. W. Coneybeare and Rev. J. S. Howson, richly illustrated from drawings by W. H. Bartlett.

Several Articles, Notices, etc., designed for this No. of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, are necessarily deferred.

Errata.—P. 385, l. 4, for *bend*, read *head*; p. 386, for *Derb el-Serich*, read *D. el-Serich*.

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XXIII.

AUGUST, 1849.

ARTICLE I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO CHURCH HISTORY.

By Professor Philip Schaff, Mercersburg, Pa.

§ 1. *The idea of History in general.*

THE object of this General Introduction is, to come to a clear understanding of the nature and purpose of church history, and thus to gain the proper position for the contemplation of its details. A full insight into it can be reached indeed only at the close of the historical course; for the best definition of church history is the thing itself. But some preliminary explanation is still very important, at least to know what we propose in some measure, and to serve as a directory to the study of particulars. Our best course will be to resolve this compound conception into its two constituent parts, and so to inquire first what *history* is in general, and then what the *church* is, which will lead of itself to the true idea of *church history*.

By History in the *objective* sense, we understand the sum of what has happened, or more strictly expressed, of all that pertains to the life of humanity and enters essentially into its development. History in the *subjective* sense, is the apprehension and representation of what has thus taken place, by means of language.¹ The value of the last

¹ The English word *history* comes, through the Latin, from the Greek *historia*, (from the verb *historéō*,) which signifies first research, then what is known by research, then science generally and in particular the science of events in history. The German word *Geschichte* comes from "geschehen," to happen, to occur.

depends throughout on the degree in which it is a true copy of the first, and thus presupposes that the historian has freely surrendered himself to his object, brings it to a living reproduction in his spirit, and is concerned only to be a faithful mirror of what has taken place, or to make its representation answerable exactly to its actual occurrence.

History, in the objective sense, of which mainly we have to speak, is not an outward aggregate of names, dates, and deeds, more or less accidental, without fixed plan or sure purpose, but a living organism, whose parts are inwardly joined together in the way of mutual need and complement. All nations form but a single family, having the same origin and destination; and all periods are only the different ages of its life, which is throughout one and the same. History stands moreover under the conduct of Divine providence, proceeds on an eternal, unchangeable plan, and is carried forward accordingly, in the irresistible necessity, to a definite end. This end is the same with that of the creation in general, the glorification of God, the Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier of the world, through the free worship of his intelligent creatures, whose highest blessedness at the same time flows from this worship.

We must look upon history thus, as the product always of two different factors. The last and highest factor is *God himself*, in whom we "live and move and have our being," who turns the hearts of men "as streams of water," who worketh in the good both to will and to do, and ruleth the wrath of the wicked to his own praise, yea, maketh Satan himself tributary to his absolute will. In this view we may style history a *self-evolution of God* in the course of *time*—in distinction from nature, which is a revelation of the Creator in *space*—a successional representation of his omnipotence and wisdom, and more particularly of his moral attributes, his righteousness, holiness, patience, long-suffering, love, and mercy. A history which leaves this out of sight, and turns God into an idle spectator of the actions and fortunes of men, is *deistic, rationalistic*, in its last consequence *atheistic*, and for this very reason at bottom without spirit, without life, without interest, and without consolation. Such a history must be at best a cold statue, without beaming eye or beating heart. God however works not in history as in nature, through the force of blind laws, but by *living persons*, whom he has made after his own image, endowing them with reason and power of will. This implies that he has assigned them a certain sphere of self-conscious, free action, for which they are held responsible; he will not coërcé their service, but form them rather to the fellowship of love with himself. *Men* become in

this way a relative, secondary factor of history, and receive the reward of their words and deeds, whether they be good or bad. To deny such *subjective* causality, and make men mere passive channels or blind machines of the divine activity, is to fall into the opposite extreme of *pantheism* and *fatalism*, and overthrows also by consequence all human accountability, nay in the end all distinction between good and evil, virtue and vice. These two forms of causation again, the divine and the human, the objective and the subjective, work not one beside and out of the other, which would be a perfectly abstract and mechanical conception, but *in* and *by one another*. It may not be possible to run the line of demarcation between them; still the recognition of both is the first condition of all sound sense for history, and it is this which forms it to a lofty, continuously-rolling anthem in praise of God's wisdom and love, an humbling mirror of man's weakness and guilt, and in both respects a rich repository of instruction, encouragement, and edification. As the biography of humanity, the development of its relations to itself, to nature, and to God, it must of course embrace all that deserves to be known, all that is beautiful, great, noble, and glorious, in the course of the world's life. In it are deposited all the experiences of our race, all its thoughts, feelings, views, wishes, endeavors, and doings, all its sorrows and all its joys. Divine revelation itself belongs to history, forms the inmost marrow of its life, the golden thread that runs throughout its leaves. Thus in the nature of the case, there can be no study more comprehensive than history in the broad sense of the word, none more instructive and entertaining.

§ 2. *The central position of Religion in History.*

Universal history, like the life of humanity itself, unfolds itself of course in different spheres; which however all stand in nearer or more remote connection, and so condition and complete one another mutually. There is a history of government, of trade, of social life, of the different sciences and arts, of morality, and of religion. Among these, the last is plainly the deepest, most central, and full of interest. For religion, or the relation of man to God, the band that exalts his earthly life and knits it to the invisible world of spirits, the eternal abode of the blessed, constitutes the most sacred interest of our human life, the fountain of its loftiest thoughts, its mightiest deeds, its most blessed enjoyments, its sabbath, ornament, glory and crown, in the consciousness of all nations; the region of everlasting truth and rest, where, as it is expressed by a profound German philosopher, all mys-

teries of the world are solved, all spiritual contradictions reconciled, all painful sentiments hushed; in whose ether all sorrow, all care, is made to disappear, whether in the present feeling of devotion or in hope, while all that is dark in time brightens into the radiance of eternity. Religion, communion with God, is the morning, noon, and evening of history, the paradise from which it starts, the haven of peace into which, after a course of many thousand years on the storm-lashed ocean of time, it will finally be conducted, to rest eternally from its labor and toil, where God shall be all in all. Even the other departments of history themselves find their highest attraction, and their full illustration, only in the rays from a higher world which are flung upon them from religion.

All this however holds in the highest degree only of Christianity, the absolutely true and perfect religion. Its founder, *Jesus Christ*, the God-man and Saviour of the world, is accordingly the *animating soul*, and *central sun*, and *universal key* at the same time, of all history. His entrance into the world forms the boundary between the old and the new; from him, the light and life of the world, light and life flow backwards into the night of Paganism and twilight of Judaism, and forwards through all following centuries by means of his church. Even in ancient history, what is most worthy of notice and full of meaning is the preparation of the way for Christianity, through the divine revelation made to Israel and the dark longings of the heathen world. For later history in full, Christianity is the inmost pulse, the very heart's blood and central stream. This shows itself most clearly in the Middle Ages, when all sciences and arts, all social culture, and the greatest political and national movements, received their impulse from the church, and were guided and ruled by its spirit. But the history also of the last three centuries, rests throughout, in all its branches, upon the great ecclesiastico-religious movement of the sixteenth century, in the process of whose development we are still involved. Any one may easily see from this the comprehensive significance of *church history*.

§ 3. *The Church.*

Christianity, to which as the absolute, universal religion this central and all-embracing position in history belongs, and on which depends the salvation of the whole human race, exists not merely as something subjective in single pious individuals, but also as an objective, organic, visible society, as a *church* or *kingdom of God upon the earth*. The church is in part a pedagogic institution to prepare men for

heaven, and as such destined to pass away; in part the everlasting communion of the redeemed, embracing earth and heaven. In the first view, it embraces, as a visible organization, all baptized persons, many consequently who are hypocrites and unbelievers, who are to be fully separated from it only at the end of the world. Hence our Lord compares the kingdom of heaven, Matt. xiii, to a field, in which wheat and tares grow together until the harvest; also to a net, in which good and bad fish are promiscuously taken. To the true essence of the church however, the everlasting communion of saints, belong only the regenerate, who are united by faith with Christ the head, and through him also with one another.

The church still further is a human society, but not for this reason by any means the product of men, as being called into existence by their invention and free will, like free-masonry for instance, temperance societies, and all sorts of political and literary associations. On the contrary it is grounded by *God himself through Christ*, his incarnation, his life, suffering and death, his exaltation and the effusion of the Holy Ghost, for his own glory and the redemption and salvation of men. For this very reason, the gates of hell itself can never prevail against it. It is the ark of Christianity, out of which there is no salvation, the channel in which flows continuously forward the revelation of the triune God and the powers of eternal life. Paul styles it ordinarily the *body of Christ*, and believers the *members* of this body.¹ As a *body* in general, the church is an organic union of many members, which have different callings and gifts, but are pervaded by the same life-blood, governed by the same head, animated by the same soul, coöperating with mutual assistance in the service of one and the same end. All this is set forth in the most masterly and incomparable style, particularly in the 12th and 14th chapters of the first epistle to the Corinthians. As the body of *Christ*, the church is Christ's dwelling place, in which he exercises all his divine and human life-powers, as also the organ by and through which he acts upon the world in the capacity of its Redeemer, as the soul dwells in the body and reveals its activity by its means. The Lord is thus present in the church, and in all its institutions and means of grace, particularly in the word and sacraments, after a mystical, invisible, and incomprehensible manner indeed, but not the less real and efficient and manifest on this account, with the entire fulness of his personality, his theanthropic nature and life. "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I"—my person, not merely my spirit or my word, or my influence—

¹ Rom. 12: 5. 1 Cor. 6: 15. 12: 27. Eph. 1: 20. 4: 12. 5: 30. Col. 1: 24.

“in the midst of them” (Matt. 18: 20). “Lo! I am with you”—the representatives of the universal body of saints—“always to the end of the world” (Matt. 28: 20). Hence Paul names the church, “the fulness of Him that filleth all in all” (Eph. 1: 20).

We may thus say, without exaggeration, that the church is the continuation of Christ's life and work upon the earth, though never indeed, so far as men are concerned, without a mixture of sin and error. In the church, the Lord is perpetually born anew in the hearts of believers; through her, he speaks words of truth and consolation to the fallen race of man; in her he heals the sick, raises the dead to new life, distributes the heavenly manna, gives himself for spiritual food and drink to souls longing for salvation; in her, are repeated his sufferings and death; in her also, however, are continually celebrated anew, his resurrection and ascension, and the outpouring of the Holy Ghost. She takes upon herself, through all her militant state, like her Head in his humiliation, the form of a servant, and is hated, despised, and mocked, by the ungodly world; but out of this form, at the same time, gleams a divine glory, “the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” In her maternal womb must we be born again out of incorruptible seed; from her breast must we be nourished, in order that we may have spiritual life. For she is the Lamb's bride, the habitation of the Holy Ghost, the temple of the living God, “the pillar and ground of the truth.” Those old primitive sayings, perverted into a fleshly and false sense by the church of Rome: *Qui ecclesiam non habet matrem, Deum non habet patrem*; and: *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, are altogether correct when we understand in the case the true church, the spiritual Jerusalem, “which is the mother of us all” (Gal. 4: 26). For inasmuch as Christ, in his character of Redeemer, is to be found, neither in Heathenism nor Judaism nor Islamism, but in the church only, the fundamental proposition, “Out of Christ no salvation,” necessarily includes in itself also the other, “No salvation out of the church.”

§ 4. *The Development of the Church.*

The church now is not to be viewed as at once at hand and complete, but as a historical fact, and as a human society, subject to the laws of history, to genesis, growth, and development. Here indeed we must make an important distinction. In her idea, or as objectively viewed in Christ, in whom dwells the whole fulness of the Godhead, and who is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, the church is from the start complete and capable of no change. In the same way,

his revealed word is the everlasting truth and the absolute rule of faith and practice, which the Christian world may never transcend or leave behind. The doctrine of an improvement of Biblical Christianity, of an advance on the part of man beyond revelation or beyond Christ himself, is entirely rationalistic and unchristian. Such a so-called improvement were only a deterioration, and a falling back into the old Judaism or Paganism. But from this idea of the church in the divine mind, we must distinguish her *actual manifestation* upon the earth; from the objective revelation itself, the *subjective apprehension and appropriation of this in the consciousness of humanity*, at a given time. This is progressive. As little as the single Christian may at once become a perfect saint, can humanity as a whole at once appropriate to itself the fulness of life which is in Christ. On the contrary, this can take place only by a gradual process, with much trouble and toil.

As in the case then of every individual believer, and indeed of Christ himself in his human nature,¹ we must speak of the church also, under her historical form, as passing through the different stages of infancy, childhood, youth, and mature age. She advances from one measure of truth, knowledge, holiness, to another; struggles victoriously through the opposition of an ungodly world; overcomes innumerable foes within and without; surmounts all manner of obstructions and diseases; till finally, made free from all sin and error, at the general resurrection, she shall exchange her militant for the triumphant state, and appear thus everlastingly complete. This whole process however is nothing more than the realization of the idea of the church as presented in Christ from the beginning, the appropriation and impression of his spirit and life on all sides. Christ is thus the beginning, middle, and end, of the entire process of church history.

This process of growth is in part an *outward extension* over the face of the globe, until all nations come to walk in the light of the gospel. In this respect mainly our Lord compares the kingdom of God to a grain of mustard, which is the least among all seeds, but grows to be a great tree, in whose branches the birds of heaven make their nests (Matt. 13: 31, 32). In part again it is an *inward development* of the idea of the church, in doctrine, life, worship, and government, or a more complete impress continually of the new life principle which has appeared in Christ, and is destined to pass over from him to the human race, so as gradually to transform the whole world into

¹ Comp. Luke 2: 52, "And Jesus *increased* in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man." Heb. 5: 8, "Though he were a Son, yet *learned* he obedience by the things which he suffered: and being made *perfect* he *became* the author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey him."

a glorious and blessed kingdom of God. To this refer the numerous passages in St. Paul's epistles, in which mention is made of the *growth* and *edification* of the body of Christ, "till we all come, in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a *perfect* man, unto the measure of the *stature* of the *fulness* of Christ, that we henceforth be no more children," etc. (Eph. 4: 12—16. comp. 3: 17—19. Col. 2: 19). This development moreover is *organic*, that is, not an outward mechanical heaping together of facts that stand in no living connection with one another, but a process which springs from within, out of the vital energy implanted in the church, and continues in its course identical with itself, as the man through all stages of his life still remains a man. The untrue and imperfect in an earlier stage is overcome by that which follows, while what is true and essential is preserved, and made the living germ of further development. The history of all Christian nations, and of all times from Christ to the final judgment, forms a connected whole, and represents only in such totality the entire fulness of the new creation. Since the church on earth stands in perpetual conflict with the unbelieving world, and even believers themselves are still entangled with sin and error, it follows that the development in question is not regular and quiet, but a *constant struggle*; it proceeds through all sorts of obstructions, diseases, and extremes, through innumerable heresies and schisms. But even these disorders themselves, in the hand of Him who can bring good out of evil, are made to serve in the end the cause of truth and piety. There is no pause, strictly speaking, in history. Single lateral streams of it may indeed dry up; small sects, for instance, which have fulfilled their course, or even large divisions of the church that have once played a highly important part, may fall into stagnation, congeal into dead formalism, when they close themselves wilfully against all historical progress, as is the case with most of the Oriental churches. But the main stream of the church moves *uninterruptedly onward*, and must finally reach the mark which is proposed for it of God. Along with the wheat, however, according to the comparison already quoted, ripen at the same time also the tares, for the harvest of the last judgment; in connection with the development of the good, of truth and Christianity, advances the development of the *evil*, *falsehood*, and *antichrist*, and the two processes are often in such close contact that it requires the sharpest eye, rightly to discriminate between light and shade, the work of God and the work of Satan, who as we know not unfrequently transforms himself into an angel of light. Even here indeed we see the hand of righteous retribution, turning wicked thoughts and deeds to shame, and punishing the enemies of God; but

in the present world, this is only partially and imperfectly the case. The famous word of Schiller, "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*," must accordingly be so far corrected :

"Die Weltgeschichte ist *Ein* Weltgericht,
Und Fluch und Segen fällt aus ihren Händen,
Doch ist sie darum nicht das *Endgericht*,
Wo erst sich Fluch und Segen wird vollenden."

§ 5. *The Church and the World.*

The church, like Christianity itself of which it is the bearer, is a supernatural principle, a new creation of God through Christ Jesus, far exalted above all that human intelligence and will are able of themselves to produce. In this character, her relation to the natural world, as fallen from God and lying in wickedness, is in the first place one of direct hostility ; in which view, church history and the history of the world, (here taken as profane history), stand in conflict with one another. Since however Christianity is ordained for men, and aims to raise them to their proper perfection, the hostility now mentioned cannot regard nature itself as it has come from the hands of God and belongs to the true essence of man, but only the corruption of nature, that is sin and error ; so that it must come to an end, when these ungodly elements are overcome. Christianity proposes not to annihilate human nature, but to redeem and sanctify it from the power of evil. Revelation seeks not to destroy reason, but to enlighten it and to inform it with its own spirit. The church must subdue the whole world finally, not with an arm of flesh, but with the weapons of faith and love, the Spirit and the Word, bringing it in captivity to the feet of the crucified One. The supernatural passes over thus into the natural, and becomes more and more at home upon the earth and among men ; the Word, in this sense also, becomes flesh, and dwells among us, in such way that we can see, feel, taste and enjoy his glory.

Nor is it, in this view, a single department of the world, that the kingdom of God proposes thus to pervade and master, but the world as a whole. Christianity is absolutely catholic or universal in its character ; that is, it is designed for all nations, for all times, and for all spheres of our human existence ; the church is humanity itself,

¹ A more full exposition of the idea of development, which falls in properly with that of history itself and is indispensable to the cultivation of it with any living spirit, has been attempted at least in our small work entitled: *What is Church History? A Vindication of the idea of Historical Development.* Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co. See especially p. 80 sq.

made perfect and complete. The whole creation groans after redemption and the glorious liberty of the children of God. The moral order of the world can never become complete, without being permeated in full by the life of the God-man. Nay, the very body itself, and the surrounding earth, are to be comprehended in the all-pervading and transforming process; since the new creation finds its end in the resurrection, and in new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. Whence our Lord compares the kingdom of God with heaven, which is to pervade the entire human mass, that is our human life as a whole, in spirit, soul, and body (Matt. 13: 33).

The several spheres of the world in its good sense, or the essential forms of human life ordained of God himself for its proper evolution, are particularly the *family*, the *State*, *science*, *art*, and *morality*. On all these Christianity exerts, in the course of history, a purifying and sanctifying influence, and lays them under service to the glory of God and the establishment of his kingdom, till God may be all in all.

It recognizes in the *family* a divine order, but raises it at the same time to a far higher character than it ever had before, by conforming it to the law of monogamy, placing the relative duties of husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, on their highest religious ground, and consecrating the whole institution by the reference in which it is made to stand to the sacred union of Christ with the church. Marriage meets us accordingly under its happiest forms, and reveals its richest fruits of domestic bliss, in the history of Christianity. In the same way, the *State* is regarded here also as a divine institution, for the maintenance of order in human society, for the encouragement of good, for the punishment of evil, and for the promotion generally of the public weal; while however the magistrate himself is again made dependent on the absolute sovereignty of God and responsible to it, and subjects are required to obey for the Lord's sake. Thus arbitrary despotism is counteracted, obedience is shorn of its slavish spirit, cruel and hurtful institutions are gradually abolished, and room is made for the introduction more and more of wise and wholesome civil laws. The end of history in this respect is a *theocracy*, in which all dominion and power shall be given to the saints of the Most High, and all nations shall joyfully yield themselves to his will as their only law. Christianity owns no opposition in principle to *science*, imparts to it rather a new impulse, and itself gives birth to the most lofty of all sciences, theology; but it is ever active in separating error and egoism from science, leads it to the highest source of all wisdom and knowledge, to God as revealed in Christ, and rests not till all sciences are finally transformed into *theosophy*, and so carried back to the ground from

which originally they take their rise. What Bacon says of philosophy holds good of science in general : *Philosophia obiter libata abducit a Deo, penitus hausta reducit ad eundem*. The *arts* in general the church takes into her service, and produces herself the noblest creations in architecture, painting, music and poetry. The scope of history in this direction, is the spiritualization of all arts in *worship*, or divine service. Lastly, Christianity transforms the whole *moral life*, both of individuals and of entire nations, infuses into morality its proper soul, namely, love to God, and rests not till all sin is banished from the earth, and *holiness* as it belongs essentially to the idea of the church is fully realized in the life of redeemed humanity.

§ 6. Church History.

We have now opened the way to a definition of church history. It is nothing else than the gradual actualization of the plan of the kingdom of God in the life of humanity, the outward and inward development of the church ; that is, her extension throughout the earth, and the introduction of the spirit of Christ into all spheres of human existence, the family, the State, arts, sciences, and morality, to form them into organs and expressions of this spirit, for the glory of God and the advancement of man to his proper perfection and happiness. It is the sum of all the utterances and deeds, experiences and fortunes, all the sufferings and conflicts and victories, of Christianity in general, as well as of all manifestations which God has made of himself in it and by its means.

As the church militant lives in the midst of the ungodly world, which also forces itself into it in manifold ways, it follows of course that in church history also all kinds of sinful passions, perversions and caricatures of divine truth, heresies and divisions, will come into view ; as we find indeed to have been the case extensively, in the age of the New Testament itself. For, in proportion as the kingdom of light causes itself to be felt, the kingdom of darkness also shows itself more active, and whets its weapons on Christianity itself. Judas not only stood in the sacred circle of the apostles, but wanders also as Ahasuerus through the ecclesiastical sanctuary of all centuries. The most dangerous and hateful forms of human and diabolical perversion, are called forth in direct opposition to the highest manifestations of the Spirit of God. But church history shows, in the first place, that this opposition, that all errors and divisions, even where they may have come for a long time to almost universal prevalence, must still in the end serve only to assist the church to a sense of her true calling, to

evoke the inmost powers of her life, to open the way for higher developments, and thus to glorify the name of God and his Son Jesus Christ. All troubles and persecutions also are for her, as for the single Christian, only a powerful refining fire, in which she is purged always more and more from her remaining dross, till in the end, upon the renovated earth, adorned as a bride at the side of her heavenly bridegroom, she shall celebrate the resurrection morning as her last and most glorious pentecost.

But, in the next place, this dark side of church history is only as it were its earthly and transient outside. Its deeper and more permanent substance, its heart's blood, is the manifestation it carries in itself of the divine love and wisdom. It shows us above all the Lord Christ, as he moves through all time, living and working in his church, expelling all sinful and false elements more and more from her communion, and triumphing over the world and Satan. It is the repository of the manifold signatures and seals of his Holy Spirit, in that bright cloud of bloody and unbloody witnesses, who have not counted their lives dear even to death itself; who have maintained true and faithful conflict with all ungodliness in and out of themselves; who have preached the gospel of peace to every creature, bathed themselves in the depths of the divine life and of everlasting truth, and brought forth and interpreted the treasures of revelation for the instruction, improvement, and comfort of their contemporaries and subsequent generations; who with many tears and prayers, willingly bearing the cross of their Master, but through much joyful experience also, triumphing in faith and hope, and boldly disregarding death and the grave, have passed into the upper sanctuary, to rest there forever from all their labor.

The *commencement* of church history is strictly the incarnation of the Son of God, or the entrance of the new principle of light and life into humanity. The life of Jesus Christ forms the unalterable divine human foundation of the entire structure. Gieseler, Hase, and other historians, accordingly, embrace a short sketch of this in their systems, while Neander has devoted to it a special work. But inasmuch as the church first comes into view, under the form of an organic union of the disciples of Jesus, on the day of Pentecost, we may begin also with this; and it is better to do so, as by reason of the mass of matter to be handled no room can be found to do full justice to so difficult and momentous a subject as the life of Christ. In any case however there must be prefixed to the account given of the apostolic age, a preliminary sketch of the condition of the Jewish and Heathen world, at the time when the church thus entered into it as a new creation; since it is only thus that any clear conception can be had of the world-historical

significance of Christianity. The *relative goal* of church history is the present as it stands at any given time, or rather the epoch which lies nearest to the historian; since what is immediately passing before our eyes and is not yet brought to its conclusion, cannot well be the object of free, impartial representation. Its *absolute goal* is the final judgment; though here of course what is still future for us can only be the object of prophetic representation, and falls consequently beyond the range of any simply human history. Only the inspired Apocalypse, whose exposition belongs to exegetical science, is a prophetic church history, in grand symbols, the full understanding of which will be possible only when all is fulfilled in actual event, just as the prophecies of the Old Testament are much clearer to us Christians than they were to the Jews before the coming of the Messiah.

For us, then, church history embraces a period of eighteen hundred years. This at once shows it to be, of all branches of divinity by far the most comprehensive and extensive. It is preceded by *exegesis*; that is, the exposition of the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, with all needful introductory and auxiliary science. Since the Bible is the storehouse of divine revelation, and the rule of faith and practice for the church, this department may be styled Fundamental Theology. Much exegetical matter at the same time enters also into history, particularly in the patristic age and in that of the reformation, the way namely in which the Bible has been understood and explained at different times and by different theologians; whence *exegesis* itself again has its history. Where *exegesis* ceases, church history begins, in such way however that they both come together in the apostolic age; for the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of the New Testament, are source and object for both sciences, only under a different view. Historical Theology, in the next place, is followed in natural order by *speculative*, or as it is usually styled, *systematic* theology, whose province it is to explain and vindicate the Christian faith scientifically, from the position of its own time. The whole organism of the science of religion completes itself finally in *Practical* Theology, which, resting upon *exegesis*, church history, and *systematic* divinity, gives direction for the advancement of the Christian faith and life among God's people, by preaching (Homiletik), instruction (Katechetik), administration of divine services (Liturgik), and church government (theory of ecclesiastical law and discipline). Thus *exegesis* has to do with the *normative* charter in which the revelation starts, church history with the manner of its conception in time past, speculative theology with the present church consciousness, while practical theology looks towards the future. But as present and future are always

becoming past, speculative and practical theology fall again continually into church history, which in this way also is found to be the most comprehensive theological discipline.

§ 7. *Single Branches of Church History. History of Missions.*

Since the Christian religion, by reason of its universal character, pervades like leaven all spheres of human life, with its regenerative force (§ 5), church history divides itself of course into as many corresponding branches, any one of which may be treated separately, and is rich enough indeed to occupy a whole life. Only by the coöperation then of innumerable learned powers, can any tolerable justice be done to the whole; and even in this case, when a work of history rests upon the shoulders of many centuries of labor, it is still but a piecemeal production, as compared with objective history itself.

1. The first section of church history, which usually also is first handled, is the history of *missions*; that is, of the spread of Christianity among unconverted nations. By some it is embraced, by others rejected, the preparation and want of preparation for it also discovering themselves in very various degrees. The missionary work, which the Lord himself has solemnly committed to the church, must continue as long as there are still heathen, Jews or Turks, or a single soul on the face of the earth to which the sound of the gospel has not come. It is not carried forward however at all times, with the same zeal and success. The conversion of the heathen meets us on the largest and most effective scale, in the first and second centuries; then on the threshold of the Middle Ages, in the christianization of the Germanic nations; and finally in our own time, when Asia, Africa, and Australia, are overspread with a net of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionary stations. But often the church is so occupied with her internal affairs and conflicts, with her own purification and the right understanding of herself, that the poor heathen are almost entirely forgotten; as was the case, for instance, in the age of the Reformation, and in the Protestant church of the seventeenth century. Ordinarily then, however, in place of the *foreign* missionary interest, one of a *home* character prevails, directed towards the defenceless or lifeless portions of the church itself. Under the head of such inward missionary work, we may reckon the course of the reformation through the Roman Catholic countries of Europe in the sixteenth century, the labors of the Evangelical Society in France in favor of Protestantism, the highly important and successful activity of the American Home Missionary Society, and other associations for providing the Western States of

North America with ministers and means of grace; and indeed, strictly speaking, the Protestant missions also among the Abyssinians and the Oriental churches.

2. Just the opposite of the history of missions, we have in the history of the *compression* of the church, through the persecution of hostile powers, as of the Roman empire in the first three centuries, and of Mohammedanism in the seventh and eighth. But what appears in one aspect a compression or limitation, is in a higher view a purifying and invigorating process, and serves in the end to promote even the outward diffusion of Christianity. So under the Roman emperors, the blood of the martyrs became the seed of the church. Here again also we may distinguish between *outward* persecution proceeding from openly infidel powers, and an *inward* persecution of one part of the church against another. To the last belongs, for instance, the suppression of the reformation in Spain, Italy, Austria, and other regions, by the Roman Catholic Inquisition and the machinations of Jesuitism. Protestantism also has its martyrs, particularly in France, Holland, and England.

When however Christianity has effected its settlement among a people, the more slow and tedious inward work commences, which has for its object the full extirpation of all remains of its old sinful heathenism, and the transformation of its thinking and working, manners and customs, into an evangelical mould. The church must take root, gain firm growth, and bring forth its proper flowers and fruits. This conducts us into new portions of church history, which are much more difficult to treat than the two now mentioned.

§ 8. Continuation. History of Doctrines.

3. Christianity cannot seek to suppress the desire of knowledge and science implanted in the human spirit by the Creator, but must encourage it rather and give it right direction, leading it to the primitive source of all truth. Faith itself urges to *gnosis*; it aims always at a clearer sense of its object; a still deeper apprehension of God, of his word and of his relations to men, is for it always a sacred duty and lofty satisfaction. With this is joined, in the way of impulse from without, the opposition of science and learning, and still further the perversions of the Christian doctrine by heretical sects. These attacks force the church (which must be ready always to give an account of her faith to every man) to inquiry and vindication. In this way, partly through the inward tendency faith has to knowledge and partly through assaults from without, arises *theology*, or the science of the

Christian religion, and this first, as opposed to heathen philosophers and Gnostic errorists, under the apologetic and polemic form. Theology is the higher self-consciousness of the church, and theologians are its leading intelligences, the eyes and ears, so to speak, of Christ's body. We find that in the most active and fruitful periods precisely, divinity shows the greatest life, as in the time of the Fathers, in the best period of the Middle Ages, and in the age of the Reformation; while along with the decline of theology in common, ignorance also, superstition, and general religious decay, sooner or later make themselves felt.

The most important part of the history of theology, is *dogmatic history*, having for its object the doctrines of Christianity.¹ This forms the most spiritual, and in many respects the most weighty branch, of church history in general, and has been in modern times accordingly honored in Germany with a number of separate works by Muenscher, Engelhardt, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hagenbach, Baur, and others. Besides this, German scholars have devoted to the history of the more weighty dogmas special extended monographies, some of which are of great value. So Baur and Meier have treated the doctrine of the Trinity and the incarnation, Baur also the doctrine of the atonement, Dorner the doctrine of Christ's person, Ebrard the doctrine of the Lord's supper, etc.² The New Testament, which is the living germ of all theology, contains also all the doctrines of salvation, not however in a scientific, but in their original, living, popular, and practical form. Only Paul, who had a learned education and whose mind was of the most dialectic cast, approaches in his epistles, and particularly in his epistle to the Romans, the logical and systematic mode of instruction. By *dogma* now, we understand simply the Biblical doctrine, mastered by reflection, reduced to a scientific expression and laid away as a fixed article of religion. It becomes *symbolic*, when it is adopted by the general church, or by a part of the church, as expressing its sense of what the Scriptures teach, so as to be invested thus with general authority as a doctrinal rule. Dogmas and dogmatic theology then, in the strict sense, begin only with the time when the church woke to scientific self-consciousness, a result due, in no small part to heresies and the perversions of the Christian doctrine. The dogma

¹ We have no fully suitable name for it in English. *Dogmatic History*, as it is generally called, should signify rather a history of dogmatic theology, or of the systematic treatment of doctrines, and refers more to the form than the contents. The nearest approach to it is the title *History of Christian Doctrines*.

² There is also an extended, philosophically digested, instructive and stirring "Introduction to Dogmatic History" by *Theodore Kliefuth*, 1839.

of course has also its own development, and is subjected to the moving flow of the world's general life and culture, whilst the Biblical truth remains in its own nature always the same. Each period of church history is called to unfold and bring into clear view some special side of the dogma, over against corresponding errors, until at last the whole circle of the Christian system of truth shall be brought out in natural order. So the Nicene period was called to assert particularly the dogma of the divinity of Christ and of the Holy Ghost, the dogma thus of the Holy Trinity, against the Arians and Semi-arians; the Augustinian period, the dogma of man's sin and God's grace against the Pelagians. The work of the Reformation, in a dogmatic respect, was soteriological, that is, it brought out the doctrine of the subjective side of salvation, in particular of justification by faith, in opposition to the Romish idea of righteousness by works. In our own time, the dogma of the church appears to be challenging continually more and more the attention of theologians. Eschatology, or the doctrine of the Last Things, will finally have its turn. Since however the Christian doctrines form a connected whole, no one of them of course can be handled, without some reference at the same time, to all the rest.

As theology in general comes into contact with the profane sciences, exegesis with oriental and classic philology, church history with world history, Christian morality with philosophical ethics, homiletics with rhetoric, etc., so dogmatic history stands in specially intimate connection with the history of philosophy, and is always more or less under its influence. Thus with the Greek fathers we find the dogmatic consciousness swayed by Platonism and New-Platonism; in the case of the mediaeval schoolmen, by the logic and dialectics of Aristotle; since the Reformation, by the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, Fries, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The history of philosophy and dogmatic history are two parallel processes, which repel and attract one another at different times, till finally the world-consciousness shall be brought to harmony and reconciliation with the consciousness of God, natural reason into unison with the truth of revelation.

§ 9. *History of Morality, Government, and Worship.*

4. The next branch of our science, is the history of *Christian practice* or of *morality*. This very important part, which is most adapted for practical ends, has been alas thus far but too much neglected. Neander, who throws it into one section with worship, has given more

attention to it than usual; and it is this which imparts to his celebrated work its peculiar charm in the way of religious edification. The doctrine of Christianity requires a corresponding holy walk, faith must work by love. Since the Christian religion is throughout of a moral nature, that is, aims always at the glory of God and the full sanctification of man, all church history is indeed, in a broad sense, a history of morality. The dogma, theology, church constitution, worship, are all moral acts. We take the word here, however, in the narrower sense of what is immediately practical. To this part then belongs the description of the peculiar virtues and vices, the good and bad deeds, the characteristic manners and customs, of leading ecclesiastical individuals, as well as of whole nations and times. Here it falls, to describe the influence of Christianity upon marriage, the family, the female sex, on the abolition of slavery and various social evils. A large space is required, in this view, for the history of the monastic institute, particularly during the Middle Ages, when it split into a great many orders, each of which again forms a more or less peculiar type of morality, having however also its corresponding dangers and temptations.

5. The church must have further a form of government, and exercise discipline on her refractory members. This gives us the history of *church polity* and *church discipline*; which are usually comprised under one section, but may just as well be treated apart also, especially where the last has reached a high degree of cultivation. The constitution of the church, like the Christian doctrine, includes an unchangeable substance and a changeable form. The first is the spiritual office ordained by Christ himself, to which belongs the power of binding and loosing in the name of the Lord. This is different, according to the necessities of the time and its particular relations. In the beginning, we find the Apostolic constitution, where the apostles are the infallible teachers and leaders of the church. In the second century, the Episcopal system comes forward, which advances with natural growth into the Metropolitan and Patriarchal systems. The Oriental churches stop with the last, while the Latin church, in the Middle Ages, concentrate all the power of the patriarchs in the bishop of Rome, and form thus the Papal system, which in the end degenerates into an insupportable despotism over the conscience. With the Reformation then arise new church constitutions, more suitable to the free genius of Protestantism; so, in particular, the government by Presbyteries and Synods.

Discipline is at one time strict, at another lax, according to the reigning spirit of the church, and the measure of her freedom or vassalage, as related to the civil power.

It is in this sphere particularly that the church comes into correspondence with the *State*, and this relation also has its own history, as subject to a great variety of forms. Either the State takes the attitude of hostility to the church, in the character of a persecuting heathen power, as in the first three centuries before the conversion of the emperor Constantine; or the church rules the State and becomes hierarchical, as in the case of Western Christendom in the Middle Ages, and as the case is still where the papacy is in full power; or the Christian State governs the church, and is Caesaro-papistic, on the principle *cujus regio ejus religio*; so in the case even of the Byzantine emperors, who had a great deal to do with the outward, and also with the inward, affairs of the Greek church, and then more fully in the case of a number of Protestant countries since the sixteenth century. Or finally, State and church are independent of one another and each is left to its own free course; the order which prevails in the United States, and that seems latterly to be making way for itself also in Europe.

6. Lastly, we have still to notice the history of *divine service* or *worship*. The essential elements of it, appointed by Christ himself, are the preaching of God's word and the administration of the holy sacraments. But the way and manner of preaching, of religious instruction, of administering the sacraments, has again its history. In addition to this, the church appoints sacred places and sacred times, produces prayers, liturgies, hymns, chorals, and all sorts of significant symbolic forms and actions, enters into alliance with the fine arts, especially architecture, painting, music, and poetry, and makes them tributary to the purposes of worship. Often the service is rich, overlaid indeed, as in the Roman church, which seeks to work upon the mind by imposing symbols, by outward show and pomp, particularly in the mass. Or it is simple and sober, as for instance in the Puritan churches. Again, each single branch of worship has its separate history. There is a history thus of the pulpit, of catechetical instruction, of liturgies, of church building, of religious sculpture and painting, of sacred poesy and music, etc. Here also much still remains to be done, especially in the department of Christian art. *Hase* is the only one properly among general church historians, who has brought it into the range of his description; and he too is confined, by the narrow size of his manual, to short though spirited sketches. Often the history of church government and worship is thrown together, under the name of Christian *archaeology*, which is then usually limited to the first six centuries, as the period of the origin and settlement of church forms and laws. The most important works here are *Bingham's Antiquities*

of the Christian Church, which have been translated also into Latin, and the later Archaeologies of *Augusti* (full in 12 volumes, abridged in 3), *Rheinwald*, *Böhmer* and *Siegel*. From all this, we may see easily the rich and manifold nature of church history, as well as the difficulty of properly mastering its immense material.

As regards now however the treatment in detail, it will not do to carry out rigidly everywhere this six-fold division, unless we choose to become pedantic and interrupt the natural order of things. In the age of the Reformation, for instance, the different spheres, particularly the outward course of events and the development of doctrine, run so actively into one another, that a strict distribution of the matter under different heads, would do violence to the history, and hinder more than promote a clear view of it. Nor will it answer to follow always the same order, but in each period, that interest should be placed foremost which in reality is found to take the lead. Thus, for instance, the development of doctrine stands, in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries, almost entirely still, and must take, in this period, accordingly, only a very subordinate rank. At the same time, however, the division and treatment of the matter, in the different periods, will depend very much of course on the disposition of the historian and the end he has particularly in view.

§ 10. Sources of Church History.

Whatever may serve to furnish information, more or less accurate, on the external and internal acts and fortunes of the church, is to be reckoned among the sources of its history. The degree of its credibility and trustworthiness, criticism must determine on outward and inward grounds. We may distinguish in general between *immediate* and *mediate* sources.

A. The IMMEDIATE OR DIRECT SOURCES, as being the pure original utterance of history itself, are the most important, and fall again into :

a. *Written*. Here belong,

1. *Official reports and documents*. Of special weight among these are the *acts of councils*;¹ then the *official letters of bishops*, particularly the *bulls of the popes*.² These decrees and bulls refer to all

¹ Of these we have several collections; the best, by *Mansi*: *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*. Florent. et Venet. 1759 sqq. in 31 folio volumes. (For the history of our American churches, also, synodical transactions are, in like manner, the most authentic immediate source.)

² Of these, too, there are various collections; one of particular note by *Cocquelinus*: *Bullarum amplissima collectio*. Rom. 1739. 28 t. fol., and *Magni bullarii continuatio* (1758—1830), collegit Andr. Advocatus Barbieri. Rom. 1835 sq.

sections of church history, but especially to doctrine and government. For single sections, again, there are special documentary sources. For dogmatic history first of all the *confessions of faith*, in which the church doctrine is enunciated in *normative* style;¹ for the history of the Christian life, the different *monastic rules*;² for the history of worship, the *liturgies*;³ for the history of ecclesiastical polity, the civil ordinances of the Byzantine, Frank, and German princes referring to the church.⁴

2. *Inscriptions*; particularly over graves. These frequently throw light on particular facts, the birth and death of distinguished men, their deeds, etc. and are characteristic for the spirit of the age. They are not, however, of as much value for church history, as for certain parts of profane.⁵

3. *Private writings of historical actors*. So for the history of the ancient church, the works of the apologists and church fathers are of the greatest account; for the history of the Middle Ages, the works of the schoolmen and mystics; for the history of the Reformation, the works of the reformers and their Roman adversaries. They give us the most lively image of their authors and their age. Here however it is necessary to weigh beforehand, in the scales of careful and thorough criticism, the genuineness of the authorities, so as not to be misled by any false light. Especially needful is this in the case of written monuments of the second and third centuries, when a multitude of apocryphal writings were forged; which are themselves indeed characteristic, only not for the names they are made falsely to represent, but for the heretical tendencies rather out of which they have sprung.

¹ A collection of the older symbols is given by *C. W. F. Walch*, in his *Bibliotheca symbolica vetus*. Lemgo. 1770; and recently by *A. Hahn*: *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der apost. Kath. Kirche*. Breslau. 1842. The Confessions of the Lutheran church are found complete in the editions of *Rechenberg* and *Hahn*; those of the Reformed church in the *Collectio Confessionum*, etc. by *Niemeyer*. Leipzig. 1840.

² *L. Holstenius*: *Codex regularum Monasticarum*. Rom. 1661. 3 t. enlarged by *Brockie* a. 1759. 6 t.

³ *Comp. Assemani*: *Codex liturgicus ecclesiae universalis*. Rom. 1749. 13 t. — *Renoudot*: *Liturgiarum orientalium collectio*. Par. 1716. 2 t. — *Muratori*: *Liturg. rom. vetus*. Venet. 1748. 2 t.

⁴ The laws of the Roman emperors may be found in the *Codex Theodosianus* and *Cod. Justinianus*; those of the Frank kings in *Baluzii Collectio capitularium regum Frankorum*. Par. 1677; those of the German emperors in *Haiminsfeldii Collectio constitutionum imperialium*. Frcf. 1713.

⁵ Collections of such inscriptions are, for instance, *Ciampini Vetera Monumenta*. Rom. 1747. 3 t. fol.; *Jucutii Christ. antiquitatum specimina*. Rom. 1752 4 t.; *F. Munter's Sinnbilder und Kunstvorstellungen der Alten Christen*. Altona. 1825.

So again it is necessary also to have at hand correct and complete editions.¹

b. *Unwritten.* Here belong works of art; particularly church edifices, and religious paintings. The religious domes of the Middle Ages, for instance, are an embodiment of the gigantic spirit of that period; they may be taken as a commentary on the reigning apprehension at the time of Christianity and the church, and are so far of the greatest importance for the historian.

B. The **MEDIATE OR INDIRECT SOURCES** are:

1. Before all, *the reports and representations of historical writers.* These do not give us the history as it is in its own originality, like the immediate sources, but its subjective apprehension, in the way of exposition and commentary. Among such reports, those of course must take the first place, which proceed from eye and ear witnesses, whether friends or foes; in which case indeed they approximate closely to the character of direct sources. The measure of their worth depends, as all may see, on the trustworthiness and capacity of their authors. Weighty in this way are, for the Apostolic period, for instance, the Acts of the Apostles by St. Luke, aside even from their canonical authority; for the history of the early persecutions, the reports of the churches at Smyrna and Lyons; for the age of Constantine, the historical works of Eusebius; for the Middle Ages, the annals and chronicles of the monks; for the Reformation, Spalatin's *Annales reformationis*, the biographies of Luther by Melanchthon and Matthesius, Sleidan's *Commentarii*, etc.

Historians who have lived after the events they narrate, may be regarded also as sources, when they have drawn upon reliable documents, monuments, and *autoptic* reports, which are subsequently either lost altogether, or at least placed beyond our reach, (as in the case partly with the treasures of the Vatican library). Among these, the biographies of particular men, who have stood high in the church, take an important place. Such biographies, of the martyrs particularly and saints, we have in great number.²

¹ Of all the more important church fathers there are good editions, particularly from the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century. (See Walch's *Bibliotheca patristica*.) There are also valuable collections of patristic literature; as, *Maxima bibliotheca veterum patrum*, etc. Lugd. 1677. 28 t. fol.; and, *Galkandi: Bibliotheca vet. patrum antiquorumque scriptorum ecclesiast.*, postrema lugdunensi locupletior. Venet. 1765—88. 14 t. fol.

² The most important collection of the sort, which however by reason of the fables mixed with it needs to be used with great caution, is found in the *Acta Sanctorum*, quotquot toto orbe coluntur, edd. Bolandus et alii (Bollandistae). Antwerp.

2. Among the mediate sources, finally, may be reckoned also, although of very subordinate consequence, oral *traditions*, *legends*, and *popular sayings*; so far at least as they are characteristic of the history of the time, in which they had their origin. So, for example, the saying throughout the Middle Ages, that the church since her union with the State under Constantine had lost her virginity; the saying which arose in the time of the Hohenstaufen, that Frederick II. would return, or that an eagle would rise out of his ashes, to destroy the papacy, showing an early opposition to Romanism on the part of the common German mind.

§ 11. *Substitute for Study of Sources.*

For the historian a critical acquaintance with at least the principal sources is indispensable; and this requires again a vast amount of preliminary knowledge, in particular a most intimate acquaintance with the Greek and Latin languages, in which for the most part the direct sources are offered for use.¹ For general need however, and for common practical ends, such works may answer as are founded on a thorough study of the sources. Especially worthy of commendation among the modern works of that kind, are the church histories of *Neander* and *Giesel*, neither of which however is yet completed. Neander combines with the most extensive reading, particularly in patristic literature, the finest sense of truth and justice, an inward sympathy with all forms and types of the Christian spirit and life, a great talent for apprehending and delineating genetically the spirit of leading persons and tendencies, and a lovely, child-like religious spirit and sincerity; qualities altogether, which have won for him deservedly the title, father of modern church history, and almost cause us to forget the faults of his immortal work—among which must be reckoned particularly the carelessness and frequently wearisome diffuseness of his style. Giesel's text is very lean, and betrays rather an untoward,

1693—1794, in 53 folio volumes. They are composed by Jesuits, and arranged after the days of the months, reaching to the 6th of October. The apparatus for this work embraces alone about 700 manuscripts, which are found in a castle of the province of Antwerp.

¹ Not these languages indeed in their classic purity. The ecclesiastical Greek and Latin, accordingly, is not to be learned out of the usual grammars and lexicons alone, but other helps must be called in, such as *Suicer's Thesaurus ecclesiasticus e patribus graecis*; *Carol. du Fresno's (Dom. du Cange) Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae graecitatis* (Lugd. 1688. 2 t. fol.); also his *Glossarium ad scr. med. et inf. latinitatis* (Par. 1733—36. 6 t. fol.) Other editions, with *Carpentier's* supplement, in 4 vols. folio.

spiritless apprehension of history; his work is made invaluable, however, by the rich extracts from the sources, selected with vast diligence and skill, which occupy by far the most room, and place the reader in a situation to form his own judgment.

Of smaller works, *Guericke* and *Hase* are best for manual use. *Guericke's* work is just of the right size (3 volumes) for commencing students, and gives the principal matter in a comprehensive and pious form; the best parts of it however, down to the time of the Reformation, are due to the work of Neander, and it stands, subsequently to this epoch, so much in the service of bigoted Lutheranism, and blind hatred towards the Reformed church, that this must hinder its usefulness, out of Germany especially, far more even than its cumbersome and tasteless style. *Hase* is, among all that have been named, by far the most gifted writer of history. He has an extraordinary talent for spirited individual delineation, and can, with a few masterly touches, characterize a whole age. So much the more to be lamented is it, that his admirable genius should not be baptized fully in the element of faith.

Along with such general works however, should be consulted particularly also the many extremely instructive and interesting monographies of German scholarship on distinguished theologians and their times; as these serve to bring minuteness into our view, and in many cases almost supercede the necessity of a study of sources. Such monographies we have on Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Gregory the Great, Anselm, Bernhard of Clairvaux, Hugo of St. Victor, Gregory VII, Innocent III, Alexander III, those on the Forerunners of the Reformation, on almost all the Reformers, on Spener, Franke, Zinzendorf, Bengel, etc.; so again on the most weighty portions of the dogmatic history, on single divisions and periods of the church. This monographic literature moreover is constantly on the increase; as German diligence in particular, especially since Neander here also has led the way, is adding almost every year some new work of value to those already on hand, and is not likely to rest till every nook and corner of church history is explored and the entire past made near to us by living reproduction.

§ 12. *Method of writing Church History.*

We are next to inquire, how the material of church history is to be arranged and represented.

I. As regards *external* method, or the disposition of the matter,

it is best to unite the order of *time* with that of *things*. The *chronological* or *synchronistic* method, which has been in much favor heretofore, is very external and mechanical, when carried out by itself, whether by years, according to Fleury, or by centuries, as with Mosheim. History sinks in this way to a mere chronicle, and the flow of events is broken, so that things are sundered which should go together, and not unfrequently things brought together which should be held apart, all in obedience to the artificial rule of time. No less unsuitable however is the use, exclusively, of the order of *subjects* or *things*, where the matter is distributed under certain heads, as missions, doctrine, government, etc., and each head pursued without regard to the rest, from the beginning down to the present time. History in this way is turned into a number of independent and separate parallel lines; allowing no insight into the interior connections and relations of the different departments, no proper apprehension of any period as a whole.

In view of these disadvantages on either side, it is desirable so to unite the two methods, that we may have the benefit of both. This we may do, by following indeed the course of time, but in such way that the division here shall depend on the character and order of the events, and the same subject be followed out still to its relative close, without any concern to have this coincident exactly with the end of a year or century or any other fixed period. The entire history is thus divided into certain periods answerable to its actual course itself, to satisfy the chronological interest; while within these periods, the matter is treated under particular sections or heads, as many as each period may need, to satisfy the order of things.

2. The *internal* method of the historian is the *genetic* or *evolutionary*; which consists in this, that the history is made to reproduce itself according to nature, or to represent itself exactly as it has occurred. This method differs on the one hand from simple narration, which puts together mere outward facts and names, without rising to general views and philosophical observations, and on the other hand from *a priori* construction, which adjusts history to a preconceived scheme, and for the spirit of a past age substitutes its own spirit. The historian must give himself up in full to his object; first inquiring accurately and conscientiously into the state of facts, in the next place living himself into the spirit of the time which has produced the facts, and then representing both, the facts filled with their own spirit and life, in such way that the whole process of development may repeat itself before the eyes of the reader, and the actors appear clothed in real flesh and blood. History is neither altogether body, nor altogether soul, but both in in-

dissoluble union; on which account both, as fact and idea, must be understood and brought into view. The older historians have done invaluable service in the way of collecting material, facts; but their works lack generally the character of living freedom. The modern historical school goes to the inmost marrow of history, the hidden springs of its life, and lays all open to our view. The two methods do not of necessity absolutely exclude each other, although each calls for a different kind of talent; but properly one completes the other, and the full force of history is reached only by their intimate union.

Truth and fidelity thus are the highest object of the historian; which, though as a fallible man he can never attain it in full, he is bound to keep continually before his eyes. He must divest himself of all prejudices, of all party interests, in order to bring the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, into the light of day. This does not imply, as some have pretended, that he must lay aside his own subjectivity, his character, nay his religion itself, and become a mere *tabula rasa*. For in the first place this is a downright impossibility, since a man can have no knowledge without the exercise of his own thinking and judgment; and it is plain besides, that those precisely who boast most of their philosophical *inoccupation*, as for instance Strauss in his notorious "Leben Jesu," are of all others most completely preoccupied with opinions and principles, by which they affect to master history instead of sitting as docile scholars at her feet. Then again, the very first condition of all knowledge is an active sympathy already at hand with the object to be known. He that would know the truth, must himself stand in the truth; only the philosopher can understand philosophy, the poet poetry, the religious man religion. So also the church historian must live and move in the spirit of Christianity in order to do justice to his subject. And since Christianity is the centre of the world's life and of truth itself, it unlocks also the sense of all other history. We cannot say then, that according to the same rule only a heathen can understand heathenism, only a Jew Judaism, and only a rationalist rationalism; for only from a higher position can we command a full view also of all below, and not the reverse; and only by the truth can we understand error, whereas error cannot be said at all to understand even itself. *Verum index sui et falsi*. But paganism over against Christianity is a false religion, and whatever of truth there may be in it, such as the longing it includes after redemption, finds precisely in Christianity its own fulfilment. The same is true of sects, as related to the central power of truth in the church. And so far as Judaism is concerned, it is just a direct preparation for Christianity; this is its completion, and it is thus more

intelligible for the Christian than for the Jew, in the same way that the man is able to understand the child, while the child can have no proper understanding of himself. Whence Augustine says with full right: *Novum Testamentum in vetere latet, Vetus in Novo patet.*

The objectivity then which the historian is bound to aim at always, though he may never reach it fully in this life, is the truth itself, as it is to be found only in Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. This truth is inseparable at the same time from righteousness, and allows no partiality, no violation of the *suum cuique*, to come into view.

§ 13. *Division of Church History.*

The development of the church has different stadia or life-stages, which are styled *periods*. The close of one period and beginning of another is an *epoch*, properly a stopping-place (*ἐποχή*). This marks the entrance of a new principle; and an epoch-forming event or idea, is such as introduces a new course of development. So for instance, the first feast of Pentecost; the conversion of St. Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles; the destruction of Jerusalem; the union of church and State under Constantine; the rise of Gregory VII; the posting of his ninety-five theses by Luther; Calvin's appearance in Geneva; the succession of queen Elizabeth to the throne; the landing of the Puritan pilgrims at Plymouth; the appearance of Spener, Zinzendorf, Wesley; the breaking out of the French Revolution; the year 1848, etc. A period is the circuit (*περίοδος*) between two epochs, or the time within which a new idea or view of the world comes to its evolution. Among periods themselves, however, we may distinguish greater and smaller. The greater periods we will style, for the sake of clearness, *ages*, or if it be preferred, world-ages. A new age we will allow to commence, by a vast scale of productive contemplation, where the church not only passes into an entirely new outward state, but the stream of her inward life also is brought to assume a wholly different direction. Such an age then falls again into a number of sections or periods in the narrower sense, each of which represents and unfolds some particular side of the general principle which rules the age.

We divide now the whole history of the church down to the present time into three ages, and each age again into three periods; from which we derive the following scheme, or universal index, in the way of preliminary survey and preparation.

FIRST AGE: The *Primitive* church, or the Graeco-Latin (Oriental and Occidental) Universal church, from its foundation on the day of Pentecost, to Gregory the Great, embracing thus the first six centuries (to 590).

First Period: The Apostolic church, to the death of the apostles.

Second Period: The church under persecution (*ecclesia pressa*), to the sole sovereignty of Constantine (311).

Third Period: The church in the Graeco-Roman empire, under the barbarian flood, to Gregory the Great (590).

SECOND AGE: The church of the *Middle Ages*, or the *Romano-Germanic* church, from Gregory the Great to the Reformation (590—1517).

Fourth Period: Commencement of the Middle Ages, the Planting of the church among the Germanic nations, to the time of Gregory VII. (1073).

Fifth Period: Bloom of the Middle Ages, summit of the papacy, monasticism, scholastic and mystic theology, to Boniface VIII. (1294).

Sixth Period: Dissolution of the Middle Ages and Preparation for the Reformation, to 1517.

THIRD AGE: The *Modern* church, or the *Evangelical Protestant* church, over against the Roman, to the present time.

Seventh Period: The Reformation, or Productive Protestantism (16th century).

Eighth Period: Self-consolidating or Scholastic Protestantism (17th century and first part of the 18th).

Ninth Period: Negative Protestantism (Rationalism and sect spirit), and introduction to a new age (from middle of the 18th century to this time).

§ 14. General Character of the Three Ages of Church History.

A full justification of this division, in its details, can be found only in church history itself. It is in place here, however, to establish in some measure the authority of the main division into three ages, by a preliminary exposition of their general character.

I. The *Ancient* church, from her foundation to the close of the sixth century, has her local theatre in the countries immediately around the Mediterranean sea; namely in Western Asia (particularly Palestine and Asia Minor), in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, southern Gaul), and in Northern Africa (Egypt, Numidia, etc.), in the very centre, thus, of the old world and its heathen culture. Proceeding

from the bosom of the Jewish nation, Christianity even in the age of the apostles effected a settlement in the Greek and Roman nationality, and this national basis reaches through the whole first age; which we have good ground thus to style the *Graeco-Roman* or *Oriental and Occidental*. In the first place, it has a mighty conflict to sustain with Judaism and Paganism, this too under its most cultivated and powerful form. Hence a weighty part falls to the history of the diffusion of Christianity, and also to the history of the church's persecutions, in part by the Roman sword, in part also by Grecian science and art. In this conflict, however, the church triumphs, through her moral strength displayed in life and death, and her new view of the world. She appropriates the classical language and culture, fills them with Christian contents, and produces the magnificent literature of the fathers, which has been of fruitful force also for all later periods. The Oriental or Greek church occupies the foreground, as the principal bearer of the movement. She unfolds in this age her highest power and fairest blossoms, particularly in the explanation and settlement of the objective fundamental doctrines of Christ's divinity and that of the Holy Ghost, and of the blessed Trinity; the Greek dialectics being made here to do good service; whence her complacency in the title of the *orthodox* church. Still the Latin church also comes into view, especially the African, from the time of Tertullian, and takes the lead indeed, through Augustine, in the great anthropological controversies.

This age is, in dogma, polity, and worship, fundamental for all following centuries, the common ground; out of which the later main branches of the church have sprung. In it the church presents to our view, even outwardly and visibly, an imposing free unity, which comprises in itself at the same time manifold differences; and commands admiration by the power she has to vanquish, not only outward foes, Judaism and Paganism, but inward foes also, the most dangerous errors and schisms, with the weapons of the Spirit and of truth.

2. The church of the *Middle Ages*, though in one view the product of the Primitive church, is still very different from this both outwardly and inwardly. In the first place, the theatre changes; it is carried forward towards the west and north, into the heart of Europe, into Italy, Spain, France, Britain, Germany, Scandinavia. The unity of the church is split into two great halves. The Eastern church, after her separation from the Western, loses more and more always her own vitality; stiffening in part into dead formalism, and in part making room for a new enemy from without, Mohammedanism, before which also the North African church gives way. This loss in the East however,

is compensated in the richest manner by a new gain in the **West**. The church here receives into itself an entirely new nationality, **barbarians** indeed at the start, but highly gifted and of vast native force, namely the *Germanic*, which descending from the North like an **overflowing deluge** on the inwardly rotten Roman empire, destroys with rude hand its political institutions and its treasures of learning, but at the same time founds upon its ruins a succession of new States full of energy and big with promise for the future. The church rescued from the rubbish the Roman language and culture, together with her own literature; christianized and civilized these rude tribes, especially from Rome out, which was then her centre; and so created the **Middle Ages**, in which the pope represented the highest spiritual, the German emperor the highest temporal power, and the church ruled all social relations and every popular movement in the West. This then is the age of *Romano-Germanic catholicism*. Here we meet the colossal creations of the papacy, in league or conflict with the German imperial power, of the monastic orders, of the scholastic and mystic divinity, of the Gothic architecture and other arts, vying with each other to adorn the worship of the church. But in this activity, the church loses sight more and more of her apostolical foundation, and is overrun with all sorts of human alloy and impure dross. The papacy becomes a despotism over men's minds, the school divinity degenerates into empty forms and useless subtleties, and the entire religious life takes a Pelagian, legal direction towards particular outward works, substituted for living faith in the only Saviour. Against this oppression of the hierarchy, with its human ordinances, reacts the deeper life of the church, the consciousness of evangelical freedom.

3. So after due preparation, not only without but also within the bosom of the mediaeval Catholicism, we are brought to the *Reformation* of the sixteenth century; which gives the stream of church history an altogether different direction, opening the way thus for an entirely new age, in whose evolution we ourselves are still comprehended. The *Modern* church has her theatre primarily in *Germany* and *Switzerland*, where the Reformation was born and inwardly matured. This itself impresses upon it, in a national respect, a predominantly German character. It spreads, however, with rapid triumph, into the *Scandinavian North*, into France, the Netherlands, England, Scotland, and at last into North America; which continues to unfold itself as a theatre of the kingdom of God, making room in itself for the good and bad powers of the old world, and representing the different tendencies of Protestantism along with the renovated life of Romanism in complicated confusion. As in the second age the Greek and Latin, so with

the beginning of the third age the Latin church falls asunder into two great halves, the Roman and the Protestant, the last branching into the Lutheran and Reformed confessions. And as in the Middle Ages the Roman Catholic church was the centre of all great movements, while the Greek remained motionless in an earlier position; so also Protestantism forms manifestly the central stream of modern history, and the activity of Romanism itself, though numerically the stronger interest, is conditioned mainly by the impulse it gains from the Protestant side. We have a right then to style this third age, from its leading character, the age of the *Evangelical Protestant* church.

§ 15. Continuation.

Taking these three ages in their most general relation to one another, we find a difference which may be best described by the philosophical distinction of objectivity and subjectivity.

The first age is the *immediate union of objectivity and subjectivity*; that is, we find the two great moral principles, on which all individual human life as well as all history turns, the authority of the general and the freedom of the single, in tolerable equipoise, but still in their first stadium only, without any clear sense of a determinate boundary between the two orders of existence. We meet in the ancient church a rich activity and manifoldness of the Christian life and of Christian science, also a great number of unsound excrescences, dangerous heresies and divisions. But over all these individual and national tendencies and views and characters, is felt the sway of the universal church mind, separating with sure instinct the false element, and in oecumenical councils settling doctrines and promulgating ecclesiastical laws, to which single Christians and nations submit.

Afterwards, however, these two principles of objectivity and subjectivity, the outward and the inward, the general and the single, authority and freedom, stand forward *onesidedly*; and in the nature of the case, the principle of *objectivity* first prevails. In the Catholic church of the Middle Ages, Christianity appears prevailingly under the character of law, as a power extending itself with outward domination over the whole life. We may call it thus the age of Christian legalism, of ecclesiastical authority. The free personality comes not here to its proper rights; it is bound slavishly in fixed objective rules and forms. The individual subject is of account, only so far as he is the organ and medium of the general spirit of the church; all secular powers, the State, science, art, are under the guardianship of the hierarchy, and must serve its ends throughout. It is the era emphatically of grand,

universal enterprises, colossal works, for whose completion the co-operation of nations and centuries is required; the time of the most perfect outward sovereignty of the visible church. Such a well ordered and imposing system of authority was necessary, at the same time as an educational institute for the Germanic nations, to form them to the consciousness and rational use of freedom; for parental discipline must go before independence, the law is a schoolmaster towards Christ. This consciousness awoke even before the close of the Middle Ages. In proportion as the dominion of Rome degenerated into tyranny over conscience and all free thought, the subjective and national spirit was roused into an endeavor to shake off the ignominious yoke.

All these struggles of waking freedom concentrated themselves finally into a world-historical movement, and assumed a religious determinate character by the Reformation of the sixteenth century. With this commences the age of *subjectivity* and *individuality*. Still the Reformers aimed to free the Christian world only from the oppressive authority of human ordinances, and not by any means from the authority of God; on the contrary they sought to bring reason into subjection to God's word, and the natural will into subjection to his grace. They wanted no licentiousness, but a freedom filled with the contents of faith and ruled by the Holy Scriptures. Inasmuch however as history, by reason of our human sinfulness and its constant attendant error, proceeds only through contradictions and extremes, the Protestant subjectivity degenerated gradually into its corresponding abuse of division, wilfulness, and contempt for all and every sort of authority. This has taken place especially since the middle of the last century, theoretically in Rationalism, and practically in Sectarism. Rationalism has formed itself into a learned and scientific system, particularly among the Germans, a predominantly theoretic and thinking people, and in the Lutheran church; but as to substance is at hand also in other European countries, and in North America, under various forms, such as Arminianism, Deism, Unitarianism, Universalism, and infects to some extent the theology even of the orthodox denominations themselves. As is well known, it places private judgment above the Bible itself, and receives only as much of this as it can grasp with the natural understanding. The system of sect and denomination has sprung more from the bosom of the Reformed church, and owes its form to the practical English nationality. In North America, under the banner of full religious freedom, it has reached its zenith; but strictly it belongs, in actual power, to Protestant Christianity as a whole, which is sadly wanting in unity, outward

visible unity, the necessary fruit of that which is inward, as much as works are of faith. Sects, it is true, do not commonly reject the Bible; rather they are stiff for it, in their own way; but it is in opposition to all history, and in the imagination that they alone, of all the world, are in possession of its true sense. Thus their appeal to the Bible still runs out at last practically into rationalism; since they always mean *their own sense* of the Bible, and so at bottom follow their private judgment. Finally, the principle of subjectivity shows itself in this, that since the Reformation the different spheres of the world, the sciences, arts, politics, social life, have separated themselves more and more from the church, and pursue their own way independently of its authority. In such wide spread rationalism and division into endless party interests, and the consequent weakness of the church over against the world, with its different spheres, especially over against the State, we have presented to us only a bad, diseased subjectivity, which forms just the opposite pole to the stiff, hard objectivity of degenerated Catholicism.

Against this evil state, however, reacts the deeper life of the church, which can never be extinguished. In opposition to Rationalism, arises with victorious conflict a new evangelical theology, which now satisfies the demands of science together with those of faith; while the misery of sect comes more and more into painful consciousness, and calls forth a longing for church union. At the same time, the question concerning the nature and form of the church presses evidently into the foreground. The deeper although by no means prevailing tendency of the time is thus towards objectivity; not however indeed towards that which had place in the Middle Ages; for history can as little flow backwards, as a stream up hill; but to an objectivity which shall be enriched with all the experience and manifold living fulness of the age of subjectivity, to a *higher reconciliation* thus, (*vermittelte Einheit*) of *Protestantism and Catholicism*, without their respective errors and diseases. These struggles of the present, when brought to due ripeness, will issue doubtless in a far more glorious reformation than any the church has yet seen; and then will open a new age, in which also all spheres of the world shall return, in a free way, into league with the church, science and art join to glorify the name of God, and all nations and powers, according to the word of prophecy, be given to the saints of the Most High.

ARTICLE II.

CEMETERIES.

By Rev. J. Richards, D. D., Hanover, N. H.

Hydriotaphia, Urn Burial, or a Discourse of the Sepulchral Urns lately found in Norfolk. By Thomas Browne, Doctor of Physic. London. Printed for Charles Brome, 1686. pp. 21 Fol.

The Church in the Catacombs: a Description of the Primitive Church of Rome, illustrated by its Sepulchral Remains. By Charles Maitland, M. D. London, 1846. pp. 312 8vo.

Le Veritable Guide et Conducteur aux Cimitieres du Pere La Chaise, Montmartre, Mont-Parnasse et Vangirard. Par M. M. Richard et * * *. Paris, 1836: Roy Terry, Editeur. pp. 360 18mo.

"It is the heaviest stone," says the sententious doctor of physic, Sir Thomas, "that melancholy can throw at a man, to tell him that he is at the end of his nature; or that there is no further state to come, unto which this seems professional, and otherwise made in vain." Hence the vast majority of men have endeavored to avert such missiles by cemeteries, monuments, cremations, embalmings, and obsequies of endless name. By these they testify to an innate conviction of another life, where thought and memory and affection shall survive. Antique sculpture at Rome (in Aedibus Barberinis) represents a man just arrived at the Elysian fields, holding out his hand to a shade whom he recognizes as his wife, and is mutually recognized by her. This expectation is common to Pagan and Christian, but with the Christian, how ennobled!

Again, it is a very heavy stone to be thrown at a man, as the knight might have gone on to say, to tell him there shall be no memory of him with posterity. Be it that "pyramids, arches, and obelisks are the irregularities of vain glory, and wild enormities of ancient magnanimity," it is a natural feeling and not to be despised, that there lived such a man as I myself. "Siste viator! Stop, traveller! and read, how I once lived as you now do. Haply, if you inquire, you may find *what* I was, as well as *who*, and in that knowledge something that claims kindred and challenges interest in yourself, beyond that of community of species. This feeling is in the humblest as in the loftiest; it raises the rude monument in the country church yard as it does the costly structure in the cemetery of the proud city. The lines

of Gray, in which rhythm and sweet melancholy blend so inimitably, are exactly to this point :

“For who to dumb forgetfulness a prey,
This pleasing, anxious being e'er resigned ?
Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day,
Nor cast one longing, lingering look behind ?”

Another heavy stone thrown at a man would it be, to tell him, “Your friends will show no outward marks of respect and affection for your mortal relics. They will carry you out to the Esquiline Hill and throw you into the deep pit's mouth with slaves and malefactors, or leave you to be devoured by dogs and vultures.” The man who laughs at obsequies ancient or modern, Pagan or Christian, has acquired an obtuseness of heart that should well nigh make him an outlaw from the community of sorrow and sympathy. The brutes do better when they bellow at the blood of their kindred. “Diogenes,” said one, “when you die, what shall be the disposition of your body ?” “Hang me up,” said the Cynic, “on a tree, with my staff in my hand, to scare away crows.” And Humanity says, “Let Diogenes be hung up ; but as for me and mine, I crave a better lot—my body, shrived and affectionately committed to the urn or grave, a thrice repeated Vale ! spoken, and a stone to mark the spot.” On this point, we own no part nor lot with Diogenes, but frankly avow that in the anticipation of the dread hour and the narrow cell, it affords a real consolation that surviving friends will make these outward demonstrations of affection and respect.

Nor may we despise that very prevalent feeling in the world in all ages, that, some way or other, a becoming funeral service foreshadows a better condition at the next stage. To throw a little earth upon an unburied body, was a sweet charity with the Roman ; it would save the otherwise cheerless shade a hundred years' wandering on the shores of Styx. The utensils and armor exhumed from the graves of our own aborigines, show a similar expectation. How they supposed the kettle, the pipe, the bow and the arrow were to get to the point of their own destination, is not the question. It is true, also, that Christianity scatters to the winds these fantasies of the heathen ; but considering them as connected with the innate conviction of immortality, with all their distortion and wantonness of imagination, they challenge our respect. May they not be connected with obscure but real tradition concerning a resurrection of the body ?

The Greek and Roman fables of Elysium, Tartarus, Charon, Styx, Minos, and his consensors, came from Egypt. According to the ear-

liest records, the burial place of the ancient Memphis was in an island of the adjacent lake, called Acherusia. On the shore sat a court of judges. If the character of the deceased, whose body was brought thither, had been good, the court permitted the funeral to proceed, and the body was ferried over to the island. The island was most tastefully ornamented with groves and shrubbery, and the place called Elisout—the blest. The court ordered a eulogy to be pronounced. But if the character of the deceased was bad, the body was ordered to be thrown into a loathsome ditch, with degrading ceremonies. The ditch was denominated Tartar—miserable. Hence the Greek and Roman *Tartarus*, as also from Elisout, *Elysium*.

In times after these, arose the art and mystery of embalming, invented by the Egyptians and by them lost, perhaps irrecoverably. Removing the more perishable parts, the brain and viscera, they filled the body with spices and other indurating substances, so that it seemed to defy equally the tooth of worms and of time. Indeed, judging from the fulness and freshness of those specimens exhibited in our country some four years since, it is not extravagant to say that the mummies of Egypt which shall escape the exhumation of curiosity and vandalism, will retain their identity of form and substance till the consummation of all things. This study of the Egyptians in the art of embalming, and in the time-defying character of their sepulchres, evinces an anxiety for the body which we think it will be difficult to explain short of the hypothesis of a resurrection.

The same sort of interest, it may be less in degree, we trace all along the course of time. The few handfuls of earth bestowed by a pious hand was, to the Greek and Roman, a boon of immeasurable value. In Rome, every person was considered as having both a legal and a moral right to burial, that is, to funeral rites; for it made no difference in respect to care for the body whether it were buried entire or burned. Among the Greeks both methods were practised, though burning chiefly. The Romans interred most, till the time of Sylla. This tyrant, fearing his successors would treat him as he had treated Marius, ordered his own body to be burned; and after that, burning became the more common mode. The Jews interred till the time of Asa; thence onward to the captivity, burning prevailed. But after the captivity, interment was again the only practice.

The occasion of our learned knight's essay was the digging up, in 1645, in the county of Norfolk, England, between forty and fifty earthen vases or urns, containing ashes and bones half consumed. These "were deposited in a dry and sandy soil, not a yard deep, nor far from one another: . . . some containing two pounds of bones, distin-

guishable in skulls, ribs, jaws, thigh-bones, and teeth, with fresh impressions of their combustion. Besides the extraneous substances, like pieces of small boxes, or combs handsomely wrought, handles of small brass instruments, brazen nippers, and in one some kind of opal. Near the same plot of ground, for about six yards compass, were digged up coals and incinerated substances, which begat conjecture that this was the *Ustrina* or place of burning their bodies, or some sacrificing place unto the *manes*." "The present urns were not of one capacity, the largest containing above a gallon; some not much above half that measure; nor all of one figure, wherein there is no strict conformity, in the same or different countries; observable from those represented by Casalius, Bosio, and others, though all found in Italy. While many have handles, ears, and long necks, but most imitate a circular figure, in a spherical and round composure, whether from any mystery, best duration, or capacity, were but a conjecture. But the common form with necks was a proper figure, making our last bed like our first; nor much unlike the urns of our nativity, while we lay in the nether part of the earth, and inward vault of our microcosm."

As no inscriptions were found on these urns, their date was uncertain. From all the circumstances, our author concludes they might have belonged to the Romans of Agricola's time, as not far from the place is an ancient Roman camp; or they might have been the deposit of more ancient Britons, since it is evident from Tacitus and others that the Gauls, Germans, and Scandinavians burned their dead bodies; or, finally, they may have dated from the era of the Antonines, and so have been at least thirteen hundred years old. Whoever the proprietors of these relics may have been, no question they were deposited by anxious, sorrowing friends, with many tears and affectionate remembrances, and with hopes of some sort reaching far into the future. What the fundamental idea of the practice of burning was, can hardly be determined by us. The absolute ashes of a dead body bear but a small proportion to the whole solidity, the greater part flying off in a gaseous form. Nor do the discourses of Cicero and other ancient philosophers enlighten us much when they talk of the fiery nature of the soul, and how it seeks the upper regions according to the laws of specific gravity. The fable and emblem of the Phoenix too, which often graced the urn, give us but the general idea of a life beyond the present, and no clue to the careful preservation of the ashes.

More significant are the "extraneous substances—small boxes, combs handsomely wrought, bundles of small brass instruments, etc.,"

found in the urns ; and especially the analogous things so often found in the graves of our own aborigines. Well do we remember looking at and sadly contemplating a mass of skulls and other bones, mingled with domestic utensils and warlike implements, the relics of an Indian burying ground, exhumed by the excavations made for a public canal. Tradition from the last of the tribe held that on that same spot there had been fought a bloody battle between their own and a neighboring tribe. What was the origin of this custom ? Why put the bow and lance, the kettle and the ornament, in the grave with the body ? No probable answer seemed returned but this. These people, or their ancestors who taught them, believed in a resurrection of the body. In some way, however inexplicable, they believed their immortal part would again visit the body and be reunited ; and that they would use again the implements of their former life.

A deeper conviction of the same comes from those mummies of Egypt, whose date reaches back three thousand and perhaps four thousand years ago. And especially when we connect them with their complicated infoldings, their sarcophagi, and the colossal structures of catacombs and pyramids, built for their reception. Desire to perpetuate a name might be a sufficient motive among the great ones of the earth, the Pharaohs and their prime ministers ; but we can hardly think so of the multitude. Again, respect and affection for friends, we should think, would be satisfied with obsequies which did not forecast for thousands of years. But here we see a whole nation, from the prince to the peasant, preserving with most careful solicitude the mortal part, and successfully too, as if in expectation of its living again. From the whole history of funeral rites that come to us from every source, we cannot avoid the conviction that the doctrine of a resurrection was entertained in the earliest ages, and has permeated the religious notions of every tribe. Distorted and woefully confused these notions have been, it is true. In Egypt, by the doctrine of the metempsychosis ; in Greece and Rome, by the fables of Elysium and Tartarus, by Charon and Styx, and the *umbra* retaining the form of its earthly partner ; in more barbarous tribes, confused by vague conceptions, but the generic idea is there. Not merely does the soul survive the body, but it shall be united to it again.

In confirmation of this connection, we hesitate not to adduce the passage in Job : " O that my words were now written ! O that they were printed in a book ! That they were graven with an iron pen and lead, in the rock for ever ! For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth : And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God :

Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another; though my reins be consumed within me."

Mr. Barnes has reasoned ingeniously on this passage to show that it does not contain even an allusion to a resurrection. But after attentively considering his reasons, we dissent from his conclusion and adhere to our first impressions. He admits that our translators believed it affirmed a resurrection, that the Vulgate, Septuagint, Chaldee, and Syriac versions favor it, that almost the united body of plain, sober-minded Christians have so received it, and that even the original, by itself, is not inconsistent with it. And he seems to admit also that if one letter were changed in the word מִבְּשָׁרִי, so that instead of reading מִבְּשָׁרִי, which even Herder renders "in my living body," but which Roesenmüller translates *absque carne mea*, "without my flesh," it read, בְּבָשָׁרִי, *in my flesh*, it would necessarily imply a resurrection. He has also had a sore conflict with his first impressions. But inasmuch as the original, fairly interpreted and translated, does not necessarily imply a resurrection; as it is inconsistent with the argument and scope of the book, because if so understood, it would have settled the controversy between Job and his friends; as it is inconsistent with numerous passages where Job expresses a contrary belief; as the doctrine is not referred to by the other speakers in the argument; as it would be inconsistent with the views of the age in which Job lived (the Abrahamic age); and as the exigencies of the argument are met by the supposition that it refers to some such event as is recorded in the close of the book: therefore, his conclusion. He also asserts in his "Introduction," that the knowledge and views of Old Testament saints in respect to a *future state* (the whole future state, if we understand him) were so very dim, that this life was immeasurably preferable; the scattered rays in the future serving only to render the horrible sights more horrible. He appeals to Ps. vi. and lxxxviii. and to Hezekiah's prayer, Isa. xxxviii., to Job 10: 20—22, etc.

Now it seems to us that Mr. Barnes wholly overlooks one commentator who should be heard and who should modify his views on this whole subject. We mean the apostle Paul in Heb. xi. Paul says Abraham forsook home and country, became a stranger in a strange land, and met cheerfully innumerable privations and trials, *because* he looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God: a city not here, but beyond. Sarah also had similar faith; it gave her the strength of conception when past age, and being the wife of Abraham, it is not likely the "city which hath foundations" was out of the circumference of her faith. These all (Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Sarah) died in faith, not having received here what they

expected—the city among other things and chiefly—but were persuaded of its existence, and embraced it and confessed themselves strangers and pilgrims here. They who say such things declare plainly that they *seek* a country. Had they preferred this, they could have had their choice, and taken their fill ; but now they desire a better country, *that is, an heavenly*. Abrahah offered up Isaac, believing God was able to raise him from the dead, that is, that if he had struck the fatal blow, God would have raised him to life on the altar, or from the ashes, from which he did in a figure—all but—receive him. It could have been no great stretch of faith to have passed on to a resurrection after his natural death ; and the words, *in a figure*, convey an intimation of such an event. Moses chose affliction with God's people rather than the pleasures, treasures, and honors of Egypt's court, because he had respect to the recompense of the reward ; which in this connection must mean, at least involve, the city which hath foundations, to which Abraham looked. Finally, Paul says of the ancient martyrs—those of Manasseh's time doubtless, as well as those of Antiochus Epiphanes, that they accepted not deliverance, looking for a better *resurrection*.

Paul then does say clearly, in this chapter, that Old Testament saints, those of Abraham's age, had clear views of a future state and not dim ; and in saying this, we may still say the New Testament has shed a flood of light on the subject. Paul does say also that Old Testament saints believed in a resurrection. We offset Paul, therefore, against David and Hezekiah and Job in his contrary assertions, that is, we offset Paul against those *interpretations* of the former which make their gloomy forebodings cover the whole future state. And we think if writers would distinguish more between the intermediate state, for such a state there is between each one's death and the consummation, those gloomy passages would not appear so formidable. Let us add that the New Testament itself has but few passages on that intermediate state, which makes those three, viz. " To die is gain," " This day shalt thou be with me in paradise," and the parable of the Rich man and Lazarus, inestimably precious. At the same time it does speak of the transition from the intermediate state to the resurrection state as one of great exaltation and desirableness.

To proceed. We believe that, however superstition and fable may have obscured the subject in the minds of Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, and barbarous nations, traces of a resurrection are to be found. In short, we believe God revealed it to Adam ; and that Abraham, who rejoiced to see Christ's day and saw it and was glad, was acquainted with it. And in this view we read, with ever fresh delight, the con-

secration of that first cemetery of which we have any authentic record.

Abraham was a wanderer. In the country of Chaldaea he was born; there, in the dew of his youth, he married Sarah; with her, in company with his father, he emigrated to Haran on the Upper Euphrates; from thence, at the call of God, he went to Canaan, and we next hear of him at Mamre, whose pleasant valley attracted him. Here dwelt Abraham and Sarah with strangers; here they saw God and his angels; here, together, they walked with God in holy reverence, and with one another in kindest affection. From this spot they often made excursions, as the necessities of herds and flocks led them, now to Egypt, now to Philistia, now to the cities of the Plain; but ever returning to the delightful valley between converging hills, where they had seen the burning lamp and smoking furnace, pledges of the great promise; where they had entertained angels with a kid from their flock, and cakes from their storehouse; whither Abraham had returned joyful from Moriah with the son of promise raised "in a figure" from the dead. What a meeting must this have been with the wife of his affections, when he told her of the sorrowful journey, and the guileless but most touching inquiry of Isaac, "Behold the fire and the wood, but where is the lamb for the burnt offering?" No wonder that Mamre, the same is Hebron, became endeared to them through so many wonderful events and tender associations.

At length the days of mourning come. The longest life will have an end. Behold, Sarah dies! the companion of his travels, the partner of his joys, the soother of his sorrows, probably for more than a hundred years. For "Sarah was an hundred and seven and twenty years old, and she died in Kirjath-Arba, the same is Hebron. And Abraham came to mourn for Sarah and to weep for her," he gave the parting kiss, he closed her eyes, the patriarch wept over the corpse of his beloved.

"And Abraham stood up from before his dead and spake unto the sons of Heth, 'I am a stranger and a sojourner with you: give me,' that is, sell me, 'a possession of a burying-place with you, that I may bury my dead out of my sight.' And they said, 'Hear us, my lord: thou art a mighty prince among us,' thou hast gained our entire respect and confidence though a stranger, 'in the choice of our sepulchres bury thy dead; none of us shall withhold his sepulchre,' " we scorn to sell thee a place, so free is our heart. At this respectful generosity the patriarch stood up and bowed himself to the people of the land: "If it be your mind that I bury my dead out of my sight, hear me, and entreat for me to Ephron the son of Zohar, that he may

give me the cave of Machpelah which he hath, which is in the end of his field." But Ephron, in his sympathy, emulates the generosity of his brethren; calling them to witness, he declares he will not sell his field, but will make a whole present of it. Again the patriarch bowed himself before them and said to Ephron, "If thou wilt part with it, I pray thee hear me. I will give thee money for it: take it of me, and I will bury my dead," not without. And when, hardly persuaded, Ephron named a price, Abraham weighed to him the silver which he had named, "four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant."

"No mean salary of Judas,"¹ the father of the faithful offers for the last resting place of his bosom friend. Moreover he wants it for a possession, a possession of permanency, confirmed by solemn contract. For here he intends to lie down himself at the end of his now hastening career: with the wife of his bosom he means to rest, with her he means to rise. Not only respect and affection moved Abraham to act thus, in establishing a burial place for his family, but religion also.

"And the field of Ephron," the account proceeds, "which was in Machpelah, before Mamre, the field and the cave therein, and all the *trees* that were in the field, that were in all the borders round about, were made sure unto Abraham in the presence of the children of Heth, before all that went in at the gate, for a possession of a burying place." And there Abraham buried Sarah his wife in the cave. There Isaac and Ishmael buried Abraham; there Isaac buried Rebecca; there Jacob and Esau buried Isaac; there Jacob buried Leah; and there the sons of Jacob, going up from Egypt in solemn procession, buried him. And there the relics remain, as we believe, to this day, preserved by the providence of God, guarded by the Argus eyes of a race that as yet possess no part or lot in the spiritual blessings which pertain to Abraham and his seed. There the old quadrangle, with its massive limestone walls and peculiar pannel-work indentations, identifying it with a very remote age, most likely David's, still protects the relics. And there probably it will stand as long as time endures. As if God had set his own seal to the original consecration, and had thus given example and authority to all succeeding ages, to regard piously the earthly tabernacle of his noblest creation, and preserve it for a higher destiny.

¹ But Plato seemed too frugally politic, who allotted no larger monument than would contain four heroic verses, and designed the most barren ground for sepulture: Though we cannot commend the goodness of that sepulchral ground that was set at no higher rate than the mean salary of Judas.—*Hydriotaphia*, ch. 3.

The next most interesting cemetery in the world (always excepting Calvary), is doubtless the catacombs of Rome. It was in the year 1841 that Maitland obtained the materials of his work by actual inspection of inscriptions in the Vatican and consulting the best works. The origin of the catacombs is as follows. The subsoil of Rome is a formation of loose, sandy rock of various solidity, in which tufa and puzzolana prevail. These furnished materials for building the city, both stone and cement. To obtain these materials, pits were dug and subterranean galleries run, following often the veins of puzzolana. By the latter times of the republic, these pits and galleries had become very numerous and extensive, reaching even miles around the city, as on the Appian Way. A celebrated locality was on the Esquiline hill, where, as Sir Thomas Browne observes, "abject corps were huddled forth and carelessly burnt without the Esquiline Port." And Horace, Sat. 1. 8, compliments Macænas for reclaiming this offensive place and converting it into beautiful gardens. "Before, the cast out bodies of slaves were brought here by their fellow servants to be deposited in ill made coffins, in narrow cells. This place was the common sepulchre for the dregs of the people. . . . Now it is possible to live on the wholesome Esquiline, and bask on its sunny banks: where lately the ground, covered with whitening bones, was enough to produce melancholy."

These caves and subterranean galleries became the refuge of the Christians during the persecutions, say from the year 98 to the accession of Constantine, more than two hundred years. From their number, their intricacies, and their darkness, they furnished a comparatively safe retreat. Jerome visited them in the middle of the fourth century. He says, "I used to go down into the crypts dug in the heart of the earth, where the walls on either side are lined with the dead; and so intense is the darkness that we almost realize the words of the prophet, 'They go down alive into hell (Hades).'" The caves first occupied by the Christians are supposed to be those near the present Basilica of St. Sebastian, now an object of general curiosity. During the heat of persecution, these caves became at once dwelling, temple, and sepulchre for the people of God. Some lived there for years—one individual, eight years successively. The galleries, first wrought for building materials, were enlarged by the Christians for their own purposes, according as they needed dwellings, tombs, and chapels. Sometimes they were pursued by the soldiery and surprised in the midst of their worship. The bishop Stephen, who lived thus years under ground, was surprised while ministering to his flock. He was thrust back into his Episcopal chair and beheaded in presence of his

people. The severest enactments were made, forbidding the Christians to resort to the catacombs, and they were hunted in these "dens and caves of the earth" like wild beasts.

When the Roman empire broke to pieces by the invasion of the barbarians, the catacombs were neglected. Building material was no longer needed for the city, nor refuge for the Christians. Their orifices were filled up and they slept a thousand years. In the latter part of the sixteenth century they were opened, through the zeal of the Papal church for relics, and all their sleeping treasures brought to light. Every marble containing an inscription, funereal or other, was examined, and three thousand slabs and more were removed, and plaistered into the ceiling of a long corridor at the entrance of the Vatican Museum. There the traveller may now walk and read, in order, the short and simple annals of these poor, 'of whom the world was not worthy.' "The fathers of the church," says Maitland, "live in their voluminous works; the lower orders are only represented by these simple records, from which, with scarcely an exception, sorrow and complaint are banished; the boast of suffering, or an appeal to the revengeful passions, is nowhere to be found." These show, too, "the distinction between the actual relics of a persecuted church, and the subsequent labors of a superstitious age."

What renders this exhibition more impressive is, that on the opposite side of the gallery are arranged, in a similar manner, a multitude of inscriptions taken from heathen monuments—the great, the noble, the mighty—here a Scipio, there a Marius, and again the leaders of a cohort or a legion, whose names once sounded in the ears of men. These are dedicated "To the Divine Manes," and are embellished with the symbols peculiar to the Roman mythology. The initials D. M. uniformly surmount the inscription. Nowhere, perhaps, can be found a more impressive illustration of the truth that Christianity has thrown a flood of light on the grave, than the contrast presented by these opposing walls of the Lapidarian Gallery. While the heathen inscriptions are uniformly full of gloom, and recognized not at all a resurrection, the Christian inscriptions beam with hope and the doctrine which sustained that hope. Usually a hieroglyph accompanies the inscription, consisting of the first two letters of the word *XPICTOΣ*, the *Rho* intersecting the *Chi* longitudinally. The palm leaf is a frequent accompaniment, sometimes simply, sometimes on a branch, and again a wreath, signifying victory over death, and a crown beyond this life. A vessel supporting a burning flame, is another emblem. The words *in peace* abound; also the words *he sleeps*. The following examples will give some idea.

VICTORINA DORMIT.

"Victorina sleeps."

ZOTICUS HIC AD DORMIENDUM.

"Zoticus laid here to sleep."

DORMITIO ELPIDIS.

"The sleeping place or dormitory of Elpis."

GEMELLA DORMIT IN PACE.

"Gemella sleeps in peace."

We should like to transcribe in *fac simile*, but cannot for want of type and room. We add Maitland's translation of two or three.

PEACE.

This grief will always weigh upon me : may it be granted me to behold in sleep your revered countenance. My wife Albana, always chaste and modest, I grieve, deprived of your support, for our Divine Author gave you to me as a sacred (boon). You well deserving one, having left your (relations), lie in peace, in sleep : you will arise ; a temporary rest is granted you. She lived forty-five years, five months, and thirteen days : buried in peace, Placus, her husband, made this.

IN CHRIST.

Alexander is not dead, but lives beyond the stars, and his body rests in this tomb. He lived under the emperor Antonine, who, foreseeing that great benefit would result from his services, returned evil for good. For while on his knees, and about to sacrifice to the true God, he was led away to execution. O, sad times ! in which sacred rites and prayers, even in caverns, afford no protection to us. What can be more wretched than such a life ? And what than such a death, when they could not be buried by their friends and relations ? At length they sparkle in heaven. He has scarcely lived, who has lived in Christian times.

Macus (or Marcus), an innocent boy. You have already begun to be among the innocent ones. How endearing is such a life to you ? How gladly will your mother, the church of God, receive you, returning to this world. Let us restrain our sighs, and cease from weeping.

Lawrence to his sweetest son Severus, borne away by angels, on the seventh Ides of January, etc.

Amerimus to Rufina, my dearest wife, the well deserving. May God refresh thy spirit.

Maitland has an interesting chapter on the symbols which accompany the inscriptions, as illustrative of the hopes and doctrines of the persecuted infant church. The anchor, the ship under sail, "heavenward bound," the dove, the cross, the letters $\Lambda \Omega$, the Apocalyptic title of Christ, are full of meaning in the connection in which they are found on the marbles. Some inscriptions present the tools of the deceased, to indicate his occupation ; and others the instruments of tor-

ture with which they were put to death, as the *ungula*, or two-pronged claw, to tear the flesh. To those interested in such antiquities, this book will be a rich treat; and, earnestly commending it for perusal, we pass to add a few remarks on more modern cemeteries.

Formerly the dead were interred in the church yard, or beneath the church itself. In the crowded city, the inconvenience and noisomeness of this practice were sorely felt, and that it was so long tolerated is wonderful even with allowance for the power of long established custom, and we may say of superstition. Paris, so far as we are informed, was the first to break away from these fetters and set the example of a rural cemetery without the city enclosure, adorned with walks and alleys and avenues, and trees and shrubs and flowers, to throw some cheerfulness and attraction around man's last asylum. In 1804 the Père La Chaise, so called from a reverend father of the Jesuits who once owned the tract in part, was purchased by the city authorities for a burying place. The extent of the purchase was fifty-two acres, and lies on the east quarter of the city. The ground is beautifully diversified in surface, having one commanding hill. The laying out of the grounds was committed to M. Brongniart, architect, who executed the work in a manner, considering the novelty of the enterprise, worthy of all praise. The cemetery however met with small favor from the public for a number of years. In the first year one hundred and thirteen monuments of all sorts were erected, and for the next seven years but an average of fifty annually. The causes of this neglect are said to be the wars of that period and the mania of victory which absorbed all France. But after the pacification of Europe it grew rapidly into favor, so that in 1815 there were eighteen hundred and seventy-seven monuments, and in 1826 there were numbered thirty-one thousand monuments of all sorts. In a central position stands a chapel of Grecian architecture, for funeral service. The material of the monuments, the costly and the better sort, is marble, and the epitaphs of every description. Those who desire, will find their curiosity abundantly gratified by consulting the "Guide," noted at our head. We cannot, however, omit the monument of Marshal Ney, a plain slab, not of marble, at the eastern end of a plat, enclosed by a plain iron railing, bearing the inscription,

Ci-gît le maréchal Ney, duc d'Elchingen, prince de la Moscowa, décédé le 7 décembre 1815.

Four fir trees grace the plat, and this is all which speaks of "that iron man."

At a later period three other cemeteries, similar in their character and general plan, were established around Paris, viz. Mont-Martre on the west, containing thirty acres, Mont-Parnasse on the south, and Vaugirard on the south-west; the two latter of much smaller dimensions, and all inferior to the Père La Chaise.

From the Père La Chaise we take it (for we are not travelled), our own Mount Auburn, near Boston, is modelled, and the cemeteries at Brooklyn, N. Y., Laurel Hill at Philadelphia, Mount Hope at Rochester, N. Y., the one at Springfield, Mass., and others. Mount Auburn, more than twice the extent of Père La Chaise, and not inferior, as we believe, in natural adaptation, may yet rival its prototype in all respects. The Springfield cemetery has one exceedingly interesting characteristic. From its alluvial hills there gush forth, *ad libitum*, springs of the purest water, furnishing facilities in abundance for ornamental jets and refreshing pools. It is our ardent wish that these beginnings may be carried on to any extent of excellence, not in wasteful gorgeousness of individual display, (that is not excellence, but folly: there are pyramids and mausolea and Petras enough for one world already,) but we wish to see the last habitation cared for, protected, and such ornament and expense bestowed as propriety and *good* taste dictate. And there may be established a standard of good taste in this respect as well as in literature. Moreover, rural and horticultural cultivation will do much in accomplishing this object. It begets a community of interest in all concerned, a commendable *esprit du corps*; for we seem to have a propriety in what grows up immediately from the hand of God, although it be more particularly our neighbors'. We feel this ownership far more than we do in masses of dead stone, on which the eye of melancholy alone can rest. "Le Veritable Guide" closes with a description of a monument in Mont-Parnasse of a young wife. *Julia*, alone, is engraven on the stone. For two years, two or three times every week, the husband visited this grave and cultivated the plat; and not that only, but, at his own expense, the grounds around, to a considerable distance, comprising many monuments of those strangers to him. How much more cheerful also and significant of that which alone alleviates the gloom of the grave, viz. the hope of the life to come, is the living soul, so to speak, of the tree and shrub, which rises from the dead every spring and sends forth its fragrance, than the cold, motionless, silent marble! We cannot but commend the taste of the old patriarch, when purchasing the field of Ephron the Hittite, he contracted not only for the field and the cave therein, but "for all the trees that were in the field, and that were in all the borders round about."

We ardently desire, therefore, that the models which have been so happily begun among us may be finished, as we have no doubt they will be, in ultimate excellence. We devoutly exhort all from the country who can, in their visits to metropolitan places, to turn aside from their business and pleasure and find both a business and pleasure in the observation and study of rural cemeteries. There is more inexcusable negligence approaching barbarism, in our country cemeteries, than most are aware of. Who does not know of many where the enclosure is defenceless, and herds trample the mounds under foot; where thorns and thistles and burdocks, unsightly things, emblems of the curse, grow up in offensive luxuriance; monuments fallen, leaning, and inscriptions obliterated, the whole looking like a potter's field, purchased with "the mean salary of Judas?" We know of some, few we rejoice to say, which have been entered by barbarians, who have broken down monuments by violence, indiscriminately and in mere wantonness. These things ought not so to be, in a Christian country, that boasts of its preëminence over Turks. The Turks respect not only what they call their own, but the graves of strangers also. Through their care, we shall yet have access to the patriarchal cemetery at Mamre, the prototype of all. Whoever visits Mount Auburn or its like, will hardly feel it in his heart to treat with rudeness or neglect any last resting place of his species.

We complain of the small care that is taken in the selection of material for common tumulary stones. In our primitive sections of country slate abounds, and is much used; but from its schistose structure it is perishable, and the inscription liable to flake entirely off, and so one source of local history lost. Steatite is both inelegant and too soft. Most of the sandstones are too coarse and perishable for permanently legible inscriptions; and even our marbles are disappointing, because their polish will not stand the wear and tear of our climate. We should like to see the Quincy granite substituted to a great extent. A square prism of granite polished on one surface, or a block of the dimensions in inches, 36. 15. 6. for the part above ground, and extending below 27 inches, would unite durability, erect position, permanency of inscription, and enduring beauty, better than any other material. The first cost of such a monument would be little if any greater than the more perishable material now used; and in the rapid extension of railway transportation the Quincy quarry is almost at the door of all. The great desideratum in a monument should be endurance. We want it to last a thousand years at least; for thus much, the Jews assure us, the sacred period has yet to run. The Quincy granite admits of fine *lettering* also, whether sunk or raised, another

desideratum when we regard the men of a thousand years hence. This remark suggests another offence in the monuments of country cemeteries, which by this time should be removed. We mean the illiterate character of inscriptions. Words are misspelled, wrongly divided at the end of a line, and sentences so punctuated, that the eye is pained. This is tolerable in such an age as Gray's *Elegy* refers to—"spelt by the unlettered muse," but it is intolerable now. Yet there are many manufacturers of grave stones in New England having some skill in polishing and graving, who are utterly destitute of *literary* taste. They ruin a stone for which they ask fifty dollars, by orthographical and other blunders. Such forfeit their claim to patronage, and their patrons should give the city the monopoly.

The Christian custom of burying with the head towards the west, is generally observed with us. We hope to see no innovation of this custom; for whether it arose from tradition, that such was the disposition of our Saviour's body in Joseph's sepulchre, as some assert, or according to others from a fanciful inference from Christ's words, "For as the lightning cometh out of the east and shineth even unto the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be," and therefore lying in the last sleep with the head towards the west would be the most convenient position for the awakening body to rise up and catch—that is, the reunited spirit catch—the first glimpse of the Son of Man, it matters not. It is a Christian custom—let it be perpetuated. The most remarkable violation of this custom we remember to have seen, is where it was least to be expected, viz. at Old Plymouth, on Burial Hill. Here the bodies lie all ways. Sir Thomas Browne, if he were to rise from his own grave and survey that ground, would say: "This body, whose head is towards the north, was a Persian; that, whose head is towards the east, was a Phœnician; whereto pertaineth that third, which looketh towards neither cardinal point, were difficult in the conjecture; but this fourth, whose head is towards the west, is, past controversy, a Christian, to whatsoever nation he pertaineth."

It cannot be expected that rural cemeteries, after the model of Père La Chaise and Mount Auburn, will extend much into the country. They are metropolitan in their character, they need the resources of the rich, and the spirit of a dense population. Nevertheless they may be multiplied to some extent. Our country is a country of rising villages, and wealth is increasing. There is many a village in whose vicinity lies a piece of ground of good adaptation for such a purpose, and perhaps is worth but little for most other. The man who can awaken in his neighborhood a desire and originate a movement in this behalf, will deserve well of posterity and humanity. But the influence

of these model cemeteries on the country, if they are not imitated to any considerable extent, must in many respects be great and good. We wish them abundant encouragement. Every cemetery should be made, if possible, attractive and not repulsive. It is a place that all have occasion to visit and revisit, and it is the place of the last visit, the dire necessity of man. Some of the most durable impressions are there received, especially in those of tender years. We own our obligations to the man who wrote the stanza in the old New England Primer, however homely.

I in the burying place may see
Graves shorter there than I ;
From death's arrest no age is free,
Young children too may die.
My God ! may such an awful sight
Awakening be to me ;
O that, by early grace, I might
For death prepared be.

We shall never forget it, nor the associations it created. The more inviting the cemetery is made, the more frequented it will be and the deeper the benign impressions.

Many are the motives which conspire to a care for the dead, some higher, some lower. In the matter of a cemetery we make no criticisms and ask no questions, but accept the contribution whatever be the motive. If it be posthumous recognition among men, we accept it ; if it be respect and affection for friends, we honor it ; if it be the hope of a resurrection, we rejoice at it and sympathize most of all. But as Protestants, surely no diversity of religious sentiment should sever any community from a cordial union in such a work. For ourselves, we cheerfully avow the belief of a literal resurrection from the dead, and acknowledge that as the supreme motive of interest in the subject. We believe it a thing not incredible that God will raise the very body in which a man dies. No philosophical dilemmas that are raised, affect us any more than the old puzzles of the crocodile and the like. God is able and certainly will follow with his special providence every elementary particle that is needful for the reconstruction, and call it from its hiding place. He can and will prevent these particles from constituting successive bodies or coëxisting bodies at the moment of death, so as to involve a philosophical impossibility in the reconstruction. He who guides the planet in its proper orbit can watch over and guide the atom. God will raise the dead to life again.

As little are we moved by the assertion that the *vis vitæ* of the physiologists—the principle of life—which being coëxtensive with the body

and coëxisting with it till death, is itself body—the spiritual body—and flies off with the soul at death, thus annihilating the resurrection of the mortal body. “This *mortal* shall put on immortality, and this *corruptible* shall put on incorruption.” “Who shall change our *vile* body that it may be fashioned like unto Christ’s glorious body.” That the vital principle is the spiritual body may be a beautiful theory, but it is theory only and baseless. It must be baseless until the physiologist can detect it (the vital principle), and show it to be an entity and not a relation. There is not the slightest hope of such an event; we should as soon expect to meet with the fabled *umbra* of the ancients and hold it in our grasp. Moreover the theory requires such special pleading in the interpretation of the Bible, that that alone subjects it to fatal suspicion.

That the church in the catacombs believed in a literal resurrection, we have not the slightest doubt. Those simple hearted, unlettered, unsophisticated Christians expressed on their tomb-stones their straightforward belief, unsuspecting of any philosophical difficulties. “You well deserving one! lie in peace—in sleep—you will arise—a temporary rest is granted you.” “How gladly will your mother the church of God, receive you, returning to this world.” We join hand and heart with their interpretation. Nor does the doctrine seem to have been *wholly* excluded from the thoughts of the heathen. We beg leave to quote Sir Thomas Browne once more. In chapter 4th he says:

“And if the ancient Gentiles held not the immortality of their better part and some subsistence after death, in several rites, customs, actions and expressions, they contradicted their own opinions; where in Democritus went high, even to the thought of a resurrection, as scoffingly recorded by Pliny. ‘*Similis reviviscendi promissa Democrito vanitas, qui non revixit ipse. Quae, malum, ista dementia est! iterari vitam morte.*’ L. 7. c. 55. ‘A similar vanity of living again was set forth by Democritus, who himself did not live again. What madness this, forsooth! that one should live again after death!’—What can be more express than the expression of Phocylides? ‘*καὶ τάχα δ’ ἐκ γαίης ἐλπίζομεν εἰς φάος ἐλθεῖν λείψαν ἀποικομένων,*’ et deinceps, ‘And departing from the earth, I hope soon to return to the light which I had left,’ etc.”

It is pleasant to meet with glimmerings of the doctrine among the heathen, but how dark their night! They sought, but could not find. “We have a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto we do well that we take heed, as unto a light shining in a dark place.”

We say, then, that while other considerations may be permitted to have all the weight they deserve, the doctrine of the resurrection

ought to be the high commanding motive, that should influence us in our care for the dead. For this, let them be decently composed, arrayed, and committed to the narrow cell, to moulder and dissolve until the appointed time. For the day of the Lord will surely come, earth's millions will come forth. Every battle field will move—Marathon, Borodino, Waterloo. Jerusalem, that grave of men, will shake, the sea will give up its dead, and all that departed in the waves of the great inundation will come forth, and every cemetery make its contribution. The great forefather, with his whole family, will appear again upon this stage. And a separation will be made, a sentence will be given; it is the last court, there is no appeal. "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." Before such considerations, all other motives fade like the taper at noon day. Especially does the motive of posthumous memory vanish. Should the wicked man perpetuate his name till the sound of the last trump, it will rot then. But the righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance.

Sir Thomas grows eloquent in the conclusion of his *Hydriotaphia*: we cannot hope to emulate him with all his quaintness and antithesis. As we began with him, so we will end with him.

"Five languages secured not the epithet of Gordianus; *The Man of God* lives longer without a tomb than any by one, invisibly interred by angels, and adjudged to obscurity, though not without some marks directing human discovery. Enoch and Elias without either tomb or burial, in an anomalous state of being, are the great examples of perpetuity, in their long and living memory, in strict account being still on this side death, and having a late part yet to act upon this stage of earth. If in the decretory term of the world, we shall not all die but be changed, according to received translation; the last day will make but few graves; at least, quick resurrections will anticipate lasting sepulchres. Some graves will be opened before they be quite closed, and Lazarus be no wonder. When many that feared to die, shall groan that they can die but once, the dismal state is the second and living death, when life puts despair on the damned; when men shall wish the coverings of mountains, not of monuments, and annihilation shall be courted."

We suggest to the authorities of Mount Auburn the expediency of publishing an edition of the *Hydriotaphia*, believing it would promote the interests of cemeteries in general. We know not where there is so much condensed on the subject of burial, in a short compass, as in this tract. Its antiquated style and eccentric thought and varied lore

cannot fail to please; and it will be found, on careful reading, to be suggestive of many valuable thoughts, both practical and serious. It should, however, be edited with notes sufficient to render it popular. It would then make but a small book, and would beguile some spare hour of the visitor to the City of the Dead.

We hope, also, that some publisher will find it in his way to reprint the work of Maitland. The subject is one of great interest to the Protestant public, and is destined to a more full development, when the watchful jealousy of the Vatican shall become a little more relaxed, as the events in Divine Providence already give striking indications. In a note, Maitland remarks thus :

“ In the year 1841, the writer applied for permission ‘to copy some of the inscriptions contained in the Lapidarian Gallery,’ and a license ‘to make some memoranda, in drawing, in that part of the Museum,’ was granted. About that time a misunderstanding is reported to have arisen between the Jesuits and the officers of the Vatican; in consequence of which the former were refused permission to copy the inscriptions in question for their forthcoming work on the Christian Arts. An application was also made by them to the Custode of the Gallery, in order to prevent the use of its contents by a Protestant. On the last day of the month for which the author’s license was available, he was officially informed that his permission did not extend to the inscriptions, but only to a few blocks of sculpture scattered up and down the Gallery. This communication was accompanied by a demand that the copies already made should be given up, which was refused; and with the understanding that no more inscriptions should be copied, and that they should not be published *in Rome*, the matter was allowed to drop.”

ARTICLE III.

THE CLAIMS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES ON THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.

By Rev. John Jay Dana, South Adams, Ms.

THE dissatisfaction with existing forms of government is only one of the indications that the human mind is awaking. There is an extraordinary zeal in investigating nature. The little island of knowledge is an island still, but every year makes additions to its territory.

From the centre of this island to the region of uncertainty and doubt, the distance was formerly but a few paces; but in our days we have bold navigators, who go out into the sea of truth and find soundings where, but a few years since, none could be discovered. A half century has wrought wonderful changes in the domain of truth; for where, formerly, nought was found but quicksands, the investigator stands on a firm foundation; and the day is not far distant when this little island shall become a continent. Who can contemplate, without strong emotions, the changes which have taken place in the knowledge of the sciences within a few years. Chemistry, fifty years ago, was scarcely known; and, at that period, few individuals knew one rock from another. Even astronomy has been able to number new planets and stars among its discoveries. Electro-magnetism has had its laws declared, and the lightnings have been tamed so that they do the bidding of man.

There has never been a period of scientific investigation of nature so ample and thorough. Some fear, indeed, for the result; lest infidelity should seize hold of these investigations and make them a powerful engine for evil, and with them demolish Christianity. With these fears we have no sympathy, because we are confident that the works and word of God are but counterparts of each other and are designed to constitute one great revelation by which the glory of God shall be most conspicuously displayed. We do not tremble when we see skeptics investigating nature, because we have a firm belief that in all the works of God, they can find nothing which shall conflict with his word. We are willing that they should come with their telescopes and their microscopes, their hammers and their retorts; nay, they may come with poetry and music, and with wit and learning and oratory. They may summon all their forces from the earth, and they may make an united assault against the truth, and their efforts will be attended by no results over which they will have any reason to rejoice. The past defeats of infidelity make us the more confident of her ultimate overthrow. She may gain perhaps, now and then, a temporary triumph; but all those discoveries which, from time to time, she shall claim as impugning religion, will ultimately be torn from her grasp and turned against her.

Since there is this disposition to investigate nature, and to turn all discoveries into weapons with which to assault truth, the natural sciences have claims upon the Christian ministry, which they ought not to overlook. There are gems of truth in the physical world which are yet to be wound into a gorgeous diadem and thrown around the head of Jesus of Nazareth. The day is not far distant when some

gifted mind shall arise to investigate the physical sciences and develop their relations to moral truth, so as to make them minister to the glory of the Saviour. These sciences will be shown to be the handmaid, not of Paganism, nor of Mohammedanism, but of Christianity.

The reader will not deem it strange that, having these views, we feel a very strong desire that clergymen should investigate these sciences, that they may aid the final triumph over skepticism. Having this desire, we wish to present a few thoughts respecting the claims of these sciences on those who minister at the altars of religion.

The day has gone by when ministers in general are afraid of human learning. The day is also past, we trust, when ministers fear the influence of learning on their spirituality; but it is our impression, that while they believe in the importance of knowledge, and while they deem its acquisition perfectly compatible with their piety, and at the same time a duty which they owe to God and man, we fear lest the claims of the physical sciences have, in a great measure, been overlooked. It is our purpose to present a few thoughts on the claims of these sciences, not to the disparagement of other kinds of knowledge, but to show that what has been so much neglected, has very important claims on the attention of those set for the defence of Zion.

Concerning the importance of the study of the natural sciences by the ministry, we mention,

1. The oft asserted truth that knowledge is power. Knowledge gives influence. It matters little, in one respect, in what this knowledge consists; it gives the minister influence with the people of his parish, if they can confide in him as a man of learning. It is the duty of him who ministers at the altar to hold within his grasp as many elements of power as he can gain. Indeed it is his duty to use all lawful means to increase his influence, that he may win as many as possible to the truth. Influence should be regarded as a talent committed to our care, not only to be used, but to be increased, so that more honor may accrue to Him by whom the trust has been reposed in us.

Knowledge gives the clergyman power in this way: moral truth has weight on the minds of his hearers, not because it brings before them points capable of being demonstrated with mathematical exactness, for its nature forbids this kind of demonstration. It has power only as the speaker can gain the credence of his hearer. He gains this credence just as a party at law gains that of a jury, by bringing such witnesses as shall tend to establish the truth. What can have more weight with an audience of common minds, than the conviction that the speaker has confidence in the truth of what he asserts; when, at

the same time, they have the impression that such is his mental culture and power of investigation, that he would not receive for truth that which was false, and the confidence that he would not wilfully utter that which was untrue. If a pastor is really a learned man, and no pedant, and his people are convinced that such is the case, they may be charmed with the zeal or eloquence of an Apollos, but the pastor's words carry with them the weight of a Paul. This accounts for the amazing influence which a pastor may exert among his flock. Him they know, him they trust, and his voice they will hear; but a stranger they will not follow.

The study of the natural sciences is peculiarly adapted to give a pastor an influence over a particular class of men. We mean those of a practical turn of mind, who often find in the ministry those learned in book knowledge, but destitute of what is termed common sense. Let the pastor, from his scientific acquaintance with chemistry, be able to show a common farmer, that a kernel of wheat is composed of certain substances, and be able to indicate to him the kind of stimuli which should be applied to land to make it produce wheat; or let him, from his acquaintance with the various soils, be able to indicate why the same substance applied to one piece of land makes it bud and blossom as the rose, and causes another to be barren and unfruitful, and he confers not only a temporal benefit but a moral one, because when that individual perceives the truth of his assertions respecting the objects of nature, a foundation has been laid for his receiving with confidence what he may utter respecting spiritual objects. A few facts of this kind, mentioned by a pastor, will attract the attention of the husbandman, and tend to allay his prejudice against the ministry. The knowledge thus imparted makes him a listener, and sharpens his appetite for more knowledge; and when the truths of the gospel are proclaimed by this minister to that man, his words come home with great power.

The same is true of the mechanic, and in short of every class of practical minds. It is especially true of men of science. They sometimes sit under the ministry of one who is ignorant of all kinds of science; and while they question not his piety, nor the greatness of his spiritual attainments, his preaching does not reach them. It exerts no more influence than though it had never been uttered. Such ministers often mourn over the fact that men of science are not more frequently converted. They are not able to discover any skepticism (in the usual acceptation of that term), and yet the hearer comes and goes on the sabbath with his heart untouched. Pastors often cry, "Lord, who hath

believed thy report?" and for consolation fall back on the Scripture assertion that "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called."¹

We are not disposed at all to question the divine sovereignty in the conversion of mankind; but we must be allowed to demur against ascribing the impenitence of scientific men to this cause *alone*. While "God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass," he accomplishes his purposes by means, means adapted to produce the ends designed; and one reason why scientific men have not been more frequently numbered among the converts to the Christian faith, is to be found in the fact that they have not given heed to the gospel because its ministers have not been such that they would listen to their teachings. From their ignorance of scientific pursuits, the clergy have not furnished an appropriate instrumentality for reaching such minds. Not that we suppose that men can be converted by science; but those scientifically inclined must hear the gospel from those whose scientific attainments are such that they will give credence to their words from the pulpit. Ministers of Jesus ought not to be so indolent as to fail to acquire that knowledge which will enable them to reach the minds of learned men, and then ascribe the fact of the continuance of such men in unbelief to a decree formed in the far-back ages of eternity. The truth is, effects must have causes, means must be adapted to ends; and until a befitting instrumentality shall arise in the form of a ministry interested in the natural sciences and ready to regard them as the handmaid of religion, are we to indulge in a well grounded expectation that many men of science will be converted. Certain it is, that scientific men must be made to *respect* the ministry, else they will not be apt to be attracted by their preaching. When the minister is a shining light in earthly knowledge as well as in religion, he may draw the votaries of science towards him by a sympathy which will prepare them to receive religious truth from his lips.

Thus far we have spoken only of scientific men who professedly regard the Bible as God's word; but there are, alas! too many who have their doubts respecting this revelation because of the supposed collisions between it and the book of nature. Must they be permitted to wage an unholy warfare against the Bible, and virtually charge God with inconsistency, and say that he has given us two revelations so discordant that they cannot both be received by us as true?

The minister versed in science, has it in his power to take such a man on his own ground, and show that the works of God indicate design, and that this proves the existence of a Designer, and so on up to

¹ Vid. 1 Cor. 1: 26.

the First Cause: Any man well versed in geology (a science which, more than almost any other, has been supposed to favor infidelity), can, from the rocks of the earth, and especially from their palaeontological remains, prove conclusively the existence and perfections of God, and can show that the supposed discrepancies between this science and the Bible are such as can be removed without doing violence either to revelation or to the leading principles and facts of this science. True, it requires thought and investigation, but it can be done; and when it is done in such a manner as to do no violence to the scientific views of men of learning, the tendency is much more happy than when they are called to lay aside their science because it is declared to be inconsistent with piety. Many a theologian, by attempting to reconcile science and revelation, while he lacked the requisite scientific knowledge, has made himself a by-word and a laughing-stock among infidels, and has injured the cause whose interests he intended to subserve. The true way to meet a scientific objector is not by proscription and denunciation, but by admitting the truth of his science, if it is true, and showing him that between his science and the Bible there are no discrepancies such as should shake his confidence in this book as a revelation from God. It is easy enough to show him that the difficulties of revelation are no greater than those of nature, and that he has no reason to reject the Bible because of these difficulties any more than the book of nature. When a pastor has it thus in his power to silence if not to convince an objector, and to do this by only taking pains to acquire the requisite knowledge, he must feel that these sciences have a strong claim upon him.

Knowledge of this kind is power in another way. It furnishes the pastor with topics for preaching, and with illustrations of truth. Some would fain have us believe that a minister must know nothing but Christ and him crucified, and must preach nothing but this one doctrine. But, it seems to us, that such have never taken into consideration the fact, that he who has familiarized himself with the structure of the earth, and has opened the grave of some animal of a genus or species now extinct, or he who has so studied the heavens that he can call the stars by name, and can trace, as in lines of light, their brilliant pathway through the heavens, or he who has made himself acquainted with the elements of the various chemical compounds by which he is everywhere surrounded, are doing something to manifest the glory of that Jesus by whom and for whom all things were created, and who is Head over all things, heavens, earth, air, and sea, to the church, to those who, by the washing of regeneration, have become or are to become the heirs of God. They cannot have considered

that this knowledge of Jesus, which is gained from his works, can be used as an argument for his deity; else they would not esteem the relations of natural science to religion as too remote and too gossamer-like to be unworthy their consideration. When can the pastor so powerfully paint the condescension of the adorable Mediator in his incarnation and death to save guilty man, as when he has expatiated on the greatness of his works, and placed him on the throne as the acting divinity of the universe? And when can he so clearly do this, as when he has been in close and scientific communion with nature, and has gone from this study to his closet and knelt under the cross and remained there till his eye took in at one glance the Creator and the Crucified, and they become so blended that they produce but one image on his mind.

Here, had we time, we might proceed to show the relations of the book of God's works to the Redeemer of the world. That the world was created and is preserved for the purpose of promoting the interests of the great work which Christ has undertaken to accomplish, and thus is designed to manifest His glory, can be doubted by no one at all conversant with the Bible. Who is to study and to develop these relations, if not the pastor? And that the pastor may do this successfully, he needs to make scientific attainments an object of pursuit.

2. The study of the natural sciences is well adapted to secure for the pastor a well balanced mind.

Mind, to be healthy, must have relaxation; and this it attains, not by inanity, but by directing its energies towards some other pursuit. The light, gay, trifling world take their relaxation in the giddy maze of the dance, or in the unmeaning frivolities of social gatherings. From such places, the pastor's good sense as well as his piety exclude him. If a man of principle and worthy to stand in the sacred desk, he will not fill his mind constantly with fiction, whose influence may destroy its tone, and unfit him for his severer duties. Yet his mind must be relaxed, or its elasticity will depart beyond recovery. Where can he find a relaxation better adapted to promote his physical vigor and intellectual scope (and one, withal, which will not blunt his moral feelings and deaden his spirituality), than in communing with nature.

Let him stroll away from the busy haunts of man and cull a flower and study it, and he will have amusement and relaxation, and will come back to the severer duties of his office with his mind refreshed and invigorated, and thus ready to grapple with new difficulties.

Or let him take his hammer and break a rock, and open the tomb of some of those ancient animals whose sepulchres are with us unto

this day, and question those organic remains respecting their laws of life and their relationships to existing genera and species, and he will find relaxation and, at the same time, gain mental power. Each day he may learn some new fact, and find some new indication of the handiwork of Jesus Christ in creation, and some new link by which this world is bound to the throne of its Maker. All the while he is doing this, he is becoming stronger, and is fitting himself, by his relaxation, to take hold with new energy in preaching Jesus Christ and him crucified.

He is thus prepared to adopt liberal views; and by not being exclusively devoted to one subject, his mind does not become so distorted that he can see truth only in one direction. He is prevented from becoming a man of one idea, and also from proscribing all those whose views do not, in all respects, harmonize with his own. He ceases to be suspicious of every new advance in knowledge; but uses all the discoveries of science as his efficient aids, and makes them minister to the advancement of his own chosen pursuit.

It certainly is a great point gained, when a minister of Jesus Christ can so arrange his seasons of relaxation, and can devote them to such pursuits as shall promote his advancement in knowledge, and thus increase his efficiency as an ambassador from heaven. His great work is to make known the truths of the gospel, and he may strengthen himself to do this by employing his hours of leisure in the pursuit of knowledge which may be made subservient to this grand aim.

It may be said that "this is out of the line of his profession," and hence should be avoided; but we ask whether it is any more so than those relaxations to which clergymen ordinarily resort?

3. We cannot close this discussion, without adverting to one other point, viz. the mental discipline which the study of these sciences affords.

The grand reason why the sciences have made such rapid advances, is because scientific men have made diligent search after facts. Theories were discarded, and students in astronomy, philosophy, geology, mineralogy and chemistry began to investigate nature with a view to know what were the facts. The old system of astronomy has given way before the light of facts, and its theories have become matters of history. The old chemical theory of the four elements has also passed away, and has been forgotten except by him who deems the history of chemistry a topic to be glanced at in an introductory lecture. At the present day, nothing in philosophy, nor chemistry, nor any other science, is considered true which facts will not warrant. The facts are

first found, then their antecedents or causes, and then the theory is formed; a theory not like the Median laws, unalterable, but subject to modifications to be suggested by subsequent discoveries.

The student of nature delights to trace the analogy between different classes of facts, and to find their relations to each other. He learns to look upon the whole natural world as a chain of many links, reaching from the bright seraph before the throne to the minutest atom which floats in a sun-beam, a chain forged by the same master hand, and in every part manifesting the most consummate wisdom.

In such exercises of mind, the student acquires that kind of discipline which is all important to the student in theology.

Of all men living, no one ought to be more earnest in inquiring after truth than the minister of the gospel; for he must needs investigate not for himself alone, but for his hearers who have not time to study, and who expect that his "lips should keep knowledge." To arrive at truth and make that truth his own, he needs to investigate, to inquire after facts and not after theories, to become satisfied what the *Scriptures* teach, rather than to conform his views to those of some one who has preceded him. To do this, to investigate, and to do so systematically, he requires no discipline better than that secured by the student of nature in his search after facts. It is needful that the pastor and student in theology should be disengaged from the trammels of old systems, and investigate for himself. He must inquire after truth, not after the opinions of others; after facts, not theories.

Many scout the idea of improvement in theology. Ready as they are to admit that in philosophy and chemistry and other sciences there has been a great advance, they are unwilling to admit that there can be any improvement made in understanding the greatest science of all. True, we are not to expect any new revelations from God; but we are much mistaken if there are not increased facilities for a correct understanding of these revelations. Recent discoveries in the natural sciences have modified the interpretations of Scripture to some extent; and doubtless the day is coming when the light of science shall enable us to see many things which have hitherto been undiscoverable. The more God's works are studied, the better his word will be understood; and the more knowledge there is respecting his word, the more certainly may we hope for that interpretation of his works which shall be productive of his glory. The better these revelations are understood, the more mankind will know of the science of theology in the most enlarged sense of that term. Each age has the advantage of the discoveries of its predecessors, and hence occupies

higher ground; and if so, the views of the present ought to be more enlarged than those of any age which has preceded it.

With many, Calvin's works are regarded as standards; others, equally honest and zealous, regard Arminius as the most correct expounder of biblical theology. Others pin their faith on the church; others, on councils; others, on the last two united; and others think the teachings of the church in patristic theology are the most true interpretations of the word of God. Each of these classes leans upon man rather than God; upon another rather than themselves for light. Such sneer at the ignorant devotee of a false religion for following his leaders without hesitation; while these religionists do not follow their guides any more implicitly than many Protestant ministers do their standard authors. They regard modifications in theology, occasioned by new discoveries in mental, moral, and physical science, of a dangerous tendency, because these views differ from what their standard authors have taught for truth.

Few men, when they know that they must be regarded by their brethren with suspicion, and perhaps anathematized, have the hardihood to come out and face the storm which will certainly be occasioned, if their conceptions or utterances of truth shall vary from the commonly received opinions. Thus one age adopts a doctrine because others have adopted it; and it is only once in a long period that there arises one who, like Luther, has the moral courage to investigate for himself and throw out his results before the world. When one such does arise, he must have a courage which nothing can daunt, or he will not carry the point at which he is aiming.

Independence of thought is the out-shoot only of independent investigation; and if ministers would be independent thinkers and preachers, they must themselves dig in the mines of truth. They must not only delve on in the same mines which have been wrought for ages, but must seek new mines, and labor in the hope of bringing to the surface ore which none other has ever seen. There is a freshness in thoughts which become ours, as the fruits of our own investigations and the results of our own labors, which those which we receive from others never possess. The theologian ought to study for himself; but to do this properly, he needs the same discipline which the scientific student of nature has. He must have his laboratory, and his retorts, and his tests, so that the precious may be separated from the vile, and so that he may not proclaim for truth that which will not abide the most severe tests. And here the reader cannot fail to note that had many theological writers possessed this *kind* of mental discipline, the

world would have been saved from many inundations of theological lore. Had these writers put their works to the torture and removed the error, the church would have been saved from many delusions. We hazard nothing in saying that, to a theologian, the kind of mental discipline afforded by the study of the natural sciences, is eminently important. He who can bring to the study a mind thus trained, even if it may lack brilliancy, will accomplish much.

The late Dr. Chalmers laid the foundation for a fame which has ranked him among the noblest intellects of earth, by bringing to the study of the Scriptures a mind well disciplined by reading the book of nature. The germ of his astronomical discourses was the germ of his fame, a fame which will live as long as science and Christianity are known. His preaching became the power of God to the salvation of sinners, when his well stored mind laid all its acquisitions at the feet of the Saviour, and his soul melted in love to him who blends in one glorious personage the Creator and the Crucified.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SANSKRIT LANGUAGE.

On the Grammatical Structure of the Sanskrit.

Translated and somewhat abridged from v. Bohnen's "Das Alte Indien." By W. D. Whitney, Northampton, Mass.

THE language in which are written the classic works of the ancient Hindoos bears the name *Sanskrita*, literally *composite*, *concrete* (from *sam* together, and *kri* to make), but in its common acceptation signifying *perfect*, as distinguished from the popular dialects, which have grown out of it. In some districts of India it has entirely passed out of knowledge, so that in the Deccan, for instance, it is enough to say of any illegible inscription, "it is Sanskrit," to put a stop to all attempts at deciphering it. It may be regarded as extinct throughout the whole country ever since the times of the Mohammedans, although still learned by the Brahmins, in order to the understanding of the sacred books, and even occasionally made use of in learned composition. And had nothing come down to us from Ancient India saving the grammar of their admirable language, and of this only the verb,

with its regularity of structure, its copiousness in respect to moods and tenses, the multitude of meanings it can convey with the help of a few prefixes, and its capability of being stripped of all adjuncts down to the naked root, we should still have been in a condition to judge with considerable accuracy of the spirit of the old Hindoo people. But apart from its value as an index of the intellectual character of those who spoke it, and as affording means for tracing historically the development of that character, the circumstance which gives to the study of the Sanskrit in our eyes its crowning importance is this : it is, to a remarkable degree, the most perfect and complete of a rich family of languages, embracing the Greek, Latin, Gothic, Lithuanic, and Persian. Analytical investigations by Bopp, Humboldt, and others, have led to the following conclusions : the Sanskrit must have already attained its philosophic precision and elegance when the Grecian, German, and Italian colonies were sent forth, for it exhibits regular forms analogous to most of the irregular and obsolete cases and inflections of the other languages named ; but, on the other hand, as the latter have retained much that has become obsolete in the Sanskrit, we should not be justified in considering this the mother of the family. In order that the proof of these propositions may be placed within the reach of those who are not versed in philological analysis, I will endeavor to present a brief sketch of the structure of the Sanskrit, so far as it is possible to do so without offering a great array of examples. But first of all, to lay firm ground for further progress, we must consider the written character, and the classification of the sounds. Of hieroglyphics we find no trace in India ; the oldest inscriptions are written with a character which resembles more or less closely that of the manuscripts, or, even when illegible, gives evidence of its affinity therewith, and in its roughest forms is plainly an immediate invention, and not derived through the medium of any picture-writing. The antiquity of manuscripts will give us as little help in ascertaining the time of the origin of writing among the Hindoos as among the Greeks : the oldest we have are of but a little later date than the codices of Homer. With the oldest deciphered inscriptions, also, of the fifth century, we lose all evidence of the earlier existence of an alphabetic character derivable from monuments, and are obliged to betake ourselves to internal probabilities and the testimony of foreigners. The perishable nature of the ordinary writing material, cotton paper, rendered frequent transcription necessary ; and not only the immense body of the literature itself, but more particularly the great variety of popular running-hands, which may all be traced back to the original alphabet, prove that in no country was there ever more written than in India.

It is impossible to fix historically the date of the invention of cotton paper; this only is well known, that as early as A. D. 650 the Arabians found a fine article of it in Samarcand, and Ali Ibn Mohammed, who gives us the information, adds that it was then in use only there and in China. Earlier than this was the use of silk paper, which the Chinese claim to have invented about 108 B. C.; those versed in Chinese antiquities, however, conjecture that the art of writing with paper and ink was introduced into China from India in the train of the religion of Fo. But the most ancient mode is undoubtedly that still practised in Malabar, of scratching with an iron point on green palm leaves; the method always employed in the native drama, when the scene is laid in the open air. The Sanscrit word *likh*, to paint, made use of in the epics to express writing, supposes a liquid material; in all the ancient works, reading and writing, when reference is had to the Vedas, are taken for granted as universally known; the Bhagavadgita mentions the first letter in the alphabet; and accordingly it is not true of India as of other countries, that the art of writing was born and grew up with the prose literature. It must, moreover, have been pretty generally familiar at the time of the Macedonians; else those guide-boards by the road-sides, marked with names and distances, were wholly useless. Finally, we conclude that the written character, though unknown at the time of separation of the kindred tribes, (for otherwise the Greeks would hardly have adopted the imperfect Phœnician alphabet, which so fettered their language,) must yet, at a comparatively early period, have allied itself with the Sanskrit; since the latter, in its euphonic changes, is so often governed by it: and above all, that it was not introduced from abroad, but must be deemed of independent Indian origin; that learned and accurate palæographer, Kopp, having failed to establish any affinity between it and the Phœnician alphabet.

The Sanskrit alphabet, whose invention, as an act of immediate inspiration, the Indians attribute to Brahma, is called Devanâgarî, or writing of the gods; and, like all its derivatives, reads from left to right. It is arranged according to the organs of utterance, and is so complete, that any language may be spelt with its forty-nine signs. Among its vowels, numbering with the diphthongs fourteen, we miss only short o and short e; that is to say, these sounds have no peculiar representatives in the written language; both, however, are included in the short a, and may often be traced out or guessed at by the aid of the kindred tongues; e. g. *asthin*, a bone, ὀστέον; *aris*, enemy, ἔρις. But it is unsafe attempting to fix, by such means, the pronunciation of a dead language; and the sound of a, in the Sanskrit, may have been

pretty uniform. Peculiar to the Devanâgarî, on the other hand, are the vowel-like letters *ri* and *lri*; the latter, pronounced somewhat like the Polish *l*, is introduced merely for the sake of uniformity, in order that the semi-vowels, *ya*, *ra*, *la*, *va*, which are subject to conversion into vowels, may have each its corresponding element, *i*, *ri*, *lri*, *u*. The *ri*, however, or vowel *r*, is essential to the Sanskrit, though appearing in the sister languages as a consonant, in its Guna-form, as the Indian would say; e. g. *kri* or *kr*, create; *vrit*, vertere; *stri*, sternere; *trip*, *τρέπω-σθαι*. Moreover, there is a separate sign for the lengthened sound of each vowel, and we have *a* and *â*, *i* and *î*, *u* and *û*, *ri* and *rî*, *lri* and *lri*. *A* unites with *i*, whether either be long or short, to form the diphthong *e* (e as in there); *a* and *e* become *ai* (our long *i*), which is, as it were, a triphthong. In like manner comes *o* from *a* and *u*, and *au* (ou in our) from *a* and *o*. It is not for the sake of euphony only that this union takes place, when, either in composition, or to avoid the hiatus, the final vowel of a word is blended with the initial of the next following (e. g. *hitopadesa* for *hita-upadesa*, *nai va* for *na eva*); a similar change takes place, also, in the formation of derivatives, by the addition of an *a* to the primitive vowel; for instance, *i* is strengthened into *e*, *u* into *σ*, which first increment is called by the grammarians Guna, coloring; again, *s* becomes *ai*; *σ*, *au*; this is termed Wriddhi, growth. By attention to these changes, we are always enabled to recognize the derivative, and refer it back to its primitive. So *prauda*, proud, leads us to the root, *prud*, to be proud; *yauvana*, youth, to *yuvan*, a young man. Applying the same process to the cognate languages, we have from *cupere*, first *copa*, then *cauponari*; so likewise are the Norse *raudr*, red, or the Lithuanian *raudonas*, strengthened forms, the Sanskrit *rudhiras*, and *ῥυθρός*, being simpler. Every consonant of the Devanâgarî is supposed to include and be followed by a short *a*, as its soul or particle (*mâtrâ*), unless its place is supplied by some other vowel expressed; just as, according to some authorities, in the old Roman, *krus* was written for *karus*, *kra* for *cora*. This *a* was originally signified by the perpendicular line in each consonant, which is therefore omitted when the *a* is silent, or doubled when it is lengthened. The exactness and consistency of this mode of vocalization, show that it could have been but once invented; its peculiarities are lost in the rounded current-hands, and are wanting even in a number of the Devanâgarî letters themselves, which may be later additions to the alphabet, being, as they are, merely modifications of other sounds. A horizontal line above the letters unites them calligraphically into words, but it is an unessential part of the character, and rarely found in ancient inscriptions.

After the vowels and diphthongs come the consonants, arranged in five classes, and in such an order that, the classes being written above one another, the first perpendicular line will include the smooth mutes, the second their aspirates, the third the middle mutes, the fourth their aspirates, and the fifth the nasals. These latter are not in other languages, as here, denoted by separate signs, although the guttural *n* in *angle*, for instance, is obviously quite distinct from the dental in *enter*. A point written above the calligraphic line, termed *anusvara*, may stand instead of any one of the nasals. The five classes are as follows. First, the Gutturals; *ka*, *kha*, *ga*, *gha*, *nga*. Second, the Palatals; *cha* (*ch* in church), *chha*, *ja* (*j* in James), *jha*, *na*. This class is of special importance with respect to comparative investigations. *Cha*, even in Sanskrit, is convertible into *ka*; from *vach*, to speak, comes *vāk*, a word, vox; and in Latin *qu* often supplies its place: *pancha*, five, quinque; *chatur*, four, quatuor. In the classic languages, *g* stands for *ja*, and in all probability originally had the same pronunciation, as it still has in their dialects; *rāj*, to rule, *rajan*, king, *regere*, *rex* (for *regs*); Italian, *il rege*; *jānu*, knee, *γόνυ*, genu; French, *genou*; etc. Third, the Linguals or Cerebrals, called in Sanskrit, head-tones; *ta*, *tha*, *da*, *dha*, *na*; peculiar to this language, and uttered back in the throat. These exhibit a tendency to pass into *r*. Fourth, the Dentals, *ta*, *tha*, *da*, *dha*, *na*. Fifth, the Labials, *pa*, *pha*, *ba*, *bha*, *ma*. Next follow the semivowels, *ya*, *ra*, *la*, *va*; then the sibilants, *sa* palatal, *sa* dental, and *sha*; and last of all, the aspirate, *ha*. The first *sa* varies to *k*, even in the Sanskrit, and yet more readily in the cognate languages; *dis*, to point, *indicare*, *δείκνυμι*; *das*, to bite, *δάσσω*; *driś*, to see, *δέχασθαι*; *pasu*, beast (from *pas*, to tie), *pecus*; *satam*, hundred, *centum*; *dasa*, ten, *decem*, *δέκα*; *svan*, dog, *κύνες*. The *f* is wanting among the Sanskrit elements, and the aspirated *bha*, performs its office; *as*, *bhu*, to be, *φύω*, *suo*; *bhri*, to bear, *φέρω*. This system of arrangement is of high antiquity, for we find it observed in the earliest lists of roots, and it is followed by all the vocabularies, as well as by the derived dialects. The extended use of the Devanāgarī agrees precisely in point of time with the spread of Buddhism, which during the fifth century before Christ and later, gradually made its way out of India over all the islands and through China, Japan, and northern Tibet. It has been preserved nearly pure in the written character of Cashmere, and of a northern dialect in India; is but little corrupted among the Hindostanees about Agra and Delhi, as also among the Sikhs of Punjaub and the Mahrattas. The alphabet of the Bengalee dialect along the Ganges, likewise used by the inhabitants of Assam on the Brahmaputra, is

sharper and slighter. As we go southward, we find a tendency to a rounded hand more and more prevailing. Besides the systems still in use, there are many which may be regarded as dead stereotypes; as, among others, the triple character of the Pali, in which are written the sacred books of the Buddhists about Ava and Pegu.

In order now to arrive at some degree of acquaintance with the internal structure and peculiarities of the Sanskrit, we must go back to the so-called *roots* of the language. The Indian, naturally inclined to speculate upon every subject, has ever made his own language a special study, because it was the holy tongue in which Brahma himself revealed the sacred writings. He has, in truth, made himself thoroughly master of the process of its development, as nothing better shows than that profound and remarkable step, his attempt to strip the verbs of their subjectivity, in order to arrive at the naked elements of the language; and thus, what so late as Schlozer was declared to be a useless folly, the endeavor, namely, to trace out the original beginnings of a language, he has long since effected with regard to the Sanskrit. For next after the interjection, that mere animal utterance, which seeks to express feeling only by sounds of a higher or lower key, these stems (*dhātavas*) plainly constitute the first attempts to clothe with form the fleeting breath, when pantomime was found no longer sufficient. If the vowels may properly be styled the soul of language, the consonants supply its peculiar physiognomy; they are the characteristic part, and they are more or less imitations of natural sounds, in proportion as a sensual observation of Nature, or a cultivated reason, have borne the more prominent part in the formation of a language. Among the Sanskrit elements are to be found very few such imitations; instances are, *tup*, to strike, *ṛṇteiv*; *pat*, to fall; expressions for speaking, knowing, teaching, meditating, are comparatively very numerous; and rarest of all those for struggling and fighting; facts which bear strong testimony to the early earnest and peaceful character of the Indian; indeed, as Humboldt remarks, many and varied evidences of his propensity to abstraction and pious seclusion are traceable in his language. The roots being formed by the addition of consonants to a simple breathing, they must of course be all monosyllabic, whether containing one consonant or more; as, *mā*, to measure; *smi*, to smile; *skand*, to ascend. Simple vowel roots, Grimm disallows, and in this the acute philologist is fully borne out by the Sanskrit, which in such apparent cases shows that it has itself lost a consonant, or that the other languages have corrupted the stems; as the Greek *ἀνῶ*, comes from the Sanskrit *av* and *va*, to blow. As to the signification of the roots, we gather from their development that they form a descriptive

part of speech, intermediate between an interjection and an adjective, and therefore the verbal stem appears generally in its purest form in the imperative, or as the final member of an adjective compound; e. g. dharmavid, skilled in law; vid being the root, meaning to *understand*; compare armiger, frugifer, etc. So also is the Latin termination *brum* to be referred to *bhri*, to bear; as, candelabrum, light-bearer. The Indian grammarians regard their verbal-stems as germs, or material (*prākṛiti*), which become verbs only when invested with intellectual predicaments, when the relation to the attribute and the existence of the subject in respect to quantity and quality are expressed; when, in short, a complete sentence is formed: for instance, *tupāmi*, I strike, properly contains the predicate *tup*, the copula *as* (to be), and the subject *mi*; *striking am I*. They therefore define the roots by abstract ideas, as speech and motion, which they regard as original categories; and moreover express the definition in a case which has the least direct connection with an object, namely, the locative; e. g. *î*, to go, is explained by *kānti-gati-vyāpti-kshepa-prajana-khadaneshu*, in *loving, going, obtaining, throwing, begetting, biting*, a single compound, whose last member bears the case-ending. There are about five hundred roots of motion; next in number are those of sound; but not until they become organized and inflected verbs, do they come within the province of general usage, which limits more narrowly the nature of the motion or sound; e. g. *ling*, to move, inflected or united with a prefix, means to embrace, *umschillingen*; *ag*, to set in motion, *agere*, applies particularly to fire; hence *agnis*, fire, *ignis*; *valg*, to move, is as a verb modified to express wry or crooked motion; compare the Latin *valgus*, the Greek *φελγω*, *flecto*, the English to walk; the latter, however, has lost the accessory idea. So *tus*, to sound, in common use, becomes to cough, *tussire*; *vrih*, to sound, properly refers to the cry of the elephant; and thus all these lighter shades of meaning lie dormant, as it were, in the roots, and are waked into life by being brought forth into the actual language. It is easy to see how much this analysis of the verbs must facilitate our researches into the inmost structure of the language, and a similar treatment of the classic tongues were a thing much to be desired, in order that by closely comparing the roots of kindred dialects, we might be enabled to trace out their historical development. The Latin and Lithuanian seem more to resemble the Sanskrit in keeping fast hold of their verbal stems than does the Greek, because the noble tongue of the Hellenes, earlier left to itself, concealed its Asiatic physiognomy under the veil of Grecian individuality; but even here, with the aid of the Sanskrit, we find it possible to trace and separate a great number of pure roots.

Almost every native Indian grammar contains, in the form of an appendix, a catalogue of roots (dhātupāṭa), and of these, two in particular are highly esteemed for completeness; that of Kasinatha, which has been edited by Wilkins; and that of Vopadeva (Kavikalpadruma), which Carey embodied in his Grammar. Rosen's learned and accurate work, with examples from the ancient writings, is made up from them both. The number of verbal-stems is 2352; to these are to be added the so-called Sautra-roots, which are assumed by the grammatical rules (sūtrāṇi), in order to furnish a derivation for the few nouns which cannot be referred back to the others. This number might be reduced one half, if roots of similar signification, but differently conjugated, were to be reduced to the same original. The common usage of the language seems to content itself with a much less number; there are more than 1800 for which Rosen fails to find examples, and therefore in the earlier productions of Sanskrit literature, only five hundred appear to be commonly used; these, however, with the aid of prefixes, suffice to express an inexhaustible variety of meanings. These prefixes, eighteen in number, are all of them related to the prepositions of the allied languages, as for instance pra (pro), pari (περί), upa (ὑπό), etc.; they are mostly inseparable in the Sanskrit, and are only elevated to the rank of distinct prepositions in the kindred dialects, as the case-endings go out of use; so the Slavonian needs no *with* or *by* to express the instrument, for he has his instrumental case. Examples of the manner in which the prefixes modify the verbs are: pat, to fall; utpat, to fly up, *πέτεσθαι*; āpat, to fall headlong; lambh, to obtain, upalambh, to understand, to take upon one's self, as it were, *ὑπολαμβάνειν*; svas, to breathe, āsvas, to console, to give free breath; nirsvas, to sigh, expire, visvas, to be quiet, etc. Rosen's investigations show that no root receives four prefixes; instances of the addition of two and three are, however, frequent.

If we now take a general view of the verbal-stems of the Sanskrit, we shall conclude that they were reduced at a time when the language was still fresh and vigorous, but after it had begun in some measure to extend and modify itself with respect to these its fundamental elements. It is, perhaps, still possible to follow these efforts of the language toward a more copious development, for we can detect among the roots certain classes of modifying changes which could hardly have been suddenly effected. The first attempt was to acquire a new supply of roots, by rejecting a final consonant, and lengthening the radical vowel; this change is evidently of very ancient date, for the cognate languages often divide the double roots among them, and now find their point of union in the Sanskrit; examples are, gam

and gâ, to go; bhas and bhâ, to shine, compare φάσχω and φάω; sthal and sthâ, to stand, to put, compare στελλειν and stare; ir and î, to go, compare ἰέναι and ir-e; dru, drav, and drâ, to run; all still in use in the Sanskrit; the latter corresponds to δράω; dhri, dhar, and dhâ, to set; compare τίθημι (dadhâmi); from dhar comes dhârâ, earth, while terra cannot be traced to a Latin root; pal and pâ, to rule, to spread abroad; compare pellere; the former appears again in the Causal, and in pallis, seat of government, as appended to the name of a city; this throws light on the hitherto unexplained derivation of πόλις. Again, the language sought to multiply its roots by increasing their vowels with Wriddhi; as, gî and gai, to sing; dhî and dhyai, to meditate, etc.; or by changing them into the corresponding semi-vowels, in which case the other languages of the family have often retained the purer form; as, sud, sved, to sweat, sudare; sun, svan, to sound, sonare; sup, svap, to sleep, sopire. Still further, we find a tendency in the roots to become dissyllabic; thirteen such exceptions to the general rule are enumerated, and the mode of their origin illustrates the efforts of the language to enrich itself. Its further development would assuredly have afforded us more of such roots; they would in part form denominatives, (as from duskha, pain, has come a verb dukh, to be in pain, and as katha, to relate, is derived from the interrogative katham, how? and so properly means, to make known the grounds of a matter; a derivation hardly recognizable in inquit and the English quoth,) and in part would arise from the blending of prefixes with the root, as has been the case with the few dissyllabic roots. The last step was to relinquish the radical vowel, of which the Sanskrit presents us comparatively few instances. It never allows of such changes as, for instance, in brach, brechen, brich, gebrochen, bruch, but holds fast to its vowel at all events, and at the most only allows of a strengthening by Guna and Wriddhi. Yet the interchange of â and î is frequent and of ancient date; e. g. pâ, piv, and pî, to drink, which explains the common origin of πόω bibere, and πίνω; again, âp and îp, to obtain, ad-ip-isci; with the prefix abhi it means, to hope, op-tare; with pari, to be handy, ap-tum esse.

Before leaving this part of my subject, which is evidently of the highest importance to the thorough investigation of the classic languages, and, as relating to the very ground work of the Sanskrit, seems to require a degree of detail in its treatment, I must make reference to those stems which, in some of their inflected forms, introduced a nasal, because they furnish a common origin and point of union to the corresponding Latin and Greek verbs; as lih, and linh, to lick, λείχειν and lingere; chhid and chhind, to split, σχίζειν and

scindere; ud and und, to flow, *ῥῥω* and unda; labh and lambh, to attain, *λάβω* and *λαμβάνω*; yuj and yunj, to unite (yuktas), jungere and jugum; pij and pinj, to paint (piktas), pingere and pictus; and sak and sank, to be holy, which explains sacer and sanctus, for which Kärcher and others, of late, could find no root. The Latin, in particular, gains from the Sanskrit a fixedness and certainty in its etymology, which none other of the kindred languages furnish it; would we settle the dispute among grammarians, as to whether vehemens should be spelt with an h, the Sanskrit stem vah, to carry, vehere, decides it in the affirmative; would we trace to a root aevum and *αἰών*, we find it in the Sanskrit iv, to endure; dies is in Sanskrit dyā (like the Cretan *Δία*), and comes from div, to shine; proelium, is pralaya, dissolution, from pra-li; the teeth, *ὀδόντας*, dentes, are adantas, the eaters, from ad, edere; the Sanskrit likewise assures us that the old derivation of vidua from the Etrurian iduare, is incorrect; widow here is vidhava, literally, without a husband (dhavas); and so in innumerable other cases. But it is time to leave these naked stems, the germs of the verbs, and turn our attention to the verbs themselves.

The division into the so-called conjugations is based upon the different methods in which the personal endings are united to the root. There are ten of them, but they differ only in respect to the first four tenses. The first introduces an a between the root and the termination; pach, to cook, pach-a-ti, he cooks; analogous to the Greek *λείπ-ο-μεν*, for *λείπμεν*. Nearly half the whole number of verbs belong to this conjugation. The second is properly the primitive conjugation, for it adds the personal endings immediately to the root; ad-mi, I eat, ved-mas, we know; Doric *ἴδμεν*; pâ, to rule, pâmi, pâsi, pâti, declined precisely like *φάμι*. The number of roots in this conjugation is some sixty or seventy; in the Greek and Latin it is still less. The third takes a reduplication; dâ, to give, dadâmi, like *δίδωμι*; dhâ, to set, dadhâmi, *τίθημι*. The fourth introduces a y; vas, to clothe, vasy-anti, they clothe; we may find formations analogous to this in the Gothic and Althochdeutsch, though not in the Greek. The fifth adds nu to the root; ap-nu-mas, we obtain; compare *δείκνυμι*. The sixth is much like the first, but is uncommon. The seventh includes the stems already mentioned, which admit a nasal; yuj and yunj, to unite. The eighth adds u; as tan, to stretch, tan-u-mas, we stretch; so *ταν-ύ-ω*. In the Latin tendere, a d is introduced, as in pro-d-ire, and other words. The Greek sometimes prefixes a d; e. g. Sanskrit ra-ras, dew, ros; Greek, *δρόσος*; Sanskrit asru, tear; Greek, *δάκρον*, etc. The ninth appends ni; lû, to loosen, lu-ni-mas, we loosen; compare *δάκνω*, *ἰδακνω*. The tenth agrees with the fourth in introducing a y.

Every verb is either transitive (*parasmaipadam*, passing over to another) or reflexive (*âtmanepadam*, returning upon the actor). From the first are formed passives, which have the inflexions of the middle. Likewise are found modifications of the roots into Causals, Frequentatives, and Desideratives; the latter formed by reduplication, as in Greek; e. g. *pîpâs*, to wish to drink; compare *πιπράσχω*, *διδράσχω*. The moods and tenses are ten, arranged as follows. The Present; the Potential, corresponding to the Subjunctive and Optative; e. g. from *pâ*, to rule, *pâyâm*, *pâyâs*, *pâyât*, I might or could rule, etc.; compare *φαίην*, *φαίης*, *φαίη*; *dadyâm*, I would give, *διδόην*. The Imperative; *pâtu*, let him rule; *dadatu*, let him give; like *φάτω*, *διδότω*. The Imperfect with an augment; *apâm*, *apâs*, *apât*, I ruled; *ἔφας*, *ἔφα*; *adadam*, I gave, *ἔδιδων*. The Perfect with a reduplication; *tutopa*, I have struck, *τέτυπα*. Two Futures, one periphrastic, formed with help of the auxiliary, to be; *datâsmi*, for *data-smi*, a giver am I; the other regular, with the character *s*: *dasyami*, I will give; compare *δωσω*. The Precative; this, with the other tenses following, is of rare occurrence: *dâyasam*, I would give, *δοίησαν*. The Conditional, used in hypothetical propositions; *adâsyat*, if he gives. Lastly, an Aorist, with an augment: *adam*, like *ἔδων*. Each tense has a singular, a dual, and a plural, and in the dual a first person, which all the other members of the family, save the Lithuanian, have lost. It may be remarked, however, that the Indian regards our first person as the third, because the *I* is last taken cognizance of by consciousness; and so their declension runs; he loves, thou lovest, I love. Finally, from every mood and tense are formed participles, entirely analogous to those of the classic languages. I shall not, however, enlarge further upon the nature and inflection of the verb, as what I have already said will suffice to give some idea of its structure, and this part of the subject has been learnedly and thoroughly treated of by Bopp. Neither will it be necessary to take up the declension of the noun, however interesting would be its comparison with that of the kindred tongues, upon which moreover it casts much light. There are eight cases; namely, besides the classic six, an instrumental and a locative. The latter ends in *i*, which, with final *a* of the root, becomes *e*: *deve*, in God. In *domi*, *ruri*, this character is still perceptible; in *ῥοιῷ*, *Romae*, and the like, it has become confounded with the genitive and dative. Both noun and pronoun have also a complete dual. The Indian grammarians treat the noun as they treat the verb, inasmuch as they assume for it a fundamental form, which only becomes a noun by the addition of case endings; accordingly we find in a vocabulary not *Devas*, God, but *deva*, as the nominative is formed

by affixing an s : not nama, name, but naman, the n, rejected to form the nominative, appearing again in the declension. It is as if the Latin were to give homin, and pulver, as fundamental forms for homio and pulvis. These forms are mostly traceable to the verbal-stems, and are very variously derived from them : by the before-mentioned strengthening of the vowel (Guna and Wriddhi) ; as from yuj, to unite, yoga, union ; or by simply adding a vowel ; as from tal, to count, comes tâla, number ; or by the addition of an infinite number of derivative syllables, suffixes, which give to this language a copiousness such as belongs to no other. I will name here but a few of them : âlas, â, am, form general nouns ; from sthâ, to stand, sthâla, anything that stands, a dish, a stool, etc. ; from pî, to drink, piyâla (name of a tree), compare *πιάλη* ; from chand, to shine, candidum esse, chandala, lamp, chandelle : tra indicates the instrument ; pâ, to drink, pâtra, cup ; bhas, to shine, bhâstra, window, old Latin, festra ; vas, to clothe, vastra, clothing, Greek *ἑσπερίς* : tri denotes the actor ; sũ, to sew, sutri, the sewer, sutor ; kri, to make, kartri (kartaram), creator ; jan, to beget, janitri, genitrix : ras, â, am, forms adjectives ; madhu, honey, *μέθυ*, meth, mæd ; thence madhuras, sweet, ripe, maturus : ikas has the same office, vasantikas, spring-like ; compare *ποιητικός*, etc. : înas, â, am, signifies a relation ; kula, family, kulinas, belonging to a family ; compare leoninus, *ξύλινος* : tas, not inflected, serves to express, adverbially, a relation of place ; devatas, from God ; compare coelitus, divinitus ; tas, â, am, or nas, nâ, nam, form past passive participles ; dâtas, â, am, given, dânam, gift, donum ; the same suffix makes of aris, enemy, arina, discord ; compare *ἐρινός*.

The final means by which the Sanskrit arrives at great copiousness and elegance is composition. The various methods of composition are reduced by the native grammarians to fixed classes, and of some of these classes only single examples are to be found in the classic languages, so limited in comparison is their capacity for forming them. Most frequent is that class of which a limiting adjective constitutes the first member, a substantive the second, Bahuvrihi, which Schlegel terms qualitative composition ; e. g. mahâtman, of lofty spirit, like magnanimus, *ρόδοδάκτυλος*. Another class is Tatpurusha, the energetic composition, whose first member is dependent on the second in a way usually expressed by a case ; devadânam, God's gift, for dânam devasya ; Râmâyana, Rama's adventures ; analogous to *πατροκτόνος*, aurifaber. A compound whose first member is a numeral is called Dviga ; panchanâvas, having five ships, like *πενταετής*, septicollis. Another, Avyayibhâva, unites a particle with a substantive ; anugangam, what is along the Ganges, like *παράκοιτις*, confinis. When a

qualifying adjective is connected with a substantive, the compound is termed Karmadhâraya ; mahârâja, the great king ; *Μεγαλόπολις* ; the Latin affords no examples. The last class unites two or more, often many, substantives as asyndeta ; e. g. *pânipâdan*, hands and feet ; so Aristophanes forms *Tisameneophaiuippus*, and perhaps the Latin *suovetaurilia* is of the same character. All these compounds are easily recognized in Sanskrit, because the case ending is only applied to the final member, all the others retaining the ground-form. Some have, however, ignorantly mistaken the euphonic connection of words for composition, and maintained accordingly that there were to be found words of several hundred syllables. For the Sanskrit, having only regard to euphony, adapts the final consonant of one word to the initial of the next, and writes both together ; as if the Greek were to write the sentence *τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν λαμβάνειν, τημπολιγιατὴν ἀρχηγῆ λαμβάνειν*.

This grammatical sketch may suffice to enable us to judge in some measure of the character of the Sanskrit ; that this character is of high antiquity, we are assured not merely by the close and minute analogy discernible between it and the kindred languages, particularly the classical (and that this is not a casual resemblance, the entire diversity of structure of the Semitic family proves), but also by the fact that the productions which Solomon obtained from India are called by names which admit of a regular derivation from roots of this language, and that all geographic appellations, and more especially Indian words, which we receive from Alexander's Greeks, are, however much corrupted they may be, explainable in Sanskrit. One more very remarkable circumstance tends to prove the same thing, and moreover corroborates our theory of the influence of Indian on Egyptian civilization, namely, that the ancient Egyptian names allow of an easy and natural explanation by the Sanskrit, while the etymologies which Jablonsky, Loega, Champollion, and others, have attempted from the Coptish, vary widely from one another, although their signification ought to be but one, and of evident probability. It is, however, but an uncertain matter at best, to guess at the derivation of names whose meaning is not given, and such attempts have ever constituted the most slippery ground of etymology.

The Indians regard Panini as their oldest grammarian ; yet he compiled from still earlier works his short aphorisms or sutras, 3996 in number, and the Bhagavadgita makes mention of grammatical forms, thus showing that abstract grammar even then had an existence. Katyayanâs wrote a commentary on Panini's sutras ; a brother of Vikramaditya also applied himself to their elucidation, and during the

century before Christ the grammatical rules were woven into a remarkable poem, the *Bhāṭṭikāvya*, by *Bhartrihari*. The professed subject of this poem of twenty cantos is the adventures of *Rama*, but its main purpose is to furnish practical illustrations of theoretical grammar, to which end it introduces the greatest variety of forms, anomalies, and words rarely used, yet without becoming either obscure or inelegant. *Panini*'s dark oracular sayings were likewise interpreted by a great commentary, the *Mahabhashya*, which is regarded as a standard authority, and ascribed to *Patanjali*, the founder of the *Yoga-philosophy*; and this again has found its commentators. The *sutras* themselves, with such explanations as seemed most necessary, have been published at Calcutta. The work of *Ramachandras*, called *Prakriyakaumudi*, is shorter, and on a systematic plan; it, too, has undergone revision, and has appeared at Calcutta. From this was derived a popular grammar, the *Sarasvata*. One of the most recent, but highly esteemed in Bengal, is that of *Vopadevas*, styled *Mugdabodha*; its use, however, is rendered difficult by its new terminology. From these originals were drawn the first Sanskrit grammars of the Europeans; they were arranged in strict accordance with the native method, which was not calculated to facilitate the study of the language. The Jesuit *Hanxleden* had picked up and committed to paper some scanty particulars touching the language; and from his collection the Carmelite *Paulinus*, likewise a German, made up the first Sanskrit grammar, abounding in the grossest errors, which he nevertheless struggled stoutly to defend against the English. These latter are the true founders of Sanskrit grammar, and first among them comes *Colebrooke*, whose work, unfortunately, was not completed and is very rare; *Carey* followed, and *Wilkins*, who excels all others in the simplicity and perspicuity of his arrangement; then *Forster*, who by the completeness of his paradigms did much to aid investigations into the structure of the language; the second part of his grammar, broken off by his death, was to have contained a translation of that of *Vopadevas*, a prosody, and such a treatise on the roots, with full references to the classic authors, as *Rosen* has since furnished us. Finally, *Yates* published a grammar according to the occidental system, which however is not entirely applicable to the Sanskrit, even had *Yates*'s work been less inaccurate; its most valuable part is a list of grammatical terms and a brief treatise on prosody. The latter subject is often handled by the Indians in their own writings, and has engaged the attention of some of the greatest poets. After these English, the first German grammar made its appearance, viz. that of *Othmar Frank*; in it some progress was made, particularly with reference to the syntax,

which had before been neglected ; but Wilkins's clear arrangement it abandoned, and its lack of paradigms is an embarrassing defect, which however finds its excuse in the fact that Frank, for want of types, was compelled to make use of lithographs, at considerable trouble and expense. Bopp's complete grammar needs only to be mentioned, as the name of the author is a guarantee of the learning and accuracy of the work ; it has been translated into Latin, and an abridged edition, adapted to general use, has also been published.

The subject of Sanskrit lexicography will demand less of our attention, as we have already mentioned the lists of roots, and as little has here been done by Europeans to help the student. The Indians possess an infinite number of native works in this department, commonly called *koshas*, *thesauri* ; Wilson had met with seventy-six of them ; but they are on the whole of less practical use than the catalogues of roots, for either they contain nothing but obscure glosses, or they are otherwise incomplete, and all, at the fancy of the collector, are homonymically or synonymically arranged in metrical stanzas. The best and most complete dictionary, in the estimation of the Indians, is the *Amarakosha* of *Amarasinha*s. The poems and other works of this author were destroyed during the persecution of the Buddhists, to which sect he belonged ; but his useful and not heretical lexicon was spared, and others labored to perfect and complete it. With its supplements, but without a word of explanatory matter, it was published at Calcutta in 1807 ; but here again came to our aid that same scholar who, with so varied and profound learning, had illustrated the Vedas, the religious ceremonies, the sects of the Buddhists and Jainas, the philosophy, laws, astronomy, mathematics, grammar, and prosody, of India, Henry Thomas Colebrooke, now (1830), in his old age, the worthy President of the Royal Asiatic Society in London. He republished the *Amarakosha* with a translation and explanations, and facilitated its use by a register or concordance as ample as the work itself, for the latter was formed on the plan of arranging together synonymous words, as for instance all forms of expression for God, for heaven, etc., and so, being intended to be learned by heart by the studious Hindoo, was utterly useless to a European. For this reason Paulinus mistook the work for a collection of traditions and liturgies, and Anquetil Dupéron for a treatise on the Phallus (its opening subject being *linga*, gender, of words, that is to say), and both defended their opinion against the English with indecorous vehemence. From these and many other original word-books, eighteen in all, and ten commentaries on the *Amarakosha*, was made up the first and only Sanskrit dictionary (now, unfortunately, out of print), by Wilson, containing about

sixty thousand words, but spite of its copiousness, still far from complete, and an insufficient guide through the Sanskrit literature. A great desideratum, namely, a Glossary to the episodes and extracts which have been published in Germany, has been furnished to beginners by Bopp himself.

ARTICLE V.

SPIRITUALITY OF THE BOOK OF JOB AS EXHIBITED IN A COMMENTARY ON CHAPTER XIV, EXAMINED IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER PASSAGES.

By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., Professor of Greek in the University of the City of New York.
(Concluded from p. 229.)

Verse 13. *מִי יִהְיֶה בְּשֹׂאֵל הָצִנְנִי*. The apparent utter despondency of the preceding expressions is succeeded by the language of agonizing prayer, as though the gloomy conception had suggested and even impelled the cry for deliverance. The idea of annihilation, when dwelt upon, becomes intolerable. The earnestness of the petition shows that the seemingly despairing statement had not been the language of denial, but of a soul seeking in it a confirmation to faith as the only refuge from the intolerable darkness of the opposing view. *Oh that thou wouldst lay me up in Hades.* *צָפַן* means not simply to conceal generally, like *סָתַר* or *הִסְתִּיר*, but also to *lay away in security as a precious deposit*. Compare Ps. 27: 5 *He will hide me in his pavilion, in the secret of his tabernacle*. Hence the righteous are called *צִפְנֵי יְהוָה*, *clientes Jehovah*, as Gesenius gives it—more properly—*His hidden ones*.

שֹׂאֵל. This word alone is sufficient proof that the ancient Hebrews, from the earliest periods of their language, believed in a separate world of souls, a realm of the dead, distinct from the grave, for which they had another distinct and well known term. Although regarded as denoting a subterranean habitation, or as a region to which the grave might seem the local entrance, yet almost every use of the word, from Genesis to Malachi, indicates a conception clearly distinct from that of the mere earthly receptacle of the body. This, indeed, seems conceded both by Herder and Rosenmüller. There can be no better proof than the account of the transaction between Saul and the

witch of Endor, to convince any candid mind that such a ghost-world, or realm of departed spirits, was a settled part of the *common belief of the common Jewish mind*, entertained as strongly, and perhaps more strongly, than the prevailing notions now existing respecting an unseen spirit land. Whatever view we may take of that strange narrative, as wholly or partly real in respect to the particular scenes exhibited, it proves incontestably three things. It shows us, first, a common or popular belief in a world of departed human spirits; secondly, a belief in the reëpearance of such spirits, at certain times, upon the earth; and thirdly, in the power of a certain class of persons called *oboth* (אֹבוֹת) thus to have intercourse with, and to bring up, the departed dead. In fact, this incident, together with the frequent mention of the effort made to put a stop to the evil practices connected with such a belief, and which date back to the time of Moses, proves that among the Jews there was as firm a recognition of a ghostly state, as has ever prevailed among us. The very name given to these professed dealers with the spiritual world, was sometimes applied to the ghost itself, as in Isa. 29: 4, And thy voice shall be like that of a *spirit* (אֵל) *coming out of the earth*.¹

There may be traced a manifest resemblance between the Hebrew Sheol and the Greek Hades. The etymology ever given by the older Hebraists, whether Jews or Christians, made this more striking. Hades means the *invisible*, the *unknown*. The same idea was sought in the Hebrew word, by supposing it to be derived from the verb אָשַׁא, to *ask* or *demand*. Of this, two views were taken: one referred the verb to the ghostly world itself, as ever *demanding* or *asking* more and more victims, as never satisfied, *rapax orcus*,² as it is styled by the Latin poet Catullus; the other regarded it as addressed, objectively, to Sheol, in the sense of anxious and gloomy interrogation. In this way it presents the conception of the unknown state, towards which is ever directed the very inquiry contained in the 10th verse of this chapter, *Man dies and yields up his breath, and oh where is he?* (אֵי) It is the unseen spirit land, from whence no answer comes, although so often and so anxiously invoked. From such conception came the ancient practice of thrice solemnly calling upon the *manes*, as the mortal remains were borne towards their final resting place. It is this feeling of the unknown, of the unseen, of the unsatisfied, which be-

¹ Gesenius defines the אֵל νεκρόμαντις, i. e. *haridulus incantationum et curminum magicorum vi manes evocans*.

² It would almost seem as if there were some allusion to such a supposed etymological sense of the word, by the prophet Habakkuk, ch. ii. verse 5, *who hath enlarged his desire like Sheol, and cannot be satisfied*.

longs to the Greek Hades; and if this derivation could be allowed, the Hebrew Sheol would etymologically present the same *idea*, only through a different organ of sense. From the one, it might be said, there comes no gleam of light to the anxious eye;¹ from the other, no voice to the listening ear. The other derivation, which is probably the correct one, regards it as connected with the radical שָׁוָה, having the sense of *hollowness, cavity*, and corresponding to the Greek *κοῖλος*, the German *Hölle*.

Although the Hebrew conception of Sheol, as well as the Greek of Hades, was of a sombre, and on the whole undesirable state, still it was regarded as a condition of conscious rest, where one might be supposed to repose in security under the watchful eye of God, and which might, therefore, be looked to and prayed for, by the suffering, as a refuge from the overwhelming calamities of the present life. Thus the ghost of Samuel complains, or is represented as complaining, when disquieted and made again to revisit the agitating scenes of this world, 1 Sam. 28: 15. There are, moreover, some few intimations of distinct apartments for the righteous and the wicked. It is in reference to the latter, that it is so often spoken of as the *pit*; and there are now and then expressions of a far different kind, which seem to denote a different *state*, if not a different *locality*, for the beloved of God. Of this kind were, *the congregation of the fathers—the secret place of the Most High—the shadow of the Almighty*, where he hides his *chasidim*, or *subjects of his grace*. These latter terms, it is true, are metaphorically used of the divine protection even in this life; but they may be also regarded as having their fullest import in reference to the unseen world, and to those who, although long since departed, are said still to “*live unto Him*,” and of whom he styles himself “*their God*.” *He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.*

The general feeling, however, accompanying the word Sheol, is that of a joyless and undesirable life; and therefore, although Job may have looked to it as, in some sense, a refuge, there is an exceeding naturalness and probability in the allusion which he afterward seems to make to a deliverance from Sheol into some higher condition of renovated being, whenever and wherever it might be, whether upon the earth, or in the heavens, or heaven of heavens; whether to be a life like the present, or one far more blessed, permanent, and glorious. As also in

¹ With the etymological conception of Hades, as the obscure, the unknown, the invisible, are connected some of the more common expressions of the Greek poets for life, such as *ὄπ᾽ ἡν φάος ἡελίοιο*, and also the poetical use of verbs of sight as equivalent to *ζῆν* or *ζῶειν*. The same metaphor also exists in the Hebrew, as in Ecclesiastes 11: 7, *It is a pleasant thing to behold the sun*.

Ps. 49: 15, where the whole context impels us to regard it as spoken of a state after death, in which there shall be some deliverance peculiar to the righteous, and not of a mere temporal salvation: *surely God will redeem my soul from the hand (or power) of Sheol, for He will receive me.* Compare also Ps. 16: 10, *Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol.*

The reader will pardon us here, in making a summary review of the probable state of this ancient belief in a future life, the modified aspects under which it may have been held, at different times, in different nations, or in different states of individual souls, and of the circumstances to which may be ascribed its growth and development in the world. There may be traced, we think, two several kinds or rather grades of belief. There was, *first*, the common *creed*, or rather *sensiment*; of which we have spoken as being universal in the age of Job. It was the bare notion of a continued spiritual existence after the dissolution of the body. This was in some unknown though generally imagined subterranean locality. It was thought of by means of conceptions derived, in a great measure, from the impressive phenomena of the dying hour, and of the grave or funereal rites, and therefore tinged with many sombre and fear inspiring shades. To this extent, at least, the dogma of a ghostly world seems to have been held, *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*. Pages of antiquarian research could produce no surer conviction of its universality than the repeated Homeric expression, *κλυτὰ ἱθρεα νεκρῶν*, *The renowned, the far-famed nations of the dead of whom all have heard*—who were everywhere the subjects of religious rites, and addressed with sacrifices and supplications.

Again, there was, in the *second* place, what may be styled the occasional or individual belief, brought out by peculiar circumstances, and though naturally connected with the first, yet still held as a matter of experience or personal interest, rather than as part of some universal tradition, which the individual soul holds, not so much of itself, as through its participation in the common mind of the nation or period. This more personal belief, thus manifesting itself in occasional hopes and fears, brought out by inward workings, or prompted by outward suggestions, may be the commencement of a new modification which becomes afterwards more and more common among reflecting souls, and in this way finally assumes the form of a settled and universal creed. It is first the strong desire, having its birth in their souls, and then the incipient belief, then from the prison of Hades, undesirable even for the good, there would yet be a deliverance to some better state. In minds of a certain cast, this might give rise to the idea of a metempsychosis, or a continual transition to a higher and still higher

condition of corporeal being. In others it would assume a more spiritual or transcendental aspect; as in the Platonic idea of an existence, which although not wholly disembodied, recedes more and more from matter, in its approach to a reünion with the universal mind. Others again, possessing more of the devout than the philosophical temperament, and living nearer to the stream of primitive revelation, would give this hope more of a moral aspect; they would connect it with the idea of a general future judgment. The death of the body and the imprisonment in Sheol being regarded mainly as a moral penalty, their hope of deliverance from it would assume the form of a *new* life, to be shared by the body, in some unknown isles of the blest, or in some celestial region, or in some future renovation of the earth on which we dwell.¹

Such prayers, and hopes, and ejaculations, as these of Job, may have been the germ of what afterwards became a common idea, assuming a statement more and more definite, until finally it grew into that doctrine of a resurrection which is obscurely hinted at in some of the Psalms and in Isaiah, which is so manifestly taught by Daniel, which undoubtedly existed among the Jews at the coming of our Saviour, and to which, finally, Christ gave his sanction, as to a truth, not then first taught by him, but which had for ages been known in the Eastern world.

Mr. Barnes asks, Can we believe that God would reveal such a doctrine to an Arabian sage? Why not? Although his question, we think, is an absurd one, yet still we say, Why not? Why not to an Arabian, as well as to some Babylonian or Chaldean sage or sages,

¹ Along with this, and probably of prior birth, as being more strongly demanded by the moral sense, was the idea of a final judgment of the incorrigibly wicked;—a judgment as to which they were to be brought forth (see Job 21: 31), from the same unseen world of imperfect and unblessed existence. This idea of judgment for the wicked, became sooner an article of common belief, than the hope of deliverance for the righteous. The inference is derived not only from historical traces of the doctrine among other nations, but from the most unforced exegesis of Job 21: 28, where the idea is treated as common to all reflecting men, as carried by wayfarers from land to land, and which, therefore, every one had heard of—*Wilt thou not ask them who go by the way, and recognize their tokens; that the wicked are reserved (held back) for the evil day; in the day of wrath shall they be brought out, הוֹצֵא בְּיוֹם אַפְּרוֹחַ בְּאוֹרֵי שָׁמַיִם בְּאוֹרֵי שָׁמַיִם brought out in a solemn public procession.* The attempt of some to give הוֹצֵא here the contrary sense of being rescued, would have been pronounced most forced and uncritical, had it been employed in favor of any evangelical interpretation. Mr. Barnes, although generally inclined to follow Rosenmüller, is here compelled to abandon his track. The allusion to some great period of signal retribution is too plain to be mistaken; and the demand of the argument shows, that this must be referred to some period connected with the winding up of the present drama.

from whom the unevangelical commentators contend the Jews derived the doctrines of a future life and of the resurrection of the body ? The important question is not, *to whom* God first revealed it, or whether he ever expressly revealed it at all to certain individuals, but how we are to account for its being in our world as a fact which revelation acknowledges when it comes to speak in the most direct terms about it, and on which acknowledged fact its subsequent communications do seem most evidently to proceed. The truth must have had a beginning somewhere and at some time. It requires no very profound rationalizing to show that it must have been small before it was large ; and if the Chaldeans generally, or even the Chaldean sages, had it as an acknowledged dogma at the time of the captivity, it must certainly have been growing for many centuries at least. It must have been gathering strength from those more remote periods when it had its origin perhaps in ejaculations, and sighs, and hopes, and prayers brought out by peculiar circumstances in God's providence, such as now surrounded Job, and which may have been designed for the very purpose of thus giving the initiative to this great doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Or it may have been the result of some early special *inspiration* ; and this term may be used of just such a state of things as we have supposed in the other case. It may not have been by way of a formal dogma historically viewed, or regarded as oracularly announced. Although not revealed in any prophetic ecstasy, or in any vision of the seer, or by any voice from the shrine, yet may it have been truly *inspired* by being gently breathed into the souls of tried and suffering saints, in the sore travail of whose earth wearied spirits it was born into the world ; not in the form of a dogma, precise and well defined, but rather as an embryo or germinal sentiment, at first faint and obscure, though afterwards unfolded more and more until it became part of the common mind, and grew up into an established and universal article of faith.

Such questions as this of Mr. Barnes seem to proceed from what we must deem erroneous views, both of the matter and manner of revelation. No one can produce a passage from the Scriptures (the challenge is made in reference to the New Testament as well as the Old), in which the resurrection, or even the future life, is presented as a newly announced truth, then formally proclaimed, and treated as something unknown before. The same may be said of almost all the great truths of religion. They have either been in the world from the beginning, or they have thus come into it in the course of the providence of God introducing them historically in some known or unknown way, and then treating them as known grounds of appeal in the

written word. This is certainly true of the great and fundamental articles of the divine existence, of the divine moral government, and of the general doctrine of a separate spiritual life of the dead. The first two are assumed throughout the Scriptures. The third, if it did not exist from the beginning, is at least presented in the Old Testament in its incipient growth, in the hopes of the pilgrim patriarchs—in the common popular language respecting the dead who are gathered to the congregation of the Fathers, in the apparently casual, yet on that account the more significant mention of the popular belief of some kind of intercourse with departed spirits; and in the superstitious regard for a certain class by whom it was supposed such intercourse could be maintained. To one who views this doctrine from a still higher ground, it manifests itself in those highly spiritual ideas of the divine moral government, and in those sublime expressions of faith in the eternal righteousness, which have no meaning when the rationalist forces them down to a connection with the idea of a mere animal existence of the briefest kind for man. And finally, it reveals itself in the praises and prayers of God's beloved saints, growing clearer, and loftier, and more animated, until we come down to the manifestation of the Desire of all nations, and to those teachings of the New Testament in which the spiritual life is everywhere assumed as something long previously maintained, whilst it is nowhere announced as that which was utterly unknown before.

We may say the same of the primitive dogma of sacrifice, and of the need of some form of expiation for acceptance with God. So also of that most solemn of all doctrines, without which all the rest, even the being of God, and the question of a future life, lose all their interest for the soul,—we mean the fundamental truth that man, frail and finite as he is, is the subject of a moral law connecting him with the infinite and eternal Justice, and imparting to his actions an incalculable importance, which must extend far beyond the brief period of his present phenomenal existence.

What then, it may be asked, does the Bible most truly *reveal*? We answer—*Jesus Christ and him crucified*, as the great fact which gives its highest meaning to every other fact and doctrine. It was not the knowledge of sin, of wrath, of the need of expiation. It was not the atonement as a doctrine, nor the redemption, nor the moral law, nor the resurrection, nor the life to come. It was no one of these as an abstract dogma. It was the *person* and life of the incarnate Redeemer—He of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets, did write, and of whom evangelists and apostles testified. It was Jesus the Messiah, the Expiator, the Mediator, the Redeemer, and who embraces all these

doctrines in himself, when he is called the Peace, the Redemption, the Way, the Truth, the Resurrection, and the Life.

עֲדָתָא דְּיָהוּדָא, *Until thy wrath be past.* The Jews and Arabians, as we have remarked, regarded Sheol as an undesirable state or place, ἀταρπεία χωῖον, "a joyless region," as Homer styles it. This we have spoken of as arising, in a great measure, from the physical conceptions of vastness and desolateness, and sepulchral gloom in which the imagination was first led to invest it. But this was not all. The feeling had much of its force from a moral sentiment, if not a moral doctrine, connected with it; and which affected especially those who were nearest to the stream of primeval revelation. Among such as had preserved, more or less distinctly, the traditional story of the fall, Sheol was regarded as, in some respects, a state of wrath. It was such, in some degree, to all our race; to the comparatively good as well as to the bad. This unnatural existence of soul or shade, separate from its former body, and inhabiting a subterranean region, was a part of the penal death which had come upon all the sons of the covenant-breaking Adam. It was ever felt as a *penalty*, and no effort of naturalism could ever wholly divest it of this aspect. Even the righteous, then, although dwelling there as in some secret place of the Almighty, and existing apart from the wicked, as in the covert of his pavilion, might still be supposed to sigh for deliverance. It might be preferred to a condition of exquisite misery on earth; yet still it was an imperfect state, and therefore not to be desired as the final and permanent abode of the soul. The departed shade was not *wholly man*. It was only a marred relic of our former being. It was regarded as not capable of exercising the functions of the fully organized humanity, and hence the language respecting it ever tended to the style of impersonal expression.

On this account, along with the *hope*, there would most naturally arise the *idea* of deliverance to a new and more glorious condition, after the wrath had passed away; and how strikingly is this confirmed in those passages of the New Testament which not obscurely intimate that, for this very purpose, Christ himself went down to Hades. It was to preach deliverance to the captive, the opening of the prison to them who were bound, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and to announce the finished ransom to those believing spirits, who, as we are told, Heb. 11: 40, were waiting for this perfect redemption, "until God should have provided some better thing for us."

We would not, of course, maintain that Job looked definitely to this period, or to the general resurrection, or to any definite time or manner of deliverance, or that he exercised any very strong assurance in

his prayer, and yet, may we not suppose that the pathetic cry that God would lay him up in Sheol, that he would hide him until the wrath be past, that he would appoint him a set time and remember him,—may we not suppose, that this, and many a similar prayer under the darker dispensation, did in some sense receive their answers in that descent of Jesus into Sheol from whence he returned in triumph, when he led captivity captive, and divided the spoil with the strong.

The idea that Job is praying for death, in the sense of spiritual annihilation, is at war with every view of the context,—as well with that which maintains that the change subsequently spoken of is a temporal deliverance, as with the idea of a deliverance from Sheol.

V. 14. אִם-יָמוּת גִּבֹּר הַיָּחִיד . There may have been intended an emphasis here in the word גִּבֹּר as used for man. The radical idea is *strength—a robore dictus, Ges.* It is then a far more emphatic term than אִישׁ. *The strong man; the man of might; the Greek ἥρως—shall he die, when the most insignificant herb of the garden has its period of reviviscence? This idea presents still more clearly the striking resemblance, as far as mere expression is concerned, to the language of Moschus in the epitaph on Bion.*

Ἄμμες δ' οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ κατεροὶ ἢ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες.
But we the great the strong the wise.

Our previous comments have, in a great measure, anticipated all that might have been said on this remarkable question. One class of commentators give what they deem the intended answer at once. *Minime vero*—say Rosenmüller and others—*Most certainly not—He lieth down and shall never awake or be aroused from his sleep.*

Two things on the very face of the text seem to stand in the way of this most decided negative. One is the previous prayer, and the other the subsequent declaration. The process, or probable train of thought may be thus stated. Job had used language apparently of the deepest despondency. As though in danger of being overwhelmed in the exceeding gloom of his own suggestive picture, he cries out in the language of agonizing prayer,—*Oh that thou wouldst lay me up in some secret place in Sheol—Oh that thou wouldst appoint unto me some set time and then remember me.* He cannot bear the thought which he had presented so strongly to his own mind—the thought of lying down and rising no more; and the prayer of anguish, which is the consequence, is followed by its appropriate effect—the springing up of faith, expressing itself first in the musing or wondering interrogatory, and secondly, as it rises still higher, in the strong declaration which succeeds. In other words—despondency had driven him to prayer,

prayer had led to faith, faith to patient submission, and this, finally, to a feeling (although for a moment, it may be) of almost triumphant assurance—"All the days of my appointed time will I wait until my springing forth (הִלֵּי־יָמַי) shall come. Thou wilt call and I will answer—thou wilt have regard to the work of thy hands.

An interrogatory of this kind, we have said, instead of imparting doubt, much less denial, may be a natural mode in which strong emotion presents some new truth, or some new aspect or conception of an old truth which seems suddenly to be accompanied with a life and an importance unrealized before. Something of this kind, as far as the style or tone of expression is concerned, appears in that famous query of Achilles, *Iliad* xxiii. 103; where he exclaims, less in a spirit of doubt than of wondering awe—

ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν
ψυχὴ καὶ εἰδῶλον;

Pope has been censured for making too free with Homer, and yet we think he has here seized the spirit of the passage, although he may have given it too much of a philosophical aspect—

'Tis true, 'tis certain; man, though dead retains
Part of himself; th' immortal mind remains;
The form subsists without the body's aid;
Ærial substance and an empty shade.¹

Achilles had just been visited by the shade of his friend Patroclus, and the manner in which the vision of Eliphaz is recorded in the 4th of Job, shows that the belief in ghosts and a separate ghostly existence was as familiar to the early Arabian as to the Grecian mind. Indeed when and where has the world been without it? and yet when brought suddenly before the mind with some unusually life-like accompaniments, we start back with awe as from a conception too great or too wondrous to be realized.²

¹ The question here, however, may perhaps point mainly to the succeeding words ἄνρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνὶ πύμπαν—expressing not so much his wonder at the fact of a separate life, as at the strange mode of the spirit's existence. Can it be that there are in Hades any life and form (or umbra) without mind? etc. He may allude to the common notion, as we have before presented it, of the purposeless and almost mindless condition of the shades. This would seem to have been one aspect of the question, from what follows—παννυχίη, etc. All night the ghost of Patroclus had seemed to converse with all the reason and recollection of the present life.

² Plato in the Republic, Lib. iii., condemns this passage from Homer, and other similar representations of ghostly apparitions, as tending to pervert right views of the other life. We doubt, however, whether all his reasonings in the Phædon

May we not conceive of a pious mind putting to itself such an interrogatory, and in just such a time, respecting the being of a God? It might be called out, in the same manner, by wonder at some new and startling aspect of the thought flashing upon the soul, and lighting it up with a sudden illumination, which, for a moment, gives an unwonted *reality* and vividness to the whole horizon of moral and religious truth. In such a quickened state it would almost seem as though we had never truly believed before; so that the soul asks or rather exclaims in wonder, Is there indeed a God who rules the earth, and who will bring every work and thought of man into judgment!

Very much, too, depends upon what strikes us as the most emphatic form of the interrogatory, *If a man die shall he live again?* Is death then the wondrous way to *life*, and are all the trials with which God disciplines us here, but the birth throes to another higher, and more perfect, and more permanent existence? Is this world, after all, itself the death, the anomalous living death, the night far spent,—and may what we call death be but the dawning of another and eternal day? As the mourner sat contemplating the inexplicable visitations of Providence, or as he brooded over his painful domestic bereavements, and the condition of his diseased and loathsome body, there may have flitted across his dark mind some such strange query as Socrates quotes from Euripides. As when he says, in the *Gorgias*—“But indeed life is really an awful thing, and I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when he said—

Τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ΖΗΝ μὲν τὰτὶ ΚΑΤΘΑΝΕΙΝ,
Τὸ καθάπειν δὲ ζῆν—

Who knows but to live is to die, and to die is to live? and that we now are in reality dead, as I have heard from wise men (of old)—namely, that we are now really dead, and that *the body* (τὸ σῶμα) is our *grave* (τὸ σῆμα, by a play upon the word, our monument), in which we are buried,” etc. Gorg. 493 A.

There is no need of maintaining that such, or any other definite or indefinite view was Job's settled creed,—as we use the term when we speak of the acknowledged articles of our faith. It may have been a mere gleam, soon sinking into a deeper shade. We would only contend that such thoughts are not only possible, but also probable, as being most naturally suggested by the circumstances in which he was

furnish as strong a proof of such a life as this universal belief. The representations of the poet are more in alliance with the deepest feelings of our nature, than the subtle arguments of the philosopher.

placed; especially in connection with the rudimentary ideas which men in all ages have had of the Spirit World.

Such thoughts also are more likely to occur in the soliloquising style, which may be regarded as greatly prevailing throughout the poem, especially in the speeches of Job, when the introspective, subjective, or exclamatory is more consistent with his condition, and is therefore more marked, even when he is using outwardly the manner of direct address to his interlocutors. Here, too, we think, is the key to unlock many of the apparent contradictions of the book. In such an introspective state of meditation, becoming objective to itself in speech, there is but little regard to words expressive of the transitions of thought. The soul thus talking to itself, loves to present its conceptions in various and even seemingly opposing lights; sometimes assigning, apparently, the prominence to such as it would in reality most strongly reject. In this way only can we reconcile Job's expressions,—at one time of utter despondency, again, and perhaps quite suddenly, of hope, and faith, and even assurance,—at one time of fretful and almost blasphemous impatience, at another, of the most perfect submission,—now cursing his day, and again exclaiming, *though he slay me, yet will I trust in him*,—at one time exhibiting a sort of despairing exultation at the thought of the prosperity of the wicked, as though it furnished him with a reason for his reproaches of his Maker and an answer to his insulting friends, and again (when the tumor of his soul had settled down), manifesting a feeling of the most perfect confidence in the Divine Justice.

Very much of this same reflex or subjective style appears in that only other remnant of what may be styled the Hebrew philosophy,—namely, the book of Ecclesiastes, or the “Inquiry into the *Summum Bonum*.” There, too, opposing ideas are presented in their strongest lights. In one place, all is chaos, chance, death under the notion of a total cessation of being, an utter confounding of the good and the bad, of the wise and the unwise, of the joyful and the miserable, of man and beast. Again—to say nothing of a future life—there is the strongest expression of confidence in other truths utterly inconsistent with all this,—even more inconsistent with it, we may say, than any direct assertion of such future life regarded in its physical rather than its moral aspect. We mean, that doctrine of a *Divine Justice*, which must make an eternal difference—a difference necessarily extending far beyond the present state—between right and wrong, between sin and holiness, and of course between the sinner and the righteous man. In one place we have before us nothing but the materialist, the virtual atheist, the apparent denier of all providence and of all moral govern-

ment—"Time and chance happen to all—As dieth the fool so dieth the wise—Man has no supremacy over the beast—As dieth the one so dieth the other—There is a vanity done upon the earth in that it happens to the righteous as to the wicked, to him that feareth God as to him that feareth him not." Again (as though the soul had cast all this darkness about itself, in order that it might emerge into a clearer assurance of the great truth which the moral nature demands, and demands too in the face of all inductive phenomena to the contrary), how suddenly do we find ourselves in the midst of declarations involving the contrary of all this, and implying if not revealing, a future life in the idea of an eternal justice—*Though the sinner do evil times innumerable, and yet prolong his days, still do I surely know that it shall be well with those who fear God; but it shall not be well with the wicked*, Eccl. 8: 12, 13. *For God will bring every work into judgment with every secret thing whether it be good or whether it be evil*, Eccles. 12: 14. *All the days of my appointed time will I wait*, etc. Some would regard this as hypothetical—*All the days etc. would I wait*. But there is nothing which urgently calls for this, and such a departure from the more obvious construction is not to be justified except on the ground that there could be no good meaning without it.

צָבָא. Properly rendered by the Vulgate, *militia*—*military service*. See its use Job 7: 1. It however embraces, both here and in Job vii., the idea of appointed or *set time*—*an enlistment*. The LXX also intend this in their paraphrase—*συντελέσας ἡμέρας αὐτοῦ*. It also agrees with the context, especially with the term חַי, in the preceding prayer that God would appoint him a decree, and not forget the years of his dark and unjoyous abode in Sheol.

אֶחָד—This word seems to have here the same strength as in Job 13: 15, *Though he slay me yet will I wait for him*. So here, *Even in death or in Sheol will I wait for him*. Compare Ps. 23: 4.

חֲלִיפָתִי *My change*—more properly, *my springing forth*—*my germination*. Neither Rosenmüller, nor Mr. Noyes, nor Mr. Barnes, adverts to the evident relation which this word bears to the verb חָלַף (verse 8), in the comparison of the two. We might almost rest upon it alone for proof, that there is intended here no merely temporal deliverance, but something analogous to the new life which appears in the plant. The strong sense of reviviscence suits poorly with such a change as would consist simply in a restoration of Job's lost sheep and camels. Such an idea destroys all the force of the comparison in the very points for which it was mainly intended. It is, moreover, out of keeping with the sombre ideas of death and Sheol which both precede and come after it. He had prayed that God would hide him as some secure de-

posit in the spirit-land; that he would there appoint him his set time and remember him. How unnatural the supposition that the next thought, suggested by all this, should be simply the prospect of again attaining to a state of worldly riches. It is equally at war, too, with the sombre pictures that follow, in which he describes the gradual decay of all terrestrial things,—how the powers and changes of the natural world continually prevail against man, blighting all his hopes, and finally changing his countenance, and laying him low in the dust. Such a picture would not have naturally followed an exulting expression of confidence in some restoration to temporal wealth. At all events, it would not have succeeded it so suddenly, that we are hardly cheered by the dawning of worldly hope, before being again visited by a deeper darkness than before. All this, however, is perfectly consistent with a sudden expression of hope beyond the tomb. Even our most joyous conceptions of a spiritual world of blessedness, or of a final resurrection to a more glorious existence, may very naturally connect themselves with mournful thoughts of the grave that intervenes. We cannot think of the glorious promised land, with its never-withering flowers, without also bringing in the swelling flood, and the gloomy Jordan that rolls between. The transition is most natural from such ideas of future blessedness to those serious thoughts, which are connected with a view of our frailty, and of death regarded physically as the dark termination of our weary pilgrimage upon earth.

“How can it possibly be accounted for,” says Mr. Noyes (in his Commentary, p. 123), “that he should sink into *despair*, because he could not hope to enjoy the doubtful good of living again in this world of sin and misery, whilst, at the same time, he believed in the existence of a world of happiness and purity to which the righteous were to be admitted.” Modify the terms of this a little; put despondency or melancholy for despair, and hope in place of fixed belief, and Mr. Noyes’s query may be explained on the best known principles of human nature, even as they appear at times in the exercises of the Christian. Should we even call it despondency, or weakness of faith, the transition from spiritual hopes to a species of serious melancholy, connected with thoughts of death and the grave, is certainly far more natural and usual, than that any such sudden change of feeling should follow the hope of great worldly prosperity, which, from its nearness, and consequently distorting magnitude, is so apt to blind the mind to all considerations of a more serious kind.

V. 15. תִּקְרָא. *Thou wilt call and I will answer.* This language is used in reference to judicial proceedings. There will be a day when my case shall be called up, and I shall answer to the summons. Mr.

Barnes thinks it refers to the present time. There is nothing however strongly leading to such a view; whereas the entire context shows that the mind of Job, however weak and indefinite his faith, was brooding over the thoughts of the distant future, in fact in just the condition, spiritually and physically, in which the ideas of another life, and of a future deliverance would most naturally, if ever, present themselves.

Thou wilt have a desire to the work of thy hands. רָצָה. This is a very peculiar verb, occurring but few times in the Hebrew Bible. It is from the same root with the noun for *silver*, although the connection of meaning is far from being obvious. It is, however, unquestionably one of the strongest words to express the emotion of longing desires. As in Niph'al, Ps. 84: 3, *My soul longs for the courts of the Lord*. In Genesis 31: 30, it denotes the powerful feeling of homesickness, or love to one's native land—*Because thou sore longedst after thy father's house*; as Ulysses (Odys. I. 58) is represented as almost ready to die for the longing desire he had to see his father-land—

Ἰέμενος καὶ καπνὸν ἀποθρώσκοντα νοῆσαι
ἥς γαίης θανέειν λμείρεται—

Such a peculiar word as this, and indeed the whole expression, seems altogether out of place when regarded as referring to no higher change than a restoration of worldly wealth or prosperity. But what an intense beauty has it when thus interpreted of God's watchful care over the righteous dead? If Job did not mean the remains of the body as deposited in the grave, still it may with great propriety have been spoken of his *rudimentary humanity*, as laid up in Sheol, and awaiting the summons for trial and deliverance. But why should it be thought a thing incredible that even the former idea may have suggested itself to one who, as we may judge from such cries and lamentations as we find ch. xvii. verse 1, had evidently no hope of any such reviviscence in the present life. In the 139th Psalm, v. 16, God is represented as taking most careful note of the future rudiments of the human body before birth, and even before conception—*Thine eyes did see my substance yet unwrought, and in thy book all my members were written, when as yet there were none of them*. If this thought is so natural to a soul in elevated meditation, why may not one equally natural and affecting have suggested itself to the mind of the afflicted righteous man,—the thought that even *when* “*he made his bed in Sheol*,” He who had formed him and fashioned him would still have regard to *the work of his hands*? This last expression would have little or no meaning considered as referring to outward worldly prosperity; but its application to the bodily frame, or at least to his humanity in general, would

seem to be almost certain in view of the similar language he is so fond of using, and of which we have a specimen ch. 10: 10—*Thy hands have fashioned me and made me, and wilt thou let me be swallowed up? Hast thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me as cheese? With skin and flesh hast thou clothed me; with bones and sinews hast thou fenced me. Thy providence (יְהוָה) hath preserved my spirit.*

V. 16. וְעַתָּה—*Truly now*—as the particle עַתָּה is best rendered when followed by עַתָּה—as Gen. 26: 22. Num. 22. 29. Job 6: 3 etc. Or עַתָּה may have an adversative sense; as in Hab. 3: 17, 18—*Though the figtree shall not blossom, yet will I rejoice.* And so here—*Though now thou dost number my steps, yet thou wilt not (always) keep wrath on account of my sins.* There seems to be an emphasis on עַתָּה. There will come a time when thou wilt no longer cherish wrath against me. He would appear to have in mind that future judicial deliverance, when all the mysterious dealings of God's providence should be cleared up. A contrast of times seems certainly intended, and even if we suppose that Job had in view only a future deliverance in the present life, it makes a far more natural rendering than that which violently converts the latter clause into a question, and thus brings out an opposite sense. To effect this, Rosenmüller regards לָא as for לֹא (nonne), for which usage he cites Lam. 3: 36 and Jonah 4: 11. In the first example the sense is much better without the supposition of any interrogation at all; and in the second, the interrogative, or rather exclamatory aspect (which any reader of the Hebrew must see more properly belongs to it) is imparted by the tone of the context, irrespective of the negative particle.

וְעַתָּה לָא is best taken here as an ellipsis for the usual expression, וְעַתָּה לָא יִשְׁמֹר אֹתִי or עַתָּה לָא יִשְׁמֹר אֹתִי; as in Jer. 3: 5—וְעַתָּה לָא יִשְׁמֹר אֹתִי—*Will he keep forever—that is, his wrath forever.* This ellipsis, however, is more frequent with the very similar verb שָׁמַר.

וְעַתָּה. Rosenmüller renders this—*et concinnas super iniquitatem meam.* Gesenius regards it as equivalent to the Latin—*mendacia concinnavit*, or the Greek phrase δόλον ῥάπτειν. The primary sense of the verb is unquestionably—*sarsit-assuit*; and we would venture to suggest, whether in this word, and in חִתָּה of the preceding clause, there is not a reference to the *sealing up* and enclosing of a tale or account. The allusion then would be to that same judicial process, to which he had previously referred in his prayer, v. 13, and in his confident declaration, v. 15. The other view, which represents Job as charging, not only injustice, but *fraud* upon the Almighty, seems certainly inconsistent with the previous submission, and the confident hope of some deliverance, whether it refer to this life or to another.

V. 18. וַאֲזַלְתָּ הָרִימוֹסָא—*And surely the mountain falling, etc.* There has been much discussion respecting the true bearing of the verses that follow to the end of the chapter. Some regard the figures here employed as denoting very much the same with those of the 8th and 11th verses, namely, the completeness and irreparableness of death. Thus Rosenmüller—*Irreparabilis, inquit, est occasus hominis, ejusque fatalis, illa ruina, haud secus ac montis collapsi, rupis a radicibus revulsae, lapidum a fluxu exesorum, quin et terrae alluvionibus attritae et absorptae. Ita nulla spes reviviscendi plane relicta est ei qui semel occubuit.* It is perfectly consistent with the view we have taken of the previous train of thought, to admit that Job here returns to a sombre if not wholly desponding state of mind. Such a transition, too, we would regard as probable and natural. There is, however, danger of false interpretation, if we persist in applying here the principles and rules of a direct, uninterrupted, logical, or rhetorical discourse. We are not, therefore, to look for a well connected train of thought, nor for regular transitions denoted by their appropriate particles and grammatical forms. Especially is this remark applicable to the discourses of Job. These, as we have said, partake largely, in some parts, of the nature of soliloquies. Mingled with appeals, now to God, and again to his interlocutors, together with occasional direct notices of their arguments, there is, throughout, a continued communing with his own soul, and with the wondrous thoughts concerning his present and future destiny which God's dealings were suggesting to him. He turns them over and over; surveys them in many varied aspects,—now in the shade of his despondency, and again in the light of his hope. The transitions, of course, are sudden, apparently abrupt, sometimes seemingly contradictory; and in this lies much of the dramatic power of the unknown author of this wondrous production. Imagine the aged mourner lying on the earth,—sackcloth on his body, and ashes on his head, his “face soiled with weeping,” his “horn in the dust,” the “shadow of death upon his eyelids”—now cursing his day, now sinking in despondency, now rising in hope, now humbled in prayer, now patient in tribulation. Long intervals of silence intervene between his passionate ejaculations; during which his friends forbear to disturb the current of his thoughts,—as when at first they sat with him in silence three uninterrupted days and nights. In this way his silent meditations may carry him very far from apparent connection with the previous current of the discourse, until at length from his surcharged heart he again “takes up his parable”—it may be in a strain quite different from that which formed the closing cadence of what, to the eye, seemed immediately to precede it. The

introductory words of transition, in such cases, may be regarded as referring to, or as suggested by, these silent, intervening thoughts, just as though they had been spoken aloud in the continuity of the discourse,—or the new commencement may sometimes be startling and abrupt. In some such way as this, may we suppose a musing pause, brief yet crowded with serious thought, to have followed the preceding strong expression of faith and hope. In the rapid transitions of his soul, the sombre ideas arising from the contemplation of his physical humanity again return, and he breaks out here with the abrupt argumentative particle *μή*, just as though he had been contending in spirit with some imagined opponent. *Ὁ μὴν δὲ, ἀλλὰ*—as the Greeks would say—‘*No indeed—there is nothing permanent in our mere physical or earthly existence; All nature is ever manifesting the law of phenomenal change and decay. For verily even the mountain falling cometh to nought, and the rock is removed out of its place.*’

We do not, however, think that irreparability is the main thought intended to be suggested by the figures that follow. There is in all of them, rather, an idea of gradualness, if we may use the term, which seems inconsistent with the other view, or to have, at least, no necessary connection with it. It looks like a representation of the powers of an external world, gradually, yet irresistibly prevailing against man, destroying all his works, disappointing all his hopes, and, finally, after a protracted struggle bringing him down to the dust of death. Slowly, but surely, is he decaying and dying through the greater part, if not the whole, of his earthly existence. His life is inefficient. He accomplishes nothing compared with his hopes and purposes. He is as the Greek poet describes him—*ὀλιγοδρανίος, ἄκικυς, ἰσόκειρος*. He cannot contend with nature. His mortal existence is like the troubled dream of a sick man, in which he is ever doing, ever striving, yet never effecting the object at which he aims—

Veluti in somnis oculos ubi languida pressit
Nocte quies, nequicquam avidos extendere cursus
Velle videmur, et in mediis conatibus ægri
Succidimus; non lingua valet, non corpore notæ
Sufficiunt vires nec vox, nec verba sequuntur.¹

The mind of the muser returns here to the earthly and mortal aspect of humanity. Slowly but irresistibly, as the mountain crumbles, as the rock is removed from its place, as the waters wear the stones, so God, through the appointed powers of the physical world, prevails

¹ Aeneid XII. 908.

against man regarded as a mere physical being, destroys continually all his hopes, gradually changes his aspect, from youth to manhood, from manhood to age, from age to decrepitude, and finally sends him away from this scene of ever unsuccessful conflict with the outward influences that are continually bearing upon him.

V. 19. *The waters gradually wear the stones.* פָּרִיט—*paulatim attrunt*—by little and little. Hence the noun פֶּחָק—*pulvis*—corresponding to the modern geological term *detritus*,—that which was worn down by the waters, as was probably the case with all that now constitutes the loose soil of the earth. Isa. 40: 15—*The small dust of the balance.*

Thou wastest away the things that grow out of the dust of the earth. In this our English Version gives the common sense of פָּרִיט, although it does not explain the suffix. Herder and Noyes render it—*The floods overflow the dust of the earth.* Rosenmüller's translation comes to the same thing. They all give an unusual sense to פָּרִיט, not warranted, we think, by its connection, in any other place, and besides requiring a very harsh grammatical anomaly, in a plural masculine nominative to a feminine singular verb. Such a construction can hardly be justified by an appeal to some rare usage of the Arabic. Moreover, in this idea of a sudden inundation of a flood, there is lost that feature of the comparison which appears in all the other parts, namely, of steady and irresistible power,—gradual, yet finally prevailing. May not פָּרִיט be the nominative? It would present something of an anomaly in respect to gender, but nothing so strange as that arising from the other view. Besides, in the compound nominative פָּרִיט-אֶרֶץ, we may regard the gender of the latter noun in regimen as controlling. The sense then would simply be—*The dust of the earth—or the earth with its dust—overwhelms its productions, or the vegetation which grows spontaneously out of it.* It would then seem to refer to the gradual encroachment of the desert sands upon the cultivated soil, such as often had taken place, and does yet take place, in that part of the world. It would, in this way, present a very natural parallel to the first member,—the former referring to the gradual encroachment of the waters, the latter to that of the desert upon the cultivated earth. And then follows most naturally the sentiment of the closing member—*Thou destroyest the hope of man.* Nature is ever at war with him—or, rather—Thou, through nature, art ever defeating his most lasting plans, and bringing to nought his proudest works. Horace has something of this idea, together with comparisons substantially the same, though presented in an opposite aspect—

*Debemur morti nos nostraque, sive receptus
Terra Neptunus classes aquilonibus arret,
Regis opus : sterilisve diu pontus aptaque remis
Vicinas urbes alit, et grave sentit aratrum ;
Doctus iter melius ; mortalium facta peribunt.¹*

With this view admirably coincides the verse following — *תָּחִיבֵהוּ וְיִדְּבֹקֵהוּ* — *Thou prevailest continually against him until he depart ; or, that he may depart ; ever changing his countenance until finally thou sendest him away.* *תָּחִיב* as a rare word occurring here, in Job 15: 24 and in Eccl. 4: 12, with some few instances of the derivative noun. The places where it is found are, however, sufficient to show that its radical idea is that of *irresistible power*.

לִנְצָח Rosenmüller finds here also his favorite idea of irreparableness — *opprimis morte irreparabili ut resurgere nequeat*. It accords well with the primary idea of the word, and the previous train of thought, to render *לִנְצָח* continually,—implying a *steady, uninterrupted, and irresistible* course of action, operating by way of an immutable law, or of a fixed divine procedure in the employment of natural powers. This also agrees well with the other sense of the word, namely, that of *victory or final triumph*. *תָּחִיבֵהוּ*. This word, according to the view we have taken, would not refer merely to the change that passes upon the human countenance at death, but to the gradual evidences of decay which attend us during almost the whole of our earthly life.

V. 21. 'This verse evidently refers to a state after death, when man has finally succumbed and given up the weary conflict. *His sons come to honor, and he knoweth it not ; they are brought low, and he regardeth it not.* There is here the same idea to which we have before adverted. Man goes not to the land of annihilation, but to the ghost-world of Sheol, where the soul, in its penal separation from the body, loses its connection with the upper world,—has no longer any recollection of, or interest in its past scenes ; but is reduced to its rudimentary, quiescent, dream-like, powerless state of ghostly animation.

Their hatred and their love is lost ;
Their envy buried in the dust.
They have no share in all that's done
Beneath the circuit of the sun.

The closing verse of the chapter seems to have given the commentators much trouble. There is something very harsh in regarding it as spoken of the dead, on any view we may take of their condition ; and yet many have given it this interpretation. "He speaks figura-

¹ Hor. Ars Poet. 65.

tively," says Rosenmüller, "of his body, as though it felt the gnawing of the worm, and of his soul, as though it felt grief for its separation." We cannot help thinking this exceedingly unnatural, repulsive, and improbable. Even on his own hypothesis, it would be strange that such a figure should come directly after Job is supposed to have spoken of death as a state in which there was no recollection. The reference by Rosenmüller to Num. 6: 6, is unworthy of his scholarship. The use of מֵתָ there for a dead body, is on a different principle altogether. It is merely an elliptical expression for what visibly remains of man after dissolution, or the departure of the spirit, and which is taken as the true representative of what was once the whole humanity. So the Greeks sometimes use ψυχή by way of ellipsis for death, or the loss or departure of the soul—as in Euripides Iphig. in Aulid. 1453

οὐ πενθεῖν με σὶν ψυχὴν χρεῶν.

By a similar, though inverted use of a part for the whole—νεκροί, which literally means *dead bodies*, is sometimes put for the *souls* in Hades, or the dead generally. As in Eurip. Hecuba 557

—ἐν νεκροῖσι γὰρ
δούλη κεκλησθαι, βασιλῆς οὐσ', αἰσχύνομαι.

The true explanation of the connection here may be found in what has been already said of the meditative, musing, soliloquizing and ejaculatory nature of Job's discourse. May we not here also imagine a pause of impressive silence? He reviews the whole ground of his former meditations, and then comes the closing thought,—not intended to be in immediate logical connection with what just precedes, but as a sort of moral, or summing up, to the whole chapter containing this rhapsody on mortality; or rather to the general picture of human frailty presented in the latter part. As though he had said—"Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter—*Such is man*. His life is a scene of perpetual conflict. Death conducts him to the ghostly land of forgetfulness. Such is his mere physical condition in this world. It is sorrow, and labor, and a sore travail, and a heavy yoke for all the sons of Adam, from the day in which they come forth from their mother's womb, until they return to the earth, the mother of all." As the son of Sirach thus sums up human life—"Anxious thought—fear of heart, passion, zeal, commotion, fear of death, little or nothing of rest;" so Job most concisely expresses it all in reference to both departments of human nature—*His flesh upon him has ever pain; his soul within him ever mourns*. The one is ever the seat of disease in some of its

various forms; the other of care and grief alleviated by comparatively little of rest or enjoyment. In other words—*Flesh and heart* (שָׂרִיר וּלְבָבִי body and soul) *both fail*. Here closes the picture as drawn by desponding Job. The stronger and steadier faith of the Psalmist could append the triumphant finale—*But thou, O God, art the strength of my soul* (the rock of my heart) *and my everlasting portion*.

A strong, though not conclusive argument for this view of the verse, is derived from the use of the futures, which the whole style of the passage requires us to take in what has been called the frequentative or habitual sense, as referring to that which is done continually or uninterruptedly; a good example of which may be found in Job 1: 5, in the future, יַעֲשֶׂה. So here they refer not to what takes place in the future strictly, or after death, but to what is commonly experienced by both soul and body upon earth.

ARTICLE VI.

REINHARD'S SERMONS.

By Edwards A. Park, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary.

IN the last No. of the Bib. Sac., it was proposed to give some illustrations of the sermons of Francis Volkmar Reinhard, the celebrated Court Preacher at Dresden. Some remarks having been made on his Life and Labors, the Novelty and Variety of his Themes for the Pulpit, the Connection of his Themes with his Texts, and with the Occasions on which they were discussed, the Rhetorical Structure of his Discourses, their Vivacity, and their Fitness to excite the Curiosity of hearers or readers; we now proceed to consider the

§ 9. *Historical Character of his Sermons.*

The festivals¹ of the Romish and some of the Reformed churches, have reference to the external facts of Christianity. Many of the lessons prescribed for these festivals are of course narrative in their character, and lead to the composition of historical discourses. When

¹ Such as Annunciation day, Good Friday, Easter, Ascension day, Whitsuntide, etc.

Reinhard was appointed, in 1808, to make a new *pericope* for the Saxon churches, he selected as many narrative lessons as propriety allowed, because such texts "give the preacher an opportunity to vivify his discourses by actual events, and to apply his remarks immediately to the relations of common life."¹ His example is congenial with his theory. Although he never occupies the chief part of a discourse with a continuous narrative, he frequently diffuses the historical element through his entire discussion. It may be called his favorite method, first to expose the principle which underlies some biographical incident, and then apply that principle to our common life. His text presents an individual fact; he briefly develops the moral truth involved in that fact, and devotes the body of his sermon to the illustration of that truth in the daily conduct of men. Thus his discourses have the interest and the vividness of the historical style, their moral lessons being pictured out in the significant fact which the text records, and have at the same time the unity and directness of the logical arrangement, unfolding a principle in its exact relations, and explaining it incidentally by the text. There is, however, an occasional infelicity, perhaps an apparent irreverence, in applying a record of the divine operations, or a passage of our Saviour's life, to the habits of men, and thus making the greater merely illustrative of the less. In the lesson Matt. 9: 1—8 it is said, that Jesus "entered into a ship and came into his own city" (Capernaum, the place of the Saviour's frequent residence during his public ministry), "and immediately they brought to him a man sick of the palsy," etc. This fact indicates that Jesus enjoyed the confidence of those who lived near him, and suggests to Reinhard the Proposition of a sermon,² How valuable to true Christians is the confidence of their own townsmen. It shows a) that a good religious sentiment prevails around them; b) it is a testimony to their exemplary life; c) it is a means of doing good to their fellow-citizens; d) it encourages them to persevere in works of charity. We should by no means be regardless of our reputation at home; we should diligently examine our own characters if we are in ill repute among those who best know us; we should never strive to obtain this home reputation by improper means; we should never disturb good men in their enjoyment of this blessing.

In a sermon on Matt. 4: 1—11,³ the scene of our Saviour's Temptation, he treats of those epochs which occur in the life of men, and at which they decide their future destiny. The Temptation of Christ

¹ Vorrede zu Predigten, 1809, s. V. VI.

² Predigten 1804. Band II. ss. 165—185.

³ Predigten, 1801. Band I. ss. 159—180.

was such an epoch in his life, and exemplifies our duty in the critical periods which we experience. In another discourse from the same text,¹ he treats of the wisdom with which Christians ought to regulate their secret thoughts. In a sermon preached² on Ascension day from Mark 16: 14—20, instead of dwelling on the departure of Christ to heaven, he announces as his prominent theme, The duty of Christians to be careful that they so live, as to exert a good influence upon the world after their death. This truth is vividly illustrated by Christ's life and ascension. He discourses on the value of quick decisions from Luke 5: 1—11,³ which records Peter's sudden resolution to let down his net at Christ's command. The text Luke 7: 11—17 suggests to him, The wonderful connection of sorrowful with joyful events in the fortunes of men.⁴ From the fact mentioned in the lesson Luke 14: 1—11 that the Pharisees watched Jesus, he derives the Proposition that we are frequently observed by others without remarking it ourselves; sometimes a) by the unprejudiced as by children, who wish merely to notice what is done; sometimes b) by friends, who watch us because they love us; sometimes c) by critics, who examine our conduct merely to improve their knowledge of human nature; and sometimes d) by enemies, who lie in wait for us. Hence we should be afraid to sin, should be incited to a reformation of the life, to the strictest care of our outward conduct, and an unwearying diligence in doing good.⁵ From the same text he discourses, in another sermon,⁶ on The foresight with which we should prevent others from making a bad use of us. The treatment which Paul received at Malta, his being regarded first as a murderer, then as a God (Acts 28: 1—10), is ingeniously employed by our author⁷ to illustrate the Proposition, that distinguished men appear enigmatical to the multitude, a) being different from others in mental power, they are suspected of dangerous error; b) being superior in moral principle, they are condemned as devoid of fellow feeling; c) being elevated above others in their outward conduct, they are wondered at for their want of wisdom or tact; d) rising against all obstacles to great influence, they are at once admired, feared, and resisted; e) suffering much from the ingratitude of others

¹ Predigten, 1799, Band I. ss. 129—140.

² Predigten, 1801, Band I. ss. 440—460.

³ Predigten, 1802, Band II. ss. 167—186.

⁴ Predigten, 1802, Band II. ss. 298—318.

⁵ Predigten, 1804, Band II. ss. 124—143.

⁶ Predigten, 1797, Band II. ss. 358—374.

⁷ Predigten, 1809, Band II. ss. 247—266. This sermon contains some obscure references to Napoleon Buonaparte, who, at the time of its delivery, was usurping the German thrones, and was a particular favorite at the Saxon court.

and from their own inattention to earthly comfort, they are misunderstood with regard to their motives and principles of action. Hence we should a) exercise the greatest caution in judging of the character and conduct of those, whom we do not understand because they are elevated above our sympathies; b) we should cherish true benevolence toward all men, for thus, as did the citizens of Malta, may we confer a favor upon some unknown but remarkable personage; c) we should derive all possible benefit to ourselves from great men, for He who in his providence sent Paul to heal diseases in Malta, has sent remarkable personages to us for our intellectual and moral instruction.

The degree in which Reinhard's discourses derive a vivacity and continued freshness of interest from the infusion of their historical element, may be seen in his very agreeable sermon on the domestic life of Jesus, from the lesson John 2: 1—11.¹ We are interested, he says, in knowing the particulars of Christ's first public act, and also of his whole preceding course. The lesson of the day gratifies us in regard to the former, but we have little information with regard to the latter. From his twelfth to his thirtieth year, a thick cloud hangs over his history. The scene described in the text, however, affords some intimations concerning the character which he had previously established. This scene occurred on the confines of his private and public career. He had in reality commenced his great work, and on this occasion he performed his first miracle. But he had not become known as a public teacher. He was regarded as yet a plain inhabitant of Nazareth. He had called disciples around him only two days before; and was now invited with his new friends to the wedding of one of his relatives, with no suspicion that he had outgrown his interest in such scenes, or emerged from the family life in which he had heretofore so cheerfully participated. The incidents, then, of this marriage feast, combined with some hints in other passages of the Gospels, slightly raise the curtain which hides his domestic history, and enable us to cast a few glances at his household character. We discover signs that in his domestic life he was a) a remarkable son, full of obedience to his parents; b) an industrious member of the family, (working as a carpenter with his father,) c) engaging in the commonest business of life with his mind fixed on the noblest ends; d) exhibiting a still, modest greatness, which would be scarcely observed by the neighborhood, (which was not recognized by his brethren even, and apparently by none but his mother, who watched his movements closely, and laid them up in her heart); d) holding himself back from confidential, inti-

¹ Predigten, 1802, Band I. ss. 47—69.

mate friendships, even although he possessed the most affectionate sensibilities, and never more so than in his earlier years. When he appeared on the stage of public action, he seems, with all his tenderness and kindness of feeling, to have formed no hearty intimacies with his townsmen or even his brothers. These glimpses into the domestic life of Jesus, a) increase our reverence for him and confirm our faith in his character and mission. b) They fill us with the greatest respect for the institution of the family. The Son of God lingered thirty of his thirty-three years in the bosom of an humble household, was sedulous in accommodating himself to its wants, and was formed for his great work under its plastic influences. c) They allure us to contentment with our vocation, and an honest zeal in the discharge of our daily duties. The Lord of all things passed by far the greater part of his life at home, working in the honest trade of his father; then and there he grew in wisdom and in favor with God and man. He thus consecrated our well meant industry; and his example should stimulate us to fulfil all righteousness, in quiet resignation to the divine will, and with an eye uplifted to our heavenly home.

Living in an age and in a city somewhat notorious for licentious indulgences, it was natural that so conscientious a preacher as Reinhard should seek and even invent an occasion for discoursing on the duties of the family relation. The same text which was at the foundation of the sermon last noticed, affords him an opportunity for administering the needed rebuke in connection with a beautiful narrative. The incidents at the wedding in Cana, John 2: 1—11, suggest to him as a theme, the Home feeling, or the Sense of Domestic duty and bliss.¹ He considers the theme logically, but it is entwined by the historical spirit of the text. First, he explains this virtue as involving a) a decided love of the family relation; b) a lively zeal in performing the duties of that relation; c) a tender interest in the joys resulting from it. Secondly, he shows the importance of this home feeling, as a virtue, a) prompted by nature, b) recommended by prudence, c) enjoined by duty, d) hallowed by religion. Thirdly, he applies the subject, a) in a warning to those who, being free from the family relation, do not cherish the sense of domestic duty and bliss; b) in an entreaty to those who are unhappy in their household relations, because they are deficient in this virtuous home feeling; and c) in an encouraging exhortation to those who preside over families, and who therefore ought to awaken in themselves and impart to their households this attachment to domestic scenes.

¹ Predigten, 1801, Band I. ss. 47—69.

On the Feast of the Epiphany, Reinhard selects for his subject the Weakness of Sin.¹ He arrives at this theme by the following circuit: the lesson of the day is Matt. 2: 1—12; this passage includes the description of Herod's unsuccessful attempt to destroy the infant Jesus; and this attempt is an instance of both crime and impotence. In discussing the weakness of sin, Reinhard divides his discourse into four general topics, and subdivides each into two specific heads, and distinguishes each of these into a particular description of Herod's crime, and an application of the principle which it involves to all other sin. Sin is weak, A. because it is without the aid of truth, and this, a) because it involves ignorance of the truth, as Herod was impotent through want of knowledge; and b) because it implies hatred of the truth, as Herod was unwilling to reflect on the folly of his efforts to destroy the Messiah. Sin is weak, B. because it is without courage, and this, a) because it prevents the sinner from relying on his own cause, as Herod was made fickle and childish by want of confidence in the goodness of his designs; and b) because it prevents the sinner from relying on the support of his comrades, as Herod, although impelled by his ignorance to seek the aid of the Magi, was still unable to trust them, and this want of confidence in one's associates generates cowardice in one's self. Sin is weak, C. because it is without the love of others, and this is seen in the fact, a) that sin cannot secure the affection of men, as Herod's selfishness was abhorred in despite of all the splendor in which it was concealed, and in the fact, b) that sin will always excite the opposition of men, as Herod was mocked and thwarted by those whom he had endeavored to propitiate. Sin is weak, D. Because it is without the aid of God, and this is seen in the fact, a) that God makes use of the sin of men in forwarding his own schemes, as Herod's public efforts to destroy the Messiah gave a previously unattained celebrity to the cause which he wished to exterminate, and in the fact, b) that God will thwart those influences of sin which oppose his designs, as he baffled the attempts of Herod to slay the infant Jesus, and although he gave to that king great power, he did not enable him to injure a young child whose life was important for the kingdom of God.

There are but few preachers who employ the historical element with so much skill and success, as Reinhard; and the sprightliness which his style derives from it, contributes much to relieve the

¹ Predigten, 1795, Band II. ss. 1—15.

§ 10. *Didactic Character of his Sermons.*

A didactic preacher is often thought to be a soporific one. But when the inquisitiveness of hearers is aroused, and they are earnest to pry into an intricate theme, they are gratified and enlivened by nothing more than by explanations which they hear from the pulpit. In an eminent degree are the discourses of our author explanatory. They thus satisfy that craving for information which has been excited by their startling character. He expounds the Bible,¹ not in the desultory, vagrant, dissipating style so common with what are called expository preachers, but with strictness of logical method. He explains his subject, whatever his subject be. Here is indeed a fault in his theory and practice. Some of his elucidating divisions are needless, and as they conduce to a monotony of arrangement, are hurtful. Discoursing on Matt. 6: 24—34,² he propounds as his theme, The little incidents of daily life, from which we should derive nourishment for our confidence in God; and then announces the following Division: first, these little incidents of daily life must be definitely described; secondly, it may then be shown how they should be used for cherishing our confidence in God. The first of these Divisions is subdivided into four Heads. A similar excess is not infrequent. A want of transparency is the last defect which can be ascribed to our author. An exuberance of elucidatory remark is one of his most common, but one of his best faults. It must be acknowledged that the pulpit generally leaves unexplained much which is not understood by the auditors.

The didactic character of his sermons, however, is not limited to their explanations of the text or the theme. It pervades his whole discussion. An interesting specimen of it is found in one of his sermons on Luke 16: 1—9.³ The chief doctrine, he remarks, suggested by this parable is, that man should use the good things of this life, as means of promoting his welfare in the life to come. But with this doc-

¹ He often complains in his Prefaces that he is not permitted to preach upon and thus explain a greater variety of texts, but is confined to the lessons from the Gospels. In the year 1806, however, he was allowed by the Government to preach upon the lessons from the Epistles. His sermons for this year are remarkably rich exposition of Scripture. In 1807 he was remanded by the civil powers to the lessons from the Gospels, the same on which he had already published more than twenty volumes of sermons, and on which all the clergymen of his country had regularly preached for many years. See the Prefaces to his discourses for 1807 and 1808.

² Predigten, 1800, Band II. ss. 167—186.

³ Predigten, 1796, Band I. ss. 234—253.

trine how many weighty thoughts are combined, how much profound instruction on the character of man, the mixture of good and evil in his conduct, the difference between wisdom and cunning, the connection between different sins, their contagious power. In the multitude of themes which this parable suggests, one is to me especially mournful. Jesus describes the dishonest steward, as finding no difficulty in the execution of his knavish scheme (*bubenstück*). Not one of the debtors recoils from the bribe. The cunning steward knows just how much to offer each man. To the first he gives half of the debt, to the second four-fifths. He acts on the principle that every man has his price, and he wishes to purchase each individual at the cheapest rate. But let us examine the question, Does every man have his price for which he gives himself away? We will consider, first, the meaning of the question. The phrase "man gives himself away," implies that we are our own masters so long as we act in harmony with reason and conscience; we are then raised above all degrading influences, and are in no danger of punishment; but when we violate our duty, and oppose our moral sense, we subject ourselves to a foreign power, we allow to those who tempt us a debasing authority over us, we give ourselves away. The "price" for which we dispose of our rightful self-government, is some gratification offered to our lower nature. We do not part with our self control for no recompense; although some of us demand a higher price than others, and each insists on a reward accommodated to his peculiar temperament. The sentence, then, "man has a price for which he gives himself away," means that he is so sensitive to the pleasure derived from worldly good as to give up his self-government whenever a certain degree of this pleasure is procured or promised to him. But secondly, let us inquire, Is it true of every man that without special help from God, he gives himself away for a reward? Is it the tendency of his nature to yield the mastery of conscience to the solicitations of sense and the proffers of worldly good? Or is such a base surrender an accident happening to some, but not common to all? Were I allowed, my hearers, to say nothing unpleasant to you, and to conceal from you every rough truth, oh I would have quarreled against the proposal of such a question; for it is hard, humbling, apparently unamiable to say what I am now obliged to prove. But what can I do against the power of truth? I answer the question whether every man has his price for which he gives himself away, with a Yes. To justify my answer, I appeal to the general impression of the Bible; to such passages as Rom. 3: 23. John 3: 6. Gal. 5: 17; to the commands that we free ourselves from the slavery of the flesh; that we watch against its enticements; and that the best

men be vigilant lest they fall. And oh how strongly is this testimony confirmed by a consideration of the nature of our desires and passions, and their relation to the reason. They are strong at the first, they have complete dominion in our infancy, and thus acquire an artificial strength before the reason begins to influence them; they are nurtured by our early education, by our outward circumstances, and are often inflamed, as in the parable, by peculiar exigencies. And the truth thus established by the Bible and the study of our own nature, is placed beyond a doubt by our experience and observation. We see that every man has his weak side; and although he will resist a certain amount of temptation, he can be over-persuaded by an additional amount. Instead of attempting to evade this truth, let us rather contemplate, thirdly, the consequences which flow from it in reference to our moral conduct. It teaches us, a) that we should be mild in our judgment of the faults of others, for men fall into sin in consequence of a natural weakness of character, a weakness in which we ourselves have a melancholy share, which does not excuse indeed, but should induce us to mourn over our own frailty, rather than be censorious in regard to our neighbors. The subject teaches us, b) that we should search out our own weak side, and ascertain where we are in the greatest peril; c) that having found our most vulnerable point, we should use a double diligence in defending it; and d) that we should labor, under the divine guidance, to remove radically and entirely the corruption of our hearts, to become new creatures in Christ Jesus.

An equally unique example of our author's didactic style is found in his sermon¹ on Matt. 9: 18—23, the record of Christ's raising the ruler's daughter, and of his being laughed to scorn by the people for saying that the damsel was not dead but asleep. After stating that the natural man discerneth not the things of the Spirit, that even Paul was thought to be beside himself, and that Christ endured much contradiction of sinners, Reinhard proposes to discourse on the fact, that the conduct of true Christians often appears ridiculous to the multitude; and, first, he states the reasons for its so appearing; secondly, the consequences which should result to us from it. The reasons are, a) that the multitude deem the principles which regulate the Christian's conduct to be absurd; b) the faith which he cherishes in invisible things to be foolish; c) the zeal which animates him to be extravagant; and d) the magnanimity which distinguishes him to be indiscreet. He ought to provide more thoughtfully for himself, and not to waste his strength for unseen good. The consequences which

¹ Predigten, 1807, Band II. ss. 227—249.

should result to us from this general disposition to ridicule the pious man are, a) we should fear to join in this contemptuous merriment, for the Christian's conduct is not ridiculous, and can be esteemed such by superficial observers only ; b) we should suspect the genuineness of our own piety, if we escape the ridicule of the multitude ; for why do they not look with scorn upon us, if indeed we be governed by motives to them so mysterious and unreasonable ; c) we should be stimulated to an exemplary life by the fact that we are not of the world, and therefore the world despiseth us ; that we are scorned as was our Master, and for our likeness to him ; d) we should be elevated in our hopes and aims, for not all are so debased as to condemn the Christian life, but we are united with a select company of noble spirits whom the world cannot appreciate ; therefore let us forget the things which are behind, etc.¹

In the preceding extracts from Reinhard the reader cannot have failed to perceive the

§ 11. *Ethical Character of his Sermons.*

Their general structure has been much commended, for the promise which it gives to their practical design. The same thoughts which in other sermons appear to be of merely theoretical importance, are so arranged by him as to suggest at once their relation to duty. Preaching on Matt. 7: 15—23, he proposes to show² how we may obtain that knowledge of men which is necessary for true piety ; and first, he states in three particulars what constitutes this knowledge of men ; secondly, he proves in three particulars that such a knowledge of men is essential to true piety ; and thirdly, he teaches in four particulars how this indispensable knowledge of men may be obtained. Dr. Blair would have reduced these thoughts to some such general Proposition as, The knowledge of human character ; but who knows whether such a statement is to be commented upon in a theoretical or in a practical style ?

In a sermon on Luke 11: 14—28,³ Reinhard proposes to state some truths which may console us in view of the fact that our good actions often fail to make the impression which they ought to make on the minds of men. First, he explains this fact by answering three queries,

¹ In another sermon from the same text, Matt. 9: 13—26, our author preaches on the nature, sources, moral character, and means of improving a vain curiosity. Predigten, 1796, ss. 352—371.

² Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band III. 147—166.

³ Predigten, 1797, Band II. ss. 109—125.

What are good actions? What impression ought they to produce upon men? What impression do they produce? Secondly, he explains the occasions of the fact that our good deeds affect men as they should not; and thirdly, he shows how we may console ourselves in view of this fact. Each of these Heads is elucidatory, and only the last is, with logical strictness, a discussion of the proposed theme. He should either have made his Proposition more general, so as to have properly included the first two Heads under it, or else should have introduced these first Heads in an abbreviated form, as preliminary to the Proposition. He elsewhere states that his motive for adopting such an illogical arrangement, is his desire to present his theme in that phraseology which will attract most attention to its practical tendencies.¹

The ethical discourses of Reinhard exhibit a sharp analysis of the nature of virtue, a comprehensive spirit, a cheerful and yet a severe piety. Among the richest of them is one which is also historical, preached on the day of John the Baptist, and founded on Luke 1: 57—80,² the last of these verses being that which immediately suggests the theme.—In all times virtue has presented itself in two forms, the one dark, solitary, stern; the other kindly, social, cheerful. There have always been pious men who, in their punctual obedience to the dictates of conscience, in their shrinking back from all those pleasures which might interrupt their still communion with God, in their profound grief over sin, their severe processes of self mortification and self discipline, have appeared to the world too austere, too rigorous. And there have also been good men, who have not repelled the community from them by their hard self denials, or their impetuous zeal, but have condescended to associate and sympathize with their weak brethren. Religion has been to them not a ruler so much as a friend, not the antagonist but the promoter of joy and cheerful companionship. One would think that this last form of religious activity would have been more impressive on the world than the first. But it is not so. John, the subject of our text, was the best example of the first; and although he performed no miracle, yet he made such an impression upon his age as suggests the theme of the present discourse. The dark, unsocial virtue excites more wonder in the world than the kindly and cheerful.

First, we will endeavor to prove this Proposition. A. It is verified by the history of the Jews before Christ. Who wielded the highest authority over them? Such men as Moses, after he had withdrawn himself from the court of the Pharaohs, dwelt long in the desert, and

¹ See also Bib. Sac. Vol. V. p. 743.

² Predigten, 1800, Band II. ss. 44—65.

shown his unconquerable firmness, his irrepressible zeal. Such men as the prophets, unsparing in rebuke, fearless in defence of law, abstaining from innocent self indulgence, living within themselves and in God, apart from the society of frail men. The description which Paul gives of them in Heb. 11: 26—38, reveals one secret of their authority over the people. B. The history of the Christian religion is a proof, that men who separate themselves from the world by a life of visible austerity, make a stronger sensation than those who let themselves down to a more apparent congeniality with their fellow men. John withdrew himself from the sympathies of youth even, spent his early days in the wilderness, dressed himself in an eccentric garb, refused the comforts of life, came forward at last with bold denunciations against sin, and, if he had performed miracles, might have eclipsed the Saviour in popular admiration. As it was, he was supposed to be the Christ; he was obliged often to send applicants away from himself to the "one mightier than he;" men were astonished that he neither ate nor drank, while they looked down upon the more social Jesus as a glutton and a wine bibber; and even after the Baptist's death, there remained a party who believed in and advocated his messiahship. The apostles of the Saviour were obliged from the first to resist the tendency of the church to an austere life; but the tendency at length prevailed, and was more and more abused, until mild men who deemed it right to be companionable, were despised; the saints were the anchorites, the most barbarous self tortures were esteemed the surest signs of inward holiness, and a religion of gloom was thought to be the purest. C. The history of heathen nations proves that fanatics, who exhibit a peculiar severity of manners, who perform painful exploits, and mal-treat their physical system in the service of the gods, excite more general astonishment and complacency than is excited by tender hearted and accommodating men.

Secondly, we will investigate the causes of this remarkable phenomenon. A. The dark and austere virtue is more striking than the cheerful and kindly. A man who disciplines himself visibly in the maceration of his body, arrests more attention than a man who schools his heart in secret. John with his diet of locusts and wild honey, is more readily noticed than one who is "in all things like unto his brethren, yet without sin." A bold reprover who puts his adversaries to shame, takes a stronger hold upon them than the mild friend who strives to insinuate into them the gentle influences of love. B. The austere religion is apparently more infrequent than the cheerful. It is an outward exception to the general rule. There seem to be fewer men who renounce the pleasures of the world altogether, than there are who par-

take of them with moderation. We are naturally most impressed by that which occurs but seldom. C. The severe virtue is esteemed more genuine than the mild. It is thought to be far more difficult to spurn all earthly good, than to make a wise use of it. A philanthropist who deigns to commune pleasantly with men, is regarded as on a perfect equality with them; and it is not considered, that he may be influenced in holding this communion with them, by the pious desire of elevating them to his own moral standard. On the other hand, if under the impulses of scorn and pride he should violently denounce men, he would be regarded as superior to them in moral worth, too high above them for sympathy with their follies. He raises himself up to be a mark for observation; and it is asked, what other than a good motive can a man have for making himself, in toils and sufferings bodily and mental, an exception to his race? D. As the unsocial virtue is esteemed the more pure, so it is esteemed the more difficult of imitation, and therefore is the more amazing and impressive. Men imagine that it requires no effort to perform the gentle, winning, refined and modest duties of the philanthropist, but that the penances and harsh discipline of the hermit are well nigh superhuman; and it is natural to revere the difficult more than the easy.

Thirdly, we will notice a few ideas suggested by this disposition of men to esteem the forbidding, more highly than the alluring virtues. A. This disposition suggests a lesson of instruction. Although, apart from its abuses, it is in itself right, yet it is not the distinctive form of *Christian* piety. The spirit of Christianity is one of love, tenderness, clemency; it flows outward in generous efforts for the happiness of men, and does not keep the eye of the philanthropist introverted upon himself, his heart locked up from the approach of his neighbors. Our Saviour does not condemn that type of piety which was exemplified without its natural abuses in John, but he does not extol it as the most desirable, and his own example favors the more amiable virtues. These are in less danger of becoming ostentatious, of being regarded as supererogatory, of degenerating into pride, obstinacy, misanthropy, fanaticism, extravagance. They are also in fact, although not in appearance and in common estimation, more infrequent, more pure, more difficult than are the self inflicted tortures of what are called the religious orders. B. This disposition, as it has prevailed in past ages suggests a mortifying reflection on our present state. It must be confessed that we, my hearers, do not value the unsocial virtues so highly as the social. We do not honor the man who cuts himself off from human sympathies. Why? Is it because we have imbibed more of the spirit of the Gospel? Do you believe this? No. It is because we

have become too effeminate for those self sacrifices, too soft for those conflicts, too weak for those toils which once commanded the reverence of mankind, but are looked upon by us in our degeneracy as irrational and ludicrous. We have lost the impetuous zeal of the one class, and the faithful love of the other class of the true friends of their race, and we should therefore be ashamed of our indifference to religion, our pusillanimity, love of repose, enervated wills. C. This disposition, as it has prevailed among men, suggests to us a solemn warning. We are too sickly to revere the rigorous virtues, and too cold-hearted to practise those that are more genial. We do not reflect on the strictness of life which is involved in a cheerful piety; a strictness more constant, more laborious, requiring more watchfulness and a more earnest spirit, than are needful for the ascetic, monastic state. It demands a greater effort to win men to holiness by a uniform benignant example, than to administer the sharpest rebukes against sin. There is great danger that, mistaking the nature of Christian cheerfulness, forgetting the description of the broad and narrow way, and of our duty to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, we shall become more and more selfish, worldly, fickle and trifling, until we ruin our souls. Wherefore let us have grace whereby we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear, for our God is a consuming fire, Heb. 12: 28, 29.

+ Notwithstanding the scholastic habits of Reinhard, he seems to be at home in the discussion of the most common duties of life. The foibles of domestic intercourse he describes as minutely as if he were a man of the world, rather than a man of books. In an ethical discourse on Matt. 5: 20—26,¹ he proposes to warn his hearers against the dominion of ill humor, and after having remarked, a) that this ill humor consists in a discontented state of mind, ill will toward men, a sullen, fretful disposition expressing itself in the countenance and in offensive conduct, a peculiar irritability excited on the most trivial occasions; b) that this ill humor is occasioned by the weather, by the businesses, interruptions, or even amusements of life, by the reaction from an excessive activity of the mind, by lawless and violent passions; c) that this ill humor is of various kinds; sometimes occasional and of short duration, sometimes habitual and of long continuance; he proceeds to show; first, that this ill humor is the rock on which our peace of mind is wrecked; for, a) it not only deprives us of the pleasures which we might enjoy, but b) it increases the sorrows which we must experience; secondly, it is the rock on which our success in

¹ Predigten, 1795, Band II. ss. 242—256.

life is wrecked, for a) it estranges our friends from us, and b) it converts all around us into foes; thirdly, it is the rock on which our usefulness is wrecked, for it diminishes a) our desire, and b) our fitness to do good; fourthly, it is the rock on which our virtue itself is wrecked, for, a) it poisons our virtue in its fountain; as it is impossible to combine misanthropy with that love to God and to our neighbor which is the origin of virtue, and b) checks it in its outflow; as it is impossible to combine misanthropy with those acts of forgiveness, patience, beneficence, joy, peace, etc., which are the expressions of virtue.

There is an obvious tendency in Reinhard's mind to derive lessons for the common duties of life, from texts which more obviously suggest a theoretical or doctrinal discussion. Thus in a sermon from Matt. 22: 15—22, "Render unto Cesar," etc.¹ when we expect a course of remark on the claims of God or of civil government, he startles us with the Proposition, A man should have the courage to be better than others. He should, as Jesus did, defend the truth, the right, virtue and propriety, when they are neglected and opposed by others. That a man should display true courage is rational, is Christian, and, as illustrated in the text, is for his highest interest. In discoursing on Matt. 9: 1—8,² our author devotes his Exordium to a beautiful description of the fact that plants, flowers, trees grow up without deformity; that there are very few diseased and misshapen animals; but among men the instances of a disagreeable, disfigured exterior are frequent. Notwithstanding all the attempts to conceal the disproportion and sickliness of the body, we seldom meet a large company of men without discovering a physical blemish in some of them. Why is the human organization more exposed than the inferior structures, to an unhealthy growth? It is the master-piece of nature's visible works; why then is it peculiarly exposed to disorder? It is injured by the passions which are sinfully allowed to rage within it. Jesus looked upon the palsied man, and reminded him that his disease was the result of crime. The reproof was gentle, and consisted in forgiving the invalid who had abused his physical system by a dissipated life. As his sin may have been notorious as well as ruinous, the scribes were offended that it should be thus readily forgiven. Instead of dilating, however, upon the mode in which they were put to shame by our Lord, we are led by the impression which he made upon the forgiven invalid, to consider the necessity of earnest reflection upon the strictness with which nature revenges all abuse of the physical system.

¹ Predigten, 1800, Band II. ss. 319—340.

² Predigten, 1796, Band II. ss. 459—477.

It is natural to expect that, devoting the energies of his richly stored, his fertile and inventive mind to the ethical department, Reinhard would discourse on many duties which have seldom engaged the thoughts of even meditative men. There is no crevice in moral science which he does not appear to have explored, and to have derived from it some valuable reflections. He is one of the last preachers who can be accused of vague generalizations; for he applies the principles of the Gospel to those individual states and specific duties, which are too peculiar to be often inculcated and considered apart by themselves. In a sermon¹ on Luke 10: 24, "many prophets and kings have desired to see those things which ye see, and have not seen them," etc., he considers, first, the fact that many foresee a better future than they will live to experience; they foresee, a) the cessation of some evils which now oppress the community; b) the successful issue of certain schemes which are now in process; c) the mature development of certain principles which now lie in their germs; d) the happy issue of certain events which are now dubious and threatening; secondly, he considers the duties resulting from this foresight of a better future; a) it is neither rational, nor kind, nor prudent, nor pious to restrain our interest in the improvements which we shall not live to see developed; b) we should avoid all selfish interest in them, as well as all hostility to them; c) we should labor to promote them and to hasten their development. The peroration of the sermon is given in a note in Bib. Sac. Vol. III. p. 486.

But while Reinhard is eminently an historical and a practical preacher, he is not merely such. Let us briefly consider the

§ 12. *Philosophical Character of his Sermons.*

It is by no means implied, that the general style of his preaching is distinctively philosophical. It develops the results of scientific research, but is ordinarily accommodated to the facile apprehension of the multitude. It is difficult, however, for one whose mental habits are those of a philosopher, to banish from his sermons all the peculiarities of his favorite pursuits. In the following syllabus of one of Reinhard's ethical discourses, we discover his metaphysical tendencies.

When our Saviour forgave the sins of the man sick with the palsy, certain by-standers "said *within themselves*, This man blasphemeth; but Jesus knowing their thoughts, said, Wherefore think ye evil in

¹ Predigten, 1795. Band I. ss. 233—252.

your hearts ?” Our author devotes his entire sermon on Matt. 9: 1—8¹ to the discussion of a principle suggested by the above named incident. His theme is, The freedom of the thoughts ; not the freedom to think, the right of free inquiry ; but that constitutional property of the soul by which our ideas follow each other without hindrance. Our train of thought is often free in regard to the interference of other men ; for often they cannot detect it, or in any manner influence or regulate it. They may present an object to the mind, but that object may occasion an entirely different mental process from the one which they anticipated. The preacher, for instance, suggests to those who hear him, sometimes no idea at all, sometimes just the opposite to that which he intended, very seldom the precise thought which is in his own mind. Our mental processes are sometimes free, even from the power of our wills. Now and then an idea which we wish to recall, will not occur to us ; and one which we wish to expel, haunts us continually. When we choose to marshal our thoughts in order, they will confuse themselves the more ; when we wish them to move rapidly, they linger, and their stream often flows on as it will, independently of our effort, or of foreign interference. Yet this freedom has its bounds. *Nature* sets some limits to it, and our thoughts *cannot* be always free. They follow a law of the constitution ; they are influenced by the body ; they will sometimes, in despite of all our desire to conceal them, expose themselves through the physical organs. A man may pretend, in his words, that he has not certain thoughts, but his eye and cheek will convince all observers that he is making a mere pretence. The *inclination* sets some limits to this freedom, and our thoughts *will not* be always free. When a strong passion arouses us, it causes all our other acts to gather themselves around it and serve it. It is as a dam built across the stream of our ideas, and it turns them from their free out-flow. *Duty* likewise affixes some limits to this freedom, and our thoughts *ought not* to be always free. A man has no right to entertain any ideas, which entice him to any form of even secret sin. He is responsible for some of his thoughts, and therefore our Saviour rebukes the scribes in our text for their concealed mental processes.—If then the spiritual acts of a man be in some respects under control, in others not, we may learn the duty of paying a fit deference to the freedom of thought in other men. We should not be meddlesome in prying into their hidden states of feeling, in ferreting out their secret purposes, in sounding and striving to look through them. We should not officiously watch for all the little signs of their

¹ Predigten, 1797, Band I. ss. 316—335.

entertaining some opinion which we dislike, and of which we meanly suspect them ; we should not endeavor to force their natural course of thought into exact agreement with our own. We should, however, do nothing which can divert the train of their ideas into a wrong channel, but everything which is proper for us to do, which is respectful to them, and agreeable to the golden rule, in suggesting motives for holy feeling, and influencing their free wills to choose the highest good.— And as we should pay a due respect to the freedom of thought in other men, so should we make a conscientious use of the same property in ourselves. We should guard against the easy habit of indulging our inclinations, and of harboring every train of thought which gratifies them. We should be sedulous in following duty, and in struggling against the admission of every idea which opposes it.

In a truly philosophical discourse on Luke 10: 23—37,¹ Reinhard first describes the sympathetic disposition which God has implanted in our minds, a) its nature, b) its immediate effects, c) the laws according to which it operates. Secondly, he considers the design of God in implanting this principle within us ; the sympathetic disposition a) is to be an antagonist to the feelings of resentment ; b) is to promote the social union of men ; c) is to alleviate the diversified ills of life ; d) is to open a copious fountain of animating joy. Thirdly, he considers how this principle is to be cultivated, according to the precepts of Christianity ; a) it must be protected against violent passions ; b) it must be controlled by rational considerations ; c) it must be enlivened by true Christian motives ; d) it must be made fruitful by being exercised for the relief of the necessitous.

In another sermon,² equally scientific and ethical, developing a shrewd observation of human nature, he examines the deleterious influence of sudden prosperity on the feelings of man. His text is Luke 17: 11—19, the history of the instantaneous change in the ten lepers. He first illustrates the connection between our spiritual state and every unexpected change, prosperous or adverse, in our outward condition ; a) he defines this unexpected change ; b) notices its general effect on the intellect ; c) on the heart. Secondly, he describes the injurious influence of sudden prosperity upon the feelings ; a) it occasions light-mindedness ; b) a forgetfulness of one's former principles and sentiments ; c) a self-complacency and pride ; d) callousness of feeling toward sufferers. Thirdly, he considers how this injurious influence may be avoided ; a) the light-mindedness may be prevented by reflecting on the moral lessons suggested by our unlooked for pro-

¹ Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band III. ss. 244—263.

² Predigten, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band III. ss. 264—279.

perity ; b) the forgetfulness of former principles of action may be prevented by reflecting on the new duties which our sudden prosperity devolves upon us ; c) the proud self-complacency may be prevented by considering how little we have contributed to our unexpected change of condition ; d) the callousness of feeling toward the miserable may be prevented by recalling to mind the experiences of our own past life.

As philosophical exhibitions of truth, however, the sermons of Reinhard do injustice to their author. A similar remark may be made on the

§ 13. *Theological Character of his Discourses.*

It is a well known theory of German rhetoricians, that men in a Christian land who enter the house of God, profess in that very act to believe in the doctrines which are there preached, and hence do not need to be informed what these doctrines are, nor to be persuaded to adopt them. In this respect the German science of Homiletics differs from what is barbarously called *Keryktics* and *Halieutics*.¹ The influence of this theory is to exclude from the pulpit nearly all argumentative discussion of Christian doctrine. The absence of such discussion is one cause of the fact, that the more intelligent classes of the German community are seldom found in the sanctuary, and this fact has a reflex influence on the intellectual character of the pulpit. The audiences being such as to require plain thoughts in plain language, we cannot expect to find in the discourses addressed to them such profound disquisitions as are given us by a Howe or Mc Laurin, a Butler and a Balguy. Moreover, the church edifices of Germany are so ill constructed, as to render a prolonged service perilous to the health of both preacher and hearer. They have so little conformity with the principles of acoustics, as to forbid any approach to such a prolonged address as that which Dr. Barrow delivered without any other result than a weariness in his feet from standing two consecutive hours. The German clergy are compelled to confine their discourses within such narrow limits as to render it impossible for them to pursue those comprehensive trains of reasoning, which are needful for sound theological discussion. Again, the practice of regulating the selection of themes for the German pulpit by the order of the Romish festivals, precludes the symmetrical exhibition of the evangelical system. These festivals erect a few external facts of Christianity above the doctrines which are veiled under those outward events. They tempt the preacher

¹ See Bib. Sac. Vol. I. p. 374.

on Good Friday, for example, to rehearse the bare historical scenes under which the atonement lies hidden from the view of hearers who regard the holiday as a season for amusement. Men are not predisposed on these festivals to meditate on spiritual truths. There is a day set apart for John the Baptist, but none for the creation of the world; one for Michael, but none for the resurrection, the judgment, the eternal retribution. The consequence is, that while some doctrines may be exhibited with great frequency, others are seldom called forth from their retirement. The fall of Adam, the depravity of man, the phenomena of regeneration, the sovereignty of God, and other fundamental doctrines, are noticed if at all, only as incidents by the majority of German preachers.

Their neglect to enforce even such truths as they believe, and the real necessity that they should be more theological in their discourses, are illustrated in an interesting manner by Reinhard in a sermon on John 3: 1—15.¹ This text necessarily suggests the theme of Regeneration by the Holy Spirit, but our author employs it as an illustration of the fact, that man is accustomed to overlook the greatest and most useful truths, barely because they are too familiar. Nicodemus was a learned Pharisee, yet had paid no attention to the doctrine of Regeneration, because this doctrine was too well known. So at the present day, the well informed man is seldom attracted strongly enough to the most familiar truths, he does not penetrate into them deeply enough, does not apply them carefully enough to practice. He overlooks them, because he has a restless curiosity for what is new, he falsely imagines them to be very plain, he finds that the accurate investigation of them mortifies his corrupt inclinations. But this oversight is very injurious to him; for it deprives him of rare opportunities for acquiring wisdom, it occasions the most ruinous errors of conduct, it makes him unreasonably hostile to the best men, the real friends of the truth. That we may resist the habit of overlooking these familiar truths, we should transmute our curiosity for what is novel into a curiosity for what is true; we should from time to time strictly catechize ourselves with regard to the doctrines which we imagine to be very familiar to us; with the aid of divine grace we should in all ways strengthen our purposes of moral improvement.—The sermon of which the above is a syllabus, exhibits a specimen of Reinhard's own disposition to substitute some novel train of remark for the more important doctrinal discussion which is falsely regarded as too familiar. In a sermon on Matt. 22: 1—14, we naturally expect a series of re-

¹ Predigten, 1797, Band II. ss. 208—224.

lections on the unreasonableness of sin, or on the extensive provisions of divine grace, or on the doctrine of election (whether believed or rejected), but Reinhard diverts our minds from such themes to the Proposition: The ruling spirit of every age affords pretexts for evading the claims of Christianity.¹ We look for a presentation of the atonement in a discourse on 1 Cor. 11: 23—32, but Reinhard turns our attention to the immortality of the soul.²

In the year 1806, when our author was allowed to preach from the lessons in the Epistles instead of those in the Gospels, he introduced more of doctrinal discussion than had been usual with him, and in the year 1809, when he formed a new *pericope*, he selected such lessons as, in his opinion, prompted to a full exhibition of the evangelical system.³ The following is a condensed summary of a sermon,⁴ both expository and doctrinal in its character, and illustrating its author's evangelical sentiment.

Not only every Christian, but every rational man must be interested in the question whether he have been truly converted. Without this radical change of character, he cannot safely or fitly enjoy the pleasures of sense even, nor can he attain his true dignity and peace. But the nature of this change is extensively although needlessly misunderstood. It is supposed to consist in a reformation of outward conduct, or some new play of the amiable sentiments. But the character of the converted man is not only different from, it is opposite to that of the unconverted. The contrast may be easily discerned. Our text, Eph. 4: 22—28, places the renewed spirit over against the unrenewed in sharp and decided contrast, and speaks not only of a dissimilarity between them, but of a positive contrariety. It leaves us no choice of a subject, but forces us to the theme, The contrariety of the feelings and conduct of the renewed man to those of the unrenewed. The text divides itself into two sections, one on the nature of this opposition, and one on the illustrations of it, and thus leads us to the following Division; First, wherein does the contrariety between the renewed and the unrenewed man consist? and secondly, how is it exhibited in the life?

The text not only suggests, but answers both of these questions; the first by showing, in the first section, verses 22—24, that the renewed man is opposite to the unrenewed, A. in the laws according

¹ Predigten, 1795, Band I. ss. 294—313.

² The sacrament of the Lord's supper reminds us of our immortality. Predigten, 1797, Band I. ss. 137—155.

³ See Vorrede zu Pred. 1809. s. VI.

⁴ Predigten, 1806, Band II. ss. 263—281.

to which, B. in the impulses by which, C. in the ends for which he acts; or in other words, the renewed man regulates himself no longer according to the demands of sense, but to the precepts of God; he obeys no longer the promptings of selfishness, but the emotions of conscience and love of right, he strives no longer for a merely terrestrial good, but for likeness with God.

A. The unconverted man knows no other law of conduct, than that of sense and natural desire. Our text speaks of him as "corrupt according to deceitful lusts." Our experience proves that he subjects every thing, how sacred soever, to his own gratification. But the converted man is said, in the text, to be "created in righteousness and true holiness." The laws by which he is regulated are not merely unlike, but contradictory to those of the sinner; as opposite as light to darkness, Christ to Belial, God to Mammon.

B. Equally striking is the contrast between the two men, in the impulses by which they are moved. As the unrenewed man knows no other law than that of his own desires, so he has no other impulse than that for his own gratification. But the converted person is influenced by higher motives. "He has put off the old and put on the new man." He does not inquire whether his own interest will be promoted by his acting, but whether it be his duty to act, and whenever he learns that gratitude or reverence or love, that the cause of truth or right, of men or God require him to move, then he moves, and cares not into what dangers or distresses he must plunge. It may be, that his discharge of duty will be followed by many advantages; it must be, that it will be crowned with an eternal reward. But this prospect has no influence upon his high resolve. Is the course demanded by his reason and conscience, it is enough. Thus marked is the change in the renewal of the soul: gain and pleasure which were once all in all to the man, must become objects of [comparative] indifference; and duty, which was once an object of indifference, must become all in all.

C. In the objects for which the two men act is there an equal contrariety. The unconverted person labors for earthly good; the converted does not disregard this good, but values it appropriately as a gift of his Father. It is not, however, the design, the end of his toil. Our text says, that he is renewed "in the spirit of his mind," and is "*after God* created in righteousness," that is, he aims supremely at the imitation of God. "Old things are passed away" with him, "all things are become new."

The second question proposed for us to consider is answered in the second section of the text, verses 25—28. The contrariety between

the renewed and the unrenewed man is exhibited in the life; A. when, from being a disingenuous, he becomes a truthful man; B. when, from being a passionate, he becomes a forgiving man; C. when, from being an imprudent, he becomes a circumspect man; and, D. when, from being a useless, he becomes a man of public beneficence.

A. The renewed man loves the truth in thought, word, and deed, and shuns all subterfuges, all kinds of hypocrisy; not merely because of a natural impulse to be sincere and ingenuous, but because of the tendency of an honest life to promote his reputation or his interest, but because of the fact suggested in the text, verse 25, that "we are members one of another," and all insincerity between brethren who are thus amalgamated, is incongruous and base. The unrenewed man will sacrifice a simple-hearted honesty to the demands of his selfish pleasure. An uncandid, self-deceptive, flattering or treacherous spirit is one of the most common of all sins. Hence the apostle mentions as the first sign of conversion, a change from the habit of concealing or counterfeiting the truth, to the simplicity and open-heartedness which should characterize men who have one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father.

B. The renewed man is radically opposite to the unrenewed in the control of the angry affections. It is not wrong to be angry, but it is wrong to indulge resentment in improper measures, or to an improper degree. This affection should not be harbored for a longer time than is necessary; if so, it becomes revenge. It should not be allowed to rise into such a height of violence that it cannot be regulated by the conscience; if so, it becomes a malevolent passion. Our text prescribes the exact rule, "Be ye (not cold, indifferent, but) angry (when anger is appropriate), but sin not (in the extent to which you allow the affection, nor in the time of harboring it), let not the sun go down upon your wrath." Obedience to this command is one sign of the renewed spirit; for selfishness assumes the type of malignity, whenever, and so long as any obstacle is presented to its schemes, but the forgiving spirit is "after God," who sendeth rain on the unjust and giveth sunlight to the unthankful.

C. The renewed man is radically opposite to the unrenewed, in his carefulness against giving occasion for reproachful remarks. The impenitent, swayed by his passions, rushing into imprudences, excites the spirit of calumny among men. The penitent, circumspect in his demeanor, precise in his conformity to the example of Jesus, furnishes those who desire it no opportunity for accusing him, "except they find it against him concerning the law of his God." Our text speci-

fies this point of contrast between the two men, when it commands the renewed "neither give place to the devil," i. e. give no opportunity for slanderers to criminate you.¹

D. The renewed man does good to his fellow-beings; the unrenewed is alluded to in our text as a thief, verse 28, because he lives on the labor of others, and does nothing for them, appropriates to himself the blessings which were designed for the general welfare. By a life of industry and beneficence is the Christian obviously distinguished from the sinner. So plain is the contrast between the two in their outward developments of feeling, that no man need mistake his real character.²

Such a distinct exhibition of human sinfulness is not very frequently found in our author's sermons. He prefers to look on the bright side of our nature, and often makes assertions which must be interpreted with some latitude in order to be reconciled with the true doctrine of our fallen state. It is evident that he does not restrict his view to any one mode of presenting doctrine, but admits so great a diversity in the forms as will expose him to the charge of inconsistency with the substance of truth. In a double sermon³ on Luke 2: 1—14, he endeavors to show that the appearance of Christ in the flesh reconciles us to human nature.

I. The facts that Jesus is a man and is our brother, take away our repugnance to the human constitution,

A. When it is regarded as weak, by showing that this weakness is, a) not so dishonorable, b) not so great as it seems at first;

B. When regarded as corrupt, by showing, a) that its evil tendencies are not essential to the constitution itself (Christ not possessing them), b) that they do not destroy its noblest powers;

C. When regarded as unsusceptible of improvement, by showing, a) that it is improvable under the influence of the extraordinary institutions which have been established by divine grace, b) that men

¹ This interpretation is favored by Erasmus, Luther, Vater, Morus, Koppe, Flatt, Büchner, Heubner, et al.

² It is obvious that the preacher might have proceeded to disclose other lines of distinction between the regenerate and the unregenerate, as purity and spirituality of conversation, verse 29; reverence to the Holy Spirit, verse 30; tender and affectionate treatment of men, verses 31, 32. But the lesson of the day closed at the 28th verse, thus cutting off a part of the appropriate text, and rendering it necessary for the preacher to maim his discussion. Reinhard speaks with good reason in one of his Prefaces of the Saxon *Pericope*, as poorly compiled.

³ Predigten, 1807. Band II. ss. 338—382. These two discourses were preached on the two successive days of the Christmas Festival. Their Proposition (quoted exactly) is, The Festival of Jesus' birth reconciles us to human nature.

have actually been and are still ameliorated by these spiritual instrumentalities.

II. The facts that Jesus is a man and is our brother, not only take away our repugnance to the human constitution, but also inspire us with a confidence in it; for,

A. They lead us to revere it on account of its worth, as seen, a) in its connection with God, b) in its adaptedness to the noblest of ends;

B. they lead us to love it on account of the circumstances in which it is placed, as seen, a) in the honor which God confers upon it, b) in the certainty with which it rewards the labor bestowed upon it.

C. They lead us to desire its welfare on account of its destiny, as seen, a) in the progress which it may make in time, b) in the distinction which it may hope to reach in eternity.

If by "*der menschlichen natur*," the phrase pervading these discourses, Reinhard means the nature of man viewed as simply fallen and disordered, his remarks need much qualification; but if he means the nature viewed as a constitution, as the work of God, as that which in all its essential parts has been assumed by Christ, his remarks are reconcilable with the assertions in the sermon cited above, that the unrenowned man is entirely selfish and sinful. He probably has the same idea with Dr. Young,

Revere thyself;—and yet thyself despise.
His nature no man can o'er-rate; and none
Can underrate his merit.

It is interesting to notice the manner in which our author discourses on the future state of the wicked. His opinion on the subject was that their punishment is to be eternal, and may be considered as consisting either in ceaseless positive torture, inflicted upon sinners remaining forever impenitent, or else in the evil consequences naturally resulting from their past iniquity, and afflicting them even after they have been converted by the disciplinary but temporary torture which they endured immediately after death. He evidently inclines to the supposition, that the torture to which they are first subjected will be instrumental in transforming their characters, but still they will never cease to suffer the injuries naturally resulting from their past sins. He prescribes, however, in his *Dogmatik*, that 'in discoursing to the people on the doctrine of future punishment, a preacher should prove from the Bible that this punishment is to be endless, and should clearly explain the evils which will eternally result to unparadoned transgressors from their conduct in this life; but he should not

¹ Night Thoughts, The Infidel Reclaimed, Part I.

go beyond these simple truths, into the nice distinctions which men unused to methodical reasoning will misunderstand; especially as the Bible does not go into them, but confines itself to merely general instructions.¹ The manner in which he conforms to his own rule, may be detected in the following abstract of one of his discourses.²

If anything can fill the soul with dread, it is the Gospel which I shall now read. What a prospect does it open to our glance! To what a theatre does it transport us! The reality of eternal punishment many deny; but "oh, instead of doubting whether these woes will follow sin, instead of endeavoring to hide them from us by artifices and sophistical reasonings, let us rather adopt all the methods which God has made known to us for escaping them. May he who has appeared upon earth to free us from the misery of the future life, and to be our guide to a peaceful eternity, bless this hour. We pray to him therefor, in silent devotion.

Text. Matt. 25: 31—46.

Proposition. Considerations on the Punishments of the future life.

Division. First, What does Christianity teach us concerning these punishments?

Secondly, What is the practical use of its teachings?

First Head. A. The punishments of the future life are certain.

All nations believe in them. Conscience decides that they ought to be inflicted, reason that they will be, and the Bible places this decision beyond the propriety of a doubt. (Proof-texts quoted.)

B. The punishments of the future life are just. The text indeed, being a general description, does not imply that every one shall receive precisely according to his personal deserts, but makes no allusion to different degrees of pain. The whole spirit of the Bible, however, teaches that the penalties of the future life will be distributed in proportion to the respective sinfulness of the sufferers.

C. They will be painful.

D. The precise nature of them is unknown to us. The biblical description of them is drawn from images which cannot be literally applied to the spiritual world. These images are so numerous and so diversified as to be inconsistent with one another, if they be literally applied, as the darkness, the fire, the undying worm. The Bible specifies no place where these punishments are to be

¹ See Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik, L. xii. § 136.

² Reinhard's Predigten zur häuslichen Erbauung, herausgegeben von Hacker, Band IV. ss. 182—198.

inflicted. It could not make their nature intelligible to beings of such gross sensibilities as ours.

- E.** They will be eternal. This the Scriptures declare in various forms. (Quoted.) Reason confirms the truth. The evil which a man has already done cannot be hereafter undone. He cannot fill up his past hours with the good which he then omitted. In the nature of things, then, he cannot attain the perfection of the blessed.

Second Head. The teachings of Christianity with regard to the punishments of the future life, should be useful to us,

- A.** As warnings, incentives to such a demeanor as shall not incur these penalties.
- B.** As means of exciting reverence toward the laws of God. How important these laws must be, if God cannot be just without annexing this pain to their infraction! How benevolent and useful they are, if a single deviation from them conduct to endless suffering!
- C.** As motives to an increasing activity in behalf of our brethren. Our text describes the severe punishments of the last day, as inflicted on those who have done no good to their brethren. "What condemnation, then, will fall upon you, miserable men, who have not only neglected to do good, but have done positive evil to your neighbors?" etc.

But although the discourses of Reinhard are deficient in theological character, their general tone is decidedly evangelical. He was the leader of the Supranaturalist theologians of his time, and his sermons breathe the spirit of the ancient Lutheran faith. Notwithstanding his great amenity of manners and gentleness of heart, he sometimes expresses great indignation against the Rationalists of his day, who had usurped offices never intended for them in the Reformed church.¹ By his efforts in the pulpit and his theological treatises, he accomplished a great work in staying the progress of Neology and in commending to popular favor the cardinal truths of the Gospel. If the remark of Luther were strictly accurate, Reinhard must be considered as unexceptionable in his religious creed; for says the Reformer, "Whenever (the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ) is preached, the pulpit is safe; there is no danger from errors and heretics. This doctrine allows no falsehood to be entertained in connection with it; for the Holy Ghost accompanies the truth with his influences, and

¹ See especially his plain-spoken sermon on the Festival of the Reformation, delivered in 1800; a sermon published by order of the Saxon Court, and circulated throughout Germany.

they who believe it will endure no error." That Reinhard strenuously insisted on the atonement by a divine Saviour, and on faith in it as the indispensable condition of salvation, his discourses furnish abundant evidence. The longer he lived, so much the more evangelical became his style of address. His later sermons have less of the distinctively ethical, and more of the strictly religious character. His errors were those which the circumstances in which he wrote, would naturally incline him to adopt; and instead of complaining that he did not cordially defend some truths which we prize, we should rather be grateful that he emerged from the spiritual darkness of his age, and stood forth the champion of a down-trodden and essentially evangelical creed.

ARTICLE VII.

OF THE DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL POWERS UPON THE BODILY ORGANIZATION.

By George I. Chace, Prof. of Chemistry and Geology in Brown University.

Few subjects are fitted to awaken a more lively interest, than the mysterious connection subsisting between the body and the spirit. Though entirely distinct from one another, and constituted, as there is reason to believe, of essentially different elements, they are bound together by the closest ties, and sustain throughout the most intimate relations. Neither is able to withdraw itself from the other, or can act independently of the other, or has any power except through the other. Any disorder of the body immediately affects the mind, and any derangement of the mind as quickly extends its influence to the body. This wonderful union, and, as it would almost seem, blending of the material and spiritual in our natures, has commonly been regarded rather as a theme for the exercise of the imagination and fancy, than as a subject for sober investigation; and the ideas formed concerning it have been expressed more frequently in the vague and figurative language of poetry, than in the precise terms of philosophy. They have moreover been as various as the different aspects of the connection to which they relate.

Some of the ancients looked upon the complex frame of mind and body as a kind of musical instrument, and regarded the different nerves as so many keys to whose mysterious touch the soul gives out

its beautiful harmonies. Others saw in the body a prison, in which the spirit is incarcerated, and from which it can look out upon the world only through the narrow windows of the senses. But for the barrier opposed by the dark walls, which shut it in on every side, they supposed the range of its perceptions and knowledge would be much wider. Remove that, and the soul would be all eye, and all ear, and the intellect pure intelligence. In the Second epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, and in the General epistle of Peter, we find the body spoken of under the figure of a tabernacle or house, fitted up indeed with various accommodations for the temporary residence of the spirit, but destined after a few years to be exchanged for a more glorious habitation, "a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." In later times, since the structure and functions of the several parts of the bodily frame have been better understood, it has more commonly been regarded as a very complex machine, embracing numerous contrivances, adapting it on the one hand, to the powers and susceptibilities of spirit, and on the other, to the endowments and capacities of matter—a specially constituted medium through which these two forms of being, although in nature so widely removed from one another, may notwithstanding hold intercourse—a skilfully constructed instrument whereby the soul is enabled to impress its volitions upon outward existences, and these in turn can act upon the soul.

Within a few years past, there have arisen those who suppose, that besides establishing a communication between the mind and the external world, the body also furnishes in the brain, organs through which the different mental powers are exercised. They believe that not only the intellectual faculties, but also the sentiments are dependent in their manifestation upon these organs, in the same manner as the several bodily functions are dependent upon the parts respectively ministering to them; and as in the latter case, they imagine the vigor of these faculties and sentiments to be proportional to the development of the particular regions of the brain, with which their manifestation is connected, and moreover capable of being determined by the external indications of such development.

Without stopping to inquire how much of truth there may be in these or any other ideas that have been advanced in respect to the relation subsisting between the spiritual and the corporeal nature of man, we propose to trace the organic conditions of the several classes of mental phenomena so far as it may be done in the present state of physiological science, and see what light these throw upon the subject. We shall commence with the phenomena which are most immediately and most obviously connected with the body—the various forms of

sensation. All of these, of whatever character they may be, whether pleasurable or painful, whether designed for the protection of the body or for the conveying of information to the mind, are directly dependent upon the nervous system, the only part of the organization in immediate relation to the spirit—the only part upon which the spirit is capable of acting, or through which it can receive impressions from the outward world. The connection of the other parts is solely through this. By themselves, the bones, muscles, and integuments, the organs of the several senses, the heart, lungs and stomach have no more life, no more sensibility, no more power of motion than any foreign matter. It is the nerves alone that endow them with these properties—that put them in communication with the spirit, and thus render them available for the different purposes which they are designed to accomplish in the living economy. In prosecuting an inquiry, therefore, designed to throw light upon the organic conditions of the mental phenomena, we need not extend our researches beyond the nervous system, as all without this is necessarily excluded from any direct agency in their production.

All our sensations, have their remote origin in impressions made upon the outward senses. These impressions, however they may be produced, whether by the contact of solid bodies or by the vibration of aeriform fluids or by the impulses or undulations of still more subtle media, give rise to some kind of action—its precise nature has not been determined—which is propagated along the filaments of the nerves, until arriving at their termination in the brain, it passes to the spirit. By a law of our constitution, the sensations thus awakened although really in the mind, are referred either to the parts of the body where the impressions in which they originate are made, or else to the external objects which are the cause of these impressions. Such a reference of them is necessary in order that they may accomplish the objects for which they are intended—the protection of the body and the imparting of knowledge to the mind. Did not the pain occasioned by too great heat or too great cold or by undue pressure or by any of the other causes from which we are liable to suffer, direct our attention to the part affected, it would be of little service in enabling us to avoid the threatened injury. The same is true of the suffering attendant on disease. Did we conceive of this, only as an affection of the spirit, it would afford no indication as to the nature or situation of the disorder, and no guide as to the proper means for remedying it. The sensations connected with the eye and ear, on the other hand, being designed for the sole purpose of awakening in the mind a knowledge of external existences, are uniformly referred to objects without ourselves.

The different shades of color, whether from instinct or through the power of habit formed at a period too early for its origin to leave traces in the memory, are constantly regarded by us as attributes of the bodies which reflect the rays immediately producing them. Nay, we necessarily conceive of them not only as external to ourselves, but as having actual extension—as spread over the surface of those bodies, in the same way as the sensations designed to protect our corporeal frames seem to extend through the parts in which we imagine them to be situated. And yet, it is obvious upon a moment's reflection, that no two things can be more unlike than the state or affection of the spirit produced by the impinging of the different colored rays upon the optic nerve, and that physical condition of the surface of bodies which determines the reflection of those rays. They are as wholly dissimilar as the sensation of heat, and the substance which evolves the caloric producing it; or as the sensations of smell and the bodies which exhale the odors awakening them; or as those of touch and the material forms whose contact and pressure excite them. The same general observations apply to the ear. The sensations which we experience through this organ seem to be wafted from the distant body whose vibratory movements, propagated through the intervening air, are the immediate agent in their production. Neither the distant body, however, nor the atmospheric undulations proceeding from it, bear any resemblance to sound. This, like color, is merely a sensation in the mind, which from long habit we have come to associate so closely with its outward cause, that we cannot even in imagination separate them. In a similar way, "up," and its correlative "down," although relating exclusively to the earth, and in reality changing in direction each moment as that turns upon its axis, have become so intimately connected with our notion of space, that we cannot wholly exclude them, even when we endeavor to form the most absolute and unbounded conception of space, which our limited faculties will permit.

It might be supposed that the apparently local character of our bodily sensations, instead of being the result of a direct constitutional provision, is only the natural consequence of an extension of the sentient principle along the innumerable ramifications of the nerves to every part of the entire frame. Such an explanation, however, would not apply to the case of color and sound, which though equally sensations, we uniformly regard as the attributes of bodies situated wholly without and beyond ourselves. The supposition is moreover directly at variance with the teachings of observation and experiment. These show that the brain is the only part of the nervous system in immediate relation to the spirit. The other and remoter parts have their con-

nection with it, through this. If a nerve of sensation be cut, it immediately loses its sensibility. So long as the parts remain separate, the paralysis continues; but when at length nature has effected their re-union, the nerve resumes its wonted properties. By a like separation from the great central organ of all the animal functions, the nerves of voluntary motion are equally disqualified for their proper office, and while the isolation continues, have no more power over the muscles to which they go, than so many threads of any foreign substance. Even the spinal marrow, which from its near resemblance to the brain in composition and structure might be supposed to perform a similar office, in ministering to sensation and voluntary motion serves only as a medium of communication between that and the remoter portions of the nervous system. When it is so far disordered at any point as to cause an interruption of the peculiar action that is propagated along it or the peculiar fluid which is transmitted through it, all the nerves that pass off below that point become paralyzed, and the several parts of the body to which they are distributed lose both their sensibility and their power of motion. By a careful and delicate dissection moreover, the nervous filaments, or rather tubes as they appear when examined by the aid of the microscope, may be traced from the extremities through this organ up to the brain.

As a further proof that the local reference of our bodily sensations is due to a special organic provision, and not to a general diffusion of the sentient principle, it may be remarked that we do not always conceive of the pain attendant on injury and disease, as situated in the affected part. If a nerve going to the hand or the foot be irritated, the annoyance and suffering experienced are not felt at the point of irritation, but in the hand or foot where the nerve terminates. Every one is acquainted with the sensation produced in the little finger and along the inner edge of the forearm, by a blow on the ulnar nerve where it passes over the elbow. In the same way, the pain experienced after an amputation, from the irritated and inflamed state of the large nervous trunks severed in the operation, continues to be referred by the individual to the removed limb, until the painful certainty of its loss continually forced upon him by his other senses has at length broken up the association. So also after the rhinoplastic operation, performed by detaching, bringing down, and twisting over a portion of the skin of the forehead, until the edges of the flap have become united by vascular and nervous connections to the skin of the face, the sensations caused by touching the new organ are still referred to the forehead. It is well known that tumors generally give rise by their pressure upon adjacent nerves to sensations of uneasiness and

suffering in parts quite remote from where they are situated. Indeed, a large proportion of what are usually denominated sympathetic pains, receive their explanation from this same organic law, in consequence of which the sensations produced by the irritation of a nerve at any point in its course, are uniformly referred to the part or parts where the branches of that nerve terminate.

It deserves further to be remarked in this connection, that each nerve is so constituted as to be capable of awakening but a single class of sensations. The optic nerve, whatever the stimulus applied to it, can awaken only sensations of color. No pain is occasioned by its mechanical irritation; there is no consciousness even of such irritation; all that the individual perceives, is a succession of luminous flashes of greater or less vividness. The effect is the same when discharges of electricity are made to take place along its fibres. By pressure properly applied to the ball of the eye and through that to the nerve, all the colors of the rainbow may be produced. Even gastric disturbance, when extending its influence to this organ, awakens only the perception of brilliant luminous points and spectra. So also the auditory nerve is capable of exciting no other sensations than those of sound. Irritation or pressure communicated to it through the surrounding parts, does not occasion pain but simply *tinnitus aurium*, or ringing in the ears; and as the passage of electricity along the optic nerve produces an effect nearly resembling lightning; so the transmission of the same fluid along the auditory nerve awakens a sensation that might be mistaken for thunder. The same is true of the nerves of smell, of taste, and of feeling. Each of these is precisely fitted in all respects for the performance of its own proper office, but no one of them is capable of performing under any circumstances the office of another. As well might the elements themselves interchange their respective functions and properties.

We next pass to a brief review of the phenomena of perception. These, though less immediately perhaps, are as really dependent upon the action of the brain and nerves, as those of sensation. In fact, there is reason to believe that they are always either preceded, or attended by sensation, and are consequently subject in their manifestation to the same organic laws. They are commonly divided by writers on mental philosophy into two classes; the first, including all our original perceptions, or those which are supposed to have been connected with the first use of our perceptive faculties, and the second and far more numerous class embracing all those ideas which though not originally derived from the senses, have become through the power of habit, indissolubly associated with their exercise. The dis-

tion is undoubtedly a just one, and should be borne in mind, if we would form correct views in regard to the sources of our knowledge. For, while on the one hand, it would seem clear that if our sensations had originally suggested nothing beyond themselves, they must forever have remained thus isolated, on the other hand it is equally clear, that a very large proportion of the ideas, which they at present serve to introduce, are connected with them only by the ties of association. For the true origin of these, we must look to other classes of sensations, or to the deductions of reason, or to the teachings of experience, or to all of these different sources combined. Of the numerous and varied perceptions which we now have through the eye, it is probable that only those of color and figure and the latter with but two dimensions, first entered the mind through that organ. All the others, whether of form, size and distance, or of the numerous physical conditions and properties of bodies, so instantly recognized by their appearance, have been gradually built up upon these. Although in reality only associated conceptions, they are suggested so immediately and held before the mind so steadily, that we ordinarily mistake their character and confound them with our perceptions. By a careful analysis, however, of the assemblage of ideas called up by looking at any familiar object, it is not difficult to distinguish them; and in endeavoring to do so, we may derive assistance from recollecting that the same ideas are awakened by the picture of that object, which consists of nothing but different shades of color spread upon a plane surface. That a large part of the information received at present through the eye, entered the mind originally through other channels, is moreover evident from what we know of those persons who have seen for the first time after they have arrived at an age enabling them to notice and describe their sensations. Such persons have been found uniformly unable to recognize by sight the objects, with which they were most familiar through the other senses; and it has been only by a long course of experience that they have learned to connect the perceptions which they have through their newly acquired faculty with the corresponding ones of touch, so as to refer both to the same external object. The boy who was couched by Cheselden, at first saw everything flat. The walls of the room, the beams projecting from them, and even the intervening articles of furniture, seemed to be in the same plane; nor could he distinguish from one another, by their appearance, the objects immediately around him, which he had known and been accustomed to handle from his infancy. "He was acquainted with a dog and cat *by feeling*, but could not remember their respective characters when he *saw* them. One day when thus puzzled,

he took up the cat in his arms and felt her attentively, so as to associate the two sets of ideas; and then setting her down, said, 'so, puss, I shall know you another time.' " Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter, in his excellent treatise on physiology, mentions the case of a boy upon whom he operated, and who for some time after he had acquired the power of seeing, was accustomed when in haste and among familiar objects to close his eyes, so little was the assistance derived from them, and direct his steps by feeling.

To draw the precise line of distinction between our original and our acquired perceptions, and to trace each of the latter to its true source, is one of the most difficult tasks of the mental philosopher; and as it is in no way essential to the proper elucidation of our subject, we do not propose to enter upon it. We would rather invite the attention of the reader to a brief consideration of the feature of the human constitution, in which this association of ideas,—this blending of the knowledge derived from one sense with the perceptions awakened through another, has its origin. On examination, it will be found to proceed, we think, from a law of our nature which may be expressed as follows. Whenever any two bodily or mental acts have been many times performed either simultaneously or successively, the repetition of one of these acts creates a tendency towards the other; and so strong does the tie between the two at length become, that the performance of one is invariably accompanied or followed by that of the other, without any conscious effort on our part. This law, which would seem also to hold, though not perhaps to so great an extent, of the bodily and mental affections or states, lies at the foundation of all our habits. Without it, indeed, we should be wholly incapable of habit, that chief method and instrument of every form of human improvement. Without this we should be unable to fit ourselves for any of the avocations or duties of life. We could not learn to act or to think, to talk or to walk. We could not rise in the scale of existence even to a level with the brutes, many of which are to a certain extent susceptible of education. Nay, we should be incapable of making provision for the supply of our natural wants, and the race itself would become extinct.

Illustrations of this great and fundamental law of our nature, may be drawn from any of the trades, arts, professions or occupations in which men are engaged. Preparation for them, consists not so much in the acquisition of knowledge as in the formation of habits. It is not the committing of rules or the understanding of principles even, but practice that makes perfect. He who would learn to play upon a musical instrument, will find the most difficult part of his task to con-

sist in chaining together the varied muscular contractions necessary for the execution of an air, so that when the first movement has been made, the others shall spontaneously follow, with due regard to order and time. When this point has at length been attained, he may withdraw his immediate attention from the instrument and become interested in other subjects, and engage in conversation upon them, and the keys continue to be rightly touched, and the harmonies to flow on. In learning to speak a language, the chief labor consists, not in mastering its vocabulary, nor yet in acquiring a knowledge of the laws in accordance with which its words are combined in the construction of sentences, but in linking them to the corresponding ideas, so that these on arising in the mind shall instantly suggest them, and in forming the organs of articulation to those habits of associated action which are necessary to their ready and fluent utterance. So also in the different kinds of mental training, the most important as well as the most difficult end to be attained, is not the acquisition of knowledge, but the power of using it—not the simple storing of the mind with ideas, but the connecting of these ideas with one another according to their natural relations, so that they shall spontaneously flow out in continuous trains of just and vigorous thought; and this concatenation can be effected only by causing them repeatedly to pass through the mind in the order or orders in which we would have them associated.

We are aware that writers on this subject are accustomed to speak of contiguity of time and place, of the relations of cause and effect, of resemblance and of contrast, as principles of association; and that our ideas are connected with one another very generally in accordance with these relations, is unquestionably true. But, that these relations constitute the real tie between them and are the immediate cause of that connection, is a very different and we think far more doubtful proposition. Indeed, such a notion can be founded only on the supposition that our ideas are actual existences stored away in the mind and so chained together by certain constitutional affinities, that when any one of them is brought under review, it draws the others along after it. The moment we conceive of them in their true character, as states or affections of the spirit, having their origin either in its own action or in that of the organism with which it is connected, we see that like all other effects, they can be associated only through the causes which produce them. The real, physical connection must exist between these, and if we mistake not, is to be found in those ties which habit has established among the different bodily and spiritual activities concerned in the evolution of the mental phenome-

na. The reason, therefore, why our ideas are connected with one another very generally in accordance with the above relations is, that the organic acts upon which they depend have been again and again repeated, either voluntarily or through the influence of circumstances, in the order of those relations, until they at length have become chained together by habit, and the series when once started continues to move on, without the stimulus of outward impressions and without aid from the will. In the same manner, our perceptions acquired through the different senses, become linked to one another so that when any one class is awakened by the object to which they relate addressing that particular sense, the others are immediately introduced by the simultaneous action of the appropriate organs; and so close is the connection between the different classes of the associated group, that as we have already intimated, there is frequently much difficulty in separating them and determining which are the original and which the acquired perceptions. The great English dramatist appears to us, to have had a far more just conception of the true cause or principle of association among our ideas, than we usually find in the books of philosophy. The following passage from the opening scene in the *Merchant of Venice*, presents a fine illustration of the train of thought following the lines of connection, which interest and habit have established, and not the relations subsisting among the ideas themselves. Salarino is describing the anxiety and apprehensions which would prey upon his spirit, had he "such venture" at sea as Antonio.

My wind, cooling my broth,
Would blow me to an ague, when I thought
What harm a wind too great might do at sea.
I should not see the sandy hour-glass run,
But I should think of shallows and of flats;
And see my wealthy Andrew dock'd in sand,
Vailing her high-top lower than her ribs,
To kiss her burial. Should I go to church,
And see the holy edifice of stone,
And not bethink me straight of dangerous rocks?
Which touching but my gentle vessel's side,
Would scatter all her spices on the stream;
Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks;
And, in a word, but even now worth this,
And now worth nothing?

Why the continued repetition of a series of bodily or mental acts binds those acts together, so that the series once commenced flows on irrespective of any effort on our part, is a question which our present knowledge of the human constitution affords no means of an-

swering; and until more of the mysteries connected with this part of our nature shall be cleared up, we must be content to regard the truth as an ultimate fact. That some positive and permanent change is effected, both in the organization and in the spirit, there can be no doubt. But concerning its character, we would not venture even a conjecture. Nor would we dare to say that in the case of our bodily habits, the tie which connects the successive acts of which they consist, or more properly through which they are manifested, may not lie back in the spirit. This, it is well known, has other modes of acting upon the organization besides that of will. Of one of these, indeed, we have a striking example in the influence of emotion over the muscles of the countenance, and when particularly vivid, of the body generally, even when opposed by the most strenuous exertion of our voluntary powers. From recent anatomical and physiological investigations, there is reason to believe that this influence is exerted through an entirely distinct set of nerves, having a different origin and different properties from those which transmit the commands of the will—nerves especially appropriated to that office, and wholly incapable of ministering to either sensation or voluntary motion. Now it may be that in the repetition of those actions, which have been chained to one another by habit, so that the direct agency of the will is no longer required for their performance, an indirect influence is exerted through the mind voluntarily placing itself in special relation to the parts of the organization upon which the actions are immediately dependent, and retaining the meanwhile a certain latent consciousness of the general purpose to be accomplished by them. Indeed, something of this kind, we think every one is sensible of even when engaged in those occupations which custom has rendered most familiar to him.

Pursuing our investigation in the order which would seem to be indicated by the nature of the subject, we shall next consider the phenomena of conception. These do not, like those of sensation and perception, depend upon the action of any outward organs. Whether relating to the objects of sight, hearing, or smell, neither the eye, the ear, or the nose has any part in their production. Nay, their manifestation is clearest and steadiest when these organs have been put completely at rest, by the entire exclusion of the media which act upon them. Even the destruction of the organs, after they have once supplied the mind with ideas, does not impair the powers of conception.

But while there is abundant proof that this faculty is wholly independent of the outward parts of the bodily frame, there is equally strong evidence that in the present state, it cannot be exercised ex-

cept through the brain. In diseases of that organ the powers of conception are commonly disturbed sooner and also more seriously than those of sensation and perception. It is moreover well known that a moderate degree of pressure, applied to certain parts of the brain suspends, during its continuance, the exercise of all the mental faculties. And what is perhaps equally satisfactory on this point, in the ordinary and healthy condition of the organ, unusual or prolonged activity of any of the intellectual powers, occasions an increased tendency of the circulation towards it.

The question then arises, in what way and to what extent does the brain minister to conception? We answer, in the same way and to the same extent that it ministers to perception. The idea of an object we believe to be awakened by the spontaneous action of the cerebral extremities of the same nerves which, under the stimulus of impressions received through the senses, originally presented the object itself; the chief difference between the two cases being, that in the former, the action, though not originating in the will, is subject to its influence, while in the latter, it is wholly beyond the control of our voluntary powers. The reasons by which we are led to the adoption of this opinion, are,

1. The very close resemblance of our conceptions to our perceptions. This is seen not only by direct comparison of the two classes of phenomena, but from the fact that the former are continually mistaken by us for the latter. As we have already noticed, what are usually denominated acquired perceptions are only conceptions connected by the ties of association with the object which serves to introduce them. And yet so perfectly similar are they to the perceptions for which they pass, that it is only by the most careful attention, that we are able to distinguish them. In sleep too, when the senses are at rest and the power of the will over the cerebral organs is suspended, the ideas awakened by their spontaneous action, no longer under our control, assume the independent character of external existences, and while the state continues, are actually regarded by us as such. Indeed, it would seem, that whenever we lose the power of voluntarily shaping our conceptions and of banishing and recalling them at pleasure, whether it be through sleep, reverie, or insanity, we uniformly mistake them for perceptions, and our ideas, as they succeed one another in the mental train, appear to us as actual and outward realities. We are then in a state similar to that which the advocates of the wild scheme of idealism would have us believe to be our habitual and normal condition.—Now we say it is contrary to the analogy of every other part of the human structure and therefore *a priori* improbable, that in framing the special organism of the mind the Divine Being should

have constituted one extremely delicate and complex set of nerves for awakening our perceptions, and another equally delicate and complex apparatus for evolving our conceptions, when these two classes of phenomena are so nearly alike, that during our waking as well as our sleeping hours, and in health no less than under the influence of disease, we are continually confounding them with one another. It is far more in harmony with that beautiful simplicity, and that strict economy in regard to means which are so conspicuous in all the Creator's works, to suppose that both are produced by the same organs, and that the difference between them arises from these organs acting in the two cases, either in different ways, or what is perhaps more probable, with different degrees of intensity.

2. The association of our conceptions, through the corresponding perceptions. Whenever two objects have been repeatedly seen together, the idea of one in any manner awakened, immediately calls up that of the other. Whenever two sounds have been heard many times in connection with each other, the thought of one, however suggested, introduces that of the other. In like manner the recollection of a friend's countenance brings with it not only his general appearance, but the tones of his voice, the peculiarities of his manner, together with numerous circumstances connected with him, by virtue of associations established among these several ideas, through the perceptions which originally awakened them. Indeed it would seem that our conceptions are both more readily and more permanently linked to one another, by the simultaneous or successive repetition of the corresponding perceptions, than by a similar repetition of the conceptions themselves, owing, it is probable, to the organs evolving them acting with greater intensity in the former case than in the latter. Now all this is readily explained from the universal and all-pervading law of habit, if we suppose the two classes of phenomena to be dependent upon the same portions of the brain, but wholly inexplicable on any known principle of the human constitution, if we suppose them to be dependent upon different portions.

3. The apparent absence in the brain of any other organs besides those which minister, on the one hand to sensation and perception, and on the other, to automatic and voluntary motion. In order to have a just conception of this fact, and of its bearing upon the present inquiry, it will be necessary to consider somewhat more in detail than we have hitherto done, the structure and functions of the several parts of the nervous system—a circumstance which we are the less inclined to regret, as such a consideration will disclose new proofs of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. It will moreover, show that even

in the most mysterious and inscrutable operations of life, there is no direct interposition of the divine agency, but that in this, as well as in every other department of nature, ends are brought about by means skilfully adapted to produce them.

Until within a comparatively late period, all the different nerves were supposed by physiologists to have the same office. They were believed to be the channels, through which impressions are transmitted from the outward organs to the brain, and from the brain to the outward organs. They were regarded as together constituting but a single system, which having its centre within the cranial cavity and radiating thence to every part of the body, regulates and controls all the living phenomena. From recent anatomical and physiological investigations, however, it is inferred, that instead of one, there are no less than five different systems of nerves, having as many separate and distinct centres and performing as many separate and distinct functions. These different systems are not isolated, it is true. On the contrary, they are connected with one another by numerous affiliations, whereby entire harmony of action is secured as well as the most perfect unity of result. Each system, however, is complete within itself, and may continue to act—a case which in certain diseases actually happens—after the others have ceased to perform their respective offices.

Two kinds of matter, and so far as can be ascertained from microscopic examination, only two, enter into the composition of each of these systems—the white and the gray. The white matter consists of a great number of exceedingly minute fibres, which together with the sheaths embracing and protecting them, make up the entire substance of the nerves. Its office is believed to be simply that of conduction, each tubulated fibre being in fact a separate channel along which impressions received at one of its extremities are transmitted to the other. Two distinct sets of nerves are connected with each system, the one afferent and the other efferent—the former serving to convey impressions from the circumference of the system to the centre, and the latter from the centre to the circumference.

The gray matter is very unlike the white. Its structure instead of being fibrous is glandular. It is moreover traversed by innumerable veins and arteries, which supply it abundantly with blood; while the white matter receives but a comparatively small quantity of this fluid. From these circumstances, as well as from the position which it occupies in the several systems, it is believed to perform the office of separating from the blood, the peculiar agent or fluid, whatever it may be, by which the transmission of impressions along the nerves is effected. It is collected into masses of varying dimensions, which either singly

or in groups, constitute the centres of the respective systems. All the afferent nerves terminate in them ; all the efferent originate from them. Indeed it is only through these central masses of gray matter, that the two sets of nerves are connected with each other, and the circle of which they form parts, completed. Minute portions of the same substance are also found about the external extremities of the nerves of sensation, having for their office, it is thought, the secretion of the peculiar fluid or principle by which these nerves are excited to action. The mere mechanical impression made upon the outward senses is not, it would seem, their proper stimulus, but only the means of disengaging and applying it. It is not improbable that the extremities of all the other afferent nerves, are in like manner enveloped by the gray matter, although its existence about them has not as yet been demonstrated.

These observations are of a general character and apply equally to all the different systems of nerves belonging to the human frame. For the further elucidation of the subject, we add a few brief remarks upon the situation, structure, and offices of each.

1. Of the sympathetic system. This has no connection with either the brain or the spinal marrow, but is situated wholly without the cavity containing those organs. It was first separated by physiologists from the rest of the nerves, and received its name from the supposition that a peculiar sympathy is established through it, among the several parts which minister to nutrition and secretion. The concatenated masses of gray matter which form its centre, are lodged principally within the general cavity of the trunk, and the nerves proceeding from them are distributed mainly to the thoracic and abdominal viscera. Branches from this system also accompany the arteries throughout all their ramifications. Connected exclusively with the organs concerned in the maintenance of life, it is believed to preside over their action, and to regulate and harmonize their closely related and often mutually dependent functions. Hence it is frequently called the visceral system or the system of organic life. The nerves belonging to it are incapable of ministering to either sensation or voluntary motion, nor do they in any manner or at any point come into relation with the spirit. The connection between the latter and the parts to which they are distributed, is established solely through the medium of twigs and branches which come from other systems.

2. Of the excito-motary system. This has its origin in a series of ganglia occupying the axis of the spinal marrow, the exterior or fibrous portion of that body only serving to connect the sensory and voluntary nerves with the brain. Emerging at different points from this axial

line or rather chord of gray matter, and passing out through the surrounding layer of white substance, the efferent nerves go to all the muscles indeed, but more especially to those which are employed in respiration, deglutition, and other actions or motions equally necessary to the maintenance and perpetuation of life. The afferent nerves arising mainly, either from the external surface or from the internal membranes, and gathering themselves successively into twigs, branches, and trunks, make their way to different points of the spinal marrow, and having penetrated the outer layer of fibrous matter, terminate in the same line of ganglia from which the efferent take their rise. As in the preceding system, the nervous circles are thus completed without anywhere coming into relation with the spirit. Irritation of the afferent fibres immediately calls into action the efferent, neither sensation nor volition intervening. In this manner a large and important class of actions are provided for independently of any effort or knowledge on the part of the individual, so that they continue to be performed not only during the unconscious state of sleep but even after the entire paralysis of the nerves of both sense and will. Besides the mechanical acts of respiration and deglutition already alluded to, the moistening and lubrication of the eye by the frequent passage of the lid over it, the dilation or contraction of the pupil according to the degree of light, the spontaneous and spasmodic closure of the glottis against whatever, if admitted, would do harm to the lungs, the defence and control of all the entrances to the body, together with the habitual tone or tension of the muscles generally, depend upon this system. In many of the lower animals, it is much more largely developed and performs a greater number of offices than in man. These two systems, the sympathetic and the excito-motary, are the first which are called into action and the last which cease to act. Their functions commence with the organic life of the individual, and continue without interruption or cessation till that life is terminated. It is under the influence of the latter of these systems that the last dying struggles take place, after, it is believed, in many instances, all sensibility and consciousness have ceased—after, it may be, the spirit has already been loosed from its connection with the body.

3. Of the senso-motary system. This has its origin in a chain of ganglia situated at the base of the brain, and in intimate connection, on the one hand with the cerebrum, and on the other with the spinal marrow. The nerves of sensation, including those of the special senses, constitute the afferent branches and a corresponding set going to the different muscles—the efferent. This system is in immediate relation with the spirit. All our sensations are experienced through it,

and a large class of our actions are dependent upon it. It is not however alone capable of awakening perceptions, nor are its efferent branches directly acted upon by the will. Sensation and not volition is their proper stimulus. Hence the motions to which they give rise are spoken of as consensual. Of this character are the violent muscular contractions occasioned by the sudden application of heat and cold to the surface, the involuntary closing of the eye from excess of light, coughing, sneezing, vomiting, laughing, weeping, and numerous other similar acts which are performed not only without assistance from the will, but in direct opposition to it. Of the same character also are the various instinctive actions, which though comparatively few in the case of man, make up by far the greater part of the motions executed by the lower tribes of the animal kingdom. In all of these instances, the nervous circle is completed without the intervention of either perception or volition. There is no knowledge, no plan, no purpose. Some form of sensation or of emotion is the immediate and sole cause of the action.

4. Of the cerebral system. This is situated entirely within the cranial cavity, of which it occupies the larger portion. Its structure is far more compact than that of the preceding systems and the relative disposition of the two kinds of matter entering into it, very different. The gray, instead of occupying the centre, is situated at the circumference of the cerebrum, surrounding and enclosing the white on all sides, except where the latter, as already mentioned, forms connections with the ganglia of the senso-motary system. It consists in man of a layer, about the eighth of an inch in thickness, which follows the surface of the brain through all its irregularities, now passing over its eminences, and now descending into its depressions, so that if it were detached from the included mass, and all its numerous bendings unfolded, it would be of sufficient dimensions to contain a body eight or ten times as large. Indeed, it is not improbable that the chief object of these remarkable inequalities of surface is the extension of this peripheral layer of gray substance, and the consequent increase of its power as a secreting organ. More points are also thus presented for the reception of the innumerable fibres of the white or conducting matter, which radiating from the senso-motary ganglia, go to bury themselves in this layer. These fibres are closely packed, and together with the insulating material by which they are surrounded, and the veins and arteries which serve to nourish them, make up the whole interior portion of the brain. Their sole use, as it would seem, is to connect the ganglia at its base with the periphery of the organ.

Such is a general account of the structure of the cerebrum. Its

office as gathered from the teachings of comparative anatomy, from experiments made upon the lower vertebrated animals, and from various pathological phenomena observed in the case of man, is on the one hand, the awakening of ideas in the mind, and on the other, the transmission of volitions to the different members of the body. Impressions made upon the outward senses, are capable of exciting through the preceding system only sensations. Through this, they give rise to perceptions. The will has no power over the preceding system. By this its mandates are received, and conveyed to the muscles whose duty it is to execute them. Whether the fibres of this system, afferent and efferent, pass out through the senso-motary ganglia, and go to the several organs of sense and motion, or whether they terminate in those ganglia—the impressions made and received by them being transmitted through the preceding system—is not quite certain. Most physiologists incline to the latter opinion, although the analogy of the other parts of the nervous structure would seem to favor the former. Further anatomical investigations conducted by aid of the microscope are necessary for settling the question.

5. Of the cerebellum. This like the cerebrum is situated within the cranium, occupying the lower and back part of that cavity. Although of far inferior dimensions, the relative disposition of the two kinds of matter composing it, is the same,—the gray forming the peripheral, and the white the central portion of the organ. Its connections are with the cerebrum, the ganglia at the base of the brain and the spinal marrow,—more especially the two latter. From the study of its comparative development in the different orders of the lower vertebrated animals, as well as experiments made upon those animals, it is believed to be immediately concerned in the regulation and subordination of the different muscular contractions necessary to the execution of the more delicate and complex movements. Indeed there are scarcely any motions so simple as not to require for their production the simultaneous contraction of several muscles; and it not unfrequently happens, that the same muscle forms one, of two, three, or four different sets of muscles producing by their combined action as many different motions. Now the several muscles constituting each of these sets, are associated through the cerebellum, it is believed, in such a manner that their simultaneous and due contraction is determined by a single act of the will, directed by the idea of the object to be accomplished. When the cerebellum is removed from the brain of a bird, which it may be without materially affecting the vital functions, the bird, although retaining its powers of sensation, perception, and voluntary motion, is no longer able to execute with any precision

movements requiring the combined and harmonious action of several muscles. If on the other hand, the cerebrum be removed, it retains the power of sensation and continues to perform a great variety of instinctive and consensual motions, but it no longer shows signs of either perception or will. If food be placed in the mouth, it is swallowed, and life may in this way be sustained for weeks or even months. But no intelligent, voluntary effort is made by it for procuring the means of sustenance.

From the brief view which we have thus presented of the different nervous centres and of the functions respectively connected with them, it will be seen that our present inquiry has to do more especially with the cerebrum. This is the seat of perception and of volition. Through the instrumentality of this, ideas are awakened, which supply material to the intellect, and furnish, as it were the basis of all its operations. When quickened into action in any part by impressions conveyed to it from without, through the medium of the sensory ganglia, the ideas to which it gives rise are recognized as perceptions. When, on the contrary, the action originates within, whether spontaneously through the power of habit, or from the influence of the will, the ideas evolved are recognized by us as conceptions. In both cases, however, the same parts of the cerebral structure are concerned in their production. Each of the senses has its own separate ganglion, in which the nerves ministering to it all terminate. There is one for seeing, another for hearing, a third for smelling, a fourth for feeling, and perhaps a fifth for tasting, although it is not quite certain whether this sense is anything more than a modified form of touch. These ganglia, as already stated, are intimately connected with the cerebrum, by dense bundles of fibres which radiate from them to its circumference, and which are supposed to be the immediate instrument in awakening our varied perceptions. Now what we would have especially observed is, that only one of these ganglia—we mean on the same side, for the brain like the external parts of the organization is throughout double—is found to each of the senses. There is not one ganglion for awakening the *perceptions* of sight and another similar and associated ganglion for awakening the corresponding *conceptions*. The same is true of hearing and smell and touch. In the case of no one of them, is there but a single interior organ, which can be supposed to have any part in developing the ideas, whether perceptions or conceptions belonging to it. Remove from the brain the sensory ganglia, together with the entire mass of fibres which go from them to the gray matter of the cerebrum, and there would remain only the parts subsidiary to motion. From the structure therefore of the great nervous centre with which the mani-

festation of the mental powers is immediately connected, as well as from the close resemblance of our conceptions to our perceptions and the readiness with which associations are established among the former, through the latter, we conclude that both classes of phenomena are dependent upon the same parts of the brain; and that as we have already said, these parts are excited to action in the one case by outward causes, over which we have no voluntary power, and in the other by influences within, to a greater or less extent under the control of the will. In both cases, the organs are the same, and the kind of action is the same. The only difference is in its origin and degree.

In pursuance of our purpose of tracing the organic dependence of the several classes of mental phenomena, we shall next consider *recollection*. This is more complex than any of the acts or states of the spirit, to which we have thus far directed our inquiries. It involves conception and something in addition to it. In its simplest form, it consists of the reproduction and recognition of a former idea. The first of these is a mere act of conception, which is accomplished as in any other case, through the instrumentality of certain parts of the brain. In its ordinary, spontaneous form, it is the result of some association which has been established between that, and the act or state immediately preceding it in the order of the mental train. The second is a purely spiritual cognition, wholly independent of the material organization, except so far as that is necessary for evolving the ideas to which it relates. It is an intuitive judgment which the mind forms on comparing what it is at present thinking or perceiving, with what it has previously thought or perceived, including, it may be, along with the main idea, more or less of the attendant circumstances—a judgment by which the two things are affirmed to be identical. As this judgment which the mind thus passes, has exclusive reference to its own consciousnesses awakened indeed by the action of the cerebrum, but not themselves organic, it is obvious, that it must be a simple act of the spirit, and would therefore continue the same, were the brain entirely dissolved, provided the same mental states should be produced through the medium of any other agent or organ.

Besides the cognitions of memory, there are numerous other intuitions of the spirit, which are equally independent of the cerebral organism, and which would in like manner continue to arise, in whatever way the ideas forming their subject should be presented. In truth the entire class of interior perceptions, which by transcendental philosophers are referred to the pure reason, would seem to be of this character; and if we mistake not, it is by this character, and this alone, that they are distinguished from the so-called phenomena of the

understanding. The latter are immediately produced by the action of the material organs upon the spirit, and under our present constitution and present circumstances, are capable of being produced in this way only. Were our constitution changed or were the media by which we are surrounded altered, then the same phenomena might be exhibited under other and different conditions; but in our present state, their manifestation is inseparably connected with the body. The former, on the contrary, are not the immediate or necessary result of the action of the brain, but arise in the mind by virtue of its own inherent endowments, when the ideas awakened by that action are contemplated. Such are the axioms of arithmetic and geometry. Such are the first principles in morals and metaphysics. These truths are directly apprehended, while the conceptions to which they relate are awakened through the organization. This secondary character which belongs to the entire class of intuitive or rational perceptions, and by which they are removed from all bodily connections, and carried back wholly into the spirit, appears to be what with the philosophers above referred to, has led to the conclusion however unjustifiable, that they spring from a source beyond and above the individual in whom they are manifested.

Of the same secondary character are the various desires, sentiments, and feelings of which we are susceptible. They are not the immediate result of the action of the brain upon the spirit, but spring up in the mind from the contemplation of ideas of a nature fitted to produce them. The ideas are awakened by the action of the brain, but the desires and feelings by the ideas. The modern phrenological doctrines which refer the intellectual and moral sentiments to certain parts of the cerebrum as the immediate instruments of their manifestation, are no less at variance with the true exposition of the mental phenomena as revealed in consciousness, than they are inconsistent with all just views in regard to the structure and functions of that organ; and we venture further to express the belief that could all the sources of error necessarily attendant upon their application to the determining of character be excluded, their failure to bear this last practical test of their soundness would be found equally signal.

We have thus far considered only the elementary powers of the mind. Its more complex operations and processes however, such as analysis, synthesis, ratiocination, and generalization will require but a brief notice in connection with our subject. Indeed, they will be found upon examination to be made up of the simple acts and states which have already passed under review. They all necessarily involve conception. This runs through them and constitutes the chief

and essential ingredient in their composition. Without this, they would be impossible. In fact, each one of the processes consists in the development of conceptions under the guidance of either the intuitions or the sentiments. Analysis is the separate and independent production of ideas which having entered the mind simultaneously, ordinarily present themselves in a combined, or more strictly speaking, associated state. Synthesis is the simultaneous production of ideas which having entered the mind at different times and under different circumstances, ordinarily present themselves in a disconnected state. When the ideas thus brought together are associated according to their philosophical relations, it is said to be an exercise of the understanding or the reason; and when in accordance with their poetical relations, of the imagination or the fancy. In the same way, ratiocination is the spontaneous or voluntary development of a train of ideas in the order of their logical connections, accompanied at each step by the perception of these connections; and so of the other mental operations. They all consist in the production of ideas connected with one another by certain definite relations, the intuitive apprehension of which furnishes the guide to their development. They are therefore dependent upon the action of the cerebrum, inasmuch as this is necessary to the awakening of conceptions. But they also involve the exercise of other and higher powers which are wholly independent of the cerebrum—which belong exclusively to the spirit, and which would continue the same although its connection with the body should be dissolved. Such are the various intuitions which enter essentially into these processes, and in fact determine their character. They together make up the human intelligence, and are of a nature so superior to the mere outward perceptions, dependent upon the organization, that as we have already said, they have been supposed to have their origin in the Divine mind. Indeed, the former class of powers are almost as highly developed in many of the lower animals as in man. It is the want of the latter that chiefly constitutes their inferiority, and must forever restrict them to the humble place they occupy in the scale of created intelligences.

Before dismissing our subject, it may be proper briefly to advert to one or two consequences which would seem to follow from the foregoing exposition of the mental phenomena, and which by many may be regarded as an insuperable objection to the views presented. If the mind be awakened to action only by the presence of ideas, and if these are evolved under our present constitution through the instrumentality of the brain, then it follows, it may be said, that the spirit on its separation from the body must pass into a state of profound and unconscious repose. Having now neither perceptions nor concep-

tions, there will be nothing to awaken its sensibilities or call forth its powers. That such a conclusion follows legitimately from the premises, provided we suppose the spirit on laying aside its connection with the body, not to assume any new connections or enter into any new relations, we think must be admitted. Indeed the same thing might be inferred from the loss of consciousness which takes place whenever the action of the brain is temporarily suspended, as in paralysis or syncope. During the continuance of these, so far as we can judge from appearances and from the subsequent recollections of the individual, there is a total cessation of all thought and feeling. The mind is apparently in a state of unconsciousness, as profound as that from which it was awakened by the first impressions made upon it through the organization.

But if the spirit be destined to survive the body, all analogy would lead us to expect that other instrumentalities will be provided, for enabling it to carry on its own processes, as well as for putting it in communication with surrounding existences. It is not necessary that these instrumentalities should be like those at present made use of, organic. In its new state of being, the spirit for aught we know, may be bathed on every side by a subtle essence or medium, which shall disclose to it surrounding existences, in the same manner as light reveals their external forms to the eye. Whoever will compare our capacity for knowledge with our present means of acquiring it, cannot fail to be struck with the great disparity between them. A child may learn in a single day what it has taken a whole life-time to discover. The information imparted by the senses is extremely limited. They at best make known only the outward phenomena. Of the essence and properties they tell us nothing. These must be sought by long and laborious processes of experiment and induction; and even after we suppose ourselves to have arrived at them, as the method pursued was not direct but merely inferential, further investigation may show that we were in error. Were a new sense to be granted to us, by which we might look into the interior of bodies and see their component atoms, might observe the different ways in which those atoms act upon one another, and how that action gives rise to the innumerable changes which are everywhere occurring, with such a faculty a single glance around us would give a deeper insight into the real nature and actual constitution of things, than has been gained by the combined researches of philosophers during a period of six thousand years.

Nor is the mode in which the spirit holds intercourse with other spirits in the present state, at all so simple or perfect as might be conceived. Instead of direct communion with them, or the rapid inter-

change of thought and feeling, through the medium of some intervening agent, recourse must be had to a complicated system of means, involving numerous actions and reactions, for conveying the simplest idea. In the first place, the idea must be expressed. In order to this, couriers are despatched along the nerves leading to the vocal organs, and these are called into action in such a manner as to form the particular sounds which represent it. These sounds breaking upon the surrounding air, are borne upon its waves to the ear of the person addressed, which entering they traverse its successive compartments—undergoing in each certain important modifications—until they at length reach its termination in the auditory nerve. Here an entire change takes place in the character of the action. From a mere mechanical impulse or vibration, it is converted into an agency or influence of a far more subtle nature, which is transmitted along this nerve and which on arriving at its interior extremity, where it is in relation with the spirit, appears in the form of a sensation. Finally, by virtue of an association established between them, this sensation introduces the idea which it was the object of the entire process to communicate. That such a mode of intercourse, however well adapted to our present condition as physical and organic beings, will be retained by the spirit after it has laid aside its material connections, no one can for a moment imagine. What other more direct and simple mode will be substituted for this, it is impossible to say; although the wide diffusion of certain ethereal media and the important ends which they subserve in the general economy of nature, would suggest the probability that these may in some way be subsidiary to that more perfect communion which we suppose spirit to hold with spirit.

It may be further said, by way of objection to the foregoing views, that if, as supposed, the ideas of memory are awakened through the organization, on the dissolution of that, the faculty itself must be destroyed and the whole previous existence of the individual become thenceforward an entire blank. That such is not a necessary consequence of what has been said, will be obvious we think, on a moment's reflection. In whatever manner our former ideas may be reproduced, whether by the instrumentalities at present employed for that purpose, or by others equally adapted to the same end, as long as the power of recognizing them continues—a power which resides in the spirit itself, and is wholly independent of the organization—so long the faculty of memory must remain. Indeed, should our means of recalling the past in another state be more perfect than they are at present—which is at least supposable—then this faculty may not only continue unimpaired, but be greatly improved, so that it shall disclose to us in

the retrospect of existence vistas, of which we have now no conception.

From the rapid view which we have thus taken of the several classes of the mental phenomena, it appears that there is no evidence of their being dependent upon the organization, in any such manner as to render that necessary to their development. Nor is there in any of them, evidence of an actual dependence under our present constitution, at all different in kind from that which is manifested in the simplest cases of ordinary perception. The ideas originally awakened through impressions made upon the senses are subsequently reproduced by the spontaneous action of the interior or cerebral portions of the same organs. The intuitions of the reason, as in their first appearance, so in their subsequent manifestations, are wholly independent of the brain. They arise in the mind by virtue of its own endowments, whenever the ideas to which they relate are presented to it. There is nothing therefore, in the connection between the spirit and the body, so far as we are able to trace it, to afford ground for the belief, that the dissolution of the latter will be attended with the destruction of the former, or even with a diminution of its powers; but on the contrary, it is entirely supposable, and the law of progress so visibly inscribed, not only on our own nature, but upon every part of the Creator's works, would lead us to expect, that these powers will be greatly enlarged, by its introduction to new and higher relations fitted to call forth energies which are now dormant.

ARTICLE VIII.

BIBLICAL CHRONOLOGY.

WE have translated and we herewith present to our readers the Chronological Tables on Biblical History, inserted by Winer as an Appendix to the third edition of his *Biblisches Realwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1848. It is a convenient summary of the results of the latest investigations of archaeologists and commentators in relation to this subject. Many points, it is well known, are in dispute. Some of them never can be settled, for want of adequate data. It may be well, however, to present the conclusions, (in some instances conjectures,) of a scholar so industrious and able as Winer. The mark * indicates the death of the person with whose name it is connected.—E.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES FROM SAUL TO THE DEATH OF SIMON MACCABAEUS, AND FROM KING HEROD'S ENTRANCE ON HIS GOVERNMENT TO THE IMPRISONMENT OF PAUL AT ROME.

B.C.	<i>Events in Israelitish History.</i>	<i>Synchronisms.</i>
1075	Saul is chosen king.	
1055	Saul is slain in battle. David, king of Judah, at Hebron. (Ishbosheth, Saul's son, king of the other tribes.)	Heraclidean States in Greece. Codrus last king of Athens. State of Alba Longa in Italy flourishes. Lower Italy peopled from Greece.
1048	David, after Ishbosheth's murder, king over all Israel. Jebus (Jerusalem) taken, becomes the seat of government. Wars with the Edomites, Moabites, Syrians, Ammonites, etc.	Tyre flourishes. Hiram, successor of his father Abibal, reigns as king 34 years. Aram-Zobah in Syria becomes powerful. Hadadezer king. (The 21st or Tanitic Dynasty in Egypt.)
1015	David*. Solomon king.	
1012	Temple begun on Moriah.	Independent kingdom of Syria-Damascus. Reson king.
1006	Temple completed and dedicated. Other splendid edifices built in and out of Jerusalem.	Hiram of Tyre in friendship with Solomon.
975	Solomon*. His son Rehoboam king.	King Shishak (Sesonchis) reigns in Egypt, of 22d (Bubast.) Dynasty.

B.C.	<i>Kingdom of Judah.</i>	<i>Kingdom of Israel.</i>	<i>Synchronisms.</i>
975	Rehoboam acknowledged as king only by Judah and Benjamin. Ammonites and Edomites subject to Judah.	The Ten tribes choose Jeroboam king. Moabites subject to the kingdom of Israel.	
970	Invasion of Judah by the Egyptian king Shishak.		
957	Abijah king.		
955	Asa king. Zerah the Cushite (O-sorchon of the 22d Dynasty?) invades Judah, but is defeated.	Jeroboam engages in war against Abijah. 954. Nadab king.	Tabrimmon reigns in Syria-Damascus.
	Judah in league with Syria-Damascus.	953. Baashah king. War between Judah and Israel. 930. Elah king. 928. Elah killed. Zimri and Omri contend for the throne. Omri king. Tibni rival king.	Benhadad I. reigns in Syria-Damascus.

B.C.	Kingdom of Judah.	Kingdom of Israel.	Synchronisms.
		924. Tibni*. Omri only, king, (in Tirzah). Samaria, as a royal residence, built, in 923.	
914	Jehoshaphat king. Unfortunate war of Judah and Israel with Syria-Damascus. Ammonites and Moabites, invading Judah, are defeated. Philistines made tributary?	918. Ahab king. Jezebel a Phoenician princess, his queen. The prophet Elijah.	In Sidon (and Tyre) Ethbaal (Ithobal) reigns, whose daughter is married to Ahab. Benhadad II. reigns in Syria-Damascus.
	Israel and Judah attempt to subdue the Moabites without success.	897. Ahaziah king. The Moabites refuse to pay tribute.	
889	Jehoram king. Jehoram marries Athaliah, daugh. of Jezebel, and thus comes into connection with the Israelitish court. The Edomites become independent. Philistines and Arabians plunder Jerusalem.	896. Joram king.	
885	Ahaziah king.	Expedition of Judah and Israel against Syria-Damascus. The prophet Elisha.	Hazael reigns in Syria-Damascus.
884	Athaliah, mother of Ahaziah, after his murder, usurps the throne.	Jehu king, after the death of Joram. The Damascus-Syrians seize on the country east of the Jordan.	Lycurgus in Sparta.
878	Athaliah killed. Joash, her grandson, raised to the throne by the priests.		In Tyre, Pygmalion reigns 47 years. In the 7th of his reign, his sister Dido is said to have escaped to Africa and founded Carthage. Jos. Apion I. 18, 143 yrs after the building of Solomon's temple.
860	Prophet Joel.	856. Jehoahaz king. The land hard pressed by the Syrians.	
840	The Syrians appear before Jerusalem and exact a tribute.	840. Joash king. War with the Syrians.	
838	Joash murdered. Amaziah king. Amaziah makes war on Edom and takes Seilah.	The Moabites attack Israel. War betw. Israel & Judah. Israelites plunder Jerus.	Benhadad III. reigns in Syria-Damascus.

B.C.	Kingdom of Judah.	Kingdom of Israel.	Synchronisms.
		825. Jeroboam II. king. Syrians of Damascus defeated. Kingdom powerful and flourishing. Moabites made tributary?	
809	Uzziah king. Recovers the Edomite sea-ports. Ammonites tributary. Philistines subdued.		
	Prophets Amos & Hosea. The last flourishes under this and the three following reigns.	784. Jeroboam *. Anarchy.	776. The first year of the Olympiads.
		772. Zachariah, son of Jeroboam, king.	
		771. Zachariah murdered. Shallum king. Shallum, in 1 month, murdered. Menahem king. Israel tributary to Assyria.	Pul reigns in Assyria.
758	Jotham king. Isaiah prophesies under this and the two following kings.	760. Pekahiah king.	753. Rome founded.
741	Ahaz king. Ahaz, attacked by Israel and Syria, purchases aid of Assyria.	758. Pekahiah murdered. Pekah king.	747. Nabonassar, king of Babylon. Era of Nabonassar commences. Rezin king in Syria-Damascus; Tiglath-Pileser, in Assyria. The first, in a war with the last, loses his crown and life.
	Edomites revolt? The Philistines seize on a part of the west of Judah. Judah dependent on Assyria.	The Assyrians conquer the country E. of the Jordan, and N. Palestine, and take captive the people.	In Egypt, 3 dynasties, contemporary—a Tanitic, a Saltic, and an Ethiopian (in Upper E.)
		738. Pekah murdered. Anarchy?	In Assyria, (Media and Babylonia), Shalmanezzer reigns; marches into Hither Asia, subdues a part of Phenicia. Elulæus is king of Tyre. (Jos. Ant. 9.14.2.)
725	Hezekiah king, fights successfully with the Philistines. The prophet Micah.	729. Hoshea king, tributary to Assyria.	So, i. e. Sevechus of the 25th (Ethiop.) dynasty, reigns in Egypt. Sargon, king of Assyria, besieges Ashdod.
	Alliance with Egypt, as a defence against Assyria.	722. Hoshea, relying on the aid of Egypt, attempts to throw off the Assyrian yoke, occasions an Assyrian invasion. Samaria besieged.	715. Numa Pompilius chosen king at Rome. Sennacherib, king of Assyria, marches against Egypt; is met by Tirhakah (Tarakos), king of the 25th (Ethiop.) Dynasty.
712	The Assyrians besiege Jerusalem, but suddenly retreat.	721. Samaria taken. Kingdom of Israel destroyed. The inhabitants carried into exile. The land colonized by the Assyrians. Moabites spread over the country E. of the Jordan (earlier?).	

B.C.	Kingdom of Judah.	Kingdom of Israel.	Synchronisms.
	Isaiah counsellor of the king.		Media becomes independent of Assyria.
	A Babylonian embassy at Jerusalem.		In Babylonia, Merodach Baladan (an independent) king; then Elebus. He subdued by Sennacherib.
696	Manasseh king. Carried captive, by the Assyrians, to Babylon, but set free ?	New Assyrian colonists transplanted to Israel by Esarhaddon.	Esarhaddon reigns in Assyria (after 696 ?) In Egypt, the Dodekarchy (after 671 ?) 15 years. Then Psammetichus becomes sole sovereign (656).
641	Amon king.		Scythian hosts march through Palestine.
639	Amon murdered. Josiah king.		625. The Babylonian. Nabopolassar, becomes an independent king.
627	Jeremiah appears as a prophet, and prophesies down to the destruction of Jerusalem. Prophets Zephaniah and Habakkuk.		Draco in Athens.
622	Discovery of a copy of the book of the law, in repairing the temple. Thorough reform of the theocracy. Prophet Jeremiah begins to prophesy.	Also in the cities of Israel, Josiah destroys the remains of idolatry.	616. Tarquinius Priscus, king at Rome.
609	Josiah is slain in battle with the Egyptians, near Megiddo. Jehoahaz king 3 months. After Jehoahaz is dethroned, Jehoiakim placed by the Egyptian king on the throne.		Pharaoh Necho marches against the Chaldeans to the Euphrates. 606. The Egyptians are defeated, near Circesium, by the Chaldeans. Cyaxeres, the Median, takes Nineveh and subdues Assyria.
598	Jehoiakim*. Jehoiachin reigns three months.		604. Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon.

*Events in Jewish History.**Synchronisms.*

	Jerusalem taken by the Chaldeans. the temple plundered ; Jehoiachin and many Jews carried captive (among them Ezekiel). Zedekiah king.	
595	Ezekiel appears as a prophet in Babylonia. Daniel in the Chaldean court.	Psammuthis II. reigns in Egypt.
590	The inclination of Zedekiah to seek aid from Egypt, occasions an invasion by the Chaldeans. Jerusalem besieged. Labors of the prophet Jeremiah.	Vaphres or Hophra (after 590) reigns in Egypt. Solon in Athens.
588	Jerusalem taken and destroyed. Zedekiah put to death. The greater part of the Jews carried to Babylon.	

B.C.	Events in Jewish History.	Synchronisms.
	Gedaliah, appointed governor of Judea by the Babylonians, is murdered, after two months. Many Jews flee into Egypt. Jeremiah accompanies them.	In 586 or 585, Nebuchadnezzar begins the siege of Tyre. The ruler in Tyre is Ethbaal II.
584	Last deportation of the Jews to Babylon.	

B.C.	Events in Jewish History.	Synchronisms.	
		EAST.	WEST.
536	The exiled Jews receive permission from Cyrus to return to Palestine. The first company, Jews and Levites, return. Zerubabel. Jeshua.	Cyrus ascends the Medo-Babylonian throne.	Pisistratus. Pythagoras. Croesus in Lydia.
534	Building of the temple begins.		534. Tarquinius Superbus becomes king at Rome.
	The Samaritans excluded from taking part in building the temple, malign at the Persian court the Jews.	529. Cyrus*. Cambyzes king of Persia.	
	The building of the temple is interdicted by a royal decree.	525. Egypt and the neighboring countries conquered by the Persians.	
520	The building of the temple proceeds. The prophets Haggai and Zechariah.	522. Smerdis, a Magian, ascends the Persian throne. Cambyses*.	
516	The temple completed and dedicated.	521. Smerdis is murdered. Darius Hystaspes chosen king.	
458	A second company of Jews under Ezra arrive in Palestine.	Xerxes king of Persia. 485. Esther, Mordecai. 465. Xerxes murdered. Artabanus. Artaxerxes Longimanus.	510. Tarquin. Superbus banished. Rome a republic. 492 seq. Wars of the Persians and European Greeks.
445	Nehemiah, royal viceroy in Palestine. Confirms and arranges the civil and religious affairs.	424-3. Xerxes II., Sogdianus, and Darius Nothus, successively kings of Persia.	480. Xerxes and Leonidas at Thermopylae. Themistocles. 460 seq. Age of Pericles at Athens. 451. Laws of XII Tables in Rome. Sybaris in Italy peopled by a Greek colony. Herodotus.
	Nehemiah comes the second time to Palestine (not before 414 ?) and reforms abuses. The prophet Malachi.		Alciabiades. Socrates.

B.C. *Events in Jewish History.**Synchronisms.*

		EAST.	WEST.
	A Jewish priest, who had married "a strange woman," banished.		Xenophon. Plato.
		404 to 336. The kings in Persia are Artaxerxes II. Mnemon, Artaxerxes Ochus, and Arses.	404. End of Peloponnesian war. 360. Philip, king of Macedon. Aristotle. Demosthenes.
		335. Darius Codomannus king of Persia.	336. Alexander, king of Macedon.
		333. Alexander marches against the Persians. Battle near Issus, Darius defeated.	
332	About this time, Samaritan temple on Gerizim built, according to Josephus.	332. Alexander besieges and takes Tyre, and enters Jerusalem. Alexandria in Egypt founded.	
		331. Persians again defeated by Alexander, near Guagamela.	
		330. Alexander enters Persia Proper. End of the Persian monarchy. Darius killed in flight.	
	Onias high priest of the Jews.	323. Alexander*. The conflicts of his generals begin with each other. Laomedon viceroy of Syria.	The democratic element in Rome seeks to place itself on an equality with the aristocratic.
	Ptolemy I. Lagus, viceroy of Egypt, occupies Jerusalem and Palestine. Many Jews voluntarily go to Egypt. Jews also migrate to Lybia and Cyrene.	318 seq. War between Eumenes and Antigonus, for the supremacy in Asia.	
314	Antigonus seizes on Phoenicia and Palestine, but thereby brings on a war with Ptolemy.	315. Eumenes killed. Antigonus retains the supremacy, and expels Seleucus, viceroy (after 321) of Babylonia	
		312. Seleucus again takes Babylonia and Media. Beginning of the era of the Seleucidae.	
301	Ptolemy Lagus, now king, retakes Palestine. Simon the Just high priest.	306 Antigonus assumes the title of king. The other viceroys follow his example.	
		302. Antigonus attacked by Seleucus, Ptolemy Lagus, Lysimachus, and Cassander.	

B.C. *Events of Jewish History.**Synchronisms.*

		EAST.	WEST.
		301. Battle near Ipsus. Antigonus loses the battle and his life, in the 12th year of his rule over Asia. Syria falls to Seleucus (Nicator), and Phoenicia and Coele-Syria to Ptolemy.	
300 sq.	Jews remove into Syria, and obtain the rights of citizenship, especially at Antioch.	300 Antioch founded; soon, also, many other cities in the provinces of Syria.	
	Translation of the LXX. Eleazar high priest.	284. Ptolemy Lagus*. Ptolemy II. Philadelphus king.	284 seq. Aetolian league in Greece; along side of which, soon after, is the Achæan league.
264 sq.	Wars between Egypt and Syria afflict Palestine also. Antigonus Socho the writer.	231. Seleucus murdered. Antiochus I. Soter, king.	281 seq. War of the Romans with Pyrrhus; the former, for the first time, carry their arms to countries beyond the sea.
		262. Antiochus II. Deus. Arsaces, viceroy in Parthia, revolts and founds a Parthian kingdom, 256. Berosus, the Babylonian historian. Manetho, author of the Egyptian Dynasties, about 260.	264-41. First Punic war. Romans create a naval force.
250	Onias II. surnamed the Just, high priest (Jos. Antt. 12, 4. 1).		
		247. Ptolemy III. Euergetes, king of Egypt.	
		245. Seleucus Callinichus' unfortunate war with the Parthians.	240 seq. Beginnings of Roman literature.
218	Antiochus the Great, in war with Egypt, seizes the greater part of Palestine.	226. Seleucus Ceraunus.	
		224. Antiochus the Great.	
217	Palestine again under Egyptian rule. Third Book of Maccabees. Simon II. high priest.	221. Ptolemy IV. Philopater, king of Egypt.	218. Sec'd Punic war beg.
		218. Ptolemy Phil. is attacked by Antiochus.	217. 16. Hannibal victorious in Italy.
		217. Egyptians utterly defeat Antiochus, near Raphia.	216. Romans defeated near Cannæ.
			214. Syracuse besieged by the Romans. Archimedes.
202	Antiochus again takes Palestine, and transplants many Jews from Babylonia to Asia Minor.	204. Ptolemy V. Epiphanes. Antiochus allies himself with Philip of Macedon against Egypt.	204. Romans enter Africa under P. Corn. Scipio.
199	Egyptians again conquer Palestine.	202. Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, and Palestine, occupied by the Syrians.	202. Hannibal defeated near Zama.
198	Antiochus takes Palest. once more, but promises to return it to Ptolemy Epiphanes, as a marriage dowry to his dau., whom Pt. marries.	198. Antiochus defeats the Syrians near Panæas.	201. End of the Second Punic war.

B.C. *Events in Jewish History.**Synchronisms.*

		EAST.	WEST.
193	In consequence of this marriage, Palestine reverts to Egypt.	192. Antiochus wars with the Romans, but 190. is defeated by them, near Magnesia, and is 189. compelled to consent to a disgraceful peace.	The Aetolian League disarmed by the Romans.
176	Palestine subjected to Syria. Son of Simon II. high priest. Heliodorus attempts to plunder the temple.	187. Antiochus the Great killed. Seleucus IV. Philopator king.	
175	Jason, brother of Onias, purchases for himself the high priest's office and becomes head of the "Greek" party among the Jews.	180. Ptolemy Philometor, still a child. The Jews in great honor in Egypt, Jos. Ap. 2.5. 175. Seleucus murdered. Antiochus IV. Epiphanes king, possesses Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.	
172	The high priest's office transferred to Mene-laüs (Onias), who, later, plunders the treasures in the temple.	171. Antiochus IV. begins a campaign against Egypt.	
	Antiochus Epiphanes, informed of the rebellious conduct of the Jews, plunders the temple, and causes great slaughter among the Jews.	170. Ptolemy Philometor taken prisoner by the Syrians. Ptolemy Physcon assumes the government.	
167	A Syrian army under Apollonius seize Jerusalem and inflict great cruelties on the Jews. Worship of Jehovah abolished. A statue of Jupiter Olymp. set up in the temple. Insurrection of a part of the Jews under Mattathias.	168. Ptol. Phil., liberated, reigns in connection with Ptol. Physcon.	169. Roman poet Ennius*.
166	Mattathias*. His son Judas a successful leader of the Jewish patriots. Successes against the Syrians.	168. Romans interdict Antiochus from all hostile acts towards Egypt.	168. Perseus, king of Macedon, submits to the Romans; Macedonia a republic, but acknowledged by the Romans as free.
164	Jerusalem taken by the Jews. Temple purified. First offering on the 25th of Chisleu. Judas head of the country, and even undertakes operations against the neighboring tribes.	163 sq. Ptolemy Phys. expels Ptol. Philom., but is himself banished, by the Romans, to Lybia and Cyrenaica. Philometor alone, again king of Egypt.	166 sq. Terence in Rome.

B.C. *Events in Jewish History.**Synchronisms.*

		EAST.	WEST.
163	The Jews besiege the fortress in Jerusalem. A Syrian army enters the land. Antiochus makes peace with Judas.	163. Antiochus Epiph.* is succeeded by Ant. V. Eupator.	
161	Alcimus, head of the "Greek" party, is confirmed as high priest by Demetrius, and is introduced by a Syrian army. Judas is defeated by the Syrians and slain. Jonathan takes his place as leader.	162. Eupator compelled to meet an irruption into Syria by Philip, his former guardian. Onias, a Jewish priest, obtains permission for the Jews to build a temple at Leontopolis. A Jewish central Divine worship is there established, according to Eusebius, B. C. 161.	
159	Alcimus suddenly *. Jews live some years in peace with the Syrians.	Dem. Soter causes the death of Eupator, and ascends the Syrian throne.	
152	Jonathan, going over to Alexander's party, is named high priest by him.	152. A rival king, Alexander (Balas), appears in Syria.	
		151. Alexander conquers Demetrius, and becomes king.	
147	Jonathan, as an ally of Alexander, takes the field against Demetrius.	150. Ptol. Philom. gives his daughter as queen to Alexander of Syria.	149. Third Punic war begins.
		147. Demetrius II. Nicator, son of Demet. just mentioned, seeks the Syrian crown, and makes war on Alexander.	148. Macedonia becomes a Roman province.
		146. Ptol. Philom. invades Syria, ostensibly to aid Alexander, but declares immediately for Demetrius. Alexander flees to Arabia, and is there murdered.	146. Carthage taken and destroyed by the Romans. Corinth destroyed by L. Mummius, and Achaia becomes a Roman province.
145	Jonathan goes over to Demetrius, and is confirmed as high priest by him; but the Syrians still hold the fortress at Jerusalem. Jonathan sends troops to Demetrius against the Antiochian party who had revolted, but soon declares for Antiochus.	145. Ptol. Physcon, king of Egypt to 116.	Polybius, the historian.
144	Jonathan taken prisoner by Tryphon. Simon, leader of the Maccabees; Jonathan, soon after, murdered.	145. Antiochus VI. is set up, by Tryphon, as rival king to Demetrius, and in	
143		144 gets possession of the throne.	
142	Simon joins Demetrius, and proclaims the people free from tribute. First year of Jewish freedom. Peace and returning prosperity to the Jews.	143. Tryphon causes Antiochus to be murdered, and himself ascends the throne. Demetrius and Tryphon reign in Syria, having made a division of the country.	

B.C.	<i>Events in Jewish History.</i>	<i>Synchronisms.</i>	
		EAST.	WEST.
141	Fortress at Jerusalem falls into Simon's hands.		
140	Simon becomes hereditary prince of the Jews.	140. Demetrius is taken prisoner in a war with the Parthians.	
138	Simon allies himself with Antiochus Sidetes, but is soon attacked by him. A Syrian army, under Cendebeaus defeated by the Jews.	138. Antiochus VII. Sidetes, contends for the Syrian throne. Tryphon is killed in flight.	
135	Simon, with the knowledge of Antiochus, killed. John Hyrcanus becomes high priest and leader of the Jews. Jos. Antt. 13. 8 sq.		
B.C.	<i>Events of Jewish History.</i>	Yr. of Rome	<i>Synchronisms. Roman Empire.</i>
40	Herod named king of the Jews by the Roman Senate.	714	M. Antony, C. Octavius (and M. Lepidus), actually exercise (after 43) absolute sovereignty.
37	He takes Jerusalem by storm. Ananel, a Babylonian, high priest.	717	
36	Ananel deposed. The royal infant Aristobulus named high	718	
sq.	priest in his first yr.; then again Ananel, Jos. Antt. 15. 3. 1. 3.	sq.	
31	Earthquake in Palestine. Herod confirmed in his kingdom by Augustus, and	722	Open war between Antony and Octavius.
30	receives, at his command, some cities in addition.	723	Sept. 2, Battle of Actium. Octavius victor.
	Jesus the son of Phabi, then Simon, son of Boëthus, high priests, Jos. Antt. 15, 9, 3.	724	First year of the sole sovereignty of Augustus in the Roman empire.
		725	Named perpetual imperator by the Senate.
		727	Receives the honorary title of Augustus.
		729	Galatia a Roman province.
		733	
21	Herod begins to rebuild the temple in Jerusalem.	735	Year of Virgil's death.
19	The temple itself is completed; on the outer works of the sanctuary the building goes on.		
7?	John the Baptist born.	746	Year of Horace's death. Sent Saturninus proconsul in Syria.
6?	Jesus born at Bethlehem. Matthias, son of Theophilus, high priest, Jos. Antt. 17, 4. 2.	747	
4	Herod * shortly before the passover. In his sickness, he had named Joazar high priest. Jos. Antt. 17, 6, 4. Tumults among the Jews.	750	

B.C.	Events in Jewish History.	Y ^{r.} of Rome	Synchronisms. Roman Empire.
4	Herod's sons, after a revision of their father's will by Augustus, receive, Archelaus, as ethnarch, Judea, Samaria, and Idumea; Herod Antipas, as tetrarch, Galilee and Peraea; Philip, as tetrarch, Batanaea, Gaulonitis, Trachonitis (Auranitis). Eleazar, brother of Joazar, high priest; then Joshua, son of Sîd. Jos. Antt. 17, 13. 1.		Quintilius Varus president of Syria.
A.D.	Archelaus dethroned, and exiled to Gaul. Quirinius holds, in his province, a census; to Quir. was committed the province of Syria, and the administration put into the hands of procurators. The first procurator is Coponius.	754	
1		757	Augustus adopts Tiberius.
6		758	P. Sulpitius Quirinius proconsul in Syria.
		759	
	Insurrection, by Judas of Galilee. Joazar, son of Bothrus, high priest. Jos. Antt. 18, 2. 1.		
7	760—767, M. Ambivius is next procurator; then, An. Rufus. Ananus, son of Seth, high priest.	760	The legions of Varus are defeated in Germany, by Hermann the Cheruscan.
		762	
14	After Tiberius entered on the government, Valerius Gratus procurator.		
	Ismael, son of Phabi, high priest. Jos. Antt. 18, 2.	761	Augustus *, 19th of Aug., at Nola. Tiberius emperor.
15	Eleazar, son of Ananus, high priest one year, Jos. Antt. 18, 2. 2. The office is then filled, successively, by Simon, son of Camithus, and Joseph (Caiaphas), the last to the year 36, Jos. Antt. 18, 2. 2. 18, H. d.		
		772	Year of the death of Titus Livy.
28	John Baptist enters on his public ministry, immediately after Jesus.		
31?	Jesus is crucified. Philo in Egypt. Philip *. His possessions fall into the province of Syria.		
			Vitellius president of Syria.
36	Pontius Pilate deposed (before Easter), succeeded by Marcellus. Caiaphas, deposed, is succeeded by Jonathan, son of Ananus, Antt. 18, 4. 3. Stephen stoned?		
	Herod Antipas engages in war with Aretas, king of Arabia Pet.		
37	Theophilus, br of Jona., high priest, Jos. Antt. 18. 5. 3. Marullus, Rom. officer in Jud. Joseph., the historian, born at Jerus. Herod. Ag. I. retains the possessions of Philip, and the tetr. of Lyسانias as king.	790	Tiberius *, 16th of March. Caius Caligula emperor.

A.D.	Events in Jew. History.	Do. in Christian History.	Y'r. of Rome	Synchronisms. R. Emp.
	Herod Agrippa I. enters on his government. Herod Antipas banish'd to Gaul. Herod Agrippa receives his possessions.	38 ? Conversion of Paul to Christianity.	791	
			792	Vitellius leaves Syria. Petronius undertakes the government.
			793	Philo appears before the emperor as an ambassador of the Alex. Jews.
41	Herod Agrippa receives, in addition to his former possessions, Judea, Samaria, as well as Abilene, and thus becomes ruler of all Palestine.	First abode of Paul in Jerusalem.	794	Caligula murdered. Tib. Claudius becomes emperor (in Jan.). In Syria, Petronius is still governor.
42	Simon, son of Boethus, called Cantheras, becomes high pr., Jos. Antt. 19, 6, 2.		795	Marsus president of Syria. Mauritania a Roman province.
43	Matthias, son of Ananus, becomes high priest, Antt. 19, 6, 4, soon after (already, in 44 ?) Elionaeus, son of Cantheras, Antt. 19, 8, 1.		796	Successful progress of the Roman arms in Britain.
44	H. Agrippa I. *, after the passover. Cuspius Fadus, procurator, attacks the robber Thendas.	Paul with Barnabas in Antioch. James, the brother of John, beheaded, at the command of Agrippa. Peter cast into prison.		
45	Famine in Judea. Tiberius Alexander (after 45 ?) procurator of Judea.	45. Paul the second time in Jerusalem; goes soon from Antioch on his first missionary tour.		
48	H. Agrippa II. becomes (prince of Chalcis and) overseer over the temple at Jerusalem. Josephus, son of Cami or Camydus, becomes high priest. Antt. 20, 1, 3, soon after Ananias, son of Nebadaeus. Antt. 20, 5, 3. Cumanus, procurator of Judea.	51. Apostolic Council in Jerusalem. Paul, the third time, in that city. Immediately he goes on his second missionary tour. Timothy.	801	Cassius Longinus president of Syria. The Jews banished from Rome.
			804	Ummidius Quadratus president of Syria.
52	After the removal of Cumanus, Felix procurator.	52. Paul comes to Corinth, where he meets with Aquila and Priscilla.	805	

A.D.	Events in Jew. History.	Do. in Christian History.	Yr. of Rome	Synchronisms. R. Emp.
52	Herod Agrippa receives from Claudius (τῆς ἀρχῆς δωδέκατον ἔτος πεπληρωκώς, Ant. 20, 7.1.), instead of Chalcis, the former possessions of Philip, Trachonitis and Abilene, as king.	53. Paul in Corinth. The two Epistles to the Thessalonians.	806	
54	Herod receives from Nero, in addition to his territory, some cities of Galilee and Peraea.	54. Paul in Asia Minor and Jerusalem (the fourth time); then his third missionary tour. 55, 56. Paul in Ephesus. Epistle to the Galatians? 57. Paul hastens to Macedonia, and thence to Achaia. First and Second Epistles to Corinthians, and First to Timothy. 58. Paul in Corinth. Epistle to the Romans. Journeys at Pentecost to Jerusalem (fifth time); is imprisoned and led to Caesarea. 60. On his appeal to Caesar, Paul is sent to Rome, and arrives there. 61. Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon, and Philippians.	807	Claudius *. Nero, (Claud. Drusus) emperor, in Oct.
60	Felix is removed.		813	Domitius Corbulo president of Syria.
61	Festus procurator. Shortly before, Ismael, son of Phabi, becomes high priest, Antt. 20. 8. 8.			

ARTICLE IX.

REVIEW OF TYLER'S TACITUS.

By Charles Short, M. A., Roxbury, Mass.

The Histories of Caius Cornelius Tacitus: with Notes for Colleges, by W. S. Tyler, Professor of Languages in Amherst College. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1849. 12mo. pp. 453.

BORN in the reign of Nero and living till the death of the emperor Trajan, amid the corruptions which attended and hastened the fall of Rome, corruptions as gross as they were universal, and infecting alike literature and morals, Tacitus stood preëminent and almost alone in courage, integrity, and virtue. By his writings he won for himself a name among the Annalists of the *Eternal City*, worthy to be compared with those of Virgil and Horace, Rome's greatest poets of her proudest days. Educated partly at Massilia and partly at the capital, he adopted the profession of law and was elevated to civil dignity by Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian. In the reign of Nerva he was made *consul suffectus*, and on the occasion of the death of his predecessor in that office pronounced an oration, in allusion to which Pliny (Ep. 2, 1) says of Virginius Rufus: *laudatus est a consule Cornelio Tacito; nam hic supremus felicitati ejus cumulus accessit, laudator eloquentissimus.* Under the emperor Nerva, we find him engaged in conducting the prosecution of Marius, proconsul of Africa, in which he made a manly and able reply to his sagacious opponent, Salvius Liberalis. He was the chosen friend of the Younger Pliny, his associate at the bar and in his study, and the cherished companion of his lighter hours. We have the highest testimonial of his private excellence in the fact that he was deemed worthy to be the son-in-law of the great and good Agricola. His early studies at the Hellenic Massilia must have rendered him very familiar with the literature of the Greeks, and his mind naturally comprehensive, profound, and acute, would have inclined him to an acquaintance with their philosophy, a predilection fostered and strengthened, beyond doubt, by the study of the admired Seneca.

In the sixth year of the reign of Vespasian, when Tacitus had hardly attained the age of manhood, the dialogue entitled *De Oratoribus, sive De Causis corruptae Eloquentiae*, was written. If this treatise be rightly ascribed to Tacitus, which the learned now concede, it was his *earliest*

work, and this circumstance and the nature of the theme will account in a great measure for the peculiar style of this book, which is easy and diffuse when compared with that of his other writings. About the time of Trajan's accession to the throne, his two treatises, *De Situ, Moribus et Populis Germaniae* and *De Cn. Julii Agricolaë Vita*, were published.¹ The *Historiae*, his next production, was composed at some time after the death of Nerva, which happened A. D. 98. This work comprised the period of twenty-seven years, from the second consulship of Galba, A. D. 68, to the death of Domitian, A. D. 96. The task of recording the events of the reigns of Nerva and Trajan, he had reserved for a maturer age—*senectuti seposuit*—a work he did not live to accomplish. Of the *Historiae* there are extant only four books complete and the first part of the fifth. As these remains comprehend only the events of about one year, it is inferred that the entire work was very large. Express testimony in regard to the original number of its books is wholly wanting, if we except the allusion of Jerome, who (Comm. ad Zachar. 16.) says: *Cornelius Tacitus, qui post Augustum usque ad mortem Domitiani vitas Caesarum triginta voluminibus exaravit*. His last work, the *Annales*, treated of the time from the death of Augustus, A. D. 14, to the death of Nero, A. D. 68, a space of fifty-four years. It was divided into sixteen books, of which we now have the first four, a small portion of the fifth, the sixth, nearly all the eleventh, from the twelfth to the fifteenth inclusive, and the first part of the sixteenth. If in his words adduced above, Jerome referred to the *Historiae* and the *Annales*, as *one continuous work*, then the number of the books of the *Historiae* in its complete form, may be gathered from his statement.

We learn from internal evidence what were some of the sources, from which Tacitus derived the materials he employed in composing his historical works, with which this paper is more particularly concerned. In Ann. 15, 74, he refers to the *Acta Senatus*; in Ann. 4, 53, to the *Memoirs* of Agrippina; in Hist. 3, 28, and Ann. 1, 69, to the *History* of Caius Plinius; to that of Cornelius Sisenna in Hist. 3, 51; Fabius Rusticus, Ann. 13, 20, and in the same place to Cluvius Rufus. He must have obtained much information from the learned friends and admirers, who, as we are told by Pliny (Ep. 4, 13), were accustomed to visit him. The *Historiae*, it will be borne in mind, treated of his own times, and of a period in which he himself shared in the administration of civil affairs, and had favorable opportunities to become intimately acquainted with public life. The *Annales*, too, were

¹ For a notice of Prof. Tyler's edition of the *Germania* and *Agricola*, see a former number of this Journal, Vol. V. p. 180, Feb. 1848.

the records of what occurred during the half century immediately preceding his own age, and of which many eye-witnesses or persons more or less directly connected with them, were probably still living in the time of the Historian.

The character and ability of Tacitus were a surety that he would use his materials in an honest, impartial, and skilful manner. A moral dignity and rectitude, of an almost martial severity, have left an impress on his works as deep and enduring as that of his intellectual power. He had a love of truth and virtue equalled only by his hatred of what was false and vicious. To a singularly exact knowledge of the human mind and a profound insight into the motives of men, he added a disposition kind and considerate. His fixed aim was to register and explain human conduct just as he had learned and as he understood it, unbiassed by his relations to the actors or by their position, whether his own friend or foe, whether emperor or subject. If his regard for truth constrained him to censure the meanness, dissimulation, and cruelty of a Domitian, he also obeyed the prompting of gratitude to leave a record of the favors he had received at the hand of his imperial patron. If in his allusion to the Christians, he did not give them their true character, his well known candor and integrity forbid the belief that he was guilty of a wilful misrepresentation. His judgment of the Jews, it must be considered, was that of a Roman and a Pagan concerning a people deprived of the free sympathies and direct acquaintance of all other nations, by a civil and an ecclesiastical polity exclusive to the last degree. Of his practical wisdom, Tacitus has given us perhaps the strongest proof in his willingness to participate in the administration of the government at a time when it was so weak, unsteady, and corrupt; and in his efforts for the public good, when to be virtuous was to be singular, and to be truly patriotic had, in so many instances, been to incur opposition, insult, and death. But much as Tacitus loved his country, he would have loved her more, had she been purer and better. If he speaks of her vices with severity, we are yet sure that he would more gladly have spoken of her virtues. He who could gain the friendship and high admiration of Pliny and write a fitting memorial of the universally lamented Agricola, could hardly have failed to do justice to his country; and if Rome, great in her rise, still greater in her fall, was fortunate that she had a Livy to throw his magic charm about her earlier days, she was more fortunate to have such an Annalist to record the story of her crimes and her misery in her majestic decline.

In his life of the emperor Tacitus, Vopiscus one of the writers of the Augustan History, states that the emperor claimed a descent from the

historian, and ordered his works to be placed in the libraries, and ten copies to be made annually at the public expense and deposited in the archives (Tac. Imp. Vit. c. 10). From this precaution of his illustrious descendant, we may perhaps safely infer, that Tacitus was not a general favorite. Indeed, the philosophic element entered so largely into his writings—he being designated as *the father of philosophic history*—and his style, in which the Roman language seems condensed to its utmost, was so concise and elliptic, that his intelligent and discriminating readers must have been very few, and by other classes he would scarcely ever have been read. Added to this was the circumstance, that the enemies of freedom and virtue, whose hostility he had excited by his exposure and condemnation of wrong and oppression, would naturally have labored totally to suppress his works. How great a portion of his historical writings have been lost by accident or destroyed by infuriate hands, we have already stated. Yet it is well known, that of the immense work of Livy, originally consisting of 142 books, only 35 have come down to our times, notwithstanding the fascinations of his easy and graceful diction. Tacitus is seldom quoted by the historians who followed him, and never by Suetonius, Dion Cassius, or Plutarch; still his writings were a source from which others perhaps drew, and his name was an authority to which on occasion they would have appealed. Amid the subsequent fortunes of the city, for centuries, alas! too much like the gloomy changes of the historian's own age, he must have been read with earnest thought and deep feeling by the wise and good quite down to the period when Rome herself had forgotten her native accents.

In modern days, Tacitus has seldom been read except by mere scholars and students of philosophic history. The demand he makes on his readers is still too great to be often answered. He can be understood and enjoyed only through patient and profound study, and such study will make his harsh style seem easy, and his obscurities give place to thoughts great and beautiful as well as clear. Like other superior writers, he is difficult to be appreciated because he himself so fully comprehended his subject and treated it even in its deepest and most subtle relations. He has been studied but little by American and English scholars. In America the *Annales* have never been printed; only four separate works on this author have, to our knowledge, appeared in this country, and three of these have been published within the last two years. England has produced no valuable independent work on Tacitus. All the complete editions of his writings issued there, have been entirely or almost entirely the results of foreign scholarship. "The London Catalogue" for the period from

1814 to 1849, gives but *sixteen* distinct works on Tacitus, as published in the United Kingdom during that time ; elsewhere we are able to find the titles of but *seven* more works ; and when, some four years ago, an edition of the *Germania* and *Agricola* appeared with notes from *Ruperti*, *Passow*, and *Walch*, together with the first book of the *Annales*, it was stated in the preface, that the *Germania* and *Agricola* were the only parts of Tacitus which, up to that time, had been published in England with explanations in the vernacular tongue for the use of schools. Some idea of the amount of labor expended on this author by the Germans, may be formed from the fact that in Englemann's Catalogue of the Ancient Classics and works connected with them, brought down to the year 1847, the mere titles of the books on Tacitus fill *eleven octavo pages*. Since that time, an edition by Orelli, in two vols. imp. 8vo. has appeared from the press at Zurich, and the great work of Prof. Ritter of Bonn, has been published simultaneously in England and Germany.

Of the German editions, scholars have been best satisfied with those of an earlier date, and Lipsius still remains a favorite authority. The edition by Imm. Bekker, in two vols. 8vo. Leipzig, 1831, contains the valuable labors of Lipsius, Gronovius, Ernesti, and Wolf, and is furnished with good indexes. *Ruperti's Index Verborum* and *Index Latinistis* afford good aid in the study of Tacitus, and are perhaps the least exceptionable portion of his voluminous and ill digested work. The best and most recent edition is that by Prof. Ritter, which we have mentioned above. It is in four vols. 8vo. and being intended for purposes of exact study, is accompanied with ample *prolegomena*, various readings, notes critical and explanatory, and two useful indexes, one of proper names and the other grammatical. During the last year, also, the second and last volume of the edition by the lamented Orelli came forth, the text of which was based on a revision of the Florentine MSS. by his friend and associate, Prof. Baiter. This work appears in a form of singular beauty ; and in addition to the views of the learned editor it is enriched with notes from the most judicious commentators, including as well the earlier as the later. It is the text of this edition, which Prof. Tyler has, for the most part, followed in his work on the *Historiae* before us, and which we now proceed to examine.

Prefixed to the work is an "Essay on the Style of Tacitus," of which it is said in a marginal note : *abridged from the Prolegomena of L. Doederlein to his edition of Tacitus, tom. II. Halle, 1847, and translated from the Latin by Mr. Marshall Henshaw, A. M. Tutor in Amherst College.* The first two chapters of the original, which con-

stitute the introduction, are given in full. The translation of this Essay is very unequally done, some portions of it adhering so close to the Latin, that they can scarcely be understood without consulting the original, while other parts are faithfully rendered into easy and idiomatic English. There are also several errors relating to single words.

At the close of the first chap. in *breve illud dicendi genus, quod ut proprium ac peculiare huic scriptori admiramur*, where *proprium* and *peculiare* must be nearly synonymous, these epithets are rendered "appropriate and peculiar," and thus the first word is deprived of a pertinent meaning.

In c. 2d, p. 9th, *sermo—quasi natus erat, was naturally adapted*, is translated: "was made, and, as it were, born;" and just below, the fine thought of Doederlein in *brevitatis quasi imperatoriae*, is missed in the words: "of — brevity and, as it were, of authority." Near the end of the same page, we have: "nor while I am pursuing this subject, do I entertain any fear of seeming to depreciate the ability of Tacitus, as if it were the mark of a weak and narrow mind in so earnest a narration of the most important events, to choose his words with a sort of scholarlike care and anxiety." The Latin is fuller and very intelligible, and adds a thought not given in the translation: *Quae dum persequor, non vereor ne sinistre cuiquam judicare videar de Taciti ingenio, tanquam angusti et pusilli animi fuerit, si eum inter tam intentam maximarum rerum commemorationem scholastica quadam cura et sollicitudine verba elegeris arguam, ut scilicet quam brevissima haberetur oratio.* Unless the translator intended to render this passage with great freedom, he must have misapprehended the connection of the words *tanquam—fuerit*. On p. 10, near the beginning of the second paragraph, *praeter longitudinem, sc. substantivorum in tio exeuntium, etiam jejuni aliquid et aridi habent*, is translated: "besides their length, they often seem meager and jejune." In c. 5. p. 11, we read: "It," i. e. the dignity of the Latin language, "is increased when nouns follow nouns or verbs directly, so that the idea seems to be evident from the simple force of the words." The original of the last clause is: *ut meris ponderibus constare videatur sententia*; and concise as this is, it relieves the obscurity of the English. At the end of the 13 c. of the translation, p. 19, "and so to Rome," is, in the Latin, *vel adeo Romam*. The next chapter begins: "Since now such a studied brevity seems to involve an excess of freedom, and to favor an abundance of materials, rather than to subserve the beauties of style." The precise import of this, the reader could hardly ascertain without referring to the original: *Tale igitur brevitatis studium cum soluti aliquid nonnunquam habere et rerum copiae potius quam orationis decori inservire videatur.*—

Here *soluti aliquid* should have been rendered by, *a violation of common usages, a departure from the ordinary style*, or by something equivalent; and *inservire* in connection with *rerum copiae*, should have been translated, *is adapted to, is suitable for*. On the same page below, in the words, "in his boldness approaching nearer to the austerity of philosophers than to the ornament of poets," the term "ornament," *decori*, being contrasted with "austerity," should have been *grace*. Near the end of c. 16, Doederlein is made to say of Tacitus: "Rejecting *asylum*, he says *subsidium*," and then a few lines further: "he admits some such words as *tropaea, asylum*, etc." In the Latin, however, there is no such contradiction; the first words there being: *In the Annales 3, 36, he says subsidium, avoiding asylum*; the author here referring to a particular instance. At the beginning of the 17 c., we find: "He hesitated not to revive ancient words and forms of words—believing that there is more brilliancy in that which savors of antiquity." This last clause, in the original, is: *ipsi antiquitatis saporis plurimum splendoris inesse ratus*, where the rhetorical term *splendoris* should have been rendered by some word suiting the context: *thinking that in the very savor of antiquity there was the greatest excellence*. The meaning of the words, "the brilliancy in that which savors of antiquity," is not obvious.

This treatise by Doederlein on the style of Tacitus, though brief, is very valuable. Prof. Tyler has shown his estimation of it by his frequent references to it in his commentary, references which are commonly very apposite and highly explanatory of the peculiarities of the historian. A study of the essay, in its original and unabridged form, gives a more favorable and just idea of its merits. The questions which naturally arise in an inquiry into the style of Tacitus, as indeed of any writer, admit, in many cases of answers at once various and just. These are here treated in a laborious and ingenious manner, and for the most part very satisfactorily. The two passages on p. 16, quoted by Doederlein as marked instances of the figure *zeugma*, will bear, as the reader will see, a close version involving but little harshness. The citations are: *ἔλεν δ' Οἰναμάου βίαν παρθένον τε σύνεπον*, from Pindar, and: *Εὐρυτόν θ' ἔλοι Τήν θ' ὑπίπυργον Οἰχαλίαν*, from Soph. Trach. 353 et seq. At the end of the same page, Doederlein says: "Frequently also adverbs or ablatives, datives or accusatives used like adverbs, bear some attributive either adjective or participle, as it were, concealed in them. This is evidently contrary to Cicero's custom, who preferred to call his work *libri de officiis scripti*, rather than to omit the participle." What Cicero's prevailing usage in this particular may be, we have not ascertained; but turning to

his works on reading this statement of Doederlein, we soon found the three following passages, in which Cicero omits the participle in such a connection : *Hunc librum de senectute ad te misimus*, Cat. Maj. 1; *Hortor, mi Cicero, ut — hos etiam de philosophia libros — legas*, de Off. 1, 3; *libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti*, de Fin. 1, 3. The essay will seem most deficient in the account of Tacitus's use of Greek constructions, though the translation before us has in the chapter treating of these, c. 18 (c. 19 of the original), only one omission, which consists of two references to the *Annales*. Such *Grecisms* as, *ceteris remanere volentibus fuit*, Hist. 3, 43, and the similar construction in Agric. 18, which Prof. Tyler has well explained; and the use of the adverb instead of an adjective, as in Hist. 1, 65 *multae invicem clades*, and 5, 4, *longam olim famem*, ought to have been mentioned by Doederlein. On p. 17, c. 11 (c. 12 in the Latin) he refers to the absolute use of *navare* for *operam navare*, in Hist. 5, 25, *Si Vespasiano bellum navaverint*, as if it were peculiar to Tacitus. But even Cicero thus uses this word, as in Ep. ad Att. 15, 4, *Quam vellem, Bruto studium navare potuisses!* and in Ep. ad Diversos 3, 10, 2, *ut — nostram in te benevolentiam navare possimus*.

The parts omitted in this abridgment would all be very useful and suggestive to the diligent student. They consist chiefly of references to the works of Tacitus, especially the *Annales*, and make us acquainted with the author's method of deciding between different readings by an appeal to the usages of Tacitus. The 9th c. of the Latin, on the use of the figure *apostopesis*, is wholly left out in the English. We regret that this essay was not given entire, and as it would hardly be consulted except for critical purposes, those inclined to study it, would prefer to read it in the language in which the author himself wrote it. But if the version here made shall induce any one to become acquainted with the original, who might otherwise have remained ignorant of it, or have been repulsed by its scholastic garb, the translator will have rendered exact study a good service by this effort.

The *Chronologia Historiarum*, by Zumpt, is copied from the edition of Orelli, and this is followed by the *text*, which occupies two hundred pages. The *Remarks Preliminary* to the notes consist of fifteen closely printed pages, which we are sure no fit reader will pronounce too long. Being composed with care, they contain valuable information, and admirably answer the purpose for which they were written, which was, as the editor informs us in the Preface, *to introduce the student into a familiar acquaintance and lively sympathy with the author and his times, and with that great empire, of whose degeneracy and decline in its beginnings he has bequeathed to us so profound and instruc-*

tive a history. The *Remarks* form an appropriate and able introduction to the historical writings of Tacitus, to the *Historiae* in particular, and merited, we think, a more conspicuous place in the volume. The *commentary*, which succeeds, is comprised in 192 pages. We here add some observations on such portions of it as we marked in our reading.

Book I, c. 1, p. 246. "*Consules* means *colleagues* (those who go together, *con* and *sul*, root of *salio*), or joint presidents of the Roman republic." So Forcellini. The same origin of the word *consul* is given in Dr. Smith's *Antiquities*, and the words *exul* and *praesul* are there adduced as formed analogically from the same root. But *exul*, *exsul*, may well be referred to *solum*, as the editor himself has done on 5, 24, p. 436. *Salio* means not *to go*, but *to spring, to leap*, like its etymon in Greek, Ἀΐσι, ἄλλομαι. *Praesul*, in early use, denoted the chief of the *Salii*; and as it was his business to lead them in the dance, the term is correctly traced to *salio, salto*. The word *consul*, according to the ancient etymologists, came from *consulo*. Varro quotes: *Qui recte consulat, consul cluat*; and in Cic. de Orat. 2, 39, we find: *Sin ex vocabulo, ut Carbo; si consul est, qui consulit patriae, quid aliud fecit Opimius?* It is manifestly allied to *consulo, consilium, consus*. With *consul, consulo*, compare προβουλος, προβουλευω. — "*Post conditam urbem.* Observe the concrete form of expression. The Latin language is very deficient in such abstract words as *foundation, constitution*, etc. The people were marked for *action*, and their language deals in *facts*." This needs some qualification. Speculative inquiries and the study of Greek philosophy gradually introduced into the Latin many abstract terms. Up to the time of Cicero, philosophy had been little studied by his countrymen, but his writings in this department gave a new character to the language in this respect; and as the Romans became more literary and studious, those additions were made to the stock of abstract words, which were naturally demanded to express the new ideas, whether original or derived from the Greeks. In the age of our author, a strong tendency to form and use abstract terms was even a characteristic of the language. Many of these new words of the post-Augustan times, and forms first used by Tacitus, the editor himself has pointed out in the succeeding pages; as, *superventus* 2, 54; *diffugium* 1, 39; *diversitas* 1, 62; *relatus* 1, 30. His use of the abstract noun instead of the concrete is sometimes very remarkable, as *expectatio* 1, 17; and *consilium* 1, 87. In frequent instances both in the present work and in his other writings, he employs the neuter singular of the adjective limited by a noun in the genitive, instead of directly qualifying the noun by the adjective

in concord with it, according to the earlier usage; as, *obscurum noctis* 2, 14; *humido paludum* Ann. 1, 61; the adjective being thus nearly equivalent to an abstract noun. He sometimes prefers, however, the concrete form to the abstract; as, *clarus egerat* 3, 44; *citus aderat* 2, 40. This happens chiefly in his descriptive passages where he aims to be graphic, and it is one of his many imitations of poetic style. It was indeed true of the *early* language of the Romans, that it was deficient in abstract words, as from the very laws that govern the development of mind, it must have been; but their common use of certain abstract terms instead of the concrete is worthy of notice; as, *exercitus*, *fructus*, *copiae*, *sectio*.

Ch. 9, p. 256. "*Quieto milite* = quum quieti erant milites," for = quum quieti *essent* milites.

Ch. 10, p. 257. "*Prope ab*. A peculiar Latin idiom. Cf. *protinus ab*, G. 43, note." Consulting this reference to the *Germania*, we find: "*Protinus deinde ab*, next in order, reaching to the ocean. We should expect *ad*." This reference does not seem parallel to the case in question, *Protinus* here not modifying *ab*. If, however, it be taken in immediate connection with *ab*, the phrase,—*directly on from*,—is not opposed to our idiom, by itself, but only as introduced by *deinde*. Thus construed, *next directly on from the ocean*, like *prope ab*, near from, it will be at variance with our idiom; and this mode of expression arises from the fact, that the Romans here viewed the object following the preposition as *the starting point*, while we contemplate it as *the end*; such differences of conception are very common in different languages, and however diverse they are, they yet may all be natural. The last words of the editor in our quotation above, seem to overlook this fact.

Ch. 15, p. 262. "*In domo*, sc. *sua*, which is omitted to make *in domo* correspond with *in republica*." Were *in domo* not followed by *in republica*, *sua* could not agreeably to usage be expressed with it in the ablative. When *the place where* is to be designated, and is to have the possessive adjective joined to it, *domi* is used rather than *in domo*. Zumpt, Lat. Gram. § 400.

Ch. 17, p. 264. "*Publica expectatio*. Abs. for conc. = *populus impatienter expectans*." This is an Anglicism. *Avidissime* expectans would have been good Latin. Cic. 14 Phil. c. 1.

Ch. 23, p. 270. "*Agnoscere* refers to persons and things previously known, *cognoscere* to those not previously known." Cicero uses *cognoscere* of things previously known; as, Or. in Cat. 3, 5, *Tum ostendi tabellas Lentulo; et quæsiui cognosceretne signum, Annuït*. So Plautus, *Video et cognosco signum*. Pseud. 4, 2, 45; and Livy,

Praeda omnis—militi concessa est: et pecus exceptum est, quod intra dies triginta domini cognovissent, 24, 16. In *Aen.* 6. 340, 452, Virgil uses, in the first passage *cognoscere*, and in the second *agnoscere*, of what was previously known, thus employing these words without distinction. "*Eniterentur*. It is subjunctive because *cum* = *since*, denoting a causal connection." If *cum* did not here mean *since*, it would still, according to usage require the *subjunctive* after it. When *cum* is used with this mode, sometimes the idea of *cause* predominates, sometimes that of *time*. In this case it is the former.

Ch. 26, p. 272. "*Postero iduum dierum*. The day after the *Ides* days. The expression is unusual. It seems to be like the Greek *ὑστέρᾳ εἰδῶν*." *Ernesti* says he knows of *no other* instance of this form of expression in a notation of time. He adds that it may have been formed after the analogy of the Greek, which would be *ὑστέρᾳ εἰδῶν*, but he does not cite those words as actually occurring. — "*Ut quisque—oblatus esset*. *Ut* gives an indefinite sense to *quisque*, and is accordingly followed by the subjunctive." *Ut* is here a relative adverb and as such governs nothing, but is joined with the indicative or subjunctive as the nature of the sentence requires. Cf. Zumpt § 531, note, and § 710. Below, in ch. 29, we have the indicative after *ut quisque*: *ut quisque obvius fuerat*; and also in 4, 59, *ut quisque flagitium navaverat*. In the first case, the writer wishes to express the thought as *contingent*, and therefore uses the *subjunctive*; in the two others, which we have just cited, he wishes to state facts, and so employs the indicative, using *ut*, however, with *quisque* alike in both connections. It is the nature of the idea as *contingent* or *absolute*, which determines the mode of the verb. The strict meaning of *ut* here, is *as, according as*; the correlative *ita* being omitted. *Ut quisque* followed by an adjective or an adverb in the superlative degree, with *ita* expressed in the corresponding clause, is very common. Zumpt § 710.

Ch. 29, p. 275. "*Pro gradibus*. From the steps. Cf. Z. 311." Zumpt, in the section here referred to, says: "*pro* also signifies at the extreme point of a thing, so that the person spoken of is *in* or *upon* the thing." Hence in this and the kindred passages, *pro* is more exactly given by *on*.

Ch. 33, p. 279. "*Cunctatione* = *hesitation*, literally *waiting to collect everything* (from *cunctus*). The verbal *cunctatio* is derived directly from *cunctor*, which Doederlein refers to *conor*. According to this view, *cunctor* properly denotes *to be trying to do something*, and, by implication, *not to do it*. Cf. ὁ μέλλων, a loiterer, from μέλλω, *to be going to do something*. *Cunctus* is best regarded as an abbreviated form of *conjunctus*: compare with *cunctus* its synonym *uni-*

versus, the *strict* import of these two words being very nearly the same.

Ch. 39, p. 284. "*Plerique*, *many*; a sense peculiar, though not confined to Tacitus. Cf. Agric. 1, note." Consulting Prof. Tyler's edition of the *Agricola*, as here referred to, we find: "*Plerique*, not *most persons*, but *many, some*: 'a sense peculiar to Tacitus,' says Dronke. But it is found, though less frequently, in earlier writers: cf. Facciolati and Forcellini." On 2, 73, p. 345, the editor also gives: "*Plerumque* = *sometimes*." This weak sense of *plerique* and its adverbial form *plerumque*, *some, sometimes*, a sense opposed alike to its etymology and the common use of the word, must not be assigned to it without necessity. The adjective *plerique*, is not given at all by Forcellini with the import *some*; and in but a single passage from an author *earlier than Tacitus*, with the signification of *many*; namely, Nepos, Timoth. 4: *Timothei moderatae sapientisque vitae cum plerique possimus proferre testimonia, uno erimus contenti*. The word in this passage not only bears the meaning *many*, but as it is evidently contrasted with *uno* in the last clause, the rendering *very many* suits the context still better. Instead of *plerique*, Weise here reads *plura*. We know of no passage in Tacitus which plainly requires this weak meaning to be given to *plerique*. In regard to such examples as 1, 86, *Rapti e publico plerique, plures in tabernis et cubilibus intercepti*; and 4, 84, *plerique Jovem, plurimi Ditem patrem—conjectant*, we may say, that if in the former we render *plures, more*, and in the latter *plurimi, most*; thus giving them their usual signification, even then *plerique* may have in both cases its common meaning of *very many*. So too of the adverb *plerumque*; the weakest sense in which it is cited by Forcellini is that of *often*, except in two instances; one from Quintilian, which critics now explain by *persaepe*; and the other from Paul. et Ulpian. Dig., which Freund renders *often*, the same meaning which he gives to this adverb in several passages from Tacitus, and which, he says, is a later use of the word. Where *plerumque* is employed alone, we must insist on its ordinary force; and the cases adduced by grammarians, where it is used with other adverbs, all show that it uniformly retains in a greater or less degree its intensive meaning; in Livy 40, 46, it stands opposed to *interdum*; and in Cicero, Orat. 51, 170, even to *saepe*.

Ch. 44, p. 237. "*Mens* (from Gr. *μένος*) is properly *the intellect*; *animus* (from Gr. *ἄνεμος*) *the spirit, the feelings*." This is indeed the meaning of these terms respectively in Latin, but their import they have acquired from Roman usage, not from their sources in Greek; the word *μένος* never strictly designating *the intellect*, and *ἄνεμος* signifying only *wind, a storm*.

Ch. 53, p. 295. "*Inter [paganos] corruptior*, sc. quam in castris. Our word *pagan* comes from *paganus*. The earliest Christian churches were in the cities, while yet *the inhabitants of the country villages* were unconverted. Compare *heathen* from *heath*." This statement in regard to the ecclesiastical use of the word *paganus*, *pagan*, is not sufficiently full and exact. When the control of the empire passed into the hands of Constantius after Constans's death, A. D. 350, all sacrifices to the heathen gods were first prohibited on pain of death. In Rome and Alexandria, this law could not be fully carried out; but everywhere else, from this period, heathen worship was obliged to conceal itself in the country, in remote corners; and hence the terms *pagani*, *paganismus*. The expression, in its new and religious sense, is first found in a law of Valentinian, A. D. 368: Codex of Theodosian, l. 16, tit. 2. Gieseler, Eccl. Hist. Vol. I, p. 307 et seq. Edinb. ed. In respect to the word *heathen*, Germ. *heiden*, if it be derived from *heath*, Germ. *heide*, then, following the analogy of *paganus*, it must be assumed that *heide*, *heidenen*, meant the country as opposed to the city. This explanation, offered by Voss, is ingenious, but without foundation. The word is, beyond question, of Southern origin, and directly from *ethnici* of the Vulgate, Greek *ἔθνικοί*, which is from *ἔθνη*, the designation of the heathen in the LXX. from the Hebrew *גוֹיִם*, *nations*. Compare with this the ecclesiastical use of *gentiles* from *gens*. The correspondence between the Germ. *heiden*, *heathen*, and *heide*, *heath*, is probably accidental, as many of the coincidences of form in language are acknowledged to be.

Ch. 63, p. 299. "*Temperavere—refrained*. The radical idea of the word is that of *separation* (*tempus*, *τίμνω*). Whatever be the primary meaning of *tempus*, the various significations of its derivative *tempero*, can best be drawn from the import of *tempus* as fixed by usage. Thus *tempero* would strictly mean to *regulate as to time*.

Ch. 68, p. 302. "*Urbs* is properly *the capital*; *civitas* the whole body of *citizens*." More definitely, *urbs* denotes *the place*, of which *civitas* designates *the citizens*, as a civic body. Cf. Cic. Sest. 42, 91, *conventicula hominum, quae postea civitates nominatae sunt; domicilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicimus*. Freund. So too in Greek, *ἄστυ*, a city in a local sense; *πόλις*, in political relations.

Ch. 72, p. 304. "The word *forum* is allied to *foras*, and signifies properly *an open place*." *Forum* may be traced to *fero*, thus strictly meaning *a place* where things are *borne, carried*; hence *a market*, and, by usage, *a place for the transaction of public business in general*. Cf. the Gr. *ἀγορά*, which is from *ἀγείρω*, *ἄγω*.

Ch. 76, p. 306. "*Primus—addidit*. *First gave*. The Latins use the

adjective where we use the adverb of time." This use of adjectives denoting *order* as well as those of *time*, is idiomatic in Latin; and some of the adverbial relations of *place* also are expressed by adjectives. Cf. Zumpt § 685, 686 — "*Auditus* is a post-Augustan substantive." This word may be found in Cic. De Nat. Deor. 2, 57, and in Auct. ad Herenn. 2, 5.

Ch. 81, p. 310. "*Celebre*. Properly crowded (from *cello*, κέλλω [κέλλω];" and on 2, 28, p. 328, the editor gives: "Columen. Our word *column*, a pillar. From *cello*, to drive." Our word *column*, we have directly from *columna*, not from *columen*. *Columen*, *culmen*, and *columna*, are allied forms from *cello*, which appears not as a simple word, but only in compounds, as *ex-cello prae-cello*, and from which come also *celer*, *celsus*, *collis* (Gr. κολώνη). All these words are from κέλλω, with the radical idea of *to move*, and the special sense of *to raise*. Thus *celeber* will strictly mean *moved upwards*; then tropically, *eminent*, *distinguished*.

Ch. 82, p. 311. "*Invidia*, primarily, the *averted* look of hatred and envy (*in* negative, and *video*)." *In* negative, is not often prefixed to *verbs*, but to adjectives and participles used as adjectives, as *injustus*, *infinitus*; to words formed from such adjectives and participles, as *injustitia*, *infinitis*; and to adjectives formed from substantives, as *informis*. Cf. Zumpt § 328 and Schmitz's Lat. Gram. § 226. Both Zumpt and Schmitz seem to pass over the use of this prefix with *nouns*, as in the common word *injussu*, and in *inapparatio*, which is found in Auct. ad Herenn. 2, 4, 7, though *inapparatus* does not occur. On the origin of *invidia*, we have in Cic. Tusc. Quaest. 3, 9: *nomen invidiae*; *quod verbum ductum est a nimis intuenso fortunam alterius*. In accordance with this, Freund interprets the word *invideo* thus: I. *to look at* something; II. *to look at* something *with envy*. So too εἰσορῶ signifies *to look at longingly*, in Soph. Antig. 29 et seq., ed. Dindorf:

ἐὼν δ' ἄκλαυτον, ἄταφον, οἰωνοῖς γλυκὺν
θησαυρὸν εἰσορῶσι πρὸς χάριν βοῶν,

Ch. 87, p. 314. "*Habitos in custodiam*. Observe the accusative after *habitos in*. — *Habeo* (from ἄνω [ἈΨΩ], ἄπτω) strictly implies *motion*, and hence may be followed by *in* with the accusative." This mode of accounting for this construction is too subtle. We find *in* with the *accusative* after even the verbs *esse* and *manere* in good writers. As these verbs in usage imply no motion, we must explain the regimen on some general principle. Boetticher, according to Prof. Tyler, makes *Habitos in custodiam* by *zeugma* equivalent to *in custodiam da-*

tos et in ea habitos. Freund, in the same way, explains the regimen of *habere* in this and in kindred passages. This use of *in*, however, is limited in Latin. Cf. Zumpt § 316. In Hellenistic and Classic Greek, *ἐν* and *εἰς* often interchange by *zeugma*.

Ch. 89, p. 315. "*Haud* is the Greek *οὐδ'* [*οὐδ'*]. The ancient grammarians maintained that this particle was derived from the Gr. *οὐ*; and the final *d* led some to refer it to the apostrophized form of the double negative, *οὐδέ*. But after stating the objections to such an origin of this difficult word, the philologist Hand remarks: "Si quae [qua] etymologica vestigia hic remanent cognata esse videntur α negativum et *haud*."

Bk. 2, ch. 1, p. 317. "Corinthi—[Achaiae] urbe. [*At Corinth*]. This use of the genitive is explained by some as an old form of the ablative (Corinthoi, Gr. *Κορίνθοι* = *Κορίνθῳ*); by others as an ellipsis of *urbe, loco*, or some other ablative, which, like the dative in Greek, is the proper *where-case*. Zumpt § 393." There was no old form of the ablative ending in *oi*. But the dative of the second declension still retains an *i* in some words, as *alter, alteri, nullus, nulli*, etc., while the common ending of this case is *o*. Thus both these forms have their prototype in Greek, the first in the early dative, as *οἷξ οἱ*; and the second in the later and usual form, *οἷξ φ*. The form of the second declension in Latin, called *the genitive denoting the place where*, may well be referred to the first *οἷξ οἱ*, and the ordinary termination of the dative of this declension, *o*, is from the last *οἷξ φ*, in which, as the orthography should seem to indicate, the *i* had ceased to be sounded, or at most was faintly uttered. It is mentioned in Zumpt l. c., that once Grammarians regarding the form ending in *i* as really *the genitive*, accounted for it by the ellipsis of *in loco*. Zumpt says nothing of an ellipsis of *urbe* in this connection, and such an ellipsis would be contrary to the usage of the Latin. Cf. Zumpt § 399. We here avail ourselves of the occasion to remark, that in the section, to which we have just referred, there is a contradiction in Dr. Schnitz's translation of Zumpt. The "invariable" apposition of the names of places with *urbs, oppidum, locus*, etc., when the latter with the preposition precede the former, is stated to have some "exceptions."

Ch. 8, p. 320. "*Super*, when followed by the ablative, always means *concerning*." *Huic navi alteram conjuuxit, super qua turrim effectam* ad introitum portus opposuit, Caes. B. C. 3. 39. *Ensis cui super cervice pendet*, Hor. Od. 3, 1, 17. *Requiescere fronde super viridi*, Virg. Ecl. 1, 80. Cf. Freund. The note by the editor, given above, is followed by a reference to Zumpt, where we find: "*Super* has, in prose, the ablative only, when used in the sense of *de, concerning, or in respect to*." Gram. § 320.

Ch. 13, p. 322. "*Cum*. Causale = *since*, hence followed by the subjunctive." We quote the whole passage from the text: *Auxit invidiam praeclaro exemplo femina Ligus, quae filio abdito, cum simul pecuniam occultari milites credidissent, eoque per cruciatus interrogarent, ubi filiam occuleret, utrum ostendens latere respondit.* If *cum* be *causale* here, it must introduce a reason either for *auxit invidiam* or for *interrogarent*. It cannot do the former, for that is done by the clause *quae—respondit*, of which *cum—occuleret* is a subordinate part; if it assigns the cause of *interrogarent*, then this relation is expressed both by *cum* and by *eo*, the use of the connective *que* becomes absurd, and the mode of *interrogarent* cannot be accounted for. *Cum*, therefore, must here be *temporale*. Both verbs, *credidissent* and *interrogarent*, are in the subjunctive under its regimen, and its office as a relative word here is to connect *credidissent, eoque—interrogarent* with *respondit*.

Ch. 55, p. 333. "*Cessisse*. Cedo is followed by the dative of the person and accusative or ablative of the thing. Cf. Zumpt § 413. Tacitus uses it here and in some other places without either, *vita* being understood." The absolute use of *cedo* occurs elsewhere in Tacitus, as well as in the best writers, in the sense *to yield*; but in no other instance in Tacitus, that we know, with the ellipsis of *vita*. Even in the present passage, manuscripts are found which read *cessisse vita*, and thus Forcellini and Freund quote this place. Tacitus uses *concedo* with an ellipsis of *vita* in Ann. 4, 38 and 13, 30. — Ch. 56. "*Obnoxiiis—ausis*. The generals being liable to be called to an account for their own crimes (ob—noxam), and therefore not daring to forbid the crimes of others." This should be: *The generals being liable to be punished* (strictly, exposed to harm, from *ob* i. e., ἐπί, and *noxa*) sc. for their own crimes, and therefore, etc. In the editor's translation, the meaning of *obnoxiiis* is exhausted by the words "liable to be called to an account," and what he gives as the translation of this adjective is, in fact, implied, not expressed.

Ch. 58, p. 339. "*Utramque Mauretaniam*. *Uterque* is plural in its meaning, but seldom used in a plural form. Cf. Zumpt § 141, n. 2." This note does not accord with Zumpt as here referred to. The plural of *uterque* is necessarily employed in certain circumstances. Cf. l. c.

Ch. 64, p. 341. "*Onerabat*. Rendered more odious; akin to our word *aggravate*." The precise import of this last remark is not obvious. The roots of *onerare* and the English to *aggravate* are allied in sense; and there is a use of the word *aggravate*, chiefly in colloquial language among us, with the meaning of *to annoy*; but this use, we believe, is hardly sanctioned by good authority, though it is given in American Dictionaries.

Ch. 87, p. 350. "*Calones* were, properly, wood-carriers (from *cala*, old Latin for *fustis*)."
Cala is the Greek *κᾶλα*; strictly, *fire-wood*.

Ch. 99, p. 354. "*Expediri*. Alii, *expedire*. But without MS. authority. Cf. Ann. 15, 10, *expediri—jussit*; also Virg. Aen. *flammam inter et hostes expedior*." In the text the active form *expedire* stands, and in the note on 1, 10, p. 257, the active is given in a quotation of this passage. With regard to the voice of this verb, we find the Active in 1, 10, *quotiens expedierat, magnae virtutes*, on which Freund says: absolute for *expedire se*, to prepare one's self for battle. We find the Active used absolutely also in 1, 88, *multos—Otho—secum expedire jubet*. In the passage in the *Annales* 15, 10, the connection requires the verb to be rendered as *the passive*, and the words cited from Virgil (Aen. 2, 632 et seq.) being preceded by *ducente deo*, *expedior* may well be regarded there also as a real *passive*.

Bk. 3, ch. 1, p. 355. "*Advenisse [mox cum] Vitellio*. Had just arrived on the side of Vitellius, not with him, for he was at Rome. Cf. ch. 36, below. But it is an unusual sense for *cum*; and *mox* in the sense of *just now*, *a little before*, is, so far as I know, without a precedent in Tacitus or any other writer before Columella." The sense here given to *mox* is at variance with the use and etymology of the word (on its origin, cf. Hand, sub voce). The passage from Columella, where this particle is said to occur in the sense of *just now*, is given by Forcellini as follows: *de altero, quod mox proposueram nihil dubito, quin* etc. 3, 20, 24. Forcellini states that Statius also uses this word in the same manner, Theb. in fine:

*Mox tibi, si quis adhuc praetendit nubila livor,
Occidit.*

One more place has been adduced, in which this meaning has been assigned to *mox*; it is: *mox dicta finierat, multitudo omnis—consensit*, Ammian. Marcell. 14, 10, 16. In the passage from Columella, we see no objection to considering this word as an adverb of order, and we would render it, *next, in the next place*. In a similar sense Tacitus uses it in 4, 3, and 3, 72; and in the *Annales* 11, 22, we find: *primum—deinde—mox—post*. So Livy 40, 48, 6. The form *occidit*, in the quotation from Statius, is regarded as corrupt. Its import in the words from Ammian. Marcellus above, it is difficult to settle. Ernesti's explanation is, perhaps, the most natural. He understands it, in the sense of *vixdum*, and accordingly it is nearly equivalent to the formulas *mox quum*, *mox ubi*, as soon as. Cf. Livy 38, 41: *eundem mox, quum jam—manum cum hoste conseruisset, terrorem ab tergo prae-buisse*; and Plaut. Casin. 2, 2, 39: *mox magis quum otium mihi et tibi erit, igitur tecum loquar*.

In the passage before us, *advenisse mox cum Vitellio*, we would make *mox* an adjunct of *cum Vitellio*, and thus both *mox* and *cum* may here retain their usual meaning. Translate, *Had come soon to be with Vitellius*. For this ellipsis of *futura*, compare Virgil, Aen. 5, 116 et seq. :

Velocem Mnestheus agit acri remige Pristim,
Mox Italus Mnestheus, genus a quo nomine Memmi.

In Georg. 1, 24, Virgil uses the word with the future participle expressed :

Taque adeo, quem mox quae sint habitura deorum
Concilia incertum est.

The conciseness of the expression is in the manner of Tacitus, and, as we have shown, agreeable to the usage of Virgil. Doederlein and Bekker offer nothing on this passage; and Ruperti, considering it as corrupt, suggested, as Prof. Tyler states, a change in the text.

Ch. 8, p. 358. "*Claustra annonae*. Egypt was the Roman granary for corn." A reference to ch. 48 should have been given here, which is moreover a qualification of the above statement. Cf. Cic. Pro Lege Manil. c. 12 : *Siciliam—Africam—Sardiniam—haec tria frumentaria subsidia reipublicae*.

Ch. 23, p. 363. "*Magnitudine eximia*. Ablative of quality. The ablative (not the genitive) is always used to denote an *accidental* quality. Cf. Zumpt § 471, note. The genitive expresses only the inherent." The ablative is never used to denote the accidental qualities which relate to time and measure, but may be used to denote other qualities, whether inherent or accidental; the genitive is always used to express the accidental qualities of time and measure; but, with this exception, it is commonly used of inherent qualities. Cf. Zumpt, as above, and Krebs, Latin Comp. §§ 141, 193.

Ch. 24, p. 364. "*Cur*. Interrogative particle = *cui rei*. Zumpt § 276." In the section to which reference is here made, Zumpt says : "*cur*, probably formed from *quare* or *cui rei*," giving *quare* the precedence. It would have been more consistent in the editor to have followed Zumpt in this, since on p. 293 he himself refers *cura* to *quaero*, and by the analogy *cur* should be referred to *quare*.

Ch. 28, p. 366. "*Degenerare* non solum a bono, sed et a vitiis Latini dicunt, ut Cic. Verr. 3, 68. Bipont." This use of the word in *utramque partem*, is in accordance with its etymology. The note implies the contrary. — Ch. 29. "Testudine [laberentur] for a testudine. Cf. Essay [on the Style of Tacitus], p. 11." Virgil uses *labi* with the

ablative without a preposition, as Ecl. 1, 64; Aen. 11. 588. So too Ovid. Met. 3. 699.

Ch. 33, p. 368. "*Faces in manibus*. Accusative after *habentes* understood." If the ellipsis here be supplied, *gerentes* would be the classical term, and this Doederlein gives in *the Essay*, p. 17. But even then the expression will be *poetic*; the *prosaic* form being *cum* with its case, as Cic. In Cat. 1, 6, *stetisse in comitio cum telo*. Cf. Krebs, Lat. Comp. § 209.

Ch. 49, p. 374. "*Ex facili* = *facilia*. Cf. Agric. 15. = *faciliter*." The form for the adverb should have been *facile*, according to the usage of Tacitus, cf. cc. 28, 78, Agric. 9, *De Orat.* 35; and good writers universally. *Faciliter* is unclassical. Cf. Zumpt § 267, n. 2. In regard to *ex facili* in the present connection, it may be equivalent to *facilia* or *facile*, according as we supply the *copula* or a *transitive verb* with *cetera*.

Ch. 52, p. 375. "*Volentia*. *Pleasing*. Taken passively." *Volo* means, primarily, *to be willing* (*βούλομαι*, to which it is allied); then, *to wish* (*θέλω*). It is here used *tropically* of things, and in the former sense, *willing*; hence, *favoring*; then by Metonymy of cause for effect, *pleasing*. The word cannot be "taken passively," unless it is rendered *pleased*, a meaning it never bears. Perhaps the editor intended to say, *taken intransitively*.

Ch. 58, p. 377. "The word *superstitio* properly denotes a sentiment, rite, or usage, that has *survived* (from *supersto*) and been handed down from an earlier age." The strict meaning of this word according to its apparent etymology, has never been settled. Freund says: "*superstitio*, super—sto, primarily, the act of *standing over*, by something; *being amazed at* something, *awe*; hence, generally, *awe of what is divine*. Cic. De Nat. Deor. 2, 28, thus explains it: *qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sui sibi liberi superstites essent, superstitioni sunt appellati; quod nomen postea latius patuit*. Still different explanations are given by other Roman writers. Cf. Lactant. 4, 28, and Quint. 8. 3.

Ch. 76, p. 384. "[*qui non egredi moenia—audebant*]. For the case of *moenia*, cf. Andrews and Stoddard's Lat. Gram. § 233, R. 1. It is peculiar to the age of Tacitus to use the accusative after verbs compounded with *e* or *ex*. Sallust and Livy use the ablative; Cicero, the ablative with *ex* repeated. Cf. Zumpt § 386." We find in Caesar, B. C. 3, 52 *munitiones egredi*; in B. G. 1, 44, *multa praedicavit—exercitum—provinciae fines egressum*: in Sallust, B. J. 110, *flumen Mulucham—egrediar*: and in Livy 1, 29, *Egredi urbem*, which form of expression Livy repeatedly uses. *Excedo* as well as *egredior* is regularly

construed with the accusative in the sense of *to transgress, to go beyond*. Cf. Schmitz § 250, 4.

Bk. 4, ch. 1, p. 388. "*Nec deerat—prodere*. *Prodere* depends on *deerat*.—*deesse* usually takes after it either an infinitive or a dative or a predicate nominative to limit its meaning. Cf. 3, 58, *deerat elicere*." *Deest* when construed with nouns, has the thing wanting in the nominative, and the person to whom it is wanting in the dative; as, Caes. B. G. 4, 26, *Hoc unum Caesari defuit*; or in whom it is wanting, in the ablative; as, Cic. De Orat. 3, 4, *Ut—in Antonio deesset hic ornatus orationis*: or, the person wanting is expressed by the nominative, and the object in respect of which, by the dative; as, Cic. Ep. ad Attic. 7, 17, *Non deero officio neque dignitati meae*. But the construction with the infinitive, as here and in 3, 58, is poetic and post-Augustan. The earlier form of expression would have been *nec deerat—quominus proderet*, cf. Cic. Rep. 3, 30; which construction Tacitus himself uses in Ann. 14, 39, *nec defuit—quominus—incederet*. The editor has given no examples, in which "*deesse* is followed by a predicate nominative to limit its meaning," and we know of no such form of expression as these words describe. He may have had in mind such passages as the following: *nos—consules desumus*, Cic. in Cat. 1, 1. But here *consules* is exegetical of *nos* and *desumus* is used absolutely. So too our author, in the *Annales* 15, 59, *miles deesset*. Cf. Freund, sub voce II. β.

Ch. 7, p. 391. *Suffragia*. Observe the etymology of the word. Cf. Leverett's Lexicon." Under this word, in Leverett, we find: "*(sub and frango) a broken piece, a shard, a potsherd, with which the ancients used to vote in the assemblies of the people. Hence a vote.*" Of this word Smith, in his Dict. Gr. and Rom. Antiquities, says: "The etymology is uncertain; for the opinions of those who connect it with *φράσθαι* or *fragor*, do not deserve notice. Wunder thinks it may possibly be allied with *suffrago*, and signified originally an *ankle-bone* or *knuckle-bone*. On the passing of the *Leges Tabellariae*, the voting with *stones* or *pebbles* went out of use." Freund is inclined to adopt the view of Wunder.

Ch. 33, p. 400. "*Quisque* with superlative = *omnes*. Cf. Zumpt § 710, b." This should have been: — *in general = omnes with the positive, but adding the idea of reciprocal comparison among the persons denoted by quisque*. The editor has well treated of this form of expression on 1, 46, p. 289; and on Agric. 19, p. 153, he has given it in English by the definite article and the superlative, which seems to be the nearest approach to it our idiom allows.

Ch. 42, p. 402. "*Senatoria aetate*, i. e. 25." as fixed by Augustus,

should here have been subjoined; in earlier times the required age being at least 32 years.

Ch. 49, p. 405. "*Alienato erga. Alienated in respect to. We say from.*" This note might mislead, as implying a difference in idiom, whereas *alieno a, alienatus a*, is the common construction in Latin, with which our own use of the derivatives, *to alienate, alienated, agrees*. The use of *erga*, in the present passage, of an *unfriendly* relation, deserved notice. The earlier writers commonly employed it to denote *friendly* relations; Tacitus uses it in both connections. Cf. 2, 55, *additas erga Germanicum exercitum laudes gratesque*; and again as above in Agric. 5, *sinistra erga eminentes interpretatio*. — Ch. 52. "*Nutabat. Was balancing, as it were, on a pivot.*" This is incorrect, if it was intended as an exact explanation. For the strict meaning of the word, cf. Gr. *νέωω*, Lat. *NUO*, whence *numen, nutus*, and the present word *nuto*, which coincides in meaning with *νέωω*.

Ch. 58, p. 407 "[*pro vobis sollicitior aut pro me securior*] *Pro me. Pro me = de*, cf. Agric. 26, note." The reason for this deviation from the usual construction should have been suggested here. *PRO ME securior* seems to have been used instead of *DE ME securior* (cf. Agric. as referred to) for the sake of conformity to the preceding words.

Ch. 59, p. 408. "*Flagitium navaverat. Praegnanter for operam in flagitio perpetrando navaverat.*" If this expression be filled out, it should be: *AD FLAGITIUM faciendum operam navaverat*. Cf. Livy, 9, 16, *Certatum est, ut AD RECONCILIANDAM pacem—opera navaretur*. But for the *absolute* use of *navare*, consult the references given above in the remarks on the *Essay on the Style of Tacitus*.

Ch. 69, p. 410. "*Periculo ac metu. Fear of danger.*" and on ch. 72, p. 412. *periculum aut metus* is rendered, by Hendiadys, *the fear of danger*. It is better not to resort to this figure in explaining these passages, but to allow the *particles* their usual force, as connecting different ideas, which the editor has done on 1, 88, p. 315, and made a good defence of the interpretation. Cf. Cic. Pro Lege Manil. 6: *provincia—non modo a calamitate, sed etiam a metu calamitatis est defendenda*.

Ch. 72, p. 411. "*A metu. From, i. e., through fear.* The Latins more commonly omit the preposition." The connection in which these words stand, is: *Cerialis a metu infamiae, si licentia saevitiaque imbuere militem crederetur, pressit iras*: and in this instance the preposition seems to have been expressed for the sake of perspicuity, *licentia* and *saevitia* so soon following in the same case, but in a different relation.

Ch. 73, p. 412. "*Teutonisque.* This word contains the element of

the modern name of the Germans, sc. *Deutsche* (D is pronounced like our T)." D in German, when it is *final*, has the power of the English *dt*, but elsewhere it is nearly equivalent to our *d*. A nearer approximation to *Deutsche* is found in the forms *Theuthoni*, *Theothoni*, which are other modes of writing *Teutoni*, found in MSS. Cf. Benecke on Cic. Pro Lege Manil. 20.

Ch. 76, p. 413. "*Adolescentuli [verba et conciones quam ferrum et arma] meditantis. Quam. sub. magis.*" We think there is no ellipsis of *magis* in this passage, but that *quam* is here an adverb of degree, and, like other relative words, implies its correlative *tam*. Thus the precise meaning will be: *words and harangues as well as the sword and arms*, and from the prominence given to *verba et conciones*, they are emphatic, and so the expression becomes equivalent to the formula *magis—quam*. Cf. Ann. 1, 58, *Pacem quam bellum probabam*, where by the same view *quam* is tantamount to *magis—quam*. So also Plautus, Rud. 4, 4, 70: *Tacita bona est mulier semper, quam loquens*. In 5, 5, *Corpora*—Tacitus is here speaking of the custom of the Jews—*quam cremare, e more Aegyptio, quam* undoubtedly means *than*, and therefore *magis* or *potius* must be supplied. But *quam*, even in the sense of *than*, may in the condensed style of Tacitus imply its correlative comparative, and so *in itself* have the power of *magis—quam*. Most of the passages cited by the commentators as instances of the omission of the comparative can be satisfactorily explained without recourse to such an ellipsis. Cf. Orelli's references on the use of this word in Ann. 1, 58.

Ch. 84, p. 416. "*Versus animi. Changeable in his feelings, wanting in decision of character.*" The perfect passive participle, the editor has here rendered as a verbal adjective in *bilis*. The participle has this meaning in very few instances, and then only by implication or by Metonymy of the effect for the cause. *Monstratus* in the sense of *monstrabilis* is found in Germ. 31 and in Hist. 1, 88; though Prof. Tyler does not point out this peculiarity in his notes on those passages. Freund says this use of *monstratus* is *Tacitean*. In Agric. 33, and in Sallust B. J. 91, we have *coercitus* with the meaning of *qui coerceri potest*. The citation from Sallust is: *genus hominum mobile, infidum ante, neque beneficio neque metu coercitum*, where *infidum* and *coercitum* with their adjuncts are explanatory of the verbal adjective *mobile*. The use of some perf. pass. participles with the negative prefix *in*, having the force of forms in *bilis*, is common; as, *invictus*, *infinitus*. So *infectus* in Sallust B. J. 76; and *inexhaustus*, Germ. 20; to which last word the editor has referred on 5, 7, p. 425. Cf. Zumpt § 323.

Prof. Tyler seems to add the interpretation of Walther—"versus equivalent to *eversus*, *crazed*"—as being different from his own; whereas if *versus animi* be rendered as the editor has done, this meaning can be reached only through the interpretation of Walther, thus: *changed, impaired*; then *undecided, wavering, changeable*, as the result of insanity of some degree. *Versus* in the sense of *changed*, occurs in Ann. 1, 4, *verso civitatis statu*; and in Hist. 2, 54, *versam partium fortunam*. In Ann. 3, 36, *abolitas leges et funditus versas*, it has the meaning of *destroyed*. Of the many explanations given of this difficult passage, we know of none which better suits the context or may more fairly be defended than that which Prof. Tyler has offered. We adduce as kindred examples, Livy 22, 51, *miles ira in rabiem versus*, and Virgil Ecl. 8, 66 et seq., *magicis sanos avertere sacris Experiari sensus*.

Bk. 5, ch. 11, p. 428. "Duos colles"—of Jerusalem—"Four in all, but two principal ones." Three hills only, *Zion, Moriah*, and *Akra* are commonly mentioned, cf. Jahn, Bibl. Archaeol. § 335; but a fourth and even a fifth, *Bezetha* and *Ophel*, are described in Robinson's Researches in Palestine, Vol. I, p. 383.

We have remarked, in several instances, a want of that accuracy, which is so important in works that are professedly prepared and used as instruments of exact as well as polite culture. On p. 261 we find: "*adhibito*, literally *being had in*"; p. 296, "*Dirumpunt*, *dis* gives emphasis"; p. 363, "*Vacuo atque aperto*. From a place open and clear, sc. of *arbustis*"; p. 319. "*Statim*, at hand, from *sto*"; p. 378. "*Absurdus*. Always used with a negative, like, etc." There are also some important omissions of authorities, illustrations, and explanations. On the origin of the military term *manipulares*, Ovid might have been quoted on p. 271; and the use of the word *sinus* in the sense of "plunderer," on p. 393, could have been explained by a reference to the Roman costume. A conjecture on the origin of the expression *descendere in causam*, is given on p. 355, and an explanation of *supplicium* in the sense of *capital punishment*, on p. 282, but no authority or illustration is added to enable the student to judge of their correctness. In regard to the English of the volume, a good degree of care seems to have been taken. But on p. 238 and elsewhere the word *locate* is used for *place, station*, etc.; on p. 246, and in several other cases, the passive form, *was being* written, etc. is employed instead of our active form, *was writing*, which, according to a fixed idiom of our language, may be used in a passive sense; on p. 380, we find *quite* in its colloquial connection; on p. 235, we have *transpire* in the sense of *occur*, a meaning which has arisen from carelessness, and which critics with good

reason disallow ; on pp. 333, 399, we find *technic* instead of *technical term*.

The geography of the volume is well treated, though the editor does not intimate what authority he has followed in this department of his commentary, as he had done in his previous book, the *Germania* and *Agricola*. So far as we have examined this portion of his notes, he seems to agree with *Murphy* and *Doederlein*. The present work is much superior to its predecessor in respect both of its contents and its outward form. The commentary is fuller and more valuable. It seems, in general, to have been prepared according to the best principles, and to be well adapted to the immediate and urgent wants of the student. Most of the subsidiary works used by the editor, are recent and decisive authorities, though in this matter he appears not always to have exercised due discrimination. On questions relating to antiquities as well as on merely literary points, he has, with great propriety and consideration, referred to such books as are within common reach, and which the student may be supposed to have read. His frequent quotations from Virgil, Livy, Cicero, and Horace, are very appropriate, and will tend to sustain and increase an interest in these authors, with whom most readers will be acquainted before they proceed to Tacitus. The comparisons of the Latin with the Greek are, in almost every instance, happy, and those who are occupied at the same time with the study of both languages, will only wish that these had been instituted to a greater extent. The brief remarks which, on occasion, are made concerning the manners and spirit of the times of the *Historiae*, are just and often acute, and will enable the reader much better to appreciate his author. A tone of enlightened and severe morality pervades the commentary, which seems most fitting. No one, indeed, who does not cherish serious views of human conduct, and has not a profound sense of human right and obligation, could well interpret the *morale* of Tacitus.

The *text* as well as other portions of the book, is printed in an elegant and very correct manner. Except in the Greek citations, we have discovered but few typographical errors. On p. 16, l. 10, we find "Brittanicum" for *Britannicum*, and on p. 22, in the quotation from Horace, "Rediderit" for *Reddiderit*.

We hope that the editor, in answer to a demand for his labors, will give us new and revised editions of the volumes he has already published ; and that, at some future day, the *Annales* too may be welcomed from his hands to an honorable place among kindred works ; and then, adding the dialogue *De Oratoribus*, he will have prepared the first American edition of the complete writings, as now extant, of the greatest of the Roman historians.

ARTICLE X.

RECENT ENGLISH WORKS ON LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

By N. Porter, Jr., Professor in Yale College.

Lectures on Logic. By C. E. Moberly, M. A. pp. 184. Oxford and London. John H. Parker. 1848.

An Essay on Logical Method. By Charles P. Cretien, M. A. pp. 220. John H. Parker. 1848.

On the development of the Understanding. By Hensleigh Wedgewood, A. M. pp. 133. London. Taylor & Walton. 1848.

Ideas. Or, Outlines of a New System of Philosophy. By A. C. G. Jobert. pp. 141. London. Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1848.

Exact Philosophy. Books First and Second. By H. F. Halle, P. LL. D. pp. 212. London. Effingham Wilson. 1848.

THESE works are not all of equal value, but they are all interesting, as indications of the direction now taken by thinking men in England. They show that logic and metaphysics are far from dying out on English soil; that, on the other hand, they are pursued with greater thoroughness than for a long time previous, and are held in higher estimation, both in respect to their value in the training of the scholar, and in their relation to the fundamental principles of the sciences and theology. The advance in this respect since Whately published what may be called his vindication of Logic, is very perceptible and gratifying. Such works as Herschell on Natural Philosophy, Whewell on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Mill's System of Logic, Hamilton's edition of Reid, Morell's History of Speculative Philosophy, etc., are all tokens of a more thorough and less timid philosophical spirit. In this country, the study of logic has for the last generation been almost unknown, and it is not surprising that it has been gravely proposed to dispense with it altogether and to substitute in its stead, as the regulator of the mind, *intuition by the emotions!* We may possibly be in the right in this judgment, but it may not be amiss for us, to be informed, of the differing judgments of our neighbors in England and on the Continent. In Germany, logic has for seventy-five years at least, held its deserved honor, and tasked the energies of all its severest thinkers. In England, it seems to be rising rather than falling in the public esteem. In both England and Germany, the relations of logic to science, or of thoughts to things, is occupying the attention of

many earnest men ; as, with us, the kindred question of the relation of logic to theology. We propose to settle it by a contemptuous discharge of logic, as an inadequate and incompetent assistant, who will rather hinder than help us. Our older, perhaps not our wiser neighbors, seek by a more thorough study of logic itself, and by the light which logic affords, to trace distinctly the line between thoughts and things, between our conceptions and the realities which they represent ; between things as expressed in language and things as they exist in nature.

The "Lectures on Logic" is a small volume, which is designed as a manual of formal logic, or logic as it is concerned with the forms of reasoning, as distinguished from "the method of their application to the various departments of knowledge." In style it is direct and condensed. It enters, without apology or introduction, upon the several topics of which it treats, defines and expounds each one in its turn, with perhaps a single illustration, and then leaves the subject for the next in order. As a manual for a beginner, it is of course too brief and synthetical ; but as a text book for familiar oral instruction, or for a thorough review of the definitions of formal logic, it is unsurpassed and unequalled by any work that we know of in the language. What adds greatly to its value, is the fact, that the terminology of the Latin logicians is used and explained, and thus is secured to the student the double advantage of being trained to exact precision in nomenclature, and of becoming familiar with the origin of not a few terms which have passed into common usage. One or two other peculiarities we have noticed. The relation of Terms and Propositions to *things*, of the form to the matter, is constantly kept in mind, so that without discussion or illustration, simply by a sharp exactness of statement, the student is continually warned of the fact. The substance of more than one long and wordy chapter in Mill's system, is expressed within the compass of a single brief page, and almost compressed into the brief utterance of a definition. Under Reasoning, induction is treated of as well as deduction, and the various "methods," as they are called, as briefly defined and explained. The application of the figures of the syllogism is explained by an exhibition of the kind of reasoning to which each is appropriate ; and even "*analogy*" is reduced to definition, and its canons as a positive and a negative argument are given, with the uses of each.

The "Essay on Logical Method" proposes to itself another problem, and that is, to discuss "Method or the use of Logic." The object is "to view Logic at once by the light of the past and the present ; to inquire, in the first place, what ideas respecting its nature were formerly entertained, and what questions originated from their adoption ; how one race of thinkers profited both by the knowledge and the mistakes of those pre-

ceding them, and handed down the results of their labors to their successors, not without a still abiding mixture of error; and this done to show how as Logic has always of her own free will testified to the truth of Science, Science in her turn bears unintentional but not involuntary witness to the truth and utility of Logic." After thus defining his object, the author offers some just and forcible remarks on the uses of the study of method as well as upon its dangers. The mere collection of facts, which he cannot apply, may be of little use to himself or others; but he will also do little harm to either. It is not so with him who trusts to method, "unprovided with facts and without the intention of acquiring them." "On some of the first principles which recommend themselves to his own mind, or are taken on trust from those whom he admires, * * he fastens his belief."—"That which he thus invents he believes, but this belief rests not on objective truth, nor on the evidence of his fellow-creatures, nor on God, but on himself. Unbelief sits at the right hand of such a faith. A self-made Damocles, he sees the sword of skepticism suspended over him by a hair." If facts do not agree with his system, "he deserts his system; and what has he left?"

The first chapter is on the ancient view of the relation of Logic to Science. In a brief notice of the earlier schools of philosophy, the author shows the origin of the name, and the fact, that it was till the time of Aristotle applied both to the truths and facts on which the rules of reasoning were founded and to the rules of reasoning themselves. Between the two, Aristotle drew a dividing line, applying Analytic, to what we call formal Logic, and leaving Logic with its more general signification. Plato blended the two, and it was only the later Peripatetics who developed the true view of Logic, that it is only the instrument of thought. As the ancients failed to attain to a clear perception of the nature of Logic, it is not surprising that it yielded meagre results. Chapter II. is entitled, "The Mediaeval view of the relation of Logic to Science." In this, the author gives a brief, but an exceedingly clear and satisfactory exhibition of the Scholastic Philosophy, showing why its Logic, though so refined and acute, was yet altogether unproductive, and demonstrating that with their views of the principles furnished by Aristotle and the truths revealed in the Scriptures, they were necessarily shut up to these barren results. Chapter III. is entitled, "Nominalism and Realism," as a necessary part of the history of the gradual escape from these Logical forms into some insight of their relation to things as they are. Next we have in Chapter IV., "The Modern view of the relation of Logic to Science;" in which the principles of Bacon are discussed; and in Chapter V. a disquisition "On the different Modern Schools of Logic." In this, the opinions are first discussed of those who contend that Logic has to do with

language only as Hobbes, Horne Tooke and Condillac, then the position of Mr. J. Stuart Mill who considers it as more safe and practical, to regard it as having to do with things. With this Chapter, the author concludes the historical view. He then proceeds to the direct consideration of the nature and office of Logical Method. This he prosecutes in the nine Chapters following, which are entitled, "On Logical Method in general. On the Method of Science. On Scientific Ideas. On Classification and Definition. On the Gradations of Science. On Method in Art. On Method in Morality. On Analysis and Synthesis. On the connection of Method with formal Logic." In all these Chapters striking thoughts are expressed in a felicitous manner, but the expectations raised by the perusal of the historical criticisms of the views of others are not sustained when the writer proceeds to grapple with the subject itself. At all events, the difficulties are not all solved, nor is the subject exhausted. He concludes with the following inquiries, which will be recognised by some of our readers, as indicating a tendency similar to that avowed in this country. "And how far is this fair Mother of Sciences [Theology] like her children? Do the same formal conditions which bind them, bind her also? If they do not, has she another Method of her own; her own laws of investigation, and standards of truth and falsehood? If they do, how does the nature of the high and mysterious subjects with which she deals affect and modify their application? If again, she neither conforms to the ordinary rules of speculation, nor has extraordinary canons of her own, how can the body of truth which she presents, be fairly studied at all? How can the human mind, prone, not by its perverseness and obliquity but by a right instinct and a deep principle of nature, to seek for order and system, find its highest occupation in resting on details which may not be combined, statements which may not be compared, examples from which no principles may be extracted, facts which refuse to incorporate themselves with doctrines?"

"He will do a good service to Truth and Christianity and the Church who shall face these questions fairly; and in grave earnest and after all due preparation venture in a strength not his own, to treat of a subject which I have not ventured to handle—the application of method to *Theology*." These inquiries have a significance at Oxford which they do not have elsewhere, but they also suggest a subject for discussion, for which the times and the minds of men are ripe with us.

The volume "On the Development of the Understanding," is altogether unpretending in its character, and may not be very rich in its actual contributions to the science of the human mind. It is however quite refreshing to meet with an English author, who dares to follow a method of his own, and to pursue a course of inquiry, with the air and the aim of a man, who thinks for himself. The work does not profess to be a complete and ex-

hausting "system," nor to be a "manual" for the instructor and the class room. It is only an Essay starting from a point well defined and proceeding through a distinct series of topics, with a single object. The first Section is entitled, "Scope of the Work." In this section Mr. W. first contrasts the superiority of Mental over Physical Science with the Ancients, and then asks, how it is to be accounted for, that this order of superiority has been precisely reversed with the moderns. The answer to this inquiry he finds in the fact that a precise and well grounded method of procedure has been applied to Physics, while no such method has been rigidly adhered to, and thoroughly applied, in the study of the mind. Every object of thought may be considered in two lights; first in its relations to other objects, and secondly, with reference to its relations with the thinking being himself. In the second light we ask, "by the exercise of what faculties, by what train of mental action is it discerned amidst the multifarious scene, which is in a constant course of representation in the region of sense, or among the objects already developed in the Understanding." This last is the true method, which is coincident with the object proposed by Locke in his Essay. "Unfortunately Locke has not carried out his system with the rigor necessary to wring from it an authoritative decision in many of the great questions respecting the foundations of knowledge." The object of the author is, to apply the method of Locke to the solution of these unsettled questions. Lecture II. is on "Sensation and Thought." The difference between the two is thus indicated. Thought is not exclusively appropriated to objects which are absent, but it accompanies sensation by being employed with it, on those which are present. In sensation, the attention is directed to the phenomenon before us. In thought we compare the present with the past. We regard both as a single *thing*. How do we pass in this way from sensation to thought? By the impression of *resemblance*. This perception of resemblance in the matured understanding is spontaneous; much more than should it be so, in the first beginning of its activity. From this distinction, the author proceeds to account for the fact of *perception*, or the distinguishing of the self and the not-self, and also to explain the origin of the distinction of substance and attributes. Section III. on "Number," carries forward the same course of thought. The perception of resemblance, involves that of difference, and in the perception of things as different originates the idea of Number. This is *relative*. The first object is apprehended without this feeling of resemblance to any other. The second is recognised as like the first, and is attended with a recollection of the first as being unattended with the discernment of such likeness. Hence the origin of first and second, and so on. The author then proceeds to discuss the following subjects. IV. Body and Space. V. Cause. VI. Free Will. VII. and VIII. Position. IX. Figure. X. Reasoning.

XI. Right and Wrong. To give an account of the opinions of the author on these points, and to show how he develops these notions, would require us to exceed the limits prescribed, and almost to copy the entire volume. It is enough to say that the method is novel and fresh, when the opinions are familiar and old, and that in more than one instance truths not familiar are explained and illustrated in a manner, that is striking and original. It is quite refreshing to the student of dry abstractions, often rendered doubly dry from being announced in the same stereotype phraseology, and enforced by the same out-worn illustrations, to meet with a book like this, which is at once thoughtful, condensed, and striking, without being also affected, obscure and ambitious.

"Ideas, etc." is a book quite as striking in its way, though the way does not seem to us quite so good. It is written in English by a Frenchman, and is designed to serve as a *pendant* to a previous work on the "Philosophy of Geology." We give its title at length. "Ideas. Essay the first; On Causation and fundamental Ideas; or Common sense versus the Kantian, Berkelyan, Scottish, and Whewellian Doctrines." It is divided into fifteen chapters. In the first, the author informs us that in his previous work he had advanced the opinion, that in the application of the idea of Causation, it must not be considered as involving *a priori* the constant uniformity of the antecedent fact. Otherwise as appears from the subsequent discussion, the evidence, furnished by Geological phenomena of the interruption of the constant uniformities of nature, by the interposition of a power purely creative, could not be received. He then considers the doctrine of Sir John Herschell, who derives the notion of power and of causation, from the consciousness of effort in the exertion or the resistance of force. This he rejects, as introducing into the science of nature, an element altogether extraneous and impertinent, but as it seems to us without exactly comprehending what Herschell intended by the doctrine, or the way in which he could apply it. He then attacks the *a priori* view of Whewell, and in order to explode his views of the origin of the idea of Cause, is led to discuss his account of Space, Time, Motion, Number and Substance. After a rambling discussion of these topics and of the fundamental view which they all involve, he proceeds to consider at some length the doctrines of Hume, Reid, and Dugald Stewart, and then those of Aristotle, Kant, Coleridge, Fichte and Berkely. He then brings before us his own view, to make way for which he had exploded all the theories of these celebrated philosophers. We derive the notion of Cause from our observation of the course of nature, or from actual experience. "Every fact is preceded by its appropriate antecedent fact, and *vice versa*." "Cause is the anterior fact; Effect is the fact which follows, and the idea of necessity has no other origin than the observation

of the constant repetition of the same relation between antecedent and consequent facts." But though Hume was in the main correct, in his view, he was wrong in requiring that the same fact should *invariably* precede its consequent, as is proved by the record of facts that are laid up in the rocky tablets which Geology uncovers and interprets, in which is plainly to be read, that facts have come into being, without being preceded by their common natural antecedents. Their antecedent and cause is therefore God. The whole discussion, beginning with its announcement, followed through its acute, ingenious, yet unjust attack upon his opponents, and terminating in a result so theistic, strikes one as decidedly singular. The book is worth reading however. In one other respect it is altogether by itself. Surely never was a discussion on "*Causation and Fundamental ideas*" served up in a volume so daintily executed as this. The paper is of the finest quality, the type is exquisitely cut, the binding is in the brightest red, and the edges of the leaves are gilded as if the book were prepared for the boudoir of a luxurious lady, rather than for the smoky recess of an angular metaphysician.

If "*Ideas, etc.*" is a singular book, "*Exact Philosophy*" will be pronounced both singular and amusing. Who this H. F. Halle, P. LL. D. may be we do not know; but if he may be judged by the account which he gives of himself in a self-glorifying Preface of some twenty-six pages, he is certainly a very wonderful man—a man far before his age, and whom his age treats with no greater regard than it treated Lord Bacon and sundry other philosophers in their life time. What his *Exact Philosophy* is, we cannot learn; for Books first and second contain little more than a general onslaught on the chemists, physiologists and philosophers of the day, who adopt the principles of the atheistic and material school. The most conspicuous objects of their attack are G. H. Lewes, Auguste Comte and J. Stuart Mill. This attack is not wanting in ability. In its argumentative portions it is able, and in the exposure which it makes of the verbal pretensions and the real hollowness of these influential writers, it is forcible and severe. The only thing to be regretted is that while the critic makes the subjects of his remark occasional objects of contempt; he makes himself still more decidedly an object of laughter; and by his Quixotic and pedantic effusions, makes us wonder, under what "*disastrous influence*" of the stars his intellect was constructed and trained. One cannot however read his exposé of the current philosophising of the day, without a feeling of horror at its mingled superficialness, pretension and blasphemy; nor can we contrast the occasional glimpses of a sounder and more religious science, which the author would defend, without wishing that his self-knowledge and intellectual dignity were equal to his acuteness and his zeal for the truth.

ARTICLE XI.

MISCELLANIES, LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL.

Letronne.

AT the close of the year 1848, the cause of classical learning and of archaeology sustained a severe loss in the death of Letronne, who stood altogether at the head of the French savans in his department. He was born at Paris, Jan. 15, 1787, of an obscure family; and, while obtaining his education, was obliged to divide his time between study and the labor necessary to supply his wants. His first impulse was towards geography. On returning from a journey which he performed as a companion to a foreign gentleman, between 1810 and 1812, he published his "*Essai sur la Topographie de Syracuse pour servir à l'intelligence, de Thucydide et de plusieurs autres auteurs anciens.*" His next work known to us is his "*Recherches géographiques et critiques sur Dicuil*;" published in 1814. Dicuil was an Irish monk who wrote a geographical compilation, entitled "*de mensura orbis terrae*," in the year 825, as he himself informs us in some verses at the close of the work. The extracts, of which this little work (filling 69 pages in Letronne's edition) principally consists, are taken from Pliny, Solinus, Orosius, Isidore of Seville, Priscian, the author of a *Cosmography*, and the reports of certain commissioners (*missi*) of the emperor Theodosius (the Great, probably, and not his grandson), sent out to make measurements of the provinces. No other information has come down to us of such an undertaking by the Roman emperor. Besides these authorities, Dicuil quotes from contemporary travellers: one of these travellers is the monk Fidelis (Dicuil 6. § 3. ed. Letronne), who told Dicuil's master, Suibneus, in his presence, that on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem he sailed down the Nile by seven granaries of Joseph (pyramids), and from the Nile into the Red sea. This Letronne looks upon as a proof that a canal uniting these two waters, was then in actual use. In another most valuable passage Dicuil speaks of certain islands two days and nights' sail distant from the northern British isles, which can be no other than the Faroe isles, and of which he says that hermits from '*ex nostra Scottia*,' had lived there for a hundred years; but now, owing to the incursions of the Normans (*causa latronum Normannorum*) had left their abodes. This is testimony contemporary with the earliest Norman expeditions, and agrees with a report that these rovers found Irish books there when they landed.

Dicuil was first published by Walckenaer in 1807, at Paris ; but Letronne first settled the text after careful collations of manuscripts, and accompanied it with most valuable and scholarlike prolegomena. Among other important passages, the biblical critic will find a most satisfactory explanation of Luke's use of the term *Adria*, in Acts 27: 27.

In 1816 M. Letronne won a prize offered by the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres for an essay on the metrical system of the Egyptians, and soon afterwards was elected a member of the Institute, that is to say, of the branch of it known as the Academy just named. Not long after, he was appointed Inspector general of the University, and Inspector of studies in the royal military schools. And by degrees as he acquired reputation by his writings, the learned Societies of Europe enrolled him on their list of members. Thus he enjoyed the high honor of being a foreign member of the Royal Academy at Berlin.

In 1817 he published in a thin quarto, having previously communicated it to the Academy of Inscriptions, his '*considérations générales sur l'évaluation des monnaies Grecques et Romaines*,' in which he supported, against a theory of Count G. Garnier, the commonly received views respecting Greek and Roman coins by a force of argument to which archaeology had hardly ever attained. We first were led to this work in 1828, by the very high commendation which Boeckh of Berlin bestowed upon it, who added that Letronne's investigations were entitled to equal respect and confidence with the ablest researches of the German scholars.

In the year 1823 he published his '*Recherches pour servir à l'histoire de l'Egypte*,' in which, with vast skill and learning, he makes the inscriptions collected by the French expedition and others to tell upon Egyptian history during the sway of the Ptolemies and of the Romans in that country. It was this work which put an end to the opinion then prevailing of the very remote origin of Egyptian astronomy, by showing that the zodiacs—as that of Denderah or Lentyris—originated in the times of the Romans.

Many of Letronne's hours, from this time until his death, were consecrated to Egyptian investigations. Soon after the work just mentioned, appeared his '*matériaux pour servir à l'histoire du christianisme en Egypte en Nubie et en Abyssinie*.' In the tenth volume of the *Memoires* of the Academy of Inscriptions he inserted a dissertation on the vocal statue of Memnon. He draws from the inscriptions upon the colossus the conclusions "that the vocal phenomenon began to attract attention after the conquest of Egypt by the Romans, and probably after the statue was broken in two, which probably occurred during an earthquake in the year 27 B. C. ; that it ceased under Septimius Severus, when the statue was restored ; that the statue was brought into connection with the Greek

mythical hero Memnon after the sound began to be heard, and in consequence of the quarter, where the statue was, being called the Memnonium, which is a word of Egyptian origin; and finally, that the sound was produced not by pious fraud, but by some physical cause connected with the great change of temperature at sunrise."

A number of dissertations inserted in the memoirs of the same Academy attest to his industry and learning. He was also for many years an important contributor to the *Journal de Savans*, to the *Annales* of the Archaeological Institute at Rome, and to the *Revue Archæologique*, a work begun but a few years since. In his articles in the first named journal almost every work of note proceeding from German scholars passes under his revision. He also published the fragments of Scymnus and of the description of Greece usually ascribed to Dicaearchus, but which he and Meineke¹ after him assign to Dionysius, son of Calliphon. Another production of his pen was his "Letters on historical wall-painting in the decoration of temples, etc.," in which he united a knowledge of that art, derived from study in his youth under David, to most extensive philological acquisitions.

But the great work of M. Letronne, and one which unhappily he left unfinished, was his '*Recueil des Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de l'Egypte*,' of which the first volume in quarto appeared in 1842, and the second in 1848. He had prepared also, it is said, all the materials which were to enter into his third volume; by collecting and collating the Greek manuscripts upon papyrus which have been found in Egypt. But death cut him off in the midst of his labors at an age not very advanced, when his sound health offered reason to look for a protracted life.

Letronne united caution, sagacity, extensive acquirements, freedom from bias and theory in a rare degree, so as to be perhaps the safest guide in his conclusions of all the archaeologists of the present day. Besides the honors which we have mentioned above, as conferred upon him, he was Professor of History in the College of France, Conservator of the National Library, Keeper (*garde général*) of the Archives (*administrateur*) of the College of France, and Director of the School of Chartes. No scholar of our time is believed to have united the characteristics of the French and German mind more happily.

T. D. W.

Greek Fragments found in Egypt.

In the spring of 1847, Mr. A. C. Harris bought from a dealer of antiquities at Thebes of upper Egypt a number of fragments of some Greek author written upon papyrus. On a subsequent visit to Thebes in 1848,

¹ In his edition of *Scymnus and Dionysius*, Berlin, 1846.

he was unsuccessful in his endeavors to ascertain the spot from which these manuscripts were taken by the Arab excavators. The fragments were published by him in London upon eleven lithographic plates in August, 1848, and soon arrested the attention of Prof. Boeckh of Berlin, who re-edited them in the *Halle Allgem. Literatur-zeitung* for October, 1848, (Nos. 223—227) and of Prof. Sauppe, the joint editor with Prof. Baiter, of a late edition of the *Attic Orators*, who likewise republished them in *Schneidewin's Philologus*, (in the fourth number for 1848). Mr. Harris announced the fragments as pertaining to the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes, arising out of the affair of Harpalus. And such the greater part of them prove to be. As for the rest, we may embrace what needs to be said respecting these fragments under the following heads.

1. Those which are most entire contain three and even four narrow columns of writing, in letters which may be said to be uncial, somewhat rounded. The way of writing is said by Boeckh to be very similar to that of the fragment of the *Iliad* (Book 24), which was found in Egypt a number of years since. There are from twenty-seven to twenty-nine lines on a column. The order of the fragments is a matter of conjecture. The two scholars above mentioned have partially agreed in their arrangement, but Sauppe, while he has gone too far in settling that point without sufficient data, has made some discoveries which escaped the observation of Boeckh. In particular he found that the fragments marked VIII. and XIV. by Mr. Harris, continued each other in their first, second and third columns successively, by which means a long passage with but few uncertain words is brought into its proper shape.

2. Eleven of the thirty-two fragments are too small and too much effaced to be of any value. Three of the remaining ones clearly belong to an oration in defence of some person, and one of them to the very prologue, so that they cannot have appertained to the oration of Hyperides above referred to, but may be parts of some other work of the same orator. The other fragments evidently belong to the same composition, and that this was the oration in question is proved by several words or phrases cited by Harpocration as from this oration, and here found in place.

3. In the judgment of Prof. Sauppe the fragments show those characteristics which were ascribed to Hyperides by the ancient critics, such as grace of narrative, dexterity in the use of arguments, wit and comic power, and the opposite of fastidiousness in the choice of words. The strain of these remains reveals not the indignation of a patriot who believes that a wrong has been done to his country, but rather the artful eloquence of a hired advocate who depends less on the power of truth than on readiness and on trickery in representation.

4. The fragments disclose a few particulars respecting the affair of

Harpalus not known from the oration of Dinarchus or from other sources. From one passage it appears that a party at Athens believed, on the arrival of Harpalus with his money, that the favorable moment had arrived for a contest with Alexander. To this party the author of the fragments seems to have belonged; and perhaps the fact that Demosthenes took a more cautious part was the reason why these men, who had long been political friends, were now so widely separated. Hyperides seems to have been concerned in the process, as one of the ten orators who were appointed by the people to protect the interests of the State before the courts.

T. D. W.

NOTE ON THE WORDS "ALL TO," IN JUDG. IX. 53.

By E. Robinson, D. D., Professor at New York.

THE object of this Note is to call attention to an expression in our excellent English version of the Bible, which, in the course of time, has come to be misunderstood probably by most persons. It occurs in Judg. 9: 53, "And a certain woman cast a piece of a mill-stone upon Abimelech's head, and all to brake his skull." The question is as to the words "all to," in the last clause of the verse. Most readers, probably, understand this clause as if it read thus: "and all this in order to break his skull." The word "brake" seems often to have been regarded as an antiquated orthography for the present tense "break; and hence the latter has been substituted in several editions of the Bible, enumerated below, so as to read: "and all to break his skull." But this is wrong, and "brake," as a past tense, is right; as appears on turning to the original Hebrew and the ancient versions.

HEB. וְהָרָץ אֶת־אֶבֶן־מִלִּין, and brake his skull.

SEPT. καὶ ἐκλάσε τὸ κρανίον αὐτοῦ, and brake his skull.

VULG. et confringit cerebrum ejus.

The Hebrew Hiphil form is sometimes held to be intensive, "to break in pieces;" but in this particular verb, Kal is mostly intransitive, and therefore the full sense of the Hiphil is expressed by the transitive idea. This is further shown here by the fact, that Abimelech, after the blow, was able to call on his armour-bearer to thrust him through; and even assigns the reason. Hence the Septuagint and Vulgate properly express the idea without emphasis; unless the *confringit* of the latter may be so considered.

The earlier English versions vary in respect to this clause, e. g.

TINDAL (MATTHEWS): and all to brake hys brayne panne.

COVERDALE: and brake his brane panne.

CRANMER (THE BISHOPS): and all to brake hys brane panne.

GENEVA: and brake his brayne panne.

DOUAY (RHEIMS): and brake his brayne.

It thus appears that Coverdale and the Geneva follow the Septuagint; the Douay, the Vulgate; while Tindal and Cranmer (whom the common version follows) have attempted to mark the supposed intensive sense of *Hiphil*. That is to say, the phrase "al to," or "all to," was in their day employed to express the sense of the more usual "altogether," by which it has been superseded; meaning "wholly, entirely, completely."

This position is supported by the following passages; to present which, in a permanent form, is another object of this Note. They have been collected by J. R. Bartlett, Esq., author of the Dictionary of Americanisms, to whose kindness I am indebted for them.

The idiom in question has become so entirely obsolete, that probably very few are aware that it ever existed. The English Dictionaries throw no light upon the subject; they do not even notice such a use of the words. But in some of the Provincial Glossaries are found the following definitions; the words being written sometimes with a hyphen and sometimes without.

ALL-TO } Entirely, very much. The *to* seems to have an augmentative power, so
ALL TO } as to increase the force of the word following. Thus *all-to torn* means
"very much torn."—NARES' Glossary. 4to. Lond. 1822.

ALL-TO: Entirely, altogether.—HALLIWELL'S Glossary. 8vo. Lond. 1847.

ALL TO NOUGHT: Completely.—CRAVEN Glossary. 12mo. Lond. 1828.

These definitions are sustained by the following extracts from writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

That did with dirt and dust him *al-to* dash—HARRINGTON'S *Ariosto*, xxxiv. 48.

Now, forsooth, as they went together, often *al* to kissing one another, the knight told her he was brought up among the water-nymphs.—PEMBROKE'S *Arcadia*, p. 154.

Mercutio's icy hand *al to* frozen mine.—SHAKESPEARE'S *Romeo & Juliet*, Suppl. l. 285.

For when her husband forsoke a right woorshipful rounge when it was offred hym, she fell in hand with hym (he told me) and *all to* rated hym.—SIR THOMAS MORE, *Works*. p. 1224.

When corn is well dried, the manner is to lay it upon some hard, craggie, or stonie ground, then *all to* beat and be labour it with cudgels, that it may be soft to lie under cattell.—HOLLAND'S *Pliny*, p. 602. Lond. 1624.

"Where with her best nurse, contemplation,

She [wisdom] plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings,

That, in the various bustle of resort,

Were *all-to* ruffled, and sometimes impair'd."

MILTON, *Comus*, l. 390.

"This passage in Milton," says Archdeacon Nares, "being the last known instance of it, has been much misunderstood. It has been read : "all too ruffled," as if to be ruffled in some degree was allowable ; which the author certainly did not mean."

The following editions of the Bible exhibit the reading "break," referred to above, as wrongly substituted for "brake." Quite a number more might be added to the list :

Bagster, 4to. 1828 ; also in his folio Polyglott.
 Edinburgh, 1715, 1748, 1811.
 London, 1795, 1833.
 Cambridge (Eng.), 1762, 1827.
 Bristol (Eng.), 1774, 1802.
 Philadelphia, 1782 ; also fol. 1796, 1798.

It is understood that the American Bible Society, in their future editions, intend to print the words *all to* in Italic letters ; so that the clause will read thus : "and *all-to* brake his skull." This is done in order to prevent the prevailing misapprehension, by suggesting that those words were added by the translators, and that the sense is complete without them.

Sacred Rhetoric, or, Composition and Delivery of Sermons. By Henry J. Ripley, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Duties in the Newton Theological Institution. To which are added Hints on Extemporaneous Preaching, by Henry Ware, Jr., D. D. Boston : Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, 59 Washington Street., 1849. Stereotyped and printed at Andover.

This work was not designed to supersede the well known treatises on Homiletics, but forms a valuable complement to them. Without professing to exhibit a complete and comprehensive view of the entire rhetorical science, it presents a rich variety of rules for the practical use of a clergyman. The rules evince the good sense, the large experience and the excellent spirit of Dr. Ripley ; and the whole volume is well fitted to instruct and stimulate the writer of sermons. While it fills a vacuum which has been left by other treatises, it encourages their renewed and thoughtful study.

The Hints of Dr. Ware we have long regarded as pre-eminently valuable. His views are in some respects rather extreme, but on the whole judicious and philosophical. A vast improvement would be effected in our homiletic literature, if preachers would never write *extempore*, but always with care ; if they would extemporize more frequently, so as to gain time and also power for the more labored and accurate penning of such discourses as their hearers, to say nothing of posterity, "will not willingly let die."

We notice that Dr. Ripley uses the word *inferential*. He may be justified in doing so. Webster authorizes it, without qualification. Worcester allows it, but marks it as "rarely used," and quotes the authority of John Tyler in its favor. Walker, Johnson, Todd, Perry, Richardson, do not sanction it, and nearly all English as well as many American reviewers condemn it. Still it is a wholesome and useful word, is favored by many analogies, has insinuated itself into the writings even of those who proscribe it, and must be considered as having struggled at last through much persecution into a tolerably safe part of our changeful language.

We alluded, in our last Number, p. 407, to the work of Professor Arnold Guyot, entitled "The Earth and Man." It is now published and is receiving great and deserved favor, and is destined to effect a happy improvement, if not a decided revolution in the study of geography. It unfolds, in a very happy manner, profound and comprehensive views of the structure of the earth and of its wise adaptations to the animal and rational life that people it. The admirable wisdom and goodness of the Creator are made everywhere conspicuous. Though we grieve for the loss which Switzerland and Europe sustain in the removal of such men as Professors Agassiz and Guyot, yet we rejoice to welcome them to this new world as our instructors in the sciences in which they are so eminent. Prof. G. is preparing a course of lectures on History in its relations to the structure of the earth. He will also write, at his leisure, some elementary works in geography. For the felicitous manner in which the Lectures are translated, the public are indebted to Prof. Felton.

Professor Gammell, of Brown University, has written a History of the Foreign Missions established and sustained by the American Baptists. It is prepared in a liberal tone, and in a truly scholar-like manner, and will be welcomed alike by the zealous Christian, the philanthropist, and the man of accomplished taste. It is published, as is the work of Prof. Guyot, by Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, of Boston.

Rev. Dr. L. Coleman, author of the well known works on Ecclesiastical Antiquities and Government, and now teacher of a classical school in Philadelphia, is author of a volume, 489 pp. 8vo., entitled, "Historical Geography of the Bible." It is supplied with Maps, chiefly copied from Kiepert's Bible Atlas (Berlin, 1847), with a Chronological Table, an Index of Texts, an Index of the Harmony of the Gospels, an Index of the Maps, and an Index of Subjects. These Indexes are carefully prepared and are really a most useful feature of the book. A great amount of valuable information is condensed in this volume, from the works of Dr. Robinson, Rosenmüller, Winer, Ritter, Von Raumer, etc., and from the most recent books of travels in the East. We notice in some cases a definiteness of statement which our knowledge will hardly warrant, e. g. the site of Ur and of Haran, p. 53.

Winer's Bible Dictionary, from which we have copied the Chronology on a previous page, is one of the most important works for the biblical student, which has been lately published. It is in two volumes, 8vo., pp. 688 and 779, is well printed, and is furnished, bound, in this country, for seven or eight dollars. With all its various merits, many of its articles are to be read with caution and with the necessary exceptions, as Dr. Winer has not escaped the rationalizing influences which prevail around him. In the first date, for instance, in the Chronology, he has neglected the statement of the apostle (Acts 18: 21) in relation to the time of Saul's reign. It is a subject for sincere regret that a work so useful should be disfigured by loose and erroneous statements, and by suggestions and doubts and hypotheses, which are as baseless as they are uncalled for. In the Preface, the reader will be glad to see the following statement: "That upon the whole, there appears to him to be contained even in the Old Testament more true continuous history than is now granted by many, and that he has learned during his labors this time, to entertain a higher respect for the Bible."

M. Botta, discoverer of the Assyrian Antiquities near Mosul, has been appointed French consul at Jerusalem.—Rev. Thomas Gordon is engaged in translating Wieseler's late work on the Chronology of the Apostolic Age to the death of the Apostles Peter and Paul.

The Homerton, Highbury, and Coward Colleges in London, are to be united so as to form one efficient institution, with a larger staff of professors than was connected with the older colleges, and with a more extended course of study in the various branches of literature, science, and theology. An eligible site has been purchased in St. John's Wood, and a building is to be completed within one year from next autumn. Coward College is the continuation of Dr. Doddridge's celebrated Dissenting Academy at Northampton. It possesses many of his books and manuscripts. Dr. Thomas Jenkyn is the instructor in theology. The students attend to the sciences in the classes of the London University, which is very near.

Dr. Isaac De Costa, a converted Jew of Amsterdam, has a work in press, entitled "Contributions to the History of the Jews from the earliest times to the present day." — Caussin de Percival, the well known orientalist of Paris, has published, in 3 vols. 8vo., "Essay on the History of the Arabs before Islamism, during the epoch of Mohammed, and until the reduction of all the tribes under Moslem law." — The System of Christian Doctrine, by Dr. C. I. Nitzsch, professor in Berlin, has been translated and published in London.

The Theologische Studien und Kritiken, edited by Ullmann and Umbreit, for July, 1849, contains, I. Remarks on the Doctrine respecting Sin, with reference to the work of Julius Müller; II. The Testimony which the

fourth Evangelist himself furnishes in respect to his own person, by K. L. Weitzel, deacon at Kirchheim; III. New Testament Lexical Studies and Criticisms, by Dr. G. F. Gelpke, professor in Bern, carefully analyzing the first words which occur, in the lexicon, e. g. *ἄβυσσος*, *ἀγαθός* and its compounds, *ἀγαλλιάω*, etc.; IV. Exegetical investigations on Mark 9: 49, 50, by Dr. Bähr of Karlsruhe; V. On the Idea of the Holiness of God, by J. M. Rupprecht, pastor at Krogelstein in Bavaria; VI. Review of Recent Works on the Church Pericope-System, by Ernest Fink; VII. A Notice of the new edition of the Greek Testament by de Muralto; VIII. Conclusion of an Article, begun in the preceding Number, by Dr. Sarwey, entitled, "Thoughts and Meditations, by a South German, on the Church of Norway."

The "History of the European States," commenced under the auspices of Heeren and Ukert, and published by Frederic Perthes of Hamburg, now contains 23 parts, at the subscription price of 101 Thaler.—The History of France is complete, viz. four volumes by Schmidt, and four volumes by Wachsmuth, on the history of France, during the Revolution. The History of Austria, by Mailath, is complete in five volumes. There are, besides, three volumes on Portugal, by Schäfer, and four on Russia, by Hermann.

The second vol. of Prof. F. W. Rettberg's Church History of Germany has been published. This vol. extends to the death of Charlemagne. — Dr. A. Hilgenfeld of Jena has published "the Gospel and Epistles of John, according to their doctrinal Import." — J. Perthes of Gotha is publishing a series of Atlases, constructed by E. von Sydow. They contain a hydrographic atlas, a school atlas in 37 charts, a methodical hand-atlas for the scientific study of Geography, in 21 charts, etc. They are beautifully and perspicuously colored, and are commended by Carl Ritter. — C. A. Bretschneider, teacher in the gymnasium at Gotha, is about to publish an Historico-geographical chart of Europe at the time of the Reformation. The price will be about \$1.50.

The third volume of Prof. Torrey's Translation of Neander's Church History is in press, and will shortly be published. — Rev. Dr. Woods's Lectures on Theology will be published in five volumes, price ten dollars. The first volume will be ready about the first of September. — It is expected that two volumes of the works of Rev. Dr. Emmons, in addition to the six already published, will be given to the public. — Rev. Dr. Joseph Bellamy's Works are in the process of stereotyping, under the auspices of the American Doctrinal Tract Society. The same Society propose to publish, from time to time, the works of the leading theologians of New England of past times. By means of a fund it will be able to accomplish what private enterprize would not be likely to undertake. The works will also be afforded at a reasonable price.

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ARTICLE I.
NATURAL THEOLOGY.

By Rev. J. Haven, Jr., Brookline, Mass.

If theology is the science of religion, natural theology is the science of natural religion, and should not be confounded therefore with natural religion itself. The question is, not whether in fact there is a God, but how do we *know* that there is one, what is the evidence that there is one, and how shall that evidence be best drawn out and presented; not whether there is in man an idea and belief of a supreme being, an idea and belief sufficient to control his conduct, nor whence he derives that idea, but simply what is the logical value of it. This palpable distinction between natural religion and natural theology, has not indeed always been kept in view by theological writers, yet is manifestly of importance.

If the definition now given be a correct one, natural theology, regarded as a science, lies evidently at the foundation and constitutes the firm basis of all other theological science. As in religion everything rests upon the *conviction* in the mind that there is a God, so in theology, in like manner, everything rests upon the *certainty*, the clear and decisive *evidence* that there is such a being. This evidence, it is the appropriate work and province of natural theology to set forth and arrange. Till this be done, nothing can be accomplished in theology. The science of revealed religion does not include this, any

more than the superstructure includes the foundation on which it is built. Revelation implies a revealer; it must first be known, then, that *there is* a being to reveal, before it can be known that anything is revealed. Until natural theology has done its work, all other theology is impossible.

Nor does revelation come in to aid and assist us in this work. Revelation is out of place, cannot be appealed to as authority, until natural theology has first established this primary truth, that besides and beyond man there is a being capable of revealing himself, and eternal truth, to man.

Manifestly, then, it is of the highest importance that a science which lies thus at the foundations of all other theological truth, should be well and thoroughly wrought, and carefully adjusted to its true position. There should be no flaw in the arguments. No part of the work should be slightly done. It should not be left to the enemies of truth to make the first discovery of any existing defect or weakness in the processes of our reasoning. In this matter, the friends of truth have more at stake than its enemies. He who points out a defect, or suggests an improvement, in the method of stating or defending that truth, should be regarded not as a foe but as a friend to the cause.

Yet, strange as it may seem, no department of theology perhaps has been left in so unfinished a state as this; none stands in greater need of what military men term *inspection*. The work has been wrought upon by diverse minds, in different ages, and in diverse methods; each in his own way has wrought. Some of the laborers have been truly sons of might, men of lofty and noble powers. But how well the diverse parts of the structure are fitted to each other, what are the strong and what the weak points in the line of defences, how and where it can most readily be assailed, these are to say the least open questions.

What we propose, in the present essay, is to take a general survey of this department of theological science, with a view of ascertaining, if possible, the comparative strength, and value, of the different arguments generally relied upon to establish the cardinal doctrine of the divine existence.

For this purpose some method of classification becomes necessary. It has been common to arrange the various arguments in natural theology under the general methods *a priori* and *a posteriori*. It admits of question however whether, strictly speaking, there is any such thing as *a priori* reasoning on this subject; any such thing as reasoning from some high and abstract truth downward to the existence of a supreme being; whether, in fact, all arguments for that existence

must not and do not have some starting point, some *πρῶτον*, in the world of effect.

Take for instance the argument of Clark, usually pronounced one of the finest specimens of this method of reasoning. The starting point in this instance is that *something exists*; from which it is, by a logical process, inferred that something has always existed—something uncaused, independent, the first cause of all other existence. The whole argument goes to show that this something which now exists is in reality an effect, and requires a cause. It cannot therefore with propriety be termed *a priori* reasoning, since it does not proceed from cause to effect, but on the contrary *from effect to cause*.

The celebrated argument of *Descartes*, derived from the idea of God in the human mind, is another instance of what has been usually called the *a priori* method. The substance of the argument is, that there could not be this *idea* of a supreme being in the human mind, unless there were a *corresponding being*, the type and originator of the idea; in other words, this idea of God, which man has, is an *effect*, which requires God as its *cause*. Is this reasoning from cause to effect, or the reverse?

Presuming then that there is, strictly speaking, only one general method of procedure in conducting the argument for the divine existence, viz. the *a posteriori*, it becomes evident that what we have to do is precisely this; to bring forward, from whatever source, something which can be shown to be an effect, and then to show, moreover, that for the existence of this effect there is and must be not simply a cause, but *such* a cause as corresponds to our idea of God. The effect must be such as to require for its production all that which we include under the term God. For it is evident that, in reasoning from effect to cause, we can infer no more in the cause than is sufficient to account for the effect. This principle has been strangely overlooked, however, by many writers. They have set out with a definite idea in their own minds of what God is, and having demonstrated, as they suppose, the existence of an effect, and so of a cause, they conclude that they have also demonstrated the existence of the being whom they call God, without pausing to inquire whether the effect in question is of such a nature as to require for its production just *that sort* of cause which they have in mind, and which they thus designate. The truth is, we are dependent on the effect for all our positive knowledge of the cause, —not simply *that* it is, but *what* it is; not simply that there is a God, but *what sort* of a being God is. The cause *may* be more than commensurate with the effect,—adequate to the production of effects *vastly* beyond this which we observe; but we do not know that it *is* so,

have no *evidence* of that, and therefore no certainty of it. What we have to do then in natural theology is, first to find something which can be clearly shown to be an effect, and then to show, furthermore, that it is *such* an effect, as requires for its production not a cause, merely, but *the* cause whose existence we wish to establish, and which we call God.

The arguments on which different theological writers have placed reliance, are manifold and diverse; yet they admit of being reduced to several classes, or leading divisions, according to the sources from which they are derived.

There is first the argument from the *simple existence* of matter — the ground-work and simple premise of which is this proposition, '*something is.*'

There is next the argument from the *properties and relations* of matter; not merely *something is*, but *something is so and so*. The argument from design, commonly so called, falls under this division.

Both the methods now indicated relate to the *external world, things without*. They are the arguments on which English and American theologians have hitherto placed their chief reliance, and with which they have principally concerned themselves. But arguments which others have deemed at least of equal strength and importance have been drawn from *the world within*. Of this sort is the method of reasoning from *the idea of God* which exists in man, in other words from the nature and operation of the human mind.

Then deeper and beyond this, in the inner world, there is the *moral nature and constitution* of man, which also furnishes an argument for the divine existence. These four comprise, it is believed, the various arguments which have been generally relied on to prove the existence of the supreme being.

I. The argument from the *existence of matter*, claims our first attention. It may be thus expressed. Something exists, therefore something must always have existed; either the things which now are, or else some other and superior being capable of producing them. But the things which now are, the present system and universe of things, lying about us, subject to our observation, of which we form a part, *this* cannot have been in existence from eternity; is not independent, self-existent, and uncaused. Therefore some other being is so, and is the first cause and author of these things.

This has been regarded by many as one of the strongest arguments which it is possible to frame in proof of the existence of a first cause. Reduced to the syllogistic form, it would read thus:

1st Syllogism.

1. Whatever exists must either have *eternally* existed, or have *begun* to exist.
2. But matter has not existed eternally.
3. Therefore matter began to exist.

2d Syllogism.

1. But whatever *begins* to exist, has some *cause* of beginning.
2. Matter begun to exist.
3. Therefore matter has some cause of its existence ; in other words a producer or creator.

It is evident now at a glance on what portion of the argument the burden of proof mainly falls. In either syllogism, the major premise is obviously true ; self-evident ; it is the minor alone that requires proof. To show that the present system of things is *not eternal*, that it had a *beginning*, *hic opus, hoc labor est*. Unless this can be clearly and certainly established, the whole argument falls. You have not shown an *effect*, and cannot therefore demand a *cause*. Now this is precisely the point which it is most difficult to establish, and which nevertheless seems to have been comparatively overlooked, and hastily passed over by many writers, not sufficiently aware of its importance and difficulty. It is manifestly not so much the *existence* as the *begun* existence of matter that concerns us in the present argument.

And how is this to be proved ? For in an argument of this sort we are not to take a mere impression, a conviction of the mind, however firm, as a sufficient basis of reasoning, but to demand clear and conclusive evidence. What then is the evidence that the present system of things, or that matter in general, began to exist, and is not from eternity ?

Various have been the methods by which different writers have attempted to establish this. Prominent among them are these two. 1. The present system of things cannot be eternal because it is composed of successive and finite parts. Generation succeeds generation, plant succeeds plant, man follows man, and so on in constant series and progression. *Each part* being finite, the *whole* cannot be infinite. 2. It cannot be eternal because it admits of *change*, which is inconsistent with absolute and necessary existence.

The first of these arguments proceeds on the supposition that an infinite whole cannot be composed of a series of parts each of which is finite ; in other words, that an infinite series of finite parts is impos-

sible. This has been called a self-evident proposition. It may be fairly questioned, however, whether the evidence of its truth lies so fully obvious as to merit that high claim. Can we not conceive of extension or of duration infinitely protracted through successive periods, each of which is finite, yet, because they are infinite in series, making an infinite whole. If the successive periods or parts, though finite, are *without number*, so that you cannot fix your thoughts upon any one of them, and say *this is the first*, or *that is the last*, is not the *series*, in that case infinite? Indeed, what other idea can any man form of the existence of God than this, of a being existing from eternity in successive periods of conscious duration. '*An eternal now*,' however bold and sublime as a figure of poetic diction, yet, strictly interpreted, is an expression to which it is utterly impossible for the human mind, constituted as it is, to attach any clear and intelligible idea, for the simple reason that if it means anything, it means that which to us can never be true, but only a contradiction in terms. We might safely challenge any man to form in his own mind a distinct idea of the existence of a conscious intelligent being, from which idea and from whose existence all succession of thought, feeling and event shall be entirely excluded.

Does the finiteness of the parts destroy the infinity of the whole? Let us apply this to the divine existence. If there be a God, the first cause and producer of all things, he must have existed before he created; creation is an event, has a date, a beginning, previous to which the Deity existed alone. We may in our thoughts then divide the duration of the Deity into these two parts, in the first of which he dwells alone, in the second, surrounded with created existence. The two make up the entire duration of the Deity; yet both are finite; for the first ends, and the other begins, at the moment of creation. We may and do then, without inconsistency, or contradiction, conceive of finite parts, yet an infinite whole. It may be said that the duration of the Deity is in reality unbroken and continuous. This is admitted. But the same is also true of all existence so long as it continues. Succession of parts does not interrupt the series. The line may be in reality unbroken, yet in its extension may be carried through a succession of inches without number. A single human life is, from the moment of its beginning, to the instant of its termination, a continuous existence, an unbroken thread; yet it is no inconsistency to speak of it as composed of successive parts. Protract that existence, that continuous thread, infinitely in either direction, and you have an infinite series of finite parts.

Is eternal succession impossible? Let us apply this also to the di-

vine existence. It will be generally admitted that in the divine mind there is succession of thought and feeling. As has been already said, we can form no intelligible idea of a conscious rational existence, which is entirely destitute of this element. We do not, in fact, conceive of God as cherishing toward the sinner repenting to-day, the same emotions with which he regarded the same sinner impenitent and obdurate yesterday. Nor do we conceive of Him as putting forth, at one and the same instant, all volitions and all acts; as constantly creating this world, or constantly redeeming it, or as creating and redeeming it at one and the same moment. Succession of events enters into all our conceptions of divine agency, as does succession of thought and feeling into all our ideas of the divine existence. Unless then the Deity has existed, at some time, absolutely without thoughts, emotion, or volition, there has actually been an infinite succession of these in the divine mind.

Of the existence of saints and angels, and in like manner of our own future existence, we can form no other idea than this of constant succession through endless duration. The joy, and the song, and the intellectual employment, of an angel before the throne to-day, is not the joy, and the song, and the range of thought, of that same angel as he stood before that throne yesterday and worshipped. And if we are ourselves to exist hereafter and that endlessly, it will be an existence protracted through successive periods of duration, marked by successive events, successive thoughts and emotions, following each other in endless series and progression. In these cases, however, the succession though endless is not strictly infinite, since it is admitted to have had a beginning. Not so however as regards the Deity. In any case we have only to make the supposition of eternal existence, and infinite succession becomes not only possible but seems to follow as a sure consequence. The law of succession then cannot be relied on to prove a begun existence.

It is not necessary, however, to demonstrate that there is any such thing, in fact, as infinite or eternal succession; but only, that such a thing can, without absurdity, or contradiction, be conceived to exist; that it is not impossible. In either case the objection is valid, and the argument is overthrown; for it is claimed, by those who advance this argument, to be a plain and self-evident truth, that such a thing as infinite succession is impossible.

A new element however is introduced into the discussion, when we conceive of the series as composed not merely of successive finite parts, but of parts that are successively dependent each on the other. Plants, animals, men, exist not merely in succession, but each genera-

tion depends for its existence on that which preceded. Inasmuch as each part is dependent, can the whole be independent? Can there be an infinite series, every part of which had a beginning, but the series itself no beginning; a chain, each link of which depends on another, but the whole on nothing.

That the argument is not materially modified by the introduction of this new element, will appear on a little reflection. In any argument or illustration of this sort, as for instance that of the chain, ideas derived from things finite are carried forward and applied to things infinite, and it is more than possible that some fallacy may lurk under such a method of reasoning. Because there cannot be a chain of numberless iron links suspended in the air without some point of support out of itself, it does not follow that there cannot be, or that there has not been, an infinite series of generations of living men, plants, or animals, in the world, each starting from the preceding, yet the whole series independent on any external producing cause. If the series be *infinite*, it is for that very reason, and by the very supposition, *independent* also. There is a virtual *petitio principii* involved in this reasoning. It is confidently asked on what the whole chain hangs, *thus* presuming a *first link*; whereas, if the chain be infinite, according to the supposition, it *has no first* link. What produced the first man, plant, animal, of a series which is infinite, and therefore has no first? Where did that begin, which by the very supposition has no beginning.

And where does he who so confidently propounds this query, as if it were the end of all controversy, propose to suspend his chain of existence? On a great first link, of course, and that link infinite and endless, itself unsupported, and hanging upon nothing. Has he ever seen *such* a chain? Is it not evident that this method of reasoning by illustrations drawn from sensible objects, is, whatever its logical value and force, an instrument capable of turning in either direction, and quite as likely to operate against, as for, him who uses it.

We come directly back then, after all, to the simple question, already discussed, can there be any such thing as an infinite succession or series. Whatever may be the true answer to this problem, the considerations now suggested are, it would seem, sufficient to show that the alleged *impossibility* of such a thing as infinite or eternal succession is, to say the least, not a *self-evident* proposition. In an argument of this sort, derived from the abstract laws of being or nature of things, an argument so positive withal in its assertions, and so lofty in its claims, the mind demands, and has a right to demand, clear and positive evidence of the things asserted. When the atheist

affirms that the present system and order of things is actually an eternal series, without beginning or cause, we demand proof; when the theist affirms that an infinite series is an *impossibility*, we demand of him likewise the irresistible evidence of what he asserts. It may be fairly questioned whether either theist or atheist can make good his assertion; whether both have not undertaken to prove what cannot be proved. Certainly the mere possibility of an eternal series, even if it were granted, is no evidence that the present system *is in fact* such a series. On the other hand the argument under consideration fails to furnish clear and sufficient proof that the present order of things is a *begun* arrangement, an *effect*.

It has been shrewdly objected to the idea of infinite succession that in this way we should obtain infinite quantities that are unequal to each other, one infinite greater than another infinite; that if the generations are infinite, the number of individuals must be vastly greater than that of generations, and the number of eyes, limbs, etc., so many times greater than that of individuals, and so we have one infinite ten times as large as another infinite, and that again just half as large as another, which it is affirmed is sheer absurdity. So reasons Bentley, and others after him have attained to the same sharpness. The dialectic subtilty of this objection is more worthy of admiration than its logical force. Are all infinities *equal* of necessity? Where is the evidence of that? Clark, the very Philistine of dialectic warfare, confesses the futility of this reasoning. "To ask whether the parts of unequal quantities be equal in number or not, when they have no number at all, being the same thing as to ask whether two lines drawn from differently distant points, and each of them continued infinitely, be equal in length, or not, that is whether they *end* together, when neither of them have *any end* at all!"¹

The other argument by which metaphysical writers have endeavored to prove that the present system of things is not eternal, viz. that it admits of change, next demands attention. It is contended that if the world has existed from eternity and is uncaused, the ground of its being is in itself alone, in other words it is a *necessary* existence, a thing which it is an absurdity, and a contradiction to suppose not to exist. But all change or modification is inconsistent with the idea of necessary existence. If the world is a necessary existence then it can never have been, or be supposed to have been, *other than it now is*, in any respect. It would be a contradiction, and absurdity, to suppose it either larger, or smaller, than it actually is; either swifter or slower, in its movements; having more, or fewer, mountains, rivers,

¹ Demonst. p. 35.

seas, plants, animals, than it now has. Everything is fixed by the law of absolute unalterable necessity. But such is not the fact with respect to the present system. It admits of and is constantly undergoing change, and cannot therefore be eternal. Such is substantially the reasoning of *Clark* in his celebrated demonstration.

With all deference to the great minds that have elaborated, and the great names that have endorsed this argument, it may nevertheless be called in question; the more so, that it has ever professed itself fearless of scrutiny, and boldly challenged investigation.

Where then, it may be asked, is the *evidence* that all change is inconsistent with self-existence; how do we know that? Let the same method of reasoning be applied to the divine existence. The Deity it will be admitted exists by a necessity of his own nature; owes his existence to nothing out of himself. It is impossible then, according to this argument, to conceive of him either as *not* existing, or as being *other* than he is. But how is this? Since I can conceive the *world* not to exist, can I not also, in that case, conceive the *world-maker* not to be; the work being gone, what forbids my supposing there is no workman? Or I can conceive that it is *self-existent*, and then, being no longer an effect, it does not demand a cause. Or I can conceive it to be a different sort of world from what it is, in which case it may have required a different kind of Deity to produce it. Had it been a malevolent effect, I should have inferred a malevolent cause. In a word, there is no inconsistency or absurdity in modifying our conceptions of the maker, in such a manner as to correspond to any changes we may make in our conceptions of the things made. If it be not absurd or impossible to *conceive* of the world as not existing, or as existing otherwise than now, then it is not absurd or impossible to *conceive* of the Deity as not existing, or as being other than he now is. But it is a contradiction in terms, says *Clark*, to *suppose* a self-existent, that is, a *necessarily* existent being, not to exist, or to be other than it is. Therefore, he says, this world is not self-existent. Therefore, he might add, also, the Deity is not self-existent.

But in those conceptions which the mind ordinarily forms, and is taught to form, of the Deity, is there not involved something of this forbidden element, of transition from one state or circumstance of being, to another; do we not conceive of him, *now* as working, *now* as resting from his works; and that without any implied change in his nature, or attributes? Now, who will say that in this transition of the supreme being, from the state of absolute rest, and alone existence, to that greatest of all conceivable works, *creation*, — the calling into being other existences, and innumerable worlds, and systems, — there

is not involved a change at least as great as occurs on the earth, in the gradual passing away of one generation, and the succession of another, the falling of a tree in the forest, and the springing up of another in its place, or the gradual changes constantly going on in the relative position of mountain and valley, of land and sea? For in these transitions which we observe, this constant succession of things in the world, is it not a change of *state* and *circumstances*, rather than of *nature* or *essential qualities*, that we behold? How do we know that all this does not take place in nature according to some fixed, eternal law, founded in the very nature of things, as immutable in its character, as unvarying in its operations, existing by a necessity as absolute, as the Deity itself—the universal, eternal, immutable law of transition and succession? What forbids such a supposition, and what is there in it inconsistent with the idea of self-existence? Where is the evidence that these and the like transitions have not been going on eternally?

But however that may be, if we can and do conceive of the supreme being as working, or as resting from his works, as existing for a longer or a shorter time before beginning to create, as calling into existence more or fewer planets, systems, orders of being, as having never created, if in any or all these respects we can, without absurdity, suppose the Deity to have been, or to have done, far otherwise than he has actually been, or done, if it be, in fact, no more a contradiction to reason, and to the actual state of things, to make such a supposition than it is to suppose the world different from what it now is, then how does it appear that all change, and even the very conception and possibility of change, is inconsistent with *necessary and eternal existence*? And if this be not inconsistent with the necessary existence of the Deity, why should it be with that of the universe, or of being in general?

But to suppose a self-existent being *not* to exist, or to exist *otherwise* than it is, involves as great an absurdity, says Clark, as to suppose two and two not to be equal to four. But suppose one were to deny this. Suppose some one, less acute than the great philosopher, were audacious enough to say, "To my mind this does not so appear, nor can I possibly make it appear thus;" what shall be done with this man? How shall he be made to perceive the alleged absurdity? Is not his *denial* of any such absurdity, as valid in argument, as our *assertion* of it? To say the least, is it not somewhat singular that, if this be as its advocates affirm a self-evident truth, so many, and by no means illiterate, or ill-informed minds, should have confessed themselves unable to perceive its conclusiveness?

The argument under consideration, however subtle and ingenious, has failed to commend itself generally to reflecting minds, much more

to the popular apprehension. Dr. Reid says of it, "These are the speculations of men of superior genius ; but whether they be solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination into a region beyond the limits of the human understanding, I am unable to determine." Dr. Brown speaks with more confidence : "I conceive the abstract arguments which have been adduced to show that it is *impossible* for *matter* to have existed from eternity — by reasoning on what has been termed *necessary existence*, and the incompatibility of this *necessary existence* with the qualities of matter — to be relics of the mere *verbal logic* of the schools, as little capable of producing conviction, as any of the wildest and most absurd of the technical scholastic reasonings on the properties or supposed properties of entity and non-entity." Dr. Chalmers also professes himself entirely unsatisfied with this argument, and unimpressed by it. "Because I can imagine Jupiter to be a sphere instead of a spheroid ; and no logical absurdity stands in the way of such imagination, — therefore Jupiter must have been created. Because he has only four satellites, whilst I can figure him to have ten ; and there is not the same arithmetical falsity in this supposition as in that three and one make up ten, — therefore all the satellites must have had a beginning. * * * We must acknowledge ourselves to be unimpressed by such reasoning. For aught I know, or can be made by the light of nature to believe — matter may, in spite of those dispositions which he calls arbitrary, have the necessity within itself of its own existence — and yet be neither a logical nor a mathematical necessity. It may be a physical necessity — the ground of which I understand not, because placed transcendently above my perceptions and my powers — or lying immeasurably beyond the range of my contracted and ephemeral observation."

The metaphysical argument against the eternity of the present system has been somewhat differently stated by a late ingenious writer. — The world *might* have had a beginning — there is nothing to forbid such a supposition. If it might have had a *beginning*, then it might have had a *cause* — whatever admits of the one, admits of the other. But if it *might* have had a cause, then it *must* have had one — for whatever is *capable* of having a cause of its existence, is *incapable* of existing without a cause. — We have here, to use an artistic term, a *variation* of the original theme, sprightly and pleasing, but embodying the same essential idea. It devolves on the reasoner, in this case, to show, inasmuch as he throws the whole weight of the argument on that one word, that the world *might* have had a beginning ; that it is possible for anything, for such a thing, for *this* particular thing, to

come into existence out of nothing ; and also to show that whatever can be caused, *cannot* be *uncaused* ; neither of which propositions can easily or clearly be made out by any abstract process of reasoning. Suppose, in the present instance, an obstinate objector were to insist upon reversing this argument, as an engineer reverses his machine and so obtains movement and speed in a contrary direction. Suppose he were to say, It is possible that the world should have had no beginning ; it *might* have been eternal. If it might have had no beginning, then it might have had no cause. But if it *might* have had no cause, then it *must* have had none, for whatever admits of being *uncaused* does *not* admit of being *caused*.

It will be observed that in this investigation we have not been careful to distinguish between the existence of matter in the abstract, and its existence in the present state and system of things, as we find it in our world. The argument, in fact, includes both ; nor is the distinction essential to it, since if the *non-eternity* either of matter abstractly, or of our world as we find it, were once clearly established, we obtain in either case the demonstration of a first cause.

Whether this point can be established by any abstract process of reasoning is, to say the least, altogether questionable. As brought to prove the present system an effect, and so to establish the existence of a first cause, the metaphysical argument must, on the whole, it would seem, be pronounced unsatisfactory and unsound. When once this point is established, the method in question may, however, be of service in demonstrating the self-existence, independence, and eternity of that first cause, which can perhaps in no other way be so clearly shown.

How then, it will be asked, since not in this way, is that most important point, absolutely essential indeed to the argument, and to the whole science of natural theology, to be made certain ? That the present system, this world of ours, had a beginning, may, we believe, be clearly shown, if not metaphysically, yet in some other way. The *physical sciences* have it for their appropriate sphere and province to do this ; and they *can* do it to the satisfaction, it would seem, of any reasonable mind. They can and do show that the present things have not always been ; that our earth has passed through a series of changes, always advancing. In the deep foundations of the globe itself, they read the sure history of these changes, written as with an iron pen, and lead, in the rock, forever. They carry us, with unerring step, back to a period in that history when, instead of the present highly organized forms of matter, and of life, there is no longer the least perceptible trace of any organization whatever. Back of the

ever rushing stream of time, and beneath its mighty cataract, they conduct us along, till we reach the spot where all forms of organized being finally disappear, and we stand on "*termination rock*;" beyond all is darkness; we can go no further; but the conclusion irresistibly forces itself upon the mind, uttered as with the sound of many waters, that this unorganized matter, too, had its beginning. But however that may be, one thing is now certain, that *life* in all its varieties of structure and development, life in the plant, the animal, the human species, had a *beginning*. We reach, we examine, a point in the earth's history when, as yet, there were none of these things. But if these things began, there must have been a *beginner*; one capable of producing such things. The existence of a first cause is thus reached.

In all this, however, we are reasoning not from *metaphysics* but from *physics*. So doing, we build not upon airy abstractions, but upon the firm and solid earth.

II. We come now to the second method or argument in natural theology, an argument not from the existence of matter, but from its manifest properties, and relations. The starting point, the *novum*, is entirely changed; the scene is laid, not in the distant places of the universe, but near at home, amid the daily walks and under the common observation of men; the argument rests, not on the abstract truth that matter, or even our world, exists, but that it is *such a sort of world* as we find it to be.

The strongly practical tendencies of the English mind have made this a favorite method of reasoning with theological writers of that country, especially for the last century; previously to which the metaphysical reasoning of Clark, and others of that school, held, for a time, predominant influence. The argument is that in the world, as it lies before us, there are such evident indications of contrivance, such adaptation of means to ends, such fitness of one thing to another, as can leave no reasonable mind in doubt that an intelligent, designing mind has been concerned in the arrangement; in other words, that there must have been a contriver.

What, now, is the real strength and true value of this argument? Has it sound logic, and a sound philosophy, as its basis and support? In proposing and conducting such inquiries, let us not be understood as disparaging, much less abandoning, this method of reasoning, but rather as diligently carrying on a sort of coast-survey and soundings, with a view to ascertain the true depth of the channel, and its proper direction. The more important the channel, the more important that such survey and soundings should be accurately and thoroughly made.

It must be borne in mind that, whatever method we pursue in natu-

ral theology, the things to be done, as stated at the outset, are these two: first, to show conclusively that something is an *effect*; then, that it is *such* an effect, as to require for its producing cause *whatever we include under the name and idea of God*. Does then the argument from design, as now stated, really accomplish these two things?

In order to settle this point, we must first determine what degree and kind of evidence is necessary in order to prove anything to be an effect. How are we to *know* what is effect, and what is not? The real question is, not what proves a *designer*, but what proves *design*. Does simple *fitness of means to an end* prove it? This is assumed, it will be perceived, in the argument now under consideration. It is the running principle that pervades and holds together the entire body of reasoning in Paley's justly admired treatise; the warp, that receives the entire filling, with all its beautiful devices. The design of the work, and object of the writer, is evidently this,—to point out in nature a considerable number of instances, as striking as possible, of this manifest fitness of means to a given end,—and thence to draw the conclusion, from the facts observed, that this fitness *must have been designed*, must be an effect, and therefore requires an efficient cause or producer. It is assumed that simple fitness of means to an end is a sufficient basis on which to construct the argument, is in itself demonstration that the system of things, which exhibits such arrangement and relation of parts, must be an effect. The whole argument from design, as usually brought forward by its advocates, rests upon this essential premise, which, instead of assuming, it had been well perhaps to have examined somewhat thoroughly, before proceeding to build so important a structure upon it. This seems nowhere to have been done. Everywhere it is taken for granted, that fitness of things to given ends is contrivance, and so proves a contriver. But is this invariably and necessarily so? Is there no element overlooked in this process? Does simple fitness to an end, however striking and admirable that fitness may be, in itself prove design? Is it of no consequence that we should know whether this relation and fitness of things, which we call contrivance, is a *begun* arrangement, or not? If in proposing these inquiries, we seem to be striking at the very foundation of the argument from design, as usually advanced, it is only that we may replace that argument upon a firmer basis.

The question is one not to be determined at a glance. The simple fact that the human mind, whether rightly or wrongly, logically or illogically, does nevertheless almost universally reason in this manner, that where there is manifest fitness of things to given ends, *there is design*, *there is* an effect, somebody has been at work *there*, this of it-

self goes far toward establishing the correctness of the principle in question. But how is it, and why is it, that we invariably reason in this manner? This is a matter deserving the closest attention.

Reid, Stewart, and the philosophers of that school, refer the matter to a *primary law* of the human mind. We are *so constituted*, that when we perceive this relation of things, this fitting of one thing to another so as to bring about a certain end, we are convinced that there must have been design there — contrivance — a contriver; and in coming to this conclusion we simply carry out the law of our nature.

Now it is easy to account for any phenomenon which we imperfectly understand, in this way; to refer it to a *primary law* of the mind, and say, we are *so constituted*, and that is the end of the matter. Nor is it easy for any one to show that such is not the true solution of the problem. It deserves to be considered, however, whether, in the present instance, such a principle will not carry us too far. *If it be a primary law of the human mind that leads us to reason thus, then such reasoning is beyond question correct, and its conclusions valid. Wherever we see this fitness and relation of things, there it becomes certain that design has been employed. We have the best possible evidence of it, the testimony of this primary law of our own being, which, unless we are so constituted as to be always deceived, must speak the truth. Whatever presents to our mind, then, any fitness to a given end, is, beyond doubt, an effect, a contrivance; the greater and more manifest the fitness — the greater and more sublime the end to be accomplished — so much the greater the evidence and the certainty of this. Above all other beings and things, then, we must conclude the Deity to be an effect; for he, of all beings and things, presents to our conceptions the greatest and most manifest fitness to the greatest and sublimest ends. Nor is there any escape from this sad conclusion, but to retrace our steps, and proceed anew more cautiously.*

Perceiving the difficulties which are likely to attend this solution of the matter, others refer the whole thing to *human experience*. Of this number are Paley and Chalmers. It is not, according to them, because of any primitive law of the mind that we infer design where we see fitness to given ends, but simply because our own experience teaches us thus to reason. We have ourselves, in repeated instances, observed this fitness of things to be the result of special contrivance on our part, or on the part of others; have never perhaps, in a single instance, observed anything of it where it was not, to our knowledge and satisfaction, the result of such contrivance; we come, therefore, naturally to conclude that it is invariably so, and whenever we see

indications of this quality, we infer that these are in like manner evidences and results of the operation of a designing mind.

Whatever may be true of the justness of this conclusion, it is altogether probable that it is one to which we are led in the manner now indicated, i. e. as the result of our own experience. The matter admits of a practical test. Suppose one destitute of any such experience, having never contrived anything, or seen aught contrived by others, — a child thrown in early life upon some uninhabited island, subsisting on the spontaneous productions of nature, unacquainted with men and their ways. Let such an one discover, at length, on the shore of his solitary dwelling-place, some piece of human mechanism; — the watch with which Paley introduces his beautiful treatise. He has never seen such a thing before; forms no idea, of course, as to what it is, its nature, or use; is quite as likely to think it some strange *shell-fish*, or curious *insect*, as anything else. All reasoning about it, and from it to a producing cause is, in such a case, out of the question. The child or child-man may wonder where it came from, or how it came there, but not who made it. But suppose now the nature of this newly-discovered curiosity is in some way made known to him. His wondering eye begins to comprehend the mysteries of its complicated structure. He discerns its use, and the fitness of its parts to subserve that use. Does the idea of a *maker*, a *contriver*, necessarily suggest itself to his mind at this stage of the process? Why should it? Whence should it come? He has never known anything to be produced or contrived. What is there in the thing before him to awaken in his mind this new idea? The thing exists; that is certain; but for aught he knows it may always have existed. It is very curious; that is certain; but it may always have been as curious as now. It is capable of use; but so far as he can see, it may always have been capable of the same. There is nothing in the machine itself to indicate that it ever had a beginning, or to suggest the idea of a cause. He knows not that it is a *machine*; an effect, a contrivance. To him it is simply an *existence*, — one of the thousand existences which he perceives about him, — all to him mysterious; himself, — if his thoughts should ever travel so far into the region of conjecture, — his own existence, and origin, the greatest of all mysteries to himself.

How comes now this untaught, unobservant being to reach the grand idea of a producing cause? According to Reid, Stuart, and others, he gets it by the operation of a primary law of the mind which leads him, from the perceived fitness of things to certain ends, to infer at once, and independently of all experience, the existence of design and a designer. According to those who maintain the opposite view,

he does not get the idea of producing cause at all, and never will get it, — apart from revelation, until *his own experience* comes to his aid, and guides him to the first steps of an analogy, which is to lead him on to the sublime conclusion that there is a being who made him and all things.

That this is the right solution of the problem we are strongly inclined to believe. The question returns however, as on the other hypothesis, whether this inference, this reasoning from what we know to what we do not know, is perfectly just and sound. Assuming that the theory last mentioned is the true one,—that we reason in this manner only from experience,—and our experience being necessarily limited, — how far, and with what degree of confidence, may we safely follow such a guide? When we reason in this manner from analogy, do we reason always safely and conclusively? We have seen ships built, and houses; so far our experience; does it follow with certainty, from this, that worlds are built also, and are, in like manner, the effect of contrivance? So we conclude. But is the conclusion valid? Here is a man who, from whatever cause, has never as yet exercised the inventive faculties of his mind in the direct contrivance of anything with reference to the accomplishment of a given end, — who has never observed such efforts, on the part of others, — has no acquaintance in fact with the manifold devices and arts by which a busy, ever-plotting world makes all things subservient to its own purposes. This man is, according to the present argument, without evidence of the existence of a supreme being, in other words of a general designer of all things, since he is without personal experience or knowledge of any such thing as design. He may perceive manifold and notable instances of fitness and adaptation in the material world to the purposes of man's being, but they do not excite his wonder, for he has never known these things to be otherwise; much less are they data from which he can reason to the unknown and the infinite. Thus stands the case with him to-day. To-morrow, for the first time, he invents, he contrives, no matter what — the simplest mechanism of which we can conceive — a wooden peg — a leaf-apron. Now matters are essentially changed. The mystery of the great Universe now opens before him. He has sufficient data now from which to reason out with unerring certainty the existence of a great first cause. 'This wooden peg, this girdle of platted leaves, is a wonderful thing, — soliloquizes our new artist; — it's an invention of my own, — a contrivance. It would never have existed in its present form, and never have secured its present purpose, had not my own inventive mind formed the design and carried it into execution. Now

I understand how it is this goodly world, and I myself, exist. This peg instructs me. It is manifestly fitted to a useful purpose. It has that fitness only because of my forethought and contrivance. I am authorized then to conclude that *whatever* seems fitted to some use, is in like manner the product and result of forethought and intelligent design, — and as all things about me in the universe seem to possess such fitness to useful ends, it follows, from this my specimen of contrivance, that *all things* are likewise contrived.' Such, we are to understand, would be the course of thought in his mind; and according to the philosophy we are now discussing, it is a method of reasoning perfectly fair and conclusive.

Nor is it easy to see what should hinder our artist, and newly instructed reasoner, from proceeding a little further in the same direction. Ought he not, in consistency with the above reasoning, to conclude on the same principle, that *if there be*, anywhere else, out of this visible universe, and beyond this sphere of observation, any form of existence capable of promoting and bringing about useful ends, having a fitness therefor, *that also* is a contrivance — and so the being, whoever he may be, that wrought out and first divined this present system, possessed the qualities that fitted him for such a work, must *par eminence*, be an effect.

But even if we suppose him not to reason thus consistently, but to stop short of that dread conclusion, is it not evident, that to infer the contrived existence of *everything* which manifests fitness to useful ends, from the known contrivance of *anything* that has such fitness, to deduce the mechanism of the universe from the manufacture of the simplest human contrivances, is a method far too bold and sweeping; that the basis is quite too narrow for the superstructure; that there are and must be limits to this matter of reasoning from the results of our experience, the few and little things which we know, to the things which we do not know, the infinite, the eternal.

Now it is precisely at this point in the line of defences, that the enemies of our religion bring their heaviest machinery to bear. Because in this world of ours certain things are well adapted to certain uses, it does not follow, say they, that these things, and this world, are of necessity contrived. There is no evidence of that. It is merely an *inference* of our own, and one based on insufficient premises. We came to this conclusion by seeing human contrivances and devices. Our experience helps us to it. But it does not follow that because we contrive and produce certain arrangements and adaptations of things, therefore *all things whatsoever*, which manifest like fitness to certain ends, are also the result of contrivance. The watch that I

have seen constructed by the skill and ingenuity of the artist, may be to me a sufficient datum from which to conclude that *other* watches are in like manner contrived. But what right have I to infer that all things in the universe are thus produced, because I have seen one thing made? If thrown on an uninhabited shore, I should find in my rambles some structure of reeds or sticks or stones, capable of affording shelter, and like to the habitations which men construct under such circumstances, I might reasonably conclude that some one had been there before me, and that this was his work. But because this hut of reeds or stones is manifestly a contrivance, the result of a producing intelligent cause, shall I proceed at once to the conclusion that the *planet Jupiter* is likewise a contrivance, or that the world in which I live is so? I have seen a ring manufactured. Is it therefore certain that the rings of *Saturn* are likewise produced? Who has ever seen a world made, continues the skeptic; or known of one being made within the sphere of his personal observation? If one had ever made, or seen made any such thing as a world, then he might reasonably conclude that *other* worlds were made also. But where is the evidence of it as matters now stand?

Such is substantially the reasoning of *Hume* in his famous objection to the argument from design. The world, he contends, if it be an effect, is a *singular* one, unlike anything which we have ever seen produced. We have had no experience in world-making as we have in watch-making, and cannot therefore reason from the one case to the other.

No one perhaps has more resolutely girded himself to encounter this formidable objection than the truly noble Chalmers. Admitting that experience is the basis of all our reasoning in such matters, he contends that in the present case we are not destitute of that basis, but, on the contrary, have all the experience we need. It is not necessary he contends that we should take into account *the specific* end which was intended to be accomplished in any piece of mechanism, but only that we should see *an* end, and that evidently designed. Having in many instances observed the invariable connection between a designing intellect, as cause, and any wise and useful end, as the result, we may in all cases where one of these two terms is given, infer the existence of the other. It matters not whether we have ever seen a watch made, or any machine having exactly that office and use. We have seen *other* things made in which was the like fitness of part to part, and of means to ends, and in which this fitness has always been the result of contrivance. In a thousand instances we have observed the relation between these two things, the fitness, and the contrivance,

to be that of antecedent and consequent ; of cause and effect. This experience warrants us in concluding, that whenever we find, in any new instance, the same phenomenon, i. e., adaptation to an end, we find it there as the result of the same antecedent, i. e., a designing intelligence. "Thus we might infer the agency of design in a *watch-maker*, though we never saw a watch made" — and so "we can on the very same ground infer the agency of design on the part of a *world-maker*, though we never saw a world made."

This reasoning is valid, on the supposition that *there is* such a being as a *world-maker* ; in other words, that the world is an effect, a thing made. The argument proceeds entirely and avowedly on this supposition. It is only *in things made* that we perceive this invariable connection between fitness and an end, in the things produced, and designing intelligence, in the producer. It is only *in things made*, therefore, that having one of these terms we can safely infer the other. If we extend the inference to other classes of objects, to things *not* produced, or of whose production, and begun existence, we have no *evidence*, we set sail on an ocean of which we know not the shores and bounds, if indeed there be any, or to what strange lands our venturesome course may tend ; we drive before the winds with neither chart nor way mark to guide us, nor any headland in view, sed coelum undique, et undique pontus. Nay it is not difficult to foresee on what rocks we must in the end be driven, for if we reason in this manner from things which we know to be produced, to things which we do not know to be so, and conclude that fitness in the latter is the result of contrivance, because it is so in the former, then we must include the Deity himself in our catalogue of effects, nor is there any possible way of escaping that conclusion.

Now beyond doubt if the world ~~be~~ an effect, a produced and not an eternal existence, it is the production of an intelligent and designing cause. But *is* it an effect ? This is the very gist and substance of the whole question, — the very thing we are in pursuit of, but which after all is as far from our grasp as ever. The argument of Chalmers does not put us in possession of this, nor indeed does it profess to do so. It is a point which must be reached, if at all, in some other way.

The argument from design, however, as usually advanced, is *intended* and supposed, by those who bring it forward, to establish this very point, that this our world *is* an effect, a contrivance, and must therefore have had a contriver. They rely upon it as conclusive of this matter. Thus stated, the argument in question must be regarded as logically and essentially defective. Mere fitness to an end does not,

of itself, as we have shown, prove design. We must first know that this fitness, and the substance to which it pertains, is a begun arrangement, a begun existence; nor is there anything in the mere fitness, however striking that may be, to determine the point whether such fitness, and the subject or substance to which it pertains, *be* or *be not*, an effect, a begun arrangement, in distinction from existence uncaused and eternal. There is this essential defect in the argument from design as usually stated. It is the defect of Paley and other reasoners. They rely upon the fitness of things as of itself proving contrivance, irrespective of the question whether this fitness had a *beginning* or not.

The true method of establishing this first, chief, absolutely essential point in natural theology, — that the present system of things is an effect, had a beginning, and a cause of beginning, — has been already indicated. It is not for any process of reasoning, whether from the abstract existence of matter, or from its wonderful adaptations and arrangements, to set this matter in a clear light. It is for *science* only to do this. It is for her to trace out for us, in nature itself, the written demonstration not simply of the begun but of the *recently* begun existence of whatever forms of organized life dwell upon the earth, and in its waters; — to show us the relics and records of a period quite antecedent to this of ours, — nay of many such periods; — and so to furnish us with the clearest evidence, that, whatever may be true of matter in the abstract, this fair and goodly frame of things which we now behold, and wherein we dwell, is an edifice of recent date. And this is enough for the purposes of the argument. To show that there is an *effect*, is to show that there is a *cause*. If these things *began*, there must have been a *beginner*.

Now it is at this precise point in the demonstration, and not at any previous stage in the process, that the argument from *design* falls into its proper place and use. The present things being not eternal but begun existences must be the result not of blind chance and mere fortuity, nor of an unintelligent unintentional agent, working without purpose or plan, and creating at random, but evidently and most manifestly they are the work of an intelligent and designing cause; there is order about them, — forethought, intention, plan about them; they are *mechanism*, not mere effects; must therefore have had not a cause merely, but a *contriver*, capable of planning and executing such designs. The wisdom, skill, power, of the Being who made these things are thus demonstrated; to some extent also, though not with equal clearness, perhaps, his goodness, and his other moral attributes, are evinced.

Such would seem to be the true province, the logical value, of the argument from design ; — not to prove the world, or the present system of things, to be an effect, — but, that being settled in another manner, — to show *what sort* of an effect it is, and what sort of a cause is required to account for it ; viz., such a cause as answers to the idea of God. It must follow, not precede, much less set aside, the testimony of physical science as to the origin of the present system. In its proper place it is valuable, indispensable ; out of it, of little worth.

Thus far we have considered only those arguments in natural theology which are derived from the external world. These may seem sufficient ; perhaps they are so ; but they are evidently not the whole field and scope of the science. They do not exhaust the theme. Beside this material system and mechanism that is in operation around us, this fair structure and frame of things without, there is in existence another and a different sort of world, immaterial, invisible, not less wonderful, not less replete it should seem with evidence of the mighty Maker, — the inner world, the spiritual part of man. This again unfolds itself into a twofold division, the mental, and the moral nature ; each of which furnishes independent evidence for the existence of a first cause. Upon this department of the subject, not less important than that which has already engaged our attention, nor less deserving a thorough investigation, we are compelled, by our already exceeded limits, to touch briefly if at all.

III. The argument, derived from the nature and constitution of the human mind. The argument which we are now to present admits of being stated in different forms, but is based on the essential fact that there is in the human mind an *idea* of such a being as God.

The following is in substance the famous method of *Descartes*.

Among the various ideas which I find in my mind is one of a very peculiar character, unlike all others, and which I am at a loss to account for, — the idea, that is, of a being infinite, eternal, independent, immutable, the first cause of all other being. Sublime idea, and most wonderful withal ! But how came I by such an idea ? How shall the mysterious phenomenon be explained that into my mind, limited as it is in the range of its observation and reflection, the thought, the bare conception, of such and so vast a being, should enter ? Whence came this idea to me ? The qualities enumerated are such, and so excellent, that the more I reflect upon them the more sure I am that the idea of a being in whom they all reside, and that perfectly, could never have originated in my own mind ; for how can the *finite* give birth to the *infinite*. Does it originate in the fact that I perceive in myself the *negation*, the *absence* of these qualities ? But

how came I to know that there were such qualities, and that I was destitute of them ; how should I know my own *imperfection* and *finiteness*, if there were not already in my mind the idea of some *perfect* some *infinite* being, with whom to compare myself ? Does it proceed from tradition ? Then where did the tradition originate ; whence came the idea of such a being to the mind that first entertained the thought, and handed it down to others ? Is the mind *so formed* as to reach the thought spontaneously by its own natural cause and operations ? Then *who formed* it so ? Is it a simple matter of revelation ? Then who revealed it ? In fine, there is but one way in which we can account for this phenomenon, this idea in man of a being so unlike himself, and that is that the *idea* has its *corresponding reality* ; that such a being does actually *exist* ; and that this idea of him which we find in our minds, wrought into our very being, *is the stamp and impression of the workman's name, set indelibly upon the work.*

The force and validity of this reasoning depend entirely on its ability to show that the idea of God in the human mind is not only an effect, but such an effect as absolutely requires God for its cause. This it essays to do. That the idea in question is an effect of something is doubtless true, for it is not in the nature of an idea to be self-existent or uncaused ; but that it could not have originated in the mind itself by the mind's own simple action, is not so clear. It is not an easy matter, if it be indeed a possible thing, to trace any idea, and especially such an one, to its true source, and determine with precision and certainty its real origin. What is there in this idea which precludes the possibility of its being the product of the mind itself ? Is it certain that the finite cannot reach the idea of the infinite ? Is it absolutely necessary that there should *actually exist*, and be known by me to exist, a being more wise or powerful than myself, in order for me to discover that my wisdom and my power are *limited* ? And does not the idea of the unlimited, the infinite, stand over against the idea of the limited and the finite, so that by the simple law of contrast, if we have one, we get the other also ? Do not the differences which we observe among men, one being greatly superior to another in power, skill, etc., lead us naturally to conceive of one superior to them all, in whom may reside the perfection of these various qualities, and whose powers may be unlimited ? If in any such manner it is *possible* for the mind, unaided from without, and in the exercise of its own proper faculties, to reach the idea of Deity, then it is not certain but the idea in question may in fact have thus originated. In other words the existence of the *idea* does not render certain the actual existence of the *being* corresponding to that idea, inasmuch as the existence of

the idea can be accounted for in some other way. The argument labors at a disadvantage in undertaking to show positively that the idea in question could never have entered the human mind, had there been no such being as God in existence. This is more than can be determined with certainty. And yet it deserves to be considered well by us, more than we are wont to do in these exact and logical processes of reason, which call into exercise the intellect and not the heart, whether in fact the idea of such a being as *God*, the infinite, the uncaused, the eternal, the supreme, author of all being and perfection, be not something in itself more vast and wonderful than we have been accustomed to regard it; whether the simple conception and thought of such a being is not in itself, when duly considered, a grand and sublime mystery—a thought before which all others in the mind ought to bow down in awe and reverence—a thought which *may* be the very *shadow* cast upon the human soul, of that mysterious, incomprehensible, unseen one of whose being and presence it dimly informs us. Whatever may be the errors of the Cartesian philosophy, it has at least this element of truth and beauty, that it invests the idea of God in the human mind, regarded as a simple and pure conception, with a dignity and importance, and regards it with a reverence, well befitting its august and real character.

From the same source, the idea formed in the mind, Descartes derives also the following argument for the divine existence, which, though distinct from the one already stated, involves essentially the same principles.

Pertaining to this idea of God which is in the mind is this peculiarity, as I perceive, by which it differs from all other ideas, viz. that I cannot separate, in my thoughts, the *ideal* and the *actual*; cannot, as in all other cases, distinguish in my mind the existence from the essence; cannot divest my conception of the divine being of this element, or idea, that he *does actually exist*. Take away from me the conception which I form of this being as an *actual*, eternal, necessary existence, and you take away my *whole idea* of God; nothing is left in my mind, nor can I conceive of him in any other way. It must be, then, that actual, eternal, and necessary existence does really pertain to this being. For how do we determine, in any case, what are the essential qualities of any object? Is it not by observing that such and such qualities pertain to the very nature of the object, and are inseparable from it? I see clearly, for instance, whenever I think of a rectilinear triangle, that its angles are in amount equal to two right angles; cannot conceive of a rectilinear triangle of which this shall not be true. Hence I conclude that this equality of the angles to two

right angles is something inseparable from the nature of such a triangle ; and that whether there is any such thing as a triangle actually in existence or not. In like manner, when I think of God, the idea invariably presents itself of a being to whom actual and real existence pertains. Existence pertains to the highest perfection ; and my only idea of God is that of a being *every way perfect*. I can no more conceive of an imperfect God, i. e. a God existing only in name, or idea, or supposition, and not in reality, than I can conceive of a triangle the sum of whose angles shall be less than two right angles.

This argument like the preceding is based on that cardinal doctrine of the Cartesian system, that every pure and simple idea has its corresponding objective reality, from which it originates, and of which it is but the *tableau* or image ; and that whatever pertains inseparably and essentially to the idea, belongs also invariably to the reality ; a principle we cannot here stay to discuss. That there is a fallacy, however, in the argument now stated, is obvious. It does not follow, because I conceive of a triangle possessing a certain property, and never think of it otherwise, that any such triangle *exists*, but only that *if* it exists, then this property belongs to it. Neither does it follow that any such being as God exists, simply because I conceive of him as existing, and as possessing certain properties, as eternal, independent, and necessary being ; but only that *if* such a being exists, then these qualities may be supposed to belong to him. Nothing is, in reality, determined as to the previous question, whether *there really is* such a being.

Aside from this, it admits of question whether the *premise* is correct ; whether there is, really and of necessity, this alleged difference between our ideas of God and our ideas of other objects ; whether we cannot, if we will, conceive of God otherwise than as a real actual existence, in the same sense that we can conceive of a star of a certain magnitude and brilliancy, and having a certain position in the firmament, without at the same time being sure that such a star actually exists. But on this we cannot dwell.

It is somewhat remarkable that *Dr. Clarke*, though professing great abhorrence of the Cartesian philosophy and method of reasoning, should himself unconsciously have constructed an argument very like the one now presented. We refer to that part of his treatise in which he discourses respecting " the absolute impossibility of destroying or removing some *ideas*, as of eternity and immensity, which therefore must be modes or attributes of a necessary being, actually existing." " For," continues he, " if I have in my mind an idea of a thing, and cannot possibly in my imagination take away the idea of that thing as

actually existing, any more than I can change or take away the idea of the equality of twice two to four, the certainty of the *existence* of that thing is the same, and stands on the same foundation as the certainty of the other *relation*. For the relation of equality between twice two and four has no *other* certainty but *this*, that I *cannot*, without a contradiction, *change* or *take away* the *idea* of that relation." (Demonst. p. 21.) Elsewhere he thus expresses the same thing: "We always find in our minds some ideas, as of *infinity* and *eternity*, which to remove, that is to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes exist only by the *substance* to which they belong. Now he that can suppose eternity and immensity removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two and four." (Dem. p. 15.)

This argument is based evidently on the assumption that immensity and eternity are *attributes of substance or being*; an assumption purely gratuitous, and without proof. *Space* answers both these conditions, possesses both these qualities or attributes, — eternity and immensity. Yet space is not *being*, much less is it God. With all respect, then, for the truly great man who thus reasons, we can but regard this as an argument more specious than solid, about which the thing chiefly wonderful is, how it could ever have misled or perplexed a truly discerning mind.

Respecting the ideal argument, as a whole, the conclusion at which, after a candid and thorough examination, the lover of truth will be likely to arrive, would seem to be this; — that while the idea which the human mind forms of God, and the fact that it does, of its own accord, as it would seem, reach and entertain that wonderful idea, *do afford strong presumptive evidence* of the existence of such a being, and may well and greatly strengthen our belief in that existence, derived from other sources, they cannot be regarded as in themselves furnishing clear and absolute demonstration of that great truth. For this we must look elsewhere.

IV. It remains for us to discuss only the argument derived from the *moral constitution of man*.

Among the various active principles and powers of the human soul, each having its appropriate object and sphere, and tending each to a certain definite result, there is observed *one* whose office and operation it seems to be to preside over all the rest — the *regulator*, as it may not inaptly be termed, or law-power, of the whole moral machinery in its various and complicated movements. This is the prin-

ciple which we call *conscience*, whose established authority in the soul is one of the most remarkable phenomena in its history and constitution.

It has indeed been contended by some that this is by no means, in fact, a universal and invariable law; that men, and even whole tribes and nations, are to be found, who seem to have no conscience. Now it is doubtless true that many are to be found in the world who do not *obey* this law of the inner being; — in whom it comes, by *desuetude*, to be a silent and virtually a dead letter; but certainly there is a palpable and broad distinction between the *authority*, and the actual *power* of a law. That which is a law *de jure*, may not in all cases be a law *de facto*. It is sufficient that there is in man a moral principle, or power, whose object, and evident legitimate office, is to control his moral action; and that when left to its own proper functions, unperverted, undestroyed, it does execute that office, not without a sort of majesty and truly regal sway. It is no evidence against the existence and rightful authority of a king in the land, that he is for the time driven from his palace and his throne by a revolutionary faction; nor against the existence and rightful authority of a statute, that in a state of anarchy and rebellion, men no longer recognize its right, or submit to its control. This distinction between the *lex de jure* and the *lex de facto*, as regards the human conscience — a distinction which was first clearly pointed out by bishop Butler, and has been fully elaborated by Chalmers, is at once a very plain and a very important distinction, and constitutes a sufficient answer to the objection now stated.

Upon this observed peculiarity in the moral constitution, this law of our nature, theologians have constructed a favorite and powerful argument in proof of the divine existence. Here is a *law*. Where, and who, is the *law-maker*? Here is the various machinery of a court. Is there not, somewhere, a legislator, and a judge? So it would seem; and so, we presume, men would naturally and generally conclude. The evidence may be regarded however as presumptive rather than demonstrative, when we come to look more closely at it, inasmuch as it proceeds upon the supposition that the soul of man is a creation. Here, says the reasoner, is a piece of curious mechanism — a watch — whose movements are all nicely controlled by an adjustment called the regulator, which certainly seems to have been intended for this very purpose. Is there not, somewhere, an intelligent contriver and controller of these movements? Precisely such is the office of conscience in the human soul, and precisely such its testimony as to the existence somewhere of a power capable of appointing and enforcing this authority. Unquestionably, we reply, if there be here veritable

regulation, there must be, somewhere, a regulator; if mechanism, then a maker. But are we *sure* of the premises? What if the watch, to which this apparatus belongs, should fail to be proved a machine; what if the soul of man, instead of being a creation, a thing made, should turn out to be an uncaused and self-existent thing; then, for aught we know, this regulating apparatus, in both watch and soul, may have always pertained to them, and in full play, as an integral part of themselves. Let it be granted, or first proved, that man himself—this spiritual, conscious moral being, which we call the soul—is a *created* existence, that there is, in other words, true and real *mechanism* here, that what we call the law of conscience is a bona fide *law*, and not simply a mode in which the spiritual nature has always acted, that it is an *arrangement*, a *begun* thing, and it follows of course that there is, somewhere, or at least was, a beginner and producer thereof. But how are we to know this? That which is here assumed is the very thing to be proved—the very point we seek to establish. Nor is it from the inspection of the mind itself, or of the watch itself, independently of other sources of information, that this is to be learned. The regulator, in itself considered, cannot inform us whether it has always existed and operated as at present, or whether it is a piece of pure contrivance and mechanism; neither can the law of the human soul, which we term conscience. The question is, have we truly and properly a *law*—a creation—a contrived and originated property of a begun and continued existence. Not until this point is settled, can we appeal to the regulating power or principle, in the watch or in the soul, as evidence clear and positive of the existence of a being extrinsic to themselves, who is in reality the controller and governor, as he was the contriver, of these truly wonderful movements.

Now we do not deny that the argument from our moral nature, as also that from *design*, of which we have already treated, does furnish evidence of a certain kind, *presumptive* evidence, and that in a high degree, of the existence of a supreme being; that it serves greatly to strengthen our belief, already formed, in such a being; that it corroborates the evidence derived from other sources, and brings it very near and closely home to us; nay, further, that it is in itself sufficient to bring the mind *practically* to the conviction that there is a God; and that its actual operation, in the world as we find it, is to this effect; but only that it is not—what in theology, and as the basis of a science, we demand, and must in some way obtain—a sure and clear *demonstration* of this great truth. For nothing can be plainer than that a kind or degree of evidence which may be amply sufficient to guide

one's mind, and determine one's course and conduct in the practical affairs of life, may not be a sufficient basis on which to lay the firm and sure foundations of a science.

The moral argument properly comes in, then, so far as the theologian is concerned, not to demonstrate the existence of God, but to bear important testimony respecting his character and attributes, when once that previous point is settled; to show what sort of a being God is; and in this respect it is one of the most valuable and powerful arguments in the whole compass of natural theology.

Especially does this principle of conscience manifest the *righteousness* of God. If he were not himself a righteous being, and a lover of rectitude, he would not have implanted, as he has, this law of the right, and this love of it, in every human bosom. As it is, he has so made man that, by the very constitution of his being, and aside from any external or revealed law, he is placed under obligation to do right. There is a law within him, prior to anything from without, written on or rather wrought into the soul itself, as the figure is woven into the fabric which it adorns. The soul of man, approving of the true and the right, whether it will or no, wherever these are discerned, points with unerring certainty to that which is the source of this its moral power, viz. the rectitude of the divine character,—even as the poised steel, turning ever to the mysterious north, indicates the existence of that unknown power, which from afar controls all its vibrations, whose influence it ever feels, and at whose presence it trembles.

The principle of conscience establishes also the inflexible *justice* of God. It has its awards and punishments. It visits the evil-doer with the terrible stings of guilt and remorse, and throws over him the deep chill shadow of a coming retribution. It dashes into every cup of forbidden pleasure, the unfailing, inseparable element of consequent wretchedness. It links together human crime and human suffering, the vices and the miseries of men, so that the one shall follow the other invariably, as sound and echo pursue each other along the mountain side. There is with it no respect of persons, no taking of bribes. With its whip of scorpions it pursues the wrong-doer, whoever he may be, wherever he may go; tracks him into every obscurity, finds him out in the deepest retirement and the darkest night; overtakes him in his swiftest escape, and like the terrible avenger pursues and hangs over him wherever he takes his way.

On the other hand, the pleasure which, according to the working of this same law, dispensing its awards as well as its punishments, attends all virtuous and right action, is not less a proof of the *divine benevolence*. Thus to connect inseparably together right-doing and hap-

piness, wrong-doing and misery,—so to construct and constitute the mind, the spiritual nature, that by its own natural working this great end shall be secured,—this *self-regulating power*, in other words, of the moral machinery,—is in itself one of the highest evidences not simply of the divine wisdom and skill, but (what is much more to the purpose, and more important to establish) of the *goodness* of God. We can conceive that man might have been so constituted that, while under the highest obligations to virtue, nevertheless every instance of right action should be accompanied, not as now with a verdict of self-approval, and that purest of all pleasures, the happiness which he feels who is conscious of right intentions, and a conduct void of offence toward God and man,—but on the contrary with pain and self-reproach, and the wretchedness of an unsatisfied nature; while, on the other hand, evil action, and all wrong-doing, should secure the enjoyment of a present gratification and a consequent and enduring happiness. We can conceive that a *malevolent* being *would* have so constituted his creatures, arraying the moral principles of the soul against its innate love of happiness, placing in antagonism what are now intimately and inseparably joined, and thus removing at once what are now the strongest incentives to virtue and consequent well-being. Indeed we can have no clearer and more certain indication that benevolence constitutes a leading trait in the divine character, than the fact we are now considering, that he has actually constituted his moral creatures in such a way that duty and happiness shall with them be ever concomitant; that the moral nature shall approve of that which the divine law requires; that the ways of virtue are ever found to be ways of pleasantness, and all her paths peace. In truth, the whole phenomena of conscience evince most clearly to the observant and thoughtful mind the highest regard, on the part of the Creator, for the well being of man, which is only another expression for the highest and purest benevolence.

It would seem to be, then, the great advantage of the argument now under discussion, as compared with those previously named, that it brings into bold relief, and places in a clear, strong light, the *moral character* of God; in which respect the material or physical argument is, it must be confessed, in a measure defective. We can show, from the arrangements of the material world, the power, the wisdom, the skill, of the mighty builder. But what is there in external nature to demonstrate his righteousness, his justice, his goodness? *Indications* of these attributes, doubtless, there may be; hardly, as we think, proofs. The physical structure of the shark affords as clear evidence of the *skill* of the Creator as do the anatomy and organization of the

dolphin, or the flying fish ; it would not however, on the whole, be a fortunate selection from which to argue the divine *benevolence*, inasmuch as the various and truly skilful arrangements and contrivances which admirably conduce to the welfare of the creature in question, seem not, on the whole, so well adapted, either in theory or practice, to the safety and happiness of his *fellow* creatures. Indeed the great palpable fact, that *suffering* seems to have entered, as an element, into the very plan and structure — the first draft, so to speak — of this whole system of things, reaching back beyond the history and existence of man himself on the globe ; that the earliest records and relics of animal life and organization, in whatever form of being, and in whatever distant and otherwise unknown epoch of our earth's history, are records and traces also of the physical suffering with which that existence terminated, and that life passed away ; this, we say, is a problem not as yet duly pondered, it would seem, by those who find no difficulty in making out a complete idea and demonstration of God from external nature. The truth is, as we are strongly inclined to believe, that while the material universe furnishes abundant proof of the *existence* and *natural* perfections of the Deity, his *moral* attributes are fully exhibited only in the moral realm. And this is, in fact, precisely what we might reasonably have anticipated.

To sum up, in few words, what has been advanced in the present essay,—We have sought to ascertain definitely what it is which natural theology has to do, and the best way of doing it ; in other words, the true *province* and the true *methods* of the science. The things to be done, we find to be these two : first, to bring forward, from the existing universe, something which we can clearly show to be an effect ; and then to show that this effect is such as to require for its producing cause all that which we include in the idea of Deity. For the working of this two-fold problem, we find an array of arguments drawn from these several sources,—*metaphysics*, *physics*, the department of *mind*, the department of *morals*. Of these, it is in the power of *physics* only, and not of *metaphysics*, if the preceding observations and reasonings are correct, to show clearly that the present things had a beginning ; in other words, that the world itself, the universe of which we form a part, is in truth an *effect*. Nor will physics even, as commonly employed, do this. The fitness of means to ends, the various instances which we find in the material universe of what we call design, and what seems to us like arrangement and contrivance, do not show this ; inasmuch as we must first know that these arrangements themselves have had a beginning, and are not uncaused and self-existent qualities of an uncaused and self-existent substance. What we see of this sort

in the universe may be sufficient to suggest the idea of a God, and render it altogether probable that such a being exists; may indeed convince most minds that such is the fact; may greatly strengthen and corroborate the evidence derived from other sources; but cannot clearly and certainly demonstrate that which we seek to know. In order to establish this point on a sure basis, we must call to our aid a class of sciences hitherto much neglected, and even regarded with distrust by theological writers, but which, we believe, will yet be found not harmless merely, not serviceable merely, but indispensable, it may be, to the exact and clear exhibition, and sure foundation, of the truths involved in natural theology.

This point established, that the present order of things is not without beginning, and the way is clear. Reason assures us that if there be a beginning, there must be also a beginner; if an effect, a cause; and that if we go back far enough, we must come at last to that which is the source of all other being, itself uncaused, self-existent, eternal. This is God; but yet not the whole of God; not the complete idea that we form of Deity. And here the argument from design falls into place, and enables us to infer that the builder of this goodly frame possesses intelligence, power, wisdom, skill, if not *absolutely unlimited* — and of that we cannot be sure as yet, inasmuch as from the *finite* we cannot strictly demonstrate the *infinite* — yet vast, and altogether beyond our power of comprehension. Lastly, the moral nature of man, the noblest department of those divine works which lie within the narrow circle of our vision, demonstrates to us the higher and nobler attributes of Deity, his righteousness, justice, and benevolence.

These things ascertained, and clearly established, natural theology has nothing further to do. Its work is accomplished. Whatever else we wish to know of God, we are to look for it not in his *works*, but in his *word*; not creation, but revelation, is from this point to be our guide.

ARTICLE II.

THE MEANING OF IRENAEUS IN THE PHRASE "REGENERATED
UNTO GOD."

By Irah Chase, D. D., Boston, Mass.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

[SEVERAL years ago, my attention was called to the passage embracing the memorable phrase *renascuntur in Deum*, in the work of Irenaeus against heresies; and the following Article presents the result of an examination, instituted for the purpose of ascertaining the sense in which he there uses that phrase. I was not satisfied with any explanation of it which I had seen; and I resolved to let the author himself furnish an explanation. I examined every page of his work, and was led to a conclusion which, to me, was quite unexpected. I re-examined the whole, and was again conducted to the same conclusion.

Since that time, I have, here and there, met with some brief statements indicating that others have been led to a similar result; as in the History of Doctrines by Baumgarten-Crusius (Vol. II. p. 1209), and in Dr. Krabbe's Prize Essay on the Apostolical Constitutions (p. 410). Böttinger, in his recent historical work entitled the Church of Christ and its Witnesses, (Vol. I. p. 245—254), assumes substantially the same exposition. What was published on the subject in one of our Periodicals, in 1838, was, in effect, primarily derived from the examination which I have mentioned, and was confirmed by an independent examination.

Most of those who have written with commendable erudition respecting Irenaeus, have been occupied with discussions which have led them away from examining the particular point which I have endeavored to elucidate. That the impartial and venerable Neander should seem to have acquiesced in an interpretation which I suppose to be erroneous, may easily have arisen from the intensity with which, while he was reading Irenaeus, his mind was attracted to other matters than the one here discussed. Were he to read him with a special view to this, he would, I am confident, come to the result set forth in the subsequent pages.

Respecting the manner in which the subject is presented by the learned Mr. Wall, and by the equally learned Schlosser, who translated Mr. Wall's History from English into Latin, and enlarged it

with Observations and Defences, more than a hundred years ago, it is unnecessary, I trust, to make any remark. Let every candid and earnest inquirer after truth read, and judge for himself.

Views resembling those of Irenaeus on the relation of Christ to mankind, whether right or wrong, are scattered over the fields of theological literature, ancient and modern. To understand his expressions correctly is desirable, as being connected with the history of opinions, and with an argument from ecclesiastical antiquity. For no thoroughly Christian teacher would think it right and wise, even in maintaining the truth, to employ a wrong exposition of a passage, occurring either in the holy Scriptures, or in the writings of the Fathers.]

According to Irenaeus, Christ, in becoming incarnate and thus assuming his mediatorial work, brought the human family into a new relation, under himself, and placed them in a condition in which they can be saved. In this sense, he is the Saviour of all. He restored them, or summed them up anew, in himself. He became, so to speak, a second Adam, the regenerator of mankind. Through him they are regenerated unto God: *per eum renascuntur in Deum*.

The thought occurs frequently; and it is variously modified by the various connections in which it is introduced.

In the passage which has often been brought forward as recognizing the baptism of infants, Irenaeus is maintaining that Christ appeared as he really was, and passed through the various stages of human life, sanctifying, it is added, sanctifying every age by the likeness that it had to himself; *for he came to save all by himself*; — *all, I say, since by him they are regenerated unto God,*¹ — infants, and little ones, and

¹ Omnes enim venit per semetipsum salvere: omnes, inquam, — qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, etc. That *omnes* is repeated for the purpose of giving it, not restriction but emphasis, is manifest from the amplification which is extended throughout the paragraph. The proposition that Christ came to save all by himself, seems to be based on the assumed fact that by him all are regenerated unto God. That, whatever is meant here by being regenerated, it was, in such a connection as this, conceived of as belonging to all, appears also from other passages, in which the same thing or its equivalent is most clearly attributed to "all," to "man," or to "men," without any limitation; in short, to mankind, the whole human family, "*genus humanum*." The critical reader will perceive that, in accordance with this view, *qui*, in the connection above, is regarded as being used instead of a causative conjunction, and is freely translated *since they*. The relative *qui*, it is well known, is sometimes used in this manner. See Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Lib. V. Epist. 20. Ephesum ut venirem, etc. I attach no special importance to my version. But I prefer it to the usual and literal one, as presenting the purport of the Latin phraseology more readily to the English reader. The Greek original of this passage being lost, we cannot speak positively of its form. But

children, and youths, and elder persons. Therefore he came through the several ages, and for infants was made an infant, sanctifying infants; among little ones, a little one, sanctifying those of that age; and, at the same time, being to them an example of piety, uprightness, and obedience; among the youth, a youth, becoming an example to the youths, and sanctifying them to the Lord; thus also an elderly person among elderly persons, that he might be a perfect master among all, not only in respect to the presentation of truth, but also in respect to age, sanctifying at the same time also the elderly persons, and becoming to them an example. Then, too, he passed through even unto death, that he might be the first born from the dead, himself holding the primacy in all things, the prince of life, superior to all, and preceding all. B. II. c. 22. § 4.¹

What Irenaeus thought of baptism must be gathered from the passages in which he is speaking of the subject. But that he is speaking of it in this passage, there is no sufficient evidence. For a mere resemblance in one or two words to certain terms sometimes used in connection with baptism, falls very far short of proving the point assumed. The context is against it; for the context directs our attention to *Christ* and what he himself, personally, came to do for the human family. It is by *him*, and not by baptism, that they are here said to be renewed, born anew, or regenerated. And parallel passages are against it; for they abundantly confirm the sense which I have given, as being the true sense of the passage before us. Some of these are the following:—

When our Lord became incarnate and was made man, he summed up anew, in himself, the long array of men, affording us salvation in a compendious manner, so that what we had lost in Adam, that is, to be according to the image and similitude of God, we might regain in Christ. III. 18. 1. (in G. c. 20.)

Unless man were united with God, he could not partake of incorruption. For it became the Mediator between God and men, by his intimate connection with both, to bring both together into friendship and concord, and, on the one hand to present man to God,

there seems to be no good reason to doubt that it has been rendered into Latin with much literalness. And we know that in Greek the relative corresponding to *qui*, “sometimes implies a cause, reason, occasion, motive, or something else, which would properly be expressed by a conjunction. E. g. *Θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς ὃς ἡμῖν οὐδὲν δίδως*; thou behavest strangely, *who* givest us nothing; i. e. *that* or *in that* thou givest us nothing.” See Buttmann’s Larger Greek Grammar, § 143. 1., and compare Kühner, § 334. 2, where the same fact is recognized.

¹ In Grabe’s edition, c. 39.

and on the other to make known God to men. For in what manner could we become partakers of the adoption of sons, unless through the Son we receive again from him that communion which there is with himself, — unless his Word, being made flesh, communicate it to us? Wherefore also he passed through every age, restoring to all that communion which there is with God. III. 18: 7. (in G. c. 20, near the end.)

And for this cause [the heretic Mark represents] that man, according to Moses, was made on the *sixth* day, and moreover that in the economy on the sixth day, which is the Preparation, the last man appeared for the regeneration of the first man. Of which economy [the suffering of Christ], it is asserted, the beginning and the end was that sixth hour on which he was affixed to the cross; because the perfect mind knowing the number *six* to have the power of making and regenerating, has manifested to the sons of light that regeneration which was accomplished by him who appeared prominent at that number. I. 14: 6. (in G. c. 10.)

What Irenaeus is here animadverting upon, is the idle and cabalistic speculations concerning the numbers, in respect to events acknowledged by all. Elsewhere he says:

... And signifying that it is he [our Lord] who has summed up anew, in himself, all nations scattered abroad from Adam, and every language and generation of men, with Adam himself. III. 22: 3. (in G. c. 33.)

For the Lord, who was born is *the first-begotten of the dead*; and receiving the pristine fathers into his bosom, he regenerated them unto the life of God, being himself made the commencement of the living, as Adam was made the commencement of the dying. On account of this also, Luke traces back to Adam the genealogical series, beginning it from the Lord, — thus signifying that He has regenerated them unto the gospel of life. ... Thus, too, the knot of Eve's disobedience was untied by Mary's obedience. For what the virgin Eve bound by unbelief, the virgin Mary loosed by faith. III. 22: 4. (in G. c. 33.)

And on account of this, in the end, he himself exhibited the similitude: The Son of God was made man, taking up into himself the ancient formation; as we have shown in the preceding book. IV. 33: 4. (in G. c. 59.) Sec. III. 18: 1 with 7, and 16: 6.

They who predicted the Emmanuel who was to be born of a virgin, manifested the union of the Word of God with what he had formed, that the Word should become flesh, and the Son of God the son of man; (the pure one purely opening the pure womb, — that which regenerates men unto God, and which he himself made pure); and though

he became what we are, he is the mighty God, and has an extraction that cannot be declared. IV. 33: 11. (in G. c. 66).

... Our Lord ... bringing man again into connection with God, by his incarnation. V. 1: 1.

But what he appeared, this he also was; God, summing up anew in himself the ancient formation of man, that he might slay sin, make death void, and give life to man. III. 18: 7. (in G. c. 20).

... The Son of God, being made a man among men, formed the human race afresh. IV. 24: 1. (in G. c. 41).

God the Father had compassion on what he had formed, and gave it salvation, restoring it by his Word, that is, by Christ; that man may learn by experience that he receives imperishableness, not from himself, but by the gift of God. V. 21: 3.

Tertullian, about forty years after the time when these passages were written, gave a similar representation. In his treatise on the flesh or Body of Christ, (c. 17.) he says: But first of all is to be set forth the reason that the Son of God should be born of a virgin. It became him to be born in a new manner, as he was the author of a new nativity; concerning which, when God was about to give a sign, it was predicted by Isaiah: What was that sign? Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and shall bring forth a son. A virgin therefore conceived, and brought forth Emmanuel, God with us. This is a new nativity, since man is born in God; in which man God has been born,¹ the flesh of the ancient seed being assumed, without the ancient seed, so that by the new seed, that is, spiritually, he might form that flesh anew, it being purified and the defilement of its ancient state removed. But this whole newness, as also it has been done in all things, was of old represented in a figure, our Lord being born of a virgin in accordance with a reasonable arrangement. The earth was still a virgin, not yet compressed by tillage, not yet subjected to the sower: from it we have received man made by God for a living soul. Therefore, if the first Adam is given from the earth; with good reason the new Adam, as the apostle has said, has been produced by God for a quickening spirit, equally from the earth, that is, from flesh not yet unsealed for generating. But, lest I should not avail myself of the mention of the name of Adam, why has Christ been called Adam by the apostle, if man did not belong to his earthly census? Here also reason alleges that God, by a rival operation, has regained his image and similitude which was taken away by the devil. For into Eve, still a virgin, had crept the word causing death. Into a virgin, too, was to be introduced the word of God, productive of life; that what by such a sex

¹Dum homo nascitur in Deo; in quo homine Deus natus est.

had gone off to perdition, might by the same sex be brought back to salvation. Eve had believed the serpent; Mary believed Gabriel. What sin the former committed by believing, the latter blotted out by believing. But Eve then conceived nothing in her womb from the word of the devil. Nay, she did conceive. For, after that, as abject, she should obey, and in pangs bring forth. The word of the devil impregnated her, and she brought forth a devil, a fratricide. On the other hand, Mary brought forth him who should at length save Israel, the carnal brother, his murderer. Into the womb, therefore, God brought down his Word, the good brother, that he might efface the remembrance of the bad brother. Christ had to come forth thence for the salvation of man, whither man, already condemned, had entered. . . . (c. 20.) What there is new in Christ's being born of a virgin, is manifest; namely, that it was of a virgin, according to the reason which we have given; and that a virgin might be our regeneration, . . . sanctified through Christ.

In his work against Marcion, B. III. c. 9, Tertullian expresses himself thus: Christ in respect to the flesh, had to be born of the flesh, that by his nativity he might form anew our nativity; and thus also might by his death dissolve our death, by rising again in the flesh, in which he was born that he might be able also to die.

In another class of passages, Irenaeus teaches that the extraordinary generation of Christ, which, he says, was given for a sign of salvation, must be received by faith: we must, as it were, come into it, and accede to the divinely appointed arrangement.

Alluding to the wiles of that old serpent, the tempter, as recorded in the third chapter of Genesis, and to the account given in the book of Numbers (21: 8), and to the words of our Lord, in the Gospel according to John (3: 14 and 15, and 12: 32), he says it was taught that men cannot be saved from the ancient sting of the serpent, unless they believe in him who, in the likeness of our sinful flesh, was on the cross lifted up from the earth. IV. 2: 7. (in G. c. 5.)

He asks, How shall man come to God, unless God come to man? How indeed shall he leave the generation of death, if he does not come into the new generation wonderfully and unexpectedly given by God, for a sign of salvation, — the regeneration which is from the virgin through faith? Or what adoption shall they receive from God who remain in this generation which is according to man in the world? IV. 33: 4. (in G. c. 59). In other places he teaches thus:

Those of the human race who believe God and follow his word, receive that salvation which is from him. IV. 33: 15. (in G. c. 66).

In respect to condition, so to speak, we are all children of God

because we are all made by him. But as to obeying him and receiving his doctrine, all are not children of God, but they who believe him, and do his will. IV. 41: 2. (in G. c. 79).

The Ebionites are unreasonable, not receiving into their mind by faith the union of God and man, but persevering in the old leaven of generation; not willing to understand that the Holy Spirit came upon Mary, and the power of the Highest overshadowed her. Wherefore also what was generated is holy, and the Son of the most high God, the Father of all, who performed his incarnation, and exhibited the new generation; that, as by the former generation we have inherited death, so by this generation we might inherit life. V. 1: 3.

But who are they that are here saved, and receive eternal life? Is it not they who love God, and who believe his promises, and in respect to malice are made little ones? IV. 28: 3. (in G. c. 47).

The Lord descended into those places which are under the earth, preaching also to them his advent; there being remission of sins to those who believe on him. But on him they all believed who hoped in him; that is, who foretold his advent, and complied with his arrangements, — the just men and prophets, and patriarchs, to whom he remitted sins in the same manner as to us. . . . *For all men come short of the glory of God*; and they who regard his light are glorified, not by themselves, but by the Lord's advent. IV. 27: 2. (in G. c. 45).

Irenaeus, in giving a summary of the doctrine taught by the apostles, proceeds to say in reference to our Lord, That they who believe in him shall be incorruptible and incapable of suffering, and receive the kingdom of heaven. IV. 24: 2. He quotes as authoritative the passage, 1 John, 5: 1, Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God. III. 16: 8. And says, Jesus Christ our Lord makes them who believe in his name children of God. III. 6: 2.

At the same time, in our being renewed in our minds and prepared for heaven, he often ascribes an essential influence to the Holy Spirit:

Thus therefore God was manifested; for through all these things God the Father is shown, the Spirit indeed operating, the Son ministering, the Father approving, and man consummated to salvation. IV. 20: 6. (in G. c. 37).

. . . Signifying that Christ would from among freemen and servants make children of God, giving alike to us all the gift of the Spirit that quickens us. IV. 21: 3. (in G. c. 38).

For by the hands of the Father, that is, by the Son and the Spirit, man is made according to the likeness of God. V. 6: 1.

He quotes the epistle to the Ephesians (1: 13) — In whom ye also trusted after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salva-

tion; in whom also after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance — and then adds, Thus therefore this the pledge dwelling in us now makes us spiritual. . . . Yet this is done, not by ceasing to have flesh, but by having the communion of the Spirit. For they to whom the apostle wrote, were not without flesh, but they had received the Spirit of God *by which we cry Abba, Father.* V. 8: 1.

He alludes to the grafting of the olive : — As the wild olive inserted loses not the substance of its wood, but changes the quality of its fruit, and takes another name, being now no longer a wild olive, but a fruitful olive; thus also the man inserted by faith, and receiving the Spirit of God, loses not the substance of his flesh, but changes the quality of his fruit, his works, and receives another name, signifying that change which is for the better : he is now denominated, not flesh and blood, but a spiritual man. Moreover, as the wild olive, if it does not receive insertion, continues useless to its owner, through its wild quality, and as the unfruitful wood is cut down and cast into the fire; so also the man not receiving by faith the insertion of the Spirit, continues to be what he was before : being flesh and blood, he cannot inherit the kingdom of God. V. 10: 2. And after illustrating and confirming these sentiments at some length, he concludes by quoting the words of the apostle, (Rom. 8: 14), For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

In another passage, he says : And again, giving to the disciples the authority of regeneration unto God, he said to them, Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. For by the prophets he promised to pour this out in the last times upon his servants and handmaids, that they might prophesy. Whence also he descended on the Son of God, made the son of man, accustoming himself to dwell with the human race, and to rest on men, and to dwell with what God had made, working the will of the Father in them, and renewing them from their old condition to the new condition in Christ. III. 17: 1. (in G. c. 19).

Here it seems too obvious to require any comment, that Irenaeus contemplated the conversion of persons whose minds should be enlightened by evangelical instruction, and influenced by the Holy Spirit; and who, by being baptized, should make a suitable profession of their faith. At the same time, it ought to be known that he attributed to our baptism some special efficacy; for it may be useful to see the germ of an opinion which soon came to exert great influence. The extent of the efficacy alluded to, is very distinctly expressed in

the following passage: That union which is unto incorruption our bodies have received by the laver, but our minds by the Spirit. Whence also both are necessary; since both are profitable in respect to the life of God. III. 17: 2. A similar efficacy he attributes also to the eucharist:—Our bodies upon receiving the eucharist, he says, are no longer corruptible, but have the hope of the eternal resurrection. IV. 18: 5. (in G. c. 34). See also V. 2: 3. With this it may be well to connect what he had affirmed just before, namely: But altogether vain are they who condemn the whole arrangement of God, and deny the salvation of the flesh, and spurn its regeneration, saying that it is not capable of incorruptibility. V. 2: 2.

Clement of Alexandria, writing near the close of the second century, uses the following remarkable expressions:—Knowledge, therefore, is illumination, which removes ignorance, and gives perspicacity. Now the rejection of the bad is the bringing of the good to light; for what ignorance has sadly bound, is happily loosed by knowledge. And these bands are quickly dissolved *by faith indeed on the part of man, but by grace on the part of God*; our sins being removed by one healing remedy, BAPTISM, RECEIVED IN THE DUE EXERCISE OF THE MIND. See his work entitled the Paedagogue, B. I. c. 6.¹

Like Clement, Irenaeus seems to have taken it for granted that baptism was received in the exercise of reason and of faith, and that as being a most emphatic expression of faith on the part of men, it was pre-eminently connected with grace on the part of God.

If we have this in mind, it will help very much towards explaining a passage in which he speaks of certain persons thus: They were sent by Satan to deny the baptism of regeneration unto God, and reject the whole faith. I. 21: 1. (in G. c. 18). He contended, as we have already seen, that 'our bodies' were affected 'by the laver, but our minds by the Spirit,' so that both were renewed or regenerated, and united to God;—we being understood to have received the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel in the liveliest exercise of faith, at the moment of our baptism. He, it had already been stated by Irenaeus, he who retains unwavering in himself the rule of truth, which he received along with baptism, will acknowledge the terms derived from the Scriptures, and the readings, and the parables. I. 9: 4. (in G. c. 1, near the end).

¹ Φωτισμὸς ἄρα ἡ γνώσις ἐστίν, ὃ ἐξαφανίζων τὴν ἀγνοίαν καὶ τὸ διορατικὸν ἐν-
τιθεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν χειρόνων ἀποβολή, τῶν κρείττωνων ἐστὶν ἀποκάλυψις. ἂ
γὰρ ἡ ἀγνοία συνέδησε κακῶς, ταῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως ἀναλύεται καλῶς· τὰ δὲ
δεσμὰ ταῦτα, ἧ τάχος, ἀνίεται· πίστει μὲν ἀνθρωπίνῃ, θεΐκῃ δὲ τῇ χάριτι· ὀφει-
υένων τῶν πλημμελημάτων ἐν παιωνίῳ φαρμάκῳ λογικῷ βαπτίσματι.

On this passage, Massuet, the editor of the most valuable and complete edition of Irenaeus, (which was published at Venice, in 1734,) has the following note : — ‘ He means the general faith, that especially, as he himself explains in the next chapter, which is in one God, the Father almighty ; and in one Jesus Christ, the Son of God, incarnate for our salvation ; and in the Holy Spirit who foretold by the prophets the arrangements of God, and the advent, and that generation which is from the virgin, and the passion, etc. This faith Irenaeus represents as having been received along with baptism, as what the catechumens were taught so accurately before baptism, and what in baptism itself they professed, according to the words of its institution ; as Tertullian states in his book on Public Shows. . . . To this faith received in baptism and solemnly sworn to, almost all the holy Fathers who have written against the heretics, have referred, supposing that nothing is more efficacious for refuting the novelty of profane dogmas. . . . But the more boldly did our author urge this kind of argument against the Valentinians, because they had impiously rejected the whole of the apostolic symbol or creed which was professed by those who were to be baptized.

In another place Irenaeus says, And since in that formation which was according to Adam, man made in transgression, needed the laver of regeneration, after he [the Saviour] put clay on his [the blind man's] eyes, he said to him, *Go to Siloam and wash*, at the same time restoring to him both the formation and that regeneration which is by the laver. And on account of this, when washed, he came seeing, so that he might know him by whom he was formed, and recognize him who gave him life. V. 15: 3. And in one of his Fragments¹ on the book of Kings, is found the following paragraph : It was not in vain that anciently the leprous Naaman was cleansed upon being baptized, but it was for our instruction ; who, being leprous in sins, are by the holy water and the calling upon the Lord, cleansed from the old transgressions, as new-born children, being spiritually regenerated, according to what our Lord said : Except any one be born again, by water and the Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.

How much of the representation in these two passages is fanciful, and how much evangelical, it is not necessary to determine. It is sufficient to know, and I do not hesitate to admit, that Irenaeus sometimes speaks of a regeneration as being connected with baptism. And, in view of the many passages which have been adduced, it surely cannot be denied that he also sometimes speaks of a regeneration, and sometimes uses some kindred term, in various other connections.

¹ Ex. Ms. Bibliothecae Coislinae Catena.

With baptism he associated the decisive reception of the true Christian faith, and transition from the world into the church, from a state of bondage to a state of redemption, from spiritual death to spiritual life. In some degree at least, he confounded the sign with the thing signified. This, it is well known, was done too generally, even in his early time. And thus occasion was given for some of the Gnostics to object that an undue efficacy was attributed to baptism. One extreme is apt to produce its opposite. Hence, it seems, they rejected what he denominates the baptism of regeneration. And to his strong statement of this he adds the following : But they say that redemption belongs necessarily to them who have received the perfect knowledge, so that they are regenerated unto the power that is over all ; for that otherwise it is impossible to enter within the Fulness (*ἐντὸς πληρώματος*), since it is this that leads them into Profundity (*τὸ βάθος*). Indeed, it is said, that the baptism of the appearing Jesus was of the forgiveness of sins, but that the redemption of Christ who descended upon him, was unto perfection. The one, they assert, was animal ; the other, spiritual ; and the baptism of John was announced unto repentance ; but the redemption was procured by Jesus unto perfection ; and that it is this concerning which he says, *I have another baptism to be baptized with, and very much do I hasten to it*. And to the sons of Zebedee, when their mother requested of the Lord to seat them with him in his kingdom on his right hand and on his left, they say that he set forth this redemption, saying, *Can ye be baptized with the baptism that I am about to be baptized with ?* And they affirm that Paul has often expressly mentioned *the redemption that is in Christ Jesus*. I. 21: 1 and 2 (in G. c. 18). Compare § 4.

Irenaeus himself, as we have seen, does not always confound baptism with regeneration, renewal, restoration, or introduction to a better state. Often, when he speaks of these, he has in view the incarnation and mediatorial work of Christ, as bringing the human family into a new relation to God. He gives great prominence to faith and to the Holy Spirit, in whatever connection they may appear. And in a Fragment of his that remains,¹ he says, The first thing is to deny one's self, and follow Christ ; and they who do thus, go on unto perfection, performing all the will of the Teacher, being children of God by *the spiritual regeneration* (*διὰ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας τῆς πνευματικῆς*), and heirs of the kingdom of heaven ; for they who seek this first, shall not be deserted.

¹ Ex Codicibus manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Turinensis.

ARTICLE III.

WILL THE GRAND CONSUMMATION, GIVING THE KINGDOMS OF THIS WORLD TO CHRIST, BE INTRODUCED UNDER THE DISPENSATION OF THE SPIRIT?

By Rev. Joseph Steele, Castleton, Vt.

WHAT question can be of greater practical importance to the church of Jesus Christ, at a time when so many signs proclaim the day near at hand. Already the millenarian sees it at the door, and concentrates his plans and efforts upon those duties which harmonize with such expectation. He feels dissatisfied with the tardy and far reaching plans of benevolence, and earnestly demands that the church give up her dreams of evangelizing the world, and hasten to gather in the last gleanings of the vintage. In all the aggressive movements of the day, and the success which has crowned them, he sees no cheering indications. In his view, the world is only waxing worse; the gospel is only a proclamation and not the power of God for the world's salvation; the good for which it was designed is nearly accomplished; and nothing great, nothing important, touching Zion's prosperity, is to be anticipated until the Redeemer shall come in person. On the contrary, a large portion of the church, adopting other views, and reading their duty in harmony with the expectation that, under the dispensation of the Spirit, the heathen are to be given to Christ for an inheritance, are laying plans and combining their energies to send the gospel to every creature; confident that the great harvest is yet to be gathered. In their view the cause is making progress, the signs betoken success, and the blessing of God upon their efforts is the seal of his approbation. They fancy that the systems of paganism are becoming decrepit, that the throne of Antichrist is tottering, and that the year of jubilee is near.

Views so widely dissimilar must exert widely different effects.

How far the Millenarian views, if generally adopted, would change the direction of the church, experience has not yet taught us; but it seems manifest to us, that the effect would be dispiriting and disastrous in the extreme. The influence of opposing views may fairly be estimated from the past. No era in the history of the church is more clearly marked, than that of modern missions, and the fact is well established, that the originators and most active promoters of them, held the doctrine, that the world would be subjugated to Christ under

the dispensation of the Spirit. The first appeal to the churches on the subject of a general concert made by ministers in Scotland, more than a century since, is founded upon this doctrine. President Edwards took up that appeal, and urged it with great force on the same ground. Fuller and his compeers, who actually established the Monthly Concert, out of which grew the work of missions, held the same sentiments and made them the spring of their enterprising zeal. It would be a deeply interesting work to trace the history of the missionary spirit as it grew and expanded in the minds of these devoted men, in connection with the great idea that the world is to be converted to Christ. They acted under a sense of responsibility for the accomplishment of this; they felt that the work depended upon the Holy Spirit; and they prayed that the Spirit might be poured from on high. An unusual spirit of prayer was gradually diffused in the churches. Christian benevolence and enterprise increased. From step to step the work advanced until it has become the wonder and glory of the age. Let any one ask the question, what would there be left if all which has evidently grown out of the missionary character of our times were blotted out, and he will readily perceive how much it has accomplished. Can it now be believed that such fruits have sprung from an error so important as that of mistaking the object of the present dispensation, and the great end of Christ's second appearing? We grant there is danger in judging either doctrines or practice by *immediate* results; but if the Saviour's rule has any value, it is safe to judge both by their fruits when the experience of a century has fairly proved of what kind they are.

Such views and the results which have followed are in admirable harmony with the general object and plan of redemption. We know that the dominion of Satan in our world is a usurped dominion. By seducing man to sin, the great deceiver found opportunity to mar the work of God. Changed from love of God to hatred, from loyalty to disobedience, man became the willing subject of Satan. This triumph Satan has maintained hitherto; and so successfully has the strong man armed kept his palace, that he is rightfully styled "the god of this world." Could he but *retain* this dominion, his triumph would be complete. This cannot be. The truth and honor of Jehovah are both engaged to trample Satan under foot, and give the heritage to his beloved Son. How is this to be accomplished? It is plain it might have been done by an exertion of almighty power, and in this way the holy angels may have expected to see it accomplished, when man fell. This however was not the method his wisdom chose; and in the first promise made to the fallen race, he declares that the usurped domin-

ion shall be recovered by the "Seed of the woman." So it has been up to this hour ; all that has been recovered has been recovered by Christ. Not one subject has been regained since Adam fell, except through the work of redemption. So it will be, it is reasonable to conclude, with the whole promised dominion of Christ ; and it is highly probable in itself that this dominion will extend over the whole earth. If Satan continue to the end, lord of this world, as he has been hitherto, how is he despoiled of his usurpation ? If he hold his dominion as long as the world stands, will he not seem to have maintained his supremacy ? Or if the gospel age shall terminate, and Christ appear in power and glory before he is dethroned, will it not be the *power of God*, not the *Seed of the woman*, which bruises his head ? This thought becomes the more convincing when we consider what vast preparations are made in the gospel for the express end of man's recovery ; and, though *designed* for the whole world, they have been made effectual hitherto only to a limited extent. The command to preach the gospel to every creature, with the promise that in it shall all the families of the earth be blessed, clearly indicates a glorious triumph. If now the success of the gospel continue to be limited, as it has been, will it not seem to be a failure ? Will there not be an appearance, at least, of undertaking to build, and not being able to finish ? Is it not most reasonable to suppose, after the Son of God has made a sacrifice of his life for the avowed purpose of destroying the works and the power of the devil, that he will, *by that sacrifice*, accomplish the end ?

Is it not also to be expected that Jesus Christ, "who suffered shame and reproach in this world, and was condemned and put to death as a malefactor by man, should have this reproach removed in the sight of all men, and that the cause in which he suffered and died, should prevail and be victorious in this same world where he suffered and died, and he be exalted and extolled and be very high." The enemies of Christ have always hated and derided the cross, and have tried all means to overturn it. They even laugh it to scorn, and insultingly boast that Christ can never reign on the earth by means of the cross. Shall they not be disappointed, and their arrogant falsehood be made apparent ? The great question now at issue is, not the supremacy of God, but the supremacy of the cross of Christ. With all his malice, Satan can aspire to nothing greater than to hinder the success and tarnish the glory of the cross. This is his great object. Can it be possible that he will prevail ? Another of his cunning wiles is, to make it appear that Christianity is nothing better than any other system of religion, or any moral theory ; and more than this, that it is

often evil and mischievous. How shall this artifice, which has so largely prevailed in every age, be overthrown, unless it be shown by experiment on a large scale, in the general spread of the gospel, that this, and this only can renovate the world. Thus will the long delay of the gospel triumph give full opportunity to manifest the insufficiency of all other means, and cover them with merited disgrace, and also render its final triumph much more illustrious. In this way, God will make foolish the wisdom of this world. It is said, all these ends will be attained by Christ's second coming — that when he appears "in the glory of his Father with all the holy angels," his enemies will be confounded and Christ be honored. Be it so; yet if it is accomplished by *the glory of the Father*, it is not done *by the cross*; nor can we conceive that the glory of the second coming should have any influence to take away the reproach that the cross is of none effect, or to make manifest that it is the power of God unto salvation.

The doctrine that the world will be subjugated to Christ under the dispensation of the Spirit, is also confirmed by the importance given to the work of redemption. This is the grand work of time. For it the world was created and man formed upon it. Its history, drawn by the pen of inspiration, shows that all events look to this as if it were the grand object; and designed, more than all things else, to advance the glory of God. Hence the angels look upon it with so great admiration, and are filled with exalted praises when they contemplate its mysteries. As it is the work of time, so time must last till it be complete. The results also must be commensurate with the importance of the work, and fully answer to what is said of the power of the gospel, which "is as the fire and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces." To us it seems incredible, that a work which the Scriptures so delight to magnify, a work which has been introduced with such an array of preparation, and which gives promise of results so vast, should be brought to a sudden termination when it has scarcely made an impression upon this world of sin, and when the dominion and the greatness of it under the whole heaven is still in the hands of Satan. What becomes of the promise, "It shall bruise thy head," if Satan is forever the oppressor? Does not the Scripture view of the work of redemption carry us forward insensibly to the conclusion that it will make conquest of the world? The Scriptures indeed tell us of "the glory of his power, and the brightness of his appearing," not however as means for carrying on this work, but as results following from its completion. When the work is done, then shall the end be, and *then* will Christ "come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe." We are aware that it may be said, that

the results are not small even on the present scale of success — the number who have been redeemed is already immensely great — and if infants are reckoned in the number of the saved, we may fairly estimate the whole company of the redeemed as exceeding that of the lost. This does not in the least abate the force of the argument, because it does not alter the fact that the power and glory of this world *is and ever has been* in the hands of the usurper; and the cause of Christ is trodden down and oppressed. If all the oppression of Christ and his people in our world is only the bruising of his heel, we again ask, what becomes of the promise, “It shall bruise thy head?”

This remarkable prophecy claims particular notice. It is the first on record, and contains the germ of the whole history of redemption. God says, “I will put enmity between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” This enmity, and the fruits of it, in bruising the heel of Christ, are apparent in the suffering and dishonor which Satan has been instrumental in bringing upon him; and in the opposition he has made to the interest and church of Christ in the world. This determines the nature of the contest, and who are the conflicting parties. It is a war, not between God and Satan, but between the Redeemer and the seducer — the seed of the woman and the seed of Satan. The conflict dates from the day of the curse, and the history of the church is the history of its progress. What is the result thus far? Is the head of Satan yet bruised? This no one pretends. The most brilliant successes of the cross have been in the midst of the most powerful opposition of the Adversary; and the church has felt the bruising of the heel in persecutions, and opposing stratagems at every step of her progress. At no time has Satan’s dominion in the world been broken. Past results then show us what is meant, by “bruising the heel.” True criticism obliges us to interpret one part of this passage by the other — to make the war begun and carried on by the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent, to be ended with them — and to look to have it continued and ended in the same state and by the same means that it has been thus far waged. It follows that this world is the battle-field, and the gospel and the cross are the means by which the victory is to be gained. “Bruising the head” must come in the same order of works with “bruising the heel,” and it will come when all the cunning artifices of Satan are defeated, and Christ triumphs by means of the gospel. Can anything short of this answer to the language of his prophecy?

The promise to Abraham is to the same effect — “In them shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” This promise, which the

apostle expressly applies to Christ, carries the blessing to all the kindreds of the earth. 'The nations of the earth can be blessed in Christ, only by being made subjects of his kingdom; and the promise cannot have its fulfilment unless the nations are subdued by the gospel, and by means of the gospel, Christ reigns over the earth. It is a miserable evasion of the argument from these and similar passages, to represent that this promise may be fulfilled by the destruction of the nations which are now upon the earth, and by peopling it again from the multitudes of the pious dead, with nations who receive Christ and are blessed in him. God is able "to raise up children to Abraham from the stones in the street," but had he done this, as being more simple and easy than to convert men by the Holy Ghost, would Christ have seen of the travail of his soul, even though the new creations had exceeded the sands of the sea? God is able to build "new heavens and a new earth," and to people it again with holy beings, but what has this to do with the promised *fruit* of Christ's sufferings and death? The promises we have been considering relate to the nature and results of the mediatorial work in this world; and it is absurd to trace their fulfilment in other worlds and by other agencies.

In John 12: 31, 32, we have a strong confirmation of the interpretation we have given to those passages. Then Christ, in anguish of soul prayed, "Father glorify thy Son;" then came a voice from heaven saying, "I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." As this voice was not understood by his disciples, though expressly designed for their instruction and benefit, Jesus condescends to explain its import. This he does by saying, "Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me;" thus teaching that the voice from heaven was the assurance of the Father, that by means of his sufferings and redemption work, the head of Satan should be bruised, and all the nations of the earth be blessed in him. "By his appearance in this world," says Prof. Tholuck in his Commentary, in loc. "by his last passion and death, Christ realizes the highest *ὑπακοή* (obedience) and in so doing he breaks down the dominion of sin; the kingdom of God comes in with power; the rejecting judgment of God against wickedness is fulfilled; and the Saviour beholds Satan like lightning fall from heaven. Luke 10: 8. For if the power of the kingdom of evil is broken down by that great fact of Redemption, then is the power of Satan, who is the ruler of this kingdom, broken with it." The casting out of Satan, and the drawing all men to himself clearly refer to the same event; the one looking more directly to the overthrow of hostile forces, and the other to the salutary effects

of Christ's own agency through the gospel. The drawing will be co-extensive with the breaking down of Satan's kingdom, and in this full accomplishment of both, the glory of the latter day will appear. Such we think must be the import of Christ's words. The whole tenor of Scripture in reference to the nature and ends of the mediatorial work, leads us irresistibly to the conclusion that the great conflict between Satan and the seed of the woman, will be settled under the dispensation of the Spirit. Its great design is to despoil the usurper and give the inheritance to the Redeemer. Hence when Christ appears, Satan falls like lightning from heaven.

Let us now turn to those prophetic promises which speak of what the church is to be. Her future glory is the theme of prophetic rapture in the Old Testament and in the New. "The mountain of the Lord's house shall be exalted above the hills." "The glory of Lebanon shall be given unto it." "The stone cut without hands" shall become a great mountain and fill the whole earth. These are a few out of many Scriptures which speak of the glory which is to come. Shall this be under the dispensation of the Spirit? We appeal to the Scriptures themselves for the answer. The question, be it remembered, concerns not the arithmetic of prophecy, but only the correct interpretation of the language itself; and our eyes are strangely holden, if this does teach us to expect the promised glory before the end of the present dispensation. "The mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills: and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for *out of it* shall go forth the law, etc." We ask now of what age or dispensation does the prophet speak. The description and imagery is by no means suited to such a heavenly state as is supposed to succeed the destruction of this world; neither is it suited to any other age or dispensation. It is appropriate only to the present dispensation, and a time of great and general prosperity to the church. A time when men seek after knowledge, when the law goes forth out of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem, when the spirit of war gives place to love of peace, and when the gospel is made effectual to the nations by the Holy Ghost. The present dispensation is exactly fitted for such a time as this; what other dispensation is?

The time when "the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together," Isa. 40: 5, must be the time of the grand consummation; but the precursor of this renders it certain that it be-

longs to the dispensation of the Spirit. It is the voice of John, crying in the wilderness; it is preparing the way of the Lord; it is all the work of the gospel, and it all belongs to gospel times. In like manner "the stone cut without hands" makes its way to fill the whole earth, breaking in pieces and consuming all other kingdoms, showing the work to be progressive in its character, and also that it belongs to the *age* to which the kingdoms belong which are subdued by it. In the second Psalm we have the solemn decree of the Father that the heathen shall be given to the Son for an inheritance. By what means is this decree, which secures the glorious triumph, to be executed? The prophet tells us, "the king is set, or *poured out* — upon the holy hill of Zion," the well known figurative denomination of the Christian church. Does not this clearly indicate that the church is to be the instrument? Does not a king conquer by means of his subjects? The expression *I have poured out my king* — may be equivalent to — 'I have constituted my king by pouring out my Spirit;' and then it refers to the abundant and glorious out-pouring of the Spirit on the primitive disciples, and to those still more abundant effusions of the same Spirit, yet to be enjoyed, in which Christ "shall come down *like rain* upon the mown grass; as *showers* that water the earth. Are not these the means indicated by the prophet? But the grand condition of the performance of the decree is, asking. Though the decree is irreversible, it is not to be performed but upon this condition. Yet the prescribed *asking* is not to be made by the Messiah in his own person only; else how shall we account for the long delay? In himself has not the desire ever been as strong as it can be, and in this sense has he not long since asked in the fulness of his soul? But there is a constructive oneness between Christ and his people. As they are to be joint-heirs with him in this profession of the promised ascendancy, so they are united with him in the condition of fervent supplication. If then the church is joined with Christ in *the asking*, if he as king conquers by his own people, if the glory of his kingdom comes through the out-pouring of the Spirit; can it be doubted to what dispensation it belongs? We read in Ps. 82: 2. "All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn unto the Lord; and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before him." This will be the day of Zion's glory and triumph: and this day comes through the dispensation of the Spirit. What language could more clearly describe his effectual operations, causing guilty men to remember their former ways, and turn from them unto the Lord? And thus it is that the kingdoms of the world are given to Christ, and all the kindreds of the nations are made to worship before him. These passages may suffice to show what is the

general tenor of the Scriptures, when speaking of glory which awaits the church of Jesus Christ upon the earth, and the means by which it is to be brought about. This is the appearing of Christ in the abundant out-pouring of the divine Spirit, and in the glory of the redemptive work, — not his final appearing in the clouds of heaven.

There is a beautiful harmony between this view of the coming and those parables of Christ which speak of the progressive character of the gospel. The grain of mustard seed, from the smallest beginning, grows to the largest size. The leaven, by a sure but gradual process, leavens the whole lump. In both the process may be more rapid at one time than at another, owing to the increase of heat, or some other favoring circumstance, but the same principle remains, and advances to the end, when the *whole lump is leavened*. Did not the divine principle begin to operate when the Holy Ghost was poured out at the Pentecost? Will it not continue to operate till the *world* is renovated? Do not these parables absolutely exclude the idea of the breaking up of the present system before the glorious result shall appear? How can they be made to harmonize with the supposition that the *age of the Spirit* must end, and Christ appear in a new dispensation before the promised glory come?

The triumphant reign of Christ upon the earth is abundantly established by the prophecies both of the Old and the New Testament. Daniel, in the vision of "the great image," speaks of this kingdom, as "a stone cut without hands, which became a great mountain and filled the whole earth." Again in the vision of the "four beasts," he describes it as the kingdom given to the Son of man and to the saints of the Most High, which is to supercede all other kingdoms. In the Revelation the same glorious kingdom is represented in three distinct visions. The first is at the sounding of the seventh trumpet, (chap. 11: 15,) when "there were great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord, and of his Christ; and he shall reign forever and ever." Again, in the first verse of the 19th chap. the same thing is described by the marriage of the Lamb, consequent upon the fall of Babylon and the judgment of the great whore. In the first verse of the 20th chap. it is again mentioned, as consequent to the destruction of the beast and the false prophet, and the binding of Satan, which follows upon the destruction of the last of his allies. That these all refer to the same event is evident, from the resemblance of the things described, and from the inapplicability of either to any other predicted event. Whatever is meant by the prophets of old in their descriptions of the glory which is to come; the same is meant by "the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdom

of Christ ;" by the " marriage of the Lamb ;" and by the saints " reigning with Christ a thousand years." The difference in the descriptions is only the difference resulting from different points of observation. The question which concerns the present discussion is, do these refer to the second personal advent of Christ ? As there are other passages which speak of this advent about which there is no dispute, and which are very explicit ; we must learn from these what this advent is to be. Passages of doubtful import are to be determined by those which are plain.¹ " This same Jesus which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go up into heaven." " When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him ; then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory ; and before him shall be gathered all nations : and he shall separate them one from another as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and the trump of God. . . . And to you who are troubled rest with us when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God,—And when he shall come to be glorified in his saints. Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints, to execute judgment upon all. And as it is appointed unto all men once to die, but after this the judgment ; so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation." See also 2 Pet. 5: 7—10.

These Scriptures, we think, establish the following points beyond all controversy, viz. that Christ will personally appear in our world but once more ; — that the great object of that appearing is the general judgment including both the righteous and the wicked, — that all the dead will then be raised, and all be judged ; " for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ," — that the world will then be burned up, the righteous be taken to heaven, and the wicked be cast into hell forever. Now if such be the design and ends of Christ's coming, the prophecies referred to can have no reference to it ; for they clearly indicate that this world is to continue after the event of which they speak ; and John expressly informs us that it will be followed by the battle of Gog and Magog, and that again by the resurrection of the dead and the final judgment (Rev. 20: 7—15). The resurrection and the judgment here described are general in the fullest sense. The dead small and great are raised, the books are opened,

¹ Acts 1: 11. Matt. 24: 30, 31. 1 Thess. 4: 16. 2 Thess. 1: 7, 9. Jude 14. Heb. 9: 27, 28.

and the book of life also, proving the judgment of the *righteous* as well as the *wicked*. It is idle therefore to pretend that this describes the resurrection and judgment of the wicked *only*. No description of a general judgment in the Bible is more explicit. Besides, there is not one passage in the visions of Daniel, or of John above referred to, which contains any such mention of the second advent, or of the general judgment as appears in the passages we have cited; not one from which it would be possible to *prove* the doctrine of the second advent. Daniel has been thought to refer to this, when he "saw one like the Son of Man come with the clouds of heaven, and come to the Ancient of Days—and then sees given him dominion and glory and a kingdom." But it should be observed that the coming here spoken of, is not to *this earth*, but to the *Ancient of Days*; that is, to the throne of God in heaven; and this was fulfilled when Christ *ascended in the clouds of heaven, and sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high*.

In the visions of John there is no proof of the second advent. We look in vain for such proof at the sounding of the seventh trumpet, or in the vision of the marriage of the Lamb, or of the binding of Satan. It is said that the appearance of Christ and of the armies of heaven, in the vision of the destruction of the beast and the false prophet (Rev. 19: 11) is proof that this refers to a personal advent, because Christ can be a symbol of no one but himself. But we find an appearance of the same Person in the same characters essentially, in the vision which precedes the letters to the churches of Asia. The argument therefore proves a personal advent at that time as really as at the time here referred to, which is not true. Much stress has been laid upon the 20th chapter of the Revelation. But there is nothing here indicative of the second coming. The vision represents the old serpent bound by a strong angel, and cast into the bottomless pit, the saints seated upon thrones, and the souls of them who were beheaded for the witness of Jesus living and reigning with him a thousand years. This is the whole of the vision, unless we consider what is said respecting *the rest of the dead* as a part of it. Here it is certain that the binding of Satan with a *chain* cannot be understood literally, but must refer to some effectual restraint put upon him. In like manner the reigning of the saints, sitting upon *thrones*, is not to be understood literally, but as having reference to their great power and dignity and prosperity when Satan is restrained. The souls of the martyrs living with Christ, has no fitness to symbolize the resurrection of their bodies, but is the appropriate representation of such a state of prosperity as if all the martyrs had come back to the earth, to live in triumph and to pervade the earth with their spirits. The coming Saviour forms no part of the

vision. Could a feature so important have been omitted, or overlooked by the prophet, if it had formed a part of the event described? Moreover, this vision does not embrace the resurrection of the dead and the final judgment, both of which are *inseparable* from the second advent. John expressly informs us (vs. 7—15) that the resurrection and final judgment will both take place *after the thousand years* are expired. What John saw in this vision is called a *resurrection*, indeed, and so is the recovery of lost sinners called a resurrection (see Luke 2: 34 in the Greek). True it is called a "*first resurrection*," which implies a *second*; as much as a "*second death*" implies a *first*; but as the first and second *deaths* are different in their nature, so may the first and second *resurrections* be. There surely is no *proof* here that the bodies of any of the saints will be raised previous to the millennium; and without the aid of other Scriptures, not even the great fact of Christ's second coming would be established. The obvious design of these visions seems to be, to exhibit the providence and grace of God moving on with increasing majesty and power to the *final conquest*; in the destruction of Babylon and the great whore; of the beast and the false prophet; and of all the allies and resources of Satan; and as the last act in "bruising his head," fitly introduced when his power is utterly broken, he himself is taken and shut up. Then is Christ's conquest complete; his kingdom appears in glory, his saints are exalted and blessed; and the "bruised heel" is recovered in restoring the memory of those who have been slain for Christ, and in making them to live in the general prevalence of their spirit and power upon the earth. Thus will all the prophecies be fulfilled which describe the prosperity of the church in the latter days. But how or when are they to be fulfilled on the supposition that the end of time immediately follows the destruction of the antichristian system? What existence has the church upon the present earth but in the wilderness? How shall we reconcile the idea of Christ's second coming at a thousand years' distance from the last judgment, or, as some will have it, 360,000 years, with those Scriptures which make them inseparable; which teach us that the wicked "shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power; WHEN HE SHALL COME TO BE GLORIFIED IN HIS SAINTS, and to be admired in all them that believe IN THAT DAY? How can the account of Satan's being loosed after a thousand years' restraint, and going forth to deceive the nations, and to gather together the armies of Gog and Magog, be made to comport with a state of immortality, or with the condition of men after their resurrection? Will the sea and the grave give up their dead to become followers of Satan in a new enter-

prise, and not rather that they may "be judged every man according to his works?"

Many of the prophecies relating to the Jews furnish the strongest evidence that the day of Millennial glory will come through the dispensation of the Spirit. What else can be the import of Hos. 3: 4, 5? The children of Israel are now and have been since the destruction of their city, in the condition described by the prophet, "without a king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice, and without an image, and without an ephod, and without a teraphim." As the first part is fulfilled and fulfilling, so must the remainder yet be fulfilled. "Afterward shall the children of Israel return and seek the Lord their God and David their king, and shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days." This remains to be accomplished by the operations of the divine Spirit. For it is his peculiar work to cause men to *return and seek the Lord their God*. Nothing short of their conversion to God can be a fulfilment of this prophecy.

In the 11th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul teaches with great clearness, that there is to be a general conversion of the Jews, which is to be in some way consequent upon the conversion of the Gentiles, and attended with the most important and desirable results for the rest of the world. "For if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead?" We have seen the *casting away* of the Jews, but not the *receiving of them*. This event is not to take place till after the fulness of the Gentiles is brought in; that is, after the conversion of multitudes of them. According to the apostle, the event of receiving the Jews is to come *through the mercy shown to the Gentiles*, not as the result of the crisis of estrangement; and the Gentiles therefore are to be instrumental in the restoration, through the blessing of God upon the gospel. Nothing is said of the restoration being sudden, or effected by miracle, or consequent upon the second advent. If these things belong to the event, it must be learned from other parts of the Scripture. It is not taught by the apostle, as might be expected, if such were the fact; for no one of the New Testament writers refers more often, or with greater animation, to the second coming. As if to cut off the possibility of mistake, Paul tells *how* the event is to be brought about: "And so all Israel shall be saved." That the Jewish people are meant by Israel, is certain from the context. How, then, are they to be saved? Just in the way in which the prophets had foretold. "Then shall come out of Zion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob. As for me, this my covenant with them, saith the Lord: my Spirit, which is upon them, and my

words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, saith the Lord, from henceforth and forever." How was it possible for Paul more clearly to have fixed the event to the dispensation of the Spirit? How strangely at variance with this is the theory which makes the recovery of the Jew to result from Christ's second coming, at the crisis of the world's degeneracy! and not from the lifting of the veil from their heart by the Holy Ghost, and the Deliverer coming out of Zion; — the church so long perpetuated by Gentile converts.

Every reader of the Bible has noticed those numerous Scriptures which speak of a *great general outpouring of the Spirit in the latter days*. The views which we have advanced make these intelligible and precious; every other theory makes them difficult, and tends to divest them of interest. Christ taught that the descent of the Spirit was more important than his bodily presence, a truth which seems to be overlooked by those who see nothing important or decisive accomplished till he appear again. The predictions relating to the Holy Spirit are in agreement with Christ's teaching. They magnify the work of the Spirit and the results of his agency. "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground; I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring; and they shall spring up as among the grass, as willows by the water-courses." "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour my Spirit upon all flesh, etc." The apostle Peter has assured us that this prophecy of Joel related to events which were to happen under the Christian dispensation, and that the scenes of Pentecost were a specimen of what would be abundantly displayed. They could not have been a full accomplishment of the prophecy, because the few thousands affected on that day will by no means answer to the expression "all flesh." Neither was there a complete fulfilment of the prophecy in the success of the gospel in the apostles' day, which, though great, did in fact reach but a small proportion of the world. "All flesh," does not necessarily mean every person; but it surely indicates more than a mere fraction. Can it mean less than that the Spirit, in power and fulness, will be to the whole church what it was to the primitive disciples, and to the whole world what it was to the multitudes on the day of Pentecost? Do not this and other predictions of the abundant outpouring of the Spirit, look forward to the times when "the watchmen shall lift up the voice together — when the wolf shall dwell with the lamb — when the Lord shall extend peace to his church like a river, and the glory of the Gentiles like a flowing stream?" Do they not refer

mainly to that last great onset in the mighty conflict, which is to be followed by voices in heaven, saying, "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord and his Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever?"

God has put large honor upon the Holy Spirit in the prophecies. To leave these unexplained, or to enfeeble them by limiting the results to the rescue of a few captives, here and there, out of Satan's wide dominions, is to degrade the Divine Spirit from the place where prophets in their visions beheld him. The triumph of the Redeemer's kingdom depends upon the *abundance* of the Spirit. "Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit saith the Lord." "My kingdom is not of this world." It wants no central government established upon this earth; it wants not the pomp of this world; for "the Lord God himself will be the glory in the midst of it." It is a spiritual kingdom, and needs only that the Spirit "come down like showers upon the mown grass," to cause "the desert to rejoice and blossom as the rose," and the glory of the Lord so to be revealed, *that all flesh shall see it together.*

We frankly confess we have no sympathy with those views of prophecy which shut out the glorious advent of the Spirit, and which give to the militant church no place on earth except in the wilderness: or else so blend the heavenly with the earthly as to join her with the holy dead raised with spiritual bodies to take part in a monarchy which belongs neither to this world nor the next. This is to confound the Millennium with the New Jerusalem which follows it. All our feelings are in harmony with the command of Christ, "*Go ye into all the world,*" is still binding; and the promise, "Lo, I am with you alway even to the end of the world," is the cheering watchword which cannot fail till the gospel is preached to every creature. We love the doctrine of Christ's second coming, — coming as the conqueror who *has subdued* all his and our enemies. We believe "God is not slack concerning his promise," but that he is preparing all things as fast as possible for the judgment of the great day, "when the Lord himself shall descend, and *all* that are in their graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth." An important part of this preparation is the triumph of the seed of the woman by the complete overthrow of Satan and his cause. We see not how the way is prepared for God to vindicate his own character, or for Christ to enjoy his triumph, till every obstacle to the spread of the gospel has been surmounted, till every strong hold of sin has been demolished, till every opposing power has been routed, and Satan himself bound and shut up. The letting loose of Satan for a little season, after the thousand years are ended will only

serve to show that his evil disposition is unchanged, and that it is fit he should be cast into the lake of fire, to go no more out forever.

We are confident that this view of the kingdom of Christ is suited to excite and support the faith and patience of Christians, and give fervency to the prayer, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven." Such effects have appeared during the last fifty years, and they will be more apparent as the church comes more fully to understand that the day of prosperity shall come. Days of degeneracy and trial will only strengthen the confidence of the faithful that "the God of peace shall bruise Satan under their feet shortly." We know not what commotions and fearful judgments shall be upon the earth; nor what the present shaking of the nations betokens; yet are we assured that Providence will unite with the agency of the Spirit to give the result. "Our Redeemer is strong; the Lord of Hosts is his name. Thou hast a mighty arm; strong is thy hand, and high is thy right hand." Whose heart does not kindle with gratitude and zeal while he contemplates the work to be done and the glory that shall follow? Who will not cry,

"Worthy the Lamb, for he was slain for us!
The dwellers in the vales and on the rocks
Shout to each other, and the mountain tops
From distant mountains catch the flying joy;
Till, nation after nation taught the strain,
Earth rolls the rapturous hosanna round."

"Come then, and, added to thy many crowns,
Receive yet one, the crown of all the earth,
Thou who alone art worthy!"

ARTICLE IV.

THE RELATIONS OF FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY. AN ADDRESS
BEFORE THE PORTER RHETORICAL SOCIETY OF ANDOVER
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AT ITS ANNIVERSARY, SEPT. 4, 1849.¹

By Professor Henry B. Smith, Amherst College, Mass.

GENTLEMEN OF THE PORTER RHETORICAL SOCIETY :

ALTHOUGH the very name of your society might seem to indicate the subject of your anniversary addresses, yet I have been deterred from taking sacred rhetoric as my theme, partly by the memory of the orations of former years, and partly because I have supposed that he who advocated the claims of this art ought, in his own person, to exemplify its power. And I feel justified in adventuring upon a graver topic, because this is consistent with your own precedents ; because I am convinced it is equally befitting the occasion ; and because it is more congenial with my own pursuits.

We meet as believers, as students, perhaps as teachers of the Christian faith. We are rationally convinced that in Christianity is the highest truth, and that in the orthodox system, which has formed the substance of Christianity through its advancing and victorious centuries, we have the best human exposition of the divine revelation. In proportion, then, to our love for this system, and to our love of all truth, will be the depth of our interest in the assaults made on our faith, whether by depraved passions or by elevated intellects.

No man who loves the Christian faith as it ought to be loved, no man who is alive to the spirit of the times in which he lives, as every man ought to be alive, can have failed to feel, to see, or to forebode the coming of a conflict between the mightiest powers that sway the destiny of man. There may, indeed, be those to whom, through grace, it is given, in the ripeness of an impregnable conviction, or in what Milton calls the "undeflowered and unblemishable" simplicity of a

¹ The form of the spoken address is retained in this contribution to the Review, because a change in this respect would demand a change in the whole structure and arrangement of the discussion. The tone of the piece was necessarily kept rather popular than scientific. The exigencies of the occasion must be the author's plea for the slight notice given to many important points, which must needs be introduced, though they could not be formally debated.

guileless and unquestioning faith to live in unruffled serenity ; ever to see the guiding star and never to feel the insurgent billows. Blessed are they in the repose of their faith ; intolerant of the spirit of the hour, because conscious of having the truth which is eternal. But most of us, if not ourselves assailed by doubts, or if through divine love delivered from their thralldom, cannot fail to see the ravages they are making upon others, and minds, too, of noble as well as of ignoble mould and temper.

We see the orthodox system, and Christianity itself, superseded by ethical, by social, and by metaphysical systems ; we see it losing not only its traditionary, but also its intellectual hold, over many a sincere mind. Its sacred language is converted to profane and philosophic use. Its venerable symbols, the lawful heritage of the church, won by ages of conflict, are made to yield a new sense. Social reforms are made the media of indirect, when not of open attack. Each new science puts in its claim to modify some part of the sacred record. Our American propensity to submit all opinions to new examination, and all institutions to new experiment, favors such tendencies. The current English philosophy, when it does not pass Christianity wholly by, pays it but a distant reverence ; the French philosophy is at the best vague in its admiration ; the German speculations threaten its annihilation. Many who do not definitely doubt, are still half-conscious of

That first slight swerving of the heart,
Which words are powerless to express.

Christianity is to them no longer the sun which rules the day, revealing all things in their true light, and guiding man through the waking hours of his hard and varied toil ; but like the paler moon it comes, when at all, in borrowed brightness, clothing all objects in an uncertain light, admired by the more susceptible, and having for its chief office to guard the hours of our repose. As the ardent and versatile Lamennais has represented it, before the intellect and science of the age, our faith is now arraigned, as was once its regal founder before the representative of the mightiest power of ancient times ; and it is met on all sides by the question : Art thou a king ? And how shall it show that it can really respond, I am the king of truth ; in me is the highest truth, the wise philosophy ?

The subject to which we are thus led, the Relations of Faith and Philosophy, is one which lies at the heart of all the questions of our times, and forms their sum and strength, their " pith and puissance." Let me then ask your sympathy in the boldness, if not your approbation

of the wisdom of the attempt to unfold the characteristics and the true relations of faith and philosophy. Let me hope that our faith receive no detriment, even if your reason receive no instruction ; and if the hand fail of its steadiness, still believe that the heart was right.

It is proposed to conduct the discussion by first describing the characteristics of faith and philosophy ; then, by showing their opposition ; next, by inquiring whether they are really exclusive of each other ; and if this should seem not to be the case, by stating in conclusion, what we conceive to be their relative position, and the rightful claims of each.

I. Faith, in its widest usage, designates a conviction in the reality of things unseen and eternal ; in a more religious sense, it is trust in God and God's word ; in a more specific and theological meaning, it embraces the articles of belief drawn out into a definite system ; in its most specific and evangelical sense, it denotes that full reliance upon Christ, by which we become partakers of the salvation which he alone has purchased for the human race.

In all these senses, excepting the first, it has certain marked traits, by which it is distinguished from philosophy. It rests upon authority, upon good, upon the highest authority, but still upon authority, — confirmed, indeed, by experience, but it is the authority, and not the experience, which is ultimate and supreme. That authority is divine and decisive ; it is the very word of God recorded in the Scriptures. As face answers to face in a glass, so does faith to the Bible, which it receives, both in history and in doctrine ; and it is not so anxious to harmonize the parts as to imbibe the whole. It connects all things directly with the providence of God ; to this it is ever submissive. It is content with miracles, and it accepts mysteries ; it says, God alone is wise ; here we see as through a glass, darkly ; there we shall know as we are known. With the scholastic it has sometimes been willing to say, I believe, because it is impossible ; or, with Lord Bacon, "By how much any divine mystery is revolting and incredible, so much the more honor do I render to God in believing it ; and so much the nobler is the victory of our faith." In such self-forgetful trust it finds, too, a deep delight, as well as a sure support. In Scripture and in prayer, there are rivers of pleasure, fountains which never fail, peace unutterable. Unregenerate is the heart that has never known such moods ; unsanctified the soul that does not ever sink to its rest upon them. All doubt is merged in this exulting confidence ; it flits only over its surface, as the breeze sweeps the luxuriant field of grain ; nay, it may but serve to quicken faith with a sublimer energy, to add volume and exhilaration to its deep-felt joy. And as doubt does not

enfeeble, so danger does not awe it ; for omnipotence is with it. In death also it may delight, for it will then be delivered from sin, its only real enemy ; it will be wholly sanctified, its only real good ; and through eternity it will ever behold the face of Him, with whom every fibre of the soul's inmost life is intertwined.

Such is faith ; it is called a life, and it is worthy of the name of life, it is so full and satisfying. The man who has it would as soon doubt whether his body were animated by the life of nature, when he is conscious of the movements of its muscles in their most strenuous efforts, and of the full delights of nervous sensation, as he would doubt whether his soul were a partaker of spiritual life, when its powers are expanded to their utmost intensity of action and of blessedness, by the gracious truths which centre in the person of our Lord.

Turn we now to philosophy. This is the product of human thought, acting upon the data given by the world without or the world within, and eliciting from these data principles, laws, and system. It is not the whole of human knowledge, but a special mode of that knowledge, the knowing things rationally ; the knowing them in their ideas, their causes, their successions, and their ends. Common experience gives us things in their isolation and independence ; philosophy in their similarity, harmony, and unity. It starts with facts, but with them abides not ; it seeks for law, for all law, for the laws of matter, of mind, and of the universe. It demands necessary truth, eternal and immutable laws ; by these it judges all things, and a severe logic is the instrument by which the test is applied. It does not like exceptions, it is intolerant of mysteries, it abhors contradictions. It strives to account for things, for all things. It seeks a harmonious whole. It may begin with wonder, as both Plato and Aristotle taught ; but it ends in system, as both Plato and Aristotle have exemplified. And in proportion to the comprehensiveness, consistency, and exactitude of the system, is the aspiration of the philosophic intellect satisfied. What faith is to the believer, that, as has been said, his system is apt to become to the philosopher. He exults in it with a keen, intellectual delight. The laws of nature become to him the elder oracles, which have a voice to him that questions them, though silent to all others ; which are ever profound, and ever present. In the calm and sure order, the unwearied and inflexible processes, the successive developments of nature and of the race, in the unseen yet irresistible laws of being and of motion, many a philosopher finds all his ideal realized ; he calls this system of things infinite and divine ; loving law, he forgets the source of its energy ; resting in his system, he thinks not of God.

So diverse are faith and philosophy. The one is a simple act of a trust; the other a reflective process; the one rests in facts and persons, the other in law and system. The former says, I must believe in order to know; the latter, I must know in order to believe, and then, it not seldom adds, there is no need of believing. This says, it is so, using the language of authority; that asks, how is it so? using the language of inquiry. Revelation is the boast of faith, reason of philosophy. The latter in second causes forgets the first, the former would even abolish the second, that it might magnify the great First Cause. Philosophy ignores providence so long as it can find a law; to the eye of faith, even miracles are a welcome evidence of the personal energy of God, breaking in, with wise design, upon the too fixed order of a sinful world. The former would rather confess ignorance than belief; the latter, though ignorant, ever trusts. Prayer is the delight of the one, the enigma of the other. In reading the passage: "He that hath the Son, hath life;" philosophy asks, who is the Son; what is his relation to the Father; is it inherent, or in the manifestation alone; what is this life; is it figurative or essential: while faith welcomes the inspired words with glad assent, they are the very words it needs, its heart is attuned to their gracious import. The one knows no love too great for Jesus, the other is willing to make him a partaker even of human sinfulness, that it may be exalted above the necessity of trusting in him. And, to sum up all in a word; faith sees God everywhere, especially in the Scriptures: while philosophy so long as it can find law and system, asks not for God. Law is the word of the one, God of the other; and these are their two extremes.

II. Such being their contrasted characteristics, it is hardly possible but that they should sometimes take the attitude of extreme opposition.

Faith, then, jealous for the honor of her God, and feeling that her all is at stake, approaches philosophy with the mien of one inspired by a divine impulse, and says:

I have nourished and brought you up, and you have rebelled against me! From the old traditions of the race you received those primal truths which you now claim as the birth-right of human reason. Greece had them from the Orient, where they were cradled. Germany from the gospel it has renounced. You have always been an ingrate, denying your very parentage: you have always been a rebel, defiant of authority; you have always been a sceptic, doubting the best accredited facts. Aiming after unity, you are facile to deny the obstinate facts; seeking for universality, you call partial knowledge universal; the real unity and universality are found only in God, whom you banish from your systems. Of all heresy and division you with

depravity have been the fruitful parents; from the times of the Gnostics to the times of the Germans, you have vexed the church by irrelevant questions, which no man is able to answer. Strong only in undermining, you have never been able to make a system which could survive the "shock of time, the insults of the elements," the providence of God and the might of his church. Your towers have been as Babel, on the plain of Shinar, and the act of building has been ever followed by the confusion of tongues. From pagan lands, unilluminated, you came in the name of Aristotle, and brought subtle sophistries, and, in the name of Plato, ideal reveries, and substituted these for the simplicity of the gospel. Into the depths of materialism you have seduced the heaven-born soul; to the heights of idealism you have carried man, borne on visionary pinions; and in the depths you have found only a sepulchre, and from the heights discerned only an unfilled and trackless void. In the pride of reason, you forget the reality of sin. You weave around man a labyrinthine web, and leave him there without a clue, to die without a hope. Nature you rob of its vital energy; instead of a kind providence, you give us only an un pitying law; instead of a Redeemer, an abstract system, which has neither life nor love. Under your iron, icy reign, crushed are the heart's best affections, unsatisfied its deepest wants; gone, forever gone, its most needed consolations. All the glorious forms with which grace environed us, you have touched with your magic wand, and they have shrivelled, like the leaf before the frost: you leave us only this poor, shifting world: you leave us to despair.

For us, then, there is no possibility even of a truce. It is war and only war: it is faith or philosophy; a disjunctive proposition, a vital dilemma. And you, born of groping reason, must submit to my celestial rights.

Challenged by such an adversary, philosophy, ever ready to respond, takes up the word, and, as is her wont, begins in a more modest, and ends in a more confident tone:

He that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like reason
To rust in us unused.

In your unwise zeal, you charge all philosophy with the extravagances of the few, forgetful of the services of the many. In the flush of a new system, I may have been your opponent; maturer thoughts have usually made me your ally. Without my aid how could man know, without my weapons how defend, even a revelation. When

yourself attacked you use me in your defence, if you do not rely upon bare assertion or unwise determination. Without me you are a mystic or a fanatic. In the early church I aided in expelling superstitions; I sharpened your weapons, and burnished your armor. The precision of your theological terms is owing to my logic; your accredited formulas of doctrine could never have been built up without my hard toil. Those systems of theology which have been your boast and your defence are among the ripest products of philosophic culture. When the apostle speaks of the "opposition of science, falsely so called," does he not imply that there is a science, truly to be so called? And that same God who gave to man the illumination of his Spirit, did he not also give the light of reason, and give reason first, and reason always, and reason unto all: and, even if it be granted, that the highest joys of the heart are found only in submission to his revealed will, yet it must also be conceded that the chief delight of reason is in philosophy.

Thus would philosophy speak in the language of apology; but it has other words when it accepts the formula faith or philosophy. And there are four chief tendencies of our times in which its deliberate and conscious opposition to faith is manifest.

The first is that in which all certainty is found in the facts and laws of the material world. The laws and analogies of nature are forced to explain the laws of mind and of morals. Ethics and metaphysics are subordinated to what is dogmatically called positive science. To conform to natural laws, and not to transgress them is esteemed the great end. Law has no sanctions excepting the direct consequences of obedience or transgression. The harmony of man with nature is the great ideal, is the perfect state. There is no law reaching beyond this life. This world is the boundary of all real human hope and of all well-founded human fear. All else is doubtful.

The second form utters its oracles in a higher mood; it recognizes justice and love and the brotherhood of the race as great ends. It would relieve the wretched; give man his rights; introduce a new social state. It is animated by humane principles, and seeks great moral, though worldly ends. These it believes in; these it judges to be effective and sufficient. It has faith, but a faith which centres in humanity, and not in a personal God or an incarnate Redeemer. It seeks a kingdom: but it is a kingdom which is to be of this world, though it is not yet in the world. Its heaven, the only one which is certain, is to be realized on earth.

There is a third tendency more religious in its language, and which may be and is combined with these others, though as a tenden-

cy it is distinct. God, it says, is to be loved and served; he can be loved. But, it is argued, if I have that love which is the very essence of all religion, what need I more? How can it aid or mar this love to believe in a Bible, a Trinity, an external atonement and such long confessions of doctrine? The state of the heart is all. You call the Bible inspired, so am I; you call it a revelation, I have one within, more constant and persuasive. Such a mind contemplates the grand and distinctive realities of the Christian faith, as we gaze upon the sculptured gods of a Grecian temple; we may be lost in wonder and enraptured by their beauty: but they have for the soul no divine reality, as object of faith and love; they are memorials of an antiquated superstition; we have thought and felt above and beyond them, we cannot find our whole selves in them.

The fourth form of philosophic unbelief is the pantheistic: and this combines in itself elements from all the others. Here philosophy, as though conscious of its full power, asserts its absolute supremacy. By the assumed universality of its principles, the undeniable comprehensiveness of its aims, the rigor of its logic, and the steadiness of its philosophical processes; by its high ideal character; by its claim to be the result of the concentrated thought of the race, and to contain in itself all that is essential in the Christian faith, and to give the law and the explanation to all other sciences; this system seizes with an almost demoniacal power upon minds that would laugh to scorn the dreamy fantasies of the East, that see the rottenness of bare materialism and that feel something of the inherent might of Christianity. Never did a philosophical system take such an attitude towards the Christian faith; it does not make it a superstition, as did atheism; it does not neglect it, as does our popular philosophy; it does not scout its mysteries, as does an irrational common-sense; nor does it attenuate it into a mere ethical system: but it grants it to be the highest possible form of man's religious nature, it strives to transform its grandest truths into philosophical principles; it says that only one thing is higher, and that is pantheism. It claims to have transmuted Christianity into philosophy, and to stand above it, triumphant, dominant, exultant. And thus it is the most daring, subtle, consistent, destructive and energetic philosophy which ever reared its front against the Christian faith. It has the merit of recognizing the grandeur of Christianity; it has the audacity to boast that itself is more sublime. It professes to have systematized all thought; to have possession of the aboriginal substance and the perfect law of its development; to be able to unfold all our ideas in their right connections, and to explain nature, mind, art, history, all other philosophies, and also Christianity.

All this, it says, is but the unfolding of its own inner life. It weaves its subtle dialectics around everything, that thus it may drag all into its terrific vortex. It has a word for almost every man excepting for the Christian established in his faith. By the very extravagance of its pretensions it seduces many; by its harmony with the life of sense it attracts those who love the world; and by its ideal character it sways such as would fain be lifted above the illusions of sense and the visions of imagination, and the contradictions of the understanding, into a region of rarer air where reason sways a universal sceptre. Its system includes all things. God is all things; or rather all is God; he that knows this system knows and has God. And it claims that it thus gives a higher idea of deity than when he is limited by a definite personality; assuming, without any philosophical ground, that personality is in its very nature finite, and cannot be connected with infinite attributes. It professes to give man a system which shall make him wise and it is with the oldest temptation, ye shall be as gods.

Thus does philosophy, in its most daring mood accept the alternative, philosophy or faith; and gives us the choice between Christ and Spinoza. And this is the great alternative of our times.

III. Leaving these two powers, for the present, in this attitude of opposition, we next inquire whether they can be rationally held to be utterly exclusive of each other.

It is said, for example, in faith is the only certainty; all philosophy is dangerous; the natural tendency of scientific research is against revelation; man is so depraved that though a true philosophy were a great good, it is irrational to expect it.

And it is undeniable that much modern speculation, both physical and metaphysical, is opposed to revelation; and that all systems and principles which would explain nature without a God, and man's destiny without Christianity, so far as they logically lead to these results, are an unmixed evil and ought to be exposed and opposed.

But how opposed? Philosophically, or otherwise? He who will answer this question fairly will take the only correct ground. It is, we will say, an objection to the personality of God. How shall we meet it? Shall we simply assert that we believe in the divine personality; that the Bible speaks of God as a personal agent? Or shall we not rather strive to show on the strictest philosophical grounds that the idea of a personal God is the most rational; that without it we cannot really explain the origin or the order of the universe; and that it is a mere assumption to assert, that personality is in its very nature finite — since it is the finiteness of man's attributes, and that alone, which gives the finiteness to his personality. But if we do this we are enter-

ing upon a philosophical discussion. And would it not be unfortunate to have taken at the outset a position against all philosophy, which would only serve to throw doubt over our own argument? Is there not ground for a calm distinction between philosophy and false philosophy. We may deny the possibility of a perfect system; we may show that faith is necessary; yet, is it not unwise to doubt, or to seem to doubt, or to say anything that would imply that we ever thought of seeming to doubt, that we might attain entire certainty on some points, and those, too, the most important which man can discuss? Is not any other position suicidal?

And therefore do we maintain that our ground should be, that faith and philosophy are not inherently opposed, but inherently at one; and that this should be our pervading sentiment, influencing our theology, our philosophy, our preaching, our every-day discussions; and that this is a position of prime necessity, now more than ever.

For, if this be not so, the bitterest sneers of a Hume were all true; fortified is the balanced satire of a Gibbon. He who lately wrote in a widely circulated Review: "that almost all sects have agreed to divorce religion from reasoning and to exalt faith by contemning philosophy, and that they thus have left all works of divinity in the hands of one class of writers and of one class of readers," might maintain his vituperation by our own confessions. Can that which is the detestable and sinister policy of our enemies be a prudent position for ourselves?

If this be not so, then we give over the whole field of modern scientific research, both in nature and in mind, entire and unguarded, to be the grand arena, the pride, the honor and the power of infidelity. We virtually say, that to its benefit shall enure the fruit and glory of the sciences. And thus many minds, not faithless, yet not believing, who know that science has gained and garnered up some solid truth are only repelled from a candid examination of the truths of our faith.

If this be not so, then, further, it is difficult to see the wisdom of that constitution of our being by which we are made cognizant of rational truth, as well as susceptible to the authority of religion.

If this be not so, then do we, in virtue of this constitution, deliver over the human mind to perpetual uncertainty, to an intestine war. And such a war is not like the conflict between sin and holiness, for sin is that which ought not to be, and in overcoming it, man is restored to himself as well as to his God; but, in the other case, prime elements of man's essential nature are set at variance, the foes are they of his own household; and they are contending not upon points of inferior moment, but upon the most vital interests of man. And so

we are in danger of leaving it to be inferred with the schoolman, that one may hold to a truth with all the energy of faith, which is opposed by all the arguments of reason. We shall oscillate like the German who declared: "philosophy plunges me into the arms of faith, and faith sends me back into the arms of philosophy; my spirit is a ball playing between these two extremes." If the soul for a moment be delighted with the enrapturing visions of faith, the next thought will be, these gorgeous palaces may be dissolved, and leave only a wreck behind. And thus the mind will be more ready to infer that all things are uncertain than that faith alone is sure, it is better prepared for scepticism than for trust, if it cannot hold, as an unassailable conviction, that reason and faith may be reconciled.

But this position is not only inconsistent with the rightful claims of reason, it is also repugnant to the real necessities and nature of faith. While it makes us traitors to the one it only dishonors the other. A faith which we do not believe in the very depths of our hearts to be rational, to contain in itself the sum and substance of all philosophy, is a faith which no thinking man can rationally hold; and if he holds it irrationally, it cannot long maintain its sway. "Faith may precede intellect," as Augustine says, but it involves intellect. It has its grounds, reasons and relations. "It appears to me a negligence," are the words of Anselm, "if after we are confirmed in the faith we do not study to understand what we believe." If a Christian man does not really hold that his system of faith has a firmer basis, a nobler end, a more puissant energy, that it solves more vital problems, and is adapted to man's nature in a fuller sense than any other system, that it is the highest reason as well as the only redemption, and the highest reason because the only redemption, he virtually confesses that a greater than Christ is here. We rob faith of one of its strongest persuasions if we do not claim that it is perfectly rational.

Faith, too, has its extremes and perils; and philosophy is needed as a counteracting element. It may degenerate into formality, or be sublimated into mysticism, or glow with fanatical fire. As faith without works is dead, being alone, so faith without knowledge may be superstitious, being unchecked. The divine Spirit alone can indeed save from this and every error, into which man's blind and passionate nature is prone to fall; but does He not often do it, by raising the calm voice of reason, the limitations of reflection, and the power of system against the erratic impulses of an unregulated belief. Knowledge without faith is indeed cold: but faith without knowledge is often blind. It may become the servant of passion, and speak the language of bigotry, if it have not reason for its handmaid. Faith may

be likened to the element of heat, whose central source is above, and whose subtle agency pervades all the parts of this wondrous whole — the generator of life, without which all that grows would decay, and all that lives would die ; while reason, like the other element of water, stands at the two extremes, to guard the life which only heat can generate. When the heat becomes excessive, water evaporates, and in this very process envelopes, innocuous, the fiery particles, which else would consume every living thing, and so it guards life at this extreme ; and when winter comes, water congeals, and, in its very congelation, sends out its latent warmth to animate the forms that otherwise would perish, and so it guards life at this extreme also. And even thus, it seems to me, that we may say of human reason, that it has a two-fold office in the guardianship of faith ; from the extreme of formality it may quicken it into a new life by the stimulus of argument, and, by unfolding the symmetry and sublimity of the creed which is repeated with cold lips ; and, in the other extreme of unhalloed glow, it may guard it, not only by the restraints of prudence, but also by the pervading and calm influence of a profound and clear exhibition of all the parts and checks of the Christian system.

We may add, that an intimate persuasion of the inherent unanimity of faith and reason has been a prominent trait of the grandest intellects of the Christian church. Philosophy they have repelled by philosophy. Such was Augustine, when he refuted the vain pretension that man could regenerate himself, not on grounds of Scripture alone, but from the depths of the human consciousness. Such was Anselm of Canterbury, when, at the hour of the sacred vigils, there was revealed to him his sublime speculation upon the being of God : or when, with holy zeal, he wrote upon that high argument, why did God become incarnate ? and first on rational grounds, showed the necessity of an atonement. Such too was that holy French recluse, that sublime ascetic, who felt as hardly did another of his age, the intense conflict between faith and reason, because he had both in their fulness, and who, in immortal fragments, has left us a sketch of a philosophical apology for Christianity, which has never been completed, because Pascal has had no successor. The wisest of English Christians, while he elaborated with patient thought, through many years, his unsurpassed vindication of Christianity, on the ground of the Analogies of nature, was ever animated by the conviction, that there must be harmony in all the works of God, that in their origin, their principles and their aims, nature and Christianity are in unison ; and that this can be rationally evinced. And him — the mighty man of our New-England theologic host, when, with capacious intellect

and whole souled love, he meditated, in the fairest village on the banks of our noblest river and in his remoter missionary retreat, upon those two great problems, which have given their distinctive character to all our subsequent theological discussions, upon the Nature of True Virtue, and the Freedom of the Human Will, what impulse moved him, if not the necessity of bringing the subtlest researches of human reason into harmony with the truths which lie at the basis of all piety. Without philosophy how could he have attempted the reconciliation of divine sovereignty with the consciousness of freedom : without deep speculative insight how could he have discerned, as no one did before him, the radical identity of virtue and religion. Intellect and faith acted together in him, distinct yet as consentaneous as are the principle of life and the organic structure in our animal economy.

Thus, on various grounds, we have contended that it is no sound sense to say that faith and philosophy are foes. On the highest grounds it is false ; on the lowest, it is bad policy. It is unwise to do it even in the heat of discussion, even when opposing a fatal error, even to gain an urgent end. For we should be obliged to recant before the first rational man we encountered in calm debate.

Nor do we forget either man's depravity, or the dangers of philosophy. Man is depraved — alas ! that we should say it, man is depraved ; human passions are the source and defence of many a false system : but I am afraid to allow to depravity the fearful advantage of claiming for itself full possession of our intellectual natures, as well as of the wish and the will ; for the evidence of depravity is increased when we show that it is against a man's own reason ; and we lose one of our most potent means of assailing it when we grant that reason is its bulwark and not its foe.

And philosophy, too, is dangerous ; all philosophy is dangerous. But the simple, sober fact in the case is this, that there are some dangers which can be avoided only by being incurred, and by pressing right through the danger to the victory. And there is one peril that, in our times, is more imminent, and that is, the opposing so dangerous an enemy as is false philosophy, by the only weapons to which it is invulnerable.

Our philosophical infidels are calm men, men of nerve ; their infidelity is not fed by their passions alone, nor is it vented only in execrations. They are men of thought and system. They do not feel the force of a bare assertion ; they yield to no popular clamor ; they fear no ecclesiastical denunciation. They are scrutinizing ; and profoundly conscious of holding principles which deliberately exclude

the realities of the Christian faith. They accept the philosophic horn of the dilemma, philosophy or faith; until they can see that the formula should read, faith and philosophy.

IV. And it is with this formula that we make our transition to the fourth part of this discussion: and that is, an attempt to exhibit the real relations and the rightful claims of faith and philosophy. To say that both have rights, and that we should attempt to reconcile them, is only to gain a clear field for the most important portion of our work, the adjustment of their respective claims, of their relative supremacy. And if the limits of the occasion make it necessary to omit much of great importance, they may perhaps allow a statement of the points most needing consideration.

And it may be well at the outset to disown some vague attempts at reconciliation which only smother the difficulties. Thus to faith is assigned one whole sphere, God and the Bible; to philosophy another and a distinct department, nature and the human mind; but philosophy has an intense interest in God and the Bible, and faith cannot do without man and providence. Neither the dispute nor adjustment is territorial.

Nor can we any better say, that revelation gives us all our ideas of God; and that philosophy must accept them, without anything further. For this either takes revelation in so broad a sense, that a philosophical infidelity might be based upon it; or else it puts man in a position in which we cannot see how a revelation could possibly be made to him in an intelligible manner. A revelation takes for granted that he to whom it is made has some knowledge of God, though it may enlarge and purify that knowledge.

In point of fact, faith and philosophy are employed about the same great subjects, God, man, providence and human destiny.

I. But though employed about the same great subjects, we say that they are employed about them in a different way; and that the difference in the mode results from a difference inherent in the nature of philosophy and faith. And this is the first aspect in which their relations are to be considered.

What then, we ask, is philosophy? what does it seek? what are its limits? And we answer as before, philosophy is a mode of human knowledge, not the whole of that knowledge, but a mode of it; the knowing things rationally; the knowing them in their causes, their relations, and their ends; the knowing them in the harmony and completeness of a system. It being only such a mode of knowledge, the materials, the substance, the facts must, from the nature of the case, exist before the philosophy, and be taken for granted by the philosophy, and be the limit and the test of the philosophy itself.

These exist independently of philosophy, and their reality is, of course, to be attested on independent grounds. The facts of the material or of the intelligible world are the prime materials of all philosophical systems; and without them no system can be constructed. There is one thing, then, against which speculation is fruitless, and that is the majesty of fact, of all facts of the outward or inward world properly attested. Philosophy may explain and systematize realities; may show their rational grounds and connections; but it is not within its province to annul an item of history, any phenomena of nature, or any facts of consciousness. If it endeavor to falsify any reality, duly attested by sense, by internal consciousness, or by valid testimony, it is committing high treason against the majesty of fact. It may seek the rational grounds of all that is, but in doing this it assumes that what is, is; and so far as any system is inconsistent with what is, so far it is false; and so far as it cannot rationally explain what is, so far it is incomplete. And of all philosophy, Scotch or German, ideal or empirical, the independent realities of nature, of mind, and of history are not only the substance and the strength, but also the abiding test; taken for granted as such in all discussions.

If this be so, we ask next, what is faith, what does it claim to be, in what does it rest? Faith, internally, is a state of trust; but it is always trust in something external. Its real character can only be determined by stating its objects. And the Christian's faith reposes, as we before said, upon a revelation, an historical revelation, a revelation historically attested, attested by miracle and by prophecy; a revelation recorded in a volume which claims to be inspired. It is not primarily a system of doctrines, nor a confession, nor a speculation; but it is a grand historical economy, a manifestation of God and his purposes, an annunciation of supernatural truth by natural agencies, by prophets and teachers, and, last of all, by Jesus Christ; a manifestation forming a part of human history, connected and progressive through thousands of years. And all this series of revelations comes to us in the Scriptures, which gives us both the facts and the divine interpretation of them. Christianity thus claims to be a real revelation of God, made in the best form in which we can conceive a revelation to be made, and made for the highest ends for which a revelation can be made, made to give the highest and most needed knowledge, made to redeem mankind. And this whole historic revelation bears with steady and concentrated aim upon one person, himself an historical personage, himself a man, in whom it is declared that heaven and earth are reconciled, that the great problems of human destiny are solved. And thus the Christian religion presents it-

self as adapted to man's highest wants in an exclusive sense, and with redeeming efficacy. This is the first aspect of the Christian economy ; and here is the primary basis of faith.

But this is not all ; for faith claims an internal evidence, as well as an historical basis. Man is a believer, made to trust. The infirmities of his finite, and the necessities of his sinful condition, make faith necessary to the attainment of the great ends of his being. And the Christian finds in his own heart a profound experience, which fills and satisfies his soul, and which is entirely responsive to the substance of the divine revelation, as recorded in the word of God. And here is another series of facts, reaching through thousands of years, embracing men of every clime and degree, the sage and the simple, the civilized and barbarian, the young and the mature, the living and the dying, who all, with one consent, testify that in this revelation they have found their solace and support, that it is the source of the highest activity and blessedness of all their powers. And in the experience of believers also, all converges around the same divine person, who is the centre and the crown of the historic revelation.

Nor is this all. That revelation, historically so grand in its origin, and confirmed by human experience, has also entered into and controlled the whole course of human history and of human thought, since the coming of Jesus of Nazareth. And here is another series of facts. History is the grand test of truth ; it does not lie, for it is the ever unfolding providence of God. It is more authoritative than mere speculation, for it gives us the highest reality. And in history the Christian system has existed as a real and permanent power ; it has been the centre of man's noblest thoughts and strongest feelings, in his most cultivated state, for eighteen hundred years ; it has controlled the destinies and led the march of the nations ; from its bitter contests it has ever emerged with added lustre, as though endowed with immortal energy. It is superior to defeat. Its power is now more intense and diffused than ever before. And thus is Christianity not only an historic revelation, and an internal experience, but also an organic, diffusive, plastic and triumphant force in human history ; and in this history, as in the revelation, and as in the experience, the centre around which all revolves is the person of Jesus Christ.

Nor yet is this all. This revelation has another aspect, which has already been hinted at, but which requires a fuller statement. If man were entirely satisfied with the course of nature — with being born, living, and dying ; if he had no sense of sin, if he had never sinned ; he would not be ever asking those sublime questions, to which nature is deaf and reason is dumb. But he knows something of God, of law,

of death, and of eternity, and he would fain know more; for here are inquiries in comparison with which all the secrets of nature are not only insignificant but patent to our gaze. Now it is the grand claim of the Christian revelation that it answers these vital questions, that it solves all the great moral problems of human destiny. For each enigma, so dark to reason, it has a definite and an authoritative response; for all the great moral problems of our destiny it offers a solution; and the solutions are given in the person and work of Christ; they all meet in the same radiant centre, in whom the revelation converges, in whom the believer finds his blessedness, and to whom all subsequent history has brought its loyal tribute.

This, then, is the primary aspect in which the Christian faith is to be viewed: as an historical reality, confirmed by experience, influencing history, and professing to solve the greatest questions of our destiny, and all centering in Jesus Christ, a personal object of faith and love, the very manifestation of God here upon the earth.

This being so, what is the attitude which philosophy from its very nature, if we have correctly described it, must take towards the Christian faith? Philosophy can annul no fact; it must bow to all realities properly attested. It may strive to undermine the basis of faith by historical criticism; to prove that the experience of believers is contrary to right reason; to show that history may be otherwise interpreted than as centering in Christ: and that there are other and better solutions of the problems of our destiny than those which Christianity offers: it may strive to expel Christ from the human heart and from human history. Should it succeed in throwing doubt upon the evidences, there remains the experience; should it make the experience seem a delirium, there remains the history; should it cast suspicion on the history, there still remains the broad ground that to all the great problems of our destiny, philosophy cannot furnish a better decision than that which faith bears on her lips, one more consonant with man's best hopes, more elevating to his whole nature, more rational in itself. So that until philosophy can overthrow the pillars of our revelation, and prove our inmost life to be all a delusion; until it can find some other centre of convergence and divergence for the whole history of our race than the city of Jerusalem, and the middle cross on Calvary; until it can resolve the questions of our fate with a higher argument than Christianity presents: it is obliged to leave to faith all the vantage ground, all the supremacy, which an historic and experienced reality may confer.

And here, under God, is the hiding place of the strength of faith. Its is the majesty of a revealed economy; the profoundest experience

of the human heart is with it; the might of history testifies unto it; it, and it alone, gives the key which unlocks the mysteries of our moral being. These are the things which make it stronger than any excogitated system. Thus it is intertwined, as no mere speculation can be, with education, with the family, with human institutions, with the organic structure of society, with the deepest wants of the human heart, with its most permanent convictions. And thus is the Christian revelation, considered as a grand, historic, experienced economy, centering in one person, distinct from all other pretended revelations; and here do we find our warrant for drawing the distinction broad and clear. As soon as a revelation is resolved, as by some recent writers, into intuitions, so soon does faith lose its strongest means of defence against the assaults of philosophy.

Human reason may indeed inquire whether the voice which speaks be delusive or divine; it may test the truth of revelation on historical grounds; it may ask whether its doctrines be in harmony with, or contradictory to moral truth, to our essential ideas and necessary convictions; it may inquire whether the problems it proposes to solve be real or only imaginary; but having answered such preliminary inquiries, it has no shadow of a right to go to this revelation, and dictate to it what it shall tell us of God's nature, or what shall be the method of the revelation or of the redemption, any more than it has a right to go to that other reality, nature, and prescribe its laws and limit its elements. In both cases man is to study and to learn. Viewless as the life of nature, Christianity, like that life, is a diffusive, penetrating, and shaping agency; it moves majestically according to its divine laws, and knows not the control of human reason. It is simple as is light to the eye of the child, it is profound as is light to the eye of the sage, it is blessed as is light to all, it is darkness only to those who see not the light.

2. The statements we have thus far made upon the relative claims of faith and philosophy rest on the assumption that both parties admit the existence of a personal God, and the possibility of a revelation. The relation of the two is entirely different, when philosophy would undermine these cardinal points on which revelation rests. And here is where philosophy can be met only by philosophy. It is as unphilosophical for faith to be dogmatic here, as it is for philosophy to be dogmatic in the face of a recognized reality. If we cannot construct the foundations and the outworks of the Christian system, on impregnable grounds; if we cannot show the possibility of miracles and of a revelation; if we cannot prove, absolutely prove the existence of a wise, intelligent, personal and providential Ruler of all things, then we

are merged in infidelity, or given over to an unfounded faith. If we cannot settle these points on the field of open discussion, we cannot settle them at all.

The way of meeting sceptical positions on these questions is not by saying that they are repugnant to faith, but by showing that they are opposed to sound reason; is not by saying that they are German and transcendental, but by being very bold and yet more wise, and claiming that they are not only German but radically unsound; not only transcendental, but essentially unphilosophical. And if one cannot conscientiously say this, he had better say nothing at all about it.

The wise method is to expose the principle which lies at the heart of all this modern infidelity, and to show that the principle is really unphilosophical and incomplete. And that principle may perhaps be said to be, that we have given a rational account of things when we have reduced them to abstract ideas, or great principles; to laws, whether physical or ideal; that physical causes, antecedents and consequents, are the great end of philosophic inquiries; in short, that law and system are sufficient to account for the energy, the order, and the ends of the universe. This is the prime falsehood coiled in the heart of all these infidel schemes; this is the point to be met; and against it we must show that this principle does not answer the most important questions; that it gives only order and system, and does not explain the origin even of that; that it only answers the question, what are the constituents, and what the succession of things; that it does not answer the question, Whence are they? nor the question, How came they so to be? nor yet the question, What is their final cause? And these are as important and as philosophical questions as are those which concern abstract law and fixed succession.

When, for example, an enthusiastic naturalist, who knows something of nature and little of logic, thinks that by means of the fire-mist and an assumed law, he can show how all things are developed out of the mist, up to man and down to his system, and all without a God, — shall we deny that there are order, and development, and a vast unfolding series in creation; or, shall we not rather say, conceding the order and development so far as they are verified, that the more the order, and the vaster the development, the greater is the need of an intelligent cause and an omnipotent energy? When modern explorers in history find reason and law and progress in its course, if we deny the reason and the progress, how can we vindicate Providence on any historical grounds: if we accept them, how may we not use them to show, even to the objector, that history has a guiding hand? And even when the pantheist brings forward his boasted system, and asserts that

he has got the primal substance and the universal law, by which all things may be developed, and attempts to exhibit their relations and connections and ends; whether is it wiser to say that reason is proud, that we cannot see relations and make systems, or, granting the reality of harmony, order and law, and the need and use of pointing them out, still to claim that to infer pantheism is philosophically false; that this system, with all its pretensions, accounts fully only for the succession and order of things; not for their rationality, since conscious reason alone is truly rational; nor for their energy, since mind alone is powerful; nor for their origin, since will alone can really bring into being; nor for their wise ends, since reason, power, and will are necessary to bring a rational end out of a blind universe. Philosophy must here show that the idea of a personal Creator, himself uncaused, is most rational, and is the only basis of the unity and energy of the universe.

Thus on the great questions preliminary to a revelation, we claim that philosophy has an exclusive voice, and that this is a point necessary to be insisted on in defining the relations of faith and philosophy.

And here we would not, for a moment, be understood to imply that the actual belief of men in God's existence and government is dependent upon such scientific analysis and proof: it is no more dependent on this, strictly speaking, than is man's belief in an external world on the refutation of idealism. Man was made for God, and all man's powers, in their right use, tend toward their great Author. Here is the actual stronghold of such belief against all sceptical systems. And when the belief is questioned, an argument for it may be derived from these tendencies; yet not hence alone, perhaps not most convincingly, in a philosophic point of view, as against the sceptic.

3. Having thus stated, in general terms, what we conceive to be the relations of these two powers in respect to the substance and to the foundations of the Christian system, claiming for faith the priority in the one, and for philosophy in the other; it becomes necessary to speak of their relations within the precincts of the revelation itself.

For though philosophy must, in the first instance, receive the revelation properly authenticated; yet, by virtue of its office in giving a systematic form to our knowledge, it may still render essential and needed service to faith.

And this is the same thing as saying that we need systematic theology. For systematic theology is the combined result of philosophy and faith; and it is its high office to present the two in their most in-

timate conjunction and inherent harmony. The whole history of the church gives us, in scientific theology, the best results of the conflict, and examples of the union of the highest faith and the wisest philosophy. In short, systematic theology may be defined, as the substance of the Christian faith in a scientific form. And our whole previous discussion bears upon this point as its culmination and result.

Systematic theology, by our ablest divines, is recognized as a science, both theoretical and practical. It is not a mere arrangement of the facts and doctrines of the Bible in a lucid order ; it is the unfolding of them in a scientific order ; it is not a series of unconnected doctrines, with the definitions of them, it is the combining of doctrines into a system : its parts should not only be coördinate, they should be regularly developed. It should give the whole substance of the Christian faith, starting with its central principle, around which all the members are to be grouped. It must defend the faith and its separate parts against objections, and show that it is congruous with well-established truths in ethical and metaphysical science. And in proportion to the philosophical culture of the theologian, to the comprehensiveness of his principles, will be his ability to present the Christian faith in a fitting form. While it is partly true, that he who seeks for theology in philosophy is seeking the living among the dead ; it is wholly true, that he who seeks for theology without philosophy is seeking the end without the instruments. We may be well assured that there is a statue somewhere in the block of marble ; but the pick-axe, and the drill, and eyes that have no speculation in them, can never find it : it needs instruments of the finest temper, a hand of the rarest skill, guided by a mind able to preconceive the symmetry of the perfect shape.

The necessity of systematic theology we put, then, on the broad ground that we need a reconciliation between faith and philosophy. Simple faith might have been sufficient for the first ages of the church, though it was not ; we live in an age of controversy, surrounded by minds drenched with objections to orthodoxy, among people who, whatever else they have asked, have always asked a reason ; to defend our faith, to commend our faith, we need systematic theology. Let us never cease to pray that the age of perfect faith may come ; that it come more speedily, let us arm ourselves for the contest. As well might a general lead a straggling troop of even patriotic men against marshaled and disciplined battalions, as we encounter the closed and firm phalanx of our foes without a compact army of even the sacramental host of God's elect. Systematic theology is necessary so far, and just so far, as there is any meaning in the contest between faith and philosophy ; just so far as we have anything to say, con-

sistently and definitely, in defence of Christianity. Its necessity is indeed not vital, as is that of faith in the heart : it is not of universal educational necessity, as are preaching and teaching : but it is necessary so far as we need leaders thoroughly trained, able to define and defend the truth, to show its harmonies and relations. It is not necessary, as is the circulation of the blood, but like the knowledge of that circulation, which is important to all, and indispensable to the expert. It is necessary so far as the mind needs system and science at all, so far as a science of the highest objects is yet more necessary, so far as a science of the highest objects for the most urgent and practical ends is most necessary. It is necessary so far as it is a delight to the mind to see the fair proportions of its faith depicted in their symmetry ; and surely, never is the soul better prepared to feel the deepest emotions of reverence and of trust, than when it has gazed upon the grand outlines and internal symmetry of the system of redemption. He who thinks highly feels deeply. From long meditation on the wonder of the divine revelation, the mind returns with added glow to the simplicity of faith.

We do not, then, feel the force of the objection to doctrinal theology that it is unfavorable to a life of faith. A technical system may be, but that is because it is technical. Mere formulas may be, but we should not hold any truth as a mere formula. And least of all does this objection apply to our New England systems ; these have been held by the heart quite as much as by the head ; no theology has ever insisted with such unrelenting earnestness upon the necessity of inward experience. Not written in catechisms, it has been engraved on fleshly tablets. We have not only discussed, we have also experienced almost everything ; from conscious enmity to God, to the profoundest submission to his will ; from the depths of a willingness to be condemned, to the heights of disinterested benevolence ; from the most abstract decrees of a Sovereign, down, almost, to the power to the contrary ; we have passed through the very extremes of doctrine, and known them to be real by our inward experience. We have not so much transformed spirit into dogma, as we have transmuted dogma into spirit. We have never, never forgotten, that the begetting in man of a new life was the paramount end of all theology as of all preaching.

Nor are we sure that we understand the force of the objection to doctrinal theology, derived from the allegation that language is inadequate to embody spiritual truth ; for though this be annihilating, yet it seems to us that it cannot be proved true, unless we utterly divorce language from all thought and feeling. It is of the very office of language to express what is consciously working in the soul ; language

is the express image of spirit. As soon as the mind is raised above the obscure state of spontaneous feeling, or the rude perceptions of sense, it begins to express its feelings and indicate its perceptions in audible language. In its whole training, words, thought or uttered, are the great instrument, as well as the result of its progress. And so it comes to pass, that though language be not life, yet there is not a deep or delicate emotion, not a subtle distinction or large concatenation of human thought, not an abstract principle or a simple idea, which language by simple words, by imagery, by definition, by description, or by system, is not adequate to convey. And though single words, when taken singly, may have many a sense, yet the single words only give us the separate parts of speech; but take language as a whole, put the word in a sentence, qualify it by adjuncts, limit it by its relations, define it by logic, fix it in a system, and the single word may have such an immovable significance, that no other term can be exchanged for that simple sound. It may have had its origin in the regions of sense; but by the action of the soul upon it, it has been transfigured; it has passed through all inferior stages, and at length has been claimed by faith or reason for its exclusive use; so that only a philologist knows its earthly origin, and to all others it is the apt and direct symbol of the highest ideas of reason, or the loftiest objects of faith.

And for the objection itself, we might be the more anxious, did we not find in the exquisite grace of the language of the accomplished thinker who has propounded it, that his own theory is practically refuted by his own eminent example. None more skilful than he to express the subtlest moods of mind, the most delicate analogies of thought; no one who better exemplifies the fact, that the sublimest objects of Christian faith, and the tenderest play of Christian feeling may be so fully expressed in human language, that the only hearts unmoved are those themselves devoid of feeling and of faith.

In proceeding now to state, as concisely as we can, the mode in which faith and philosophy are to be harmonized in Christian theology, so that this shall be truly their nuptial state, we say, first of all, that that only can be a true system, which contains the very substance of the Christian faith; which gives us the very heart of the revelation in a systematic form. Hence the absolute necessity of Biblical study, as the prime condition; hence, too, he only who knows the inward power and reality of faith can be a true theologian. This results from the very fact that the Christian economy is both an historical and an experienced reality. "He is the best divine who best divines" the spirit of the Scriptures; and he alone has the power of divination

whose heart is responsive to the oracles. In a higher sense than can be asserted of anything else, it holds true of the Christian faith, that "it can be really known only as it is truly loved." The illumination of the spirit is as necessary as is the light of reason. Both the cherubic and seraphic virtues, in the old interpretation of them — the spirits of wisdom and the spirits of love, must preside over the work.

But, on the other hand, only the philosophic intellect can grasp the prime principles, can see the relations of the parts, can guard against inconsistencies, can show the harmony of the system with the powers of the mind, with ethical truth, and with our necessary and essential ideas. It alone can grapple with the real problems, and show how the Christian faith solves them. Without it, the interpretation of Scripture would be careless when not obscure. It alone can regulate and correct the definitions of doctrine; it alone can impart shape and comprehensiveness to the system.

Thus we have the substance of the system, that is, the revelation; and the power which is to shape this substance, and that is the philosophic mind. But now come up the most important and decisive questions: whence are we to get the principle, and what is the principle, which is to be the central influence, and the controlling energy of the whole system? And here is where the inquiry really hinges about the relative supremacy of faith and philosophy. Is philosophy to bring this principle with it from ethics, from mental philosophy, or from natural religion; or is it to take it from the revelation itself? And here perhaps is also the point on which turns the controversy between those who seem to contend on the one hand all for system, and on the other all for faith. If a system of Christian theology be a true expression of the Christian faith, there can be no incongruity between the system and the faith; we shall not be forced either to change spirit into dogma or dogma into spirit; for in the doctrine we shall have the expression of the spirit: we shall be lifted above the misery of saying that we must be all doctrine or all life, all formula or all faith: and while we insist that faith is the essential thing, we may also be able to see that a true theological system is one of the noblest boons which faith can have, as well as a want of the Christian intellect.

All theological systems, now, which have any distinctive influence or character are based upon some ultimate principles, by which the arrangement and even the definitions of the doctrines are controlled. Consciously or unconsciously they are under the power of some dominant idea, which determines the shape of the separate parts.

Thus, the compact and consistent system, comprised in the Westminster Assembly's Catechism, rests, indeed, upon the basis of the

divine sovereignty, but this sovereignty is further modified by the idea of a covenant relation; and this it is which may, perhaps, be said to give shape to the exposition of the leading doctrines in the consistent Presbyterian church, so far as their views are different from the general orthodoxy.

Our New England theology has its basis in the same general idea of the divine sovereignty, drawn out into a clear and articulate system of decrees, giving us the very anatomy of religion in its most abstract form. And such anatomy is necessary; if we believe in a God and are consistent thinkers, we cannot avoid believing in a sure and divine system of things: thus alone can we keep alive the idea of the divine agency and government, without which all theology would be unsupported. But besides the decrees, we have had two other modifying influences in our systems, which have given them their most distinctive character, and which have both come to us through the discussions of Jonathan Edwards, though they might easily be shown to be no arbitrary development of the Calvinistic system. What is the Nature of True Virtue, and what is the real Freedom of the Human Will in connection with the divine sovereignty: are the two questions which have chiefly determined the character of our theological systems and parties. Our views on these points have given character to our theology and our preaching on many of the most important articles of the Christian faith. It is here that we have had a distinctive character, an original theological cast; it is here we have made "advances in theology." Our systems have indeed contained all the doctrines, from the Being of God to the life everlasting; but our pressure and force have been on these radical inquiries. We have met and not shrunk from the absorbing investigations which are forced upon the mind when it asks about the harmony of the doctrines of Christianity with ethical truth, and with indubitable facts of mental science.

But now we have fallen upon other times; and other inquiries are brought home to us. We are compelled to meet questions, to which our theories about sovereignty, virtue, and free-agency can give no definite response. Men are asking, what is Christianity as distinct from an ethical system? Who and what is Christ, that we should love and believe in Him? What is his nature? what his relation to God and to us? What is his place in the Christian system? The questions of our times, in short, do not bear upon the point, whether the doctrines of the Christian system are in harmony with the truths of ethics and of mental philosophy; but rather upon the point, what is the real nature of Christianity, what are its essential characteristics? And no theory of ethics or of freedom can answer these questions.

To meet the wants of our times, then, we must endeavor to get at that principle which gives its definite and distinct character to the Christian economy.

And it is here we claim, as a matter of philosophical justice also, that philosophy is not to bring this principle with it, but is rather to seek it in the Christian system itself. This is the dictate of the Baconian, of the Aristotelian induction. This is necessary in all science. To find the principles of optics, we study light. To find the laws of the mind, we study mind. To know Christianity, we must study Christianity. To get at a living Christian theology, we must have the central principle of Christianity itself.

We state our position again. The principle which is to give shape to a theological system ought, on the strictest philosophical grounds, to be taken from the Christian economy itself; so that what forms the substance and vitality of Christianity shall be the centre of our theology also; this principle is not to be sought in ethics, or in nature, or in the will of man, but only in the revealed will of God.

And *where* we are to seek for this principle, who can doubt? The central idea of Christianity, as a distinct system, can only be found in Him of whom prophets did testify, evangelists write, and apostles preach; whose life was the crowning glory of humanity, as his death was its redemption; and from whose death and from whose life influences and blessings have streamed forth, constant and inestimable; in Him, whose nature, more wonderful than any other, unites the extremes of humanity and divinity; whose work, more glorious and needed than any other, reconciles heaven to earth and earth to heaven; and whose dominion is as intimate in its efficiency as it is eminent in its claims and beneficent in its results. He is the centre of God's revelation and of man's redemption; of Christian doctrine and of Christian history, of conflicting sects and of each believer's faith, yea, of the very history of this our earth, Jesus Christ is the full, the radiant, the only centre — fitted to be such because He is the God-man and the Redeemer: Christ — Christ, He is the centre of the Christian system, and the doctrine respecting Christ is the heart of Christian theology.

For, if theology be the science which unfolds to us the relations of God and man; if the Christian revelation contains the full and authoritative account of these relations; and if in the Christian revelation the wealth of the divine manifestation and the wants and hopes of man are all convergent upon Jesus Christ; and if it be philosophically just to seek the central principle of Christian theology in that which forms the heart and life of the revelation — where else can we find this animating idea excepting in the Person of Jesus Christ? And that which

constitutes the prime and peculiar characteristic of that Person, that it is the union of humanity and divinity, will most naturally be taken as the prime characteristic of the system which centres in Him.

And with that glorious Person all the other truths of our faith are inherently connected. The distinct personality of Christ is the starting point, from which to infer the reality of the distinctions in the Godhead; atonement and justification centre in Him; our very spiritual life is hid with Christ in God; if we believe in Him we are born of God; we are to be changed into the image of Christ; the sacraments of the church testify of Him until He come. And a theology which finds its centre in such a Being, cannot be a barren, abstract system; but it gives us a direct and personal object for our faith and love. Thus, and thus only, does Christian theology express the Christian faith in its perfect form.

This position — that in Jesus Christ is to be found the real centre of the Christian economy, and that here its distinction from any and all other forms of religion is chiefly to be seen, lies at the basis of all theological systems which acknowledge a real revelation and manifestation of God in the person and work of his only Son. It is at the very head of the whole theology of the Reformation; from reliance upon an outward church, there was a return to faith in Christ, as the only ground of justification. To have Christ, to have the whole of Christ, to have a whole Christ, is the soul of our Puritan theology; the rest is foundation, defence, or scaffolding.

This principle is also in entire conformity with the dictates of Christian experience; it is demanded by that experience. Whatever the theology may have been, whatever the conflicts of sects, the name of Jesus has touched the tenderest and deepest cords of man's heart. You may cut a man loose from almost all the distinguishing doctrines of our faith, and he will still cling to the very name of Christ, as with a despairing energy. So vital is Christ in Christian experience, that many are withheld from speculating upon his nature by the unspeakable depth and tenderness of their love for Him.

Thus it is wherever Christ is truly known and loved. And it is a cause of devout congratulation, and an occasion for the most auspicious hopes, that in that land where infidelity has reached its most daring height, both in criticism and in speculation, there is also, in opposition to this infidelity, the strongest and most intelligent attempt to bring out this distinctive characteristic of the Christian system, in its philosophical and theological bearings. The later German Evangelical theology, in its return from a cold rationalism and its opposi-

tion to a daring and logical pantheism, is especially distinguished by the fact, that it is feeling more and more deeply the importance and reality of the doctrine respecting Christ, as expressing the prime principle of the Christian faith. One of the loveliest and most sagacious of all these evangelical men, Dr. Ullmann, in an admirable article on the Real Nature of Christianity, thus writes : " Christianity first appears in its distinctive nature and in its full objective character, when all that is embraced in it is referred back to the personality of its founder, considered as uniting humanity with divinity. * * * Thus viewed, Christianity is in an eminent sense something organic ; in its very origin it is a complete, spiritual, organic whole ; from a personal centre it unfolds all its powers and gifts, imparting them to humanity and uniting men under Christ in a divine kingdom. From this central point, and only from this, everything else receives its full significance ; doctrine, as the expression of a real life, attains its full power ; * * * atonement and redemption receive their objective basis and confirmation."

These are not the words of a solitary thinker in that land of scholars and thoughtful men. They express the views common to the best German divines, the most philosophical and the most Christian. Pressed on all sides by the foes of our faith, they have taken refuge in its very citadel. They have been forced to bring out the distinguishing characteristic of Christianity in the boldest relief. They have made the doctrine respecting Christ to assume its philosophical and theological importance. They have found in it the middle ground between dogmatism and mysticism, as well as a sure counteraction to all ritualism. Here is their bulwark against pantheistic and deistic abstractions. By means of it they are able to meet the man who makes Christianity a mere republication of natural religion, or who resolves it all into an ethical system. And though in some of their theologians this view may be connected with unsound or vague speculation ; though others may use it chiefly to favor some mystical views about the efficacy and nature of the sacraments ; yet it certainly is equally consistent with the highest orthodoxy, with any orthodoxy which does not rest in bare formulas.

And in this connection, and in this reverend presence, I may not refrain from offering my humble tribute to the memory of that man, much misunderstood, who led the German Christianity, in its returning course, to our Lord — to Frederic Schleiermacher, a noble and a venerable name ! His it was to infuse into a critical and cold rationalism the fervent and almost mystic love to Christ which has ever burned in the hearts of the Moravian brotherhood : his it was to make

Christ and his redemption the centre of one of the most skilfully developed systems of theology which the Christian church has known ; his it was to draw broad the line between philosophy and Christian theology ; his it was to impart such a true, profound, and continuous influence to many critical, speculative, and believing minds, that ever since that impulse, and in consequence of it, they have been coming nearer and nearer to the full substance of orthodox Christianity. If he is sometimes called pantheistic, it is only because he made the feeling of dependence to be the germ of all religion. To him must indeed be ascribed the modern revival of the vague heresy of the Sabellians ; he is not free from the discredit of undervaluing many important historic facts of our Lord's life ; with his views of the atonement we disclaim all sympathy ; many were his errors, but much was his love to our blessed Lord. By making Christ and his redemption the centre of Christian theology, we are fully persuaded that he rendered an invaluable service to the Christian science of his native land, in the time of its greatest need.¹

Permit me to say that on this point I am the more ready to bear my unambitious yet grateful testimony to the merits of Schleiermacher and of the theological science of that land of intellect, because in the present state of our popular criticism upon German theology and philosophy, I believe it to be an act of simple justice, due to them and to the truth. In the name of the republic of letters, in the name of all generous scholarship, in the very name of Christian charity, I dare not refrain from testifying, that the indiscriminate censure of all that is German, or that may so be called, is a sign rather of the power of prejudice than of a rational love for all truth. A criticism which describes a circumference of which one's ignorance is the generating radius can only stretch far beyond the confines of justice and of wisdom. A criticism which begins by saying that a system is absolutely unintelligible ; which, secondly, asserts that this unintelligible system teaches the most frightful dogmas, definitely drawn out ; and which concludes by holding it responsible for all the consequences that a perverse ingenuity can deduce from these definite dogmas of the unintelligible system ; is indeed a source of unintelligent and anxious wonder to the ignorant, but it is a profounder wonder to every thoughtful mind. A criticism which includes the Christian Neander and the pantheistic Strauss in one and the same condemnation is truly deplorable. Let us at least learn to adopt the humane rules of civilized

¹ Those characteristics of Schleiermacher's system which have given to it its really beneficent influence, are only obscurely brought out in Mr. Morell's unsound *Philosophy of Religion*.

warfare, and not, like the brutal soldiery of a ruder age, involve friends and foes in one indiscriminate massacre. Germany cannot give us faith; and he who goes there to have his doubts resolved, goes into the very thick of the conflict in a fruitless search for its results; but even Germany may teach us what is the real "state of the controversy" in our age; what are the principles now at work more unconsciously among ourselves. And can we, in our inglorious intellectual ease, find it in our hearts only to condemn the men who have overcome trials and doubts to which our simple or iron faith has never been exposed; who have stood in the very front rank of the fiercest battle that Christianity has ever fought, and there contended hand to hand with its most inveterate and wary foes; and who are leading on our faith—as we trust in Christ so will we believe it! to the sublimest triumph it has ever celebrated?

When, Oh! when, will scholars and Christian men learn, that orthodoxy can afford to be just, to be generous; and that in this age it cannot afford to be otherwise; since it thus loses its hold over the minds which are open to truth and foes chiefly to bigotry. When shall we learn that it is quality and not quantity which gives its value to all criticism; that to stigmatize whole classes by opprobrious epithets, by names "of uncertain meaning yet of certain disparagement," is the impulse of an unlettered zeal, which inflames the worst passions of our foes and arouses only the spurious ardor of our friends. When shall we learn the high lesson, that in our present conflicts, it is not nations, or men, or even parties that are to be conquered, but only error and sin; and that the victory belongs not alone to us, but to truth, to righteousness, and to God.

We have said, that the German Christianity, by the urgency of the pressure of the unbelieving systems of the times upon it, has been driven to the position, that all Christian theology centres in the doctrine respecting Christ, as to its very citadel. This principle, we have claimed, lies at the heart of all true Christian theology and Christian experience. We add, that it is eminently adapted, when brought out in its fulness and fitness, to counteract some of the extreme tendencies among ourselves, as also to present Christianity in its rightful attitude towards an unbelieving world.

No one moderately acquainted with our theological and philosophical discussions, can have failed to note the influence of one strong tendency, bringing our speculations and doctrines to concentrate upon a single point, upon man's internal state. Everything is judged by its reference to man's soul and its powers. We may call it the vast, subjective process of modern theology and philosophy. This tendency

has its rights and necessity ; it is perhaps a mark of Protestantism ; it is more fully seen in Calvinism than in Lutheranism ; it is a very distinct trait of many New England movements. And if most noticeable in those who have carried our systems to their extremes, or who have become aliens to the orthodox faith, we ought not to avoid feeling a deep interest in it, as a sign of the times ; and we are bound to see how the general mind is working, whether it be centrifugal or centripetal in respect to ourselves. In this tendency, too, may be something of our strength ; but here also is much of our danger.

We can only rapidly indicate some of its signs. Christianity is viewed rather as a system intended to cultivate certain states of feeling, than as a revelation to build us up in the knowledge of God and of Christ. The nature of man's affections is more fully discussed than the nature of Christ. Faith is defined, not as once by its objects, but by its internal traits ; and if it be called, trust in God, the emphasis is laid on the trust rather than on God. The efficacy of prayer is sometimes restricted to the believer's heart. The whole process of regeneration has been explained without reference to divine agency. Sin is viewed chiefly as a matter of individual consciousness, and less in its connections with the race and with the Divine purposes. The atonement is regarded as a life and not as a sacrifice ; it is defined by its relations to us and not by its relations to God ; and many who call it a declaration of the divine justice explain no further. Justification is pardon ; and pardon is known by a change in our feelings. Nor with these doctrines does the process end. The Incarnation is a vehicle for the communication of a vague spiritual life ; the Trinity is resolved into a mere series of manifestations, which do not teach us anything of the real nature of the Godhead ; it is like a dramatic spectacle, and when the drama has been played out, the persons retire, and leave us not a higher knowledge of God, but stronger and warmer feelings ; as in a parable, the moral lesson is the great end.

Some of our philosophical tendencies are in the same line. Mental philosophy is studied, as if all philosophy were in knowing the powers of the mind ; it is made the basis of theology. Self-determination is the great fact about mind and morals. Personal well-being is the great end, even when we act in view of the universal good ; the sum of ethics is happiness, and this happiness in its last analysis is viewed as subjective and not as objective. Man becomes the measure of all things ; not the glory of God, but the happiness of man is the chief end. God is for man, rather than man for God ;

and, as in the infancy of science, the sun again revolves around the earth.

Thus the grand, objective force of truth and of Christianity, and of Christian doctrines, their reality in themselves and as a revelation of God, are in danger of being merged in the inquiry after their value as a means of moving us. If anything will move us as much, it is as well as Christianity. "We for whose sake all nature stands," is something more than poetry. A restless, morbid state of feeling ensues, different from the calm composure which hearty faith in a revelation is adapted to inspire. Men will be perfect at once; not merely strive to be so, which none can do too earnestly; but believe that they are so, which none can be too cautious in affirming. And the essence of their perfection is found in an intention of the will, of which they must be always conscious or else their perfection is without evidence.

Thus in various ways this tendency shows itself. We have hinted at some of its extreme forms, identified with no one party or school. It is an avaricious principle. All that is not directly convertible into moods of mind, it will hardly allow to be current coin. The massive theological systems of past ages, so large, and careful, and intricate, are conceded to be imposing, but are felt to be cold and uncomfortable; we are not at home in them. The Bible, the church, Christ, the historic revelation, fade away one after another; all that remains in the last result is an internal revelation or an internal inspiration; religion is merged in a vague love to an abstract divinity. And where this state of mind has come, pantheism lieth at the door.

Now that this subjective tendency has its rights, as well as its force, that without internal experience all else is vain, that the letter kills if the spirit be not there, no one can rationally deny. That our chief dangers lie in the extremes of this tendency, is equally undeniable. That there must be a reaction from this extreme is manifest from all history, from the very laws of the mind, from the very signs of the times.

The question for us to weigh, then, is this: how shall we both encourage and restrain this mighty current?

Some would bid us back to the rites and forms and alleged succession of a visible church; but let the dead bury their dead; let us rather arise and follow our Lord. We have outgrown the power and the necessity of the beggarly elements. As Dr. Arnold said: "the sheath of the leaf is burst; what were the wisdom of winter, is the folly of spring."

Shall we insist with new tenacity upon our old formulas? But

words and formulas alone have but slight force against such an inwrought and potent tendency. And they are no effectual guards against heresy, since, as has been well observed, heresy can as readily enter, and does as often couch itself under the guise of old terms as of new. Let us rather seek to know the real sense of the formulas; let us come to have a deeper sense of the grand realities of our faith.

To come to these is our safety, our defence. To see and feel and know what Christianity really is in its inward and distinctive character; to study those central truths which lie at its foundation; here is our strength. Let us come unto Jesus. When Christ is to us more than a doctrine, and the atonement more than a plan; when the Incarnation assumes as high a place in revealed, as creation does in natural theology; when the Trinity is viewed not as a formula, but as a vital truth, underlying and interwoven with the whole Christian system; when from this foundation the whole edifice rises up majestically, grand in its proportions, sublime in its aims, filled with God in all its parts; when we feel its inherent force streaming out from its living centres; then, then are we saved from those extreme tendencies which are the most significant and alarming sign of our times; then, then are we elevated above those lesser controversies which have narrowed our minds and divided our hearts. Here also we have a real inward experience as well as an objective reality; for the best and fullest inward experience is that which centres in Christ; and the centre of the experience is then identical with the centre of the divine revelation.

Never are we so far from having any abstract ethical or metaphysical principles exercise an undue influence; never are we so far from a too fond reliance on self and never is self so full and satisfied; never are we in a better position for judging all our controversies with a righteous judgment, or nearer to the highest Christian union; never do the divine decrees shine in so mild a lustre, so benignant with grace, so solemn and severe in justice; never can we be more wisely delivered from the material attractions of an outward rite, or from the ideal seductions of a pantheistic system; never is doctrine so full of life, and life so richly expressed in doctrine; never does systematic theology so perfectly present the full substance of the Christian faith in a truly scientific form; and never are philosophy and faith so joined in hymeneal bonds, where they may "exult in over-measure;" as when Christ is set forth as the living centre of all faith and of all theology, in whom the whole body is fitly joined together, compacted by that which every joint supplieth. Here, if anywhere, we may discern,

Concord in discord, lines of differing method
Meeting in one full centre of delight.

Having traced, as far as we may, the course of the blood in the veins of the system, and scrutinized the delicate and intricate organism by which it is diffused through every part, we are better prepared to go back to the grand arterial structure, to the great central heart, where resides the life-imparting energy ; and there, too, we shall learn whence comes the blood which courses through the veins. Having the necessity, we need not want the flexure. Having the anatomy of the Christian system, let us have also its physiology ; for physiology is the science of life.

We have thus gone over the ground proposed, imperfectly, rapidly ; and yet have been only too long for the occasion. We have spoken of the characteristics, the opposition, the reconciliation, and the respective rights of Faith and Philosophy. We have, then, maintained the positions, that their full reconciliation is the true aim of systematic theology, whose office it is to present the substance of the Christian faith in a scientific form, and in harmony with all other truth ; that the central principle of the system, as of the revelation and of the believer's consciousness, is to be found in the Person of Christ ; and that such a view of Christianity will encourage whatever is healthful, and restrain what is noxious in the prevailing tendencies of our times.

And now, in conclusion, we say, the Christian system, thus viewed, gives us all that philosophy aims after, and in a more perfect form ; that it also gives us more than philosophy can give ; and this more that it gives is what man most needs and what reason alone never could divine. And, therefore, we conclude that it is not within the scope of the human mind to conceive a system more complete, richer in all blessings.

It gives us all that philosophy aims after, and in a more perfect form. For, in a harmonious system of Christian truth, nature, with all its laws and processes, is not denied or annulled ; it is only made subservient to higher, to moral ends ; its course is interrupted for a nobler purpose than a fixed order could ensure ; and thus a higher dignity is imparted to it than when we consider it as only a mere succession of material changes. And its very order and harmony are best explained when regarded as the product of infinite wisdom and benevolence, acting with the wisest and most benevolent intent. All ethical truth and all great moral ends, human rights and human happiness and a perfect social state, are included in the Christian system

as truly as in philosophy ; and a new glory is cast around them when they are made integral parts of a divine kingdom, established in justice and animated by love, which is not only to be realized here upon the earth, but is to reach forward even to eternity. Moral principles and ends thus retain all their meaning and value ; but they are made more effective and permanent when contemplated as inherent in the nature and government of a wise and holy God, and as the basis and aim of an eternal kingdom. We thus have not merely a perfect social state here, but a holy state, animated with the very presence and power of God, forevermore. All that natural religion can prove or claim is retained, all that an internal revelation and inspiration ever boasted itself to have is allowed by the Christian system ; but the truths of natural religion are fortified by a higher authority ; and the inward revelation is illumined by a clearer light, when it is seen in the brightness of that express manifestation of God in the person of his Son, whose teachings have both chastened and elevated all our views of God and of religion.

Thus may Christianity give us all that philosophy can give, and in a more perfect form. But it also gives us more ; and this more that it gives is what man most needs, and, unaided, never could attain. God is infinite, man is finite ; how, then, can man come unto and know his Creator and sovereign ? Man is sinful and God is holy ; how can a sinful man be reconciled to a holy God ? how can a sinful nature become regenerate ? Man is mortal, as well as sinful ; how can he obtain certainty, entire certainty, as to a future life and his eternal destiny ? Here are the real and vital problems of human destiny ; before them reason is abashed, and conscience can only warn, and man can only fear. The urgency, the intense interest of these questions no thinking mind can doubt ; the uncertainty and timidity of human reason, when it meets them, are almost proverbial. If these questions are not answered, if these problems are not solved in Christianity, they are absolutely answered nowhere. And precisely here it is that we contend that the Christian system has a permanent power, and a perfect fitness to man's condition ; for you cannot name a vital problem of our moral destiny which it does not profess to solve, and to solve in a way beyond which human thought can conceive of nothing greater, and the human heart can ask for nothing more ; in a way which is to the simplest heart most simple, and to the highest intellect most profound. The highest ideas and ends which reason can propound are really embraced, the deepest wants which man can know are truly satisfied, the sharpest antagonisms which the mind can propose, are declared to be reconciled, in the ideas, the means, and the

ends which are contained in that revelation which centres in the Person of Jesus Christ our Lord.

For, the highest idea which man can frame is that of a union of divinity with humanity; this is the very verge of a possible conception for the human intellect; and in the Person of our Saviour we have this idea realized in all its fulness, and with such a marvellous adaptation to human sympathies that they are made the very means of drawing us within the hallowed sphere of the glories of divinity. Through Jesus Christ, and Him alone, does finite man come to the Infinite I am.

The highest moral problem which we can know is contained in the question, how can a sinful man be reconciled to a holy God? Here is absolutely the highest moral antagonism of the universe. And in the sacrificial death of this same Person, our great High Priest, this highest moral question is presented to us as entirely solved, and solved in such a way, that the sense of sin is not lessened but heightened, and the majesty of the law not impaired but made more glorious. While in the regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit we have the means of applying the benefits of this atonement in such a way to the heart of the sinner that his very love of sin will at last be wholly eradicated.

The highest kingdom we can conceive to exist is one which aims at the holiness of all who belong to it, which has love for its common principle; which has for its head a being who unites all human with all divine perfections; who has himself suffered for all the members of this kingdom and in their stead; and who will reign over and within them, not only for this life but also for that which is to come. In such a kingdom all are bound together by the strongest ties for the highest objects. And such is the kingdom of which Jesus Christ is the head and redeemed men the body.

And all these questions are solved, these ideas realized, these antagonisms adjusted, and this kingdom is established in one and the same Person; all this system is concentrated in that God-man, who came from heaven to earth that he might raise us from earth to heaven, who adapted himself to our infirmities and necessities that He might be made unto us wisdom and righteousness, sanctification and redemption.

And, therefore, dare we assert that beyond the idea of such a system, centering in such a Being, human thought is impotent to advance and the human heart has nothing real to desire; it satisfies all within us which is not sinful, and it is its crowning glory that it subdues our sinfulness itself. Such a system brings together, recapitulates, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth; and by such a Person, all things are reconciled to God, by him, the apostle says, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven.

Whence, whence came to our sinful race the idea of such a Being, of such a kingdom? Has man's reason framed it; and the human imagination, hath that gendered it? With cold eye and heart I might gaze on the face of nature in her grandest or her loveliest scenes; with intellectual delight I may scan the principles and follow out the deductions of an abstract scheme of philosophic speculation; with sublime wonder I may follow the astronomer as he describes the laws and order of firmaments and systems radiant in their solar light; I may feel all my human sympathies enlisted by any philanthropic scheme which would bring justice and love into this world so full of oppression and hatred; but when I think of the wonders of our Saviour's Person and of the glories of his redemptive work, of all his love, his love for me a sinner, his love to all so great that He could die for all, and of that blessed and perpetual kingdom which his blood has purchased and of which He is the ever living Head; when, in some rapt moment, my heart can realize this in all its fulness, then, if ever, is my whole being filled with the profoundest emotions of awe, of gratitude, and of love. Never is the soul so conscious of its full capacities of thought and feeling, never does it throb with such unwonted and divine life, as when it has most fully grasped the majestic reality of the Christian faith, as a wondrous and harmonious whole, tending to the highest imaginable end, and centering in that glorious Being who unites divinity with humanity and reconciles heaven with earth.

In comparison with the fulness, fitness, and sufficiency of such a system, the most colossal structure which pantheism ever reared is but as a palace of ice, cold and cheerless, contrasted with that heavenly city, whose gates are pearl, whose streets are gold, thronged with a company innumerable and exultant, vocal with the melodies of the redeemed, of which the Lamb is the light, and God the glory.

ARTICLE V.

REMARKS ON BUNSEN'S LATE WORK UPON EGYPT.

THE Chevalier Bunsen, who has been for some years the Prussian minister at the court of St. James, is publishing in German and in English, a work on Egypt, which has been anticipated with much pleasure by all who are acquainted with his talents, or who have taken

any interest in Egyptian discoveries. The author possesses, in many respects, eminent qualifications for the work which he has undertaken. He is now in the full maturity of his powers. His early studies were purely philological, and were completed at Göttingen under the direction of Heyne and Heeren. He then went to Paris, and under the guidance of De Sacy and others, attended to several of the oriental languages. Having studied Sanskrit, he formed a plan of visiting India in company with an Englishman, and proceeded to Florence for that purpose. His fellow traveller failing to meet him there, Bunsen went to Rome, where he found his early friend, Professor Brandis, then secretary of Niebuhr, the Prussian ambassador. Niebuhr became immediately interested in him, and animated and directed his studies. He was subsequently appointed Niebuhr's private secretary, and then secretary to the embassy. After the departure of the distinguished historian, Bunsen became minister resident at the Papal Court. A visit of the bookseller Cotta at Rome, in the winter of 1817-18, occasioned the preparation of a very able and comprehensive work on the Antiquities of Rome, by Bunsen, Platner, Gerhard, and others. While in Rome, Bunsen formed the acquaintance of Champollion the Younger, with whom he studied the hieroglyphics on the Egyptian obelisks in that city. Since 1838, when he left Rome, Bunsen has resided for the most part in London, as Prussian ambassador. He is a gentleman no less distinguished for the excellence of his moral and religious character, for the liberality of his views,¹ and for his generous feelings, than for the extent of his knowledge and his accurate learning.

Bunsen's work, now before us, is entitled, "Egypt's Place in Universal History : an Historical Investigation, in five Books." It is to be included in three volumes. Two volumes of the German edition and one of the English are printed. The latter is not a mere version, but is in some respects a new work. "It owes," says the author, "many valuable remarks and additions, particularly in the grammatical, lexicographic, and mythological part, to Mr. Samuel Birch of the British Museum." The hieroglyphical signs, instead of being given in separate plates, are printed by the side of their respective interpretations. In the Coptic explanations in the Dictionary, the author has enjoyed the aid of Professor Moritz Schwarze of Berlin, who has been sent to London to prepare for publication important Coptic MSS. found in the British Museum and other libraries in England. Mr.

¹ Some of our readers will remember the affection and reverence with which the late Dr. Arnold speaks of him.

Bunsen is also in constant communication with Professor Lepsius. The system of Egyptian chronology drawn up by Bunsen has been adopted substantially by Lepsius.

The first volume of the English work contains only the first of the five Books. It treats of the sources and primeval facts of Egyptian History, under the six following heads :

The Nature and Antiquity of Egyptian Tradition, especially of the Sacred Books; The Researches of the Greeks into Egyptian Chronology—Herodotus, Diodorus, Eratosthenes, etc.; Egyptian Tradition among the Jews, the Biblical accounts, the Septuagint, Josephus, etc., and the Christian researches into the Chronology of Egypt, by Young, Champollion, Wilkinson, Rosellini, and others; The fourth Section is on Egyptian Grammar. The fifth is on the Writings of the Egyptians, containing a Sketch of the History of Modern Hieroglyphical Discovery, and the sixth is on the Egyptian Mythology. Two large Appendices of nearly 300 pages, contain an Egyptian Vocabulary, and a complete List of Hieroglyphical Signs.

In the 2d Book, Mr. Bunsen proposes to restore the chronology of the Old Empire, a period of 1076 years according to the data of Eratosthenes. In the 3d Book, he will treat of the Period of the Middle and New Empires, comprising nine and thirteen centuries respectively, following the guidance of Manetho. In the 4th Book, Mr. Bunsen proposes to test the Chronological Results of his researches, first by astronomy and secondly by historical synchronisms; in other words, to gain fixed points of time both by contemporaneous celestial phenomena and of remarkable events in the history of other nations. The 5th and last Book will contain a survey of General History, intended to exhibit whatever in the History of Egypt is of importance for the human mind, or mankind in general.

It is not our intention to offer any criticisms on the general views or theories advanced in this work, or to express any opinion of its merits. It would be obviously improper to pass any judgment upon it, were we possessed of the ability, while so large a part of the work remains unpublished. All which we propose to do in this Article is to offer two observations of a general character, and then some suggestions on a particular statement of the author.

Our first remark is, that the work, even should it fail of the special object which the author has in view—to establish the position of Egypt in universal History—cannot fail to be instructive in a high degree. It will furnish a comprehensive outline of the entire subject. A survey of so rich and wide a field by a scholar so able and experienced, will serve as landmarks to future explorers. It will bring

subjects of great extent and of no little intricacy into such a shape that many may be able to understand and pursue the investigations.

Our second general remark relates to the confident tone, the decisive air with which the author advances his propositions and announces his results. His bearing, indeed, towards individuals is eminently courteous, as every one would expect from his position and character. At the same time, we are struck with the rapidity with which the author disposes of the opinions and views of others, and with the firm faith which he feels in his own.

As examples of this unshaken reliance in the correctness of his own views, and the untenable nature of those adopted by his predecessors, we may refer to his assertion that he shall feel called upon decidedly to combat almost every one of the chronological views of Champollion. He also expresses his conviction that the chronological system of Rosellini is essentially as groundless as the one adopted by Champollion, though he pays the fullest credit to the value of the labors of both in other departments. "The path pursued by the English travellers Felix, Salt, Burton, Wilkinson, and others," he remarks, "is by no means satisfactory. With regard to the time prior to the 18th dynasty, the English inquirers stand on the same rough and unsafe ground as Champollion and Rosellini. Even as regards the period where they wholly or chiefly follow the old series of royal succession, they have plainly abandoned, together with the order and number of the kings, the dates also of the individual reigns, and hence have become involved in still grosser self-contradiction than the French and Italian critics."

Now in some respects a scholar able and learned, as Bunsen is acknowledged to be, is entitled to speak with confidence of the results of his investigations. He enjoyed an excellent preparatory, classical training, and he seems to have patiently and fundamentally studied all the sources of information accessible in Europe. He has thus been in possession of advantages, to some extent, of forming a truer judgment than a mere practical explorer in Egypt. Still, on the other hand, examination of the Egyptian antiquities on the spot forms one indispensable element to an adequate and perfectly trustworthy judgment. There is no substitute for the sight of the eye. Champollion, Rosellini, and Wilkinson, in addition to the great advantage derived from actual inspection in the localities, are familiar with all the principal literary helps and sources on which Bunsen relies. Rosellini was an eminently safe investigator, discarding all theories, and searching only for the facts, the real phenomena. Wilkinson has the unaffected modesty of genuine science. He everywhere shows that he is search-

ing for the truth, not contending for victory, or to support a favorite hypothesis. The reader insensibly feels more respect for his judgments than if they were propounded categorically, or with undoubting confidence.

It should be remarked that Mr. Bunsen enjoys the special aid of the latest Egyptian investigator, Professor Lepsius. But as the principal results of his labors are not yet published, we cannot form a correct judgment of the importance of the additions which he will make to our knowledge of the subject. It seems, however, to be the impression in Germany, that there will be some disappointment in this respect; that the ardent hopes cherished of the value of his discoveries will not all be fulfilled. If we may form an opinion from a little work which he has published in relation to Mount Sinai, we should have some misgiving in respect to the soundness of his judgment.

The particular passage on which we wish to offer a few remarks, is found on page 32d of the Introduction, and is as follows:

"The germs of national existence which we find in Egypt, are not the most ancient traces of humanity. No historical investigator will consider the Egyptians as the most ancient nation of the earth, even before he has called to his assistance the science of the philologist and mythologist. Their very history shows them to belong to the great Middle Ages of mankind." "The Egyptian patriarchs, perhaps, were descended from a cognate race, which sprang, in like manner, from another of kindred origin."

We may remark, in the outset, that the question which we are about to consider is wholly distinct from that pertaining to the antiquity of the earth itself. If it be admitted that the date of the creation of the earth is very ancient, it does not follow that the date of the creation of man is to be indefinitely extended.

The argument, substantially, for this indefinite extension of the Egyptian national existence, and of the life of man on earth, is drawn from the high state of civilization and of many of the arts in Egypt, at a very early period. "The Egyptians had the same arts," Mr. Wilkinson observes, "the same manners and customs, the same style of architecture and were in the same advanced state of refinement, on the arrival of Joseph in Egypt in the reign of the first Osirtasen, as in the reign of Remeses II.," an interval of several hundred years. "There is palpable proof," says Mr. Bunsen, "that the old Egyptian language, in so far as yet known or investigated, was in its essential element, a *legacy*, inherited by Menes and his empire from their forefathers." Menes reigned, as Bunsen interprets Manetho, 3555 years before Alexander the Great.

1. The first observation which we would offer on this position, or on what seems to be implied in Mr. Bunsen's remarks, is the very obvious one, that all the attempts hitherto made to assign an indefinite antiquity to different nations, have proved abortive. However gratifying to national vanity, the assumption has hitherto been entirely unsubstantiated. In reference to China, India, Persia, and Greece, this exaggerated chronology has been brought within reasonable limits, with the sanction of all scholars who have attended to the subject. The recent excavations in the plain of Assyria, though revealing a high antiquity, do not as yet afford any countenance to the idea of an indefinitely distant origin of the people.

2. Our second remark is, that in all researches into the ancient history of mankind, and into the Egyptian antiquities among others, the highest credit is due to the Biblical notices, even if we regard them (apart from their divine authority) as a common authentic history, like the histories of Herodotus and Josephus. They have been subjected to every species of scrutiny, and their accuracy, not merely their general, but their minute accuracy, has been demonstrated. Mr. Layard's investigations in Assyria, prove that the shades of thought, the minute colorings in the delineations of the Hebrew Prophets, were wonderfully exact. We may be allowed to refer to a few testimonials. The English traveller, Legh, remarks that the Old Testament is, beyond all comparison, the most interesting and instructive guide which an Oriental traveller can consult. "The oldest and most authentic record of the primeval state of the world," remarks Mr. Wilkinson, "is unquestionably the Scripture History." "Wherever any fact is mentioned in the Bible History," he continues, "we do not discover anything on the Egyptian monuments which *tends* to contradict it." The same cannot be affirmed of Josephus, or Diodorus, or Herodotus, or Manetho. "All the kings of Egypt," says Champollion-Figeac, "named in the Bible," except the two mentioned in the history of Joseph and Moses, "are found on the Egyptian monuments, in the same order of succession and at the precise epochs where the sacred writers place them." "It has been said that Egyptian studies tended to impair the belief in the historical documents furnished by Moses. The application of my discovery, on the contrary, goes invincibly to support them."¹

Now this acknowledged accuracy, which might be drawn out into a multitude of particulars, does not cover merely common *historical* events, but it extends to the genealogies of nations. In the tenth

¹ Letter of Champollion-Figeac to the duke of Blacas.

chapter of Genesis, there is a tabular view of the origin and distribution of the different families and nations of the earth, which is recognized as authentic and veritable by all classes of critics. One of the most recent and sceptical of these, Bruno Bauer, admits that in no nation of antiquity, is there found a survey so universal of the relations of different nations. John Von Müller, a critic of the opposite school, says that all true history must begin with this chapter. A number of the earliest names found in this table, are likewise found on the Egyptian monuments. Much doubt rests on the application of some of these names; yet, so far as any light has been thrown upon them by the monuments and by profane history, it has been shown that they belong to a perfectly trustworthy document. Now this table asserts that Egypt was colonized from Assyria, by a grandson of Noah, forming a race not cognate with any other, but *identical* with that of the common ancestor of man.

3. A third observation suggested by Mr. Bunsen's theory is this, that in order to account for the early and extraordinary civilization of the Egyptians, we may assume that the *original* condition of man was not that of barbarism. Had we no positive evidence of this, we should reason correctly, *à priori*, that the Supreme Being, who originally formed man, according to the hypothesis of all, by direct creation, would not introduce him into the world as a savage or barbarian. Ignorant we may suppose him to have been, in the sense that his powers and faculties were undeveloped, but still, all the germs were there, in a strength and a harmony too, which would not require long years of necessity to unfold them. It is utterly derogatory to all our ideas of the Creator to suppose that he would form a being, as an image of Himself, who could provide for his wants only by the most slow and toilsome steps, arriving at a degree of civilization only after the lapse of centuries.

Now this presumptive argument is strengthened by the preponderant traditions of all nations. These traditions imply an original, golden period of virtue and knowledge and that the degeneracy of man was some time subsequent to his creation. The tradition that the human race were originally only at a slight remove from the beasts, like them, living on roots and acorns, was not the earliest nor the one which was most generally received. Man originally lived long and happily in a friendly and highly useful communion with the gods; those benevolent beings were his instructors in the most necessary arts and sciences. He was not thrown upon the shores of time a rude, helpless being, to reach his true moral and intellectual development only after ages of slow and wearisome effort. There is every reason

to suppose that the earliest dwellers on the banks of the Nile did not migrate thither as stupid barbarians. Springing from Central Asia, they would come with no inconsiderable degree of intellectual light, with an aptitude at least to take immediate advantage of the wonderful facilities now opening before them.

4. A remark on the character of the civilization of the Egyptians and of their advance in knowledge is important. We are perhaps dazzled by their extraordinary progress in certain arts and in certain departments of action, so that we do not make the necessary discrimination. Their civilization at the best was, in some important respects, very imperfect. It was radically different, on some fundamental points, from what we understand by modern civilization. War, in its most revolting forms, was the great business of most of the Egyptian dynasties. Not a trace of humanity is discernible in their spirited and innumerable delineations of war. The face of the Egyptian and the Assyrian warrior is as passionless, as devoid of all human sympathy, as the horse that is bearing them forward. It is the grim sternness of a beast of prey. As a general thing, the people lived as long, and in the manner, that would please their sovereign. His will was despotic. Now in the development of the arts in modern times, there are two points of essential importance in which Egyptian art was entirely, or almost entirely deficient. One was the practical application of art to the well being of the great body of the people. *Human* tendencies and applications were not sought. Art was cultivated, to a great extent, only as a gratification of regal or priestly taste and luxury. Again, in modern times, the field of art is far wider. All arts are cultivated simultaneously. Certain great ideas lie at the basis of modern improvement, which were unknown to the Egyptians, and which ensure the harmonious progress of all science and art. In Egypt there was a wonderful development in certain directions. Certain processes may have been carried to a perfection which is now unknown. Ingenious contrivances, which then were familiar, seem to be wholly lost. But on the other hand, there is a wearisome monotony or uniformity, in most of their sculptures and paintings. With scientific principles of fundamental importance, e.g. the principle of the arch, they were, in the earliest times of the monuments, unacquainted. In this respect they resemble the artists of the Middle Ages. The Gothic structures in the Netherlands have a perfection which may not now be approached. The modern artisan finds it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to put up buildings of the exquisite proportions so common in Mediaeval times, or to sustain a vast weight without pillars, or to color glass in the manner so familiar

to those old workmen. And yet the arts of the Middle Ages were comparatively isolated; they were the possession of but few individuals; they came accidentally, as it were, and were not the component parts of a great system; the gifts of sudden inspiration, the *miracles* of genius; like a great epic poem springing out of a region of thick darkness; they did not imply a long antecedent period of growth, of gradual preparation, of the unfolding of a thousand influences all co-operating to the same end. So it seems to have been, to a great extent at least, with Egyptian art. It did not necessarily imply, as is the case with much of modern culture, a long process of preparatory training, ages of converging and increasing light, patient study on the part of a great number of individuals. It has more resemblance, in this respect, to the phenomena of art in the Middle Ages.

It is said, indeed, that the old Egyptian *language* was a "legacy," transmitted from a long past period. But a language, separated from its literature, does not necessarily imply a great antiquity. It may be, in some respects, remarkably developed; it may be formed in the most scientific manner, with all the regularity with which a philosopher would construct it, and yet it may be the speech of barbarians; as is the case with the Cherokee dialect, and with the Mpongwe, on the western coast of Africa. Over the growth of language, in such cases, impenetrable mysteries as yet hang. There may have been a sudden and tropical growth. Causes which appear to us accidental, may have combined to produce a rapid yet regular development. As far as we can see, the mere *existence* of a finely developed dialect, does not imply an immeasurable antiquity of the people that used it. We do not know enough of the *literature* of the Old Egyptians to pronounce in the case. All the German critics who give up the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, allow that there are certain fragments of a date at or before the time of Moses. But these fragments exhibit the Hebrew in its perfect form. Yet this perfection does not by any means imply that the Hebrew was the original language of man, or that it had been in the process of development during long ages.

But allowing all which is claimed for the high civilization of the Egyptians in the most ancient period of history and of the monuments, — and a wonderful advance and maturity are obvious to all — is it necessary to suppose an indefinite or a very long extended previous existence? May not all the phenomena be accounted for on the supposition of the lapse of only a few centuries?

It is a matter of course that the progress of a nation in art, science, civilization, will be rapid in proportion to the strength and activity of

the causes at work fitted to promote this end. The advance of England in nearly all those things which we understand by English comfort and culture, during the 350 years since the reign of Elizabeth, has been very great. There has not only been progress, but the absolute creation of some of the most important elements of this culture. The republics of Venice and Genoa shot rapidly upwards to great renown and commercial prosperity, and comparative refinement of manners, amid the stagnation and darkness of the Middle Ages. It required but a few centuries to develop an extraordinary prosperity. There was, no doubt, in both cases, an excellent basis in the ardent temperament of these children of the sea. This native, restless disposition only required scope for its exercise, and an occasion or powerful cause to call it forth. In the time in which the poems of Homer were written, the Phœnicians on the coast of Syria had made great progress in some of the arts, and had attained to a distinguished position among the nations. Now it is susceptible of the most satisfactory proof that their ancestors, a few centuries before, had emigrated from Babylonia. Böckh, e. g., has proved that their weights and measures had their origin in Chaldaea. But this great advance in civilization was caused by their maritime position.

Now it will be universally admitted that in Egypt a combination of causes existed for the rapid development and growth of art and civilization, such as is not probably to be found elsewhere on earth. These causes are so obvious that it is hardly necessary to allude to them. The climate is eminently favorable, during the greater part of the year, genial, yet not enervating. The position of Egypt — central between Asia, Africa, and Europe, on or near the great highways of nations, the Mediterranean and Red seas and the Indian Ocean, and on the banks of a great river for a long distance, probably the most useful of any stream on the globe, bearing on its bosom an annual tribute of immense wealth, yet not indolently pouring it into the laps of the people, but demanding their active coöperation and, to a considerable extent, nautical skill, being the means and occasion of affluence, not affluence itself. Again, Egypt is, by eminence, an agricultural country. Many wants would be immediately felt which could not be experienced by a nomadic people. The powers of invention would be set to work. Various implements and labor-saving machines would be the result. This civilizing tendency of agricultural labors was experienced in a high degree in Assyria, the cradle of the human race, as is demonstrated by the recent discoveries. Again, Egypt, occupying one of the gardens of the world, would hold out strong temptations to the cupidity and ambition of surrounding nations.

Wars would be the consequence, with all their accompaniments — armor, horsemanship, means of attacking and defending cities, ships, etc. Then these warlike exploits must be recorded and perpetuated. Happily the country abounded with the materials of writing. The great deeds of kings and warriors could be engraven with an iron pen and lead in the rock forever. The hardest and most beautiful granite, in inexhaustible quantity, was perfectly accessible, while the religion had provided a learned class, who had leisure and skill to hold the pen of ready writers. In short, such facilities, operating on a portion of the human race highly endowed, originally very susceptible to impression, and undoubtedly migrating with many advantages from the oldest seat of civilization, may be sufficient to account for the speedy and extraordinary growth of Egyptian art and civilization, and render it unnecessary to suppose that the “old empire,” or the earliest dynasties of Manetho, belonged to the “middle ages of mankind.” At least, the phenomena do not render such an hypothesis indispensable.

ARTICLE VI.

THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ELEMENT OF RELIGION.

By Rev. James W. Ward, Abington, Mass.

SYSTEMS of religion very dissimilar in character have, at different times and places, prevailed in the world. They have all, however, been alike in one particular, viz. the profession of two grand elemental principles — an internal and an external one; and the difference between them has arisen mainly from the different proportion in which these two elements have been combined. It is true in the moral as in the natural world, that the same elements, when united in different proportions, produce compounds whose characteristics are not only unlike, but even opposite to each other. As alcohol and sugar, the one poisonous and the other nutritious, are formed, by combining in different proportions the same original elements (carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen), so paganism and Christianity, the one a baseless fabric of hope, and the other the power of God unto salvation, are formed by the union, in different proportions, of *internalism* and *externalism*, or faith and form. These two elements possess each its

own peculiar characteristics, and are easily distinguishable the one from the other. They differ in their *nature*, the one being spiritual and the other material. As all religion is action of some kind — the one is the action of the *soul*, and the other that of the *body*. The one consists in prayers, penances, prostrations, baptisms, bands, cowls, mosques, temples — all the work of the outward man and all pertaining to that *bodily* exercise which profiteth nothing; while the other consists in penitence, faith, hope, love, and other *internal* exercises which, when directed to their proper objects and duly combined, constitute that *godliness* which is profitable to all things, having the promise of two worlds, the present and the coming. They differ, too, in their *permanence*; the one being transient, and the other abiding forever. The altars on which the patriarchs sacrificed the victim and the incense; the temples of Solomon and Herod, in which kings, priests, and people paid their devotions; the linen ephod and the breastplate of the high priest; the show-bread and the ark of the testimony; the *externals* of the Jewish economy, have long since passed away. But the spiritual emotions, the reverence, love, and joy which these outward acts and objects tended to awaken and deepen, still live, and will live as long as the redeemed souls of patriarchs and prophets shall continue to bow and worship around the eternal throne. Whatever acts, then, are performed by the bodily organs, and must cease to be performed when the body crumbles to decay, belong to *externalism*. But those which are the product of the mind, and may be produced wherever mind exists, whether connected with the body or not, whether in this mixed state of being, or in a purely spiritual condition, pertain to the internal element of religion. The two are as radically distinct as an animal of earth and an angel of heaven; but in our present state they live together and form one perfect whole, just as do the body and soul of man.

Into every system of religion which has appeared among men, both these elements have gained admission. The Christian religion is unquestionably the most purely spiritual of any that has ever been offered to the world. And yet Christianity has her external forms, her church organizations, her eucharist, her baptismal rite, her sacred temples, her gathered congregations, and her sabbath festivals. Still more emphatically all this was true of the Mosaic dispensation. Its sacrificial offerings, its utensils of service, its priestly garments, were all prescribed with the most punctilious particularity; so that it would almost seem as if the acceptance of the worshipper with God, depended on the *age* of the lamb he offered, and the very salvation of a tribe, on the number of stones in the high priest's breastplate. And

yet all this precision in the external element of religion was the appointment of Heaven, and as *really* required by God as the homage of the heart. The discharge of the outward service was the only manifested proof of the performance of the inward ; an evidence not, it is true, perfectly infallible, but the very best which the nature of the case allowed. " And if, from the Jewish ritual, we turn to the systems of *pagan* worship, we shall find that the temple, the altar, the holocaust, and the image, have nearly exiled all idea of spirit alike from the *mode* and the *object* of worship ; thus apparently rendering both the being adored and the adoration itself purely material. Still however there is even in paganism, where we should least expect to find it, a spiritual element remaining. In most cases, the idolator does not pay his worship to the carved wood or chiselled stone, but to the living spirit which, as he thinks, inhabits it. And to this spirit, a deity of his own, the product of his hopes and fears, but still a spirit, though possessed of like passions with himself, he pays a semi-spiritual service. He renders it fear and reverence, and reposes in it a partial, if not a perfect faith. And even where the degradation is so complete that the worshipper venerates the *material* image, he still exercises a species of *confidence* in his idol-god. He offers it not only a bleeding victim (it may be a lamb from his sheepcote, or a son from his hearthstone), but also the unseen yet more precious homage of blinded faith. And as the spiritual element enters, in some slight degree, into the grossest forms of paganism, so also, in a much fuller measure, is it found in Mohammedanism, Judaism, and the various types of Christianity. In fact, both these elements seem absolutely necessary to the very existence of every form of religion among men. As man is a twofold being, possessing both a soul and body, reason teaches that a system of religion for man should be suited to his compound nature. Its rules and precepts, its duties and services, should contemplate the improvement of his whole character. Its hopes and fears, its rewards and penalties should appeal to both parts of his double manhood. So is it with the religion of nature, which requires him to discipline both the soul and the body, and rewards and punishes with both corporeal and spiritual pains and pleasures. And with the religion of nature, all true systems of revealed religion must perfectly harmonize, for the author of one is the author of both. A religion destitute of either the internal or external element, could find no abiding place among men. Without the former, it might answer for irrational animals ; without the latter, for incorporeal angels. But both are needed for man. If either could be dispensed with, it must be the external one. And We would not assert but that, were man a solitary being, holding no

connection with his fellow men, he might commune with his God in the spirit, without the utterance of words or the form of prayer. He might then, perhaps, worship God with the blue heavens for his only temple, and a penitent and filial heart for his only altar of sacrifice. But he does not dwell thus alone. He is a social being and must have a social religion. And for such a religion, an outward service is absolutely requisite. There must be a place and form of worship, an assembly of the people, and a church with its officers and sacraments. If a social religion is to abide with men, it must require not only an inward faith but an outward profession. The conditions of its promise must be, "he that believeth *and is baptized*, shall be saved." "If thou shalt believe in thy heart *and confess* with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, thou shalt be saved." (Rom. 10: 9.) Not, it may be, because the confession of the mouth, or the baptismal rite is, in all cases, absolutely necessary to individual salvation, but because they are necessary to the very existence of a social religion in the world, and the highest honor of its author among men. And not only are both elements essential to the life but also to the growth of any system of religion. Religion must be addressed to the eyes or ears before it can be received into the heart. It must consequently have its organized *externality* of propagandism. How can they hear without a preacher? How can they preach except they be sent? It must have its recorded principles, its active agents to take and promulgate them, its corporate bodies for sustaining the laborers, and its schools of doctrine to discipline and bring into action young men who, when they attempt to demolish delusive schemes of salvation and rear on their ruins a saving plan of hope, will shame neither themselves nor their cause. When a host goes forth to battle, it needs for success not only a courageous heart within, but also outward equipments, ammunition and arms. So if truth would wage successful war with error, she must take not only her internal spirit of love, but also her external panoply, her preachers and colporteurs, her Bibles and Tracts, and the whole array of moral machinery with which she is furnished for her conflict. In this matter Romanism is far wiser than Protestantism, or rather she makes her wisdom far more practical. To a great extent she affiliates her members, young and old, demanding of each a small weekly contribution. It may be only a penny, or a half-penny even, but grains make the globe; and from a source so seemingly insignificant, there would arise, in a Catholic country with a population equal to our own, a yearly revenue to the church of more than \$10,000,000. She gathers into her College of the Propaganda, at Rome, young men from every nation under heaven, from India, China,

and Japan, from Ethiopia and Greenland, initiates them into the mysteries of her religion, and prepares them, on their return to their native lands, to exert a commanding influence on their own countrymen. She employs extensive printing establishments to publish, in the various languages and dialects of men, tracts, catechisms and brief systems of doctrine, to be gratuitously circulated by her missionaries. Nor does she overlook what might at first seem insignificant means of success. She employs the talents of some of the most eminent artists of Rome, that city of sculpture and painting, in originating lithographs and engravings, illustrative of the doctrines and practices of her church. And these attractive pictures she scatters over the face of the earth, thus teaching, through the eye, thousands who have never learned the names or powers of alphabetic characters. Had Protestantism a tithe of her wisdom and zeal, with a religion so inherently diffusive, and commending itself, by its native truth, to the hearts and consciences of all men, she would soon plant her standard on every hill-top and in every vale, and all nations would welcome her peaceful reign.

For aggression, then, the external as well as the internal element is imperatively demanded. Like doctrine and practice, they are both absolutely necessary to the vitality, energy, and perfection of a religious system. Still they do not stand on the same ground, nor occupy an equally commanding position. Each has its own place; and it is a matter of no trifling consequence as to which predominates in our system, for on this point hinges the character of the system itself. The facts by which the appropriate place of each must be determined, are to be found in the nature of the elements themselves, and have been already considered. They are these: *first*, the one element has respect to the soul of man; the other, to his body; and *second*, the one is confined, in its action, to time; the other lives through eternity. As, then, the soul and eternity infinitely transcend, in importance, the body and time, so the permanent element of religion should stand infinitely above the temporary. The latter occupies its proper place only when it is subordinate and subservient to the former. In fact, it derives all its value from the relation it sustains and the support it yields to the spiritual element. It has, in itself, no intrinsic excellence. Like the moon, it shines only by borrowed light. Just so far as the ceremonials of the sabbath service are adapted to deepen the impression of divine truth on the mind, and bring the soul into conjunction and harmony with God, just so far they answer their legitimate end, and fulfil their appropriate office. But when the lofty dome of the cathedral vies with the arch of heaven, exciting feelings of sublime

wonder in the beholder, when the adornings of the walls, the speaking pictures, the lifelike statues; when the superbly rich and exquisitely tasteful paraphernalia of the chapels and altars attract the eyes and allure the imagination of those who enter, and lead them to forget in a contemplation of the works of man, the Creator and Governor of the universe, they have usurped a place to which they hold no valid title, and cease to answer their designed purpose in the economy of religion; the means are made superior to the end, the shadow has become the substance, the blossoms are chosen instead of the fruit. The general rule then is, the external must be kept subservient to the internal, and employed just so far and no farther than it promotes the spiritual welfare of the worshipper. In applying this rule, it will be found that some nations, some ages of the world, and some states of society, require a larger infusion of the external element than others. Man is sometimes denominated a demigod. But it is a title which, in his pride and vain aspiring, he assumes to himself. By nature he is ever an animal; and, in his native state, a savage animal. Hence we call the infancy of human society a savage state. In this condition, the mind is but slightly developed, and is mainly brought into subjection to the body. A religion adapted to such a state, must possess a larger share of the outward element than would be necessary for a community in which the grand object was to cultivate and polish the mind. Hence, when God gave a religion to his ancient covenant people, it was more encumbered with ceremonial observances than the system which they, in after times, became prepared to receive. Not many generations passed away, before the old system was found to be exceedingly burdensome, so that in the times of the gospel an inspired apostle, speaking of the ancient system, told the Jews of his day that neither they nor their fathers were able to bear its numberless ceremonies. And yet, no doubt, it was the system precisely adapted to the age and nation to which it was given, and admirably fitted to usher in a better order of things; it was the day-star which precedes the morning, the harbinger of that system which is emphatically a dispensation of the Spirit. And in this late age of the world, neither all the nations nor smaller communities are alike in mental culture and advancement. And hence some need more of the external element than others. They must all be taught the great duties of repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. But all teaching must, of necessity, be given through the medium of outward signs and symbols. And some need much more of the illustrative, the figure and type, to obtain and retain the thought than do others. The progress of the art of communicating ideas by symbols, aptly illustrates the progress of re-

ligion in its struggles to emancipate itself from the contracting and burdensome influence of outward ceremonies. Just as mankind first communicated with each other only by rude pictures, then by hieroglyphics, using a circle for eternity, an eye for knowledge, etc., and afterwards advanced to the use of arbitrary marks for simple sounds, and a combination of these marks for words denoting objects; so the altar with its bleeding victim was first employed to teach that a spiritual sacrifice is needed for sin; afterwards, the cross conveyed to the mind the idea of that sacrifice; and, as mankind became more intellectual, they needed only the written page to learn the plan of atoning love. No fixed amount of each element can then be taken and a system of religion formed, which will answer for all ages and nations. Under the tendencies to which the world is subject, we hope the time will come when such a result will be. Under the influences at work to elevate the race, we rationally anticipate such a unity. Under the promises of the book of prophecy, we confidently wait for it, a time when the watchmen shall see eye to eye, and all shall know the Lord. But as the world now is, there will be and must be differences of religious systems, arising from the different proportion in which the two elements are combined. With some denominations, there will be more of form in the religious services than with others; and the only safe rule to be given or followed is, let each one proportion his form *inversely* to his intellectual advancement; let him receive just so much of the form as will most essentially aid in the cultivation of the graces of the spirit; let him have enough of the form to give life and freshness to the spirit; but let not the spirit be overwhelmed with religious ceremonials. Let the green fields enjoy the showers of the sky, but let them not be flooded with water.

Though these two elements ought to live together in perfect unity, the one, like the foot to the head, sweetly subject to the other, yet the external has ever been aspiring to the highest place and, like the ocean on the land, trenching on its limits. The flesh has lusted against the spirit, and they have lived together in perpetual warfare. In the garden of Eden, the external soon gained the mastery over the internal, and faith yielded to sight. And under the Jewish economy, a constant conflict was carried on between the spiritual service of Jehovah and Jewish formalism at one time, and pagan idolatry at another. The Israelites were ever prone to forget that anything more was required by God than the mere outward observances of the law, and to degenerate into mere *legalists*. They made clean the outside of the cup and platter, but neglected the weightier matters of truth, charity, and love of God. And when *legalism* had gained the ascendancy, the downward step

from that to idolatry was often short and easy. And so they exchanged the God seen by faith, and felt in the heart, for material gods, which they could see with their eyes and feel with their hands. And when the Messiah appeared and brought the spiritual element more distinctly before the men of his generation, it encountered the most violent and virulent resistance from the *legalism* of his Jewish brethren and the idolatry of the pagan world. It made progress among men only as it fought its way through seas of blood, and tracked its course with the corpses of its martyred teachers. He knew well that so it would be; and, anticipating the conflict, he said, "I came not to send peace upon the earth, but a sword." He understood the nature of the religion he propagated. He knew that it elevated the spirit to the chief place in its regard, and made the outward form a matter of comparatively trifling import. And when he sent out his religion to displace the ritual observances of his countrymen, and the grosser superstitions of heathenism, he forewarned its first propagators that it would meet with the most strenuous opposition from bigoted Jews and superstitious pagans. Both would resist and reject it, the one regarding it a falsehood and the other a folly; to the Jews it would be a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness; but to all who received it, it would be found a divinely constituted and effectual mode of saving men by purifying their spirits. Though the religion of Jesus, a religion of faith and love, continued to spread till it overran the whole known world, yet by the gradual decline of the spiritual element, it soon lost its chief life and glory. Despoiled of its spirituality, it degenerated into a religion of sight. It abounded in pictures, crosses, images, beads, incense, tapers, processions, relics, vows, prayers and penances. It made confession to a man, who is seen, and sought pardon from him rather than from an unseen God. It had idolatry without its name, the worship of saints instead of heroes, and the virgin Mary instead of the Ephesian Diana. Its spiritual element was stifled under a mass of external observances, which were accounted absolutely necessary and amply sufficient for the soul's salvation. This state of things continued for centuries, while the dark ages with their thick clouds of error, and dense fogs of superstition, hung like the curtains of night, over the groping church. There were, indeed, occasional lights, cheering the darkness; but, for the most part, they shot their feeble rays only a short distance into the murky night around them. They were concealed in unfrequented vallies and mountain fastnesses, inclosed in monasteries, immured in dungeons, or dimmed by the prejudices and delusions of the age, and soon expired, leaving the darkness only the more dense and palpable. The

spiritual element was expelled from the church and mourned in solitary exile. Religion being in such a state, the church evidently needed a regeneration. It is always so when the spiritual element loses its proper place and is overlooked or forgotten. But though driven out of the church by men, it was not forgotten or forsaken by God. He still kept his eye upon it, and determined to give it an honorable resurrection. He raised up Wickliff, Jerome of Prague, and John Huss, the morning-stars, which foretokened a bright and happy day. They brought the great principles of faith and love again to light, and set them in conflict with the pomp and circumstance of a worse than valueless religion. The light began to come in contact with the darkness. And if, in such cases, the fire can only be maintained, the issue of the encounter does not long remain dubious. And a wise Providence raised up a workman, in the dauntless and indefatigable Luther, to minister combustibles and fan the flame. He did the work. He held up to view the living principles of the Christian religion, and proclaimed in the ears of the people the supremacy of faith to form, of the inward to the outward purification. The struggle was one of life and death, and the battle long and fierce. But the truth, which had been so long crushed to the earth, rose again elastic as air and active as the inherent energies of nature. It fought and conquered; we mean where it had a fair field of conflict. There were regions to which it never came; there were States and nations which shut it out and forbade its entrance. In these places it had no fair field of combat, and of course won no laurels. But wherever the conflict was fair and open, a conflict of doctrine with doctrine and argument with argument, there truth invariably triumphed. The enemy was, indeed, driven slowly and reluctantly from the field; some of her outposts and fortresses continued, and *still* continue, to hold their ground. But for Protestantism, the main battle was then fought and the grand victory won; and Spiritualism has since been disposed to assert her rights where they were withheld, and extend her authority over the world. The contest is still going forward. And it will continue till she has completed her triumphs and seated herself queen upon the throne. Then will begin the second reign of Christ on earth. His kingdom will be set up among men; a kingdom, as he himself said, not of this world, not consisting in a civil government and temporal authority, sustained by outward force, but a spiritual kingdom, under moral law, and upheld by the powerful motives of reason, conscience, justice, and love; a support of far more efficacy than judicial tribunals or armaments of war.

It may very naturally be asked, "Why is it that these two elements

have never lived in peace, each one occupying its own place, and so consulting the general good?" To this question the answer is plain and easy. It is because the spiritual element, as it exists in human hearts, is always imperfect. As religion is ever an individual concern, so this conflict is personal as well as general. It is carried on in every human bosom; and before the whole church can become *externalized*, its individual members must be brought into subjection to the law of the flesh. The process is natural, the spontaneous working of sin in the human heart. It is always easier to perform merely the external acts of devotion, than to perform them accompanied also with the inward affection. It is always easier to pray with the mouth alone, than with the mouth and heart together. It is easier to present the body, than the body and spirit both, before God, before God in his sanctuary. It is easier to build temples and support the public ministrations of the gospel, than to keep the heart a pure temple, and offer in it the constant sacrifice of a meek and quiet spirit, of higher price in the sight of God than gold and gems. We mean it is so while sin dwells in us. It requires less thought, and mental application, and energy of will, and sacrifice of feeling, and humility, and zeal, and love. And therefore the outward act is less liable to be neglected than the inward. And when the external act has been performed, selfish as we are, we naturally wish to believe that we have done our whole duty. And so we are fain to call the outward the principal thing, and the inward the secondary; the outward, the body, substantial; and the inward, the mere shadow. We pray and worship like the Pharisee, and then please ourselves with the delusion that our service is as acceptable to God as that of the publican. We imagine that God accounts outward morality, or good works, of more value than right affections; that he would have sacrifice, and not mercy; the formal service, rather than the spirit of devotion; and we substitute those acts which are only the probable evidence of holiness, for holiness itself, and baptize them with its name. And we then perform them, not as the spontaneous promptings of a holy heart, but as good in themselves, pleasing in the sight of God, and meriting salvation. In this way, form begins the conflict in the mind of the individual, and carries it on, till it gradually usurps the place of faith. And as spirituality declines and piety grows cold, mere formalists are introduced into the church; and thus the church itself, by degrees, loses its vitality and becomes a dead body, possessed, it may be, of outward form and comeliness, but destitute of a living soul within. Such is the downhill process of ruin. It is facile and rapid. This course the early Christian church gradually run. This course many branches

of the church have run in later times, and thus wrought their ruin. But the ruin is not effected without a struggle. The spirit lifts her voice and strives to maintain her place. And in the conflict she sometimes becomes herself transformed from a spirit of light to a spirit of darkness. It is no uncommon thing for moral combatants to run into extremes. And the contests in which spiritualism has been engaged, have often deteriorated her character, and made her seem almost anything else than a child of Heaven. To a few of the unnatural shapes which she has at times assumed, we will here advert.

It may be premised that the spiritual element of religion is a complex one, embracing acts of the intellect, such as reason, belief, imagination; acts of the will, such as purposes, dispositions; and acts of the feelings, such as veneration, love, and the like. By a too full or too feeble development, or an irregular action of any of the mental powers, the spiritual element may become seriously disordered, and so exert a baleful, instead of a healthy influence on the world.

Its first abnormal state which I shall mention is that of pure Rationalism. In this case, the reason is inordinately active. It is exalted to the chief place among the powers of the mind, and acquires an undue control over them. The heart and conscience are brought into subjection to its decisions. Even the Bible is rejected, if it does not perfectly quadrate with the teachings of this inner guide. The doctrines of inspiration, and the gospel itself, a dispensation from a God of infinite wisdom, must be received only so far and in such a sense as will perfectly harmonize with the illumination of man's brighter light within. All the facts of revelation which transcend the power of reason to comprehend and explain — the inspiration of the Bible, the prophecies of the Old Testament, the miracles of Moses and Christ, a vicarious atonement, and regeneration by the power of the Holy Ghost, must be discarded as no part of a *reasonable* system of religion. All the grand and sublime truths of a revelation from heaven, originating in the omniscience of God, and partaking in character of his own unsearchableness, must be brought down from their high elevation and made level with the intellect of a worm. Now in all this, the man is under the influence of a spurious spiritualism. He dislikes and despises the sensuous and material. He *would* have a religion of mind, one purely spiritual. He mistakes reason for revelation, and makes it his sure teacher, his unerring guide; in fine, his deity. In her presence he bows, and, with French infidelity before her, he worships. He may style himself a Christian, and be baptized with the name of a believer, but he has no more of the true Christian character or doctrine than the followers of Rousseau, D'Alembert, or Voltaire. He has

only a religion which pries into mysteries and acknowledges none ; admitting no higher wisdom and no safer guide than the teachings of reason ; a religion of which the devil has more than he ; for Satan understands more mysteries than he, and reasons more correctly from admitted facts. It may be a religion more elevating to the mind than formalism, but it more surely engenders pride and self-importance. It is a system of philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of this world, and not after Christ.

A second unnatural form of the spiritual element is fanaticism. In this case, the faculty of reason is less prominent, while that of faith is so inordinately developed that it degenerates into credulity. In conjunction with this, there is an unwonted growth of the imagination, a mental organ indispensable to the exercise of faith. A due development of this faculty is necessary in order to bring before the mind the objects of faith which, not being objects of sight, must be contemplated and seen by the mental eye before they can be believed. When an individual has these two faculties unduly expanded, especially if he be very much inclined to religious contemplation, they produce a strong tendency to fanaticism. It would not be strange, if he should talk of his internal illuminations, and his being specially led by the Holy Spirit. He might even fall into the conceit that he saw, at times, the spirits of the dead, and held intercourse with the unseen world. He might think that heaven and hell were open to his spiritual view, and that communications of truth were made to him from the throne of God. He might deem himself commissioned to reform the world, and give it an improved system of religion. This delusion has not unfrequently visited the imaginative Germans. It sometimes leaves the subject of it an innocuous citizen, except in as far as he deludes himself and others, and leads them to trust in a lie. At other times it has urged him to the commission of the most horrid acts, the hapless perpetrator, deeming himself, all the while, under the special promptings of the Holy Spirit and the peculiar favorite of Heaven. Take, for example, the case of Thomas Shucker of Switzerland, who, in 1526, at a public meeting of religious fanatics, where visions and revelations were common things, approached his brother Leonard and, showing him some gall in a bladder, said : " thus bitter is the death thou art to suffer." The spectators, fearing some evil, exclaimed : " take care that no mischief happen !" " Fear not," said Thomas, " nothing will happen without the will of the Father ;" and then, snatching a sword, he severed his brother's head from his body, exclaiming : " now is the will of the Father accomplished !" " I did it," said he a little while after, " but it was God who did it by my hands."

In such a case, fanaticism overleaps its boundaries, and cures itself. It ceases to influence the community for evil. It manifests its character and destroys its power to do injury. But it often assumes a milder form, and appears uncommonly attractive, so that it would, if possible, deceive the very elect. It is highly spiritual, and has frequent revelations from Heaven, and asks us to receive them without giving us the evidence of their reality. The reason is, in this case, subordinated to internal feelings. It is vain to use argument or Scripture proof, with the victim of this delusion. He is under the power of inward impressions, which no arguments can remove. They are, to him, a present reality, more convincing than argument, more implicitly to be obeyed than the Bible, because a special revelation vouchsafed by Heaven to himself, and fitted to his own peculiar case. They, of course, rise above all civil law, inasmuch as we must always obey God rather than man. Being, as he imagines, the promptings of the divine Spirit, they can never be wrong. This is not Christianity; it is delusion. It is credulity, infatuation; and, in its extreme, it assumes a form somewhat akin to demoniacal possession. Let the evil spirit be exorcised, and the liberated captive may then sit, clothed and in his right mind, at the feet of the great Physician.

A third abnormal form of the spiritual element we know not how to designate better than to call it misguided *philanthropism*. It would be, by some, classed under the head of fanaticism, and is often found in company with it. But it springs from an essentially different source. Fanaticism originates in the intellect, in a warm imagination and an easy belief; whereas, this *philanthropism* originates in the feelings, in the prurient sensibilities of our nature. It shrinks from the sight of human suffering, and cannot bear to think of its infliction, even as a punishment for sin. It creates so intense a sympathy with the sufferer, as to drown all sense of his criminality and desert of punishment. Its repugnance to the infliction of pain on the guilty, is stronger than its love of justice or desire to sustain the authority of law; and so it comes to repudiate the use of punishment in the government of moral beings; it expunges it from the list of means for the rectification of a wicked world. It dissevers all penalty from law, and converts the law codes of both God and men into books of mere advice. Spiritual in the extreme, it would govern all moral beings, the good and bad, alike; angels, men, and devils, by reason and argument, or the omnipotent force of moral suasion. We blame not this weak sentimentality. It is less unlovely than cruelty, its opposite vice. It is, too, less worthy of respect than unwavering justice, the virtue which lies between the two extremes. Just so generosity, a virtue

standing midway between parsimony and prodigality, possesses a nobility which belongs to neither of its neighboring vices. This *philanthropism* is contracted in its sphere of vision. It takes no broad and liberal views of human nature, or the law and government of God. It can see only an individual, a suffering violator of law; but it overlooks the suffering he has occasioned to others, the persons he has injured, the God he has dishonored. In the government of moral beings, it would throw out of the account the influence of fear, and rule them only by the attractions of hope. We might much sooner expect to guide aright a refractory horse by pulling, always, at the right hand rein. In a world of sin and sinners, we must use the left as well as the right hand rein; we must have the influence of fear as well as that of hope. We must have penalties to law, and they must be inflicted. It never will answer to turn the new born child loose into the world, and take off from him the restraints of family government and civil law. But this *philanthropism* would do this. It would remove parental authority from childhood, civil authority from manhood, and the divine authority from the spirit world, and forbid alike the parent, the civil officer, and the God of heaven, to inflict punishment on the transgressor of law. It would throw the bridle upon the neck of every passion, and leave the unchecked lusts of the wicked to riot, at will, in iniquity. It would proclaim the reign of anarchy throughout the empire of Jehovah, and transform the whole universe into one broad Aceldama, a field of selfish and angry strife and blood. Howbeit, "they think not so, neither do their hearts mean so." But when they thus scatter abroad their demoralizing sentiments, and endeavor to weaken or destroy the sacred sanctions of human and divine laws, one thing is certain, they are sowing dragons' teeth, from which they will, ere long, reap a harvest of sin and woe.

Such are some of the unnatural forms of the spiritual element; they find a basis in the disproportionate development of the mental faculties. In these cases, there is generally an absence of the grand principle of true religion, we mean an intelligent regard to the general good, or an influential reception of the law: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Wherever that principle rules supreme, the true principle of obedience to God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, it secures an orderly and perfect religion. All the powers of the mind act in sweet harmony, the outward is made subject to the inward, faith is the master, and form the servant. But instead of this, *formalism* for centuries has, for the most part, held dominion over the world. She has thus had a fair opportunity to unfold her character and produce her fruit. If she could bless and save the world, if she

could purify the heart, render virtuous the life, or give peace to the conscience, she has had a fair opportunity to try her power, and might have done the work. Let us ask, then, "What has she effected for man?" "What are her legitimate fruits?"

1. She has been the mother and nurse of superstition. She imposes an implicit obedience on her votaries, defrauding them of the use of their reason, and leaving them only the choice of unconditional submission to the dictation of their spiritual guides, or the curse of excommunication from the church with all its attendant horrors — its disabilities, confiscations, imprisonment, and death. Her dogmas and decrees must be received without investigation, and submitted to without hesitation or doubt. In fact, investigation and doubt belong to the spiritual element of religion, and find no place in the formal. The submission required is, however, only outward, the acknowledgement of the lip; the belief of the heart is non-essential; it may or may not be given. If only an outward assent is yielded to her requirements, she is satisfied. She thus forms the intellectual habits, and disciplines and prepares the mind to receive any dogma or practice however extravagant or incredible. No matter how absurd a doctrine may be, if it has been sanctioned by a council; no matter how foolish a practice may be, if it has come down in the church from a remote antiquity, and been hallowed by the approval of the fathers; no matter how false, how untenable a position may be, if it has secured the approval of a pope, cardinal, or bishop; it is then unhesitatingly received by the superstitious worshipper without question or hesitation; if the church affirms its propriety and truth, that is ground sufficient of belief; it must be true and right. If the church teaches a thousand foolish legends of saints, they must all be believed without a lingering doubt. If she shows a rusty chain as that with which John the Baptist was bound in prison; if she show a bottle of blood as the blood of Jesus; no one questions their genuineness. If she says, "here is the table of the last supper; here, a part of the cross on which the Saviour hung; here, the spear with which his side was pierced; superstition gazes on these relics as possessed of peculiar sanctity. No doubt intervenes between the object and the veneration of the beholder. If there be two skulls of St. Patrick, in two rival churches in Ireland, and she can reconcile all this with the admitted fact that St. Patrick had but one head; the credulous people are ready to accept the explanation. And when it is ascertained that one of the skulls is much smaller than the other, and the decision is made that the smaller is St. Patrick's skull when he was a boy, and the larger his skull when he was a man, the explanation is received with all due submission.

sion ; and both skulls are venerated as having once veritably contained the brains of the patron saint ! The door is open to credulity, and there is no stopping-place. Under a system of formal religion, such is the training of the mind, that her followers necessarily become, in all things, too superstitious.

2. Another evil resulting from *externalism* is a misinterpretation of the Bible. It gives a material where it ought to give a spiritual signification. Take two examples, by which to judge of all others : first, the doctrine of transubstantiation, which has figured largely in the polemics of the church. Christ says, " this is my body ;" and hence formalists naturally suppose that when the bread and wine receive the sacerdotal blessing, they are literally converted into the real body and blood of Christ. And as it is right to worship Christ, it becomes right to worship the host, as the elements are called from the Latin word *hostia*, a victim. This doctrine prevails, and has for centuries prevailed, in the Romish Church. And even the great reformer only modified, without rejecting it. Nor is this strange. He could not be expected to obtain, at once, a complete emancipation from the thralldom of formalism. His principle of action in reforming the church was, to retain whatever of Romanism was not manifestly contrary to Scripture. He did not, like Zwingli and the Swiss reformers, reject everything not expressly sustained by the authority of the Bible. And so Luther and the German reformers retained many of the practices of Romanism, and only half emancipated the Lutheran church from the power of formalism. They, indeed, rejected transubstantiation ; they could not say, with the thorough Romanist, " what the priest holds in his hands, shuts up in the box, eats himself, and gives to be eaten by others, that is my only true God ; and to me there is no God beside, in heaven or on earth." (D'Aubigné, III. 354. Farel.) Four at least of their senses — sight, smell, taste, and touch, bore decided testimony on the other side. They could not resist this testimony. It was too convincing to be set aside by the mere authority of the pope. And so they chose a middle course, maintaining that, in some miraculous manner, the real body and blood of Christ became united with the sacramental elements. This doctrine of consubstantiation, or the real presence, as it is called, is held by the Lutheran churches to the present day. But the churches of Switzerland, composed of hardy freemen who had snuffed the clear cold breezes of the Alps, could not embrace this doctrine of Lutheranism. They sought, below the material elements, for a spiritual signification ; they received them as memorials of the great work of redemption, designed to remind them of the death of the bleeding sacrifice. They received them as an ac-

knowledge of their reception of the crucified Jesus for their Redeemer and king. In celebrating the eucharist, they merely indicated that, as their bodies derived strength from the bread and wine, so their souls derived nutriment and comfort from the doctrine of salvation by the dying pains of Calvary. They therefore believed that when Christ said, "this is my body," he meant to teach, as Paul did when he said, "that *rock* was Christ;" as John did, when he said, "behold the *Lamb* of God;" and as Christ himself did, when he said, "I am the *door*," and again, "I am the true *vine*," that the one symbolized, or in some important respects resembled, the other. Their interpretation was the natural fruit of a spiritual religion, while the dogma of transubstantiation just as naturally flowed from the system of *externalism*.

In the same way, formalism perverts the grand duty of repentance; making it, not an internal feeling, but an outward act. As she understands it, the command is not, be penitent in heart, that your sins may be blotted out; but, do penance, perform an act of bodily mortification, inflict suffering on the flesh, go on a pilgrimage, or pay money into the treasury of the church, that your sins may be blotted out. And so she deposes the conditions of salvation, fixed immutably by God himself, from the elevated and purifying place they properly hold in the plan of salvation, and reduces them to the insignificant matter of enduring a little self-inflicted bodily pain, or paying a trifling sum of money. The rebuke, once administered by Peter to Simon Magus, is justly applicable to all such gross misinterpreters of the Bible: "thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money." Acts 8: 20.

3. Formalism, wherever it predominates, exalts and honors man instead of God. The material being made superior to the spiritual, it would seem to follow, that a material man should be elevated above a spiritual God. And so it is. The whole system of formalism, both doctrine and practice, tends to bring man prominently before the worshipper, and keep God out of sight. Look at the foundation of its hopes of life. It is laid, not in the love of God, nor the vicarious sufferings of Christ, affording a spiritual influence to sustain moral government and reconcile mercy with justice, but in self-inflicted pains of body, austerities, pilgrimages, masses, fastings, sackcloth and ashes. These so-styled good works of man, instead of the blood of Christ, make atonement for sin, satisfy the demands of the law, and reconcile God and man. When the soul feels the burden of sin, and conscience utters her reproaches, and fears for the future agitate the spirit, and the heart pants for a power that can give the laboring conscience peace

and wash away its stains, the formalist, instead of going directly to God, and seeking comfort from the great source of peace, goes to his spiritual guide for hope and help. Materialism always interposes a man between the convicted soul and a forgiving God. And his ghostly adviser, to secure for himself that confidence which belongs only to God, directs the heavy laden applicant to repeat pater nosters and aves, to go on a pilgrimage, engage in a crusade, worship a cross, or bow before an image, and gives him the assurance that his soul will be thereby purified from sin. No wonder the troubled conscience is, in this way, often hushed to sleep; for the thoughts are thus directed to new objects, and the sins of the heart and life partially or wholly removed from sight. No wonder his adviser secures his confidence; for he encourages him to do what he is ever disposed to do, viz., to believe outward works meritorious, and trust in them for pardon and life. But *externalism* does not stop here. After having substituted human works for the atonement of Christ, she begins to feel the need of a ready fund of these works, for cases peculiar, and so fabricates a system of supererogatory works, for the benefit of those who cannot or will not perform them themselves. And so she establishes an order of religious recluses, monks and nuns, to make prayers, and perform vigils and fasts not needed for themselves, but to be kept in reserve and sold out, for the benefit of the church, to those who have more money in their purses than oil in their lamps. And thus the rich, instead of living a life of abstinence, devotion, and piety, might, by the payment of money, procure from the funds of the church prayers and penances enough to ensure their salvation. Those who were the depositaries of this sacred fund, obtained an amazing influence over the minds of the deluded people. They prescribed the terms of pardon, the number of prayers to be repeated or purchased, and the amount of money to be paid. They, moreover, required confession of sin to be made to themselves instead of God, and so gained admission to the secrets of all bosoms. In the confessional they sat in the place of God, receiving confession of sin, prescribing terms of pardon, then remitting or retaining sin, and opening or shutting the gates of heaven. They took the throne and prerogatives of God, and what could they have more? Give me this power, and I can govern the world at my pleasure. There is nothing so dear to man as his eternal interests; nothing clothed, in his view, and in truth, with so high an importance. Nothing, in time, can bear the slightest comparison with it. To escape the horrors of eternal misery, and secure the felicity of an eternal heaven, he will surrender any earthly good. The poor man will give his time and labor, the rich man will

give his money. If not in the days of health, yet when death comes to snatch him from all his heart loves best, then he will relinquish his grasp on his gold, and gladly exchange it for the assurance of heavenly bliss. The man of power will surrender to me his office and power, or use them in my service. Give me the authority thus to manage man's highest interests, and fix his eternal destiny; and, from the king in his palace to the houseless beggar, I can rule lord over them all. Such is the power which materialism arrogates to herself. She makes the eternal destiny of the soul dependent on the will of a mortal. She invests that mortal with the attributes of Deity. He sits in the place of God, showing himself that he is God. He does the work of God, for who can forgive sin but God only. He possesses the attributes of God: he must be infallible; for matters of such vital consequence, where a wrong decision would prove eternally fatal, could not be safely entrusted to a fallible being. And claiming the power to pardon the living, the step is short and easy to the assumption of the power to pardon the dead, and deliver from the pains of the future life. And thus spring the doctrines of purgatory, and masses for the dead; all adapted to honor man, and invest him with the prerogatives of Deity. Thus a frail mortal, a child of the dust, a man of sin and son of perdition, opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. 2 Thess. 2: 4.

4. But though *externalism* exalts and honors man, it does not honor all men alike. It creates distinctions where none exist in nature: it makes the intervention of one class of men necessary to the salvation of another; it thus exalts the priesthood and depresses the laity. A spiritual religion removes the distinctions which exist between man and man, and brings the different members of the human family on a par with each other. It affords the only true principle of equalizing the race: not by making them all alike in their external condition, in size, in wealth, rank, or station; but in the privileges and responsibilities of rational and immortal beings. It ascribes to all the possession of a spiritual nature, infinitely more valuable than all the external gifts of Providence. It asserts the equal subjection of all to the divine law. It proposes to all equal conditions of salvation, equal promises of life, equal access to the mercy-seat, and equal facilities for admission to heaven. Belief in Christ, a work easier than obedience, it says shall be imputed for righteousness to all who exercise it. And all have, at the last, one Judge, are judged by the same unchanging rule. In view of these momentous equalities, the differences which separate man from his fellow dwindle into

perfect insignificance. Give a man the means of easily securing an eternal crown, and associating forever with angels and God, and what, in the comparison, is the wealth of Croesus or the throne of Caesar. This equalizing spirit is expunged from formalism. Her doctrine is, that man is the mediator between God and man. She reposes the eternal welfare of the many in the hands of the few, and thus makes some demigods, and others mere underlings of creation. As a natural consequence, she fosters bigotry and pride; and, as might be expected, she manifests her bigotry in efforts to bring all others to an outward conformity with her own views and practices. She tolerates nothing inconsistent, in the least, with her own system. She has gained her supremacy by externals, and why should she not maintain them? She makes heaven dependent on them, and why should she be tolerant towards those who disregard them? She manifests her intolerance in her constant prating about the unity of the church, and her hostility to all who infringe on this unity, as understood by herself. True church unity is not subjection to one earthly head, or one common system of government. The true church of Christ is one, and of necessity must be so. The only true principle of union is found in the spiritual element, in the exercise of faith, and in subjection to the Lord Jesus Christ as the head of the church. All who are united to him by *faith*, are members of this one church. We may establish a factitious union, by outward forms and ceremonies, by officers and constitutions; but, lacking the inward principle, it is but a rope of sand. When the temporal interests of the different sections of the church come in conflict, it is severed as the flax that falls asunder at the touch of fire; and yet formalism clings to this ritual unity as to her life: her ministers must be all apostolically inducted into the priesthood; they must have the hands of a bishop imposed on them; and through his fingers, not by the calling of God, nor the power of the Holy Ghost, the consecrating influence must descend on their heads and constitute them true priests of the church. No matter how sapless the head by nature, if a right reverend hand has been imposed upon it, the owner becomes, by virtue of the imposition, a grave and reverend divine, inspired to pray and skilled to teach. But woe to the presumptuous man who attempts to dispense the gospel without the apostolic consecration, and on whose head no bishop has laid his anointed and anointing fingers. No matter if he has been brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, and is learned in all wisdom, human and divine; no matter if he be called of God, as was Aaron, and the fire burns in his heart, and the love of souls constrains him; no matter if the church has chosen him as their teacher, and his brethren have given him their approbation and commission; still, if he

open his mouth in the great congregation, and urge the unbelieving to accept the gospel, he is but an intruder into the sacred office; and, instead of the approbation of Heaven, he has only to expect the fate of Uzzah, for boldly presuming to touch the ark of God with unconsecrated hands. Thus formalism ejects from the pulpit all who have not been episcopally ordained, and utters against them her condemning anathema. And not only does she discharge from the ministry all who have not come into the office through the door of an episcopal ordination, but she also disbands and turns over to the world all the churches not formed precisely upon her model. All their members are still out of the pale of the church, and have no part nor lot in the covenant mercy of God. They may be born of the Spirit, exercise ardent love to God, and filial faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, openly profess their Christian hope, and unite with a company of believers for mutual improvement; but if they do not come to the confessional and receive absolution; if they are not episcopally confirmed, and baptized by an accredited minister of the church, and acknowledge subjection to its pontifical head, they are not members of the body of Christ, and have no share in the covenant promises of God; and, out of the church, formalism holds there is no salvation. Her doctrine is, "except ye be circumcised and keep the law, i. e. observe the outward rites of the church, ye cannot be saved." We will refer to one more fact, evidencing the exclusive nature of formalism, and that too when it gains a partial power over even good men. There are protestant Christians who even maintain not only that baptism is necessary to church communion, but baptism in one particular form. They hold that those only who have been plunged entirely under water, and that too by one who has been himself immersed, have a right to a seat at the table of Christ. An internal cleansing is not sufficient; an outward application of water to signify this internal cleansing, is not sufficient; they would have just so much water applied, enough to cover the whole body. They contend not for the spirit nor the form, but for the form of the form; not for the substance nor the shadow, but for the shade of the shadow; not for the purified heart, nor the outward rite which typifies it, but for the mode of the rite. This is, indeed, tithing the mint, anise, and cummin, and neglecting the weightier matters of the law. They make not merely the rite of baptism, but a peculiar form of the rite, necessary to church fellowship. They require, as a condition of communion, not only the water of baptism, but a certain amount of water, enough to cover the whole body. The question whether or not they shall commune with a man, is not so much, Has he been spiritually cleansed, or, Has he had water

applied in the name of the Trinity ; but, Has he had water enough applied to cover him all over ; for only so much, as they appear to think, will signify moral purification. They seem not to know that "he that is washed needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit." They can commune, as they know they do, with those not purified in heart, who have been immersed ; but they cannot sit at the communion table even with the pure in heart who lack immersion. A man may be washed in atoning blood, and have clean water applied to typify the washing of regeneration ; but if he has not been washed all over, in the material water of baptism, if a hand or foot has not felt the baptismal element, he must have the table of the Lord barred against him as an unworthy communicant. Our Baptist brethren are not all of them fully emancipated as yet from the bondage to form. We do not blame them for contending for baptism by immersion, but we are grieved to see them lay so much stress on the mere form of a form, the mode of a rite, the manner of *signifying* inward purification. There is, indeed, in that denomination, a growing spirit of emancipation from this yoke of bondage : many of the members of her communion, some of her ablest and noblest leaders, are casting indignantly away the shackles of form, fixing their eyes on the spiritual element of religion, and elevating that to the chief place in their regard. And they stand ready now, just as they hope to do in heaven, to embrace in the arms of an open charity and communion, all who possess the principle of spiritual life. God speed the day when the catholic spirit, which is now animating the hearts of so many of her mighty men, shall be diffused through the entire rank and file of her great army.

We have said that bigotry accompanies formalism. And no wonder it is so ; for when the outward is made supreme, it is easy to feel that every rite and ceremony of the church is absolutely necessary to the salvation of the soul. And if so, why should she, how could she, extend the mantle of charity over those who will not perform them ? She must, if possible, force a conformity in things which can easily be performed by all. Hence her bigotry naturally assumes the form of persecution. And why should she not force a man to do what will save his soul ? Why not make him, if need be, suffer a little in time, and thus save him and others from far severer sufferings through eternity ? So she reasons and thus excuses, nay even applauds herself for all the tears and blood she causes to flow. It is no part of her system to employ argument and attempt to convince the erring. Arguments appeal to the spiritual part of man, and belong to a spiritual religion. But the weapons of HER warfare are not spiritual, they are carnal. She em-

plays the material fire and sword to compel an outward conformity to her system. The inward faith she deems of comparatively little moment ; the outward profession of belief is enough, whether the conscience accompanies and approves it or not. She overlooks or utterly disregards the conscience. She forces an *external* conformity to her rites, regardless of the internal belief. And why not, if, as she maintains, the external is supreme ? It belongs to spiritualism to elevate and improve the conscience ; and she has nobly done her duty in this regard. She has elevated the conscience to its proper place in religion. She has made it superior to the laws of monarchs, the decrees of councils, and the bulls of popes. Sustained by conscience, her sons and daughters have cheerfully borne the cross and met the flames. Daniel, with conscience on his side, cared neither for the king nor his hungry lions. Cranmer, Latimer, Ridley, and a host of others, while they acted out boldly the decisions of conscience, heeded neither the threats of their enemies nor the power of the flames. Spiritualism always works thus by an energy from within, acting outwardly, and prompting to any efforts or sufferings for what she deems the cause of truth. The spirit within constrains her ; and, under this constraint, the labors and pains of the body are made of no account. They are borne but not felt. On the other hand, *externalism* always works from without, and thus makes her way inward. She uses the dungeon and rack to rectify the *faith* of her children. She uses the relics of antiquity, the pretended bones, blood, and garments of apostles and martyrs, to beget reverence for the good, a reverence which always degenerates into blind superstition. And governing her faith thus by outward means, and defending and spreading it by the sword, she needs either the aid or possession of *temporal* power. Hence she has always courted an alliance with the State, and looked with longing eyes at the purple robe and the executive sword. On the other hand, spiritualism meekly says, " my kingdom is not of this world. I indeed hold authority. I am a king and possess a throne. But my government is a spiritual one. My law is the law of love. The sanctions of my law are moral. The force I use is the power of argument and truth, and my subjects all serve me in spirit and in truth. Formalism has no sympathy with such a kingdom, no wish to hold such an one. She asks for an earthly crown and a sword of State. She needs them to enforce her doctrines and prevent schism. She needs them to repress thought and compel her children to receive, without question, her dogmas and decrees. She needs them as a compulsory power for collecting her tythes and filling her treasury. Without the arm of the law, she fears that she shall be left to starve in penury. She cannot

trust the power of affection; she must have also the power of the sword. Spiritualism acts on a different, a voluntary principle. She asks no compulsory support. She trusts, for a livelihood, to the spontaneous promptings of that spirit of love on which her system is based. She asks the civil power only to protect her and let her alone; and then she will support herself and the government too if it be a good one and worth sustaining. Her principles and morality are the underground basis, the solid rock, unseen by the common eye, on which the fabric of the civil government rests secure. Remove them, and only a foundation of sand would remain; and, when political storms arise and beat on the civil fabric, it would fall with a fearful ruin. She keeps, indeed, no fellowship with injustice, or oppression, or tyranny; but she is the upholding basis of all equitable governments. Formalism is ready enough to lend her aid to despotism. She supports the State, and the State, in return, compels its subjects to pay tithes and conform to the established church. So is it now in Russia; so is it, too, in England, where the church and State have formed an unholy alliance and sworn to sustain each other. The Greek church in Russia has almost no spirituality. It is but an appendage and prop of a despotic government. In England, the spiritual element has been nearly exiled from the established church and has sought an asylum among the dissenters, and lived outlawed and persecuted. But it lives and thrives, and is gaining a giant strength which it will, ere long, use for sundering the iron bands of connection between the hierarchy and that aristocratic and oppressive government. Let her mitred bishops imprison a few more Shores, and the sleeping lion of England will awake and shake his mane and utter a roar that will spread terror in both cathedral and palace. Formalism always loves power: not content with ruling the church, she aims also at ruling the State. She did rule it, with a despotic hand, in the times of Hildebrand (Gregory VII.) and his immediate successors, who disposed of crowns at their pleasure, and had kings and princes for their servants. But when the civil power has been too strong for her, and civil rulers unsubmissive and intractable, she has still courted an alliance, and consented to be the pander of the State, the adjunct and servant of the government. So is it now in England and in most of the nations of Europe. The church is degraded from the lofty eminence which she ought to hold as a servant of God, a supporter and defender of divine truth and a censor of public morals, to the place of a fawning sycophant and cringing slave. In fact, when united with the State, she *naturally* becomes either master or servant. Neither the church nor State will, any more than the sun in the firma-

ment, endure an equal and a rival. When united, the one ever has been and must be the master, and the other the slave. In the eleventh century, the church was all powerful, and the State was in servitude. In the nineteenth, the two have changed places. The State commands and the church obeys. Nor is this the only evil of a union of church and State. It is generally attended with a loss of the catholic spirit, or spirit of universality, which properly belongs to the church of Christ. Religion is for man, for the whole human family, not for one particular State or nation; and so spiritualism teaches, which requires faith of her children; a faith that may be exercised by an individual, by every individual, but not by a province or kingdom. She begins with an individual; but she is expansive and universal, embracing all mankind. She forms a kingdom of her own, a confederation of all believers in all lands; and claims the right to inherit the earth. She stops not with an individual, or a State, or empire, but assumes the work of evangelizing all nations. Her spirit of love is hemmed in by no national lines; she confines her benevolent efforts within no parallels of latitude or longitude; her sympathies and efforts are coëxtensive with the ruins of the apostasy and the habitations of man. But the natural effect of a connection with the State is to limit her efforts to the country with which she is allied. It destroys her character of universality; it narrows her purposes and plans, and kills her spirit of aggressive evangelization. She may still compass sea and land to make proselytes, as did the ancient Jews; but it is all done for the glory of Judea, that Jerusalem may be the chief city of the world. The Lutheran church, but for her connection with the State, would have redeemed Germany, and Europe even, from the dominion of Rome. She had the means and the power to do it; but she lost the will, when she threw herself into the palsying embrace of the State. She had a vital energy, which would have renovated Europe; but she became the adopted child of princes, and heir to a few electorates and dukedoms, and forgot that she was the child of God and heir of the world. And so she lost, by degrees, her diffusive spirit of universal philanthropy, and has now degenerated, in some places, into a dead formalism; and, in others, into a heartless rationalism; results, one or both of which generally follow the marriage of the crown with the mitre.

5. Another hurtful influence of formalism is her resistance to the progress of the human race. She venerates the ancient; she has her unchangeable and time-honored usages, by which she is moored fast in her place. She cannot move forward; she knows nothing of progress; she has expunged the word from her vocabulary; she fears

innovation, and checks free inquiry ; she muzzles the press ; she chains the mind in darkness, teaching the doctrine that ignorance is the mother of devotion ; she withholds the Bible from the people, denying their ability to interpret it aright. She dares not leave man to follow his reason and conscience, illuminated by the pure word of God. She even reads her devotional service in an unknown tongue, apparently fearful lest the laity should catch some sparks of truth, and begin to think for themselves. She deprives them, first, of religious, and then, if possible, of civil liberty ; forbidding them to pursue, in their own way, either their temporal or eternal happiness. She encroaches on their personal, social, and civil rights. She naturally forms distinctions and castes in society : she elevates a few, making them popes, princes, priests, the guides and governors of the others. But the masses she degrades to a point below even the beasts they drive or the clods they turn : she denies them the right, a right which the meanest objects of nature enjoy, to act in accordance with the laws of their being. She forbids them to think and reason ; she makes them slaves to the fixed and unalterable past ; slaves to her own institutions and forms. She would remain stationary from age to age, and keep the world stationary with her. This might be well, if the race of man had reached the "*ne plus ultra*" of perfection. But the golden age of the world has not yet arrived ; and she will never usher it in ; she retards its approach. The Lutheran church in Germany is, at the present moment, arrayed against the spirit of reform : it resists the progress of liberal principles and civil freedom. And in Italy, the grand obstacle in the way of liberty and a free government is found in the church. The laity favor reform ; but pope, cardinals, bishops, and priests oppose it ; and, if the spirit of freedom is smothered there, it will die by the hands of formalism. It accords with her nature to do such a work ; a work which spiritualism abhors.

Look at the different effects of the two systems as they stand out prominently marked on the inhabitants of Ireland and Scotland. They lie side by side, and are under the same civil government, but subject to different systems of religion, the one formal, the other spiritual. The Emerald Isle has received lavishly the gifts of nature : her fertile fields, her gently-rising hills and lovely vales might make her the glory of all lands. How different, in natural advantages, from Scotland, the

"Land of gray fern and rugged wood,
Land of the mountain and the flood."

Now why is it that Scotland, the land of rocks and lochs, is so comparatively prosperous, while Ireland, rich and productive Ireland, is

in a condition so calamitous? Why are the inhabitants of the one so well instructed, comfortable, and happy, and those of the other so generally uneducated, destitute, and distressed? The difference is not to be found in the native character of the people. The Irish are a brave, hardy, and teachable race. Her O'Connells, Emmets, Currans, and Sheridans, are proof positive that her children, in intellectual efforts, are capable of all that man can do. The difference between them and their Scotch neighbors is owing, almost solely, to the difference in their systems of religion. The one is under the dominion of formalism, which checks improvement and enslaves the mind; the other has a spiritual religion, which encourages progress and elevates the soul, teaching it a due self-respect and self-confidence, by admitting it to a personal audience and daily intercourse with God himself. Look the world over, and almost all the pure spiritualism in existence will be found with the Saxon race. And that race has advanced the farthest in everything which respects the improvement and happiness of man. It has in it the germ of the world's renovation. It is now doing even more than the whole world beside, to elevate and bless mankind. And wherever, among the Saxons, spiritualism is purest, there the element of reform is the most powerfully operative. In England, the spirit of progress is not to be found in the Established Church; it is with the Dissenters. It was so in the times of the revolution under Cromwell. The Roundheads moved England forward a century, in everything which respects the welfare of the people. And our pilgrim fathers have made us what we now are, a nation of elevated and happy freemen. And if, as a nation, we ever accomplish anything for the renovation of the world, it will be done through the influence of this same principle. We are even now silently leavening all the nations of the earth. Wherever formalism holds the ascendancy, there a work of reform is absolutely demanded. And in many lands it is already begun. A leaven of spiritualism has been infused into almost all the countries of Europe. It is a powerful element, working for the overthrow of almost every form of evil.

There is, too, a third element there, which, before any great reform is consummated, generally arises and performs an important part in the work; I mean the element of *infidelity*. The people begin to think for themselves. They see the falsity and absurdity of the *formal religion* in which they have been educated; and, in rejecting *that*, they lose faith in all religion, and become open or secret sceptics. They are ready to aid in overthrowing the superstitions which have long held them in bondage; and so they become, in the work of reform, the coadjutors of spiritualism. Infidelity and spiritualism are indeed antagonistic

principles, as disbelief and faith must ever be ; but as fire and water, two opposite elements, may unite in the destruction of a ship, so spiritualism and infidelity may coöperate in the overthrow of formalism. So was it in the times of Luther ; so is it now, in England, France, Austria, Italy, and other countries of Europe, where the work of revolution and progress is going forward. So is it in Egypt, where a deep-seated scepticism respecting the Mohammedan system and a strong disposition to reject all religion, extensively prevails. So is it also in many pagan nations of Asia, where the people have had their faith in idols undermined, and are nearly ready to renounce and overthrow the whole fabric of idolatrous worship. Though the spiritual element, in these cases, acts in conjunction with the infidel one, still it does not *fraternize* with it. It stands on its own platform, and does its own work, though aided by other hands. It is opposed as well to infidelity as formalism ; and often remunerates the former for the aid she affords in destroying the latter, by giving her a religion of truth, a spiritual religion, which elevates her from the dark regions of doubt and disbelief to the cheering light of hope and faith. It may seem an evil that spiritualism should ever be joined with such an ally. It has sometimes given her a bad name, according to the old adage, " a man is known by the company he keeps." She has been unjustly charged with all the wild excesses of infidelity ; still she does not sympathize with her ally, nor is she contaminated by the union. She not only pursues steadily her work of reform, but also not unfrequently persuades her infidel ally, who has aided in overturning hoary systems of error, to assist in rearing on their ruins a pure and holy faith. She understands her duty. She knows the wide field of her labors and future conquests. She knows she is the reforming spirit of the age and of the world. She has surveyed the lands yet to be possessed. She has no intention of compromising with any form of evil, or putting off her armor, or halting in her work, till the world is thoroughly redeemed from every form of superstition, sin, and woe. She looks down the vista of coming years, and beholds her glorious triumphs. With the eye of faith she pierces the mists that now encompass her, and contemplates the loveliness and beauty of the regenerated earth. She hears the sweet harp of prophecy, as it predicts this day of joy and peace to man ; a day when the world shall bask in the sunlight of knowledge, and bloom with a moral beauty even fairer than Eden's.

" Oh ! scenes surpassing fable, and yet true ;
 Scenes of accomplished bliss ! which, who can see,
 Though but in distant prospect, and not feel
 His heart dilate with foretaste of the joy ?

Rivers of gladness water all the earth,
 And clothe all climes with beauty. * * *
 One song employs all nations; and all cry,
 Worthy the Lamb, for he was slain for us.
 The dwellers in the vales and on the rocks
 Shout to each other, and the mountain tops,
 From distant mountains, catch the flying joy;
 Till, nation after nation, taught the strain,
 Earth rolls the rapturous hosanna round."

ARTICLE VII.

✓ ABYSSINIA — THE GALLA LANGUAGE.

By Professor Morgan J. Smeads, William and Mary College, Va.

1. *Wörterbuch der Galla Sprache. 1er Theil. Galla-English Deutsch (Dictionary of the Galla Language. Part I. Galla-English German). By Charles Tutschek; edited by Lawrence Tutschek, M. D. Munich, 1844.*
2. *Dictionary of the Galla Language. Part II. English-Galla. By Charles Tutschek; edited by Lawrence Tutschek, M. D. Munich, 1845.*
3. *Grammar of the Galla Language. By Charles Tutschek; edited by Lawrence Tutschek, M. D. Munich, 1845.*

MUCH interest has been manifested during the last twelve years, by the benevolent in Europe, in behalf of the eastern nations of Africa. Particular attention was directed to them by the writings of Mr. Krapf, a missionary sent out, if we mistake not, by a society in England, formed for the purpose of promoting civilization in Africa, of which Sir Thomas Dyke Acland, Bart., is president. Later, this interest was greatly increased by the publication of the works upon the language of the Gallas, which we have placed at the head of this Article. Before proceeding specially to treat of these, it will be proper to communicate to our readers some information concerning the nation itself.

Under the general name of Galla is comprised a numerous people, divided into many distinct tribes, which inhabit the southern part of Abyssinia, and a large extent of country on the east, south, and west of it. Mr. Krapf, in his "Imperfect Outlines of the Galla Language,"

gives the names of about sixty tribes. The Tigré chain of mountains, about 13 deg. N. Lat., forms (according to the observations of the English traveller Salt) the boundary which separates them, on the north-east, from the dominions of the Ras or governor of Tigré. How far they extend towards Central Africa, has not yet been discovered; the barbarity of the people and their extreme jealousy of strangers having hitherto prevented travellers from penetrating the country to any considerable distance.

The name Galla, according to Bruce, signifies *shepherds*; but Mr. Tutschek derives it from the verb *gala*, in their language, which signifies *to go home*, or *to seek a home*; and supposes it must have an intimate connection with "the historical fact that the Gallas, driven from their homes, by some cause or other, in the year 1735, rushed in torrents towards Abyssinia, and made that country their home."¹ This emigration commenced, however, in the early part of the sixteenth century; and the people bore the name of Gallas considerably prior to the time of the invasion assigned by Tutschek. It would, besides, be a very singular phenomenon that a nation should change its name from the single circumstance of emigration to another land. Others again have conjectured, from some similarity of name and habits of life, that they are one and the same people with the savage tribes of negroes (the Giaga, Shagga, Agalla, Galla) of Matambo and Congo. But neither this supposition, nor that which ascribes to them a common origin with the tribes in Guinea, bearing the name of Gala,² has been confirmed by proofs adduced from language or other sufficient grounds. The opinion of Bruce is rendered probable by the fact that they formerly led a pastoral life, and fed on milk, butter, and the flesh of their herds; and that it was only after their settlement in Habesh, that they learned the arts of agriculture and the baking of bread. The primeval seat of these Galla hordes has not yet been fully ascertained. The account they commonly give of themselves is, that they came from the interior of the country towards the north; that they came from the south, is confirmed by Salt, who says that an uninterrupted connection still exists between those in Abyssinia and the barbarous tribes that stretch out towards the interior of Africa in that direction. Ludolf also³ says, that in the year 1537, the Gallas forced their way from the province of Bali into Abyssinia; and this opinion has been adopted by Prof. Ritter, who styles them "die Aethiopischen Gallas."

¹ Preface to Dictionary of the Galla Language, Part I.

² See Ritter's Erdkunde, Vol. I. p. 229.

³ Hist. Aethiop. Lib. I. c. 16.

It is equally unknown whether it was some revolution of nature, or the encroachments of other nations, that gave the impulse to this general emigration. It could not have been, certainly, an insignificant cause which produced such a simultaneous movement towards the west, north, and east, to a great distance, and over a rugged, mountainous tract, so difficult to be traversed by men, and still more so by women, children, and herds of cattle. Whatever it was, we may infer its continuation from the fact that, even down to the present time, every year has sent its wave of savage multitudes to lay waste the beautiful Alpine lands of Abyssinia, "bringing," says Ritter, "not fruitfulness, like the overflow of the Nile, but everywhere fearful desolation, wherever they spread themselves." They are the only people of Upper Africa, with whom the Abyssinians have had to fight for the possession of their country, from which they have been gradually forced by the ever-returning throng; so that of the forty provinces in the highlands, that once formed a part of the flourishing kingdom of Abyssinia, they now retain but twelve; and the greater part of these, owing to the perpetual recurrence of hostilities, is reduced to a state little better than a desert. Through them, Abyssinia has been thrust down from its former eminence, and the people degraded from their higher state of civilization to the condition of a rough standing army.

The first appearance of the Gallas upon the confines of that country, is described as truly terrific. From the kingdom of Bali, they pressed forward towards Angote; and, a short time after, made a descent into Gojam; when, dividing into several bodies, they rushed down from the heights of Narca, into the Alpine regions of Abyssinia, burning and plundering all that came in their way, the forests as well as habitations, and slaughtering men, women, and children, indiscriminately. In this manner they depopulated and became masters of twenty-two kingdoms,¹ and formed a fearful girdle around Habesh; whence, through the narrow mountain-passes, they make yearly incursions into that country which lies, like a peninsula, in the midst of them. As Ritter aptly observes, "wie Gothen und Vandalen sich über einen grossen Theil Europa's verbreiteten, so diese Galla diese Gegenden Africa's in verschiedenen Perioden je nachdem sie Aussicht zu Niederlassungen fanden. Wie jene haben sie sich in kurzer Zeit naturalisirt, und die Sprache, Sitten und Gebräuche der Besiegten angenommen."

Of the three great States into which Abyssinia is at present divided, the most powerful is Tigré; which first gained its independence from Amhara when the Gallas overran and got possession of the old Abyssinian provinces of Shoa and Efat. Amhara is the second State in

¹ Bruce.

importance; though much pressed by the Gallas, it has thus far succeeded in maintaining its independence. The old province of Amhara has fallen into the hands of the invaders. The third of the three States, comprises the two large territories of Shoa and Efat; both occupied by Gallas, who have, to some extent, adopted the habits and manner of life of the conquered people. Instead of their previous, wandering, predatory life, making their expeditions on foot, they now dwell in towns and villages, apply themselves to agriculture and the other arts known among half-civilized nations, pay great attention to the breeding of horses, and have the best cavalry in the country. The governor of Efat is an independent sovereign and maintains a force equal to that of the Ras of Tigré, that is, about 40,000 men. The capital of his dominions is Ancober. Efat is described as a highland, lying about 8,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is said to contain some of the richest and finest lands in Abyssinia. It is situated between 9 and 11 deg. N. Lat., and thus enjoys, like the tablelands of Quito, a climate of almost perpetual spring.

Shoa lies lower down, towards the river Nile, and abounds in excellent pasture-lands and fruitful vallies. Though less important in point of military strength, it is superior to the other divisions in cultivation. Mr. Krapf resided in this province at the time he wrote his *Imperfect Outlines of the Galla Language*; afterwards, removing to Ancober in Efat, he translated the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. John into this language. Between all these States single tribes have, from time to time, thrust themselves; and, being new-comers, they retain, of course, much of their original wildness and ferocity.

The tribes inhabiting the country upon the south and west, exist in various stages of barbarism. In respect of political condition, they are commonly found in divisions of seven tribes, united under one chief or governor. These confederacies are distinguished by different names; those, for instance, who settled in the east, in the provinces of Bali and Dawaro, are called the Berhuma Galla; their prince is styled Moti or Mooty. Those in the west, along the banks of the Nile, are termed the Boren or Boranna Gallas; their chief is called Lubo. The division dwelling between these, in the valleys of Shoa, call themselves Elma or Yelema (i. e. children), and sometimes Toluma Gallas; while the inhabitants of the range of mountains south of Amhara, are called Kobi, or mountain Gallas.

The information we possess of those dwelling still farther towards the interior, is extremely scanty: about twenty tribes are mentioned as having each an independent chief, with no common bond except their language; and as being constantly engaged in hostilities with each other.

The Galla nations in the east and west, who appear to have the same language, are of a middle stature and brown complexion; those in the lower valleys are much darker, with long black hair, which is sometimes crisped, and a shape of face and head approaching nearer to the type of the Caucasian than the Negro race. They are active and muscular; which is, doubtless, partly owing to their Spartan-like education, being, from childhood up, trained to the hardy exercises of war and the chase. In their martial expeditions, they move with the most astonishing rapidity, and swim the most violent streams that may happen to intercept their way. They endure fatigue and hunger with surprising fortitude, their provisions for such excursions consisting chiefly of balls of roasted coffee, rolled up with butter.¹

In expeditions of war or plunder, the Galla is fierce and cruel; he regards all violence as justifiable, when committed upon his enemies. Bruce mentions, as a praiseworthy trait in the character of Lamb, a Galla officer otherwise notorious for his bloodthirstiness, that, when he made an inroad into Gojam, "he never murdered any woman, not even those that were with child;" a custom which, as appears also from other sources, prevails among them to a great extent. As the North American Indian takes off the scalp of his enemy as a proof of victory, so the Galla cuts off the *pudenda* of the conquered for a like purpose;² it is indifferent whether his victim be an infant or a warrior. Loaded with these bloody trophies, he returns home to receive the praises of his people for his bravery.

Several of their customs pertaining to war, remind one strongly of the American savage. Before setting out to meet the enemy, the warriors sing the *gerara*, or war-song, at the same time slaughtering a cow as a species of war-offering. A piece of her flesh, with the skin on, is cut off and carried to some unfrequented place, and left to be devoured by wild beasts: this is a symbol of the slaughtered enemy, and is prohibited to be eaten.

If his expedition has been successful, the Galla hero returns home loudly triumphing, and singing the song of victory. His friends and admirers go out to meet and welcome him; at the same time placing upon his head cakes of butter, with which to anoint himself. These are prevented from falling off by large thorns, which he sticks in his hair for that purpose. After the ceremony of anointing, he is honored with the title of *Gondala* (hero), and is allowed to wear certain ornaments, which answer to our military decorations. One of these is an ear-ring of gold or silver, composed of several small chains with little balls at the end. This ear-ring, called *loti*, is often alluded

¹ Ritter's *Erdkunde* I. p. 232.

² Salt's *Travels*.

to in their songs and prayers : *guarrakoti loti rarazi*, "hang the loti in my ear." A warrior who has killed an enemy, is allowed to wear on his arm a bracelet of ivory called, in their language, *ilbora* ; the Amharic word is *ibora* ; which is, not improbably, the same as the Latin *ebur*. The title of Gondala is obtained also by killing a buffalo or an elephant.

The use of butter for anointing the body, seems to be carried to excess, and especially to be a very important article in the toilet of a chieftain. Another habit, mentioned by Bruce and others,¹ and still more repugnant to cleanliness, is that of adorning their heads and waists with the intestines of cattle. Bruce gives the following amusing description of a visit of ceremony of a Galla chief to the king of Abyssinia, which occurred during his residence at the court of that monarch. As it illustrates several matters of dress and etiquette, it is hoped that its length will be excused.

"Guangoul, chief of the Galla of Angot, that is of the eastern Galla, came to pay his respects to the king and Ras Michael. He had with him about 500 foot and 40 horse ; he brought with him a number of large horns for carrying the king's wine, and some other such trifles. He was a little, thin, cross-made man, of no apparent strength or swiftness, as far as could be conjectured ; his legs and thighs being thin and small for his body, and his head large. He was of a yellow, unwholesome color, not black nor brown ; he had long hair, plaited and interwoven with the bowels of oxen, and so knotted and twisted together, as to render it impossible to distinguish the hair from the bowels, which hung down in long strings, part before his breast and part behind his shoulder, the most extraordinary ringlets I had ever seen. He had likewise a wreath of guts hung about his neck, and several rounds of the same about his middle, which served as a girdle, below which was a short cotton cloth, dipped in butter, and all his body was wet and running down with the same ; he seemed to be about fifty years of age, with a confident and insolent superiority painted in his face. In his country, it seems, when he appears in state, the beast he rides upon is a cow ! He was then in full dress and ceremony, and mounted upon one not of the largest sort, but which had monstrous horns. He had no saddle on his cow. He had short drawers, that did not reach the middle of his thighs ; his knees, feet, legs, and all his body, were bare. He had a shield of a single hide, warped by the heat in several places, and much in the shape of a high-crowned, large, straw hat, with which the fashionable women in our country sometimes disguise themselves. He carried a short

¹ Ritter, Vol. I. p. 232.

lance in his right hand, with an ill-made iron head, and a shaft that seemed to be of the thorn-tree, but altogether without ornament, which is seldom the case with the arms of barbarians. Whether it was necessary for the poising himself upon the sharp ridge of the beast's back, or whether it was meant as a graceful riding, I do not know, being unskilled in horsemanship; but he leaned extremely backwards, pushing his belly forwards, and holding his left arm and shield stretched out on one side of him, and his right arm and lance, in the same way, on the other side, like wings. The king was seated on his ivory chair, to receive him, almost in the middle of his tent; the day was hot, and an insufferable stench of carrion soon made every one sensible of the approach of this nasty sovereign, even before they saw him. The king not being able to stifle his laughter at such a strange figure, rose from his chair and ran into another apartment, behind the throne. The savage got off his cow at the door of the tent, with all his tripes about him; and, while we were admiring him as a monster, seeing the king's seat empty, he took it for his own, and down he sat upon the crimson silk cushions, with the butter running from every part of him. A general cry of astonishment was made by every person in the tent; and they fell upon him and, with pushes and blows, drove this greasy chieftain to the door of the tent, staring with wild amazement."

Such are the Gallas, as they have appeared to the eyes of European travellers. Until within a comparatively recent period, they were known only as a hardy and warlike people, of singular audacity and prowess, that had won themselves a country and effected important political changes in Eastern Africa. Owing to their distrust of strangers, and the state of the country, it was difficult to obtain any authentic information in relation to their social condition and internal regulations. Some circumstances occurred about ten years ago, by which interesting communications were made concerning several nations on the east of Africa; more especially that with which we are at present occupied.

As duke Maximilian of Bavaria was on his return from a tour in the East, he passed through Egypt, where he redeemed four young Africans from slavery, and brought them with him to Munich. With the view of educating them for domestics in his household, he selected as their tutor Mr. Charles Tutschek, a gentleman well qualified by his previous philological studies, for the task. A hard task it certainly was, which few would have had the skill and patience to accomplish. For some time, the youths could not be made to comprehend what he wished to do with them; but besides the want of a means of commu-

nication, the well-known mistrust which Africans entertain towards all whites, made them often doggedly sullen for days together; whilst at other times his efforts only excited their mirth, and made them ridicule him, as he said, "literally with hands and feet." In this manner he labored many tedious months, under the most disheartening difficulties; when, by his kind attentions to one of them in a short illness, he succeeded in winning their confidence. He gleaned from them, little by little, that they belonged to four nations, Galla, Umale, Darfur, and Denka. They had been forcibly carried from their homes and sold in Egypt as slaves: they spoke each a different language; but during a year's stay in Egypt, had picked up enough of the vulgar Arabic to make themselves mutually understood.

Mr. Tutschek was particularly struck by the euphonious language of the Galla; and deeming that he might, perhaps, gain some valuable information concerning that people by learning their language, he gave his chief attention to it. At the end of a year and a half, he was able to speak it with considerable fluency; and had, in the mean time, constructed a very complete vocabulary and a sketch of the grammar of the Galla tongue, which he laid before the Royal Academy of Sciences in Munich, in January, 1841. He had likewise written many tales, prayers, and songs, at the dictation of his Galla pupil. This gifted young man, whose name was Akafede Dalle (of the tribe of Boranna Gallas, from Hambo in the province of Liban), was able to give him very full accounts of the language, manners, religious belief, etc., of his native land. He had, not long after, an opportunity of proving what he had learned, by conversation with another Galla, Olshu Aga, from the province of Sibu, who had been liberated from slavery by Mr. Pell, an English gentleman, and whom the latter was kind enough to place, for two months, at Mr. Tutschek's disposal. Through him, his stock of Galla literature (if it may be so called) was greatly increased. He afterwards enjoyed an opportunity of pursuing his investigations with two others; one from Guma, and the other from Hibi in Goma. The last, whose name was Aman, had received a good education in his country, and spoke his language with great correctness.

From these representatives of four distinct and distant provinces, Mr. Tutschek gained his information; the philological part of which he has embodied in his Dictionary and Grammar of the Galla Language. The dictations and records of his ethnographical and topographical researches, amount to several manuscript volumes.

After the death of Charles Tutschek, which took place in Sept. 1843, and was lamented as a loss to science, his brother, Dr. Lawrence

Tutschek, engaged in the same path of investigation ; and, by the aid furnished by Sir Thomas Acland, he published, in English, the volumes now under consideration. In his extremely interesting Preface to Part I. of the Dictionary, he has furnished an account of the internal life of this people, which tends to mitigate the unfavorable impressions that former statements were calculated to produce. We insert here a brief summary of it, in the belief that it will be acceptable to many friends of Africa.

The chief occupations of the Gallas are agriculture and the raising of cattle. The lands in the neighborhood of the villages are so extensively cultivated, that their herds, which are very numerous, must often be driven to a considerable distance to find sufficient pasturage. This often brings the different tribes into collision, and is one of the chief causes of hostilities. In the villages, many of the mechanical arts are cultivated, particularly weaving, the manufacture of leather, earthen ware, and the working of metals into various articles of use and ornament.

They carry on some trade with the Mohammedans ; but this is chiefly confined to an exchange of products. In their commercial operations they employ, as coin, an oblong, brick-shaped piece of rock-salt, about two hands long, one hand in breadth, and two fingers in thickness. This bar of salt, which is called *amole*, is divided into regular fractions, for change : thus they have $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, and $\frac{1}{8}$ of an amole. They have also pieces of twice the size of an amole, called a *mogor*.¹

The form of government is a despotic monarchy, except in the tribes which are tributary to some neighboring power. The kingly office is, in most cases, hereditary in the male line ; though, in a few tribes, a female may succeed to the crown. In some instances, also, the *moti* or king is changed by election. There are two classes of nobles : 1. the *zoreza*, or princes of the blood royal, who are appointed to posts of command ; 2. the *aba lafa*, who answer to the lords of manors, or landed proprietors, in England. It seems probable that admission to this order depends simply on the circumstance of wealth, like that into the *ordo equestris* among the Romans. The governor of a town or village, must be a prince by birth.

As in many Oriental countries, polygamy is allowed, and very common. In the choice of wives, no attention is paid to birth, as the female holds a very inferior rank ; the number depends on the amount of property. The king enjoys the prerogative of taking, besides his

¹ This salt coin is probably the same with that mentioned by Bruce, as current all over Gondar and Abyssinia, and about an English shilling in value. See Bruce's Travels, Vol. III. p. 585.

lawful wives, girls out of any family he chooses, and making them his concubines, and that without asking permission; as such a preference is esteemed a great honor, no one making any objection.

When the common man wishes to marry, which every youth does as soon as he arrives at the age of maturity, he goes to the father of the maid whom he has selected and demands her; at the same time stating the amount of his property in oxen, horses, sheep, etc. If a maiden has several wooers, she presents a gold ring to the one whom she prefers, who then gives her a similar one and leads her home as his wife. On an appointed day the marriage is solemnized, in presence of the friends and relatives of both parties, by prayers and sacrifices. The wife does not receive the dowry till after the birth of a son; if her first child be a daughter, she receives little or nothing; and this circumstance frequently causes separation. The husband is lord and master, and should he become dissatisfied from any other cause, he may send her off without difficulty. The wife's inferior position allows her no redress; she has not even the consolation of taking her children with her; they must remain with the father.

They have courts of justice, and laws for the protection of the weaker against the stronger. In every town are regularly appointed judges, who decide disputes and punish offenders against order and morality. This may appear incredible amongst a people capable of committing such atrocities as are related of them above; but the fact is corroborated by Ritter, who says, "*bei ihren kriegszügen und Ueberfällen ist alles erlaubt, aber zu Hause leben sie unter strenger Zucht ihrer Stammhäupter.*" Capital punishment is not unusual; one method of execution is, to throw the culprit down a high waterfall, in Hambu.

The religion of the Gallas is a monotheism, which is, however, obscured by many superstitions. They believe in one supreme, spiritual Being, who possesses infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, and who governs and directs all the affairs of the world: they attribute to him, in short, similar qualities to those which Christians ascribe to the Deity. With the Gallas, religion enters into all the affairs of life; nothing of importance is undertaken without being preceded by ceremonies of prayer and sacrifice. Their prayers are characterized by great humility and submission to the Divine will; without, however, exhibiting any tincture of fatalism. They seem rather to believe in a special Providence. The following is one of the public prayers, communicated by Akafede: "it was composed and offered," says the editor, "after the close of a long and bloody war between his native province, Hambu, and the neighboring State of Hamaya, in which the former suffered many severe calamities."

"Good God of this earth, my Lord! thou art above me; I am below thee. When misfortune comes to me, as trees keep off the sun from me, mayst thou keep off misfortune; my Lord, be thou my shadow!

"Calling upon thee I pass the day, calling upon thee I pass the night; when this moon rises do not forsake me, when I rise I do not forsake thee, let the danger pass by me. God, my Lord, thou Sun with thirty rays, when the enemy comes let not thy worm be killed upon the earth, keep him off; as we, seeing a worm upon the earth, crush him if we like, spare him if we like. As we tread upon and kill a worm upon the earth, thus if thou pleasest thou crushest us upon the earth.

"God, thou goest holding the bad and the good in thy hand; my Lord, let us not be killed, we thy worms, we pray to thee.

"A man who knows not evil and good may not anger thee; if once he knew it and was not willing to know it, this is wicked, treat him as it pleases thee.

"If he formerly did not learn, do thou God, my Lord, teach him; if he hears not the language of men, he learns thy language. God, thou hast made all the animals and men that live upon the earth; the corn also upon this earth, on which we are to live hast thou made, we have not made it; thou hast given us strength, thou hast given us cattle and corn, we worked with them and the seed grew up for us.

"If I know one or two men, I know them when I have seen them with my eye; thou, even if thou didst not see them with thine eyes, knowest them by thy heart.

"A single bad man has chased away all our people from their houses; the children and their mother has he scattered like a flock of turkeys hither and thither. The murderous enemy took the curly-headed child out of his mother's hand and killed him; thou hast permitted all this to be done so; why hast thou done so? Thou knowest.

"The corn which thou lettest grow dost thou show to our eyes; the hungry man looks at it and is comforted. When the corn blooms thou sendest butterflies and locusts into it, locusts and doves; all this comes from thy hand, thou hast caused it to be done so; why hast thou done so? Thou knowest.

"My Lord spare thou those who pray to thee! As a thief stealing another's corn is bound by the owner of the corn, thus do not thou bind, O Lord; binding the beloved one thou settest free with love.

"If I am beloved by thee, so set me free, I entreat thee from my heart; if I do not pray to thee with my heart, thou hearest me not; if I pray to thee with my heart, thou knowest it, and art gracious unto me."

This petition was pronounced in a public assembly, by the priest whose composition it probably was; it may have been repeated more than once; but at all events, among a people where all instruction is given orally, it would soon be familiar to all. The two following little prayers are replete with beauty; it is difficult to imagine how they could have originated among heathens, who have been taught only by the light of nature. We give the text with the translation.

A Morning Prayer.

Ya Wac^a nagan na bultshite nagan na oltshi. Ede inand'aca karakora kan naga naf god'te, ya Wac^a, milkiko na gadyélzi. Dubad'e dubiza nati d'owi; belawe, tità nati d'owi; gufe, badjika nati d'owi; zi wamad'chan ola gofta goftañ cabne.

O God thou hast let me pass the night in peace, let me pass the day in peace. Wherever I may go, upon my way which thou hast made peaceable for me, O God, lead my steps. When I have spoken, keep off calumny from me; when I am hungry, keep me from murmuring; when I am satisfied, keep me from pride; calling upon thee I pass the day, O Lord, who hast no Lord!

An Evening Prayer.

Ya Wac^a nagan na oltshite, nagan na bultshi; gofta goftañ cabne; zi male dyaban hindyiru, tokitchi gidiñ cabne. Harkake dyaladan ola, harkake dyaladan bula, had'ikozi, abankozi.

O God, thou hast let me pass the day in peace, let me pass the night in peace, O Lord who hast no Lord; there is no strength but in thee, thou alone hast no obligation. Under thy hand I pass the day, under thy hand I pass the night, thou art my mother, thou my father.

The Gallas have several sorts of priests; it is the office of some to teach, of others to sacrifice; one class inspects the entrails of the victim, another interprets dreams or the flights of birds, etc. Public worship is always performed under particular species of trees, which they regard as sacred. On this account, some have supposed that they worshipped the trees themselves; but Mr. Tutschek rejected this opinion, which is, indeed, opposed to the whole tenor of their religious views. No trace of idolatry has otherwise been observed among them; and certainly if credence be given to the communications of Mr. T.'s youthful authorities, the idea of an omnipresent, spiritual deity is too fully developed and too clearly defined to admit of their adoring anything material. It is on this account, principally, that many persons in England, as well as on the continent, have thought that the Galla nation offered a field of unusual promise for missionary enterprizes.

It is not yet known with certainty whether the Gallas have a written language, though the author of these volumes thinks it probable. The sounds in it are too numerous to be expressed with exactness by any known alphabet or syllabarium; but it was found that Roman characters could be best employed for the purpose, though in many cases only the sound could be represented by combining two or three letters. The number of characters, necessary to write the language, amounts to thirty. For a single consonant sound, which is rather a suspension of the breath than a sound, the Semitic Ayin (א) has been borrowed.

The letters have, in general, the same sound which they have in the Roman languages. Thus *a* has, everywhere, the broad sound of *a* in *father*; *e* has two sounds, one like *a* in *fate*; and the other like *e* in *were*, *there*; which sound is designated by the circumflex; as, *mêka*, How much? *I* sounds like *i* in *pin*; *o* like *o* in *no*; *u* like *oo*. All the vowels are, at the end of words, often almost mute, or spoken so short that they seem to be only a breath, aiming, as it were, at the sound which they denote; they are then written over the line, thus: *Wac^a*, Heaven; *torbanⁱ*, Seven. They are all, likewise, either long or short.

There are no real diphthongs, each vowel being sounded separately: *k* has always its hard sound, as in *kill*; *c* (written *q* before *e* and *i*) is a softer sound, produced by pressing the tongue against the palate, but without an aspiration; *g* is everywhere sounded hard, as in *go*; and never is melted, with *n*, into the nasal sound *ng*, so frequent in European languages, this sound being entirely wanting in Galla. *Oh* is used in only a few cases, as a euphonical softening of *k* before *n* and *t* in the inflection of verbs; as, *nu bechna*, We know; its pronunciation is the same as the German *mich*, *dich*.

Tch has the harsh sound of *tch* in *fetch*; *dj* is pronounced as if it were *dsh*, but softer; and *dy*, sounded quickly, have their usual pronunciation.

The *T*-sounds offer greater difficulties than all the other letters of the language: the Gallas, however, make a very exact and sharp distinction between them, even when speaking rapidly. They are four: *t* is hard, as in *tin*; *t'* is a very hard sound, peculiar to this language; it is formed by pressing the tongue closely against the upper fore-teeth, so that after *t'* a soft *s* becomes audible; *d* is our soft *d* in *day*, *load*; *d'* is very soft, and is formed by a gentle push of the tongue upon the hinder part of the palate; so that between it and the following vowel a slight pause seems to intervene, similar to the Semitic Ayin, thus resembling the sound of *g*, with which it is liable to be confounded.

ñ is similar to the Italian *gn* in *legno*, or the Spanish ñ; *z* has the soft sound of *s*, and *ç* the sharp sound; *z'* is the English *sk*. All the other letters have the same sound as in other languages, with the exception, perhaps, of *b*, which, in the middle of words, and particularly before vowels, sounds almost like *v*; thus *d'abe* is pronounced *d'ave*.

The letters in the dictionary are arranged in families; a method which, though more philosophical perhaps, is too foreign to our usual arrangement not to be a serious inconvenience in learning the language. In an Article like the present, a complete synopsis of the language will not be expected; we will, however, notice a few of its characteristics.

"As almost in all languages," says the author (Grammar, page 9), "and especially in the Oriental, the verb is the soul of the whole and the root of nearly all the other parts of speech, so it is in the Galla language, although it belongs to none of the known families. For this reason, I have followed the custom adopted by Oriental grammarians, in placing the verb at the beginning. But in treating of it, I have, according to European usage, considered the inflection as the distinguishing characteristic of the conjugations; though, according to the views of Oriental grammarians, we might have inferred different conjugations from the different modifications a verb is capable of admitting, namely, by the use of affixes; (prefixes, in the ordinary sense, not occurring in Galla.)"

The nature of the language fully justifies the plan adopted by the author. The Galla verb possesses in truth, so to speak, a remarkable productiveness. The national mind has, it would seem, been mainly directed to the multiplication of verbal forms, for the purpose of expressing wire-drawn shades of activity, to the neglect of many of the minor parts of speech. For besides its legitimate use, the verb is frequently made to perform the office of nouns, adjectives, adverbs, numerals, and negatives, whilst in particles and affixes denoting connection, relation, comparison, the language is so poor as to make us believe it is still in the earlier stages of development.

All primitive verbs in Galla have the property of producing, by affixing syllables, new verbs, which are different modifications of the signification of the radical verb. The number of members belonging to each of the verbal families so produced is, however, extremely various, and depends on the nature of the radical verb; whence it arises that, in some verbs, singular forms are altogether wanting in the series; others are limited to only a few branches; and others, again, are capable of being extended to the sixth and even to the eighth link of the chain. We will illustrate this by an example:

bā (root), To go out of a thing.

ii. bad'a, To go out for one's self, for one's own profit or damage.

iii. baza, To cause to go out, to let go out, to drive away, to pardon, to

iv. basad'a, To let go out, to drive away, etc. for one's self. [pay.

v. baziza, To cause to let go out, drive out, pay, pardon.

vi. bazifad'a, To cause to let go out, drive out, etc. for one's own profit.

vii. baziziza, To cause to let drive out, pay, pardon.

viii. bazizifad'a. The same meaning, with the middle sense.

In this it will be observed that the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth forms, ending in ad'a, are middle voices of the preceding forms, respectively; the third, fifth, and seventh have a causative signification. These causatives, however, depend for their precise meaning on the sense of the phrase in which they occur, and may be translated actively or passively; they give neuter verbs a transitive signification. The syllable *za*, which is the characteristic of the causative, is frequently extended; that is, the syllables *ziza* are appended, which, in distinction from the first, may be called a *double causative* syllable.

The causative forms are regularly constructed, and proceed one from the other in a simple, uniform succession, according to the nature of the last radical. But the language does not stop here. As the branches of some trees take root and shoot up again like trees themselves; in like manner, the second forms become, as it were, new roots, endued with the same property of producing as the primitive roots, and thus new ramifications are developed, according to the same laws as in the beginning. In the same way, the iv. form (or second middle form derived from the first regular causative) gives rise to a new set of derivatives. Take, for example, *mara*, To turn round, to revolve; the simple forms of which are:

ROOT.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.
<i>mara.</i>	<i>marad'a.</i>	<i>marza.</i>	<i>marfad'a.</i>	<i>marziza.</i>	<i>marzifad'a.</i>	<i>marziziza.</i>
	<i>marad'z'iza,</i>		<i>marfad'z'iza,</i>			VIII.
	<i>marad'z'ifad'a,</i>		<i>marfad'z'ifad'a,</i>			<i>marzizifad'a.</i>
	etc.		etc.			

As to their signification, there exists but little difference between these causatives and those which are regularly constructed; the general manner of using these forms seems, however, to denote that the regular causatives imply a sense of "causing, operating;" whereas, in the secondary (or middle-causatives), a permission only is expressed; so that, e. g. *ñadz'iza* signifies, To cause to eat, to feed; and *ñad'ad'z'iza*, To permit or allow to eat.

The Galla has a great number of Onomatopoeicals, in which it is probably richer than any other language. The author distinguishes

three classes : 1st, the language has the property of animating certain sounds or natural tones, commonly regarded as interjections, by affixing to them the terminations *ad'a* and *fad'a*, and thus confers upon them the nature, signification, and flexibility of verbs. Thus from *hati*, which imitates sneezing, it forms *hatifad'a*, To sneeze. Such verbs resemble the middle forms, and are susceptible of the same changes. 2d, those verbs that already, of themselves, imitate such sounds, and consequently are to be taken as radical verbs ; as, *kakiza*, to cackle, *koriza*, to snore. A 3d class comprehends all those formed by the combination of natural sounds with *d'jeda*, To say, and *god'a*, To make. In this manner any sound, or the tone of any noise, may be transferred into the department of verbs ; and, consequently, there is a great number of them. It is interesting to observe in all these verbal formations, the endeavors of a people, still in the infancy of its intellectual development, to seize and render perceptible the most minute and fleeting things in nature. And not sounds alone, but motions and appearances are graphically represented. We select one example : *dirjim-djed'a* is said of the sound produced when water meets over something which has been thrown into it : this natural sound *dirjim*, by taking the passive (reflective) ending *ama*, assumes the nature of a verb, having the signification of *to wrap up*, *to sink down*, *to vanish* ; e. g. *lafti dirjimame*, The earth covered itself (with mist or darkness), darkness closed over the earth.

Passive constructions are seldom used by the Gallas, though all transitive verbs may be easily changed to passive. They prefer speaking in the active ; and if asked to translate passive sentences, they commonly avoid this construction as a difficulty, paraphrasing it with the 3d person plural active ; e. g. instead of *he was caught*, they say, *they caught him*. The formation of the passive is very simple, being made, in radical verbs, by adding the ending *ama* to the root, and, in the transitive forms, by affixing the same to the last radical, which is, however, subject to certain alterations, which our space does not allow us to specify here.

A peculiar feature of this language is the unequal development of its modes. It has, strictly speaking, but three : the Indicative, Imperative, and Infinitive. Tutschek includes the participle as a fourth ; this is, indeed, very highly perfected, being provided with numbers and persons ; yet it has rather the nature of a tense than a mode. No decided Subjunctive has yet been traced. It is true that, after certain conjunctions, in sentences where this mode would naturally be employed in other languages, the concluding vowel of some of the persons ends in *u*. But by reason of its deficiency in forms, and

other imperfections, Mr. Tutschek does not call it a subjunctive mode, but prefers to designate it as the "mode in *u*." In connection with the subject of modes, he says, p. 32: "There are, moreover, five mode-like relations, which are represented by affixed particles, and which, partly with and partly without the modification of the verb, may be appended to all syllables of flexion; and, either by themselves or by the aid of conjunctions, produce special shades of meaning. These particles are: *re*, *mi*, *ti*, *yi*, and *ini* (*ini*); and as, up to the the present time, I have found nothing analogous to them in any other language, and being unwilling to invent new denominations, I call them, after the particles themselves, the mode in *ti*, the mode in *mi*, etc." These affixes present, in fact, some of the problems that remain to be solved by future investigators.

Each tense, as also the present participle, is provided with a special form in the 3d pers. singular, to agree with feminine nouns. Collective nouns, to which the language has a decided inclination, are considered as feminine sing., although they comprehend masculine individuals. Hence the 3d pers. fem. of the verb is of frequent occurrence.

Negation in the Galla is expressed sometimes by particles, and sometimes by negative verbs. Of the latter, there are three; they have this peculiarity, that, besides denying that an act was done, they imply the reason why it was not done. They denote, namely, that the subject either had not the *will* to do it, or he neglected it through *inadvertence*, or he had not the *power*.

The indefinite future is formed by adding the auxiliary *dyira*, To be, with the infinitive; it is thus analogous to the English form, I am to love, or, I am about to love. Besides this, the Galla has still another method of expressing it more accurately, and in gradual approximation to the present; this is done by the tenses of the verb *ga*, To draw near, to approach; being combined with the Inf. of the verb in question, by which four different periods are distinguished, from the most distant future down to the time nearest to the present. "Thus besides *ini d'ufusdyira*, He will come, the Galla says also, as the time of the real arrival is more or less distant:

1. *ini d'ufu gauddyira*, lit. He will approach to come;
2. *ini d'ufu ga*, He approaches to come;
3. *ini d'ufu gae*, he approached to come;
4. *ini d'ufu gaera*, or, *gae dyira*, He has approached to come; (when the arrival is close at hand;) and this precise distinction is strictly observed by the Gallas." Gram. p. 43.

The Galla language has no article. The nouns are either primitive or derivative; the formation of those derived from verbs is, for the

most part, very simple, since generally the 1st pers. sing. of the Pres. may be used and declined as a substantive noun. For the reason that almost all nouns may be regarded as collectives, the plural number of them is very seldom used, but its place is supplied by the collective form; but the plural, when it is used, is nearly always considered as feminine, and takes the verb in the fem. sing.

In regard to declension, a peculiar feature must be noticed. The author remarks that he knew of nothing analogous to it, unless it were in the Semitic verb. "For, as in that, the 3d pers. sing. pret., being the simplest form of the verb, is placed first in the conjugation; so in the Galla, not the nominative, but the accusative is placed first in the declension, since the latter is the most simple form, though not always the pure root. My authorities, at every question concerning a substantive, always answered with the accusative." This and the nominative are, strictly speaking, the only real cases; the other relations being marked by position, or by affixing certain particles (postpositions). The Genitive is usually expressed by placing the accusative after the nominative which governs it. Very often, the relation denoted by our genitive (possessive), is expressed by the dative, as in English: *obolezi abakoti* (*ti* sign of the dat.), lit. The brother to my father. If any other case than the nominative governs the genitive, the sign of its case is affixed to the latter; e. g. *niti Butati dje'de*, He said to the wife of Buta.

There appears to be no particular relative pronoun in Galla; its place is either supplied by the demonstrative pronoun, or by the construction of the sentence itself. This is analogous to what we observe in the language of ignorant persons and children, who use simple constructions with the personal pronoun, and rarely connect them by a relative. To this circumstance and the frequently imperfect manner of expressing the relations, is to be ascribed the great want of logical clearness in the construction of sentences in this language. The confusion is increased by constantly-occurring abbreviations of vowels, especially in the particles, which are nearly always affixed. Hence it frequently happens that a single consonant, which may represent several very different particles, is our only guide to the sense of a phrase. The propensity for affixes is carried to such extent, that the language (at least as written by Tutschek) appears to incline towards agglomeration.

The character of the language is soft and musical. It has such a decided propensity to vowels, that not a single word ends with a consonant; no word begins with two consonants; and wherever, in inflection, three consonants would meet together, the harshness is avoid-

ed either by intercalating a vowel or by displacing the consonants themselves; finally, the rougher consonants are proportionally rare, whilst the softer ones are frequent. It is especially adapted for versification; and though the Galla poetry is otherwise very poor, rhyme is so much cultivated, that it occurs not only at the end of lines, but also frequently in the middle, and even at the end of every foot.

As might be concluded from what we have stated of the language, the objective element greatly predominates. The Galla abounds in words descriptive of impressions from without, whilst there are few terms that mark the processes of the intellect, or denote the results of reflection.

ARTICLE VIII.

TRANSLATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CHAPTERS OF ISAIAH, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES.

By Prof. B. B. Edwards.

Translation.

- XIII. 1. Sentence against Babylon, which ^{Isaiah} ^{son of Amoz} saw.
2. On the mountain bare, lift up ^{thy} ^{an} banner!
 Raise the voice to them [the Medes]!
 Wave the hand;
 That they may enter the gates of the tyrants.
3. I have given command to my consecrated ones,
 Also I have summoned my mighty ones, to [execute] my
 anger,
 My proud exulters.
4. The voice of a multitude on the mountains,
 As of a people great,
 The voice of the tumult of kingdoms, nations gathered
 together;
 Jehovah of hosts mustereth the armies for battle.
5. They come from a country afar,
 From the end of the heavens,
 Jehovah and the weapons of his indignation,
 To destroy the whole land.

6. Howl! for near is the day of Jehovah,
As a destruction from the Almighty it cometh.
7. Therefore all hands are faint,
And every heart of man melteth.
8. And they are confounded;
Throes and writhings take hold of them,
As a woman that travaileth, they are in pangs;
One at another looketh in amazement,
Faces of flames their faces.
9. Lo! the day of Jehovah cometh,
Terrible, with wrath, and the burning of anger,
To make the land a desolation,
And her sinners he shall destroy out of her.
10. For the stars of the heaven and their constellations
Shall not give their light,
Darkened the sun in his going forth,
And the moon shall not cause her light to shine.
11. And I will visit on the world its wickedness,
And on sinners their iniquity;
And I will cause to cease the arrogancy of the proud,
And the haughtiness of the violent, I will lay low;
12. Rarer will I make men than fine gold,
And men than the gold of Ophir.
13. Therefore, the heavens I will shake,
And tremble shall the earth from her place,
In the wrath of Jehovah of hosts,
And in the day of the burning of his anger.
14. Then as a gazelle chased,
And as sheep that no one gathereth,
Each to his people shall turn,
And each to his own land shall flee.
15. Every one that is found shall be thrust through,
And every one scraped together, shall fall by the sword;
16. Their children shall be dashed in pieces before their eyes,
Rifled shall be their houses,
And their wives shall be ravished.
17. Lo! I will stir up against them the Medes,
Who — silver do not regard,
And gold — they do not delight in it;
18. And their bows shall dash in pieces the young men,
And the fruit of the womb, they shall not pity,
Children their eye shall not spare.

19. Thus Babylon, the gazelle of kingdoms,
The beauty of the pride of the Chaldeans,
Shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah ;
20. It shall not be inhabited forever,
It shall not be dwelt in from generation to generation,
And the Arabian shall not pitch tent there,
And shepherds shall not cause their flocks to lie down there.
21. But shall couch there the wild beasts of the desert,
And filled shall their houses be of owls,
And the daughters of the ostrich shall dwell there,
And the wild goats shall dance there,
22. And jackals shall howl in their palaces,
And wild dogs in their houses of delight,
And near to come is her time,
And her days shall not be prolonged.

- XIV. 1. For Jehovah will have mercy on Jacob,
And will yet delight in Israel,
And set them in their own land,
And the strangers shall be joined to them,
And shall add themselves to the house of Jacob ;
2. And the nations shall take them,
And bring them to their place ;
And the house of Israel shall possess them,
In the land of Jehovah, for servants and for handmaids ;
And they shall capture their captors,
And shall rule over their oppressors.
3. And it shall come to pass in the day that Jehovah giveth
rest to thee,
From thy pain and from thy sorrow,
And from the hard bondage
With which thou wast made to serve,
4. Then thou shalt take up this song
Against the king of Babylon, and say :
"How ceaseth the oppressor !
At an end the exactress of gold !
5. Jehovah hath broken the rod of the wicked,
The sceptre of tyrants !
6. That smote the nations in wrath,
Strokes without intermission,
Who ruled with anger the people,
Persecution without ceasing !"

7. At rest and in quiet is the whole earth,
They break forth into singing.
8. Also the fir trees rejoice over thee,
The cedars of Lebanon ;
' Since thou art laid low,
There has not come up the feller against us.'
9. Sheol from beneath is moved for thee,
To meet thee at thy coming ;
It stirreth up for thee the ghosts,
All the mighty of the earth,
It raiseth up from their thrones all the kings of the nations.
10. They all answer and say unto thee :
' Art thou also weak as we ?
To us art thou become like ?'
11. Brought down to Sheol is thy pomp,
The sound of thy harps ;
Under thee is spread out the worm,
And thy coverlet is the worm ;
12. How art thou fallen from heaven !
Shining star ! son of the morning !
How art thou cast down to the ground,
That didst triumph over the nations ;'
13. But thou saidst in thy heart :
' The heavens I will ascend,
Above the stars of God I will raise my throne,
And I will sit on the mount of the congregation,
In the recesses of the North,
14. I will ascend above the heights of the clouds,
I will be like the Most High.'
15. Surely to Sheol art thou brought down,
To the recesses of the pit.
16. They that see thee shall narrowly look upon thee ;
Thee they shall consider [and say] :
' Is this the man that shook the earth,
That caused the nations to quake ?
17. That made the world like the wilderness ?
And its cities overthrew ?
His prisoners he sent not homeward.'
18. All the kings of the nations,
All of them lie in glory,
Each in his house,
19. But thou art cast away from thy sepulchre,

- Like an abominable branch,
Clothed of the slain,
Of the pierced of the sword,
With those that go down to the stones of the pit,
As a carcase trodden under foot.
20. Thou shalt not be joined with them in burial;
For thy land — hast thou destroyed,
Thy people — thou hast slain;
No more named forever the race of evil-doers.
21. Prepare slaughter for his sons,
On account of the iniquity of their fathers;
They shall not arise, nor inherit the land,
Nor fill the face of the world with cities."
22. Thus I will rise up against them,
Saith Jehovah of hosts,
And I will cut off from Babylon name and remnant,
Progeny and offspring, saith Jehovah.
23. And I will make her for a possession of the porcupine,
And pools of water,
And I will sweep her with the besom of destruction,
Saith Jehovah of hosts.

The Translation.

In the version above, we have endeavored, first, to give as literal a translation as possible, willingly sacrificing any elegance of phrase to the exact idea of the original; secondly, to follow the order of the Hebrew words, in all practicable cases, even at the risk of some obscurity; thirdly, to conform to the divisions of the Hebrew parallelism, after the manner of Gesenius; and, fourthly, to adopt the words of our English authorized version (for it possesses a noble simplicity, akin, in many points, to the Hebrew), except in cases where the sense was not apprehended, or was inadequately expressed.

Subject.

This passage contains a prediction of the overthrow of the Babylonian empire by the Median and Persian armies. The prophecy is directed particularly against Babylon, the capital city.

Outline of the Representation.

I.

CHAP. XIII., VERSES 2—5. The Median armies are summoned, by the usual signals, to the place of rendezvous, in order to march against the devoted city. As executors of Divine wrath, they are marshalled by Jehovah himself. The murmur of vast hosts is heard on the distant mountains, as if entire kingdoms were in motion. The terror is heightened from the fact that they come from far-distant and unknown regions.

II.

VERSES 5—8. As the immense hosts draw near, or the day of Jehovah's vengeance approaches, the Babylonians wail and are filled with consternation. All courage is lost. They can only look one on another in helpless amazement. In the pangs of conflicting emotions, their visages redden as flames.

III.

VERSES 9—16. Their fear is not without reason, for a terrible overthrow is at hand, the cause and object of which are indicated. At the catastrophe, all nature stands in astonishment. The heavens are covered with mourning. The world, the world — monarchy of Babylon, is about to reap the just reward of her iniquities. Her proverbial haughtiness is now to be laid low. The destruction will be so great as almost to annihilate the inhabitants. Men will be scarcer than the finest gold. At this overwhelming calamity, the earth and heavens tremble, God's anger is so resistless. The few that escape from the city, are like a chased roe, or a lost sheep on the mountains. The traders and other strangers, who lately thronged the city, now hasten each to his own city, to escape the gathering doom. The fugitive flees only to meet death in another form. All the horrid scenes of a sacked city are witnessed, children dashed in pieces, houses plundered, females ravished.

IV.

VERSES 17—22. The enemy is particularly designated. It is a savage foe, who despise gold, who will not accept of any ransom. Not an emotion of pity is felt in their bosoms, even towards helpless and innocent children. They will not stop short of the utter destruction of the city. This proud capital, that sat as a queen on the Euphrates, this renowned Chaldean monarchy, shall perish like the cities of the Plain. It shall become and remain a desert. The Arab shall

not pitch his tent there. Its marshes shall be inhabited only by loathsome beasts and reptiles. This destruction is at the very door.

V.

CHAP. XIV., VERSES 1, 2. The reason of the overthrow of Babylon is, that the way may be prepared for the return of the captive Jews. God is about to have pity on *them*. Their number, too, shall be enlarged, for strangers shall become proselytes. Heathen tribes will help them on their way. Even some of their oppressors shall become their servants.

VI.

VERSES 3—21. Israel shall raise over the fallen Chaldean monarch the song of triumph. When the hard bondage is over, and in the enjoyment of the long-hoped-for deliverance, the people of God will exult that the oppressor is laid low, that God has broken the rod of the tyrant, whose deeds of violence had been without intermission. The earth rejoices in its quiet. Even Lebanon joins in the hymn of thanksgiving. Hades also is in commotion. The feeble shades meet thee with the bitter taunt. They rise up from their thrones, not in honor, but only to revile and insult. Thy glory has all passed away. The couch of luxury is exchanged for the coverlet of worms. The morning-star, "herald of the dawn," is now fallen from heaven. In thy proud impiety thou didst aspire to a seat with the gods; but to the depths of the pit thou art now come down. Those that see thee can scarcely believe that such a change is possible. He that ravaged kingdoms, and showed no pity, is now denied a burial. Others are honored, as they descend to the grave. Thou art cast out as an object of utter contempt.

VII.

VERSES 21—23. But thou dost not drink the cup alone. The sins of the fathers are visited on the children. No memorial of thee shall remain. That longing and universal desire that our name may be perpetuated in our children, shall be refused to thee. Extinction awaits all thy race. The place of thine abode shall be swept with the besom of destruction.

Explanatory Notes.

Our object is to give, in as brief a form as possible, such notes and references as will explain the more difficult topics and allusions. We have also made frequent references to the laws of syntax, as all true interpretation is to be placed on the principles of grammar. We are mainly indebted to the Notes in the Commentary of Knobel, Leipsic, 1843.

CHAP. XIII., VERSE 1. Inscription. מִשְׁפָּט בָּבֶל, *sentence on or against Babylon*, Genitive of the object, see Stuart's Gesenius §112. 2. On מִשְׁפָּט and חֲזָקָה see Bib. Sacra, V. 566.

VERSE 2. The exiled Jews in Babylon are addressed, as they await the hour of their deliverance.

נִשְׁפָּח, *bald, bare, destitute of trees*, so that a signal could be seen from afar, Sept. ὄρος πεδινόν. נֹס a standard, an ensign, placed on a high hill, or mountain, designed to call people together for various causes. "Ergo perticam, quae undique conspici posset, supra praetorium statuit, ex qua signum eminebat, pariter omnibus conspiciuum." *Curt.* 5. 2. Also *Caes. de Bell. Gall.* II. 20. לָהֶם i. e. invaders, the Medes, v. 17. בֹּא with the Acc. *to come to*, or enter in, Ps. 100: 4. נְדִיבִים *princes*, here in a bad sense, tyrants, Job 21: 28, where the parallel is רָשָׁעִים. Comp. the Greek τίττανος.

VERSE 3. Already has Jehovah summoned the Medes to destroy Babylon. אֶנֶּה emphatic, § 134. 3. R. 2. קִדְּשֵׁנִי, *consecrated by me to the sacred war*. Before a war or battle, certain religious ceremonies were performed, 1 Sam. 7: 9. 2 Ch. 13: 12. גִּבּוֹרֵי, *my heroes, commanders*, different from "consecrated ones," as is shown by לֵאַמֵּר *also*. לֵאַמֵּר *to my anger*, to execute my wrath. בְּלִיַּי גִּבּוֹרֵי the frolickers of my wrath, idiomatic, *my proud exulters*, like הַר קִדְּשֵׁנִי *mountain of my holiness* § 119. 5. The words are in apposition to the first two members, denoting the exultation of the combatants and the certainty of victory. Aeschylus calls the Persians ἐπύχουμποι ἄγαν *Pers.* 795.

VERSE 4. The summoned hosts do not tarry. The prophet listens to the gathering sounds. שָׁמַע ellipsis, *sound is heard*, voice sounds. The mountains are the range north-east of Babylon, e. g. Zagrus, which separate Babylonia from Media. הִשְׁמָע nice shade of meaning: those listening hear something in the distance, but cannot determine what it signifies; still it is the bustling of an armed host; again listening, it is perceived to be the tumult of assembled kingdoms. In the army of Cyrus were Medes, Persians, Armenians, and others. See Jer. 50: 9.

VERSE 5. Already the hostile armies draw near. To heighten the terror, they come from a far land. Unknown regions, though lying near, seem afar off; where the horizon meets the earth, or at the end of the earth. "The whole earth," the Babylonian monarchy, so called, since it included almost the whole world known to the ancients, Hab. 2: 5. Jer. 51: 7. Ctesias says of the Assyrian monarch: ἡγε τεῆς γῆς ἀπάσης. The Roman empire was the orbis terrarum. On the approach of the enemy, vs. 6—8, the Babylonians howl in astonishment.

VERSE 6. "Day of Jehovah," when he manifested his glory in an extraordinary manner, commonly in the way of punishment, Amos 5: 18, Joel 2: 1, 11. *כָּשֶׁר בְּיָדָיו*, as (Kaph Veritatis) *power from the Powerful*, play on the words, in reference to the two different yet related meanings of *שָׁרָד* to be powerful, hence *שָׁרָד*; and to exercise power, hence *שָׁרָד*. "Like a tempest from the Almighty," i. e. suddenly, in an overwhelming manner.

VERSE 7. The Babylonians lose all courage. "Their heart melts." Comp. Ovid, ex Ponto, 1, 2, 57, "Sic mea perpetuis liquescunt peccata curis, Ignibus admotis ut cera nova solet."

VERSE 8. The Babylonians are the subject, who are seized with terror and anguish. The Hebrew says: "I lay hold of shame, terror, anguish," etc. Hos. 10: 6. Job 18: 20; or, "trembling, pangs lay hold of me," 33: 14. In the former case, he looks upon that which comes upon him as a quality which he receives. "As a woman in travail," common example, throughout the Bible, of the sharpest pangs. "They stare in astonishment one on another," Gen. 43: 34, *constructio praeagnans*, § 138. "Faces of flames," i. e. reddened and inflamed, as it were by fire. *Flammata facies*, Sen. Med. 387.

The day of punishment, vs. 9—18, is ushered in with terrible phenomena in nature. The land and its inhabitants are utterly wasted.

VERSE 9. Fearful is the day of Jehovah. *לְשׂוֹמֵר* depends on *בָּא*, lit. the day cometh to put, to make, etc. In *לְשׂוֹמֵר* there is a transition to the finite verb, § 129. 3. R. 2. "Sinners," Babylonians by eminence such, proud and tyrannical as no other people were, as it were the only sinners. Comp. "If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin." John 15: 22.

VERSE 10. Ground of assurance that the day of the Lord is approaching. It is coming, for the stars are darkened. This feature is taken from the storms, in which the Hebrew poets saw the anger of God. Here the whole heavens become black. Such material phenomena are symbolical of great calamities, of great moral and political changes. All nature is in sympathy with the good; but in relation to the bad, it is covered with mourning, or hangs out its signals of vengeance. *בְּסִילְיָהֶם* lit. *their Orions*, giants of the heaven, i. e. greater stars, like Orion; as men like Cicero, Scipio, etc., are called *Cicero-nes*, *Scipiones*.

VERSE 11. In the midst of these phenomena, the day of vengeance on Babylon comes. *בָּבֶל* the Babylonian monarchy, as *οὐνομένη* is used of the Roman, here of the wicked world, 11: 14, *κόσμος* John 15: 18. *רָצָה*, though without a suffix, is, on account

of the parallel בְּנִי, to be taken as the object, "I visit on the world the wickedness."

VERSE 12. Most of the Babylonians shall perish, v. 9; so few shall remain, that living men will be as rare as the finest gold. עֹפִיר paranomasia with אֹפִיר. Ophir was probably a district in Southern Arabia. Though gold is not found there now, yet we are assured, by many competent authorities, that it was anciently. It is objected, indeed, that Solomon's ships, 1 K. 10: 22, were gone three years; but the voyages of the ancients were very tedious, mostly along the coasts; the ships that now sail between Suez and Djidda, make only one voyage yearly, as the winds in the north part of the Red Sea blow nine months uniformly downwards; in the south part, nine months upwards; while in the central part they are changeable (*Rüppell, Abyss.* I. 107). It is conceivable also that the ships of Solomon were compelled to wait a considerable time for the arrival of goods from various parts of India, with which the Arabians early carried on commerce. *Winer, art. Ophir.*

VERSE 13. "Therefore," on account of this punishment so tremendous, the Divine glory will be fully revealed. בְּצַדִּיק in the anger, but on account of בְּיוֹם which follows, *in the time of it*, when Jehovah manifests it. Comp. Job 37: 1, My heart quakes and trembles from its place.

VERSE 14. - The numerous foreigners in Babylon, (collected there for purposes of commerce,) are the subject. In the impending invasion, they flee to their own homes. The strangers in Babylon are mentioned, and their flight, Jer. 50: 37. הָיָה neuter, *it is, it so happens*. "Chased gazelle," flees with the utmost haste, 2 Sam. 2: 18. Prov. 6: 5. וָיָרָץ The Vav often stands in connections where it may be resolved by the relative. After צֵאן, מְדָרִים may be supplied.¹

VERSE 15. Whoever remains in Babylon shall perish. נִצָּחָה, lit. *all who are scraped together*, i. e. *collected*, taken in the onset, shall be slain by the sword. Xenophon, *Cyrop.* vii. 5. B. 31, says: "Cyrus sent off the cohorts of horsemen along the roads; and gave orders that they should slay those whom they found without; but those in the houses should be directed, by such as were acquainted with the Syrian language, to stay within; but if any were taken without, they should be put to death."

¹ Aeschylus (Pers. 51) says of Babylon:

Βαβυλῶν δ'
ἔπελ' ἑκ πολέων πύμμικτον ὄχλον
Πεμπει σύρδην, ναῶν τ' ἐπόχους
Χαὶ τοξουλκῶ λήματι πιστούς.

VERSE 16. The horrid barbarities of ancient warfare are depicted Hos. 10: 14. Nah. 3: 10. 2 K. 8: 12.

VERSE 17. The Medes are here first named. The Persians are not mentioned, since the Medians were the leading power, being far more numerous. They appear as an uncultivated people, like the modern Koords. The invaders esteeming gold and silver of no account, the Babylonians would not be able to ransom themselves. Homer, Il. vi. 48:

Χαλχός τε χρυσός τε, πολύκμητός τε σίδηρος.

"Medes, and all present! I know you well, that neither needing money do you go with me," etc.—*Xen. Cyr.* 5. 1. 20.

VERSE 18. The cruelty of the invaders is still further depicted. חֲבֹשִׁים, *bows*, then bowmen. Comp. Germ. *Degen*, English *shots*. The Median and Persian armies were distinguished for the number and excellence of the archers, Jer. 50: 42. Cyrop. ii. 1. 7. חֲבֹשִׁים, *to spare, to be grieved for*. Pity is ascribed to the eye; it expresses itself in the looks.

The beautiful capital of the Chaldeans, vs. 19—22, becomes a perpetual heap of ruins, where only solitary wild beasts lodge.

VERSE 19. צָרָה, *beauty, splendor*; then roe, gazelle, from its extreme beauty and gracefulness. Thus in relation to Jonathan: "The gazelle, O Israel, on thy mountains slain," 2 Sam. 1: 19. "Beauty of the pride," beautiful place; and, as such, the object of the pride and boast of the Chaldeans. The epithets, says Knobel, stand in fine contrast with the miserable ruins into which Babylon shall fall. מְהִפְכָּח, verbal nominative with the Gen. of the subject and Acc. of the object, *Ges. Lehrgeb.* p. 688.

VERSE 20. Description of the most perfect destruction: Babylon shall be an eternal desolation. יָחַל for יָחַל fut. Piel from יָחַל, *to tent, to pitch tent*, § 67. R. 2. The Arabians wandered as far as Assyria, Gen. 25: 18, and Babylonia, Strabo, 16. The Nomade tribes of Northern and Central Arabia pitch their tents, at the present time, in the vicinity of Baghdad and of the ruins of Babylon. Ker Porter II. p. 286.

VERSE 21. Only beasts which delight in desolate and ruinous places, shall be found there. "Wild beasts," inhabitants of חֲצֵה *a wild, waste*; used of beasts, except in Isa. 23: 13. Ps. 72: 9. חֲצֵה found only here; derived, by Ges., from חֲצֵה, a root not in use; comp. Latin *uhula*. "Ostrich," lit. daughter of greediness, used here ἀναιδέως of both sexes; they inhabit the desert and utter a wailing

cry. "Wild goats;" lit. hairy; then, he-goat; then, as many suppose, wood-demons, satyrs; a fabulous animal, half human, with which superstition is wont to people a wild region; but here it is, perhaps, unnecessary to go beyond the common meaning of the term *he-goat*.

VERSE 22. As a waste, Babylon is an abode of jackals, Jer. 9: 10. 10: 22. Instead of אַי, lit. *howler*, תַּן, the common expression, is used. כָּנָה Sing. with a Plur. § 144. a. In אֶלְמָנוּת for ר, as is very often the case; see the lexicons. The Suffix probably refers to the Chaldean king, who lived in the palace. The jackal is noted for its melancholy scream at night, resembling the crying of a child.

CHAP. XV., VERSE 1. This destruction shall take place בִּי for God "shall choose Israel again." In exile, the Jews had served foreign masters, to whom Jehovah had given them up; but now he chose them once more as his own, as he did anciently in Egypt. בָּחַר with ב, *to be pleased with*, to delight in. נִיחַ from הִנִּיחַ, § 71. R. 9. "Strangers," such as the Canaanites who remained in the land, a part of whom were carried into exile, Ez. 14: 7, a part were left in the land, Ezra 9: 1. Many had become proselytes and zealously kept the law, Num. 15: 14. Isa. 56: 6.

VERSE 2. But it shall fare hardly with those nations that had carried the Jews into exile. As their own land is wasted, they must seek a new home; they shall accompany the Jews to Palestine and become their slaves. The Jews shall then hold captive their captors. Isa. 6: 10, הִזְנִיחַל *to appropriate to one's self*, used actively. See *Lehrgh.* 248.

VERSE 3. This shall take place when Jehovah gives his people rest from all their troubles. עָבַד for עָבְדָה, "which service one has made thee serve." אָשַׁר is Acc. and refers to עָבְדָה, § 139. 3. a, b). The exiles may have been used as serfs.

VERSE 4. The first joyful exclamation of the freed exiles! How has come to an end the oppressor, i. e. the Chaldean king. קָשַׁל *satirical poem*, song of derision. אַיִךְ *ah! how!* ironical. קָדְהָבָה ἄναξ λεγ., denominative from Aram. זָהָב = זָהָב, *exactress of gold*; or, if the participle is used abstractly, *exaction of gold*. But all the ancient versions seem to have read it כִּדְהָבָה, *oppression*; so, also, ed. Thessalon. 1600, which corresponds better with the parallelism.

VERSE 5. Jehovah has broken the heavy yoke of the rulers, i. e. oppressors.

VERSE 6. The subject is שָׂבַט, i. e. the Babylonian power, represented by the king. The common reading קִדְרָה is a verbal from Hophal; hence *persecution*, oppression, in the Acc., with a persecution that knows no intermission. Döderlein, however, suggests מִדְרָה

dominion, domination, as the parallelism demands a derivative from *רָחַץ*. This reading is acquiesced in by Maurer, Gesenius, Knobel, and others. *מָנַח* in the preceding member, corresponds to *מָנַח*, lit. *striking a strike*. For the construct form, see § 114. 3. *בְּלִי מָנַח*, which he did not restrain.

VERSE 7. After Babylon is destroyed, the whole earth is at rest, no longer exposed to the assaults of that cruel and ambitious Power. *מְצוּרֵי* "the inhabitants break out into singing," § 135. R. 2.

VERSE 8. Even inanimate nature rejoices at thy downfall. She has been maltreated by thee. Rosenmüller and others understand by fir-trees and cedars, *nobles*, great men; but this is rendered improbable by the particle *גַּם* also. The passage may be understood as a lively personification, i. e. the joy at thy downfall is so great, that the objects of nature seem to exult over thee; or, it may refer to actual facts, i. e. the trees on Lebanon had been cut down by the invaders; which appears to be the most natural interpretation. In the invasion of Judah by Sennacherib, Isa. 37: 24, the king of Assyria is represented as saying: "By the multitude of my chariots am I come up to the heights of the mountains, to the sides of Lebanon, and I will cut down the tall cedars thereof." So Hab. 2: 17 is to be taken literally, "for the violence of Lebanon shall cover thee," i. e. the violence inflicted by thee on Lebanon (Gen. of object), shall return upon thee by the law of retaliation; and "the destruction of the beasts," i. e. inflicted upon them. See the arguments in favor of the literal interpretation of this passage, in Delitzsch's *Habakkuk*, p. 95.

VERSE 9. Even Hades, the world of the dead, where else unbroken silence reigns, betrays commotion at thy coming. She is filled with astonishment and joy at an event so unlooked for. This passage, one of the sublimest in the Hebrew Scriptures, has been compared to the celebrated lines in the *Iliad*, xx. 56—65:

And fearfully thundered the Father of men and of gods
From on high; but from beneath, Poseidōn shook
The boundless earth, and of mountains the lofty tops,
And all the roots of many-fountained Ida quaked,
And the peaks, and the city of the Trojans, and the ships of the Greeks;
And trembled from below, the king of the shades, Hades,
And fearing, leaped from his throne, and cried aloud, lest from above,
Poseidōn, earth-shaker, should break through the ground,
And the dwellings to mortals and immortals appear,
Horrible, dark, which the gods detest.

See, also, the *Aeneid* viii. 241. Ovid. *Met.* v. 256. Longinus, on the *Sublime*, 8. 9. *לְךָ* either *on thy account*, or *to thee*. *לְךָ* is of com-

mon gender, and is construed with חַזַק and עָוֶרָה, § 144. R. 1. *Lehrgeb.* 705. חַזַקִּים, lit. *the weak*, εἰδωλα καμόντων, II. 23. 72. *From under*, contrast with the Chaldee king's coming from above.

VERSE 10. Expression of astonishment at the fate of the mighty monarch: "Art thou made like to us, and brought down to us?" *Const. Praeg.* § 138.

VERSE 11. The song, commenced v. 4, is here resumed. A few words from the pale shades would be much more in keeping, than a protracted address. A very brief address only would be expected. Brought down to the grave is thy royal majesty and thy luxurious life. Instead of costly furniture for thy couch, worms are thy coverlet. חַזַקִּים is substantive and Sing. *Lehrgeb.* 433. חַזַקִּים for חַזַקִּים § 144. a).

VERSE 12. Expression of wonder that the man who was exalted to the highest glory is brought down to Hades. Cicero says of Pompey: deciderat ex astris; and of Antony: collegam de coelo detraxisti. חַזַקִּים considered by some Imp. Hiph. from חַזַק, *howl!* but it is descriptive here, and not an address. It is a participial noun from חַזַק to shine = *shining one*. "Son of the dawn," i. e. morning-star. The planet Venus, rising before the sun, is called by Homer κάλλιστος ἀστὴρ. To it the noblest of earth's kings is likened. Christ is called, Rev. 22: 16, the bright, the morning star. "Cast down," praeg. const. "cast down and destroyed." The false Messiah, at the time of Hadrian, called himself *son of the star*.

VERSE 13. But this destruction is deserved. In thy pride and impiety, thou didst assume divine honors. Comp. 2 Thess. 2: 4. "Stars of God," stars of heaven, where God dwells. "Mount of the congregation," etc. There seems to be no good reason for deviating from the common view, advocated by Gesenius and others. It is the *mons sacer*, the Oriental Olympus, the Indian Meru, the Persian *el-burj*, situated in the farthest regions of the North, under the pole itself, and the seat of the blessed gods. *Ges. Thes. in voc.* חַזַקִּים *extremities*, recesses, penetralia, of a house, Am. 6: 10; of a ship, Jon. 1: 5; of a cave, of the sepulchre, Isa. 14: 15.

VERSE 14. Many of the Oriental nations were accustomed to call their kings gods. "Thou saidst, I am a God, I sit in the seat of God," Ez. 38: 2. Virg. Ec. i. 6. deus nobis haec, etc. referring to Augustus. חַזַקִּים for חַזַקִּים § 53. 2.

VERSE 15. Instead of entering the adytum of the gods, thou art brought down to that of the pit, to the deepest recess of the tomb. Gesenius quotes the verses from Vit. Tim. ii. 494:

Oft stands above the heaven a man; and stands he there?
(Quick) lies he under the grave-stone.

VERSE 16. The shades, as he descends, fix on him their eyes, in doubt whether it is possible that such a king is brought low. In the second clause, they still speak.

VERSE 17. They continue to address him, recollecting the utter desolation and savage cruelty which had marked his wars. שָׁם change from Part., in the last verse, to finite construction, § 131. R. 2. בְּסִדְרָא with the Art., to make it definite, *like the desert*, § 107. 3. R. 1. פָּתַח to open, to let out of prison, Jer. 40: 4, opp. to סָגַר. The not letting go his captives, is a mark of power and of cruelty. בָּרְחָה home, homeward, domum, "and the man went home," Gen. 24: 32.

VERSES 18, 19. The tyrant now receives the just reward of his deeds. The kings, whom he oppressed on earth, now lie in honor, each in his own house, grave, or niche; their bodies are treated with respect, while thou art cast away from thy sepulchre, from the tomb designed for thee, as a branch which a man cuts off from a tree and casts from him. "Away from," not *out of*, as the body had not been placed in a sepulchre. לְבָשׁ part. constructed with אָחַז. Comp. Job 7: 5, "My body is clothed of, or with worms," § 132. "Stones of the pit." The most probable sense of this much-disputed clause seems to be, *a stony place*, a pit where loose stones and refuse are thrown, where dead bodies are indiscriminately huddled. The dwellings of the dead, among the Persians and Egyptians, were esteemed as far more important, and were far more splendidly built than those of the living. Diod. Sic. 1. 51, says of the Egyptians: "The houses of the living they name *lodgings*, resting-places, lit. dissolvings, as we inhabit them but a short time; but the sepulchres of the dead they name *eternal habitations*; as if in Hades we were to pass a boundless eternity." Hence the great national work, the pyramids (perhaps *πίραμυς*, palace of the dead), the graves of kings, and the abodes of the dead among the Medo-Persians in Persepolis. The value that the Hebrews attached to an honorable burial is well known. 26: 16. 53: 6. 1 K. 13: 22.

VERSE 20. "With them," with kings and others who are honorably buried, v. 18. The tyranny of a particular king is not here referred to; but the general course of the monarchs, marked as it commonly was, by acts of revolting barbarity; e. g. the blinding of the sons of Zedekiah at Riblah. The king of Babylon, as a savage conqueror, was alike indifferent to the life of his own subjects and to that of his enemies. The triumphal song here concludes.

VERSE 21. Spoken by the prophet, and addressed to the Medes

and Persians. קָרִים some interpret *enemies*; but *cities* seems to be the more natural rendering, and accords with the previous clause.

VERSES 22, 23. Jehovah denounces utter destruction. The Babylonians shall be cut off, root and branch. לְבָבֶל Dat. incommodi. נָשַׁם וְיָשָׁאֵר paronomasia *name* and *man*. יֶרֶךְ וְנֶכֶד *offspring* and *offshoot*. The ruined city shall serve as a dwelling for the porcupine, Zeph. 2: 11. "Pools of water." Marshy, overflowed by the Euphrates; after the river has retired, stagnant pools of water abound. "Besom," lit. "I will besom her with the besom." The verb is denom. from טָיַט *mud*; swept clean, utterly destroyed. Damir, quoted by Bochart, says expressly, that the hedge-hog was frequently found in Syria and Irak, and was of the size of a Maltese dog. According to Nearchus, in Strabo, 16. 1, they were numerous in the islands of the Euphrates.

Author of the Passage.

Most of the later German critics maintain that this section was not composed by Isaiah. The grounds of this opinion, as stated by Knobel, follow:

1. "The subject. The writer speaks of a mighty Babylonian monarchy, under whose oppression the Jewish exiles languished, as a matter of the past and present; he sees the overthrow of this empire and the release of the exiles as near; he names the Medes as conquerors of Babylon. All this does not agree with Isaiah, who has constantly to do with the Assyrian monarchy, and at most could only predict a Babylonian empire as to arise from the Assyrian, and thence dangerous to the Jews."

In reply, we object to the method of these critics, who first reject the largest portion of the prophecies, which go under the name of Isaiah, as not genuine; and thus, when we are considering the genuineness of one of the remaining sections, shut us out from all opportunity of collation and comparison, except in exceedingly narrow limits. The last twenty-seven chapters are not genuine, it is said, because they contain many words and phrases which are not in Isaiah's genuine productions. But if it be shown that the style is similar to that of chs. xiii. and xiv., it is very convenient to reply that those chapters are anonymous. But, allowing that Isaiah limits his view to the Assyrian monarchy mainly, does this preclude him from uttering special predictions against Babylon? Why should Babylon be passed by, any more than Tyre, Egypt, or Ethiopia? The twenty-third chapter contains a prophecy against Tyre, the author being Isaiah, according to Knobel's confession; and the captor of it is evidently Nebuchad-

nezzar, as most modern critics allow; for Shalmanezzer, though he besieged it, did not take it. Secondly, Isaiah did predict the overthrow of Judah by the Babylonians, 2 K. 20: 16—19, "all shall be carried into Babylon," etc. So that Isaiah has something to do with Babylon. Thirdly. He paints, indeed, the overthrow of Babylon, and the release of the Jews, as near. But this is in conformity with the nature of prophecy, and of the manner of Isaiah in particular. The Messianic times, ch. ix., are represented as present.

2. "Spirit and Views. The author is full of bitter hatred and of glowing revenge against the Babylonians. He feeds with delight, in the outset, on their terrible destruction; and he paints with pleasure, how Babylon shall forever be a heap of ruins, uninhabited, its king lying unburied. But such a degree of fanaticism is foreign to Isaiah, and betrays one suffering under Babylonian oppression, and in general the later period, when this fanatical spirit specially prevailed as the result of longer oppression," etc.

Such objections, of course, proceed on the ground that a prophet, in delivering his message, is, at the same time, indulging his private pique, and may be a fanatic or an enthusiast. The objection really deserves no answer. But is it not conceivable that the people of God, as well as other nations, had suffered for a long time, extraordinary oppression, at the hands of the Babylonians? And might it not consist with the justice of God, to denounce severe calamities, even to annihilation, against a proud and impious oppressor? The deeper feeling and the more terrible anathema, were justified by the circumstances. But the same fearlessness in delivering his message, the same spirit of denunciation in substance, characterize the prophet elsewhere, in relation to Syria, the Ten Tribes, Tyre, etc. If the spirit of the one is unjustifiable, so is that of the other. Knobel seems to forget that there may be several aspects and even opposite tendencies in the character of a great prophet. "The man of sorrows" uttered terrible denunciations.

3. "Style and language. The style has not only no characteristic peculiarities of the style of Isaiah — being in general far more flowing, smooth, and facile — it also contains many expressions which are only to be met with in the later writers." But is the style more unlike that of the portions of Isaiah which are acknowledged to be genuine, than is that of ch. xviii.? In seven verses, in the latter, there are at least twelve words and phrases not found elsewhere, in what are said to be the oracles of this prophet.¹ Is it asserted that the

¹ הָלָאָז, מִרְכָּט, מְמַשֵּׁה, in the sense of *messengers*, צִירִים, צִלְצֵל

new topic in ch. xviii. requires a new style? Why is not the same remark applicable to chapters xiii. and xiv.? Besides, there is a wonderful variety in the diction and manner of this prophet, in those portions which our critics acknowledge to have been written by him. Compare the smooth, flowing, elevated style of 2: 1—5 with the short, abrupt, impetuous diction in 10: 28—34.

4. "This is confirmed by the frequent coincidences of this author with the later prophets." But there are striking coincidences in those portions which are confessedly genuine, with passages in other prophets. Compare Isa. 2: 1—5 with Mic. 4: 1—5; Isa. 7: 14. 9: 6 with Mich. 5: 2, 3; Isa. 5: 1—7 with Ps. 80: 8—16 and Ez. 17.

In short, we see no adequate reasons for rejecting the genuineness of this passage. The arguments adduced by the opponents are mainly subjective.

Rule of Interpretation.

In the prophecy and in the mode of its fulfilment, we are taught that we are not to descend to minute particulars in order to justify the words of the seer. Cyrus took Babylon, but did not destroy it. It was a flourishing city for many years afterwards. Even now Hillah, probably on the site of the ruins, is a city of considerable size and of some prosperity. In such cases, we are to look at general results, or at the spirit of the passage. Viewed in this manner, the prediction has been followed by a most signal accomplishment.

Note on Babylon.

Babylon was taken by Cyrus B. C. 539. It was not destroyed, nor essentially injured. The walls remained entire. On the contrary, Cyrus determined to make it his winter-residence, and, after Susa and Ecbatana, the third city of his empire. It was not till the insurrection of the Babylonians, in the reign of Darius Hystaspes, that the walls and gates were demolished, and the city so depopulated that women were forcibly taken from the neighboring districts to aid in repeopling it. Xerxes carried off the golden statue of Belus, and, according to some, caused the destruction of the temple of that god. The design of Alexander, to rebuild the city, was broken off by his death. The building of Seleucia, in the vicinity, still further depopulated Babylon. About 130 B. C. it was ravaged by the Parthian sa- traps. At the time of Diodorus and Strabo, the greater part of the city within the walls was a waste. According to Curtius, only a fourth

שְׁרִי, עִיר, וְזִנְיָוִים, בְּסֶרַח, צִח, בְּזֹאֵר, in the sense *most mighty*, כְּרִיָּק.

part was inhabited. Jerome, from the report of a Persian monk, states that it was a hunting-ground of the Persian kings, and that the walls were, from time to time, repaired in order to confine the beasts. The reports of Benjamin of Tudela, Rauwulf, and Della Valle, in relation to the ruins, are not important. They were first thoroughly investigated by Claudius James Rich, the British resident at Baghdad, who communicated the results in his "*Memoirs on the Ruins of Babylon*," 3d edition, London, 1818. In place of one of the most flourishing cities of the world, there is now found only a gigantic mass of ruins, in the vicinity of Hillah, a town of six or seven thousand inhabitants, 32 deg. 38 min. N. Lat., on the east bank of the Euphrates, forty-eight miles from Baghdad. The ruins begin nine miles east and five north of Hillah. They consist of heaps and hillocks of burnt and unburnt tiles and bricks, the greater part reduced to earth, mostly on the east side of the river. On this side, they are bounded by three walls of earth and by the river, and form a kind of parallelogram. They consist of three principal groups, which, without any trees, rise between one and two hundred feet above the Euphrates. On the northernmost part are the great ruins, which the Arabs name Mukallibé, considered by Rennell as the tower of Belus; an oblong, 274 yards on its northern side, 256 on its south, 226 on its east, and 240 on its west, and its greatest height 139 feet.¹ It is the abode of various kinds of wild beasts, porcupines, owls, etc.; and, as the natives say, of satyrs and wood-demons. The second great ruin is one mile south, called by the Arabs El Kasr, *the fortress*. It consists of many walls, and pillars, and subterranean courses. No trace of the city wall remains. The most important ruin is on the west side of the river, about six miles south-west of Hillah, and is considered by Niebuhr and Rich as the remains of the tower of Belus. The Arabs call it Birs Nimroud. The ruins form a hill, entirely of bricks, in an oblong form, 762 yards in circumference. On the west side, it is from fifty to sixty feet high; on the east it rises, in a conical form, 198 feet. The ruins are imposing, simply by their colossal greatness, not by their beauty. The most beautiful portions were taken to build Seleucia and Ctesiphon.

In Jan. 1835, the ruins were visited by James Baillie Fraser, the well known British traveller. "*The Mukallibé*," he says, "is now but a mass of crumbled and crumbling bricks, both raw and fire-baked, mingled with the usual débris of pottery, glass, and slag, in a confusion worthy of its name, which means 'the overturned.'" Indeed, so completely have the form and structure of this remarkable mass been destroyed by time, and season, and the hand of man, that, to a passing

¹ Mignon, who says he measured them carefully.

observer like myself, it seems vain to conjecture, with any hope of correctness, at its former shape, extent, or uses. On the top, a multitude of mounds and canals can be seen, on all sides, as far as the eye can reach. Hillah is almost lost among the mounds, and is chiefly discernible from its date-tree groves." "Whatever beauty or splendor there may have been in the original fabric of El Kasr, it is now buried in ignoble heaps of broken bricks and pottery; an utterly shapeless mass of rubbish alone remaining, cut into numberless ravines, and dug into great holes, in both of which the hands of the Arabs have assisted the effects of the weather. There are indeed, remaining erect, some fragments of walls, composed of most exquisite brick-work, so firmly cemented together, that it is almost impossible to separate the bricks one from another." "On nearer approach you discover that this supposed earthen mound," the Birs, "is in reality a mass of sun-dried bricks, mingled with fragments of kiln-burned bricks, of various colors, yellow and red, out of which protrudes a lofty mass of the most exquisite brick-masonry possible." "The top and sides are covered with the débris, that ages have caused to moulder down, leaving only the corners of the brick-work, here and there, peeping out. There is hardly a particle of vegetation on these ruins. The whole amount of bushes and herbage consists of no more than a few salsuginous plants, or a bit of tamarisk on the side of a canal."

In 1840, Mr. Wellsted, author of *Travels in Arabia*, published in two volumes, in London, "*Travels to the city of the caliphs, along the shores of the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean.*" The first part of the work is made up of a recital of the adventures of Lieut. Ormsby of the Indian navy. Some were verbally detailed to Mr. W., others were given in fragments of manuscripts. In the visit of Lieut. O. to Hillah and the ruins of Babylon, there is nothing particularly important. He gives the width of the Euphrates, as it flows through Hillah, at 385 ft. Its depth, in mid-channel (he does not state the month), at 4 fathoms, and the velocity of its current at $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour. "The greater part of El Kasr appears of brick, containing large portions of chopped straw; but it has evidently been cased of those furnace-dried, which are of better quality. In other respects, the mass does not differ in its general appearance, from the Birs." The only living thing is a poor, solitary tamarisk, on the top of the mound. "From the Birs Nimroud to El Hamra is a distance of thirteen miles, forming the diameter of a circle, within which mounds and heaps of ruins are everywhere strown, and of limits not inferior to those assigned by Strabo and other writers." Major Rawlinson inclines to the opinion that Niffer, south of Hillah, may represent the true site of the ancient Baby-

lon, while the mounds around Hillah are the remains of a more recent city of the same name.¹

Mr. Layard suggests that during the Assyrian supremacy, the ancient capital of the Chaldeans may have partly fallen into ruins; and that Nebuchadnezzar, on founding a new empire, which was to rival the Assyrian, may have desired to build a capital worthy of it, and to represent it, just as Baghdad now represents the ancient Babylon. None of the ruins in Babylonia have yet been properly examined; and there is little doubt that excavations in them would lead to very interesting results.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1. NEANDER'S CHURCH HISTORY.

The third volume of Professor Torrey's Translation of the great work of Neander is now published by Crocker & Brewster of Boston. It is included in a well-printed octavo volume of about 650 pages. It embraces the history of the church from A. D. 590 to A. D. 1073, completing the eighth part of the entire work. We have read the sheets of this volume with constantly increasing interest. The translation is made with great fidelity to the original, and is a fine specimen of correct and idiomatic English. We cannot but commend the scrupulous justice to the venerated author, which has led the translator to give us everything which was in the original and nothing more. The prefaces and dedications are a delightful indication of the historian's spirit. The index and table of contents are very full and minute. The period, though a part of it is the darkest part of the dark ages, is one of exceeding interest. With a guide so judicious and so thoroughly informed as Dr. Neander, the passage through these dark ages, is far from being total midnight. The reader of this volume will see that the common representations on this subject are pushed to an extreme. Good men, reformers, heavenly minded and zealous missionaries, were not wanting through all these long centuries. Love to the Saviour, and what was perhaps more difficult, a spirit of moderation and of Christian kindness, actuated not a few of the professed disciples of our Lord. Enlightened sentiments in regard to the nature of Christianity,

¹ Layard's *Nineveh*, II. p. 39, Am. ed.

and the comparative worthlessness of forms, frequently refresh the reader. The disparaging statements of Milner and of the common church historians on this subject, are to be taken with some allowance. Dr. Neander's well-known characteristics — a profound and heart-affecting view of the substance of Christianity, love to all that bear the name of Christ, eminent candor and fairness in the judgment of character, mastery of the subject in all its details, careful sifting of testimony, the ability to present a topic in its just limits and due proportions — are nowhere more conspicuous than in this volume; in their combination, these qualities place him far above any other church historian. We cannot but rejoice that the history is brought before the English and American Public in a form every way so worthy of it.

The ninth part of the work, or the first division of the fifth volume, was published in 1841, in a volume of 383 pages; and the second division of the same was published in 1845, in a volume of 1294 pages. The two continue the history from A. D. 1073 to A. D. 1294; or, from Gregory VII. to Boniface VIII. In this volume the lives and character of Anselm, Peter Abelard, Hugo of St. Victor, William of Paris, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lully, Alexander de Hales, etc., are delineated in connection with the famous theological and philosophical controversies which were then rife. The remainder of the period till the reformation, will be brought into one volume. In common with great numbers, we hope that the life of the historian will be spared to complete this great work.

2. HALLAM'S SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME.

Mr. Hallam's works must be regarded as among the most successful of their kind which the present age has produced. There have been published, in England, nine editions of his *History of the Middle Ages*, five editions of his *Constitutional History of England*, and several of the *Introduction to the History of Literature in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth Centuries*; to say nothing of the editions published in Paris and the United States. His fame rests on an enduring basis. He furnishes one of the most conspicuous instances of the union of great erudition and of strong powers of thinking and judging. Multifarious reading has only quickened and directed the movements of his mind. He may be called the judicial historian, having the power to sum up political and literary evidence with the greatest impartiality. Very few historical writers are so free from the sinister influences of sect and party. A juster idea of the history of England can be obtained from his volumes than from any of the numerous works on the subject. At the same time, there are one or two serious deficiencies. His theological learning is very far from be-

ing extensive or profound. Any work on the Middle Ages must be imperfect which is not the fruit of a thorough acquaintance with the theological-philosophical questions of those times. Literature was an entirely subordinate matter. In this respect, Mr. Hallam's work cannot be compared with that of Dr. Neander. Mr. Hallam appears, also, to have had but slight acquaintance with German writers, except with the few whose works have been translated into English or French. His references to German writers who have written in German are exceedingly meagre. In the Supplementary volume to the *Middle Ages*, London, 1848, we do not see a single allusion to the labors of Neander, or Gieseler, or to those innumerable monographies in which the Germans have exhausted many special topics. In one place he quotes Luden, and in another mentions that Michelet refers to "Grimm, who is excellent authority!" In the preface he speaks of several French writers, Sismondi, Guizot, etc., who have distinguished themselves in works on the Middle Ages, but omits all reference to the great German authors. This want of familiarity with the writers of the most learned nation of Europe, is doubtless one reason which led the author to entertain so disparaging and apparently unaccountable opinion of Martin Luther. At the same time, Mr. Hallam has avoided the evils which a familiarity with Teutonic literature exerts on some writers. His writings are full of sound, vigorous, English thought, without one tinge of mysticism, or one effort at riding hobbies. We learn habitually to respect his good sense, while we differ from some of his opinions.

The Supplementary volume consists of 408 pages and 417 notes, mostly brief, modifying or withdrawing, confirming or further illustrating statements and opinions in the *History of the Middle Ages*. In the interval of thirty years, much new matter would accumulate to a reader and thinker like Mr. Hallam. The chapters which have received most improvement are those on the History of France, the Feudal System, and the English Constitution.

8. ELIOT'S LIBERTY OF ROME.

Mr. Putnam of N. York has published, in 2 vols., "*The Liberty of Rome : a History*. With an historical account of the Liberty of Ancient Nations. By Samuel Eliot." pp. 525, 523, 8vo. One cannot but be prepossessed with the work, from its noble typography. It does the highest honor to all concerned in bringing it out, as a beautiful specimen of American workmanship. There are a number of illustrations by Mr. Charles C. Perkins, which are finely conceived and are a real elucidation of the accompanying text. The author has certainly the merit of a bold and original design.

"With God's blessing," he hopes to complete a series of works on the Liberty of the Early Christian Ages, on that of the Middle Ages, on that of Europe since the Reformation, on the Liberty of England, closing with a treatise on the Liberty of America; an undertaking which might task all the learning of the most erudite and profound thinkers. About one half of the first volume is taken up with observations on liberty in India, Persia, Egypt, Phoenicia, Greece, and Judea. We have read but a few chapters of the work, and must reserve our opinion of its merits till another opportunity. The current of thought is pervaded by a serious spirit, eminently in keeping with the sad feelings which such a survey could not fail to produce. There is a frequent and grateful recognition not only of a Divine Providence, but of the Christian redemption. The author appears to have studied his subject from the best sources. His production is only one of the many evidences of the moulding influence which Niebuhr's researches have had on all subsequent writers.

4. DENNIS'S ETRURIA.

Italy, and Rome in particular, are remarkable for containing great and distinct classes of striking objects. The city has imperial magnificence in this respect. Other cities may be exhausted; this seems to be inexhaustible. When the diversified objects on the surface of the ground are examined, then the earth gives up her dead, and no more covers her slain. When we have gazed at the mouldering ruins of republican and kingly times, a greater antiquity awaits us, earlier States are buried in the past. Greece is Greece and nothing besides. But Rome borrowed her arts from an earlier and now extinct civilization. She built her colossal power on the sepulchres of those whom she dispossessed. Mr. Dennis has piously collected these ante-Roman vestiges, dwells with fond delight on the miracles of genius which have been buried for four thousand years, and demonstrates how mighty Rome was in imitations and plagiarism as well as in arms. His volumes are among the most entertaining and instructive which have, for a long time, appeared from the British press, prolific as our parent State is in accomplished travellers and conscientious and graphic describers. Mr. D. belongs to the same class with Layard and Rich, intelligent, well-read, patient, fertile in expedients, full of a quiet yet inexhaustible enthusiasm, sound in judgment, and, in short, possessing all those qualities which insensibly win on the love and esteem of the reader. The title of his volumes is: "*The Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria*, by George Dennis; in two volumes, 8vo. pp. 530 and 535, London, John Murray, 1848." The work is the fruit of several tours made between the years 1842 and 1847. Its primary object is to serve as a guide for those

who wish to become personally acquainted with Etruscan civilization. At least half the manuscript was written in Italy, and the greater part was verified by subsequent visits to the scenes described. He pays his grateful thanks to Drs. Braun and Henzen, secretaries of the Archaeological Institute at Rome, to Prof. Migliarini of Florence, and Mr. Birch of the British Museum. The work is beautifully illustrated by drawings of masonry, tombs, and other objects, by plans of cities, by a large and excellent map of Etruria, etc. The whole number of illustrations is one hundred and nine. After an Introduction of about one hundred pages, the author takes up, in fifty-nine chapters, the cities of Etruria, Veii, Fidenæ, Sutrium, Nepete, Falerii, Corneto, Tarquinii, Vulci, Tuscania, Orvieto, Faesulæ, Vetulonia, Volterrae, Arretium, Clusium, Perugia, Rome, etc. Along with minute descriptions of the ruins at each place, historical notices, description of the existing scenery, and hints for the guidance of travellers, are given.

In very early times, Etruria embraced the greater part of Italy. It was divided into three grand districts, Etruria Proper in the centre, Circumpadana in the north, and Campaniana in the south. Each was divided into twelve States, each represented by a city, as in Greece. Such seems to have been the extent of Etruria in the time of Tarquinius Priscus. But ere long the Gauls on the north, and various nations in the south, succeeded in compressing this dominion into the central region of Etruria Proper, the mother country, the peculiar seat of the Etruscan power. To this region only, Mr. Dennis devotes his pages. It includes nearly all of Modern Tuscany, the duchy of Lucca, and the Transtiberine portion of the Papal State, having the Apennines and the river Magra on the north, the Tiber on the east, and the Mediterranean on the west and south. Of the twelve cities, the most known were Tarquinii, Veii, Falerii, Volsinii, Vetulonia, Arretium, Cortona, and Perugia. It was, of old, densely populated, not only in those parts now inhabited, but in the tracts desolated by the malaria. On every hand are traces of by-gone civilization. The earliest occupants of this country seem to have been the Siculi or Umbri. Then a people of Greek descent, the Pelasgi, entered Italy at the head of the Adriatic, crossed the Apennines, joined the mountaineers, and took possession of Etruria. These drove out the old inhabitants, raised mighty walls and fortified them, till they, in turn, were conquered by a third race, called by the Greeks Tyrrheni, or Tyrseni, by the Roman Etrusci, and by themselves Rasena. These are conjectured to have established themselves about 290 years before the foundation of Rome, or B. C. 1044. There is, however, great confusion in regard to these races. The word Tyrrheni was sometimes applied to the Pelasgi, sometimes to the

Etrusci. It seems to be certain that the land was inhabited before the Etruscans proper took possession of it; and that the Etruscans came from abroad. From what country they came, is still a subject of earnest discussion. The two data to guide us are the records of the ancients and the extant monuments. The ancient writers, with a solitary exception, mark the Etruscans as a tribe of Lydians. The dissentient voice is that of the accurate historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who asserts that Xanthus, a distinguished Lydian historian, makes no mention of such an emigration, and that there is no similarity between the Lydians and Etruscans in customs, laws, religion, language, etc. He supposes that they were an indigenous people of Italy. Niebuhr holds that they were a tribe from the Rhaetian Alps, who conquered the Tyrrhene Pelasgi, the earlier possessors of the land. O. Müller supposes that the later element was from Lydia, but composed, not of natives, but of Tyrrhene-Pelasgi, who had settled on the coasts of Asia Minor. Lepsius maintains that the Umbrians recovered strength, rebelled with success against the Pelasgi, and produced what is known as the Etruscan people. In this conflict of authorities, Mr. Dennis maintains that the theory of the Lydian origin has far the most probabilities in its favor. This clearly represents both the Roman and the Etruscan tradition. See Tacit. Ann. iv. 55. Why should Xanthus, a Greek of Sardis, and not a native Lydian, be preferred to the truthful Herodotus? They were contemporaries, or nearly so. Besides, there is some doubt of the genuineness of the works attributed to Xanthus. No fact can be more clearly established, says Mr. D., than the Oriental character of the civil and religious polity, the social and domestic manners, and many of the arts of the Etruscans. Like the Orientals, the Etruscans were subject to an all-dominant hierarchy. They were renowned for divination and augury. The origin of augury is particularly referred to Caria, an adjoining and cognate country to Lydia. The Assyrians, Lydians, Carians, Mysians, and Phrygians, being cognate and neighboring nations, what is recorded of one is generally applicable to all. The sports, games, and dances of the Etruscans, adopted by the Romans, are traditionally of Lydian origin. The double pipes were introduced from Phrygia, the trumpet from Lydia. Dionysius himself says that the Etruscan purple robes, the insignia of authority, were similar to those of the Lydian and Persian monarchs. The Etruscan language still, unfortunately, remains a mystery. The characters much resemble the Pelasgic or early Greek. We know a little of the genius of the language and its inflections. But beyond this, the wisest must confess their ignorance. About all that is known of the Etruscan tongue is, that it is unique like the Basque, an alien to every other language. It has been tested, again and again, by

Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and every other ancient language, but it remains emphatically in the sepulchre, dead. The religion resembles the other theological systems of the East, having the same unbending, gloomy, imperious character, the same impenetrable shroud of symbolism and mysticism, widely unlike the plastic and lively creed of the Greeks. The three great deities answer to the Zeus, Hera, and Pallas-Athene of the Greeks. There were twelve great gods, six of each sex. The most striking peculiarity in the mythology was the doctrine of genii. History attests the eminence of the Etruscans in navigation and military tactics, agriculture, medicine, and other practical sciences; but above all in astronomy. They fixed the tropical year at precisely 365 days, 5 hours, and 40 minutes. In the arts which minister to comfort and luxury, they were eminent. The health and cleanliness of the Etruscan towns were insured by a system of sewerage. The cloaca maxima, at Rome, will be a lasting memorial of this. They drained lakes, tunnelled mountains, and reclaimed marshy grounds. In Etruria, woman was honored and respected; she took her place at table, by her husband's side, which she was never permitted to do in Athens. Her children assumed her name as well as that of their father's. Her grave was even more splendid than that of her lord. Nothing gives a more exalted idea of the power and grandeur of this ancient people than the walls of their cities. These enormous, uncemented piles of masonry, seem destined to endure to the end of time. They often show a beauty, a perfection of workmanship that has never been surpassed. The Etruscan sepulchres are always subterranean, like those of the Greeks, and they are modelled after the habitations of the living. The earliest works of art betray the great influence of Egypt. The working in clay was the most ancient. The people were always renowned for productions in terra cotta. Then followed the arts of casting and chiselling in bronze. The she-wolf of the capitol, mentioned by Livy x. 33, has an historical renown. Any one who has seen the Gregorian Museum in the Vatican, will need no further proof of the skill and art of the Etruscans. This magnificent collection of paintings, of vases, candelabra, specula, amphorae, shields, jewelry, etc., will be a memorial to posterity, and perhaps the only worthy one, of the late pope, Gregory XVI. Many rooms are filled with these elegant treasures, mostly from Vulci.

The writer will only add that, so far as he had the means of personal observation at Fiesole, Arezzo, Cortona, Perugia, etc., he can attest to the great accuracy and fidelity of Mr. Dennis's delineations. No scholar should pass between Florence and Rome, without spending several days on these Etruscan sites. A more trustworthy and interesting guide than Mr. Dennis, he cannot desire.

4. LAYARD'S NINEVEH.

We noticed, at some length, the English edition of this work, in the May Number of the B. S. 1849, p. 391 seq., and quoted some of the results of Mr. L.'s discoveries. We have since examined Mr. Putnam's American edition. It is in two octavo volumes, of 326 and 378 pages, and has all the illustrations of the original work unaltered, viz. thirteen plates and maps and ninety woodcuts, executed with artistic skill. It is sold at the moderate price of four and a half dollars. The paper is fair and the type is large and distinct, and the whole mechanical appearance, in every respect, workman-like. We are not surprised to hear it enjoys a remunerating sale. We ought also to add that Dr. Robinson has supplied an introductory Note, in which he has taken occasion to refute a calumnious assertion of the Quarterly Review, Dec. 1848, p. 122, that the American Mission was, in some degree, the occasion of the destruction of the Mountain Nestorians. This calumny never had the smallest foundation in fact. Dr. R. also shows that the name *Chaldeans*, which Mr. Layard applies to the native Christians of the mountains, does not strictly belong either to the Nestorians or Jacobites, the two sects into which the Syrian church was divided in the fifth century.

We will only add that the work of Mr. Layard enjoys the singular felicity of being equally acceptable to the common and the learned reader. By his unaffected modesty, and his other sterling personal qualities, he has made his readers his warm friends, and they follow him with all kind wishes, as he resumes the toils which have already brought such a harvest to science and eastern literature. He has lately left Constantinople, with a physician, artist, and secretary, on his way to Trebizond, Mt. Ararat, and the ruins with which Central Asia is crowded.

5. SMITH ON THE VOYAGE AND SHIPWRECK OF ST. PAUL.

This volume furnishes one of the most remarkable instances, within our knowledge, of patient research, of scrupulously minute investigation. A large part of a life appears to have been dedicated to the elucidation of the last two chapters in the Acts of the Apostles, or to preparation for such an inquiry. It is not too much to say that all our commentaries on this passage must now be rewritten. Mr. Smith is an educated gentleman, and a member of the Royal Society of London. He entered upon the investigations, whose processes and results, modestly and faithfully recorded, now lie before us, with eminent facilities. A winter's residence in Malta afforded him ample opportunities for personal examination of the localities of the shipwreck. In the ships of war stationed there, he found

skilful and scientific seamen, familiar with the navigation of the Levant. In the Knights' Library he had access to an extensive collection of works, printed and manuscript, on the controversy as to the scene of the shipwreck and on the hydrography of the Mediterranean. He then devoted himself to the examination of the libraries and museums of Naples, Florence, Lausanne, and Paris. Returning to London, he continued the investigation in the libraries and medal-rooms of the British Museum, in the Records of the Admiralty, and in his own private library, rich in early sea-voyages. Having been a yacht sailor of more than thirty years' standing, and with much practical experience in planning, building, and altering vessels, he was able to bring a kind of knowledge to the interpretation of the passage which no commentator has possessed.

We subjoin a few of the results which Mr. Smith's pains-taking inquiries supply. Paul's company embarked in a ship of Adramyttium, a seaport of Mysia, on the eastern shore of the Aegean, opposite Lesbos. On the second day, they touched at Sidon, sixty-seven geographical miles from Caesarea. Loosing from thence, they were forced, by contrary winds, to run under the lee of Cyprus. A ship's course from Sidon to Myra is W. N. W., leaving Cyprus on the right. The contrary wind must have been from the west, which prevails in this part of the Mediterranean in the summer. Under these circumstances, they left Cyprus on the left hand, doing as the most accomplished seaman of the present day would do under similar circumstances. Favored, as they probably were, by the land-breeze and currents, they arrive, without any unusual incident, at Myra in Lycia, then a flourishing city, now a desolate waste, and now about three miles from the sea. The company were there transferred to a corn-ship from Alexandria bound for Italy. From the dimensions of one of these ships, given by Lucian, they appear to have been quite as large as the largest class of merchant ships of modern times. Myra lies due north from Alexandria, and its bay is well fitted to shelter a wind-bound ship. Their progress, after leaving Myra, was extremely slow, for it was many days before they "came over against Cnidus," at the entrance to the Aegean sea. As the distance between Myra and Cnidus is not more than 130 geographical miles, the delay was probably caused by unfavorable winds, which may be inferred from the word *μόλις*, *with difficulty*. The course of a ship, on her voyage from Cnidus to Italy, is by the north side of Crete, through the Archipelago, W. by S. But this would be impossible with a north-west wind. With that wind, the ship could work up to Cnidus, because she had the advantage of a weather shore and a westerly current; but there the advantage would cease. The only alternative would be to wait at Cnidus for a fair wind, or else to run under the lee of Crete, *κατὰ Σαλμώνην*, in the direction of Salmone, which is the eastern end of Crete.

As the south side of this island is a weather shore, they would be able, with north-west winds, to work up as far as Cape Matala. Here, however, the land trends suddenly to the north, and their only resource would be to make for a harbor. Fair Havens is the harbor nearest to Cape Matala. This was probably no more than an open roadstead, or rather two roadsteads, contiguous to each other. The site of the city Lasaea is not known. It was now after the autumnal equinox, and sailing was dangerous. It was a question whether they should winter here, or sail to port Phenice, on the same side of Crete, about forty miles west. Paul strongly urged the officers to remain, but his advice was overruled. Phenice, the harbor which they expected to reach, looks, Luke says, *κατὰ Αἴβα καὶ κατὰ χῆρον*. This preposition Mr. Smith translates *secundum*, in the same direction as, i. e. the point *towards* which the wind, Libs, blows; as Herodotus speaks of a ship being driven *κατὰ κύμα καὶ ἀνέμω*; so that the harbor would open, not to the south-west, but to the north-east. It seems to have been the one now called Lutro, which looks towards the east. The south wind, which now blew, is a fair wind for a ship going from Fair Havens to Lutro. The island of Claudia is exactly opposite to Lutro, the Claudos of Ptolemy, and the Gozzo of the modern charts.

Sailing from Fair Havens, *close, ἄσπον*, to the land, they might hope, with a south wind, to reach Phenice in a few hours. But soon the weather changed, the ship was caught in a typhon, *ἄνεμος τυφονικός*, which blew with such violence that they could not face it, *ἀντοφθαλμεῖν*, but were forced, in the first instance, to scud before it. It follows from this, that the wind must have blown off the land, else they would have been stranded on the Cretan coast. This sudden change from a south wind to a violent northerly wind, is a common occurrence in these seas. The term *typhonic* means that the wind was accompanied by the agitation and whirling motion of the clouds, caused by the meeting of the opposite currents of air. By this single word is expressed the violence and direction of the gale. The wind Euroclydon (according to the most ancient versions, Euro-aquilo = E. N. E.) forced them to run under the lee of Claudia (*ὑπερσκαμόντες*). Here they availed themselves of the smooth water to prepare the ship to resist the fury of the storm. Their first care was to secure the boat, by hoisting it on board. Luke tells us that they had much difficulty in doing this, probably because it was filled with water. The next care was to undergird the ship. Only one naval officer, with whom Mr. Smith had met, had ever seen it put in practice. Mr. Henry Hartley, who piloted the Russian fleet, in 1815, from England to the Baltic, mentions that one of the ships, the Jupiter, was frapped round the middle by three or four turns of a stream-cable. Sir George Back, on his return from his perilous Arctic voyage, in 1837, was forced, on account of the shattered condition of his ship, to undergird her.

We are next told that, fearing they should be driven towards the Syrtis, they lowered the gear (not "strake sail," which would be equivalent to saying that, being apprehensive of a certain danger, they deprived themselves of the only possible means of avoiding it). A ship, preparing for a storm, sends down upon deck the "top hamper," or gear connected with the fair-weather sails, such as the *suppara*, or top sails. When the ship was thus borne along, οὕτως ἐπέγοντο, she was not only undergirded and made snug, but had storm-sails set, and was on the starboard tack, i. e. with her right side to the wind, which was the only course by which she could avoid falling into the Syrtis. On the next day, they threw overboard the ship's tackling. From the expression αὐτόχειρες, 'with our own hands,' Mr. Smith supposes the main-yard is meant, an immense spar, probably as long as the ship, and which might require the united efforts of passengers and men. The storm continued, with unabated fury, for eleven days more. "All hope was taken away;" probably not so much from the fury of the gale as from the state of the ship, their exertions to keep her from foundering being unavailing. At length, on the fourteenth night, the seamen suspected (to use the graphic sea-phrase of Luke) "the land was nearing them,"¹ probably from the noise of the breakers. No ship can enter St. Paul's Bay in Malta, from the east, without passing within a quarter of a mile of the point of Koura; but before reaching it, the land is too low, and too far from the track of a ship driven from the eastward, to be seen in a dark night. When she does come within this distance, it is impossible to avoid observing the breakers, which are so violent as to form its distinctive character. On the 10th of August, 1810, the British frigate, *Lively*, went to pieces on these very breakers, at the point of Koura. Mr. Smith here goes into calculations, in order to show that a ship, starting late in the evening from Clauda, would, by midnight on the fourteenth, be less than three miles from the entrance of St. Paul's Bay. A coincidence so close as this, is, to a certain extent, accidental; but it is an accident which could not have happened had there been any inaccuracy, on the part of the author of the narrative, with regard to the numerous incidents upon which the calculations are founded, or had the ship been wrecked anywhere but at Malta.

The number of conditions required in order to make any locality agree with the narrative, are so numerous as to render it morally impossible to suppose that the agreement, in the present case, can be the effect of chance. The first circumstance is, that the shipmen suspected the approach of land evidently without seeing it. The quarter-master of the *Lively* states, in his evidence at the court-martial, that at the distance of a quarter of a mile, the land could not be seen, but that he saw the surf on the shore

¹ Comp. Terraeque urbesque recedunt.

Another point is this: the shipmen when they sounded, found twenty fathoms, and then fifteen fathoms. Every ship, indeed, in approaching the land, must pass over twenty fathoms and fifteen fathoms; but here, must not only the twenty-fathom depth be close to the spot where they had the indications of land, but it must bear E. by S. from the fifteen-fathom depth, and at such a distance as would allow of preparation for anchoring, with four anchors from the stern, which must have required some time. Now about half an hour further, the depth was fifteen fathoms. Fearing lest they should fall upon rocks, they cast four anchors out of the stern. This implies that there were rocks to leeward, on which they were in danger of falling; but the fifteen-fathom depth is as nearly as possible a quarter of a mile from the shore, which is here girt with mural precipices, and on which the sea must have been breaking violently. Their only chance of safety was to anchor; but to do this in a gale, on a lee shore, not only requires time, but very tenacious holding-ground. Is there such ground here? In the English Sailing Directions, it is said: "The harbor of St. Paul is open to easterly and north-east winds. It is, notwithstanding, safe for small ships, the ground generally being very good; and while the cables hold, there is no danger, *as the anchors will never start.*" But why anchor from the stern? "*Anchora de prora jacitur,*" it being much easier to arrest a ship's way by the bow than the stern. Ships constructed like those of the ancients were, of necessity, amply provided with anchors and cables. It seems, too, from the figure of the ship, in the picture of Theseus deserting Ariadne, that they could anchor by the stern, as they had hauser-holes aft, (a hauser is seen towing astern; it passes through the rudder-port, and within board it is seen coiled round an upright beam or capstan, in front of the break of the poop-deck). The advantages of being anchored in this manner are, that by cutting away the anchors, loosing the bands of the rudders, and hoisting the artemon, the fore-sail (not the main-sail), all of which could be done simultaneously, the ship was immediately under command, and could be directed with precision to any part of the shore which offered a prospect of safety. But if anchored in the usual mode, she might have taken "the wrong cast," or drifted on the rocks. The number of anchors let go, show that nothing was neglected.

The shipmen, after taking a meal, lightened the ship, not only by pumping, but by throwing the wheat into the sea. When day broke, they knew not the land, but it had certain peculiarities; the shore was rocky, *ραχτὶς τόπος*, it being in fact skirted with precipices; they then discovered a creek with a sandy beach (*ἀγιάλιον*, in a restricted sense means this, in contradistinction to a rocky coast). Into this creek they were minded to thrust the ship. They now cut their cables, and left the anchors in the sea;

and, loosing the lashings of the rudder, and hoisting the fore-sail, they made for the creek. On the west side of the bay, there are two creeks. One of them, Mestara Valley, has a shore. The other, though its sandy beach has been worn away by the action of the sea, was probably the scene of the wreck, for here "two seas meet." At the entrance of the bay, where the ship anchored, it could not have been suspected that, at the bottom of it, there was a communication with the sea outside. But such is the case. Salmone island, which separates the bay from the sea outside, is formed by a long rocky ridge, separated from the main land by a channel of not more than a hundred yards in breadth. Near this channel, they ran the ship ashore; the fore part stuck fast, but the stern was dashed in pieces. A ship, impelled by a gale into a creek, such as that in St. Paul's Bay, would strike a bottom of mud, graduating into tenacious clay, into which the fore part would fix itself and be held fast, while the stern was exposed to the force of the waves.

We have thus given a very brief outline of the results of these accurate and most interesting investigations. All the necessary maps and illustrations are provided. The remainder of the volume is occupied with a dissertation on the ships of the ancients, and with observations on the life and writings of Luke, and the sources of his histories.

ARTICLE X.

MISCELLANIES, THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY.

OUR readers are already apprised of the death of Dr. De Wette, the veteran commentator, and professor of theology in the university of Basil. We have not learned the circumstances or the exact time of his death. Early in our next volume, we shall endeavor to give an extended account of his life and of his principal writings. He has filled a large place in the theological and literary world, for the last thirty years. In a country distinguished above all others for literary competition and accomplished scholarship, most of his works have reached and have kept a very high rank. He had just lived to complete his Commentary on the Apocalypse, the third edition of his Commentary on the Acts, and the fifth edition of his Introduction to the New Testament. The Preface to his Commentary on the Apocalypse, has melancholy forebodings in regard to the religious state of his native land, and intimations of what, it has been hoped, was a firmer personal faith in the Saviour.

The last production of his pen, we presume, is an article of forty pages, in the third number of the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1849, on the Doctrine respecting Sin, with reference to the work of Julius Müller. As we have given an abstract of this treatise, see B. S. v. 499, vi. 247, we here subjoin a slight outline of the remarks of De Wette.

De Wette's remarks refer chiefly to that part of Müller's book in which he endeavors to refute the so-called sensuous theory of the origin of sin. He begins with an examination of the exegetical grounds on which Müller combats the theory that sin originates in man's sensuous nature. This theory, as so expressed, De Wette also rejects, but he does not agree with Müller in his interpretation of *σάρξ*, *σῶμα*, and *πνεῦμα*. Müller denies that *σάρξ*, in contrast with *σῶμα*, denotes the sensuous nature of man, with its essential desires and impulses, its sensations of pleasure and pain, but maintains that, as used by the apostle Paul, it means in general that operative principle of human nature which sets itself in opposition to God and his holy law. De Wette maintains that Paul always does mean by *σάρξ* the organic sensuous nature; and that, when he speaks of it in an ethical relation, he has in mind our sensuous nature, as corrupted and disordered by the fall of Adam.

Dr. Müller's view of the origin of sin is entirely independent of any such distinction in human nature as may have been designated by the words *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*. De Wette thinks that the origin of sin may be made intelligible by reference to such a distinction. The will, which should have followed the law written in its own nature, has suffered itself to be determined by the impulses of the sensuous nature, which have thereby become inordinate. Not in the sensuous nature and its impulses is the origin of sin, but in the will, which has yielded to them; and though in human nature, as now constituted, the sensuous part has become a far more formidable and destructive power than it originally was, yet the *rationale* of sin remains the same as before. The will, as well as the entire spiritual nature of man, is moved upon by sensuous excitement. This excitement, however, the will should not let itself be determined by, but should make its decisions according to the law of conscience. Does it the former? this is sin. Müller objects to the sensuous theory, that it regards only one kind of phenomena of evil, in which to be sure, at first view, sin appears as the predominance of the sensuous over the spiritual, or as sensuality, but that it leaves out of sight manifold manifestations of sin which arise from pride, or the love of glory. He asks, What have the passions of ambition, envy, or malice, to do with our sensuous nature? Here De Wette thinks Müller is mistaken in his psychology, and remarks that the observation of animals, of children, or of rude, uncultivated men, should have taught him that these very manifestations of the selfish prin-

ciple are most commonly connected with the grossest sensuality. Often, indeed, the love of fame may induce a man to forego many a gratification of bodily sense, but still as a passion it is something sensuous, having its seat in our psychical or *inner* sensuous nature.

The chief fault De Wette finds with Müller is, that he follows too much the laws of abstract logic, and does not sufficiently regard the simple facts of consciousness. For example, instead of being satisfied with the simple fact of consciousness — *we are free*, he sets up an abstract idea of freedom, which he regards as necessary to the possibility of sin, and for which there is no corresponding reality in human experience. He is therefore driven to the assumption that the personal will had this freedom in a state of being preceding our existence in time. His inquiries respecting the relation of human freedom to the Divine omniscience and Divine omnipotence, though conducted with much care, are inadmissible in their nature, and could offer themselves only in the way of a false abstract speculation. If I have done anything which I impute to myself as sin, I confess at once that I have acted contrary to the will of God, and bow myself penitently before him; but I do not ask, why he did not hinder me from doing it, and so I avoid bringing human freedom and Divine omnipotence into any relation to each other. If I see another do what I know to be sinful, and impute to him as such (which sentence, however, is never sure), I indeed think of God only in this respect, that thereby his holy will has been violated; and if I see many destructive consequences resulting therefrom, and perhaps threatening disaster to institutions dear to myself and well pleasing to God, I will not ask, why God has permitted all this evil, for that would be unholy complaining and presumptuous cavilling, and therefore no suitable subject for philosophical or dogmatic investigation; but I would take refuge in the feeling of submission. This, to be sure, I must so interpret to my understanding that, even that which I regard as evil has, in some way, come to pass by God's will; for only in this thought can I find rest. I will even regard an obstinately wicked disposition as ordained or produced by God; because, otherwise, I could not quiet my heart respecting it; but since I regard the hardened one as guilty and deserving of punishment, I ascribe his wickedness not to God, but to his own perverse will, and so limit the Divine efficiency to the outward relations and circumstances. On the other hand, if anything good has been done by me, I will not, with proud self-complacency, recognize my own free act, but will give credit to favorable circumstances, favorable influence, and especially to Divine assistance. In relation to the good which I seek after, I know myself entirely dependent upon God, and wish nothing more than to be led and supported by his Spirit and his Power.

De Wette closes his essay with lamenting that the author did not devote

his learning and his acuteness more completely to the work of mediating between the ancient truths of theology and the modern mode of thinking. The modern mind aims at a knowledge of truth through experience and consciousness; and in order to be convincing, Theology must take the same course. It must begin with the facts of experience and of consciousness, and especially aim to elevate the ethical significance of Christianity. Only in this practical way will it be possible to build up again the fallen church.

The *Studien u. Kritiken* for Oct. 1849, viertes Heft, contains seven articles. The first, by Prof. J. G. Müller of Basil, is on "The Idea of the Great Spirit, among the Wild Indians of North America." It is an elaborate discussion, filling sixty-eight pages, and exhibits the patient and extensive reading for which the Germans are so famous. The special topics taken up are such as these: View of those who make the Indians Monotheists; of those who attribute the notion of a Great Spirit, which the Indians now possess, to their Intercourse with Europeans; the Indian Polytheism and its Constituent Parts; the direct Worship of Natural Objects; Belief in Spirits and Fetishism; Amalgamation of the direct Worship of Nature and Fetishism; Worship of Images and Anthropomorphism; the many gods are not mere Sensual Forms; among them, only one Great Spirit is worshipped, under different names, and is the Creator, the God of heaven, etc. Art. II. is, Contributions to the Interpretation of the Prophet Amos, with special reference to Gustavus Baur's late work on that prophet, by F. Disterdieck, repent in the Theological Faculty at Göttingen. He considers the question, particularly, whether the book of Amos, in its aim and contents, stands in a dependent relation on that of Joel, as Credner and Baur maintain; and also whether the kingdom, mentioned in ch. 6: 2, had already fallen. There are also a number of criticisms on difficult texts in the prophecy. Art. III. contains exegetical investigations by Dr. Bähr of Carlsruhe, on Gal. 3: 13, "Christ hath redeemed us," etc. and on Heb. 13: 11—13, "For the bodies of those beasts," etc. In Art. IV. W. J. Rinck, of Grenzach in Baden, discusses the question, whether the Epistle to the Ephesians was directed to the church at Ephesus. He maintains that it was sent to that church, in opposition to Wetstein and others. In the next Article, we have the welcome pen of Ullmann, in further illustration and exposition of his previous work on "the Nature of Christianity," a third edition of which has been published during the present year. The last Article is by Prof. Nevin of Mercersburg, Pa., on "Antichrist, or the Sectarian Spirit," first published in Prof. Schaff's *Kirchenfreund*.

The great work projected by Ersch and Gruber — *Allgemeine Encyclopaedie der Wissenschaft und Künste* — is advancing slowly towards its completion. It is now published by Brockhaus of Leipsic. Ten of the Parts most recently printed lie before us. The First Section, edited by Prof. Gruber, including A — G, closes with the article Freiburg, and completes the forty-eighth Part or volume. The Second Section — letters H. to N. — under the charge of A. G. Hoffmann, closes with the word Jüdeln, and completes the twenty-sixth volume. The Third Section, edited by Prof. H. G. E. Meier, closes with the word Phokylides and the twenty-fourth volume.

Religious Sects in Germany.

The forty-six millions of inhabitants are Christians, except 578,000 who are Jews, Gipsies, or Moslems. Of the Christians, we distinguish the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Evangelical church, without respect to the separation of the last into Lutheran and Reformed, since in most countries the union of these two has been effected. Of the single religious sects, all of which have sprung out of the Evangelical church, except the lately formed German Catholic churches, we notice merely the Mennonites, on account of their large number; but omit the Hernhutters, Old Lutherans, etc. The Gipsies embrace or reject any form of religion according to the circumstances of the moment. The following is a careful tabular view of the religious sects of Germany, at the close of 1848 :

Catholics,	-	24,122,400	Greeks,	-	-	6,400
Evangelical,	-	21,278,400	Gipsies,	-	-	14,000
Jews,	-	563,000	Moslems,	-	-	1,000
Mennonites,	-	14,800				
						Total, 46,000,000

Thus the number of Christians in Germany is 45,422,000; those who are not Christians, is 578,000. More than half of the Christians are Catholics. The following table distributes them into three groupes :

	Prussia.	Austria.	Rem. of Germany.
Catholics,	5,920,000	12,094,500	6,107,900
Evangelical,	9,882,000	266,500	11,129,900
Jews,	221,000	120,000	222,000
Mennonites,	14,800		
Greeks,	1,700	4,500	200
Gipsies,	500	13,500	
Moslems,		1,000	
16,040,000		12,500,000	17,460,000

It thus appears that Austria is almost wholly Catholic. Not including that empire, the Protestants are 21,011,900; Catholics, 12,027,900. A very small number of Mennonites are found in Baden, Hanover, etc. The members of the Greek church are Russians and other persons, engaged in commerce, etc.

We have received the third volume of the new life of Luther, "*Luther von seiner Geburt bis zum Ablassstreite, 1483—1517, von Karl Jürgens. Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1847, pp. 696.*" Of the probable extent of this monument of German diligence, we are not informed. Three large volumes only complete the first part, down to the year 1517. It is, in truth, a vast thesaurus, not only of the incidents in the life of Luther and in the history of the Reformation, but of contemporary events and characters, and even of topographical and local details, when they bear on the life of the great reformer. The author has had copious materials at his command, in all the departments of his labor, which were denied to all his predecessors.

The tenth volume of "*Dr. J. M. Jost's History of the Israelites from the Maccabees to the present time, prepared from the Original Sources,*" was published in 1846—47, in three parts. The first part contains a history of the legal relations and the general condition of the Jews in Germany; the second part goes over the same ground in respect to the Jews in all other countries. The third part is taken up with the history of culture, or the present intellectual state of the Israelites. A copious Index to this volume is subjoined.

Maurer's Commentary on the Old Testament was completed in 1848, with the publication of the Commentary on Ecclesiastes and Canticles, in a fasciculus of about 250 pages. The author of the last two parts, or of Vol. IV., is Augustus Hiligstedt, a Leipsic scholar.

The promised work of Dr. Hengstenberg on the Apocalypse is about to appear. The first volume of his Commentary on the Psalms has come to a second edition. The History of the Old Covenant (*Geschichte des Alten Bundes*), by J. H. Kurtz, is described in Tholuck's *Anzeiger*, as a work distinguished for fulness of learning, orthodox views, and, for our times, what the *Historia Ecclesiastica Vet. Test.* of Buddaeus was for his. Dr. Gieseler, the church historian, has published two volumes on the "*Protestant Church in France, from 1787 to 1846.*" — The first volume of Dr. Lepsius's Chronology of the Egyptians, has appeared. Commentaries have lately appeared, on the Epistle to Philippians, by Neander, on that to the Ephesians, by Stier, on those to the Thessalonians, by Koch, and on that to the Romans, by Philippi. — C. G. Zumpt, the distinguished professor of Latin in the university of Berlin, died at Carlsbad July 25, 1849. He was born March 29, 1792, in Berlin, studied

at the gymnasia in Berlin, at the university in Heidelberg, and, at the university of Berlin, heard the lectures of Wolf, Heindorf, Schleiermacher, De Wette, and Fichte. He published the "Rules of Latin Syntax" in 1814, and his Latin Grammar in 1818. The last had reached its eighth edition in 1837. Zumpt edited the fourth volume of Spalding's edition of Quintilian, an edition of Curtius, of Cicero's Orations against Verres, and of Cicero de Officiis. He became professor ordinarius in the university in 1838. He contributed very valuable papers to the Transactions of the Berlin Academy of Sciences.

The volume of Lieut. Lynch, describing his exploration of the Jordan and of the Dead Sea, is very well received in Great Britain, and is regarded as one of the most valuable contributions to geographical science which has been made for many years, conferring honor upon the American government, and especially upon the officers and men who carried the enterprize through, in the face of such appalling difficulties. It is certainly a great honor to do well what all the enlightened governments of Europe, and innumerable enterprizing travellers, scarcely before attempted. We make these remarks the more readily as it seems to us that due credit has not been rendered to the author in some American notices of his book. They have dwelt disproportionably on the literary faults to which the introductory portion of the book especially is obnoxious, and have failed to render prominent its great merits as a real and very important addition to our knowledge of the Holy Land. The style, too, of the main portion of the book is very picturesque and appropriate.

Mr. George Ticknor, formerly Professor of Modern Languages in Harvard College, has written a History of Spanish Literature, with criticisms on the particular works and biographical notices of prominent writers. It will be published by the Harpers, in December, in 3 vols. 8vo. Mr. T. resided some time in Madrid, and is said to possess a Spanish library which has no rival out of the Peninsula.

Dr. Woods's Works. The main topics discussed in the first volume, in forty-one lectures, 588 pages 8vo., are the Method of Theological Study, Use of Reason, Inspiration of the Scriptures, the Divine Existence, Trinity, Deity and Humanity of Christ, and Divine Purposes. The work will be welcomed by the numerous pupils of the author, and by many others, as the fruit of long and patient study of the Scriptures, and as a contribution to theology of great value. The course of Lectures will embrace five volumes, the second of which is now in press. "Some of the common topics of theology are omitted, and some others treated very briefly," "as there are various well known works in which they are treated judiciously and at full length." The author has "attended chiefly to those subjects which are of the highest importance, especially at the present day." All the Lec-

tures, we understand, are rewritten and carefully revised, and some topics are discussed anew. We will only add that the mechanical execution of the volume is, in every respect, satisfactory.

The following are among the works now in press in the United States, or soon to be printed :

A Translation of Dr. Theremin's *Grundlinien einer Systematischen Rhetorik*, by Prof. Shedd of Burlington.

An Introduction to the Study of the English Language, by W. C. Fowler, late Professor in Amherst College. 12mo.

A Latin-English Lexicon, from the German work of William Freund, by Prof. E. A. Andrews; large 8vo.

A History of the Acadians, by Prof. Felton of Cambridge.

Iconographic Encyclopaedia of Science, Literature, and Art, with 500 steel engravings, in 25 monthly Parts; price, one dollar a Part. Arranged by G. Heck, and translated by Prof. Baird of Carlisle.

Mohammed and his Successors, by Washington Irving.

A Visit to Egypt and the Holy Land, by J. A. Spencer.

Historical Studies, by G. W. Greene, late consul at Rome.

New Researches at Nineveh, by A. H. Layard, 1 vol. 8vo.

A Treatise on the Elementary Principles of Government and the Constitution of the United States, by John C. Calhoun.

A new edition of the Poetical and Miscellaneous Works of Richard H. Dana.

Libraries. Messrs. Asher of Berlin will sell, on the 15th of Dec. next, the library of the poet Tieck, consisting of 7500 works, in 17,000 volumes, many of them rare. — Messrs. Sotheby & Co. of London will sell, in the eight days beginning Nov. 28, the theological part of the great collection of Mr. Rodd, late bookseller, many of the volumes being of great value, and some of them very rare. The number of works in the list is 2001. Mr. Henry Stevens, Morley's Hotel, London, will execute any orders.

Correction. On p. 575, it is stated that, "in America the *Annales* of Tacitus have never been printed." This is a mistake. The works of Tacitus, including the *Annales*, form vols. 21, 22, 23, of the *Scriptores Romani*, published in Boston, in 1817, by Wells & Lilly.

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